British Airways Board v. Civil Aeronautics Board Court Opinion
Public Court Documents
August 26, 1977
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. British Airways Board v. Civil Aeronautics Board Court Opinion, 1977. ed44688d-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ab22e036-b2ba-4b79-b46a-e659d4f8bf95/british-airways-board-v-civil-aeronautics-board-court-opinion. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F oe t h e S econd C ircuit
Jew York
LI S R
No. 814—September Term, 1976.
(Argued April 5, 1977 Decided August 22, 1977.)
Docket No. 76-4226
B r itish A irw ays B oard,
v.
Petitioner,
C iv il A eronautics B oard,
Respondent.
B e f o r e :
Oak es , Circuit Judge,
and W y za n s k i* and H olden ,** District Judges.
Petition for review of orders of the Civil Aeronautics
Board requiring petitioner to file existing schedules and
proposed schedules 30 days prior to commencement of
service.
Petition granted. Orders set aside in accordance with
opinion.
W il l ia m C. Clark e , New York, N.Y. (Peter F.
Yentro, New York, N.Y., of counsel), for
Petitioner.
Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Chief Judge of the District o f Vermont, sitting by designation.
5427
J ames C. S c h u l t z , General Counsel, Civil Aero
nautics Board (Jerome Nelson, Deputy
General Counsel, Glen M. Bendixsen, Asso
ciate General Counsel, Robert L. Toomey,
David E. Bass, Attorneys, Civil Aeronau
tics Board, Donald I. Baker, Assistant
Attorney General, Carl D, Lawson, Joen
Grant, Attorneys, Department of Justice,
of counsel), for Respondent.
Oakes , Circuit Judge:
British Airways Board (British Airways), the United
Kingdom’s government-owned air carrier, petitions for re
view of three orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board (the
Board or CAB). The first order, said to be in response to
certain United Kingdom actions taken against American-
owned carriers, required British Airways to file its exist
ing schedules of service to and from the United States by
September 28, 1976, and to file proposed schedules for any
new or modified service thirty days before making the
schedule changes. In re the Schedules of Air VBI Limited,
Order 76-9-74, No. 29778 (CAB Sept. 14, 1976). The second
order denied a stay of the first, schedule-filing order (ex
cept as to Washington-London Concorde service). Order
76-9-161 (Sept. 30, 1976). The third order was issued in
response to a letter from President Ford to the CAB, dated
October 9, 1976, in which the President stated that, because
Britain and the United States had resolved their differ
ences, “prompt rescission of the Board’s [first or schedule
filing] order . . . would be appropriate and in the interests
of our foreign policy.” The CAB then vacated its earlier
orders and terminated their effectiveness nunc pro tunc
5428
as of October 8, 1976. Order 76-10-110 (Oct. 26, 1976 ).*
Because British Airways had not filed any schedules be
tween September 28 and October 8, 1976, however, the
Board indicated in the October 26 order that the airline
would be subject to “ enforcement liability” for that period.
Id. at 3.1 2
A schedule-filing order such as the one under review
may be required under 14 C.F.R. § 213.3(c) (1975) when
the CAB finds that the government of the holder of a
foreign air carrier permit has taken action impairing or
limiting an American air carrier’s operating rights in the
foreign country. When such an order is entered against a
foreign air carrier, the carrier cannot make changes in
equipment or in times or frequency of arrival and depar
ture for thirty days, see id. § 213.3(b). The CAB can also
issue a schedule-limitation order that limits the number
of flights the subject airline can make to or from the
United States, with the order expressly subject to “ stay or
disapproval by the President of the United States within
10 days after adoption . . id. § 213.3(d). Here an order
limiting petitioner’s United States schedules was issued by
the CAB on September 29, 1976. The October 9 letter of
the President to the CAB referred to above was issued in
response to this schedule-limitation order and disapproved
1 Despite the GAB's vacation of these orders, at least the first of them
remains before us because the petition for review as to it was filed
prior to the CAB’S vacation order, and the vacation order itself was
explicitly made "subject to any necessary approval by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.” Order No. 76-10-110, at 4;
see id. at n.6.
2 During the pendency of this review proceeding, an administrative
enforcement proceeding against British Airways was initiated by the
CAB. The enforcement proceeding has been stayed by agreement of
the parties. According to the CAB’S third order, British Airways is to be
held liable only for its failure to file existing schedules; no liability for
failure to file proposed schedules is contemplated. See id. at 3 & n.5.
5429
it within the requisite ten-day period, id. The letter then
went on to refer to the schedule-filing order here under
review.* 1 * 3
This court’s jurisdiction to review these orders is prem
ised on 49 U.S.C. § 1486. That section makes reviewable
in the courts of appeals “ [a]ny order . . . issued by the
Board . . ., except any order in respect of any foreign air
carrier subject to the approval of the President as pro
vided in [id. § 1461] . . .” Insofar as here relevant, Section
1461 requires that presidential approval be obtained when
ever the CAB desires to amend or otherwise modify a
foreign air carrier’s operating permit or certificate. Thus,
if the CAB’s schedule-filing directive to British Airways
were considered an amendment of the carrier’s permit, ad
vance presidential approval, which was not obtained, would
have been required, and this court would be without juris
diction to review the orders.
3 The letter from the President provides in full (emphasis added)
T he W hite House
Washington
October 9, 1976
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I have reviewed the Board’s proposed order in the matter of the
schedules of British Airways Board (British Airways) in Docket
29778 and the circumstances surrounding that order. In view of
the fact that the issues necessitating the actions proposed in the
order have been satisfactorily resolved with the British authorities,
I am hereby disapproving the order.
1 have further determined that prompt rescission of the Board’s
order 76-9-74, which requires the carrier to file with the Board its
existing and proposed schedules, would he appropriate and in the
interests of our foreign policy.
Bespectfully,
s / Gerald B. Ford
The Honorable John E. Bobson
Chairman
Civil Aeronautics Board
Washington, D.C. 20428
5430
We believe that the orders here involved did not amend
British Airways’ permit. In 1970, by an order approved
by the President, the Board amended the permits of 48
foreign carriers, including that of British Airways’ corpo
rate predecessor, to make the permits subject to the pro
visions of certain regulations adopted on the same date.
It was under these regulations, 14 C.F.R. §§ 213.1-.6 (1975),
that the Board issued its schedule-filing directive in the
instant case. The directive thus amounted to implementa
tion of a previously approved condition and did not modify
British Airways’ permit. An implementation effort of this
nature does not require separate presidential approval.
Dan-Air Services, Ltcl. v. GAB, 475 F.2d 408, 412 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (per curiam). Therefore this court has juris
diction to review the orders before us.4
The fact that the CAB did not have to obtain presiden
tial approval before it ordered British Airways to file
schedules, however, does not mean that it was free as a
matter of law to ignore the disapproval embodied in the
presidential letter of October 9 relative to the schedule
filing order under review, see note 3 supra. The Board
4 The scope of review is governed by Section 10(e) o f the Admin
istrative Procedure Act, 5 TJ.S.C. $ 706(e), which provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall—
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be—
(A ) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law;
( B ) ' contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or im
munity ;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,
or short of statutory right;
5431
recognized this by largely deferring to the President’s
wishes and vacating its schedule-filing order nunc pro tunc
as of October 8, 1976. But at the same time it insisted
that it was acting as “an independent agency,” and to show
its independence it decided to hold British Airways liable
for its failure to file existing schedules in the September
28-October 8 period, though, “to strike a balance,” not for
failure to file proposed schedules thirty days in advance,
see note 2 supra. We believe that the Board’s insistence
on its independence in this matter represents a misunder
standing of its role with regard to foreign air carriers and
of the extent of presidential primacy on issues related to
foreign affairs. We accordingly set aside the orders.
In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), the Supreme Court
discussed the “ inversion] [of] the usual administrative
process” that Congress intended when it made CAB deci
sions relating to foreign air carriers subject to presidential
approval:
Instead of acting independently of executive control,
the agency is . . . subordinated to it. Instead of its
order serving as a final disposition . . ., its force is
exhausted when it serves as a recommendation to the
President. . . . Presidential control is not limited to a
negative but is a positive and detailed control over
the Board’s decisions, unparalleled in the history of
American administrative bodies.
Id. at 109.B A necessary implication of the President’s
“positive and detailed control” under the statute, we be- 5
5 The Chicago # Southern holdings with regard to ripeness and judicial
review have teen limited and criticized by certain courts and commen
tators. See, e.g., Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 622-23 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Wright, <7.); Air tin e Pilots’
Ass’n International v. Department of Transportation, 446 F,2d 236,
5432
lieve, is the power to disapprove particular actions taken
by the Board under broad regulations that the President
has previously approved. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. CAB, 184 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1950) (power of President
to withdraw approval), cert, denied, 340 U.S. 941 (1951).
Were this power lacking, presidential approval of broad
regulations would in effect give the CAB carte blanche in
an area in which Congress has quite clearly indicated that
the President, not the CAB, is supreme. It is in an area
of foreign policy, moreover, in which the President’s deci
sions, to use Mr. Justice Jackson’s words for the Supreme
Court, “are delicate, complex, and involve large elements
of prophecy.” 333 U.S. at 111. In such an area, an agency
of the United States Government, even if independent for
other purposes, is subordinated to executive control “ [i]n-
stead of acting independently . . .,” 333 U.S. at 109, at
least when the Chief Executive has been given positive
and detailed control by the Congress. See Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
supra, 333 U.S. at 109-10 (President is “ the Nation’s organ
in foreign affairs” ; his powers and those of Congress are
“pooled” in this area “to the end that commercial strategic
and diplomatic interests of the country may be coordinated
and advanced without collision or deadlock between agen
cies” ) ; In re British Overseas Airways Corp. Permit
Amendment, 29 C.A.B. 583, 594 (1959) (CAB cannot be
equated with U.S. Government with regard to foreign
240-41 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. CAB,
392 F.2d 483, 492-93 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. CAB, 380 F.2d 770, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1967), aff’d by equally
divided Court sub nom. World Airways, Inc. v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 391 U.S. 461 (1968); Miller, The Waterman Doctrine
Bevisited, 54 Geo. L.J. 5 (1965). None of these limitations or criticisms,
however, is directed at the portion of Chicago #■ Southern quoted, in text,
which involves the President’s statutory powers over CAB decisions
affecting foreign air carriers.
5433
carriers ; there is a “ division of functions,” with the Pres
ident making the final decision for the Government).
Once it is accepted that the CAB must take the Presi
dent’s word as supreme in a case of this nature, it follows
that the Board’s orders here under review must he set
aside. The Board itself recognized that it was not follow
ing the President when, in its third order, which vacated
the first two but preserved a basis for enforcement liability,
it explicitly stated that the Board’s deference to presiden
tial wishes “will not be unqualified.” Order No. 76-10-110,
supra, at 2. The President’s letter to the Board, moreover,
although not phrased as a directive, could not be more clear
as to the action that the President had “determined” to be
“appropriate and in the interests of our foreign policy.”
See note 3 supra.
That this determination was embodied in a letter issued
in response to the Board’s schedule-limitation order of
September 29, 1976, reinforces the view that the President
was exercising his full prerogative in the area and demon
strates the importance of the schedule-filing order in the
overall settlement of the then-current dispute between the
United States and Great Britain. The only action required
of the President under the regulations was approval or
disapproval of the schedule-limitation order; by inclusion
of the reference to the schedule-filing order, the President
made it clear that he was exercising the full extent of his
presidential control. The “prompt rescission” that the
President called for is not anywhere suggested to be a
partial rescission, and the common meaning of the verb
“rescind,” at least in law, involves. declaring something
(usually a contract) abrogated from its inception, so that
the parties are restored to the positions they would have
occupied had no action been taken initially, see Blank’s Law
Dictionary 1471 (4th ed. 1951). Rescission in this sense has
5434
been denied British Airways by the CAB’s preservation of
a basis for enforcement liability, contrary to the express
determination of the President.6
We therefore set aside the Board’s orders. Because we
have concluded that the orders improperly ignored a pres
idential directive, made in the exercise of his statutory and
constitutional powers, we need not reach the other attacks
on the orders made by British Airways.
Petition for review granted. Orders set aside in accor
dance with opinion.
I f there were any doubt as to the President’s intention, it is resolved
by tracing the underlying advisory memoranda. At our request the De
partment of Justice, on behalf o f the Counsel to the President, the De
partment of State, and the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Coun
sel, furnished the court with memoranda pertaining to the draft of the
President's letter of October 9. This material is short and simple.
The Department of State wrote the Office of Managament and Budget
on October 8, 1976. It pointed out that, in view of the satisfactory
solution worked out with the British, the basis for the issuance of the
schedule-filing order under review was "no longer valid,” and that
"withdrawal of the order has substantive importance, since the require
ment . . . significantly reduces the scheduling flexibility of [the British]
airlines.” State therefore recommended that the President’s letter
"strongly urge the CAB to withdraw its order 76-9-74 of September 14,
1976.”
The Office of Management and Budget’s "Memorandum for the
President," also dated October 8, points out that "State . . . recommends
that you advise the Board that recission [sic] of its September 14, 1976,
order is appropriate and in our foreign policy interests.” It goes on to
note: "In view of the foreign policy issues inherent in this case, the
interested executive agencies defer to the recommendations of the De
partment of State. The National Security Council concurs with the
Department of State recommendation.” The final draft of the letter
expressly used the term "rescission,” see note 3 supra, whieh carries with
it, we think, a definite retroactive meaning of significance, as dis
cussed in the text. Bather than "strongly urge” the agency, as State
had suggested, which would imply a power in the Board of independent
action, the final draft pointedly uses the terminology, "I have . . . deter
mined, which is consistent with an exercise of presidential prerogative,
not subject to independent action by the agency.
5435
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