Caston v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. Brief for Appellant

    I n the

H u p re m p  (Em trt c f  tljp lm t £ &  S ta te s
October Term, 1979 

No. 79-1236

F rank. L. Carson, L awrence H atcher, 
and Stuart E. M ines,

Petitioners,
v.

A merican Brands, I nc ., t/a T he A merican Tobacco Company ,- 
L ocal 182, T obacco W orkers I nternational, T obacco W ork­
ers I nternational Union ,

Respondents.

■PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
CERTIORARI

H enry L. Marsh, III 
W illiam  H. Bass, III 
R andall G. Johnson

Hill, Tucker & Marsh 
214 Bast Clay Street 
P.O. Box 27363 
Richmond, Virginia 23261

John W. Scott, Jr .
615 Caroline Street 
Fredericksburg, Virginia 22401

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 
Napoleon B. W illiam s, Jr.

Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Barry L. Goldstein 
Suite 940
806 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel for Petitioners



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table o f  A u th o r i t i e s  .......................................... i i

Argument ......................... ................ ............ .. 1

RESPONDENTS DO NOT STATE ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL REASONS WHY THE WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED -----  1

CONCLUSION ...............................................................
8

Page

l



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

A ssoc ia t ion  o f  Data Process ing  Serv ice  
Organizat ion  v.  Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970) ............................................................  3

Page

Cohen v.  B e n e f i c i a l  In d u s t r ia l  Loan Corp. , 
337 U.S. 541 (1949) . ....................... '. . . 2,6 ,7

Coopers & Lybrand v.  L i v e s a y , 437 U.S.
463 (1978) ..................... ................. . . . . . . 8

Duke Power Co. v . Caro l ine  Environmental
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) . . . . . 3

F las t  v.  Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

F l inn  v.  FMC Corporation, 528 F .2d 
1169 (4th C i r .  1975), 
c e r t ,  denied, 424 U.S. 967 
(1967) ............. .................................. .. 3

Moore v. Char lot te-Mecklenburg Board o f
Education, 402 U.S. 47 (1971) . . . . . . . 3,4

Norman v. McKee, 431 F .2d 769 (9th 
C i r . 1970) c e r t . den ied , IS I  v . 
Meyers, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) ................. 5,6 ,7

Patterson v.  Newspaper & Mail  Del.
U. o f  N.Y. & V i c . , 514 F .2d 
767 (2d C i r . 1975), c e r t . denied,
427 U.S. 911 (1976) ................................. 3

Se iga l  v.  Merr ick ,  590 F.2d 35
(2d C ir .  1978) ...... .......... ................ .. 5 ,6 ,7 ,8

Warth v . Se ld in ,  422 U.S. 490
(1975) . . . . . . . . . . . . . ____. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

“  i i  -



Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1291 .................................... 2,6 ,8

28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a ) (1 )  ............................ 6,7

Other Au rhor i t i e s

Rule 2 3 ( e ) ,  Federa l  Rules o f
C i v i l  Procedure ..........................................  4

Page

- iii -



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1979 

No. 79-1263

FRANK L. CARSON, LAWRENCE HATCHER, 
and STUART E. MINES,

P e t i t i o n e r s ,

v.

AMERICAN BRANDS, INC.,  t/a THE AMERICAN 
TOBACCO COMPANY; LOCAL 182, TOBACCO 
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL, TOBACCO WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL UNION,

=  = = = s = = :  =  ss= =  =  = : = = =

P e t i t i o n  f o r  C e r t i o r a r i  to the United 
States  Court o f  Appeals f o r  the 

Fourth C i r cu i t

ARGUMENT

RESPONDENTS DO NOT STATE ANY SUBSTANTIAL 
REASONS WHY THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD 

NOT BE GRANTED

Respondents  have advanced in  t h e i r  b r i e f  

t h r e e  arguments in  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  p e t i t i o n e r s '



2

request f o r  a w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i .  F i r s t ,  they 

asser t  that no case or controversy  e x i s t s  w i th in  

the meaning o f  A r t i c l e  I I I  o f  the Const i tu t ion .  

Second, th ey  c l a im  th a t  t h e r e  i s  no c o n f l i c t  

between the c i r c u i t s  on the issues presented by 

the p e t i t i o n .  Third,  they argue that the appea l-  

a b i l i t y  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  order  as a c o l ­

l a t e r a l  order ,  under the except ion  to  28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 which th i s  Court formulated in  Cohen v . 

B e n e f i c i a l  In d us t r ia l  Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 

(1949),  was ne i ther  presented below by the pa r t i e s  

not decided below by the Court o f  Appeals f o r  the 

Four th  C i r c u i t . Each o f  th e se  c o n t e n t i o n s  i s  

f r i v o l o u s  and w i th o u t  any m e r i t  w h a t s o e v e r .

With respect  to  respondents1 claim that no 

case or controversy  is  presented by these  proceed­

ings , the fac ts  show that respondents opposed the 

appeal o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ’ s order to  the Fourth 

C i r c u i t  and p resent ly  oppose p e t i t i o n e r s ' request  

to  have th is  Court grant a w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i .  

Moreover , respondents seek to  withdraw from the 

proposed consent decree and, i f  su cce ss fu l , to 

c o n t e s t , at  t r i a l , pet i t  i o n e r s ' subsequent e f f o r t  s 

to e s tab l i sh  the truth o f  the a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  the 

complaint.  Indeed, respondents '  oppos i t ion  to 

the  g ran t  o f  a w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i ,  as w e l l  as



3

t h e i r  oppos i t ion  to the appeal below, was simply 

a means employed to e f f e c tu a t e  withdrawal from 

s t i p u la t i o n  to enter  in to  a consent decree.  In 

l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  f a c t s  and the  a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t  

th a t  the  s t i p u l a t i o n ,  l i k e  any c o n t r a c t u a l  

a r rangem ent ,  i s  b in d in g  i f  j u d i c i a l l y  sanc­

t i o n e d ,— the controversy  between the p a r t i e s  is 

s u f f i c i e n t l y  a c u t e ,  c o n c r e t e ,  and p o t e n t i a l l y  

damaging to the p a r t i e s '  l e g a l  r i g h t s  and i n t e r ­

es ts ,  to  s a t i s f y  the case or controversy  standard 

and to s a t i s f y  the standing requirement.  See F last  

v.  Cohen, 392 U. S . 83, 94-103 (1968);  Assoc ia t ion  

o f  Data P rocess ing  Serv ice  Organizat ion  v.  Camp. , 

397 U.S. 150, 151-154 (1970) ;  Warth v.  S e ld in , 422 

U .S .  490, 498-501 ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  Duke Power Co. v . 

Caro l ina Environmental Study Group. , 438 U.S. 59, 

70-82 (1978).

Respondents  c i t e  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n  in  

Moore v .  C h a r l o t t e - M e c k l e n b u r g  Board o f  Educa­

t i o n , 402 U .S .  47 (1 97 1 )  in  support  o f  t h e i r  

contention that the p e t i t i o n  should be dismissed

1/ D i s t r i c t  courts  do not have unl im ited d i s ­
c r e t i o n  in approving or d isapproving c lass  ac t ion  
se t t lements .  See F l inn  v.  FML Corporat ion , 528 
F .2d 1169 (4th C ir .  1975), c e r t . den ied , 424 U.S. 
967 (1967) ;  Patterson v .  Newspaper & Mail  Del.  U. 
o f  N . Y . & V i c . , 514 F .2d  767 (2nd C i r .  1975) ,  
c e r t ,  denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976).



f o r  l a c k  o f  a case  or c o n t r o v e r s y .  In  M oo re , 

how eve r ,  t h i s  Court found th a t  t h e r e  was an 

absence  o f  a case  o r  c o n t r o v e r s y  because  both 

p a r t i e s  had urged the court to  hold  the app l icab le  

a n t i - b u s i n g  s t a t u t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .  H ere ,  by 

con tras t ,  the opposing p a r t i e s  have taken opposing 

s ides  on the issue o f  the a p p e a la b i l i t y  o f  the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s o rder .  Furthermore, the pa r t i e s  

have d i f f e r i n g  views on whether the consent decree 

i s  capable o f  enforcement against  respondents . 

Thus, a controversy  e x i s t s  between p e t i t i o n e r s  

and respondents.  To the extent that respondents1 

argument r e s t s  on a more g e n e r a l  p rem ise  tha t  

set t l ement proposals per se prec lude a case from 

s a t i s f y in g  the case or controversy  requ irement, 

the  premi se c o n f l i c t s  w i th  Rule  2 3 ( e )  o f  the 

Federa l  Rules o f  C i v i 1 Procedure . Moreover,  the 

argument f a i I s  to g i v e  r e co g n i t i o n  to the a n c i l ­

l a r y  character  o f  se t t l ement proceed ings . Worse, 

i t  w o u ld , i f  g i v e n  the  scope  contended  f o r  by 

respondents , remove the ju d i c ia r y  e n t i r e l y  from 

any r o l e  in  s e t t  l i n g  cases  and cont r o v e r s  i e  s . 

Thus, r e s p o n d e n t s '  argument redu ces  t o  an ab­

surd i ty  and shows that th i s  case i s  no le ss  a case 

or a c o n t r o v e r s y  because  the  p a r t i e s  have  a t ­

tempted to  s e t t l e  i t .



R esp o n d en ts '  f u r t h e r  c o n t e n t i o n  th a t  a 

c o n f l i c t  does not e x i s t  between the c i r c u i t s  on 

the question o f  the a p p e a la b i l i t y  o f  a d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t ' s  o r d e r  r e f u s i n g  a p p r o v a l  o f  a p roposed  

consent decree,  has been answered by p e t i t i o n e r s  

in th e i r  p e t i t i o n  f o r  a w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i .  The 

o p in i o n  o f  the  Four th  C i r c u i t  shows p l a i n l y , 

respondents ' contentions to the contrary  no tw i th ­

standing,  that the Fourth C i r c u i t  regarded i t s  

dec is ion  he re in  as being in  accordance with that 

o f  the Second C i r c u i t  in S e iga l  v.  M er r ick , 590 

F. 2d 35 (2nd C i r . 1978) and in c o n f l i c t  with that 

o f  the Ninth C i r c u i t  in Norman v.  McKee, 431 F .2d 

769 (9th C ir .  1970), c e r t . den ied , IS I  v. Meyers, 

401 U.S. 912 (1971).

Respondents  ' f i n a l  argument i s  tha t  the

a p p e a la b i l i t y  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s order  as
2/

a c o l l a t e r a l  o r d e r  was no t  argued be low— or
. 3/

decided by the Fourth C i r c u i t . — Ne i ther  a l l e g a ­

t i on  i s  t r u e . A rev iew  o f  the Supplemental Reply 

Memorandum subm it t ed  by p e t i t  i o n e r s  in  the  

Four th  C i r c u i t  shows c l e a r l y  th a t  p e t i t i o n e r s

-  5 -

2/ See B r i e f  in  Oppos i t  ion to  P e t i t i o n  f o r  Writ  
o f  C e r t i o r a r i ,  at  20-21.

3/ Id .  at 2, 13, 20-21.



argued in that court that the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  

order  was appealab le  as an except ion  to  28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 under the c o l l a t e r a l  order doc tr ine  ex­

pounded in  Cohen v .  B e n e f i c i a l  In d u s t r ia l  Loan
4/

Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949)— Respondents1 argument 

to the contrary  i s  t o t a l l y  f r i v o l o u s .

- 6 -

4/ In p e t i t i o n e r s  1 Supplemental Reply Memorandum 
subm it t ed  b e f o r e  the  Four th  C i r c u i t ,  i t  was 
a l l e g ed  by p e t i t i o n e r s  tha t :

In th e i r  supplemental memorandum, de fen ­
dants  contend  th a t  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  
order  r e j e c t i n g  the proposed set t lement in 
t h i s  a c t i o n  i s  a p p e a l a b l e  n e i t h e r  as a 
f i n a l  order  under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 nor as an 
order re fu s ing  an in junc t ion  under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292 (a ) (1 ) .  Re ly ing  on Se iga l  v M er r i ck ,
_____ F . 2d ____ , 47 U .S .L .W .  2418 (2nd C i r  . ,
D e c .  14, 1 9 7 8 ) ,  d e f e n d a n t s  a r g u e  t h a t  
the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  order  here does not meet 
the " c o l l a t e r a l  order d o c t r in e "  o f  Cohen v . 
B e n e f i c i a l  Indus .  Loan C o rp . ( c i t a t i o n s  
omit ted )  ! T~T ^

At the  o u t s e t ,  p l a i n t i f f s  p o in t  out 
that the ho ld ing  in  S e ig a l  with respect to  28 
U.S.C § 1291 would  o n ly  be p e r t i n e n t  were  
th is  not a case in vo l v in g  a d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  
order  r e fu s ing  an in junct ion. As the Court 
r e c o g n i z e d  in  S e i g a l , t h e r e  i s  a c o n f l i c t  
among the  c i r c u i t s  as to  whether  the  d i s ­
a p p r o v a l  o f  a p roposed  s e t t l e m e n t  in  a 
s tockholding d e r i v a t i v e  su i t  i s  appealab le  as 
a c o l l a t e r a l  o r d e r  under 28 U.S .C  § 1291.



7

Respondents are s im i l a r l y  in  e r ro r  in a l l e g ­

ing that the Fourth C i r c u i t  did not dec ide the 

issue o f  the a p p e a la b i l i t y  o f  the c o l l a t e r a l  order  

doc t r ine  to  the judgment below. What respondents 

o ve r look ,  in t h e i r  asser t ion  is  that the Fourth

4/ con t 'd .

See Norman v .  McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.  
1970) ,  c e r t ,  d e n i e d , 401 U.S 912 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
Ne i ther  Cohen nor S e ig a l  in vo lv ed  any discus­
s ion o f  in jun c t i v e  r e l i e f  or poss ib le  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  u n d e r  28 U . S . C .  § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) .  
Because the case  at  bar  does i n v o l v e  the  
r e fu sa l  o f  in junc t ions ,  an independent basis 
f o r  appea l  under 28 U .S .C  § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) ( 1 )  i s  
p r e s e n t . I t  is  f o r  th is  reason that p l a in ­
t i f f s  s ta ted  in  t h e i r  supplemental memorandum 
th a t  S e i g a l  i s  i n a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h i s  c a s e .

Were i t  not f o r  the r e fu s a l  o f  in junc-  
t i v e  r e l i e f ,  th i s  Court would be faced with 
the d i f f i c u l t  task o f  choosing between the 
ho ld ing  o f  the Second C i r c u i t  in  Cohen and 
the ho ld ing  o f  the Second C i r c u i t  in S e i g a l . 
Because the d i s t r i c t  c ou r t ' s  order  r e j e c t i n g  
the  s e t t l e m e n t  h e r e  i s  an " i n t e r l o c u t o r y  
order  o f  the d i s t r i c t  court "  . . . r e fus ing  .
. . in junc t ion ,  " tha t  question need not be
reached, and th is  Court should en te r ta in  th is  
a p p e a l  u n d e r  28 U . S . C .  § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) ( 1 ) . "

A p p e l l a n t s '  Supp lementa l  R ep ly  Memorandum at 
1-3.



C i r c u i t  c o n d u c t e d  i t s  e x t e n d e d  d i s c u s s i o n  

o f  th e  Second C i r c u i t ' s  o p i n i o n  in  S e i g a l  v . 

Merr ick , 590 F.2d 35 (2d C i r .  1978) and o f  th is  

Cour t 's  opin ion in Coopers & Lybrand v.  L i v e s a y , 

437 U.S .  463 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  f o r  the  s o l e  purpose  o f  

determining the a p p e a la b i l i t y  o f  § 1291 and the

c o l l a t e r a l  order  doc t r ine  to the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  

judgment below. See Part  IV o f  the Fourth C i r ­

c u i t ' s  o p i n i o n ,  App. 6a -8a .  In d eed ,  no o th e r  

exp lanation  could e x i s t  f o r  the Cour t 's  extended 

d iscussion s ince  a p p e a la b i l i t y  under § 1291 was

the  main i s s u e  which was r a i s e d  in  those  two 

cases.  Thus, a p p e a la b i l i t y  under § 1291 was both 

argued and determined below.

- 8 -



CONCLUSION

For the 

request that

reasons set f o r th  here in ,  p e t i t i o n e r s  

th e i r  p e t i t i o n  be granted.

R es p e c t fu l l y  submitted,

HENRY L. MARSH, I I I  
WILLIAM H. BASS, I I I  
RANDALL G. JOHNSON

H i l l ,  Tucker & Marsh 
214 East Clay S tree t  
P .0 .  Box 27363 
Richmond, V i r g i n i a  23261

JOHN W. SCOTT, JR.
615 Caro l ine  S t re e t  
Freder icksburg ,  V i r g i n i a  22401

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR.

Suite 2030
10 Columbus C i r c l e
New York, New York 10019

BARRY L. GOLDSTEIN 
Suite  940
806 15th S t r e e t ,  N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS



MEILEN PRESS INC. —  N. Y. C  219