Bradley v. State Board of Education of Virginia Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees

    IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
NOS. 72-1058, -1059, -1060 and -1150

CAROLYN BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, et al..

Defendants-Appellees,
and

THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division 

Hon. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., United States District Judge

OPENING BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

LOUIS R. LUCAS525 Commerce Title Bldg. 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

WILLIAM E. TAYLORCatholic University Law Sch. 
Washington, D. C.

M. RALPH PAGE

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 10 Columbus Circle 

New York, New York 10019
JAMES R. OLPHIN214 East Clay Street 

Richmond, Virginia 23219
420 North First Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees



I N D E X
Page

Table of Authorities..........................  ii
Issues Presented for Review ..................  1
Statement of the C a s e ........................  3
Statement of Facts ..........................  8

I. The Violation........................  9
A. State Educational Authorities . . .  11
B. School Segregation in Richmond,Henrico and Chesterfield ........  18
C. Demographic Change: The 

Influence of School Segregation
and Other Discrimination ........  25

II. The R e m e d y ..........................  3 3
A. School Division Lines ............  34
B. The Richmond School Board's Plan . 39

ARGUMENT........................................  47
The District Court Properly Found That 
A Desegregation Plan Not Limited By 
School Division Lines Was Required To Vindicate Plaintiffs' Constitutional 
R i g h t s ..................................  48

Conclusion......................................  64



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
Adkins v. School Bd. of Newport News,

148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd 246 
F.2d 325 (4th Cir.) cert, denied, 355
U.S. 855 (1957)   13

Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.,
396 U.S. 19 (1969)   8

Allen v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County,
207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962) ....................  9n

Bradley v. Milliken, Civ. No. 35257 (E.D. Mich.,Sept. 27, 1971) ................................  50n ,51
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310

(4th Cir. 1965)   4
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 317 F.2d 429(4th Cir. 1963)   3
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 324 F. Supp.

439 .................................................  7n
Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, No. 71-1900

(4th Cir., March 7, 1972) ..........................  61n
Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, Va., 397

F. 2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968) ..................  30n, 52n, 55
Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., No. 71-3028

(5th Cir., Feb. 23, 1972) ...........................  57
Christian v. Board of Educ. of Strong, Civ.

No. ED-68-C-5 (W.D. Ark., Dec. 15, 1969)   56n
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ..............  55n, 57
Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile,402 U.S. 33 (1971) ..................................  9
Davis v. School District of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp.734 (E.D. Mich. 1970) aff'd 443 F.2d 571

(6th Cir.), cert, denied 402 U.S. 913 (1971).... 52n, 55n
Franklin v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ.,

288 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Miss. 1968) .................  55n

ii



Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285
(1969) .............................................  54n

Godwin v. Johnston County Bd. of Educ.,
301 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.C. 1969) ..................  55n

Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County,
Va., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) ......................... 4, 9, 57

Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) .........................  55n

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) .........  54n
Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County,

410 F. 2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969) ..................... 56, 61
Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County,

429 F. 2d 364 (8th Cir. 1970) ........................  61
Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School

District, 433 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1970) ..............  56n
Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228

(E.D. Va. 1972) .....................................  26n
James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va.)

appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 1006 (1959) ..............  12n
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
Civ. No. C-70-1331 SAW (N.D. Cal., July 9,
1971) ...............................................  53n

Kelly v. Guinn, No. 71-2332 (9th Cir., Feb. 22,
1972) ...............................................  53n

Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp.
458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd 389 U.S. 215 (1967) ..........  55n

Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) .......  62
Lumpkin v. Dempsey, Civ. No. 13,716 (D. Conn.,

Jan. 22, 1971)   58n
McLeod v. County School Bd. of Chesterfield

County, Civ. No. 3431 (E.D. Va.) ..................  5,19
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ..................  11
NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) ......................  11, 53n

iii



Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis,
Civ. No. 3931 (W.D. Tenn. , Dec. 10, 1971).......... 29n, 53

Plaquemines Parish School Board v. United States,
415 F. 2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969) ........................  60n

Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., Civ. No.
4916 (W.D. Tenn., Aug. 11, 1971) ....................  62

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)..................  31n
Sloan v. Tenth School District of Wilson County,

433 F. 2d 587 (6th Cir. 1970) .....................  53n,61
Smith v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 444 F.2d 6

(4th Cir. 1971)......................................  60n
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp.501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).................................  53n
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,

402 U.S. 1 (1971)................................  passim
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,No. 71-1811 (4th Cir., Feb. 16, 1972), aff'g

328 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.N.C. 1971) ...................  57
Taylor v. Coahoma County School Dist., 330 F. Supp.

174 (N.D. Miss.), aff'd 444 F.2d 221 (5th Cir.
1971)................................................  62

United States v. Board of Educ. of Baldwin County,
423 F. 2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1970)........................  59

United States v. Board of Education, Tulsa,
429 F. 2d 1253 (10th Cir. 1970).......................  53n

United States v. Board of School Comm'rs of
Indianapolis, 332 F.Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971)......  53n

United States v. Crockett County Bd. of Educ.,
Civ. No. 1663 (W.D. Tenn., May 15, 1967).............  61

United States v. Georgia, Civ. No. 12972 (N.D.Ga., Dec. 17, 1970), rev'd on other grounds,
428 F. 2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) ........................  55n

United States v. School Dist. No. 151, 286 F. Supp.
786 (N.D. 111. 1967), aff'd 404 F.2d 1125 (7th
Cir. 1968)...........................................  53n

United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 
1970) , supplemental opinion 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex.), modified and affirmed 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.), 
stay denied, 404 U.S. 1206 (Mr. Justice Black, July 
29, 1971), cert, denied 40 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Jan. 10, 
1972)............................................ 62, 63



Statutes Page

Virginia Code Ann. §22-7 (Repl. 1969).................  lOn
Virginia Code Ann. §22-30 (Repl. 1969)

(Supp. 1971)............................  9n, 37, 38, 60
Virginia Code Ann. §22-99 (Repl. 1969)................  lOn
Virginia Code Ann. §§22-100.1, et seq. (Repl. 1969).. 10n,37,

41
Virginia Code Ann. §22-100.9 (Supp. 1971).............  41
Virginia Acts 1956, S.J.R. 3, p. 1213, 1 RaceRel. L. Rep. 445 ...................................  12
Virginia Acts 1956, Ex. Sess., ch. 68, p. 69,1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1103 ...........................  12
Virginia Acts 1959, Ex. Sess., ch. 32, p. 110 ........  12n

v



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
NOS. 72-1058, -1059, -1060 and -1150

CAROLYN BRADLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF 
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees,
and

THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division 

Hon. Robert R. Merhige, Jr., United States District Judge

OPENING BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES 

Issues Presented for Review

When Brown v. Board of Education was decided, 43.5% of 
Richmond students were black; all attended completely segregated 
schools. In the two surrounding counties, each of which had 
approximately half its present population (suburbanization was



just beginning), the 10.4% of Henrico students who were black 
and the 20.4% of Chesterfield students who were black also 
attended segregated schools.

There followed years of outright state-wide resistance 
to any public school desegregation; only the most hesitant 
and inadequate steps, the district court found, were taken to 
integrate the schools of Richmond and the counties until 1969 
or 1970. By that time, the Richmond school division was 70.5% 
black while the increasingly populous Henrico and Chesterfield 
school systems were less than 10% black; the district court 
found these changed circumstances reflected the results of 
long-standing policies of comprehensive racial discrimination 
by agencies of the Commonwealth of Virginia, including state 
and local educational agencies.

1. Did the district court err in requiring a 
desegregation plan encompassing the three school divisions, 
in order to eliminate all vestiges of State agencies' 
discrimination by ensuring that no school therein should remain 
racially identifiable?

2. Did the district court err in approving, and 
directing the implementation of, the plan submitted by the 
Richmond School Board, having found it both effective and 
feasible?

2



1/  .Statement of the Case

This suit was commenced in 1961 with the filing of a 
Complaint charging officials of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
including the educational authorities of the Richmond school 
division, with racial discrimination against black children 
(see Appendix A to this Brief: the original and amended 
complaints herein). The district court ordered only the 
admission of individual pupil plaintiffs to formerly all-white 
schools, and this Court reversed —  directing the issuance of 
an injunction running to the benefit of the entire class.
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 317 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963).

1/ Throughout this Brief, the record of this case (the matter 
is before the Court on the original papers) is cited as follows:

Transcript of August and September, 1971 trial, by volume letter and page. E.g., Tr. F 169-70 (Transcript consists of Volumes A-R inclusive).
Transcripts of hearings on procedural matters connected 

with trial on plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Richmond Board's Cross-Claim, or transcripts of June and August, 1970 trial 
regarding 1970-71 plan for Richmond, by date and page. E.g.,Tr. 6/26/70 169-70. --

Exhibits received at August and September, 1971 trial, by 
party offering and number. E.g. PX 47 (plaintiffs); RX 47 
(Richmond Board); CX (Chesterfield Boards); HX 47 (Henrico Boards); SX 47 (State defendants).

District Court's January 5, 1972 Opinion relating to decreefrom which appeal is taken, by typewritten page number. E.g.,Mem. Op. 271.
Other pleadings, orders, etc., by title and date of filing. E.g., Amended Complaint, filed December 14, 1970.
Supportive citations are given both to the record and to the detailed findings of fact by the district court, which are set out 

at pages 89-322 of the January 5, 1972 Memorandum Opinion.
3



After further proceedings, the case returned to this Court, 
which rejected (Sobeloff and Bell, JJ., dissenting) a challenge 
to free transfer desegregation plans and held also that faculty 
desegregation would not be required. Bradley v. School Bd. of 
Richmond, 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court 
accepted review on the faculty issue and reversed. 382 U.S.
103 (1965).

Upon remand, a consent decree was entered which embodied 
a freedom-of-choice plan, provided for faculty desegregation, 
and obligated school authorities to replace free choice if it 
failed to produce results. However, despite continuation of the 
patterns of segregation, Richmond school officials took no action, 
and on March 10, 1970 the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Further 
Relief, relying upon Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Following a trial, the district 
court on August 17, 1970 entered a decree approving an interim 
plan of desegregation for the 1970-71 school year, while 
explicitly holding that this plan would not establish a unitary 
school system and that further measures, including the increased 
use of pupil transportation, would be required. The Richmond 
Board was directed to inform the court within 90 days of the 
additional steps which would be taken to create a unitary system. 
(On November 15, 1970, counsel for the Richmond Board informed 
the district court by letter that plans would be filed in 
January, 1971.)

4



November 4, 1970, the Board filed a motion to join
additional parties (the School Boards and Boards of Supervisors

2/of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties, as well as their 
School Superintendents, the State Board of Education, and the 
State Superintendent of Public Instruction) pursuant to Rule 19, 
F.R.C.P., on the ground that full and effective relief could

2/ On February 28, 1962, a Complaint charging segregation of 
black students had been filed against the County School Board 
of Chesterfield county under the style McLeod v. County School 
Bd. of Chesterfield County, Civ. No. 3431 (E.D. Va.) (px 147).
A decree was entered in that case on November 15, 1962 requiring 
the admission of individual black pupil plaintiffs to formerly 
white schools, but the case otherwise lay dormant. Although the 
county initially submitted the decree to the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare to indicate its compliance with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Mem. Op. 196; PX 118, p. 123), it 
subsequently adopted a freedom-of-choice plan (Mem. Op. 197;
PX 118). Under this plan, Chesterfield County schools remained 
racially identifiable (Mem. Op. 200, Appendix A(3)). All 
formerly black schools, with the exception of the Matoaca 
Laboratory School, were then closed (Id. at 197-98). The district 
court denied a motion to consolidate McLeod with Bradley, filed 
on behalf of the plaintiffs in the former case, as untimely filed (Tr. A 16).

Prior to joinder herein, Henrico County school authorities had not defended desegregation litigation, but the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare commenced enforcement proceedings 
in 1968, leading to the adoption of various desegregation measures (Mem. Op. 161-62; PX 75, 76, 123; see Mem. Op. Appendix A (3)). 
Formerly black schools were closed, as in Chesterfield county 
(Mem. Op. 208-09; PX 120, pp. 318-22) and in September, 1971, 
after joinder herein, the Central Gardens Elementary School, which 
had been over 90% black, was grouped with four neighboring white 
schools for purposes of desegregation (Mem. Op. 210; HX 26g;Tr. H-107).

In 1970 at the time of the filing of the motion for further 
relief, and at the time the motion for joinder was filed and 
granted, none of the three school divisions operated a school 
system without racially identifiable facilities (Mem. Op. 66-67, 
200-02, 210-12, Appendix A(3); 317 F. Supp. 555; 325 F. Supp.828) .

5



not be granted to the plaintiffs without the joinder of these
3/parties.

3/  On June 25, 1970, Dr. Thomas Little, Associate Superintendent of the Richmond public schools, testified on cross examination 
that if he were directed to develop an optimum desegregation plan 
for Richmond, such a plan would involve an area larger than the 
Richmond City school division:

Q. Dr. Little, assuming transportation of pupils, 
is there any way to achieve what you consider to be, 
as an educator, an optimum of desegregation in the 
Richmond area?
A. In the Richmond area, yes.
Q. How would you do that?
A. It would involve the involvement of a larger 
area than the present city boundaries of the 
City of Richmond.
Q. Are you talking about Henrico County,
Chesterfield County, or both?
A. Henrico County, Chesterfield County, and the 
possibility of the general metropolitan area, 
maybe bordering on, in other counties other than 
Henrico and Chesterfield. Basically, the problem 
could be solved within the City of Richmond,
Henrico and Chesterfield Counties. (6/25/70 
Tr. 1122-23).

June 26, 1970, the district court rejected an HEW-prepared plan
submitted by the Richmond School Board, and required submission 
of a new plan (Mem. Op. 4; 317 F. Supp. 555, 559-60, 572). On 
July 2, 1970, plaintiffs filed a motion to require the Richmond 
school authorities to acquire sufficient transportation facilities 
in order to insure their ability to carry out a truly effective 
plan. The district court denied the motion in a letter to 
all counsel of July 6, in which he expressed his confidence that 
the Richmond school authorities would take the necessary steps 
to prepare and implement an adequate desegregation plan. Responding 
to Dr. Little's testimony, the letter suggested, among other 
steps to be taken by Richmond authorities, that they might wish 
to inquire into the possibility of voluntary cooperative 
desegregation agreements with the surrounding school divisions.
On July 23, 1970, when the interim plan was submitted (Mem. Op.
18; 355 F. Supp. at 572), the City Council of Richmond filed a 
motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against the(cont 'd)

6



The district court granted the motion and directed the 
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint setting forth whatever

3/ (cont'd)
Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield. This motion was withdrawn after the district court made the following comments:

Well, now, gentlemen, perhaps we can save 
some time on that. Let me give you some brief 
thoughts. If anybody is so naive as to think 
that this Court, by virtue of suggestions to 
counsel under the Court's obligation, has 
suggested any lawsuit be brought by a school 
system that is admittedly, has admittedly been 
operating in violation of the Constitution, 
a suit against school systems that, so far as 
I know, are not engaged in any litigation and 
apparently, I assume —  I don't know anything 
about the operation —  but I assume they are 
operating constitutionally viable or somebody 
would have been after them. Now if anybody 
thinks this Court suggested such a lawsuit, they 
are just as sick as sick can be.
The Court suggested that counsel might consider 
—  I want to be careful now because I attempted 
to come as close to the quote of the Chief 
Justice of the United States as possible without 
actually stealing his words, so to speak —  suggested they might consider the feasibility 
of discussions or negotiations, or something.
I have forgotten the exact phraseology. The thought occurred to me from the Northcross case 
that you have mentioned, Mr. Mattox, in which 
the Chief Justice of the United States says 
there are still unanswered questions, including 
the propriety of consolidating districts and 
whether the Court has a right to do it, and that sort of thing. So I want to get it in 
the proper perspective.
If anybody thinks I suggested such a complaint, 
they are very, very foolish. They are wrong.
It is one thing to sit down and talk to folks 
and it is another thing to drag them into court.
(8/7/70 Tr. 36-38).

After the motion for joinder was filed in November, 1970, the 
added defendants sought recusal of the district judge on the 
theory that he had prejudged the issue by suggesting the voluntary 
inquiry referred to above. The district court properly denied that motion to recuse. Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond. 324 F.Supp. 439. 7



claims they might have, if any, against the joined defendants 
(Mem. Op. 20; 51 F.R.D. 139) (see Appendix A to this brief). 
Following the denial of various procedural motions (Mem. 20;
324 F. Supp. 396; 324 F. Supp. 401), trial of this cause was 
held August 16-20, 23-27, 31 and September 1-2, 7-10 and 13, 
1971. On January 5, 1972, the district court issued its opinion 
granting relief, directing the merger of the three school 
divisions, and ordering implementation of the plan prepared by 
the Richmond School Board (unless a better plan is submitted to 
the district court). The State and County defendants appeal 
from that decree.

Statement of Facts

This is an appeal in a school desegregation action whose 
object is the formulation of effective and appropriate means 
to eliminate, "now and hereafter," Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. 
of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969), the vestiges of the dual school 
system for black and white pupils still maintained by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia. The district court was necessarily 
concerned, therefore, with determining (a) the existence and 
extent of the federal constitutional violation by the 
Commonwealth and its constituent agencies, Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971), and (b) the 
efficacy and feasibility of any proposed relief to bring about 
"the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking 
into account the practicalities of the situation," Davis v.

8



Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971)
so as to eliminate the dual school system "root and branch," 
Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 
438 (1968).

I. The Violation

As in other states, the administration of public education
in Virginia is shared between local school authorities and

4/
central state officials, in this instance the State Board of 
Education and its agents, the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction and employees of the State Department of Education. 
The basic unit of Virginia school administration is the school 
division, which under current law must consist of not more than 
one city or county, absent local consent and State Board 
ratification of larger units.

4/ See Allen v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962).
5/ Prior to the amendment of the statute in 1971, after the 
joinder motion had been filed herein, see p. 38 infra, Virginia law (Va. code Ann. §22-30 (Repl. 1969)) had provided for school 
divisions of at_ least one county or city, with no county or city 
to be divided among more than one school division.

The law's focus upon other governmental entities —  cities 
and counties -- and their establishment as the smallest operating subdivision of the educational structure, dates to 1922, when the 
system of individual school districts congruent with magisterial 
districts was abolished, pursuant to an earlier recommendation of 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, in order to 
eliminate "[pjurely artificial differences" among the various 
districts. Annual Report of the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 1917-18, p. 14 (PX 124). (cont'd)

9



The history of desegregation efforts since Brown v. Board
of Education, both throughout Virginia and in the Counties of

5/ (cont'd)
Since that time, further consolidation into larger units of 

school administration has been consistently recommended. In 1944
[t]he [State] Superintendent presented a long- 
range plan for the consolidation of school divisions 
with a view to greater efficiency in the adminis­
tration of school affairs. This plan would call 
for the creation of between 50 and 60 school 
divisions in the state to replace the present 110 
divisions, and would involve the creation of 
division boards of education, the membership of 
which would be based upon the school population 
in the counties, or in the counties and cities, 
comprising a division. The board looked with 
favor upon the general plan, subject to the 
working out of details.
(Minutes of the State Board of Education, August 24- 
25, 1944, RX 82, p. 1; Mem. Op. 95.)

In 1969, the State Board resolved:
The State Board, therefore, has favored in 
principle the consolidation of school divisions 
with the view to creating administrative units appropriate to modern educational needs. The 
Board regrets the trend to the contrary, pursuant 
to which some counties and newly formed cities 
have sought separate divisional status based on 
political boundary lines which do not necessarily 
conform to educational needs.
(Minutes of the State Board of Education, January 3,
1969, RX 82, p. 20) (emphasis supplied).)

Virginia law provided for the operation of joint schools by 
two or more school divisions, Va. Code Ann. §22-7 (Repl. 1969), 
for the furnishing of educational services to a city school 
division by a county school division pursuant to contract, Va.
Code Ann. §22-99 (Repl. 1969) and for the consolidation of 
school divisions under a single school board, Va. Code Ann.
§§22-100.1 et seq. (Repl. 1969), as well as for the education of 
pupils of one division by another on a tuition basis. However, 
these provisions have never been utilized to further desegregation 
but rather only to accomplish segregation. See Mem. Op. 170-73, 
177-80; RX 82, pp. 11-12; PX 94, pp. 4, 7-8, 20, 30-31, 34-35, 39-41, 45, 49, 50, 47, 60; PX 109; PX 119, pp. 15, 19, 23; PX 122, pp.
70a-71.

10



Henrico and chesterfield and the City of Richmond, demonstrates 
that the actions and decisions of local and central state 
authorities have, singly and in combination, retarded the 
process of integration, further entrenched the dual system 
of education for black and white children and contributed
substantially to the present school attendance patterns in

6/the Richmond metropolitan area.

A. State Educational Authorities

The district court's opinion sets out in graphic detail, 
as extensively supported by the record, the history of the 
State's official reaction to Brown v. Board of Education and 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is an understatement to say 
that the Commonwealth of Virginia massively resisted the imple­
mentation of desegregation following the Supreme Court's decision 
in Brown. Every available State resource was enlisted, including 
the services of the legal officers of the State (Mem. Op. 154,
156; PX 122, pp. 287-88, 304; c_f. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp.
503 (E.D. Va. 1958) (three-judge court); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963)), the State Police (Mem. Op. 138; PX 144, p. 122), 
the tremendous financial resources of the Commonwealth (e_.c[. ,
Mem. Op. 168; PX 149) ($770,000 expended from one State fund

6/ "The Court finds that the officials of the City of Richmond, 
Counties of Chesterfield and Henrico, as well as the State of Virginia, have by their actions directly contributed to the con­
tinuing existence of the dual school system which now exists in 
the metropolitan area of Richmond" (Mem. Op. 195).

11



to pay half of fees of private counsel defending school desegre­
gation cases), and the power and prestige of the office of the

7/Governor (Mem. Op. 154, 160).

As the opinion below points out, even prior to the adoption 
of interposition (Va. Acts 1956, S.J.R. 3, p. 1213, 1 Race Rel.
L. Rep. 445) and other massive resistance legislation by the 
General Assembly of Virginia, the State Board of Education 
directed local school authorities to continue to assign pupils 
in accordance with Virginia's segregation statutes until such 
time as the General Assembly should amend the law to provide for 
desegregation (Mem. Op. 136-37; RX 82, 83; PX 119, pp. 42-43;
PX 122, pp. 161-64; Tr. F 110-13, 161-62). While such amendments
were never adopted, the State Board of Education never changed

8/its instructions to local school authorities.

In 1956 the Governor was authorized to close any school
which became integrated, Va. Acts 1956, Ex. Sess., ch. 68,

9/
p. 69, 1 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1103. At the same time, the Pupil

7/ The State Department of Education gave wide circulation to 
speeches and statements by Virginia governors opposing desegre­gation. See PX 122, p. 327; RX 83, pp. 38-41.
8/ As Assistant State Superintendent Blount put it, the State 
Department of Education operated in accordance with Virginia 
statutory law —  in spite of the import of Supreme Court decisions 
—  at least until execution of a compliance agreement with the Department of HEW in 1965 (Tr. M 196-97).
9/ The Attorney General issued opinions explaining the law in 
1957 and 1958 (Mem. Op. 137-38, Appendix B; PX 144-1). After the 
statute was declared unconstitutional in James v. Almond, 170 
F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va.), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 1006 (1959),
local boards were authorized to close schools to which any federal 
or state troops, military or civil, were sent. Va. Acts 1959,Ex. Sess., ch. 32, p. 110.

12



Placement Board was established as an independent state body with
plenary power over the assignment of all school children in

1 0/the Commonwealth; it continued in existence until 1968
(Mem. Op. 135; PX 122, p. 172; see Tr. H 58-59). The Board 
was recognized by State officials as a device to prevent 
integration (PX 144-F). See generally, Adkins v. School Bd. 
of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff1d 246 F.2d 325 
(4th Cir.), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).

The State Department of Education disseminated information 
concerning Pupil Placement Board procedures to local school 
officials and its employees also served the Board (Mem. Op. 138- 
39; PX 122, p. 171; Tr. 1-152); in 1961 criteria essentially 
identical to those of the Pupil Placement Board were promulgated 
by the State Board of Education for use by localities which 
wished to reassert their power to assign school children (Mem. Op 
139-40; PX 122, p. 218; Tr. G 48, P 146).

Two other extensive programs for segregation were adminis­
tered by state authorities; tuition grants and pupil

10/ For example, a December 29, 1956 telegram from the PupilPlacement Board to then Chesterfield Superintendent of Schools 
Fred D. Thompson began: "Under the provisions of Chapter 70,
Acts of Assembly, extra session of 1956 effective December 29, 
1956, the power of enrollment or placement of pupils in all 
public schools of Virginia is vested in the Pupil Placement Board 
The local school board. Division Superintendents, are divested 
of all such powers" (emphasis supplied) (Tr. F 105-06; PX 122, 
p. 91).

13



11/
scholarships. The State Board and Department played an
instrumental role in the operation of the tuition grant scheme
(cf. Memorandum No. 3713, Mem. Op. 142; PX 122, p. 198) and the
State Department of Education reimbursed local divisions for the

12/State's share of the grants. Until its termination in 1970,
state and local agencies expended almost $25 million under the 
program (Mem. Op. 148; PX 110-12), including retroactive grants 
to Prince Edvard County parents (Mem. Op. 145; PX 119, pp. 87-88).

The extensive state-wide use of the grant and scholarship 
programs to promote segregation is revealed in the examples 
set out in the district court's opinion at pp. 177-80, extending 
from the programs' inception until at least 1969 (PX 94, 110,
1 1 1 ) .

Joint schools established to serve black students from 
different school divisions continued to operate with State 
sanction as late as 1965-68 (RX 86; PX 109A); the State Board

11/ The tuition grant law was originally adopted by the 1956 
Legislature which passed the school closing laws. Prior to the 
1958 school year, the State Board of Education issued regulations 
to implement the statute, which provided reimbursement for 
tuition paid in order to attend another school division if a 
pupil was assigned to an integrated school or one which had been 
closed by order of the Governor (Mem. Op. 141-42; PX 122, p. 181, 188).
12/ The program was expanded in 1960, pursuant to legislation, to 
include payments to private schools (Mem. Op. 143-44; PX 122, p. 
210). The new law required the State Department of Education not 
only to reimburse localities for the State's share of grants or 
scholarships, but in the case of divisions which refused to parti­
cipate directly in the program, to make grants directly to parents 
and withhold an equivalent loca1 share from other state aid funds 
due the division (Mem. Op. 144; PX 119, p. 74; PX 122, pp. 225-26).

14



specifically approved construction at one such school after 
Brown (Mem. Op. 172; PX 109; PX 119, p. 44).

In addition to the administration of specific segregation
programs, every supervisory function of the State Department of
Education was influenced by Virginia's commitment to segregation.
The Department has had the authority and the obligation for a
considerable number of years to review and approve all school
construction plans of local school divisions based on such factors
as proposed size and site location (Mem. Op. 107-09; RX 83,
p. 26; PX 122, pp. 63, 115-19, 158; Tr. F 82). Both before and
after Brown v. Board of Education —  and continuing after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the execution of
the compliance agreement between the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare and the Virginia State Department of
Education —  the construction plans of local school districts
were never considered in light of their effect upon desegregation

13/(Mem. Op. 109; Tr. F 86-87). In fact, the State Department
of Education routinely continued to approve construction 
applications from local school divisions which contained outright 
racial school designations, at least through the 1965-66 school

13/ The current school planning manual of the State Board of 
Education still does not include promotion of desegregation as 
one of the factors to be considered in selecting sites for new 
school construction (SX 4, §10.31).

15



14/year (Mem. Op. 109; Tr. F-84). Segregated state-wide
meetings of personnel were held well after 1954 and, in fact, 
on at least one occasion after the compliance agreement with 
HEW was executed in 1965 (Mem. Op. 152; RX 83; PX 122, p. 251). 
The Department continued to approve the operation of regional 
joint schools for black students as late as 1968 (Mem. Op. 172; 
PX 109; PX 119, pp. 15, 19, 23; Tr. F-131-33). The state 
continued to administer the pupil scholarship or tuition grant 
programs, which allowed students to attend public schools 
outside their own school division, until 1970, when the General 
Assembly terminated funding for the programs (Mem. Op. 147;
PX 112).

After 1965 (when the State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction executed a compliance agreement with the United 
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, in order 
to retain eligibility for federal aid) (Mem. Op. 152), there 
was no effort by state authorities to initiate the changes 
necessary to bring about an end to the dual school system in

14/ The only action of the State Department of Education with 
respect to school construction that related to the desegregation 
process was the circulation to local division superintendents of 
an HEW memorandum dealing with the necessity to consider furtherance of desegregation in construction planning (Mem. Op. 111-12;
PX 122, pp. 345-46), but this consideration was never made part 
of the State’s approval mechanism (Tr. F-86-87). And see n. 13 supra.

16



15/
Virginia. As the district court found, prior to the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was no official in the 
State Department of Education assigned to assist local school 
divisions in achieving desegregation and clearly no effort was
made to encourage local school divisions to end the dual school

16/system (Mem. Op. 151; Tr. I 129-33). Dr. Elmore, the
individual within the State Department of Education who in 1964 
assumed a liason role with HEW, took what can only be charac­
terized as a negative attitude towards the performance of his 
duties (Mem. Op. 163-64). He expressed himself opposed to the 
HEW guidelines (Mem. Op. 155-56, 162-63; RX 87; PX 123; PX 136A;
Tr. I 136-39) and on at least one occasion attempted to interfere 
with the execution of HEW enforcement responsibilities by 
suggesting to his superior, Dr. Wilkerson, that no effort be 
made on the part of state officials to supply requested 
information to HEW and that local officials not be compelled to 
do so (Mem. Op. 162-63; RX 87). Elmore admitted that the state

15/ In 1971 the State Board of Education still denied it had an 
affirmative duty to assist in the creation of unitary systems 
throughout the Commonwealth (Answer to Amended Complaint, f 11, 
filed January 15, 1971). Compare PX 96, wherein the Assistant Attorney General of the United States expressed the view to State 
Superintendent Wilkerson on July 2, 1970 "that the State Board of
Education is the appropriate agency to be called upon to adjust 
the conditions of unlawful segregation and racial discrimination 
existing in the public school systems of Virginia, set forth in 
the attached list" (Tr. G 71-72).
16/ As late as 1965, the State Department of Education held 
racially segregated personnel conferences (Mem. Op. 152; PX 122, 
p. 251) and distributed official speeches of the Governor opposing 
the HEW guidelines and the federal enforcement effort (Mem. Op. 160; 
PX 122, 327; RX 83, pp. 38-41). There never has been a like 
distribution of Supreme Court decisions or those of lower courts with jurisdiction over Virginia which have laid down principles 
of desegregation (Mem. Op. 168; Tr. I 204).

17



had never used its powers to compel compliance with the require­
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment (Mem. Op. 166; Tr. I 168; 
see, e.g., Mem. Op. 161; Tr. I 171).

After one of the private attorneys retained by the State 
in 1965 to assist localities in their negotiations with HEW 
reported that in light of HEW1s expected decision to disapprove 
free choice plans which did not produce meaningful results, 
local school divisions should prepare to utilize alternative 
methods of desegregation (Mem. Op. 157-58; PX 95), no 
recommendation along these lines was ever made by the state 
authorities to local school divisions (ibid.). Federal funds 
to provide technical assistance in the desegregation process 
through the facilities of state departments of education were 
available for five years, but it was not until 1971 that Virginia 
employed a professional to fulfill these functions. The State 
Department looked on complacently as black faculty members and 
administrators were systematically removed from their positions 
during the desegregation process although required statistical 
reports would have revealed the phenomenon (Mem. Op. 168-69;
PX 139; Tr. M 171-77).

B. School Segregation in Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield

The actions and failure of initiative on the part of the 
State Department of Education are reflected in the history of 
these three school divisions. Following Brown v. Board of

18



Education, no effort was made in either Chesterfield or Henrico
County, or the City of Richmond, to implement the decision until 
lawsuits were started or federal funds were imperiled.

(1) In 1955 and 1959 the educational and civil authorities 
in Chesterfield County, by resolution, opposed the Brown decision 
and any implementation of integration in the County (Mem. Op.
194-95; PX 117, pp. 82, 97; PX 118, pp. 76-79, 82). Although 
Chesterfield school authorities were ostensibly divested of 
their power to assign students in 1956 (see n. 10 supra), at 
the time the Pupil Placement Board was established, the Chesterfield 
Board willingly acceded (Mem. Op. 195-96; PX 118, pp. 91-92); 
the initial decree in the McLeod case ran against both the local 
school officials and the Pupil Placement Board. In 1966 the 
School Board adopted a freedom-of-choice plan which failed, 
however, to change the racial character of any of its schools; 
as late as 1968-69, nine Chesterfield County schools were

17/attended only by black students (Mem. Op. 199; PX 102).

17/ Consider the following table (PX 102):
School Year % of Elementary Stu- % of Black Elementary

dents Who Were Black Students in Black Schools

1966-67 10% 80%
1967-68 10% 7 5%
1968-69 8% 60%
1969-70 8% 3 3%

- 19 -



Chesterfield County was notified on July 16, 1968 that
it faced possible termination of federal assistance by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare because the dual 
school system was found to have continued in existence (Mem. Op. 
197; PX 118, p. 214). In 1969 and 1970 all of the formerly 
black schools operated by the chesterfield County School Board 
were closed (Mem. Op. 197-98; PX 118, pp. 217-18) but the 
following year, nine chesterfield County schools still had no 
black faculty members assigned to them (Mem. Op. 198, Appendix 
A (3); PX 102). At the time of trial, the Matoaca Laboratory 
School, which served primarily the children of faculty members 
of Virginia State College at Petersburg, but which historically 
had been treated as a part of the county school system (sup­
ported by contribution of ADA money from Chesterfield County), 
remained an all-black school (Mem. Op. 199-202, Appendix A(3);
PX 102; PX 141a).

(2) No desegregation plan was adopted in Henrico County 
until 1965, when under HEW prodding, a restricted freedom-of- 
choice plan was proposed (Mem. Op. 206; PX 120, pp. 212, 218, 
267, 285-89). This plan, like the one adopted in Chesterfield 
County, proved unavailing to eliminate the segregated patterns 
of school attendance (Mem. Op. 207) ("in fact and law, . . .  a

20



18/dual system"). In 1966 and 1967 the school board refused to
confer with representatives of the Department of HEW, and in 
1968 administrative enforcement proceedings were commenced 
(Mem. Op. 161-62, 207; PX 120, pp. 260-61, 279-80; PX 123, pp. 
75-76). In November, 1968, the School Board proposed to close 
its formerly black schools upon condition that the HEW enforcement 
proceedings be terminated (Mem. Op. 208; PX 120, pp. 318-19, 
321-22). On January 2, 1969 HEW accepted the Henrico plan and
in September of that year all formerly black school facilities 
were closed and most of the county's black principals reassigned 
to other and lesser positions (Mem. Op. 208-09, Tr. N 73-75).
Many of these schools were subsequently reopened and re-named 
as annexes to formerly white schools (Mem. Op. 209, Appendix 
A (3) ; PX 103; PX 116).

However, the zone lines drawn by Henrico school authorities 
for the remaining schools left the Central Gardens Elementary 
School over 90% black (Mem. Op. Appendix A (3)) although the 
distribution of population in the area would have led one to 
predict that black students would be found in significant

18/ The extent of segregation is indicated by the following 
table (PX 103, PX 116):

School Year % of Elementary Stu- % of Black Elementarydents Who Were Black Students in Black Schools

1966-67 8% 65%
1967-68 7.8% 50%
1968-69 8.4% 80%
1969-70 8. 5% 38%

-  21 -



numbers in the surrounding school facilities as well as in the 
Central Gardens school (Tr. Q 55-58). As the black student 
enrollment in the facility had increased, the school was staffed 
by an increasingly black faculty assigned by the County 
authorities (Mem. Op. 210, Appendix A (3); PX 103; PX 116).
After continued HEW pressure (Mem. Op. 209-10; HX 26a; PX 120, 
pp. 352-53) and after the joinder motion herein had been granted, 
the Henrico Board determined to pair Central Gardens with four 
other schools beginning in the 1971-72 school year (Mem. Op.
210; HX 26g; Tr. H 99-109). As late as the 1970-71 school year, 
ten Henrico County schools had no black faculty members; currently 
there is only one black faculty member at some twenty-five 
County schools and not all of these are classroom teachers to 
whom students are necessarily exposed (Mem. Op. 212; PX 116;
Tr. N 98-99, 101).

(3) The history of desegregation in Richmond is very much 
the history of this case. See pp. 3-8, supra. Implementation 
of the interim plan within the City of Richmond for the 1970-71 
school year left over 19 schools segregated (Mem. Op. 18-19, 
Appendix A (3)); in its order approving the interim plan for 
that year only, the district court specifically found the plan 
inadequate to establish a unitary school system, 317 F. Supp.
555, 576. And while at the time of the hearing on the
metropolitan remedial aspects of this case, the district court 
had already entered its order directing the implementation of

22



Plan III within the city for the 1971-72 school year, that 
decree was entered with the specific caveat that the plan's 
adequacy was being judged in light of the parties and issues 
before the court and without prejudice to later determinations 
when the joined parties had had an opportunity to litigate 
the new issues. 328 F. Supp. 828, 830 n. 1.

While the public schools of the three divisions were never 
closed and subjected to central state control because of 
integration, the steps taken by State authorities were not 
without long-lasting effect upon the schools in the area.
The State Pupil Placement Board, for example, was vested with 
the power to assign all students to the public schools of 
Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield Counties, and in fact had 
such power at the time this lawsuit was originally commenced 
in 1961 (see Appendix A). That power was consistently exercised 
to frustrate desegregation and continue dual school systems 
insofar as possible. During the life of the tuition grant 
and pupil scholarship programs, students in the three divisions 
utilized the device to attend other schools; from 1965 to 1971 
alone, grants totalled $462,000 in Chesterfield County, $286,000 
in Henrico County, and $97,000 in Richmond. The three divisions 
have expended nearly $1.7 million (including State reimbursements) 
for tuition grants since the Brown decision (Mem. Op. 147-50;
PX 112; PX 117; PX 118; PX 120).

Similarly, the services of the State Department of Education 
were utilized by the local divisions for the purpose of segregation.

23



For example, in 1957 and 1963, employees of the State Department 
of Education prepared segregated bus routes for Henrico County, 
including routes as long as twenty miles one way for black 
students (Mem. Op. 94; PX 120, pp. 102-38). Particularly 
significant were the school construction programs carried out 
with State Board approval after Brown. All of the construction 
in the three school divisions from 1954 to the present conforms 
to racial residential patterns and was planned for segregated 
use.

In Henrico County, school construction planning in 1955
included the preparation of spot maps by race (Mem. Op. 114;
PX 120, pp. 86-87, 89, 91) and selection of names for "Negro
schools under construction" (Mem. Op. 113; PX 120, p. 50).
Applications to the State Board of Education for approval of
proposed black school construction in 1957, 1958, 1960 and 1963
bore racial designations and were accompanied by statements in
justification of the proposals which referred to anticipated

19/
increases in black population (Mem. Op. 114-17; RX 90).

19/ For example, an addition was suggested in 1957 at the 
Henrico Central Elementary School, which was referred to as the 
"Varina Negro School." The white Varina Elementary School is 
located less than a mile away. And in 1963 permission was 
sought to construct an addition to Fair Oaks Elementary School 
because a "Negro subdivision" was being constructed near several 
white elementary schools, Fair Oaks being the closest black 
school (RX 90).

24



On the other hand, during this period —  from 1954 to 1971 _
31 new schools and additions to 36 schools were constructed 
by the county. With the exception of one, all opened as 
identifiably black or white schools (Mem. Op. 120-23; PX 103;
HX 70).

Likewise, Chesterfield County continued an uninterrupted 
practice of racially planned school construction after 1954.
Racial designations appear on applications submitted in 1958,
1959, 1962, 1964 and 1965 to the State Department of Education 
for black schools (Mem. Op. 128-33; RX 92; PX 117, p. 133;
PX 118, pp. 107, 111-12, 116, 132, 137, 169). A total of 
33 new schools were built in Chesterfield County from 1952 to 
1972 (including two schools which opened in 1971), but none 
were planned with a view towards aiding in desegregation 
(Mem. Op. 133-34; Tr. E 136-37).

Finally, until issuance of the district court's injunction, 
school construction projects within the City of Richmond similarly 
fostered segregation (Mem. Op. 6-7; 317 F. Supp. 555, 561, 566, 
578; see also, 325 F. Supp. 461).

c- Demographic Change: The Influence of School Segregation and Other Discrimination

At the time of Brown v. Board of Education, the student 
population of the City of Richmond was 56.5% white. Chesterfield 
County's public school population was 79.6% white, and Henrico’s

25



2 0/was 89.6% white (Mem. Op. 230-32; RX 75; PX 122; PX 149).
21/By 1971-72, the county systems were less than 8% black while 

the Richmond school division's student population was 70.5% 
black. However, these figures represent a change in the 
distribution of population within the area; overall, the pro­
portion of pupils in the three school divisions has been 
approximately two-thirds white and one-third black for at least 
several decades (Mem. Op. 231; RX 57, 75-78). The 1971-72 
figures include growth in total pupil population from natural 
increases and in-migration (Ibid.; Tr. I 33-34). The district 
court found that school construction within the City of Richmond 
and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield after 1954, and 
indeed after 1964, has contributed substantially to the present 
disproportion between school enrollments within the city and 
in the two counties (Mem. Op. 34-39).

In the years after Brown v. Board of Education, the 
individual school divisions built schools which were not only

20/ Chesterfield and Henrico Counties together completely 
surround the City of Richmond (see map on following page), 
Chesterfield to the south and west, Henrico to the west, north and east. Originally, the entire geographical area was part of 
the County of Henrico as established in 1634; both the City of 
Richmond and Chesterfield County were created therefrom, although 
the boundaries of each have subsequently been modified by 
annexations (CX 1).
21/ Despite the recent annexation of a portion of Chesterfield County, which removed far more white students from the County 
than blacks (Mem. Op. 173; Answer of School Board of Richmond to 
Interrogatory No. 5 of Chesterfield Board of Supervisors,
February 17, 1971; see also, Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1972), appeal pending).

26



-27-



racially identifiable within the context of the individual 
divisions, but which also contributed, when combined with the 
suburbanization of the two counties surrounding Richmond after 
1950, to the present racial identifiability of the school systems. 
The opinion below recognizes that there is a considerably 
greater affinity between the City of Richmond and the two 
counties today than existed at the time of Brown; the area of 
urbanization then was much smaller and the counties had not yet 
experienced the major spurt of population growth which came as 
Richmond established suburbs, conforming to the national pattern 
(Mem. Op. 223, 227, 304, 315, 318; RX 71; HX 21, p. 183; HX 24;
CX 21). In this context, the individual school divisions, with 
the sanction of the State Department of Education, undertook to 
construct identifiably black and white schools. Within the 
city, this construction served to intensify black concentration 
within the inner city and to accommodate white students located 
further and further away from the core. See 324 F. Supp. 456.
As established black neighborhoods in Richmond expanded, always 
on the periphery (Mem. Op. 8, 313; RX 18; Tr. I 64-65), there 
was a disincentive for blacks to relocate outside the city 
limits: the schools constructed in the counties just across
the Richmond line were white schools and black children were 
transported, for example, to the all-black Virginia Randolph 
High School in the northern part of Henrico County or the all­
black Carver High School, located near Chester

28



in chesterfield County, each the only high school for blacks
22/

in the respective counties. The Richmond School Board
allowed its schools to go from white to black through the 
exercise of choice and through the assignment of black faculty 
as the percentage of black students attending a given facility 
increased (RX 75); concurrently, the construction of county 
schools just beyond the city’s boundaries attracted white 
former Richmond residents and new white arrivals to the area 
to locate without the boundaries of the Richmond school division

23/(cf. Tr. I 63, K 49).

The school construction programs of the three divisions, 
however, were not isolated occurrences; rather, they combined 
with and reinforced other discriminatory practices and policies 
of state and local educational authorities, as well as those of 
state officials generally; they interacted with long-standing 
patterns of private discrimination against blacks. The sum

22/ See Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, Civ. No. 3931 
Tw .D. Tenn., Dec. 10, 1971, typewritten opinion at p. 10) 
[reprinted as Appendix B hereto].
23/ The two counties conducted a survey of their students in 
T971-72 which determined that some 3300 whites then enrolled in 
county schools had attended Richmond public schools in the year 
immediately prior to their enrollment (Mem. Op. 204; CX 34; Tr. 
0 84-85). Of course, it is not white families with children 
already enrolled in Richmond schools only who would have been 
motivated by the process described in text to locate in the 
counties; many could have done so prior to the time their 
children were to start school. The statistics demonstrating 
an overwhelming change in the distribution of the black and white population in the Richmond-Henrico-Chesterfield area 
during a period of time when the overall proportions remained 
constant strongly suggest deliberate policy.

29



of these forces was the containment of blacks -- and black
24/pupils particularly —  in the City of Richmond.

25/Extensive evidence of both public and private dis­
crimination against blacks was introduced below. Racial 
designations were carried in advertising for sale and rental 
housing, and for employment, in the newspapers of greatest 
general circulation in the Richmond area until 1968 (Mem. Op. 
320; PX 41; Tr. K 87-89); thereafter, a separate, non- 
geographically restricted, general housing column (in which
most property available to blacks had previously appeared) was

26/continued until 1970.

24/ Dr. Karl Taeuber, plaintiffs' expert witness, utilized 
indices of dissimilarity for 1970 census tract and block residential data in Richmond-Henrico-Chesterfield to calculate 
a "segregation index." He concluded that the area was more 
racially segregated in 1970 than it had been in 1960 or 1950, 
and that the Richmond area data was consistent with that from the 
other metropolitan areas he had earlier studied (Negroes in Cities 
(1962)) which indicated that discrimination, rather than economic, preferential or other factors, accounted for the stratification 
(Mem. Op. 288-90; PX 131; Tr. I 9-23). The segregation index calculated for school enrollments of the three divisions showed 
similar substantial isolation of black students (Mem. Op. 290- 
91; PX 132; Tr. I 23-29).
25/ Cf. Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 41
74th cTr. 1968); Swann v. charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd, of Educ.,
431 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1970).
26/ After notification from the United States Department of Justice that the practice was considered to be in violation of 
the Fair Housing Act, the newspapers (which recognized that most 
of the listings were located in black areas) agreed to eliminate 
the separate category (Mem. Op. 320; PX 41, 42a-42c; Tr. K 77- 
89) .

30



In 1969, the Department of Justice advised the Lawyers 
Title Company (headquartered in Richmond) to end its practice 
of including, in title insurance policies, racial covenants
along with valid encumbrances and restrictions (Mem. Op. 321;

27/
PX 90; Tr. E 7-14). Such covenants appeared with regularity
in deeds to subdivision lots in Richmond, Henrico and Chester­
field Counties (Mem. Op. 300, 315, 318, 322; 6/22/70 Tr. 828- 
40, see Tr. R 143-44; PX 127; CX 37, 38); the distribution of 
black residents in the entire area is far from uniform, but
blacks are rather concentrated in identifiable clusters (Mem.

28/
Op. 314, 317; PX 98; CX 10). With little exception, county
residential areas immediately contiguous to heavily black parts 
of Richmond are "occupied primarily by whites" (ibid.). Incidents 
suggesting discriminatory treatment of black prospective buyers 
of county properties were unrebutted and unchallenged on cross- 
examination (Mem. Op. 313-14, 317; Tr. D 201-12; Tr. F 42-49; 
see also, PX 92), and the existence of a pattern of discriminatory 
practices confirmed by both reports of official agencies (such

27/ Although such restrictions had been declared unenforcible 
in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Department ofJustice expressed the view to Lawyers Title that "continued 
inclusion [of such covenants] in documents affecting title contributes significantly to the perpetuation of segregation in 
housing . . . "  (Mem. Op. 319, 321; PX 90; Tr. E 11). See generally the testimony of M. Pope Taylor of Lawyers Title 
Company, 6/22/70 Tr. 828-40, admitted herein by stipulation,
Tr. R 143-44.
28/ Dr. Campbell, the Henrico Superintendent, testified that 
blacks and whites were "scattered" throughout the county, but 
the district court found, on the basis of the evidence, that 
"this is not the case" (Mem. Op. 313). See also, Mem. Op. 314.

31



as the Richmond Regional District Planning Commission) (PX 148, 
p. 34) and the testimony of its Executive Director (Tr. F 17, 
31-32).

The role of federal funding agencies such as FHA and VA 
in encouraging the creation of segregated market conditions, 
and the continued support of such a market by insuring agencies 
(FNMA, FDIC, FHLBB) was established through the testimony of 
Martin Sloane, Acting Deputy Staff Director of the United States 
Civil Rights Commission (Mem. Op. 293-302; PX 127, 128, 129,
129A, 130, 130A, 137; Tr. K 7-74). Edward Councill, the 
Regional Planning Commission Director, termed these practices 
a "major factor leading to what are not racially identifiable 
residential neighborhoods" in the Richmond area (Tr. F 29).

Currently operated FHA-financed multifamily projects in 
the Richmond-Henrico-Chesterfield area are almost entirely 
occupied by families of one race, and are located in the center 
of established residential pockets of the same race (Mem. Op.
300; PX 129, 129A, 130). There are, however, no such projects 
in the counties utilizing the rent supplement program, which 
would permit occupancy by families with low incomes, including 
many blacks (Mem. Op. 300-01, 316; PX 91; Tr. E 38, K 46,
L 162-63). Nor is there public housing except within the City 
of Richmond —  whose eight housing projects are principally 
occupied by blacks and located in black residential areas 
(Mem. Op. 302-03, 316; PX 39; PX 121, p. 242; PX 130; Tr. H 163).

32



These housing projects were built as segregated units in con­
junction with local and state school authorities, who sited 
educational facilities nearby to accommodate the pupils on a 
segregated basis (Mem. Op. 6-7; PX 31). The counties have no 
public housing authorities and Richmond's Housing and Redevelop­
ment Agency has been unable to locate projects outside black,
low-income neighborhoods (Mem. Op. 302-03; Tr. H 164-67,

29/171-73, 177).
Finally, the entire panoply of other discrimination: 

for example, the counties' failure to employ blacks in any 
but menial positions (Mem. Op. 316; PX 104, 105, 106, 107a- 
107c) and their historic practice of "short-changing" black 
schools (Mem. Op. 190-93, 202, 253; PX 125) —  in sum, the 
"totally segregated society" alleged in plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint (cf. PX 114) —  contributed to the failure of blacks 
to reside in the counties.

II. The Remedy

The preceding sections summarize evidence concerning 
various discriminatory practices of state authorities extending 
across political subdivision and school division lines; there 
are also a variety of cooperative ventures among separate

29/ The Richmond Authority could construct outside the city 
limits with the consent of the counties, but has never requested consent since it was considered a vain act (Tr. H 167).

33



local educational authorities throughout Virginia, sanctioned 
and furthered by the provisions of Virginia law. The district 
court concluded that a desegregation plan which, similarly, 
did not interpose political subdivision boundaries as a barrier 
to student movement was not only an appropriate remedy for the 
constitutional violations found, but also would, in the opinion 
of the witnesses whose testimony was credited by the court, 
offer substantial educational advantages for the children in 
each division. The court accepted the plan proffered by the 
Richmond School Board, designed to accomplish these ends, as 
educationally sound, feasible, and adequate to remedy the 
pervasive and persistent segregation. Both during the trial and 
in its opinion and decree, the district court invited the 
submission of alternative plans, but the court's order requires 
implementation of the Richmond Board proposal pending such 
submission and approval by the court, in order not to further 
delay in effectuating the constitutional mandate.

A . School Division Lines

The tuition grant and pupil scholarship programs, and 
the maintenance of regional schools for Negroes (see pp. 13-15 
supra), are the outstanding examples of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia's permissive attitude towards pupil attendance across 
school division lines for the purpose of maintaining segregation. 
Pursuant to state law, however, other educational programs

34



transcending individual division boundaries have frequently been 
established. Historically, Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield 
exchanged students regularly for a variety of reasons, excepting
furtherance of desegregation (Mem. Op. 185, 203-04; PX 101;

30/Tr. H 61-62). The Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield school
divisions currently operate several regional educational 
facilities, including a trades training center, a modern voca­
tional school, special education classes, and a mathematics- 
science center (Mem. Op. 174-75; RX 35; Tr. D 95-100). One 
Richmond school is located entirely, and another in part, 
within Henrico County while the City School Board owns an
additional county site on which construction has not yet been

21/commenced (Mem. Op. 203; Tr. L 35).

These pupil exchanges typify the pragmatism expressed in
Virginia practice, which has held boundary lines no impediment

32/to the achievement of educational (and sometimes segregatory)
purposes, but they are also reflective of a more general 
commonality of interest among the three divisions. The two

30/ In 1957-58, the Henrico School Board resolved to inquire 
into the possibility of arranging for black students in eastern Henrico County to attend a high school within the City of Richmond 
(PX 120, p. 101; Tr. H 52-53).
31/ In 1954, the current Richmond Superintendent sought to 
acquire a Chesterfield County site for a Richmond white high 
school (Mem. Op. 187; PX 117).
32/ The State Board of Education recognized in 1969 that 
"political boundary lines . . .  do not necessarily conform to 
educational needs" (RX 82, p. 20. But see p. 38 infra.

35



counties and Richmond have relied upon each other for various 
services such as water, sewage treatment, etc. (Mem. Op. 227-28;
RX 48-51). Relations between the jurisdictions have not always 
been harmonious (Mem. Op. 222; Tr. A 104) but repeated planning 
studies have consistently urged greater cooperative regional 
efforts (Mem. Op. 217-19; HX 25; RX 47, 89; PX 148). This 
advice was ignored particularly after the joinder motion was 
filed; for example. Chesterfield County withdrew from regional 
park and planning bodies (Mem. Op. 229; PX 121, pp. 9, 13, 48).

A great deal of evidence introduced concerned the extent 
of Richmond’s "community of interest" with Henrico and Chester­
field Counties (e.g., RX 46-51, 54-54A, 58-58A, 59-59A, 61-61A;
HX 7, 9; Tr. A 21-141, K 120-86, L 4-236, M 5-34, 70-93, 100-03); 
conflicting opinions were expressed and the evidence required 
interpretation rather than compelling a definitive conclusion.
It is clear from the district court's discussion (Mem. Op.
217-29) that some community of interest, of uncertain magnitude, 
does exist; while perhaps insufficient to establish that 
"community of interest" between Richmond and the counties 
necessary under Virginia law to justify annexation and merger 
of all governmental services, the evidence in the record clearly

33/
indicates the interdependency of the two counties with Richmond.

33/ But cf., for example, the April 27, 1964 opinion of the
Circuit Court of Henrico County in the 1962 annexation case between 
Richmond and Henrico (pp. 8-9): "Although community of interests 
is not necessarily as vital a consideration as other factors to be considered . . . this Court nevertheless feels that this factor
should be given consideration. . . . Dependence of the central city
of Richmond and the immediately surrounding county is mutual. [Record citations omitted.] The evidence shows that the commercial and civic interests of the city and county are largely identical." 
(HX 7). 36



Virginia law has not restricted these divisions to isolated 
operation; in fact, the development of public education has 
progressed along opposite lines, steadily enlarging operating 
entities (PX 124; RX 82, pp. 1, 20) and encouraging common 
endeavors among divisions to improve educational quality (see 
n. 5 supra), including the special educational facilities shared 
by these divisions described above. Until 1971, school divisions 
could be consolidated by the State Board of Education, pursuant 
to Va. code Ann. §22-30 (Repl. 1969) and the Virginia Constitution's 
requirement that (Art. IX, §129) "the General Assembly shall 
establish and maintain an efficient system of public free schools 
throughout the state. Such consolidated divisions would operate 
under a single Superintendent of Schools; the district court 
found, further, that the combination of school divisions 
frequently resulted in the use of cooperative techniques of 
pupil assignment, such as the operation of joint schools 
(Mem. Op. 106). Additionally, Virginia statutes detailed 
procedures for reorganization of the constituents of a conso­
lidated school division under a single school board, including 
general criteria for sharing operating and capital costs among 
the political subdivisions (Mem. Op. 101-03; SX 10; Va. Code 
Ann. §§22-100.1 et_ seq. (Repl. 1969)). State officials said 
they had always interpreted the law to require local assent 
(Mem. Op. 105; Tr. G 36) but there were instances in which the 
State Board was reluctant to permit separate operation (Mem. Op. 
96-99; RX 82, p. 10; Tr. F 134-39, G 36).

37



In 1971, a new Constitution of Virginia took effect; it 
directed the General Assembly to provide for "a system of free 
public elementary and secondary schools for all children of 
school age throughout the Commonwealth" and "an educational 
program of high duality." The Constitution also directs the 
State Board of Education to adopt standards of quality for 
education (Art. VIII, §2) and to divide the Commonwealth into 
"school divisions of such geographic area and school age 
population as will promote the realization of the prescribed 
standards of quality." The General Assembly limited this 
power in 1971, by providing that no school division should con­
sist of more than one city or county, absent the consent of
local school boards and political bodies (Va. Code Ann. §22-30 

34/(Supp. 1971)). Adoption of such an amendment had been
predicted by the Chairman of the Richmond School Board after 
the joinder motion herein had been filed (Mem. Op. 102-03;
Tr. N 30); the General Assembly was conscious of the effect 
it might have upon this litigation (Mem. Op. 102-03; Tr.
G 102-04).

34/ The new Constitution requires that consolidated divisions 
must reorganize under a single school board pursuant to Va. Code 
Ann. §§22-100.1 et seq. (Art. VIII, §5(c); Tr. F 142-44).

Pursuant to the amendment enacted by the General Assembly, 
the State Board of Education dismantled all previously existing 
consolidated school divisions on July 1, 1971 (Mem. Op. 103-04; 
PX 122, pp. 392-93; RX 83, p. 47); at the same time, the State 
Board established procedures by which now-independent school 
divisions could share a single Superintendent of Schools (ibid.; 
Tr. F 70). 38



B. The Richmond School Board's Plan

The plan submitted by the Richmond School Board (RX 63-66)
redivides the area consisting of the city and the two counties

35/
into six subdivisions for purposes of administration. Each
subdivision, with the exception of the sixth, would contain a 
proportion of black and white students roughly equivalent to 
the system-wide ratio (Mem. Op. 233; Tr. A 178). Pupils would 
be assigned to schools within each subdivision or immediately 
contiguous thereto (ibid.). Generally speaking, students 
would be exchanged or reassigned on a school-by-school basis, 
without pairing or grade restructuring (Mem. Op. 233; Tr. A 185) 
The selection of schools between which students would be 
exchanged was made by computer pursuant to instructions to 
equalize, for all students insofar as possible, the length of 
bus ride (Mem. Op. 235; Tr. A 190-94).

Assignments would be made so that the schools (except 
those in Subdivision Six, in the southern part of Chesterfield
County) would range between 20% and 40% black (Mem. Op. 233-34;

36/
RX 63; Tr. A 168, 170-73, 178, 186).

3 5/ Dr. Kelly, the Chesterfield County Superintendent, came to 
his position after serving as an area superintendent with the 
Fairfax County school system, which has 130,000 students. He 
testified that a consolidated school division such as was 
proposed, containing about 106,000 students, would have to be 
subdivided and decentralized for purposes of administration, 
just as Fairfax County was (Tr. E 103-04).
36/ Subdivision Six is the most sparsely settled. The Richmond 
Board plan proposed to take the necessary steps to eliminate all 
white and all-black schools in that subdivision through pairing 
or zoning, but because of the transportation which would be 
necessitated, did not propose to eliminate every school dispro­portionate to the entire system-wide ratio (Mem. Op. 239-40;
Tr. A 174, 189-90, B 24, R 74-76).

- 39 -



The School Board's plan proposed, rather than an island 
or satellite zone system for determining which pupils shall 
be exchanged with other schools, that a birthday lottery be 
established (Mem. Op. A 235-36, 239; Tr. A 199). Dr. Thomas C. 
Little, Associate Superintendent of the Richmond School Division 
(under whose supervision the plan was prepared) testified, 
however, that the plan was flexible enough to permit satellite 
zoning in sparsely settled areas within which a birthday lottery
might cause transportation routes of undesirable lengths

37/(Mem. Op. 235-36; Tr. A 195-201, R 74-80). (The pupil
transportation contemplated, unlike that presently in effect 
in Richmond, is home-to-school busing rather than school-to- 
school busing (Mem. Op. 238; Tr. B 65, 96)).

The maximum number of students who would need to be 
transported under the proposed plan is 78,000 —  10,000 more
than are presently bused to school in the three school divisions

38/(Mem. Op. 237; Tr. B 25-27). Richmond, Henrico and

37/ Indeed, after county officials testified that experimental 
simulated birthday lotteries in the least populated areas of 
each county (including Subdivision Six of Chesterfield County) 
showed that bus routes were of inordinate length, Dr. Little 
presented to the court detailed satellite zone proposals and 
transportation routings for these areas which minimized the 
transportation time required (Mem. Op. 240-41; RX 96, 96A;
CX 30; HX 33; Tr. N 122-36, N 208-17, R 74-80), including adoption of an island zone presently being operated by Henrico County in 
the Varina district (Tr. R 78).
38/ This figure includes both students who would be transported 
for purposes of integration and those entitled to transportation 
to the school serving their geographic zone of residence, apart 
from the desegregation plan (Mem. Op. 238; Tr. B 65, 96).

40



Chesterfield presently operate sufficient numbers of buses to 
carry out this plan and to provide buses for pickup of students 
participating in extracurricular activities after school, as 
well (Mem. Op. 237; Tr. B 28-33). The district court found 
that the projected times of transportation for pupils would not
exceed those which both counties have required in the past

39/
(Mem. Op. 238).

The Richmond Board's plan follows the provisions of state 
law insofar as governance of the new entity is concerned. It 
recommends, for example, the creation of a single school board 
in accordance with the Constitution of Virginia, Art. VIII,
§§5(c), 7 and Va. Code Ann. §22-100.1 (Supp. 1971), and sharing 
of capital and operating costs on a pro rata basis, or upon any 
other basis agreed to by the parties, again as Virginia law 
provides (Va. Code Ann. §22—100.9 (Supp. 1971)) (Mem. Op. 243).

Despite the suggestion of the district court that the 
state and county defendants help prepare and evaluate the 
plan proposed by the Richmond Board, and suggest alternatives 
for the court's consideration in the eventuality that relief 
were ordered, none of the other parties in the case offered

39/ Dr. Little estimated the maximum time any student would 
be on a bus under the plan would be one hour, within 
Subdivision Six (Tr. B 33), a time which chesterfield Superintendent Kelly agreed was not inordinate (Tr. E 79, 137-38). 
in contrast, school buses already travel routes entailing similar 
times (Mem. Op. 181, 183; Tr. N 121-22, 205; RX 91; HX 32), 
including a Chesterfield County bus which makes a two-hour trip 
each way (ibid.).

41



any alternative plan (Mem. Op. 245, 275, 324; 4/23/71 Tr. 6-9,
39; see also, Appendix C to this Brief (relevant corres-

40/
pondence)).

Substantial testimony of educational experts was offered
41/by all parties (Mem. Op. 249-76, 280-87); there was general 

agreement that under present operation, schools on either side 
of the division boundary lines could be perceived as racially 
identifiable, particularly by the black students attending schools 
within the City of Richmond, and especially in light of the 
historic dual system operation (Tr. C 50-51, 226-29, D 118-19,

40/ Although plaintiffs sought in their Amended Complaint 
(see Appendix A to this Brief) either the consolidation of the school divisions or the exchange of pupils among the divisions 
pursuant to contract or otherwise, it was not until the filing 
of the Stay Application with this Court that the state and 
county defendants first suggested they preferred the latter means. 
Compare Tr. L 28-32 (Henrico County Manager would also oppose 
contract operation).
41/ The district court noted

that the Court in considering the testimony of 
the experts gives greater weight to those experts 
whose opinions were to the effect that equality of educational opportunity would flow from the 
consolidation of schools in the metropolitan 
area, and that the proposed plan is both reasonable 
and feasible, than to the testimony of those 
whose opinions differ. In considering the weight to be given to the testimony of all of the wit­
nesses, the Court has considered their qualifications, 
experience, interest or lack of same in the 
outcome of the litigation, their bias if any, as 
well as their actions upon the witness stand, and 
the weight and process of the reasoning by which 
they supported their respective opinions and 
testimony, and all other matters which served to 
illuminate their statements (Mem. Op. 89).

42



42/, 43/131, G 137, P 171-78, 231-34). None of the expert
witnesses called by the state and county defendants disagreed

42/ Dr. Clifford Hooker, for example, testified:
Q. You think that black plaintiffs who have 
alleged in this case that they have been 
artificially confined in the city limits of 
Richmond, that they have been confined to 
segregated schools, that they have been 
confined to this community within the city of Richmond because of deprivation in economic 
opportunity, educational opportunity, and the 
whole structure of segregated society in 
Richmond, in Henrico, and Chesterfield, in 
the State of Virginia by state constitution 
[and as] commanded by acts of the legislature, 
do you think it is paternalistic for blacks 
now to seek schools, just schools, that reflect 
the distribution of blacks and whites or 
proportions of blacks and whites in this area?
A. If I were certain of the condition that you 
established, I would obviously answer the question 
No, but I don't accept a lot of the assumptions 
that you built into your question. (Tr. P 204-05)

(The district court opinion adds, "Sad to say the assumptions 
stated by counsel on the question have been proven to be accurate 
(Mem. Op. 265). See also Tr. P 147-49.)
43/ In addition, Dr. Thomas Pettigrew, the Richmond School Board's 
witness, testified that, in his opinion, schools between 20% and 
40% black contained an educationally optimum distribution of black 
and white students in terms of both cognitive development and 
stability (Tr. C 10, 16-19). Dr. Pettigrew pointed out that his
research indicated that schools over 40% black rapidly underwent 
resegregation and identification as black facilities (Tr. C 18-19). 
The district court noted in its opinion, however:

The phenomenon of white flight from schools 
over 40% black always occurs, when it does, 
in cases where there are other nearly white 
or all white schools in a community which 
provide a form of refuge. This is always 
true because there is no metropolitan area 
in the United States with more than 40% 
black population (Mem. Op. 257). (cont *d)

43



with the objective of providing integrated education, although 
most agreed with the Superintendents of Henrico and chesterfield 
Counties that they could perceive no educational advantages to 
the plan offered by the Richmond Board over the current method 
of operation among the three school divisions.

The primary objection of the expert witnesses called by 
the state and county defendants was that a consolidated division 
would be financed by three independent political jurisdictions; 
they would have preferred a fiscally independent entity (e.g.,
Tr. 0 196). They were unaware that, under current Virginia law, 
although no division is fiscally independent, procedures for 
financing consolidated divisions are mandated.

The Superintendents of the two counties, as well as the 
expert witnesses called by the state and county defendants also 
focused upon the difficulty of operating a merged school system 
comprising formerly separate divisions which had been engaged in 
a bitter dispute over the necessity for consolidation. Dr. Robert 
Lucas, Superintendent of the Princeton City Schools near 
Cincinnati, Ohio, who was called as a rebuttal witness for the

43/ (cont'd)
Dr. Pettigrew added that he would recommend desegregation of the 
total school community even if the overall population in the existing school divisions were greater than the so-called optimal 
ratio which his research suggests (Tr. C 43, 52).

Plaintiffs express no agreement with the "optimal mix 
theory. Most of the research on its educational effects is 
questionable, flawed by the absence of longitudinal measures 
and the small sample size for majority-, but not overwhelmingly 
black schools (Tr. C 18-19) —  factors themselves a function of the general failure until very recently to implement thorough 
desegregation (Tr. C 40-41a).

44



Richmond Board, described his experience as the first superin­
tendent of a school district created by decree from portions of 
six previously existing school systems whose patrons were 
initially antagonistic to each other (Tr. R 13-18):

We started immediately to try to develop a 
fine rapport among the people of the district.
And I believe we have been able to do that 
. . . . I would say that I think that as a
result of these various subdivisions we have 
been strengthened and we try to use all of 
them to the best advantage too and get them 
involved and as a result of getting them 
involved I don't see that it has been any 
handicap whatsoever and I think it has been 
a good thing for us (Tr. R 16-18).

Dr. Lucas described a second merger, with an all-black school
district, carried out at the direction of the State Department
of Education in Ohio, without a voter referendum but also
without adverse effect on any part of the educational program 

44/
(Tr. R 18-40).

44/ The Ohio State Board's action was prompted by communications 
from the United States Department of Justice. A February 29,
1969 letter from the Assistant Attorney General to the State Superintendent included the following:

Our investigation to date provides us with 
reasonable cause to believe that the children 
of Lincoln Heights are being deprived of the 
equal protection of the laws. Some of the 
facts which lead us to this conclusion are:
(1) The Lincoln Heights school district appears 
to have been created as an all-Negro district, 
by the actions of surrounding white districts 
which refused to allow Lincoln Heights to be 
affiliated with them.

(3) All students in Lincoln Heights are Negroes 
and they are taught almost exclusively by Negro teachers, while most students in surrounding 
systems are, white and they are taught almost

45



44/ (cont'd)
exclusively by white teachers. This results 
from the maintenance of Lincoln Heights as 
a separate, all-Negro, underfinanced district.
The failure of the Board to take steps to 
consolidate Lincoln with appropriate districts 
as Ohio law seems to require, in my view, constitutes a denial of equal protection of 
the law.

(The entire letter is reproduced as Appendix D to this Brief.)

46



ARGUMENT

A child may be disadvantaged for various 
reasons, but the term is generally used 
in relation to the urban and minority 
group crisis which so perplexes our nation. Although Virginia, with its 
smaller cities, has less of a problem than many other states, we do have serious 
imbalances which cause deep concern. In 
our larger metropolitan areas there are 
income deficiencies and a racial mix 
which result in serious educational dis­
advantages. The injustice, as well as 
the potentially disastrous social 
consequences of this situation, have 
prompted action by government at all 
levels as well as the private segment of 
our communities. There is no longer any 
debate as to the need for vigorous action 
to right this educational imbalance.

—  Statement of Retiring Chairman 
State Board of Education, 1969

-47-



Hie District Court Properly Found That A Desegregation Plan Not Limited 
By School Division Lines Was Required To Vindicate Plaintiffs' Constitutional 

Rights

The Statement above is lengthy, but this Court should 
be cognizant of the nature and extent of the proof offered 
below if it is realistically to evaluate the district 
court's decree. The evidence in this case is voluminous; 
the lower court's opinion is detailed and extensive. But 
its decree is a measured response to the (mostly 
uncontradicted) overwhelming evidence of illegality 
presented to it; the district court has not applied new 
legal principles to a factual setting free of discrimination. 
We submit that, given the facts as outlined above, the 
district court could have reached no other result.

We do not deal in this case with the steps which 
might have been adequate to meet the Constitutional mandate 
in 1954. Those steps were not taken. Indeed, as the 
Supreme Court recognized in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971), the task of
disestablishing the dual school system, its vestiges and 
remnants, has been rendered even more difficult by the 
tactics of delay and resistance after 1954. The actions 
of the defendants set forth in the record may be categorized 
as classic examples of such tactics; indeed, some of these 
defendants may truly be said to have invented them.

-48-



The district court's opinion, in the section containing 
its general findings and legal conclusions (pp. 21-89), 
treats the various legal theories presented by the parties^^ 
in considerable depth, and analyzes the relevant case law.
We see no point in duplicating that discussion in our Brief; 
we are in agreement with the district judge's conclusions 
and we support the relief granted. We have, however, 
attempted to set out the relevant facts at some length because 
the decree below is mandated by the application of traditional 
equitable principles to the detailed and complex factual 
situation revealed by the record. Cf. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.

Obviously we cannot restate or amplify every legal 
thesis which, when applied to a part or the entirety of the 
factual record, supports the granting of relief.—  we should 
then simply duplicate much of the district court's opinion. 
Deliberate contemplation of the facts as summarized above, 
we believe, suffices to establish the correctness of the 
result. Discussion of the law primarily serves to corroborate

45/ Extensive briefs and proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law were presented by the parties; the trial lasted some 17 days.

46/ This and other similar cases pending, for example, in 
Detroit, Indianapolis, Hartford and Grand Rapids, raise 

legal issues concerning the compelling state justification 
(or lack thereof) for the maintenance of subordinate govern­
mental units which have the effect of creating racially 
identifiable schools, in states which, through some of their 
constituent agencies, maintained segregated public schools.In these cases, the limits of effective relief and the proper 
scope of the remedy depend upon the particular demography, geography, and the history and nature of the constitutional

(cont'd)
-49-



judicial power to adopt the particular remedy, through 
established precedent or by convincing analogy. We refer 
the Court, respectfully, to the opinion (pp. 21-89) —  which 
is unusually clear and comprehensive. We shall attempt 
here, rather than an elaboration of the opinion, to respond 
to several arguments raised below by the state and county 
defendants.

The district court found that the discrimination of 
state agencies (interacting with private discrimination) 
has contributed significantly to the present distribution 
of black and white population among the City of Richmond 
and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield. The state 
and counties argued below that because racial residential 
patterns in the Richmond urban community resembled those in 
other metropolitan areas throughout the nation, there could be 
no finding that state-imposed discrimination contributed to 
that result.

We agree in general with the premise but not with 
the conclusion; indeed, plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr.
Karl Taeuber, made the point in his testimony (Tr. I 32-33,

46/ (cont'd)
violation. While in some cases, upon a proper showing, state 
educational authorities may be required to assign students 
across local boundary lines in order to remedy unconstitu­
tional conditions accruing primarily from their knowing inaction in the face of segregation forces, see, e.q., Bradley v.
Milliken. Civ. No. 35257 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 27, 1971)[Appendix 
E], at p. 13, this Court need not reach that issue in light of 
the proof here of extensive official discriminatory conduct.

-50-



41), as did the demographer called by the counties (Tr. O 97), 
that the phenomena were similar. However, neither Dr. Taeuber 
nor Dr. Biggar attempted to explain the precise causes of 
the population distribution in Richmond (Tr. I 24, 39, 0 
101-04) although both were aware of a general pattern of 
racial discrimination in housing (Tr. I 20-23, 0 109-10).

The district court's conclusion did not flow from 
the statistical disparity but from the overwhelming evidence 
of discriminatory practices presented to it. It is, there­
fore, helpful to note that other courts which have conducted 
a like inquiry have reached the same judgment.

The district court in Detroit, for example, found 
(Bradley v. Milliken, supra [Appendix E], pp. 8-9):

The City of Detroit is a community generally 
divided by racial lines. Residential segre­
gation within the city and throughout the 
larger metropolitan area is substantial, 
pervasive and of long standing. Black citi­
zens are located in separate and distinct 
areas within the city and are not generally 
to be found in the suburbs. While the 
racially unrestricted choice of black persons 
and economic factors may have played some part 
in the development of this pattern of residen­
tial segregation, it is, in the main, the 
result of past and present practices and 
customs of racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do restrict the 
housing opportunities of black people. On the record there can be no other finding, [emphasis supplied]

The court also commented on the argument that some of the 
invidious practices had ceased:

-51-



Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, have combined, with 
those of private organizations, such as loaning 
institutions and real estate associations 
and brokerage firms, to establish and to main­
tain the pattern of residential segregation 
throughout the Detroit metropolitan area.
It is no answer to say that restricted prac­
tices grew gradually (as the black population 
in the area increased between 1920 and 1970), 
or that since 1948 racial restrictions on the 
ownership of real property have been removed.
The policies pursued by both government and 
private persons and agencies have a continuing 
and present effect upon the complexion of the 
community - as we know, the choice of a resi­
dence is a relatively infrequent affair. fIbid.1

Because these practices were inextricably linked with the
resultant pupil attendance patterns,— ^ the court in

■ , . 48/Detroit has required school desegregation—  (id. at 24):

Pupil racial segregation in the Detroit Public School System and the residential racial seg­
regation resulting primarily from public and 
private racial discrimination are interdepen­
dent phenomena. The affirmative obligation of 
the defendant Board has been and is to adopt 
and implement pupil assignment practices and policies that compensate for and avoid incor­
poration into the school system the effects 
of residential racial segregation. The 
Board's building upon housing segregation , violates the Fourteenth Amendment. — '

47/ "[J]ust as there is an interaction between residential 
patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so 

there is a corresponding effect on the residential pattern 
by the composition of the schools." id. at 9.
48/ The court on October 4, 1971 ordered the submission by 

the State Board of Education of a metropolitan plan of 
desegregation. Plans have been filed and hearings are scheduled to begin March 28, 1972.
49/ Accord, Brewer vi School Bd. of Norfolk, 297 F.2d 37, 

41 (4th Cir. 1968); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac,
(cont'd)

-52-



In another case where similar evidence was presented,
the court spoke to the question of the responsibility of
school authorities (Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis,
Civ. No. 3931, W.D. Tenn., Dec. 10, 1971 [Appendix B to
this Brief] at pp. 4-6):

The proof shows that the City of Memphis, like 
many other American cities, has had an out­
migration of white families from the inner 
city to the suburbs since World War II.

This out-migration of whites was not motivated 
entirely by racial discrimination, but it was 
also grounded on the established way of life, 
which was invidiously discriminatory against all Negroes. By state and local law, and 
entrenched custom and practice, Negroes were 
denied many privileges and opportunities 
which were available to all white persons.— ■
Prior to and after World War II, the Negroes 
in Memphis were required by law to attend 
separate schools. Furthermore, the Negro 
schools were not equal from an educational standpoint.

49/ (cont'd)
309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd 443 F.2d 573 
(6th Cir.), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1971); united States
v. School Dist. No. 151. 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. 111. 1967), 
aff1d 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Board 
of School Comm1rs of Indianapolis, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 
1971); united States v. Board of Educ., 429 F.2d 1253 (10th 
Cir. 1970); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. 
Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. of 
Wilson County, 433 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1970); Johnson v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. C-70-1331 SAW (N.D. 
Cal., July 9, 1971); cf. Kelly v. Guinn, No. 71-2332 (9th Cir., Feb. 22, 1972) (slip op. at pp. 7 n.7, 9).
50/ See PX 114, a compendium of Virginia laws which imposed 

segregation or special burdens upon blacks, including 
most of the "massive resistance" legislation (see pp. 11-13 
supra). The extensive secondary effects of the State’s 
adoption of this public posture have received judicial recog­
nition. See NAACP v. Patty. 159 F. Supp. 503, 515-16 (E.D.Va. 1958), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Harrison v.NAACP. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).

-53-



In addition to this unequal educational 
opportunity, the Negroes were by custom and practice denied most of the employment op­
portunities which permitted whites to , 
purchase more expensive housing. ——

From this proof there is established that, 
historically, the controlling white citizens 
relegated certain areas in Memphis and Shelby 
County to the blacks, and that both the City 
and County Board of Education established 
separate and unequal schools in the immed­
iate vicinity of the areas of Negro concentration.

The similarity of findings by other courts which have 
considered evidence relating to the genesis of racially 
divided housing patterns, and their interdependence with 
school segregation in urban areas, then, suggests the 
accuracy of the conclusion reached below.

These findings have an important bearing upon determina­
tion of the scope of the remedy in this case. As the Supreme 
Court noted in Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21 (emphasis supplied):

People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the 
needs of people. The location of schools may 
thus influence the patterns of residential 
development csf a metropolitan area and have 
important impact on composition of inner-city 
neighborhoods. . . . Upon a proper showing a
district court may consider this in fashioning a remedy.

51/ See p x  125; Mem. O p.  190-93, 202, 253 (unequal schools).
Dr. Taeuber confirmed that the educational deprivations 

of Virginia's black citizens in the past had a direct bearing 
on their present economic status, and, accordingly, upon their ability to locate outside the City of Richmond (Tr. I 23). cf. 
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Griggsv. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
52/ See pp. 24-29 supra.

-54-



This Court correctly anticipated Swann when it held
in Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 
1968) that the affirmative obligation of school authorities
was not met by the adoption of attendance plans which merely

53/reproduced segregated housing patterns in the schools.—
The district court here has done nothing more startling than
apply this principle in measuring the performance of the

54/State 1s affirmative obligation to desegregate.—  For school 
division lines do not merely describe the jurisdiction of
administrators; they also serve as attendance zone boundaries

55/which limit pupil assignment.— 1

53/ As another district court put it, Davis v. School Dist.
of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1970), 

aff'd 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1971):
For a School Board to acquiesce in a housing 
development pattern and then to disclaim liabil­
ity for the eventual segregated characteristic 
that such pattern creates in the schools is for 
the Board to abrogate and ignore all power, con­
trol and responsibility. A Board of Education simply cannot permit a segregated situation to 
come about and then blithely announce that for a 
Negro student to gain attendance at a given 
school all he must do is live within the school 
attendance area. To rationalize thusly is to be 
blinded to the realities of adult life with its 
prejudices and opposition to integrated housing.

54/ See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Griffin 
v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 337 U.S.

218 (1964); Smith v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 444 
F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1971); Godwin.v. Johnston County Bd. of 
Educ., 301 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.C. 1969); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd sub nom. 
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Franklin v. 
Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Miss. 1968) 
United States v. Georgia, Civ. No. 12972 (N.D. Ga., Dec. 17, 
1970), rev1d on other grounds, 428 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971).
55/ The patent disregard of such lines by defendants in order 

to accomplish segregation is an independent justification 
for ignoring them to assist in desegregation: "Barriers which 
did not prevent enforced segregation in the past will not be(cont'd)-55-



Such political boundary lines, in any event, "are mere 
lines of convenience for exercising divided governmental 
responsibilities. They cannot serve to deny federal rights. 
See, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena
Parish School Bd.. [197 P. Supp. 649, 658 (E.D. La. 1961)]."
Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County, 410 F.2d 920, 
925 (8th Cir. 1969).

The defendants argued below, however, that no federal
rights were being denied because they were each operating a
"unitary school system." The district court concluded, as
the evidence unquestionably demonstrated, that black students

56/were "effectively excluded"— ■ from attendance at county 
schools as the result of discrimination —  by public, private, 
and educational authorities —  which served to contain them 
within the City of Richmond. The exclusion of most black 
children from county schools is no less real because it has 
been achieved through complex processes influenced by dis­
criminatory state action. As the Supreme Court said in

55/ (cont'd)
held to prevent conversion to a full unitary system." Henry 
v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 433 F.2d 387, 394 (5th Cir. 1970).
56/ Cf. Christian v. Board of Educ. of Strong, Civ. No. ED 

68 C 5 (W.D. Ark., Dec. 15, 1969) (typewritten opinion 
at p. 2)(emphasis supplied): "Although the record discloses 
that no student of the Strong School District is 'excluded' 
from either of its two schools, the District was and is effectively operating dual schools."

-56-



Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958):

In short, the constitutional rights of children 
not to be discriminated against on grounds of 
race or color declared by this Court in the 
Brown case can neither be nullified openly and 
directly by state legislators or state execu­
tive or judicial officers, nor nullified 
indirectly by them through evasive schemes for 
segregation whether attempted 'ingeniously or 
ingenuously.' Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128.132.

In the context of the district court's finding that the 
racial demography of Richmond, Henrico and Chesterfield 
Counties has been heavily influenced by state policies of 
discrimination, it can hardly be contended that "state-imposed 
segregation has been completely removed" by the adoption of 
'desegregation' plans in the separate divisions. Green v. 
County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) 
as quoted in Swann. 402 U.S. at 13.

Furthermore, as the district court put it, ”[t]he
institution within the three existing school districts of some
thing which might in some other context pass for desegregation
of schools is a phenomenon dating at best from the opening of
the 1971-72 school year .. . ." (Mem. op. 66). The district
court could properly conclude in the light of experience that
further steps were required to implement the constitutional
mandate. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.. No. 71-
1811 (4th Cir., Feb. 16, 1972), aff'q 328 F. Supp. 1346 (W.D.
N.C. 1971); Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ.. No. 71-3028

57/(5th Cir., Feb. 23, 1972) (slip op. at p. 10).

577 - Cf. RX 75-78, 98
-57-



Finally, the defendants argued below that the State Board
of Education was without power to create a single school
division consisting of the City of Richmond and the Counties
of Henrico and Chesterfield, and that the district court
was likewise without power to require the State Board to do so.
It was suggested that entry of a decree requiring such a step
amounted to a declaration of the constitutional infirmity of
Virginia statutes which could only be issued by a three-judge 58/ 
court.

We treat in text the basis of defendants' argument that the 
district court lacked remedial power to correct the consti­
tutional violations proved. We should distinguish, however, a variant of this theme on the substantive issues of the 
lawsuit. Defendants contended that since the State Board 
of Education, in their view, never had the power to create 
consolidated school divisions, its failure to do so in 
Richmond did not evidence any constitutional default. It 
is difficult to disagree with such a proposition, given its 
assumptions. We do not understand the ruling below to rest 
upon such grounds. While the language of Va. Code Ann. § 22-30, 
prior to its amendment in the course of this lawsuit, seems 
to have rather explicitly given the State Board the authority, 
upon its own initiative, to create school divisions, the district court recognized that the Board had significantly 
limited the statute by adhering to a policy of acting only 
upon local request.

What was significant to the district court, and properly 
so, was the complete failure of the state defendants to change 
any of their policies and practices —  including among others 
their limiting conception of their role under this statute —  
in light of the affirmative duty imposed upon them by Brown. 
Noting that the State defendants failed even to make recom­
mendations to local divisions about the possible utility of 
single division status as an aid in desegregation, the 
district court correctly considered this posture as an element 
of the State's failure to undertake its affirmative responsi­
bilities. However, as we noted above, the district court 
contrasted these defaults with the continuing affirmative 
pursuit by the defendants of policies which could only main­tain and aggravate segregation; compare Lumpkin v. Dempsey,
Civ. No. 13,716 (D. Conn., Jan. 22, 1971):

-58-



In accepting the Richmond Board's plan —  still the
59/

only plan before the court despite defendants' dilatory 
claim in their Stay Application that they would prefer some

58/ (cont'd)
This action raises the problem of whether there 
exists in Connecticut, specifically in the 
Hartford area and surrounding communities, un­
constitutional segregation of whites and minority 
groups into separate school districts. Although the legal issues surrounding situations which 
create c3e facto as opposed to de ~jure segregation 
are by no means clear, there is case law which 
suggests that since the primary responsibility 
for education and educational facilities lies with 
the state [citation omitted], the courts may, 
in some circumstances, examine the problem of 
segregation in the schools on a state-wide basis 
even though there is no reason to believe that 
the presently existing school districts were 
established for racially related reasons, 
[citations omitted]. As was noted in Taylor v. 
Board of Education, 294 F.2d 36, 39 n. 2 (2d 
Cir. 1961), the position of the Second Circuit 
on this question remains open. "under the 
circumstances we need not examine the interesting 
issue how far a public body may save itself 
from constitutional constraint by mere inaction."
[See also, no. 46, supra.]

59/ Cf. United States v. Board of Educ. of Baldwin County,
423 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1970).

-59-



alternative administrative arrangement —  the district court 
proceeded upon a logical and forthright construction of Va.
Code Ann. § 22-30 (Supp. 1971) by directing the school divisions 
before the court to request of the State Board designation 
as a single division, and directing the State Board to grant 
such a request. The suggestion made in the stay application 
to this Court, that the directive to undertake a discretionary 
act pursuant to the statute amounts to a declaration that

60/the statute is unconstitutional, is simply without foundation.

Even if the district court's construction of the statute
were in error, that would hardly mean the court was without

61/power to enforce execution of the plan. Swann emphasizes 
the broad scope of the court's remedial powers, typical of a 
court of equity. 402 U.S. at 15. These powers have been 
explicitly held to be unlimited by the provisions of state

— / The power of a district court to require a school board 
to make application for benefits available under a specific 
statutory program was upheld in Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1969).
61/ At the least, as to the state defendants, it could 
require the withholding of state funds to the three school 
divisions until they had agreed, by contract or otherwise, 
to carry out the plan and remedy the constitutional depriva­
tions. Smith v. North Carolina State Bd, of Educ., 444 F.2d 
6 (4th Cir. 1971). However, as suggested in the text, such 
a limited construction of the court's power would be totally 
unjustified in light of the significant participation of 
the state defendants in the constitutional violations complained 
of. in contrast, the predicate for vacation of the district 
court order in Smith was that the state officials had had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the mechanics of pupil assign­ment in North Carolina.

-60-



62/law.

In Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County, 410
F.2d 920, 927 (8th Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals held
separate black and white districts illegal and remanded
"for a workable plan to effectuate a completely nonracial
school system ... . " The district court accepted a proposal
to consolidate the districts in accordance with a state
statute recently enacted for other purposes, and over the
objections of the plaintiffs to the inequitable result
which would obtain, held it was in fact bound to utilize
the available state procedure. The Court of Appeals disagreed

The remedial power of the federal courts 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
limited by state law.

Haney v. County Bd. of Educ. of Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364, 
368 (8th Cir. 1970).

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that in none of the 
interdistrict desegregation cases have the courts rested upon 
the necessity of a state law basis for the remedy which has 
been fashioned. See united States v. Crockett County Bd. of 
Educ. , Civ. No. 1663 ( V I . D . Tenn. , May 15, 1967) (common 
desegregation plan); Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. of Wilson 
County, 433 F.2d 587, 588 (same); Taylor v. Coahoma County

-§// in Brewer v. School Bd. of Norfolk, No. 71-1900 (4th Cir. 
March 7, 1962), this Court rejected an argument that since 
Virginia law did not require cities to furnish transportation, 
the district court could not require the school board to pay 
for transportation as part of a desegregation plan.

-61-



School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 174, 176, 180 (N.D. Miss.)
aff'd 444 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971) (same) (suggesting the 
desirability, but not the necessity of following state law); 
Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 4916 (W.D.
Tenn., August 11, 1971) (pairing of schools in contiguous
systems); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex.
1970) (consolidation).

In sum, as the Supreme Court said in Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965), in approving a "freeze" on
voter registration qualifications, in fashioning a remedy
for constitutional violations a district court

has not merely the power but the duty to render 
a decree which will so far as possible eliminate 
the discriminatory effects of the past as well 
as bar like discrimination in the future.

Any suggestion that the district court's decision is a 
significant departure from precedent, ordering undreamt of 
relief, founders in light of United States v. Texas, 321 
F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), supplemental opinion 330 F. 
Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex.), modified and affirmed 447 F.2d 441 
(5th Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1206 (Mr. Justice Black,
July 29, 1971), cert, denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3315 (Jan. 10, 1972). 
There, in an action in which not all the governing bodies of 
individual school districts were joined (as here), but rather 
those agencies with ultimate authority only (321 F. Supp. at 
1047), and based upon the affirmative commands of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the central State agency as well as

-62-



to local districts (321 F. Supp. at 1056-57), not only were 
many individual districts ordered merged after a directed 
study by the Texas Education Agency (see unreported Order of 
April 19, 1971, attached to Stay App. Response) but the State 
agency was given significant new functions with regard to 
State-wide desegregation— including review and recommendations 
concerning consolidation of school districts enrolling dis­
proportionate numbers of black students (447 F.2d at 447).

The relief ordered below is far narrower. Yet in United 
States v. Texas stays were denied; Mr. Justice Black wrote:

It would be very difficult for me to suspend 
the order of the District Court that, in my view, 
does no more than endeavor to realize the directive 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions 
of this Court that racial discrimination in the 
public schools must be eliminated root and branch. 
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430, 437-438, 20 L Ed 2d 716, 723, 88 
S Ct 1689 (1968); see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen- 
burg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28 L Ed 2d 
554, 91 S Ct 1267 (1971); United States v.
Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 US 225,
23 L Ed 2d 263, 89 S Ct 1670 (1969). I cannot 
say that four Members of this Court are likely 
to vote to hear this case and undo what has been 
ordered by the District Court and Court of Appeals below.

My views need not be expressed at length. The 
question of granting certiorari will have to be decided by this Court when the petition properly 
reaches us. For me, as one Member of this Court, to grant a stay now would mean inordinate delay 
and would unjustifiably further postpon the 
termination of the dual school system that the 
order below was intended to accomplish. The 
District Court's opinion and order are comprehensive and well reasoned. in my judgment the facts 
found by the District Court, which do not appear 
to be materially disputed by the applicants, 
fully justify the order. [404 U.S. at 1207-08]

-63-



CONCLUSION

The District Court was well warranted, considering the 
discriminatory practices by which the defendants availed 
themselves of school division lines, first to maintain 
and then to reinforce and magnify segregation, in approving 
the desegregation plan presented to the court which contem­
plated assignment of pupils across existing division lines 
to relieve that same segregation, and the judgment below 
should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

JACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT, III
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
LOUIS R. LUCAS525 Commerce Title Bldg.
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
JAMES R. OLPHIN214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
M. RALPH PAGE
420 North First StreetRichmond, Virginia 23219
WILLIAM L. TAYLORCatholic University Law School
Washington, D. C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs- Appellees

-64-



IN Till'. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR TUB !ASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

RICHMOND DIVISION

CAROLYN BRADLEY and MICHAEL BRADLEY, inCants, etc., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

VC .
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, et al.,

and
THE VIRGINIA. STATE BOARD ON EDUCATION, a public body corporate; WALDO G. 1IILES, MRS. CATHERINE HOOK, DU. HAROLD RAMSEY, HILARY H. JONES, JR., THOMAS C. EOUSI1ALL, PRESTON C. CAKUTHERS and DR. ROBERT E.R. HUNTLEY, individually and in their offi­cial. capacities an members of the Virginia State Board of Education;DR. WOODROW w. WILKERSCH, individually and in his official capacity as VIRGINIA STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION; THE SCHOOL FOARD OF HENRICO COUNTY, a public body corporate; S.CECIL CHILDRESS, OLIVER I. SAND, JR., • ’ JOHN L. DEUSBH.T.O, CECIL F. JONES, REV. WALTER C. WHITT and MRS. W.B. McMULLIN, individually and in their official capacities as members of the School Board of Henrico County; DR. WALTER CAMPBELL, individually and in his official capacity as SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF HENRICO COUNTY; THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HENRICO COUNTY, a public body corporate; LINJOOD E. TOOMBS, L.R. SHADWELL. EDWIN H. RACSDALE, ANTHONY P. MFHFOUD and C. KEMPER LORRAINE, indi­vidually and in their official capacities as members of the Board of Supervisors of Henrico County; THE SCHOOL BOARD OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, a public body corp­orate; G.L. CRUMP, C.C. WELLS, R.P. EAGLES, 
J.W, RUSSELL, C.D. SPENCERS, and C.F,. CURTIS, JR., individually and in their official capacities as members of the School Board of Chesterfield County; DR. ROBERT F. KELLY, individually and in his official capacity as SUPERINTENDENT OP SCHOOLS OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY; THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CHEUTERFini.0 COUNTY, n ̂ pub i j e ho-.iy cuiuoiulo; 1 »d 1 1.vU C.. I""H.O. BROWNING, C.J. PURDY, Y .£’. DIETSCU, A.R. MARTIN and J. RUFFIN APPERSON, indi­vidually and in their official capacities as members of the Board of Supervisors of Chent<.•* field County,

Defendants.
AMUR! n :D NON? L M 1' T

CIVIL ACTION 

NO. 3353

f=sV-C CtlO'X A,
o.\



• r

1 , plaintiffs adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 through 
17, inclusive, of their original Complaint as paragraphs 1 
through 17, inclusive, of this Amended Complaint, with the 
same force and effect as though they were set out in their 

entirety herein.

18. Plaintiffs adopt and reallege the material alle­
gations of the Motion to Compel Joinder of Parties Needed for 
just Adjudication Under Rule 19 filed herein on or ,bo«t
November 4, 1970, cis follows:

the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 7, 
inclusive, paragraph 10 and paragraphs 
12 through 15, inclusive;
the allegation contained :r paragraph 9 ^
that the "plan of desegregation P - e n  ...
being implemented within » -
Richmond pursuant, to the c rder S?ltionai district court does not meet Constitutional
requirements; and
the allegation contained in paragraph 11
that theVf,ndunt Virginia BoardEducation ow.-.n an affnmativc obligation to 
plaintiffs and the class on whooC behalf 
plaintiffs sue to establish and maintain 
a unitary public school system for the . ' . ■ — .v ni».ni'i£fs and t ic <

I' l ' - t '
A . t J'

19. Defendants VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
SCHOOL BOARD OF HENRICO COUNTY. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
HENRICO COUNTY. SCHOOL BOARD OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY and BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY are public bodies corp­
orate established and maintained pursuant to the Constitution 
and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia as administrative 
departments of the Commonwealth and discharge governmental 
functions.

20. Defendant VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION 
establishes policies, practices, customs and usages which are 
generally applicable to the conduct of the I. ee public school 
system of the Commonwealth of Virginia, m  particular, 
defendant VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION has the power, 
within its discretion, to establish school divisions and to

. , • „ ; ... Defendant VIRGINIAconsolidate existing school cUv.^.-n..
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION is charged with the affirmative



Constitutional duty to exercise its powers so as to afford 
equal educational opportunities to plaintiffs and the class 
on whose behalf plaintiffs sue.

21. Defendant BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HENRICO COUNTY 
has the duty of levying taxes, approving and selling bonds for 
capital improvements to be utilized by the defendant SCHOOL 
BOARD OF HENRICO COUNTY; the BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HENRI CO 
COUNTY approves all budgets and appropriates funds necessary 
to operate the public school system of Henrico County.

22. Defendant BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CHESTERFIELD 
COUNTY has the duty of levying taxes, approving aid selling 
bonds for capital improvements to be utilized by the defen­
dant SCHOOL BOARD OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY; the BOARD OF SUPER­
VISORS OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY approves all budgets and 
appropriates funds necessary to operate the public school 
system of Chesterfield County.

23. Defendant WOODROW W. WILKERSON, VIRGINIA STATE 
SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, holds office pursuant 
to the Constitution and laws of the Commonweal h of Virginia 
as the chief administrative officers of the public free 
school system of Virginia. He is under the authority, super­
vision and control of, and acts pursuant to the orders, 
policies, practices, customs and usages of the defendant 
VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

24. Defendants DR. WALTER CAMPBELL a;id DR. ROBERT 
F. KELLY each hold office pursuant to the Constitution and 
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia ns admini: trative officers 
of the public free school system of Virginia. They are under 
the authority, supervision and control of, and to a material 
deqree act pursuant to the orders, policies, practices,ft \ f f

f\ i A customs and usages of both the VIRGINIA STATE CARD OF EDUCA­
TION and, respectively, THE SCHt■. L BOARD OF }!■ RICO COUNTY and 
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY.

3-



• *

25. Defendant SCHOOL HOARD OH THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
i\nd defendant LUC INK D. ADAMS, successor to 11.1. Willett no 
SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND are under 
the authority, supervision and control of, and to a material 
degree act pursuant to the orders, policies, practices, 
customs and usages of TI1E VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.

26. The Commonwealth of Virginia, through its 
Constitution and lows, the customs, policies, and practices 
of its legislative, administrative and judicial branches, 
has enforced and mandated both public and private segregation, 
the effects of which persist in the affairs oc the defen­
dants and which result in deprivation of the Constitutional 
rights of plaintiffs and the class on whose behalf plaintiffs
sue.

27. The Commonwealth of Virginia [hereinafter, 
"State"], acting through its Constitution and laws, the 
customs, usages, policies and practices of its legislative, 
administrative and judicial branches, assisted in and 
encouraged the establishment and maintenance of a segregated 
society in the Commonwealth of Virginia, exemplified by, 
among other manifestations, the following.

a) State-mandated dual, biracial public schools;
b) Segregated public facilities;
c) State-mandated segregated p- 1ic accommoda­tions, publ ic ancl private t: «.nsportation. public and private housing;
d) State-enforced segregation in public em­

ployment, including hiring, firing, ancl 
terms and conditions of emp’ayment;

e) State-encouraged discrimination in private employment, including hirin' , firing, and terms' and conditions of omp.-nyment;
f) state-mandate d diacriudnat:.; n in the allo­cation of Sta: •- and munici.n l resources and services, and financial assistance programs;
q) State-mandated racial elite mination in the application of voting notifications;



h) State-enforced racial 3 iiv-j.lntions upon
education, t.x.wriw r, c o w w 'ycc r.ndrccrcali on of bl<K.k ciV v* < Jis;

all of which has had and continue s to have the purpose end 
effect of denying equal educational opportunities, and equal 
opportunities based on education, to blcick citizens and 
students by compelling the attendance of black students in 
segregated schools, and which denies to plaintiffs and the 
class on whose behalf they sue, the equal protection of the 
laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment.

28. Through its various instrumentalities, including 
but not limited to zoning boards, planning commissions and 
departments, licensing agencies. State-approved realtor 
organizations, public housing and urban renewal authorities, 
the defendants herein, and others, and by various methods, 
including but not limited to State laws or local ordinances 
prescribing minimum lot sizes and conditioning the construc­
tion of publicly-assisted housing facilities, the location 
of parks and highways, the enforcement of racially restric­
tive covenants, and others, and pursuant to a policy of 
racial discrimination, the State and other defendants have 
established a pattern, practice, custom and us:.ge of racial 
containment of blacks to proscribed residential areas, with 
the effect that the Counties of Henrico and Cl.ectorfield have 
populations whose respective racial compositions are approx­
imately 5% black and school populations approximately 7% 
black and 8% black whereas the City of Richmond has a popu­
lation approximately 50% black and a school population 
approximately 64% black.

29. Since 1954, the State (acting by and through 
its various instrimientalitics) , pursu«..<*- policy, p-o-ti..
custom and usage of racial discrimination denying Fourteenth 
Amendment, rights, has by the devices of school closings, 
defiance of the orders of federal courts, Acts of the General 
Assembly, creation of the Pupil Placement hoard for the



«

initial assignment of all children to all schools within the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, among others, acted affirmatively 
to deny black children equal educational opportunities by 
the maintenance of a pattern of segregated schools, and has 
failed to fulfill its affirmative dut.y to establish and main' 
tain unitary public schools.

30. Defendants, individually and acting in concert, 
have created, established, supported and maintained and 
continue to support, and maintain a dual biracinl school 
system in the City of Richmond and the Counties of Henrico 
and Chesterfield.

31. The State, and particularly wie defendants 
VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and STATE SUPERINTENDENT 
OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION [hereinafter, "State defendants"] have 
approved or recommended school sites, school expansions and 
supported other aspects of the location and expansion of 
public educational facilities in the City of Richmond and 
the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield, pursuant, to a 
policy, pattern, practice, custom and usage of racial dis­
crimination. Said pattern and practice of such approvals, 
recommendations and site selections continues as of the 
date of this Amended Complaint.

32. The State and the other defendants have allo­
cated and permitted to be allocated resources, and distributed 
and permitted to be distributed State appropriations for 
public education, in such a manner as to establish and 
maintain the pattern of racial separation in the public 
schools of the City of Richmond and the Counties of Henrico 
and Chesterfield as described hevein.

33. The defendants have provided substantial funds 
to assist in the transportation of pupils in the Counties of 
Henrico and Chesterfield but have failed to provide a similar 
quantity of publicly-supported pupil transportation in the

-C-



. <■

City of Richmond, which policy, practice, custom and usage 
has assisted in the maintenance ot the pattern of racial 
separation in the public schools of the City of Richmond and 
the Counties of IJonrico and Chesterfield.

34. The State defendants have exercised their 
powers to require and/or approve interdistrict contractual 
arrangements with the purpose and effect of maintaining 
racial segregation and have directly supported, v/ith State 
funds for pupil transportation, etc., interdictrict contrac­
tual arrangements having such effect, but have failed to 
exercise their powers to carry out their affirmative duty to 
establish and maintain unitary schools.

35. The State defendants have ap >. r.vei a pattern 
of school construction in the County of Een.wirc around the 
perimeter of the defendant City of Richmond whi.ih results 
in the establishment of large school coir.plor."t naming an 
overwhelming!! white enrollment which provide a school house 
for white students to the exclusion of black students, and 
facilitate the maintenance of the pattern of racial separa­
tion in the public schools of the City of Richmond and the 
Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield as described herein.

36. The State defendants have approved a similar 
pattern of school site location, construction and expansion 
of facilities in Chesterfield County which has the like 
effect of maintaining the pattern and practice of racial 
separation in the public schools of the City of Richmond 
and the Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield.

37. There exist schools in the defendant Richmond
school system and in the defendant Henrico County and Chester­
field County school systems which are in closer proximity 
to students of one of the other systems than the schools to 
which s&id students are presently assigned. The defendants 
and some of them have in the past resisted proposals to annex

-7-



* I '

additional territory to the City of Richmond at lewat p-trt 
upon racial grounds. The failure of the State defendants to 
exercise their governmental povers to eliminate the pattern 
of racial containment in the public schools of the defendant 
school systems by requiring, where appropriate, student 
exchanges by contractual agreement, consolidation or merger, 
has the effect of perpetuating the. State-imposed dual school 
system described herein in derogation of the affirmative 
obligation of State defendants an described herein.

38. The defendant school systems operate joint 
programs of public instruction funded and approved by the 
State defendants v;hich cross political boundaries for the 
purpose of achieving educational goals within the single 
community composed of the City of Richmond and the Counties 
of Henrico and Chesterfield, just as the defendants BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS OF HENRICO COUNTY. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF 
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, CITY OF RICHMOND and CITY COUNCIL 0): 
RICHMOND have operated and participated jointly in various 
municipal activities and programs which cross their respec­
tive political boundaries. The present boundaries of the 
defendant school systems bear no reasonable relation to bona 
fide educational goals, policies and practices. Said 
boundaries have the effect of excluding black children 
from the educational resources and facility .• which would 
otherwise be available to them but for the continued main­
tenance by the defendants, despite the availability of cfher 
methods of school organization, of said school district 
boundaries.

39. The present boundaries of the defendant school
systems serve no bona fide educational goals, policies or 
practices which could not be served equally well by district 
configurations which do not result in the pattern of racial 
separation in the public schools of the City of Richmond and 
the Counties of Henrico and C...,cterfield <R..>cribed herein.

- 0 -



».A

40. Maintenance of the present school district 
boundaries has the effect of denying black children their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal educational opportun­
ities and is supported by no compelling State interest in 
their continuation.

41. There exist reasonably available alternative 
methods of school organization and operation within the 
Counties of Henrico and Chesterfield and the City of 
Richmond which would eliminate the pattern and effect of 
the denials of equal educational opportunities described 
herein and which would maintain, now and hereafter, only 
unitary schools.

42. The continued operation by d ;Cendants of 
discrete 'school districts and patterns of pupil assignment 
as described herein results in the effective exclusion of 
black students from certain schools and in the denial of 
equal educational opportunities to black students.

(

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray that this 
Court enter its Order requiring all defendants, jointly and 
severally, to take all necessary action to require forthwith 
the consolidation or merger of the defendant school systems 
in all aspects of school operation and administration.
including but not limited to, the appointment of an Acting 
Superintendent to manage the consolidated systems, the 
merger of the existing boards of education pending the selec­
tion, by election, appointment or otherwise, of a new board 
of education representative of the consolidated systems; and 
further requiring that that board shall be the successor 
board of education to the defcno.'.nvs SCHOOL ’0 0. iHu CITY 
OF RICHMOND, SCHOOL BOARD OF HENRICO COUirlV .nd SCHOOL BOARD 
OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, assuming till rights, powers, respon­
sibilities, duties and obligations presently held, in whole 
or in part, by the defendant school boards; and further

-9-



requiring that each defendant: shall, by withholding of 
funds or accreditation and by the. exercise of any and all 
powers available to each, insure the full cooperation of 
the other defendants and the prompt accomplishment of said 
consolidation or merger.

In the alternative, plaintiffs pray that the 
Court require defendants BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF HENRICO 
COUNTY, BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, CITY 
COUNCIL OF RICHMOND, SCHOOL BOARD OF HENRICO COUNTY, SCHOOL 
BOARD OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY and SCHOOL BOARD OF THE CITY 
OF RICHMOND, acting by and through the State defendants, 
to enter into such agreements;, contracts or otherwise to 
provide, for the joint operation of the educational systems 
of tho City of Richmond and the Counties of Henrico and 
Chesterfield, with free availability of all facilities for 
pupil attendance, and tri~system-wi.de assignment of pupils, 
teachers, school plant, transportation facilities and all 
other incidents of school operation, to the end that no 
school within the respective defendant school systems shall 
be raciaily identifiable.

Plaintiffs further pray that this Court require 
the defendants to prepare and submit for approval of the 
Court a plan for the operation of all of the public schools 
within the defendant school systems in conformity with the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, including but 
not limited to, the establishment of schools, pupil 
populations, staffs, faculties, transportation routes and 
extracurricular activities which are not racially identi­
fiable, and to be effective with the commencement of the 
1971—72 school year.

Plaintiffs further pray that this Court allow 
them their costs herein, reasonable attorneys' fees from 
the inception of this cause, and incidental equitable

-10~



damages for tho denial by defendants. acting individually 
and in concert, of the rights guaranteed plaintiffs under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.

Plaintiffs further pray for such other, further 
or additional relief as to the Court nay appear just and 
necessary.

JACK GIU ENBEUG
JAKES M. NABRT.T, III
NORMAN J. CHACiiKIN 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, Nov; York 10019
LOUIS R. LUCY S 525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 30103

JAMES R. 0LPHIN 
2Id East Clay Street Richmond, Virginia 23219

M. RALPH PAGE 420 North First Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

(Vd I \ ■ f\ -11-



; f ■

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTUCT COVET 
r a  THE EASTKEN DISTEICT OF VIRGINIA 

At Richmond D 1 v ' * ~  ̂

CAROLYN BEADLEY and MICHAEL
HEADLEY, infants, by Minerva 

Bradley, their mother and 
next friend,

0AE1A A. CAMEEON, an infant, 
by James Cameron and Evelyn 
M. Cameron, her father and 
mother and next friend,

EOtALZND DODSON, an infant, 
by Mary Carter, her 
guardian and next friend,

MOKGAN N. JACKSON, an
infant, by I. A. Jack-ton, 
Jr., and Alma M. Jackson, 
his father and mother and 
next friend,

BRUCE W. JOHNSON, an infant, 
by Joseph H. Johnson, Jr., 
and Doris 0. Johnson, his 
father and mother and next 
friend,

JOHN EDUARD JOHNSON, JR., 
an infant, by John Edvard 
Johnson, his father and 
next friend,

PHYLLIS ANTOINETTE JOHNSON, 
an infant, by Ford T. 
Johnson and Elisabeth J. 
Johnson, her father and 
mother and next friend,

ROBERT S. MEYERS, an infant, 
by Elisabeth S. Mayers, 
and Elihu C. Meyers, his 
mother and father and next 
friend,

>
s

CIVIL ACTION 

NO._________

:

:

i

n ' *



WILLIAM DUNBAR QUARLES, JR., 
an infant, by Roaa La* 
Quarles, his mother and 
next friend,

LEMUEL VXKBISH, JR., an 
infant, by Lemuel Wimbiah, 
Sr., and Geraldine Winbish, 
hla father and mother and 
next friend,

and

MINERVA BRADLEY, JAMES CAMERON, 
EVELYN M. CAMERON, MARY CARTER,
1. A. JACKSON, JR., ALMA N. 
JACKSON, JOSEPH H. JOHNSON, JR., 
DORIS 0. JOHNSON, JOHN EDWARD 
JOHNSON, FORD T. JOHNSON, 
ELIZABETH J. JOHNSON, ELIZABETH 
8. MEYERS, ELIHU C. MEYERS, ROSA 
LEE QUARLES, LEMUEL W1MB1SH, SR., 
and GERALDINE W1MBISH,

Plaintiffa
vs.

THE SCHOOL BOARD OP THE CITY 
OP RICHMOND, VIRGINIA,
H. I. WILLETT, Division 

Superintendent of Schools 
of the City of Richmond, 
Virginia,

and

E. J. OGLESBY,
ALFRED L. WINGO and 
E. T. JU8TIS, individually 

and constituting the 
Pupil Placement Board 
of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia,

Defendants

BILL OF COMPLAINT

- 1A-

V \ t - '



I
1. (a) Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title

28, United States Code, Section 1U1 This action arises under 
Article 1, Section 8, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti­

tution of the United States, Section i, and under the Act of 
Congress, Revised Statutes, Secti.n 1977, derived frcm the Act 
of May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section lo, lo Stat 144 (Iitle 
42, United States Code, Section 1981), as hereafter mere fully 
appears. The matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and 
cost, exceeds the sum of Ten Th»* sand Dollars ($10,0U0,00)

(b) Jurisdiction is iurther invoked under Title 28, 
United States Code, Secticn 134?. This action is authorized by 
the Act of Congress, revised Statutes, Secticn 1979, derived from 
the Act of April 20, 1871, Chapter 22, Secticn 1, 17 Stat, 13 
(Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 i, ti be commenced by 
any citizen of the United States or other persen within the juris­
diction thereof to redress the deprivation under color of state 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of rights, 
privileges and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States and by the Act of Con­
gress, Revised Statutes, Section 1977, derived from the Act of 
May 31, 1870, Chapter 114, Section 16, 16 Stat. 144 (Title 42, 
United States Code, Section 1981), providing for the equal rights 
of citizens and :f all pers.ns within the jurisdiction of the 
United States as hereafter mere fully appears.

II
2. Infant plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the 

United States arid of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and are resi­
dents of and domiciled in the political subdivision of Virginia

-  2 -

|\y ? i N' ' •' f- V ̂



for which the defendant school board maintains and operates public 
schools. Said infants are within the ag. limits of eligibility to 
attend, and possess all qualifications and sat.isfy all require­

ments for admission toy said public schools
3. Adult plaintiffs are Negroes, are citizens of the United 

States and of the Commonwealth c f Virginia, and are residents of 
and domiciled in said political subdivision.. They are parents or 
guardians or persons standing î i l.?c: parentis of one or more cf 

the infant plaintiffs.
4. Plaintiffs bring this action ir. their own behalf and, 

there being common questions '■’f law and fact affecting the rights 
of all other Negro children attending public schools in the Com­
monwealth of Virginia and, particularly, in the said political 
subdivision, and the parents and guardians cf such children, simi­
larly situated and affected with reference to the matters here 
involved, who are sc. numei jus as f  make it impracticable to bring 
all before the court, and a c*.tnm-.r relief being sought, as will 
hereinafter mi.re fully appear. the plaintiffs als. bring this 
action, pursuant to Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Pro­
cedure, as a class action on behalf cf all other Negic children 
attending public schorls in the C',ram''nwealth of Virginia and, 
particularly, in said political subdivision, and the parents and 
guardians of such children, similarly situated and affected with 

reference to the matters here involved.

5. Ifie Commonwealth .f Virginia has declared public edu­
cation a stale function The Constituti n £ Virginia, Article 

IX, Section 129, provides:

- 3 -

r  i ■



"Free schools to be maintained. The General Assembly shall establish and maintain an efficient system of public free schools throughout the State."
Pursuant to this mandate, the General Assembly of Virginia has 
established a system of public free schools in the Commonwealth 
of Virginia according to a plan set cut in Title 22, Chapters 1 
to 15, inclusive, of the Code of Virginia, 1950. The establish­
ment, maintenance and administration of the public school system 
of Virginia is vested in a State Board of Education, a Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction, Division Superintendents of Schools, 
and County, City and Town Schoor Boards (Constitution of Virginia, 
Article IX, Sections 130-133; Code of Virginia, 1950, Title 22, 
Chapter 1, Section 22-2).

IV
6. The defendant school board, the corporate name of which 

is stated in the caption, exists pursuant to the Constitution and 
laws of the C'mnnonwealth of Virginia as an administrative depart­
ment of the Commonwealth, discharging governmental functions, and 
is declared by law to be a body corporate. Said school board 
is empowered end required to establish, maintain, control and 
supervise an efficient system of public free schools in said 
political subdivision, to provide suitable and proper school 
buildings, furniture and equipment, and to maintain, manage and 
control the same, to determine the studies to be pursued and the 
methods of teaching, to make local regulations for the conduct 
of the schools and for the proper discipline of the students, to 
employ teachers, to provide for the transportation of pupils, to 
enforce the school laws, and to perform numerous other duties, 
activities and functions essential to the establishment, mainte­
nance and operation of the public free schools in said political

-  4  -



subdivision. (Constitution of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133. 
Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended. Title 22.)

7. The defendant, division superintendent of schools, whose 
name as such officer is stated in the caption, holds office pur­
suant tc the Constitution ana laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia 
as an administrati ye officer of :he public free schtol system of 
Virginia. (Constitution of Virginia, .Article IX, Section 133.
Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, Title 2.2.) He is under the 
authority, supervision and control of, and acts pursuant tc- the 
orders, policies, practices, customs and usages of the defendant 
school board. He is made a defendant herein in his official 
capacity.

V
8. A Virginia statute, first eracted as Chapter 70 of the 

Acts of the 1956 Extra Session of tne General Assembly, viz, Article 
1.1 of Chapter 12. of Title 22 -'Sections 22-231.1 through 22-232.17) 
of the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, confers or purports tc 
confer upon the Pupil Placement Beard ill power of enrollment or 
placement of pupils in the public schools In Virginia and to charge 
said Pupil Placement Board to perform numerous duties, activities 
and functions pertaining to the enrollment or p-lacement of pupils 
in, and the determination of school attendance district for, such 
public schools, except in t^ose counties, cities or towns which 
elect to be beard by the provisions of Article 1 2  of Chapter 12
of Title 22 (Sections 22-232.18 through 22-232.31) cf the Code of 
Virginia. 1950,, as amenaed, (Section 22-232.30 cf the Code of 
Virginia, 1.95C, as amended.,- The names : £ the individual members 
of the Pupil Placement heard are stated in. the caption.

- 5 •

//



9. Said statute provides that each school child who has 
heretofore attended a public school and who has not moved from the 
county, city cr town in which he resided while attending said 
school shall attend the same schcol which he last attended until 
graduation therefrom unless enrolled, for good cause shown, in a 
different scho:l by the Pupil Placement Board The purposes and 
effect of said provision are to continue, in general, the dis­
criminatory effect of the pre-existing requirement of the Common­
wealth .̂f /irginia that children in public schools be segregated 
on the basis of race and, also, to prevent local school authori­
ties from devoting efforts toward initiating desegregation and 
bringing about the elimination of racial discrimination in the 
public school system and from making any prompt and reasonable 
start toward full compliance with the May 17, 1954, decision of 
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Beard of Education.

10. Said statute further provides that any child who de­
sires to enter a public school fer the first time and any child 
who is graduated from one school to another within a school 
division or who transfers to or within a school division, or 
any child who desires to enter a public school after the opening 
of the session, shall apply to the Pupil Placement Board for 
enrollment and shall be enrolled in such school as said Board 
deems proper. The purpose of this provision, the practice there­
under, and the effect thereof are and have been that throughout 
the State of Virginia, and particularly in the political subdi­
vision hereinabove mentioned, all white children are and have 
been assigned to schools generally known and considered as schools 
for white children; and Negro children, with few exceptions, if 
any, have been assigned to and placed in schools which no white 
children attend.

- 6 -

| A vr h t



11. The statute further provides that the parents or guar­
dians, if aggrieved by action of the Pupil Placement Board in 
enrolling their child in a public school, may file with the Board 
a protest in writing within fifteen days after the placement 
of such child; whereupon the Board will hold or cause to be held a 
hearing after publishing notice thereof once a week for two suc­
cessive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the city 
or county wherein the aggrieved party or parties reside. The cal­
culated effect of such publication in the cases of parents who 
seek for their child or children the right to attend public school 
on a racially nondiscriminatory basis is to call the attention of 
the community to the dissidence of the Negro parents who seek for 
their child a racially nonsegregated public school education and 
thus to subject that parent to such pressures which may be brought 
to induce abandonment of a federally protected right. Another 
practice of the Board in acting upon the protest is to require 
both parents and the child to appear before the Board, often at a 
place distant from their home and usually at considerable expense; 
such practice being calculated to induce the parents to forego 
their child's federally protected right to a racially nonsegregated 
public school education. Furthermore, the Board's original denial 
of the application for transfer usually comes at such time that, 
after the subsequent protest and hearing and action by the Board 
thereon, judicial remedy effective at the commencement of the 
next school term is forestalled.

VI

12. As matters of routine, every white child entering 
school for the first time is initially assigned to and placed in

- 7 -

/



a school which predominantly, if not exclusively, is attended by 
white children; or if otherwise assigned, then, upon request of 
the parents or guardians, such child is transferred to a schooL 
which, being attended exclusively or predominantly by white 
children, is considered as a school for white children, Upon 
graduation from elementary school, every white child is routinely 
assigned to a high school or junior high school which is predomi­
nantly, if not exclusively, attended by white children, Similarly, 
and with few if any exceptions, Negrc children entering school for 
the first time are initially assigned to a school which none but 
Negroes attend and upon their graduation from elementary school 
they are routinely assigned to a high school or to a junior high 
school which none but Negroes attend. Thus, in the free public 
schools of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and particularly in the 
schools maintained and operated by the defendant school board, 
the pre-existing pattern of racial segregation in public schools 
continues unaffected except in the few instances in which Negroes 
have sought and obtained admission to schools other than those 
attended exclusively by Negroes

13 To avoid the discriminatory result of the practice 
described in the paragraph next preceding, the Negro child,or his 
parent or guardian for him, is required to make application for 
transfer from the school which none but Negroes attend to a school 
specifically named In acting upon such application for transfer 
from the all Negro school, the defendants take into consideration 
certain criteria which defendants do not consider when making ini­
tial enrollments or placements in any school other than the ini­
tial placement or enrollment of a Negro child in a school which 
white children attend. If such criteria are not met, the appli­
cation for transfer is denied. For example, if the home of the

-  8 -

J.’.if\ t (  f  <" f'



applicant is closer to the school to which he has been assigned 
than to the school to which transfer is sought, the application 
is denied notwithstanding the fact that the latter school is 
attended by white children similarly situated with respect to 
residence For further example, if intelligence, achievement or 
other standardized test scores or other academic records of the 
applicant dc net compare favorably with the best or the better 
of similar scores or records of children attending or assigned to 
the schrel which the applicant seeks to attend, the application is 
denied notwithstanding the fact that many white children attending 
said school have lower- scores or lower academic records than the 
applicant has,

VII
1&. The defendants have not devoted efforts toward initi­

ating nensegregation and bringing about the elimination of racial 
discrimination in the public schcjl system, neither have they made 
a reasonable start to effectuate a transition to a racially non- 
discriminatory system, as under paramount law it is their duty to 
do. Deliberately and purposefully, and solely because of race, 
the defendants continue to require all or virtually all Negro 
public school children to attend school where none but Negroes 
are enrolled and to require all white public school children to 
attend school where few, if any, Negroes are enrolled.

15. Each infant plaintiff has made timely application to 
the defendants for admission tc a public school in said political 
subdivision heretofore and now maintained for and attended pre­
dominantly, if not exclusively, by white persons; but the defend­
ants, acting pursuant to a policy, practice, custom and usage of 
segregating school children on the basis of race and color, have

- 9 -

M v • / '  <



denied the application of each of said infant plaintiffs solely on 
account of their race and color

16. The refusal of the defendants to grant the application 
of each of the plaintiffs fcr enrollment as requested constitutes a 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law and a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States, and a denial of 
right8 secured by Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981.

17. Plaintiffs and rh-se similarly situated and affected 
are suffering irreparable injury and are threatened with irrepar­
able injury in the future by reason cf the policy, practice, cus­
tom and usage and the actions f the defendants herein complained 
of. They have no plain, adequate or complete remedy to redress the 
wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of other than this com­
plaint fcr an injunction. Any ther remedy t: which plaintiffs 
and those similarly situated c uld be remitted would be attended by 
such uncertainties and delays as would deny substantial relief, 
would involve a multiplicity cf suits, and would cause further 
irreparable injury and cccasi.n damage, vexation and inconvenience.

VLLL
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully pray:
(A) That this Court erter an interlocutory and a permanent 

injunction restraining and enjoining defendants, and each of them, 
their successors in office, and their agents and employees, forth­
with, from denying infant plaintiffs, or either of them, solely on 
account, cf race or ctlcr, the right to be enrolled in, to attend 
and to be educated in, the public schools to which they, respec­
tively, have ? ugbt admission;

- 10 -

t > f ' f , U



(B) That this Court enter a permanent injunction restrain­
ing and enjoining defendants, and each of them, their successors 
in office, and their agents and employees from any and all action 
that regulates or affects, on the basis of race or color, the 
initial assignment, the placement, the transfer, the admission, 
the enrollment or the education of any child to and in any pub­
lic school;

(C) That, specifically, the defendants and each of them, 
their successors in office, and their agents and employees be 
permanently enjoined and restrained from denying the application 
of any Negro child for assignment in or transfer to any public 
school attended by white children when 9uch denial is based 
solely upon requirements or criteria which do not operate to 
exclude white children from said school;

(D) That the defendants be required to submit to the 
Court a plan to achieve a system of determining initial assign­
ments, placements or enrollments of children to and in the public 
schools on a non-racial basis and be required to make periodical 
reports to the Court of their progress in effectuating a transi­
tion to a racially non-discriminatory school system; and that 
during the period of such transition the Court retain jurisdic­
tion of this case;

(E) That defendants pay to plaintiffs the costs of this 
action and attorney's fees in such amount as to the Court may 
appear reasonable and proper; and

(F) That plaintiffs have such other and further relief 
as is just.

Of Counsel for Plaintiffs

11



S. W. TUCKER 
HENRY L. MARSH, III 214 Sue Clay Street 

Richmond 19, Virginia
ROLAND 0. EALET420 North Third Street 

Richmond 19, Virginia
Attornoyg for Plaintllfta

fvV . f t A. f x 4

12



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 

WESTERN DIVISION

DEBORAH NORTHCROSS, et al I
Plaintiffs,

I This school desegregation case, which was originally filed
March 31, I960, has been before this Court and the appellate 
courts on numerous occasions. It is presently before this Court 

! on a remand from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for|l
ij consideration of defendant system's plan of desegregation in the 

light of Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 902 U.S.
, 1 (1971) and Davis v. School Commissioners of Mobile City, 902 U.S.
|I 33 (1971). Northcross v. board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 

999 F2d 1179 (1971). After the remand this Court met with counsel
' and determined that both sets of parties were of the opinion that 

outside advisory assistance was appropriate for this case. Hov-
II ever, the parties did not agree on who should furnish the assist­
ance. The Court resolved the difference by selecting the Divisionl! i' of Equal Educational Opportunities of the United States Office of

ij Education (hereinafter called the Division) to designate qualified
personnel to assist the defendant Board in the light of the Courti|
of Appeals remand. On July 27, 1971, the Court enetered an order

/«► ' 0  1  >/WVtuUvV P,



- 2 -

to that effect and the defendant Board complied with the order 
by requesting assistance from the Division. The Division designat­
ed a team of four members and two consultants, all of whom were 
educators. The order directed the team to make an immediate 
preliminary investigation, to report to the Court and the parties 
the results thereof, and to ask for further instructions, if 
necessary.

The team made the preliminary report and made a request for 
further Instructions. These, in the opinion of the Court, raised 
legal Issues referred to in Swan and Davis and in the Court of 
Appeals opinion ordering the remand. The Court, therefore, enter­
ed an order on September 14, 1971, ruling that an evidentiary 
hearing was necessary before more specific guidelines could be 
furnished the team. In that order the Court directed counsel

1/
to suggest what the Issues should be for the preliminary hearing.
On September 28, 1971, the Court entered an order setting forth 
four issues and directed the defendant Board to file, prior to 
the hearing, those changes in the Board's existing plan of desegre­
gation which it believed were required In the light of Swan, Davis 
and the Court of Appeals remand opinion. The Court conducted an 
eight day preliminary evidentiary hearing.

One of the Issues which the Court prescribed for the hearing 
was as follows:

1/It is interesting to note that no pleadings have been filed in 
This Court since 1968. The 1970 and 1971 hearings have been 
conducted on remands based upon authorities not available at the 
time of the Court's various rulings.



-3-
the

"Are/one-race schools, or virtual one-race schools, 
genuinely nondiscriminatory; that Is, are they not 
the result of present or past discriminatory action 

1 on the part of the defendants or their predecessors?"
This issue is addressed primarily to Section V(2) of the Swan

opinion on page 25, which directs the Court to scrutinize schools
|j of one race when the plan of the Board contemplates the continued i
!: existence of some schools that are all, or predeomlnantly all, ofli
I one race. In such situations, the burden is upon the school 

authorities to satisfy the Court that the racial composition is
j not the result of pa6t or present discriminatory action on their i

part.
The defendant Board undertook to overcome this burden by show­

ing that the large number of one-race schools are the result of 
jl housing patterns over which it had insufficient control.

During the current school year (1971-72), the defendant system 
is based upon a curriculum arrangement of elementary schools of

II:l grades 1 through 6 , Junior high schools of grades 7 through 9 and 
|| high schools of grades 10 through 12. There are 145,581 pupils, 
il 53.67. of them are black and 46.47. of them are non-black (hereln- 
|i after referred to as white). Percentagewise, 87. 77 of the blacks 
j| are in 907. or more black schools and 76.47 of the whites are in 
j1 907 or more white schools. There are 162 schools, 67 of them are 

907 or more black and 61 of them are 907 or more white (29 are all
Il Iblack and 18 are all white). Percentagewise, 37.67 of the 162 schools

are 907 or more white and 41.37. are 907 or more black.'I
Pursuant to previous orders of this Court the present pupil 

assignment phase of the defendant system's desegregation plan is; I
\ basically a geographic zone plan with minority to majority trans- 1li
■I fers prohibited.



-4-

The proof unquestionably establishes that the one-race schools 
do follow racial housing patterns. Therefore, the Court must 
determine if the one-race schools result from racial housing 
patterns which resulted,in part, from past or present discrimina­
tion on the part of the defendant Board and its predecessors.

The proof shows that the City of Memphis, like many other 
American cities, has had an out-migration of white families from 
the inner city to the suburbs since World War II. Because Memphis 
was founded on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River, that 
out-migration has been directed primarily to the east. However, 
the phenomenal growth of the city and the limitation of eastward 
distances have also caused an out-migration of whites from the 
itner city to the south and to the north by leapfrogging natural 
separations. These include the Wolf River with its overflow 
bottom lands to the north, and man-made barriers in the form of 
industrial and highway barriers which arose with the growth of the 
city

This out-migration of whites was not motivated entirely by 
racial discrimination, but it was also grounded upon the establish­
ed way of life, which was lnvlduously discriminatory against all 

2/
Negroes. By state and local law,and entrenched custom and 
practice, Negroes were denied many privileges and opportunities 
which were available to all white persons. Prior to and after

2/ In 1947 the Memphis Board of Censors banned a Hal Roach Studios 
movie for the reason stated by the Chairman of the Board of Censors 
as follows: "...I am sorry to have to Inform you that (the Board] 
is unable to approve your 'Curley' picture with the little negroes 
as the south does not permit negroes in white school (sic) nor 
recognize social equality between the races even in children."
See United Artists Corp. v. City of Memphis, 189 Tenn. 397,401(l945)-:----------------- ----- —

l \  1 . < ' I



-5 i

World War II, the Negroes In Memphis were required by law to attend
Vseparate schools. Furthermore, the Negro schools were not equal

from an educational standpoint.I.
In addition to this unequal educational opportunity, the Negroes 

| Were by custom and practice denied most of the employment opportuni- 
j ties which permitted whites to purchase more expensive housing.

The city and its economic structure were dominated by white 
' persons. During this out-migration the officials of tha city 

had the foresight to annex the suburban areas and thereby avoid 
the myriad problems which adjacent incorporated communities bring 

II about. These annexations brought into the jurisdiction of the 
City of Memphis portions of the municipality of Shelby County,

, of which Memphis is the county seat. Between 1950 and 1971, tha
|!
i City of Memphis Increased in size from 97 square miles to 217

square miles. Much of the proof is based upon census tracts for 
the city and county, which primarily compare the censuses from 1950 

i through 1970, including a special census for Memphis taken in
I 1967. This comparison shows that the residential separation of
j! the races has increased with each census, and that it was more pro-

ynounced in 1970 than it was in 1960 and 1950.
From this proof there is established that, historically, tha 

|| controlling white citizens relegated certain areas in Memphis and
II Shelby County to the blacks, and that both tha City and County

!| 3 / as recently as the 1965-66 school year, tha defendant Board had
'! 'separate dual zones for black and white high school students.' |l|i 4 / Racial segregation in housing patterns is not peculiar to

Memphis or the South. This form of segregation exists to a marked 
il degree in cities in all parts of the United States. See testimony 
| of plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Karl E. Taeuber.

,\\ > i * '



- 6 -

Boards of E du c a t i o n  c s t a b i i : ; i separate and unequal schools In 
the Immediate vicinity of the areas of Negro concentration.

The out-migration included as one of its major components 
white racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a r a i r s t  N eg roe s.  The various depart-|:
ments of the federal, state and local governments, private agencies 
which affect reaL estate d e / e l o p m e n t ,  and the City and County 
Boards of Education effectively precluded Negroes from participat-

li •jl ing in the out-migration.
The proof shows that from 1934 until 1947, the Federal Housing

Administration encouraged racial restrictions, and until recently,'
it permitted them by a passive posture of non-discrimination.

r
This federal agency has had and still has the moat significant 

i, impact upon new housing.
The Memphis Housing Authority, a state created agency which 

offers low rent and subsidized housing to economically deprived 
persorein Memphis (predominantly black), practiced open and out­
right segregation until 1963,and then went through a series of 
freedom of choice policies which permitted the customs of the 

(l community to continue segregation in those facilities.
The Realtors of Memphis prescribed policies which forbad racial 

mixing in housing patterns. Formerly, the Memphis zoning regula-
I!
,1 tlons required the designation of the racial makeup of proposed|

subdivisions and, otherwise, permitted the white citizens to 
capitalize upon their economic and educational advantages

In addition to the pressure and preference of the white 
community and the agencies mentioned above, some of the lending 
institutions discriminated against blacks, thereby preventing 
them from joining the whites in the out-mlgratlon.

i•* v! •' " I ' r



-7-

As a consequence of the white out-migration, those blacks whoI
I, could afford to move out of the areas originally assigned to them'i

made suburbs of the inner city areas which were adjacent to the 
I' areas assigned. All the while the defendant Board became an
I active partner in the entire process. This Court Included in its
ti

unreported opinion of May 15, 1969, a quote from page 61 of the
! 1967 Report of the United States Commisssion on Civil Rights
| (Racial Isolation in Public Schools) which reads in part as follows;
i "At the time of the Brown decision, Southern
|| educators were aware that thelocatlon of schools

was an important factor in maintaining segregated 
school attendance patterns. A story in a Memphis,
Tenn., newspaper on May 18, 1954, is illustrative:

'"Ruling Fails to Shock City: Officials See 
Little Difficulty

jlj| "'School authorities in Memphis yesterday evi­
denced no surprise at the [Brown] decision... Mr.
Milton Bowers, Sr., President of the Memphis Board 

ji of Education, said 'We have been expecting this to
happen for a long while... We believe our Negroes 

jl will continue using their own school facilities
since most of them are located in the center of 
Negro population areas... (Negro schools are] fully 
equal to and in some Instances better [than white 
schools]. We are very optimistic about this [ruling].
The white community's racial hostility has caused some nelghbor-k •

'■ hood areas, and consequently the nearby schools, to change from
white to black as blacks moved in. The Board has made Isolatedj'

|l attempts to avoid this problem. This is done by controlling the 
j, number of whites in a school in a majority ratio of not below 
; approximately 607. or 65X. However, this practice increases or 

does nothing about the problem of the all black or virtually all 
' ,i black schools. For example, this year the Board has continued 

to maintain Maury Elementary School at 37.5X of its optlmiso 
capacity in order to avoid assigning 133 white pupils to a pre­
dominantly Negro school, thereby risking white flight from a



- 8 -

p r e s e n t l v  pro 1 i n a n t 1 y w h i t e  i; or  c i t y  a r e a .  In the area to the  

s o u t h  o f  Memphis,  i t  has d e l i b e r a t e l y  a s s i g n e d  approximately 200 

Negro p u p i l s ,  newl y  e n r o i l e u  in t h e  a r e a  t hr o ug h  a h o u s i n g  p r o j e c t ,  

t o  an o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  blaek s c h i o l  In p r e f e r e n c e  to the nearby
| Ra i ne s ha ve n  S c h oo l  where the  r a c i a l  r a t i o  i s  presently 350 whites

5/
to 104 b l a c k s .liit In addition, the proof reflects that attempts have been madel

j |  by administrative personnel of the Board to influence the size|i
and location of federally-funded subsidized housing projects.
These projects often involve large numbers of people and there- 

j, fore greatly concern the Board and its Department of Research
Evaluation and Development. The Board contends that it has attempt- 

i, ed to have the projects located in areas where they will promote 
I! desegregation or, at least, minimize segregation. However, the 
I, locations of projects are s u b j e c t  to so many factors that the|i

limited use of persuasive powers of Board personnel have had littleI
'! effect on the housing segregation patterns of the community. Initi- 

ally,the projects are subject to available funds as well as to 
available land locations. The policies and actions of the local|i
and federal agencies are also involved, and invariably.neighbor-

||,j hood or community opposition is raised to a particular site, 
especially when obvious racial housing mixing becomes a factor. If 

I a heavily concentrated black area is chosen for the location of 
the project, blacks contend that segregated housing is being more

5/ The practice points up one of the inconsistencies of the Board's 
desegregation efforts. The record will reflect that the Board and 
its former superintendent have opposed the use of minimum ratios to 
implement desegregation, but the Board uses ratios by freezing the 
percentage o f  blacks in a white schoalat 35% to 407„, in an attempt 
to prevent white flight from a neighborhood.

1 /<



-9-
heavily entrenched. On the other hand, If a predominantly white 
area is chosen for the location, white hostility undertakes to 
stop the project and some whites will move if the project is built.

Due to the many factors over which the Board has no control 
in the site selection, the Court concludes that the present Board 
is not a participant in the specific issue of housing segregation 
aused by low rent or rent subsidy projects recently planned and 
built. This is not to say, however, that the Board cannot or 
should not make pupil assignments which affect desegregation of 
the schools in the light of those projects after completion. The 
Board has recently done this with regard to a project opened after 
chool started this year in the southeastern portion of the city.
Two hundred newly enrolled pupils were assigned to the predominantly 
white Oakhaven school in preference to reopening the formerly all
black Getwell School which was closed at the end of the 1969-70i| l

|j school year as a desegregation effort.
An examination of the short history of one of the newest sets 

of schools in the system and a comparison of them with an older 
school is enlightening. The Ridgeway Schools are the easternmost 
schools in the system. Ridgeway Elementary School and Ridgeway . 
Junion and Senior High School are located on a 28.04 acre tract in 

i an area which has a relatively high residential land value. These| I
\ schools were built in an area annexed into the City of Memphis on i 

December 31, 1969, and were opened during the 1970-71 school year. 
The buildings were not ready for occupancy at the beginning of the Ischool year. Therefore, it was necessary to bus the students 
approximately six miles one way on chartered buses to another 
school pending completion. The Ridgeway students were transported i
to Grahamvood Elementary School because it is in the area of i

(.. ; V f I . ' '■ V I' . P- H



- 10 -

Mumphis w hi c h has a declining elementary school population and it 
has substantial unused c l a s s r o o m  space. Crahamwood has an optimum 
capacity of 1060 pupils and a maximum capacity of 1245 pupils. In 
1970 it had 552 pupils enrolled. This year it has 486 pupils. It va 
built in 1950 and had additions made to it in 1953, 1955 and 1963. , 
Neither changing racial housing patterns nor any other racial factor 
has caused the decline in enrollment. It was built as a white 
school, and its racial makeup has been all or overwhelmingly white., 

Ridgeway Elementary School, with an optimum capacity of 440 
pupils, has 364 pupils. Its Junior and Senior High, with an 
cptimum of 850 pupils, has 961 Seventh through Eleventh grade 
pupils. As indicated above, the two schools are on a tract 28.04 
acres in size. Whereas, one of the oldest black schools In the 
system, Manassas Junior and Senior High, originally built in 1927, 
has 2141 pupils in buildings with a current optimum capacity of 1700 
pupils and a maximum capacity of 2100 pupils. It is on a tract 
6.63 acres in size. Manassas School had nine additions to It from 
1939 through 1964.

The predecessors of the Incumbent Board have accommodated the 
white housing discrimination in many ways, such as drawing the 
black Dunbar Elementary zone, during the last elementary school 
dual system year, 1961-62, as a zone approximately five miles wide Iwith the black school in the westernmost area. See Exhibits 47b 
and 52 b, 1960 Census map and overlay. While it is true that the 
blacks at that time lived in the immediate area of the Dunbar 
School, the location of the school in the western area of the zone 
designed by the Board would certainly deter a black from moving 
into the eastern area of the zone.



I

I'

- 11 -

In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  p r e d e c e s s o r s  of t h e  d e f e n d a n t  Board deterred 
Negro m i g r a t i o n  into certain a r e a s  of t h e  F r a y s e r  community after 
i t  was annexed i n December , 1958.  This was accomplished by entering 
into a contract with t h e  county to bus the sparsley located Negro 

|| pupils to Negro schools in the county to avoid assigning them to 
the already established white schools in the Frayser area, or in 

| the alternative, providing separate and equal facilities for the 
| blacks.

The location and construction of schools by school authorities 
is a factor to be considered in the determination of the discrlmina- 

| tory actions of a school board. Swan, page 21; Pavla v. School Dlst. 
j of Pontiac, Mich., 443 F2d 573 (1971), affirming (E.D. Mich.), 309 

| l  Fed. Supp. 734 (1970).
|j In Swan the Supreme Court said:
j |  "The objective is to dismantle the dual school

system. 'Racially neutral' assignment plans pro­
posed by school authorities to a district court 

'] may be inadequate; such plans may fall to counter­
act the continuing effects of past school segrega­
tion resulting from discriminatory location of 

ll school sites or distortion of school 6 ize in
order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial 

|i separation. When school authorities present a
district court with a 'loaded game board', afflrma- 

l| tive action in the form of remedial altering of
attendance zones is proper to achieve truly non- 
discriminatory assignments. In short, an assign­
ment plan is not acceptable simply because it 
appears to be neutral." Page 28.

i1 In 1917 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Louisville, 
Kentucky ordinance which prohibited white and "colored" from 
occupying residences in a block wherein the greater number of 
residences were occupied by the opposite race. Buchanan v. Warley,j 
245 U. S. 60. The opinion by Mr. Justice William R. Day analyzes 
various cases of the Supreme Court which had Involved segregation 

Ut-»\ ‘ f > ' * 3  f •



- 12 -

of the races in the light o f  the Fourteenth Amendment. Following
that analysis the opinion contains the f o l l o w i n g  p a r a g r a p h :

" Tha t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a s e r i o u s  and d i f f i c u l t  probl em 
i a r i s i n g  from a f e e l i n g  ot  r a c e  h o s t i l i t y  w hi c h t h e
■I law i s  p o w e r l e s s  to  c o n t r o l ,  a n i  t o  whi ch i t  must

g i v e  a mea sur e o f  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,  r a v  be f r e e l y  a d ­
m i t t e d .  But  i t s  s o l u t i o n  c a n no t  be promoted by d e ­
p r i v i n g  c i t i z e n s  o l  t n e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s  and 
p r i v i l e g e s . "  Supra a t  page 60.

In regard to the over-all issue of one-race schools, this Court 
| concludes that the proof establishes that the defendant Board and 
;j its predecessors have played a significant role in establishment

I
 of the present large number of one-race schools which have resulted 

from discrimination by numerous persons and groups. Therefore, 
it Is Incumbent upon the Court to require the Board to request that 
the team of the Division make recommendations to the defendant 
Board for ways that it should amend its present plan of desegrega­
tion to the end that the Memphis schools will be in compliance with 
the Constitution of the United States.|l

A second issue set forth in the order of the Court which called
jj for the preliminary evidentiary hearing was as follows:
i "What limitations should be placed upon the team of
1 educators heretofore designated bv the Division of
I' Equal Educational Opportunities to make recommendations
,1 to the defendant Board for further desegregation of the

defendant system?"
The defendant Board and the administrative personnel earnestly 

assert that the one-race school dilemma should not be resolved by 
| any form of transportation of students to correct the racial im- 
j| balance. However, it Is apparent that the segregation evidenced by 

the one-race schools caused by discrimination cannot be effectively 
1 eliminated In the near future without transporting some students.
*i Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has held that the conversion• i

from the dual systems to the unitary system Is Judged by Its 
"effectiveness". Swan, at page 25, Alexander v. Holmes County

» i  f i b  I v  p .  ! J .



-14-

and the  p r e s e n t  p l a n  o f  d e s e g r e g a t i o n ,  i n c l u i i n g  t h e  l o c a t i o n  of 
new s c h o o l s ,  has been i n some mea sur e s a n c t i o n e d  by t h i s  C our t  and 

j t h e  a p p e l l a t e  c o u r t s .

Many o f  t h e  s c h o o l s  have been b u i l t  o r  added to since Brown v. 
Board o f  Ed. o f  T o p e k a , 349 U.S. 294 (1954). I t  should be noted 
that the early reaction to the Brown case was that the school 
authorities met their responsibility i f  they did not deny any 
person the right to attend a school on account of race. See 

j Briggs v. Elliott. 132 F. Supp. 776,777 (E.D. S.C., 1955) (Three 
1 Judge Court).

Early in the long history of this case the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, in 1962, said:

i! "Minimal requirements for nonracial schools are 
geographic zoning, according to the capacity and 
facilities of the buildings and admission to a 

i, school according to residence as a matter of right."
302 F2d at page 823.
The defendant system was also permitted to embrace the widely 

li used concept of basing its desegregation plan upon the voluntary 
choice of its students or their parents. This was considered by 
many to be a permissible method of desegregating former dual 

|j systems until 1968, when the opinions in Green, Raney, and Monroe 
' ware filed, 391 U.S. 430,443, 450. In Green the court referred
I to the affirmative duty to desegregate which a school board has.

Since that time this Court has approved the Board's basic 
geographic zone plan.without busing ,subject to the modifications whlcl 
this Court required in the light of the then announced opinions.
After the present remand, pursuant to Swan, pages 26 and 27, this I .
Court ordered the defendants to reopen the transfer period prior 

' to the commencement of the current school year and to offer trana- i
II _ i

p o r t a t l o n  on the  p u b l i c  t r a n s i t  a u t h o r i t y ' s  r e g u l a r l y  s c h e d u l e d

r  d  LI- 1 ( j ■ T



- L >-
u ter all pupils who wished CO transfer

troti a rij.'ricv assignment to a xmority ass igrunent . This prompted 
2,9 aaitci.raL requests tor transfers.

This Court cr-cluies chat the recocuuendations to be made bv 
the tear., educ a t iona 11 v, should be sound and practical ways ot

>1 a:hievine the greatest possible decree of desegregation in the|i
light of the circumstances which now exist.

On Page 22 and 23 of swan t h e  Supreme Court  s t a t e d :

"The target ct the cases from Brown I to the present 
was the dual school svstem. The elimination of racial 
discrimination in public schools is a large task and 
one that should not be retarded by efforts to achieve 
broader purposes lving beyond the jurisdiction ot 
school autuorities. One vehicle can carry only a 
limited amount of bageage. It would not serve the 
important oDjectiee of brown I to 6eek to use Sehool 
desegregation cases for purposes beyond their scope, 
although desegregation of schools ultimately will 
have impact on other forms of discrimination."
The impact of school desegregation on other forms of discrimina­

tion in the community referred to in ywan cannot be an immediate 
panacea for all of the many problems to which racial discrimination 
has contributed. These problems include poverty among many Negroes, 
housing segregation and racial prejudice and hostility. Punitive 
motives for wrongs of the past should not play a part In recommenda­
tions to correct the present racial imbalance.

The hearing was primarily for the purpose of determining what 
guidelines should be given the team of educators who will make a 
further investigation Into the facts and make specific recommenda­
tions to the defendant Board. Therefore, the Court did not permit I 
any proof on the methods to be used for further desegregation and th. 
feasibility of the possible methods. This will be dona after the j 
recommendations are made. At that time the Court will also con- !

\ \ \ ^ l l1 1 '>' .K | : ■ I T



- lb-

si'^1' the feasibility of the plan which plaintiffs wish to offer 
through the expert hired by them.

Because this system's desegregation problems are so complex, 
the Court is of the opinion that the team should be requested to 
file alternate sets of recommendations. One set of recommendations 
shall not have any minimum or maximum percentage factor. It shall 
be based upon the maximum use of pairing adjacent or nearby schools 
without transportation, changing rone lines of adjacent or nearby 
school zones, and closing some schools, plus the minimum use of 
transportation of students by clustering, pairing noncontiguous 
zones ,or other methods. 1

The term "minimum use of transportation" cannot be precisely 
defined by time or distance due to the size and location of streets, 
traffic conjestlon and other factors. The term is meant to refer 
to the use of transportation for certain particularly adaptable 
areas or situations, to the end that one-race schools shall be 
minimized. The term is Intended to mean less than city-wide trans­
portation. It could mean, if necessary, an initial phase of |
eventuallv overcoming one-race schools completely in conjunction

morewith future construction, coupled with the future use of/trans- 
portation.

The other set of recommendations shall be based upon an attempt 
to desegregate all schools necessary to the maintenance of the ,

system so that no school will have a minority race of less than 
30%. This set of recommendations shall not be based entirely on 
busing. It,coo, should make use of ocher desegregation methods i
before transportation la to be used.

Both sets of recommendations shall be subject to the transporta-

M H m  ‘ u • c -



-17-

tion limitation referred to in Swan on page 10, namely, that the 
time or distance of travel must not be "so great as to either 
risk the health of the student or significantly impinge on the 
educational process."

All tecoimiendations shall be limited to changes which are 
educationally sound in the opinion of the members of the team and ' 
in the light of the mandate of the Supreme Court to obtain the 

I greatest possible degree of actual desegregation taking into 
i account the practicability of the situation. Any schools necessary 

to the maintenance of the system which cannot be desegregated under 
these limitations must remainone-race or virtual one-race schools 

lj until housing patterns change or new schools are provided. Swan. 
jl page 25.

Because the team is composed of educators they shall not be 
|| charged with determining the economic feasibility of their recomment 

datlons. They are directed to determine the estimated cost of
1 the transportation which they recommend, and in order to do so,
li they should request additional assistance in the form of experienc-
I ed consultants for this phase of the recommendations. The Court 
will then hear proof on the economic feasibility or practicability

II of transportation as a remedy for the one-race schools.
The team should consider In Its recommendations the already

;i!! determined annexation for another southern portion of Shelby County. 
Into the City of Memphis, effective for school purposes at the be­
ginning of the school year 1972-73. The team should also consider 
what effect the presently proposed'plana of the Board for new site 
acquisitions and school construction will have on desegregation and■ii 1make recommendations in thellght thereof. The team should also

» i
1 consider the changes in the plan proposed by the Board, including



}
!i

- 18 -  ’

tlu' -̂li iii.iLi.n ,i .iju ii-ti.-u in; 1'iroc of s t u d e n t s  living on bound­
a r y  s t r e e t s  and on s t r e e t s  d e s i g n a t e d .as "pockets and coves"; the 
c l u s t e r i n g  and p a i r i n g  o f  O a k v i l l e ,  G o o d l e t t  and Shefield Schools;

I anc* tbu 2one c ha ng e s  t o  be t . ie tor I ester-Carpenter, East and
Treadwell Schools. With regard to the Lester-Carpenter, East and i 

|. Treadwell plan changes, the Board is directed to file the specific! Ij provisions of those proposed changes within two weeks from the date 
li of the filing of this decision. I

Prior to the recently concluded hearing, the Board filed a 50 
|| Pa8e brochure on the front of which was printed, "The Memphis Plan". 
This pamphlet includes an argument against desegregation of schools 
by the use of busing which ignores certain basic constitutional

I'j;  principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. The writer of the
I pamphlet also proposes a new direction in education In Memphis 
whereby the Board will undertake, by educational and socially 
oriented projects, to attack the effects of prior racial dlacrimlna-'

j: tlon on the entire community. While some of the motives of the' Ibrochure are laudable and clearly within the Board's power to pursue,
the proposals are indefinite and the money has not been approved 

|l for these innovative ideas. Tn the opinion of the Court this docu­
ment contains more propaganda than substance and, therefore, shouldII

i not be considered as a desegregation plan which would meet the re-
I qulrements of Swan and Davis and the remand of the Court of Appeaia,

The proof in the hearing also establishes other factora which
II i
1 the team should carefully consider. There are many achools in 
.which there is excess classroom space based upon both the optimum
:l V  , jand maximum capacities. While there is no invariable pattern,
' 7/ The optimum capacity is less than 'the maximum because It Is based 
upon a use of the facilities which contemplates special educational 
programs which require work space.

i Mil • ' - . •



-19-

many of these schools are older, where the facilities require more 
maintenance costs and the size of the tract on which the school is 
located does not meet modern standards.

The more recently annexed areas contain, as a general rule, 
larger school zones. This is due to less density of population. 
Before the annexation these areas were afforded transportation if 1 
the pupils lived more than one and a half miles from the school. 
Furthermore, it would appear that transportation of pupils has 
advantages to offer in those areas,in addition to overcoming racial! 
imbalance, such as the safety of the students by not having to :
walk along thoroughfares for great distances in some cases. I

The proof reflects that the area in the south part of Memphis 
to the Mississippi line has definite school racial patterns with 
regard to the present schools. The black schools are in tha 
western sector, for the most part, and the white schools are in 
the eastern sector with the several mixed schools between the two 
sectors. I

In the Frayser area, the northernmost area of tha city, sixteen 
of the seventeen schools are all white, or virtually all white; 
whereas, the portion of Memphis which is immediately south of 
Frayser is overwhelmingly black. It would appear if transportation 
is employed, that the Wolf River and its unoccupied adjacent bottom 
lands, which separate Frayser from the remainder of the city, wouldj 
not be an Insurmountable barrier to desegregation.

There is in tha center of the city an area which has not yielded 
to the changing racial neighborhood patterns. Primarily, on its ; 
own, this area has withstood the problem of white flight as soma I 
blacks have moved into or transferred enrollment into the area.
This area deserves most of the credit for the desegregation that

i r. ’ b' - {



I
- 20 -

1 1 . 0  ovist t‘v.- s v - t i ' a .  For i i r p l o ,  it contains Bruce Elementary 
School, m u  o f  t h e  f o u r •f o r m e r l y  white schools to which a total 
o f  L3 b l a c k s  was a s s i g n e d  wlwn the system first broke the color 
line iii 19rl, sew n years after k_rc n I . The other three schools 
and many o t h e r  a d d i t i o n a l  rr.es in other parts of the city have 
f l i p p e d  from w h i t e  t o  black, but Bruce this year has 260 white 
and 22J black p u p i l s .  This area also contains Central High School, 
built in 1911 as a white high school. It has now 582 white and 
437 black students.

The census figures indicate that this area la declining in 
both white and non-white citizens. Therefore, the Board has, and 
presumably will continue to have,schools with classroom vacancies ( 
in this area. However, it appears to be beneficial to take ad- Ivantage of the willingness of citizens of that area to accommodate
desegregation without a total change of racial patterns in the
residential and school populations.

A third issue which the Court set forth in its order setting
the hearing was stated as follows:

"Should the administrative zones of the defendant 
system which became effective July l, 1971, be treat­
ed as Independent systems for desegregation recommenda­
tions?"
This inquiry was made by the team after its preliminary in­

vestigation. Very little proof presented at the hearing addressed )I
itself to this issue. These administrative zones were adopted

Iafter a study was made concerning the advisability of a program |
of decentralization of the administrative machinery of this large I
system. The geographic area of the entire system was divided Into : 
four zones and area superintendents were appointed to the end that

I ' l  l f r:> I



- 21 -

tho system would have closer contact with Its patrons. The zones 
do conform to school zone boundaries, but the administrative zone 
program was not designed as a vehicle for implementing a different 
method of desegregation, and it does not appear that the program 
was based upon discrimination. Therefore, the Court concludes that 
the team should use its own discretion in the determination of how 
the administrative zones should effectuate its recommendations 
However, it would appear that, other things being equal, inter­
zone problems of an administrative nature should not be created if 
they can be avoided.

A fourth issue designated for the hearing was stated as 
follows:

"What is the effect on desegregation of the portion 
of the existing plan which permits minority to minority 
and majority to majority transfers between zones?" I
At the final prehearing conference an auxiliary issue was added

at the suggestion of counsel for the plaintiffs as follows:
"Should transfers into the defendant system from other 

school systems be limited so that transfers will be 
granted only in a manner which enhances school desegre­
gation?"
Under the existing plan transfers from a majority zone school 

to a minority zone school are given first preference. Then, if 
spcae is available, students are allowed to transfer from majority 
to majority and minority to minority situations. Transfers for the 
following school year for all pupils already in the system are re­
quired to be requested in the spring of each year based upon the 
racial makeup of the school determined shortly after the first of 
January. The actual transfer is not granted until all of the re­
quests are processed during the summer.



- 22-

For the current year the transfers were granted as follows;
Majority to minority - 1337 
Majority to majority - 8434 
Minority to minority - 278
Majority to majority transfers were allowed by the Court to 

permit the students and patrons to accommodate personal and 
necessary changes of schools without affecting the majority racial 
makeup of any school. However, the proof establishes that the 
present plan permits, in some instances, what the Court is trying 
to defeat. For example, Fairvlew Junior High School is a school 
which was built as an all white school in 1930, and it remained 
all white in its attendance until 1965-66. It has an optliman 
capacity of 864 students and a maximum capacity of 950. In recent 
years it has experienced an increasing black enrollment but an 
overall steadily declining total enrollment. In the school year
1969- 70 it had 410 students, 266 of whom were white and 144 of 
t*iom were black. Before the commencement of the 1970-71 school year
its zone boundaries were changed which resulted in an attendance of 
316 whites and 212 blacks. Therefore, for transfer purposes it 
remained a school which was majority white. This year it has 252 
whites and 309 blacks. However, the transfer records indicate that 
the Junior high school students who actually live in the sone are 
made up of 432 white and 278 black students. Therefore, 190 white 
students have transferred to other white schools as members of the 
majority race, but by actual attendance Fairvlew la now a majority 
black school.

A similar problem at Bellevue Junior High School was met by 
declaring it a majority black school based upon the attendance in
1970- 71 of 315 whites and 385 blacks. 209 majority to majority 
black transfers were granted for the current year; whereas, the
fVtt i. i ’ ' >' • i , y



-23-

r a c i a l  makeup o f  j u n i o r  hi gh  sch.  .'1 s t u d e n t s  who actually live in 
the  zone i s  202  w h i t e  and 1 «b b l . i c k .

Ot he r  z o n e -  a l s o  r e f l u .  t s u b s t a n t i a l  w h i t e  transfers when the 
b l a c k  [■  pulat ii.-n a p p r o a c h . » t h e  w h i t e ,  even though the actual 
m a j o r i t y  r a c e  lias not  c h an ge d.  C e n t r a l  High S c h o o l  has attendance 
f i g u r e s  o f  437 b l a c k  s t u d e n t s  and 582 w h i t e s  f o r  a total of 1019 
i n  f a c i l i t i e s  w i t h  an optimum capacity o f  1200 students. However, 
t h e  makeup o f  t h e  s t u d e n t s  a c t u a l l y  living in the zone is 97 blacks 
and 688 w h i t e s .

From the proof it is apparent that adjustments should be made 
to the majority to majority transfer provisions if the existing 
plan of desegregation were to be continued. However, because i
the Court has directed the team to present recommendations per­
taining to the student assignment plan of the Board, the Court 
will not prescribe any changes in the transfer provisions st this 
time. The members of the team are directed to consider the nature 
and results of the present transfers in determining their recommen­
dations to the Board. The team is further directed to make recommen­
dations on what transfer provisions, if any, should be Incorporated ii 
the d e s e g r e g a t i o n  plan o f  the Board In the light of their other 
recommendations. |

With regard to the auxiliary issue pertaining to nonresident 
transfers, the proof shows that during the present year there are

|

a total of 198 nonresident students attending 45 of the defendant 
schools. Most of these students live in Shelby County outside the 
corporate city limits.

Under the present plan the defendants must assign them to a 
school which has the same majority race as the one to which they 
would be assigned if they attended public school where they live.

i t t tJ' '■'* r  j  • * ‘

'V>. 1



-24-

There is no proof to show that the defendants are not complying 
with the plan, and the number of pupils has such a negligible
effect on the racial makeup of the defendant schools that thisi

I Court is of the opinion that no change should be made in the exist- 
; ing plan at this time. i

For the further guidance of the team, the Court is of the 
l opinion that it should take judicial notice of the widespread
P
jj hostility to busingstudents as a means of correcting the imbalance.! 
i This hostility creates grave problems for the team, the Board, the 

Court, the staff, the teachers and the students. However, the 
] law is clear and emphatic that a school board may not continue 
It to maintain a segregated system because there is disagreement with i
I the necessary methods of desegregating the system. Monroe v.

Board of Commissioners Jackson, Tennessee. 391 U.S. 450,459 (1968).
Our system of government contemplates that differences, properly 

sought to be resolved in the courts, shall be determined on the 
! basis of the facts presented in court artd the law applicable totl those facts presented under the court's rules of procedure. A

court is not permitted to vary from the law due to Influence or
i| pressure from those who do not agree with the requirements of the

law. This Court is committed to that principle and will follow
it to the best of its ability. The Court expects the members of , I
the team designated by the Division also to reject all pressures
from outside sources. To that end, the Court reiterates a portion of

IIits order wherein the Court requested the Division to assist this 'I: I
Board. This Court in its Order Pertaining to Assistance, entered
July 27, 1971, provided as follows:

"The role of the Division and its designated personnel 
shall be to obtain the necessary factual Information and

fu iff • ■ f '<;• +



-25-

li
!i
IIi1
j!

to make objective recommendations in the light there­
of. Such recommendations shall be based upon sound 
educational policies with due regard for the constitu­
tional rights of all persons within the geographical 
limits of the defendant system."
"Any attempt to interfere with or influence the 

objectivity of the recommendations by any person or 
group shall be ignored by the Division personnel and 
reported to the Court as soon as possible." |

The team is directed to commence immediately to further investigate 
the defendant system in the light of this decision and to present 
its recommendations to the Board with a copy to the Court and to 
counsel for the plaintiffs as soon as possible. Counsel for the 
plaintiffs are also directed to reduce to writing the recommenda­
tions for changes in the existing plan which they advocate. These 
recommendations will be filed with the Court and with counsel for 
the defendants within two days after the recommendations of the 
team are delivered to counsel for the plaintiffs.

This 10th day of December, 1971.



APPENDIX C



J O H N  b .  B R O W D E R  

O r O N O E  b  L ' T T l E  

J A C K  H  n U S h G L L

1 aw Of r lets
R r o w d e u . K t's s e i .l . L i t t l e  and  Mo r r is

J A M E S  w .  M t " > R I S .  I IT

P H I L I P  O M O I t n i S

N O  B E R T  G  B U r C H E R .  J R .

1510 Ross B uilding
R i c h m o n d . V i r g i n i a  U 3 2 i o A r e a  C o d e  7 0 3  

T e l e p h o n e  © < 4 . - 0 7 9 1
n u r U S  G .  C O L D A E L L .  J R .  

R O B E R T  M W H I T E  

J . T E R R V  M A N S I L V

D A V I D  O .  A O  Di  S  O N

R .  C A R T E R  S C O T T .  DI  

M A L C O L M  E . R l T N C H .  J R .  

J O H N  H . O U R ' O N .  P .

R .  H U N T E R  M A H  S C  N 
J A M E S  K . C i U V l  U I ’J S  

T H O M A S  B .  C A V i n S O N . J R  

T H O M A S  D  S T O K E S . T U

R . D. M cllw aine, III, E sq u ire
P . O. Box 705
P etersb u rg , V irgin ia  23803

D ear Bob:

On April 23, 1971, you indicated to Judge M erhige that D r. 
Cam pbell would be happy to cooperate in m eeting with the other Superin­
tendents for purposes of d iscu ssin g  im plem entation problem s and procedures 
about the consolidated plan. P le a se  check with D r. Cam pbell and give m e a 
c a ll as to a su itable tim e.

V ery  tru ly  you rs,

G eorge B . L ittle

G BL :app

CC: J .  M ercer W hite, J r . ,  E sq u ire

BCC: lorman J . Chachkin, Esquire

ftPPfPOlK c ,  p.(



I A  V'.' O f K K  I

j c h u  0. b r o w o t r

C l O « f i E  »  U  r Ti  F.
jack o Husscu B r o w d e r . R i . s s n . i . .  L i t t l e  a n d  M o r r i s

J A M E S  W.  MC H H I S ,  t i l

p m i  i p  n  M o u r n s  

R u O F I t T  f . . B U T C H n » ,  J R .  

R U I U S  O . c O L P W f l L . J R .

R i c h m o n d ,  V i r g i n i a  s d j m h
A r f .a  C o d e  7 0 3  

T e l e p h o n e  6 ^ 4 - 0 7 9 1

H O N t . n T  M.  W H I T E

.1. t e r r y  p a r s l e y
July 14, 11)71

D A V I D  D .  A D D I S O N  

R  . C A R !  E  R S C O T T .  I l l  
M A L C O L M  E .  K I T S C H .  . i M.  

J O H N  M.  O B R I O N .  J R  

R .  H U N T E R  M A N S O N  

J A M E S  K.  C L U V L R I U S  

T H O M A S  B  D A V I D S O N ,  J R  

T H O M A S  D.  L i T O K E S . U I

J .  S eg nr G ravatt, E squ ire  
105 E ast Elm  S tree t 
B lack sto n e , V irgin ia

D ear Segar:

0)i A pril 23, 1971, you indicated to Judge M erhige that you would 
be happy to cooperate in getting together the Superintendents of the th ree  s y s ­
tem s tor purposes of d iscu ssin g  im plem entation d eta ils  and problem s of the 
consolidated school plan. When we c h a tte l about such a m eeting in May, you 
indicated that D r. K elly would need m ore tim e to study the plan b efo re  con­
ferrin g  about it.

We have about one month to tr ia l ,  and I would ap p recia te  your 
checking with D r. K elly  and then ca llin g  me about a tim e and p lace .

1 would also  lik e  you to cheek on the. ad m inistrative organization
chart and the testin g  sc o re s  which w ere requested  and le t  m e know when they 
will be availab le.

V ery tru ly yours

Gc „ _ )

BCC: lorman J .  Chachkin, Esquire

(\?(>£>n>iy C, f-2-

i



J. S t  C A R  G  RAN'ATT 
A T T O R N  PY AT 1 A W  
100 past ri M m m -tt

D U A C K S T O N t . V l P X I M  1A 2 3 B 2 4

July 1 9 ,  1971

Mr. George B.  Li tt le  
Browder, R u s s e l l ,  .Little & Morris 
1510 Ross  Building 
Richmond, Virginia . 23219  ^

Rc: R ichm ond-H enrico-C hester f ie ld  School Consolidation

Dear George:

forward as  precipitously as  he indicated might be the c a s e  on April 23

decided before we can proceed beyond that point.

I have your le t ter  of July 14 .  
that  the Judge does not feel

ter of July 14 .  I have gathered from the ex p res s io n s  of the court 
does not fee l  that this c a s e  is  as  urgent and must be pushed

I do not re c a l l  any conversation on this  s u b je c t  in May. 
seems to me that we will  have to try this c a s e  and have

t re c a l l  any conversation on this  s u b je c t  in M ay.  In any ev en t ,  it 
to me that we will  have to try this c a s e  and have the i s s u e  of merger

I am enc los in g  to you herewith a axagraj 
and of the Chesterf ie ld  school  system a

herewith a diagram of the administrative organisation 
d school  system as previously requested.

JSG: smr

En closure



I

APPENDIX Dt

t
/



I

I

I

of Schools 
State Capitol 
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Dear Sirs.;

The Department of Justice has received a 
written complaint, that children attending the all- 
Negro Lincoln Heights, Ohio, public scnools are 
being deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
I am writing you to infoi/m you of our authority and 
responsibilities with respect to public school dese­
gregation, upon receipt of such a complaint, and the 
results of our investigation to date.

Our jurisdiction in this matter is based on 
Section 407 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000c-6, a copy of which is attached. 
Our authority depends upon receipt of a written 
complaint,

signed by a parent or group of parents 
to the effect that his or their minor 
children, an members of a class of per­
sons similarly situated, are being de­
prived by a school board of the equal 
protection of the laws . . . .
Section 407 provides that when the Attorney 

General certifies, among other things, that he be­
lieves the complainant unable to sue, for reasons 
set out in the Section, he may file an action for 
appropriate relief in the federal district court, 
after giving the school board notice of the complaint 
and a reasonable opportunity to take corrective action.



vV

/
The Act defines "school board" as meaning 

"any agency or agencies which administer a system 
of one or more public schools, and any.other agency 
which is responsible for the assignment of students 
to or within such system."

When we receive such a complaint, we have a 
responsibility to investigate whether the allegations 
are correct. If the investigation shows, in our 
judgment, that the school board has in fact denied 
the complainants equal protection of the lav; in its 
obligation to the complainants, we give the notice 
required by Title IV. At this time, we seek to resolve 
the matter by voluntary agreement, offering to have a 
Division attorney meet with district officials. If 
the problems are not resolved on a voluntary basis, 
the Attorney General has a responsibility, in appro­
priate cases, to present the matter to the federal 
courts.

Our investigation to date provides us with 
reasonable cause to believe that the children of 
Lincoln Heights arc being deprived of the equal pro­
tection of the laws. Some of the facts which lead 
us to this conclusion arc:

(1) The Lincon Heights school 
district appears to have been created
as an all-Negro district, by the actions 
of surrounding white districts which 
refused to allow Lincoln Heights to be 
affiliated with them.

(2) This all-Negro school district, 
with a per pupil tax base less than 1/4 
the county average, cannot and has not 
provided an educational program meeting mini­
mum state requirements. Our understanding
of Ohio law is that under such circumstances 
the school system is to be decertified and 
combined with the appropriate neighboring 
system or systems. [Ohio Revised Code §3301.16.]

|V'

i



(3) All students in Lincoln Heights 
are Negroes and they are taught almost 
exclusively by Negro teachers, while most 
students in surrounding systems are white 
and they are taught almost exclusively by 
white teachers. This results from the 
maintenance of Lincoln Heights as a separate, 
all-Negro, underfinanced district. The 
failure of the Board to take steps to 
consolidate Lincoln with appropriate 
districts as Ohio lav? seems to require, . 
in my view, constitutes a denial of equal 
protection of the law'.
Mr. Robert 0. Greer, Assistant State School Super­

intendent for Urban Affairs, has informed us that the 
Ohio State Board of Education is aware of the deficiencie 
in the Lincoln Heights school district and is preparing 
to take action under Ohio Revised Code, §3301.16 to 
remedy them. In order that I might fulfill my responsi­
bilities under, the Civil Rights Act I should appreciate 
your advising me of the steps your department is taking 
to adjust the conditions described in this, letter.

Thank you for the courtesies and assistance 
extended to my representative by your staff, particu­
larly Mr. Greer. I look forward to continued close 
cooperation in fulfilling our mutual responsibilities 
in this matter.

'vV v \‘j! y : . ‘p; 6



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD BRADLEY, et al..

P l a i n t i f f sv.

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al . ,

Defendants
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS.
LOCAL #231. AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,

Def endar.t- 
Ir.tervenor

and

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,

Defendants- 
Intervenor

RULING ON 2SSUS OF SEGREGATION 
This action was commenced August 18, 1970, by 

plaintiffs, the Detroit Branch of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People and individual parents and 
students, on behalf of a class later defined by order of the 
Court dated February 16, 1971, to include "all school children 
of the city of Detroit and all Detroit resident parents who 
have children of senool age." Defendants are the Board of 
Education of the City of Detroit, its members and its former 

superintendent of schools. Dr. Norman A. Drschler, the Governor, 
A*-torney General, state Board of Education ana State Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan. In 
uheir complaint, plaintiffs attacked e statute of the State 
of Michigan known as Act 48 of the 19T0 Legislature on the

The standing of the NAACP 3s a proper party plaintiff was 
not contested by tt.e original defendants and the Court expresses 
no opinion on the matter.

A i K t t  c o p y
FREDERICK W JOHNS

™ 2 L

CIVIL ACTION NO: 
35257

i'E Nt t N (p- I



ground that it put tne state ot fcicr.igan in the position of 
^constitutionally interfering w . th the execution and operation 
.fa voluntary plan of partial h^gh school desegregation 
Otnown as the April 7, 1970 Plan) which had been adopted by 
the Detroit Board of Education to be effective beginning with 
the fall 1970 semester. Plaintiffs also alleged that the 
Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the 
basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions 
of the defendants and their predecessors in office.

Additional parties have intervened in the litigation 
since it was commenced. The Detroit Federation of Teachers 
(DFT) which represents a majority of Detroit Public school 
teachers in collective bargaining negotiations with the defendant 
Board of Education, has intervened as a defendant, and a group 
of parents has intervened as defendants.

Initially the matter was tried on plaintiffs' aotion
for preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of 
Act 48 so as to permit the April 7 plan to be iag>lsmented. On 
that issue, this Court ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled 
to a preliminary injunction since there had been no proof that 
Detroit has a segregated school system. The Court of Appeals 
found that the "implementation of the April 7 plan wee thwarted 
by State action in the form of the Act of the Legislature of 
Michigan, (433 F.2d 897, 902), and that such action could not 
be interposed to delay, obstruct or nullify steps lawfully 
taken for the purpose of protecting rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

The plaintiffs then sought to have this court direct 
the defendant Detroit Board to implement the April 7 Plan by

(t\V. I \ "• . -2-



the start of the second semester (February, 1971) in order to 
remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights wrought by the 
unconstitutional statute. in response to an order of the Court, 
defendant Board suggested two other plans, along with the 

April 7 Plan, and noted priorities, with top priority assigned 
to the so-called "Magnet Plan." The Court acceded to the 
wishes of the Board and approved the Magnet Plan. Again, 
plaintiffs appealed but the appellate court refused to pass 
on the merits of the plan. Instead, the case was remanded 
with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial on the 

merits of plaintiffs' substantive allegations about the Detroit 
School System. 438 F .2d 945 (6 th cir. 1971).

Trial, limited to the issue of segregation, began 
April 6 , 1971 and concluded on July 22. 1971, consuming 41 
trial days, interspersed by several brief recesses necessitated 
by other demands upon the time of Court and counsel. Plaintiffs 

introduced substantial evidence in support of their contentions, 
including expert and factual testimony, dessinstrative exhibits 
and school board documents. At the close of plaintiffs’ case, 
in chief, the Court ruled that they had presented a prime facie 
case of state imposed segregation in the Detroit Public Schools; 
accordingly, the Court enjoined (with certain exceptions) all
further school construction in Detroit pending the out-- i
of the litigation.

The State defendants urged motions to dissiiss as to 
them. These were denied by the Court.

At the close of proofs intervening parent defendants 
(Denise Magdowski, et al.) filed a motion to join, as parties 35 
contiguous "suburban” school districts - all within the so-

f.-3-



called Larger Detroit Metropolitan ere*. flu. notioe w

taken under advisement pending the determinerion of the ie.u.
of segregation.

It should be noted that, in accordance with earlier 
rulings of the Court, proofs suheiitted at previous hearings 
in the cause, were to be and are considered a. part of the
proofs of the hearing on the merits.

In considering the present racial connexion of the 
City of Detroit and its public school system we m a t  first look 
to the past and view in perspective what has happened in the 

last half century. m  1920 Detroit was . predominantly white 
city - 9 1% - and it. population younger than in more recent 

times. By the year 1960 the largest se^sent of the city*s 

white population was in the age range of 3 5 to 50 years, while 

its black population war younger and of childbearing age. The 
population of 0-15 years of age constituted 30% of the total 
population of which 60* were white and 40X were black. Xn 
1970 the white population was principally aging— 45 years—  

while the black population was younger and of childbeering age. 
Childbearing blacks equaled or exceeded the total white 
population, as older white families without children of 
school age leave the city they are replaced by younger black 
families with school age children, resulting in a doubling 
of enrollment in the local neighborhood school and a ooagtlete 
change in student population from whits to black. As black 
inner city residents move out of the core city they "leap-frog* 
the residential areas nearest their former homes and move to 
areas recently occupied by whites.

The population of the City of Detroit reached its

1



highest point in 1950 and has bean declining by approximately 
69,500 per decade since than. in 1950. tha city population 
constituted 61% of tha total population of tha standard 
metropolitan araa and in 1970 it was but 36* of tha netro- 
politan araa population. Tha suburban population has 
increased by 1.978.000 sinca 1940. There has baan a stoady 
out-migration of tha Oatroit population sinca 1940. Detroit 
today is principally a conglomerate of poor black and white 
plus the aged. of tha aged, 80* are white.

If tha population trends evidenced in tha federal 
decennial census for the years 1940 through 1970 continue, 
the total black population in the City of Detroit In 1900 
will be approximately 840.000. or 53.6* of tha total. The 
total population of the city in 1970 is 1.511.000 and. if 
past trends continue, will be 1.338,000 in 1980. In school 
year 1960-61, there ware 285,512 students in tha Detroit 
Public Schools of which 130,765 were black. In school year 
1966-67, there were 297,035 students, of which 168.299 ware 
black. In school year 1970-71 there vara 289,743 students of 
which 184,194 were black. The percentage of black students 
in the Detroit Public Schools in 1975-76 will be 72.OK. 
in 1980-81 will be 80.7% and in 1992 it will be virtually 
icu% if the present trends continue. In 1960, tha non whits 
population, ages 0 years to 19 years, was as followsi

0 - 4 y««ri 4 2*
5 - 9 /•art 36*

1 0 - 14 years 20*
15 - 19 years 18*



In 1970 the non-white population, ages 0 /ears to 19 years 
was as follows:

0 - 4 y e a r s 48%
5 - 9 y e a r s 50%

1 0 - 14 y e a r s 50%
15 - 19 y e a r s 40%

The black population as a percentage of the total population
in the City of Detroit was:

(a) 1900 1.4%
(b) 1910 1 .2%
(c) 1920 4.1%
(d) 1930 7.7%
(e) 194 0 9.2%
(f) 1950 16.2%
<g> 1960 28.9%
(h) 1970 43.9%

The black population as a percentage of total student 

population of the Detroit Public Schools was as followsi

(a) 1961 45.8%
(b) 1963 51.3%
(c) 1964 53.0%
(d) 1965 54.8%
(e) 1966 56.7%
(f) 1967 58.2%

(9) 1968 59.4%
(h) 1969 61.5%
(i) 1970 63.8%

V t£ , -6-

H



For the years indicated the housing characteristic, in the 
City of Detroit were a. follows:

(a) 1960 total supply of housing
units was 553.000

(b) 1970 total supply of housing
units was 530,770

The percentage decline in the white students in the 
Detroit Public Schools during the period 1961-1970 (53.6% 
in 1960; 34.8% in 1970) has been greater than the percentage 

decline in the white population in the City of Detroit during 
the same period (70.8% in I960; 55.21% in 1970). and 

correlatively, the percentage increase in black students in 
he Detroit Public Schools during the nine-year period 1961- 
1970 (45.8% in 1961; 63.8% in 1970) has been greater than the 
percentage increase in the black population of the City of 
Detroit during the ten-year period 1360-1S70 {25.Tm  in 
I960, 43.9% in 1970). in 1961 there were eight schools in 
the system without white pupils and 7 3 school, with no 
Negro pupils. m  1970 there were 30 school, with no 
white pupils and 11 schools with no Negro pupils, an 

increase in the number of schools without white pupil, of 
22 and a decrease in the number of school, without 
Negro pupils of 62 in this ten-year period. Between 

1968 and 1970 Detroit experienced the largest increase in 
percentage of black students in the student population of any 
major northern school district. The percentage increase in 
Detroit was 4.7% as contrasted with _

New York 2.0%
Los Angeles 1.5%
Chicago

if O' c . f -7-

1.9%



Ph 1 ladelph1a 1.7*
Cleveland 1.7*
Milwaukee 2.6*
St. Louis 2.6*
Columbus 1.4*
Indianapolis 2.6*
Denver 1.1*
Boston 3.2*
San Francisco 1.5*
Seattle 2.4*

In 1960, there were 26o schools in the Detroit 
School System. in 1970, there were 319 schools in the 
Detroit School System.

In the Western, Northwestern, Northern, Hurray. 
Northeastern, Kettering, King and Southeastern high school 
service areas, the following conditions exist at a level 
significantly higher than the city average:

(a) Poverty in children
(b) Family income below poverty level
(c) Rate of homicides per population
(d) Number of households headed by feaales
(e) Infant mortality rate
(f) Surviving infants with 

defects
neurological

(9) Tuberculosis cases per 1 , 0 0 0 population
(h) High pupil turnover in schools

The City c f  Detroit is a community generally divided
by racial lines. Residential segregation within the city and 
throughout the larger metropolitan area 1 3 substantial, per­
v a s i v e  and of long standing. Black citizens are located in

( - 6 -



separate and distinct areas within the c u y  and are not 
generally to be found in the suburbs. While the racially 
unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factor, 
may have played some part in the developa^nt of thi. pattern 
of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result 

of past and present practices and customs of racial di.crimina 
tion, both public and private, which have and do restrict the 
housing opportunities of black people. On the record there 
can be no other finding.

Governmental actions and inaction at all levels, 
federal, state and local, have combined, with those of 

private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real 
estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and 
to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout 
the Detroit metropolitan area. it is no answer tc say that 
restricted practices grew gradually (as the black population 
in the area increased between 1920 and 1970), or that since 
1948 racial restrictions on the ownership of real property 
have been removed. The policies pursued by both government 

and private persons and agencies have a continuing and present 
effect upon the complexion of the conwunity - as we know, 

the choice of a residence is a relatively infrequent affair.
For many years FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the 
maintenance of ••harmonious" neighborhoods, i.e., racially 
and economically harmonious. The conditions created 
continue, while it would be unfair to charge the present 
defendants with what other governmental officers or agencies 
have done, it can be said that the action, or the failure to 
act by the responsible school authorities, both city and 
state, were linked to that of these other governmental units.

ftMfuOW £ f-9-



W*en we speak of .overrent a I action we ,hoald not vi.w tfc# 

different agencies a. a collection of unrelated unit.. 
Perhaps the mo.t that can be said is that all of th*o. 

including the school authorities, are. in part, re.pon.ibl. 
for the segregated condition which exi.ts. And w. not. th.t 

just as there i, an interaction between re.identi.l pattern, 
and the racial composition of the school., .o there i. • 

corresponding effect on the residential pattern by the r.ci.l 
composition of the schools.

Turning now to the specific and pertinent (for our
purposes, history of the Detroit school sy.t.m eo far .. it 
involves both the local school authorities and the .t.te 
school authorities, we find the following:

During the decade beginning in 1950 the Board 
created and maintained optional attendance rone, in neighbor- 
nooas undergoing racial transition and between high echool 

attendance areas of opposite predominant r.cial co^o.ition.. 
In 1959 there were eight bas.c optional attendance areas 
affecting 21 schools. Optional attendance area, provided 
pupils living within certain elementary area, a choice of 
attendance at one of two high schools. In addition there 
was at least one optional area either created or exi.tin, in 

1960 between two junior high school, of opposite predominant 
racial components. All of the high echool option.! .re.., 
except two, were in neighborhoods undergoing racial 
transition (from white to black) during th. 1950.. The two 
exceptions were: (1 , the option between Southwe.t.rn 
(61.6% black in 1960) and Western (15.3* black); (2) th. 

option between Denby (0* black) and Southeastern (30.9* black). 
With the exception of the Denby-Southeastern option (ju.t

5 y - lo-



noted) *u  “ • —  —  —  high

O W °*lt* Pr'd°"‘M "t —  Th. S o u t h e r n -
> ..... ... .11 whit.

“  “ * ‘95°- 1,60 -  > * "  --------- -- M k  s o u t h ™
,nd “ “">“ « « » •  ------ » «  .ubat.nti.l whit. w u

POP“liti°"- “  “ * —  —  — • -  .. .p. ^
T H , ......I, Probabla. for....bl. , c t u > 1  ^

“ “  OPti0,“ 1 ......... •“ «  — • ^ . . . . .  to ..gap.
identifiable "black" .-w ,

' “  ,Ch“° 1*' . . • » «  options
» n .  ( . ! » . „ « «  batwaao „ M  ,„d ^  _

. . .  to ..par... j... ,„d 0.„e u „  v a h l n  th> 
system,- the affect of which ... t„.t

^  " l’h S=h~ ‘ * «  youngetere .... td
Cooley. Although ..„y of ,h... eptio„., ..... ^

P“rP° ”  ^  **<> *“  “  '*• th.t mo.t o, th. .....
0 . 0  o.»m. pr.domin.ntly h,e„. o„. opt...., ....

»..t.t„ affecting hll.Oh duhior High gt.du.t.a, ^
the present school year , ,

y ( nd will continue to effect lith end
1 2 th grad. white young.ter. who elected to ..cep. 
predominantly h.ech Southw..t„„ to P t ^ , „ . „ t , y  whit.

" ,9h SCh°0 “ - Mr- "— SO", th. Board . f. „
"ho we. employed „ „  to. ynt^t aUa. ^ l o n a ,
•re... noted eh.t, ”i„ 0p.r.,i0„ „ . t„ n to

Oe still th. .chooi to which .hit. .tudent. ....p. ,r.  

Predominantly H.gro eurroundin, .chooi.,- Ih. 

eliminating this optional area (which affected only 10th 
Oreder. for the 1970-7, .chooi year, ... to d.cre... 

southwestern from H0.7, hlach in 1 * ,  lo h.ach 1. 1 „ 0 .

The Board, in the operation of its transportation 
to relievo overcrowding poli.-y. has admittedly bused black

iMtfi'-V t -It-



pupxls past or away fro. clo.er whit. .chool. with available 
space to black .chool.. Thi. practice ha. continued in 

several instance. xn recant year, de.pit. th. Board". avowed 
policy, adopted xn 1967. to utilize tr.n.portation to 
increase integration.

With one exceptxon (necea.xtated by the burning of 
a whxte school), defendant Board has never bused white

children to predominantly black school.. The Board ha. not 
bused whxte pupxls to black schools de.pxte the enor~>u. 
amount of space available xn xnner-cxty school.. There were 
22.961 vacant .eats xn schools 90** or more black.

The Board has created and altered attendance .ones, 
maintained and altered grade .tructures and created and 

altered feeder .chool pattern, xn a manner which ha. had the 
natural, pro-uole and act-al effect cf continuing black and 
white pupil, in racially segregated school.. The Board admits 
at least one instance where xt purposefully and intentionally 
buxlt and maintained a school and its attendance zone to 
contain black students. Througr.out the la.t decade (and 
presently) school attendance zones of oppo.xte racial 

composition, have been .eparated by north-.outh boundary lines, 
despite the Board's awareness Isxnce at l.a.t 1962; that 

drawing boundary lines in an east-west direction would result 
in significant integration. The natural and actual effect of 
these act. and failures to act ha. been the creation and 
perpetuation of school segregation. There has never been a 
feeder pattern or zoning change which placed a predominantly 
white residential .tea into a predominantly black school rone 
or feeder pattern. Every school which was 90* or more black 
in 1960. and which is still m  use today, remain. 90* or more

' V  c. r -i2-



bl-ck. Whereas 65.8* of Detroit's black student, attended 
90* or more black schools xn I960. 74.9* of the black students
attended 90* or more black schools during the 197C-71 school 
year.

The public schools operated by defendant Board are 
thus segregated on a racial basis. This racial segregation

is in part the result of the discriminatory acts and omissions 
of defendant Board.

In 1966 the defendant State Board of Education and 
Michigan Civil Rights Commission issued a Joint Policy State 

ment on Equality of Educational Opportunity, requiring that

Local school boards must consider the factor of 
racial balance along with other educational 
considerations in making decisions about selection 
of new school sites, expansion of present 
facilities . . . .  Each of these situations 
presents an opportunity for integration."

Defendant State Board's "School Plant Planning Handbook" requires 
that

Care in site location must be taken if a serious 
transportation problem exists or if housing 
patterns in an area would result in a school 
largely segregated on racial, ethnic, or socio­
economic lines."

The defendant City Board has paid little heed to these statements 
and guidelines. The State defendant, have similarly failed to 
take any action to effectuate these policies. Exhibit MM 
reflects construction (new or additional) at 14 schools which 
opened for use in 1970-71; of these 14 schools. 11 opened over 
90* black and one opened less than 10* black. School con­

struction costing $9,222,000 is opening at Northwestern High 
School w M c h  is 99.9-- black, and new construction opens at 

Brooks Junior High, which is 1.5* black, at a cost of $2,500,000.

I ' l ! ' - V  < .. -13-(



The construction at Brook. Junior High plays a dual a.gregatory 
role: not only is the construction segregated, it will result 

m  a feeder pattern change which will remove the la.t majority 
white school from the already almost all-black Mackenzie High 
School attendance area.

Since 1959 the Board has constructed at least 13 
small primary schools with capacities of from 300 to 400 pupils. 
This practice negates opportunities to integrate, “contains" 
the black population and perpetuates and compounds school 
segregation.

The State and its agencies, in addition to their 
general responsibility for and supervision of public eduction, 
have acted directly to control and maintain the pattern of 
segregation in the Detroit schools. The State refused, until 

"»on c. t..o legislature, to provide authorisation c*r 
funds for the transportation of pupils within Detroit reg.rdloe. 
of their poverty or distance from the school to which they 
were assigned, while providing in many neighboring, mostly 
white, suburban districts the full range of state supported 
transportation. This and other financial limitations, such 
as those on bonding and the working of the state aid formula 

whereby suburban districts were able to make far larger per 
pupil expenditures despite less tax effort, have created and 
perpetuated s y s t e m i c  educational inequalities.

The State, exercising what Michigan courts have held 
to be is "plenary power" which includes power "to use a 
stat .tory scheme, r.w Croat,, alter, reorganize or even dissolve 
a school district, despite any jes.re cf the school district, 
its board, or the inhabitants th re.f," acted to reorganize

| » * /• -14-



the school district of the City of Detroit.

The State acted through Act 48 to impede, delay 
and minimize racial integration in Detroit schools. The 

first sentence of Sec. 12 of the Act was directly related to 
the April 7, 1970 desegregation plan. The remainder of the 
section sought to prescribe for each school in the eight 
districts criterion of "free choice" (open enrollaient) and 
"neighborhood schools" ("nearest school priority acceptance"), 
which had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of 
segregation.

In view of our findir.as of fact already noted we 
think it unnecessary to parse in detail the activities of the 
local board and the state authorities in the area of school 
construction and the furnishing of school facilities. It is 
our conclusion that these 2cti"’t'e9 were in keeping, generally, 
with the discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated 
racial segregation in these schools.

It would be unfair for us not to recognize the 
many fine steps the Board has taken to advance the cause of 
quality education for all in terms of racial integration and 
human relations. The most obvious of these is in the field 
of faculty integration.

Plaintiffs urge the Court to consider allegedly 
discriminatory practices of the Board with respect to the 
hiring, assignment and transfer of teachers and school 
administrators during a period reaching back more than 15 
years. The short answer to that must be that black teachers 
and school administrative personnel were not readily available 
in that period. The Board and the intervening defendant union

-15-



have followed a most advanced ard exemplary course in adopting 
and carrying out what is called the "balanced staff concept" - 
which seeks to balance faculties in each school with respect 
to race, sex and experience, with primary emphasis on race. 
More particularly, we find:

1. With the exception of affirmative policies 
designed to achieve racial balance in instructional staff, no 
teacher in the Detroit Public Schools is hired, promoted or 
assigned to any school by reason of his race.

2. In 1956, the Detroit Board of Education adopted 
the rules and regulations of the Fair Employment Practices 
Act as its hiring and promotion policy and has adhered to 
this policy to date.

3. The Board has actively and affirmatively sought 
out and hired minority employees, particularly teachers and 
administrators, during the past decade.

4. Between 1960 and 1970, the Detroit Board of 
Education has increased black representation among its 
teachers from 23.3* to 42.1%, and among its administrators 
from 4.5* to 37.8*.

administrators
Detroit has a h 
than any other

igher proportion of black 
city in the country.

6 . Detroit ranked second to Cleveland in 1968 
among the 20 largest northern city school districts in the
percentage of blacks among the teaching faculty and in 1970
surpassed Cleveland by several percentage points.

f\H; '.'i • - ( -16-



7. The Detroit Board of Education currently 
employs black teachers in a greater percentage than the 

percentage of adult black persons in the City of Detroit.

8 . Since 1967. more blacks than whites have been 
placed in high administrative posts with the Detroit Board 
of Education.

9. The allegation that the Board assigns black 
teachers to black schools is not supported by the record.

10. Teacher transfers are not granted in the Detroit 
Public Schools unless they ccr.iorm with the balanced staff 
concept.

11. Between 1960 and 1970, the Detroit Board of 
Education reduced the percentage of schools without black 
faculty from 36.3* to 1.2*. and of the four schools current! 
without black faculty, three are specialized trade schools 
where minority faculty cannot easily be secured.

12. In 1968, of the ..u largest northern ;ity 
school districts, Detroit ranked fourth in the percentage 
of schools having one or more black teachers and third in

the percentage of schools having tnree or more black teachers.

13. In 1970, the Board held open 240 positions in 
schools with less than 25* black, rejecting white applicants 
for these positions until qualified black applican-s could 
be found and assigned.

14. In recent years, the Board has come under presene 
from large segments of the black community to assign male 
black administrators to predominant 1y black schools to serve

? f-17-



iS male role m°delS for nudents, bat such assignment* have
b*“  “ d* -Uh t„.
concept.

15. The numbers and percentage, of black teachers 
in Detroit increased from 2.275 and 21.6*. respectively.

^  1961' to 5.106 and 41,6*. respectively. in
October, 1970.

16. The number of schools by percent black of 
staffs changed from October, 1963 to October. 1970 a. 
follows:

Number of schools without 
decreased from 41, to 4 . black teachers--

Number of schools with more than 0* 
than 1 0* black teachers--decreased f but less 

tom 58, to 8 .
Total number of schools with less than 
teacher*— decreased from 99, to 1 2 . 10* black

Number of schools with 50* 
increased from 72, to 124. or more black teachers--

changed
17. The number of schools by percent black of staffs 

from October. 1969 to October. 1970. as follow.:

Number of schools 
from 6 , to 4 . without black teachers— decreased

Number of schools 
1 0* black teachers with more than 0*. but le.« than 

decreased from 41, to 8 .
Total number of schools with less than 
teachers— decreased from 4 7 , to 1 2 . 1 0* black

Number of schools with 
increased from 1 2 0 , to 70* or more black teachers —  1 24 .

18. The 
achieve a faculty 

the system-wide ra 
as of 1970, 1,826.

total number of transfers necessary to 
racial quota in each school corresponding 
t:o, and ignoring a]] other element* is.

to

-18-



19. if account is taken of other elements* ntcos-----------—  - ^  • >■ f v t i v o  l t « V « s S c i r  /

to assure quality integrated eJ .cation, including qualifica­
tions to teach the subject area and grade level, balance of 

experience, and balance of sex and further account is taken 
of the uneven distribution of black teachers by subject 

taught and sex, the total number of transfers which would be 
necessary to achieve a faculty racial quota in each school 
corresponding to the system-wid- ratio, if attainable at all, 
would be infinitely greater.

20. Balancing of staff by qualifications for subject
and grade level, then by race, experience aad sex, is educationally 
desirable and important.

2 1 . It is important for students to have a success­
ful role model, especially black students in certain schools, 
and at certain grade levels.

22. A quota of racial oalance for faculty in each 
school which is equivalent to the system-wide ratio and 
without more is educationally undesirable and arbitrary.

23. A severe teacher shortage in the 1950s and 
1960s impeded integratlon-of-facu1ty opportunities.

24. Disadvantageous teaching conditions in Detroit 
in the 1960s— salaries, pupil mobility and transiency, class 

size, buildinq conditions, distance from teacher residence, 
shortage of teacher substitutes, etc.-—made teacher recruitment 
and placement difficult.

25. The Board did not segregate faculty by race, but 
rather attempted to fill vacancies with certified and qualified



teacners who would take ot ferea assignments.

26. Teacher seniority in the Detroit system, 
although measured by system-wide service, has been applied 

consistently to protect against involuntary transfers and 
"bumping" in given schools.

27. Involuntary transfers of teachers have occurred 
only because of unsatisfactory ratings or because of decrease 

°f teacher services in a school, and then only in accordance 
with balanced staff concept.

28. There is no evidence in the record that Detroit 
teacher seniority rights had other than equitable purpose
or effect.

29. Substantial racial integration o f  staff can be 
achieved, without disruption ef seniority and stable teaching 
relationships, by application of the balanced staff concept 
to naturally occurring vacancies and increases and reductions 
of teacher services.

30. The Detroit Board of Education has entered into 
successive collective bargaining contracts with the Detroit 
Federation of Teachers, which contracts have included provisions 
promoting integration of staff and students.

The Detroit School Boar d has, in many other instances 
and in many other respects, undertaken to lessen the impact 
of the forces of segregation and attempted t o  advance the 
c a u s e  of integration. Perhaps t h e  most o b v . i u c  one was the 
adoption of t h e  April 7 Plan. Among o t h e r  t rings, it has 
denied tne use of its facilities t o  i r o j p s  u h i ch practice racial 
discrimination; it does n e t  p e r m i t  t e  use or  its facilities

' ' i f) < ' ! U p " ^  *



for discriminator y apprentice training programs; it has opposed 
state legislation whicn a .we the effect of segregating

the district; it has worked to placed black student* in craft 

positions in industry and the building trades it has brought 
about a substantial increase ir. the percentage of black 

students in manufacturing and construction trade apprentice­
ship classes; it became the first public agency in Michigan 
to adopt and implement a policy requiring affirmative act of 
contractors with which it deals tc insure equal employment 
opportunities in their work forces- it ha* been a leader in 
pioneering the use of mjlti-et'mc instructional material, 
and in so doing has had an impact or publishets specializing 

producing school texts ar i instructional material*; and 
it has taken other noteworthy ; icneering steps to advance 
relations between the white ar.u black races.

In conclusion, howe'er, we find that both the State 
of Michigan and the Detroi’ B rd of Education have committed 
acts which have been causa i l .i.tors in the segregated condit on 
of the public schools of the- C.-y of Detroit. As we assay 
the principles essential to a finding cf de pure segregation, 
as outlined in rulings of the United States Supreme Court, 
they are:

1. The State, throuuh its officers and agencies, 
and usually, the school administration, must have taken some 
action or actions with a purpose of segregation.

2. This action or these actions must have created
or aggravated segregation ir the schools in question.

3. A current con i i t ion of segregation exists.

A U" t  A ‘  ̂ r . - M -



We find these tests to have been met in thxs ,a«.

recognize that causation in the case before us x. both

several and comparative. The pr.ncipal cause, undeniably
have been population movement and housing patterns, but

state and local governmental a.t.ons. including school board
actions, have played a substantial role in promoting

segregation. it is. the Court relieves, unfortunate that we
cannot deal with public school segregation on a no-fault

basis, for if racial segregation in our public school, i. an

evil, then it should make no difference whether we classify
it do jure or de facto. Our objective, logically, it seems
to us, should be to remedy a condition which we believe needs
correction. In the most realistic sense, if fault or blame

be found it is that of the community as a whole,
including, of course, the blac* components. We need not

minimize the effect of the uct.uns of federal, state and local

governmental officers and agencies. ,nd the actions of loaning
institutions and real estate firms, in the establishment and
maintenance of segregated residential patterns - which lead to
school segregation - to observe that blacks, like ethnic groups
in the past, have tended to separate from the larger group an 1
associate together. The gt„ rtc is at once both a place of
confinement and a refuue. There is enonnh KiJm„ *trt c As enough blame for everyone
to share.

CONCLUSIONS OF IJ.W

1. This Court has jurisdiction, of the parties and
the subject matter of this action under 28 L’.S.C. 1331(a), 
134 3 (3) and (4), 22'Jl and 2.J2: 42 U.s.C. 1983. 1988, and

i-ffrti. <• r - 22-

2000d .



2 . In consider ; r ; the evidence a m  ln applyinq 
1 1 st. «3ncJdrds 1 * 1 c ' u 's,’r» that, the Court find that 
the policies and practices, wh.ch it has found to be dis­

criminatory, have as their motivating forces any evil intent

°r m°tlVe* V - Sch- Dtst. »1. Denver 383 F . Supp. 279.
Motive, H I  will and bad faith nave long ago been rejected 

as a requirement to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment against racial discrcitation. Sims v , Georgia 
389 U.S. 404, 407-8.

3. School districts are accountable for the natural, 
probable and forseeable consequences of their policies and 
practices, and where racially identifiable schools are the 
result of such policies, the school authorities bear the 

burden of showing that such policies are based on educationally 
required, non-racial considerations. Keyes v. Srh ni.«-

2H£-' and v . sch. Dist. f Pont,am 309 F. Supp. 7 34,
and 443 F.2d 573.

4. in determining whether a constitutional violation 
has occurred, proof that a pattern of racially segregated 

schools has existed for a considerable period of time aisounts 
to a showing of racial classification by the state and its 
agencies, which must be justified by clear and convincing 
evidence. State o f Alabama v. p .s .. 304 F .2d 583.

5. The Board's practice of shaping school attendance
zones on a north-south rather than an east-west orientation.
with the result that zone boundaries conformed to racial 
residential dividing lines, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A c r o s s  v. fid, o f  :.d ■ , Memphis. 3 33 F . ?d 661.

-23-



6 - Pupi1 racial segregation in the Detroit Public
School System and the residential racial segregation result­
ing primarily from public and private racial discrimination 

are interdependent phenomena. The affirmative obligation of 
the defendant Board has been and is to adopt and implement 
pupil assignment practices and policies that compensate 
for and avoid incorporation into the school system the 
effects of residential racial segregation. The Board's 
building upon housing segregation violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment. see. Davis v. Sch. Cist. of Pontiac, sjpra. and 
authorities there noted.

7 . The Board's policy or selective optional 
attendance zones, to the extent that it facilitated the 

separation of pupils on the basis of race, was in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hobson v. Hansen. 269 F. Supp. 
401, aff'd. sub nom. . Smuck v , h bson. 408 F . 2d 175.

8. The practice of the Board of transporting black 
students from overcrowded b : .. ,. schools to other identifiably 
M a c k  schools, while passing n user identifiably white schools, 
which could have accepted these pupils, amounted to an act

of segregation by the school authorities. Spangler v. Pasadena 
City Bd, of Ed.. 311 F. Supp. '

9. The manner in whiJh the Board formulated and 
modified attendance zones for .-.ementary schools had the 
natural and predictable effect of perpetuating racial 
segregation of students. Such conduct is an act of de jure 
discrimination in violation if the Fourteenth Amendment.
P ■S . v . Schoo1 n . sti -' ■ -80 i . Supp. 7 86 r Brewer v . cits
ol Nor: Ik. ia7 F .2J j~.

■ i  •
-24



m'J>' not< consistent with the10. A school boaru 
Fourteenth Amendment, maintui 
or permit educational choicer, 
sentiment or the wishes of a

1' scqreqated element 
t .;> be influenced by 

majority of voters.

dry schools 
conusun i t y 
Cooper v .

M£°n. 358 u.S. 1. 12-13, 15-lfc.

"A citizen's constitutional 
infringed simply because a 
choose that it be." Lucas 
of Colorado, 377 u.S. 713,

rights can hardly be 
majority of the people 
v. 44th Gen'l Assembly 
736-737.

11. Under the Constitution of the United States 
and the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, the 

responsibility for providing educational opportunity to all 
children on constitutional terms is ultimately that of the 

8tate* £um e r  v. Warren County Board of Education. 313 r. Supp 
380, Art. VIII, SS 1 and 2, Mich. Constitution: Dasiewlcs v . 
Bd. of Ed. of the City of Dctrmr 3 N.W.2d 71.

12. That a state's form of government may delegate 
the power of daily administration of public school, to officials 
with less than state-wide jurisdiction doe. not dispel the 
obligation of those who have broader control to use the 
authority they have consistently with the constitution. In 
such instances the constitutional obligation toward the 
individual school children is a shared one. Bradley v. srh.

City of Richmond. 51 F.R.D. 13 9, 14 3

13. Leadership and general supervision over all 
public education is vested in the State Board of Education.
Art. VIII, § 3 , Mich. Constitution of 1963. The duties of the 
State Board and superintendent include, but are not lisiited to, 
specifying the number of hours necessary to constitute a school 
day; approval until 1962 of school sites; approval of school 

construction plans; accreditation of schools; approval of loars

| 11 ‘ f'1 r -25-



based on state aid funds- ro,., ...' °‘ suspens ions and .xpulsions
of individual students for misconduct (op. Atty. Gen..

JUl/ 197°' N°- 47051'• >• over transportation routes
and disbursement of transportation funds; teacher certification 
and the like. M.S.A. 15.1023(1,. State law provide, reviev
procedures from actions of local or intermediate districts
(See M.S.A. 1 5 . 3 4 4 2 ) ,  with authority in the State Board to
ratify, reject. amend or modify the actions of these inferior

state agencies. See M.S.A. 1 5 . 3 4 6 7 ;  1 5 . 1 9 1 9 ( 6 1 ) ;  1 5.X919 (68b);
1 5 . 2 2 9 9  (1) ; 1 5 . 1 9 6 1 ;  1 5 . 3 4 0 2 :  S r i d ^eh ■ mpton S c h o o l

No,. 2 F r a c t i o n a l  of C a r s o n v . I l e ,  M ich, v .  Sunt . of Puh] , „
instruction. 323 Mich. 615. In general, the state
superintendent is given the duty "'t]o do all th,' 11 Jo ao ail things necessary
to promote the welfare of tie public schools and public 
educational instructions an,: pr -vide proper educational
f a c i l i t y  for the youth of the state." M.S.A. 15.3252.
See also M.S A 15 iiqoit-j,• • -229 (57). providing m  certain instances
for reorganization of school ditricts.

14. State officials, u k  lading all of the defendants,
are charged under the Michigan constitution w u h  the duty of
providing pupils an education without discrimination with
respect to race. Art. VIII, § 2. Mich. Constitution of 1963.
«rt. I, & 2, of the constitution provides:

"No person shall be denied the equal protection 
the laws: nor shall any person Le denied the 

enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be 
discriminated against in the exercise thereof 
because of religion, race, color or national 
origin. The legislature shall implement this 
section by appropriate legislation."

15. The State Dep '-tr,r.t of Education has recently
es tab 1 i shod ar. Eou.i 1 v s f ~3U"1 ..al Opportunities section having

I 11 M v ! \



responsibility to identify r ,y • l»y i.ibui ir.ctd school districts
and develop desegregation plans. M.S.A. 15.3u55 provide, 
that no school or department shall be kept foi any person or 
persons on account of race or color.

16. The state further provides special funds to 
local districts for compensatory education which are administered 
on a per school basis under direct review of the Stat. Board.
All other state aid is subject to fiscal review and accounting 
by the state. M.S.A. 15.1919. See also M.S.A. 15.1919 (68b), 
providing for special supplements to merged districts “for the 
purpose of bringing about uniformity of educational opportunity 
for all pupils of the district." The general consolidation lav 
M.S.A. 15.3401 authorizes annexation for even noncontiguous 
school districts upon approval of the superintendent of public 
instruction and electors, as provided by law. op. Atty. Gen.,
Feb. 5, 1964, No. 4193. Consolidation with respect to so- 
called "first class" districts, i.e., Detroit, is generally 
treated as an annexation with the first class district being 
the surviving entity. The law provides procedures covering 
all necessary considerations. M.S.A. 15.3184, 15.3186.

17. Where a pattern of violation of constitutiona1 
rights is established the affirmative obligation under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is imposed on not only individual school 
districts, but upon the State defendants in this case, 
cooper v. Aaron, 358, U.S. 1; Griffin v. County School HoarH

g f.PrXnCe Ed*--3rd County, 337 U.S. 218; U.S. V. Stat e of Georg, a
Civ. No. 12972 (N.D. Ga., December 17. 1970), rev’d on other
grounds, 4 28 F . 2d 3 7 7 ; Godv. . n v. Johnston County Board of 
Educ.it ion, .01 F. ai.yp. 133/- Leo y . Macon c unty Board of 

Education, 267 f . Sapp. 458 (M. D. Ala.), affd sub now..

f\{i*><" ■ 27 -



Wallace v. i'.s . , JH ■» L . f . . ; 
Board oi Education 2BH t . _ 
State Board of Ed.cjtion. s

»̂  v. >u,tii)dn County
Smith v. Nort.1 Carol 1 na
(4th Cir., June 14, 1971'.

The fore^u.c; constitute-, our findings of fact and 
conclusions of lew or. the issue of segregation in the public 
schools of the City of Detroit.

Having found a de jure segregated public school 
system in operation in the City of Detroit, our first step, 
in considering what judicial remedial steps must be taken, 
is the consideration of intervening parent defendants’ 
motion to add as parties defendant a great number of Michigan 
school districts located out county in Wayne County, and in 
Macomb and Oakland Counties, on the principal premise or 

ground that effective relief .annul be achieved or ordered in 
their lusenct. h a i n u i i s  . uve apposed the moLion . 0 join 
the additional school districts, arquing that the preeence 
of the State defendants is s„ff lent and all that i. required 
even if, in shaping a remedy. tr>' affairs of these other 
districts will be affected.

In considering the motion to add the listed echool 
districts we pause to note that the proposed action has to 
do with relief. Having determined that the circumstances of 
the case require judicial intervention and equitable relief, 
it would be improper for us to act on this motion until the 
other part.es to the action have had an opportunity to submit 
their proposals for desegregation. Accordingly, we shall not 
rule on the motion to add parties at this time. considered 
as a plan for desegregation the motion is lacking in specifit/

-28-



and is framed in the broadest 9eneral terms. The moving party
may wish to amend its propoia 1 and resubmit it as a com- 
prehensive plan of desegregation.

In order that the further proceedings in this cause 
may be conducted on a reasonable time schedule, and because 
the views of counsel respecting further proceedings cannot but 
be of assistance to them and to the Court, this cause will be 
set down for pre-trial conference on the matter of relief.
The conference will be held in our Courtroom m  the City of 
Detro*'t at ten o'clock in the morning, October 4, 1971.

DATED: September 27 . 1 9 7 1 .