Cotton v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education Brief for Petitioners
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1971
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Briscoe v. Bell Brief of the Mexican Americal Legal Defense and Educational Fund, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, and Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Amici Curiae in Support of the Decision Below, 1977. acf76293-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/108849a8-ef59-4119-8c5a-f3daa2c13f62/briscoe-v-bell-brief-of-the-mexican-americal-legal-defense-and-educational-fund-naacp-legal-defense-and-educational-fund-leadership-conference-on-civil-rights-and-lawyers-committee-for-civil-rights-under-law-amici-curiae-in-support-of-the-d. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
G r if f in B. Bell ,
Attorney General of the United States, et al.,
________ Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW,
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE DECISION BELOW
Joseph L. R a u h , J r . V il m a S. M a r t in e z
General Counsel, J o a q u in A v il a
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE A l I. PEREZ
ON CIVIL RIGHTS MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL
1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W. DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
No. 76-60
Washington, D.C. 20036
J am es T. D a n a h e r
A r m a n d G. D e r f n e r
A l e x a n d e r D. F o r g e r
A l b e r t E. J enjver, J r .
Nic h o l a s d e B. K a t ze n b a c h
Steph en J . Po l l a k
No r m a n R e d lich
fu n d
145 Ninth Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94103
J a c k G r e e n b e r g
Eric Sch n a ppe r
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
LAW YERS’ COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
D a v id S . T a t e l
D a l e F. S w a r t z
R o b e r t A . M u rph y
WIl l ia m E. C a l d w e l l
733 - 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
February 25, 1977
HOGAN & HA RTS ON
815 Connecticut Ave», N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Amici Curiae.
Washington. D .C . • T H IE L M E S S • (202) 638-4521
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1^1
INTEREST OF AMICI CU RIAE ....................................................1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.........................................................3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................... 7
ARGUMENT
I. Texas’ arguments regarding the construction and
application of the Voting Rights Act Amend
ments of 1975 are without merit......................................... 9
II. Congress intended the 1975 Amendments to ex
tend the protections o f the Voting Rights Act of
1965 to Mexican American and black voters in
T e x a s .......................................................................... • • • 12
III. The legislative record establishes that Mexican
Americans and blacks in Texas have been sub
jected to systematic and pervasive voting dis
crimination........................................................................... 14
A. English-only elections.......................................................15
B. Registration...................................................................... 18
C. Discrimination at the p o l ls ............................................ 21
D. Discrimination against minority candidates................25
E. Dilution of minority v o te s ............................................ 28
1. Malapportionment and gerrymandering.................. 29
2. Multi-member districting............................................ 34
3. The place system, majority runoff require
ments, and at-large elections.................................... 36
4. Annexations and de-annexations ............................. 41
IV. Extension o f the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to
Texas will facilitate the elimination of other
forms of economic and social discrimination.................. 45
CONCLUSION................................................................................ 50
(i)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page
Cases:
Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974).................................... 21
American Party o f Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767
(1974), rehearing denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974). ............. 27
Arroyo v. Tucker, 372 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa.
1974)............................... ........................... .............................. 16
Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Tex. 1971),
aff’d sub nom., Beare v. Briscoe, 498 F.2d 244
(5th Cir. 1 974 )........................................................................ 19
Briscoe v. Levi, 535 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert,
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3416 (Dec. 6, 1976) (No.
76-60)..................................................................................... . 10
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).................................... 25
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dis
trict, 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d in
relevant part, 469 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (en
banc), cert, denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973), rehearing
denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973)................................... 16, 47, 49
City o f Petersburg, Virginia v. United States, 354 F.
Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d, 410 U.S. 962
(1973 )........................................... -41
Connerton v. Oliver, 333 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Tex.
1 9 7 1 ) ...........................................................................................25
David v. Garrison, Civ. Ac. No. TY-73-CA-113 (E.D.
Tex. 1975)................................................................................ 38
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)......................... 11
Duncantell v. Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex.
1 9 7 1 ) ........................................... 25
East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424
U.S. 636 (1 9 7 6 ) ............................................................. 2
Garcia v. Carpenter, 525 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Sup.
Ct. 1975) ..................................................................................... 27
Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Tex. 1970),
vacated and remanded for appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971), appeal dismissed
PageCases, continued:
for lack o f jurisdiction, 450 F.2d 790 (5th Cir.
1971) ...................................................................................... 15
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285
(1969 )........................................................................................ 16
Gonzales v. Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex.
1970).......................................................................................... 25
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)..........................9
Graves v. Barnes I, 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex.
1972) , aff’d in relevant part sub nom., White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)
................................. 18, 19, 25, 26, 33, 35, 46
Graves v. Barnes II, 378 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Tex.
1974) , vacated and remanded for determination
o f mootness sub nom., White v. Regester, 422
U.S. 935 (1 9 7 5 ) ................................................. 26, 33, 36, 39
Graves v. Barnes III, 408 F. Supp. 1050 (W.D. Tex.
1976).......................................................................................... 36
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1 9 3 5 )............................... 18
Guerra v. Pena, 406 S.W.2d 769 (C .C .A . Tex. 1966)............. 21
Harper v. Virginia Board o f Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).................................................................. 18
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1 9 4 3 ).......... 12
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954 )................................. 49
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), rehearing denied,
422 U.S. 1029 (1 9 7 5 ) ........................................................... 25
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1 9 6 6 )............................. 49
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 5 6 3 (1 9 7 4 ) .................... - ..................9
Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Tex.
1975) ....................................................................................... 38
Mauzy v. Legislative Redistricting Board, 471 S.W.2d
570 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1 971 ).................................................34, 35
Morris v. Gressette, prob. juris, noted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3407 (Dec. 6, 1976) (No. 75-1538).................................... 10
National Association for the Advancement o f Colored
People v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973).............................2
(iv)
National League o f Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465
(1976 )................................................................................... . . 11
New York v. United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974), affg
65 F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 1 9 7 4 )................................................. 16
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1 9 3 2 ).......... .. ....................... 18
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).................................. 18
Pablo Puente v. City o f Crystal City, Civ. Ac. No.
DR-70-CA-4 (W.D. Tex. April 3, 1970)............................... 25
Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v.
Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. 111. 1972),
aff’d, 490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973).......................... .. 16
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1 9 6 4 ) .................................. 46
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). ..................................... 11
Robinson v. Commissioners Court, Anderson County,
Civ. Ac. No. TY-CA-73-236 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15,
1974), affd in relevant part, 505 F.2d 674 (5th
Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) ................................................................... 29, 30, 49
Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1142
(S.D. Tex. 1973), aff’d in relevant part, 516 F.2d
1251 (5th Cir. 1975 ).............................................................. 48
Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)..................................2, 18
Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1971).............................................................. 34
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966)........................................................................... 10, 11, 43
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1 9 7 4 ) ............................ 11
Sylva v. Fitch, Civ. Ac. No. SA-76-CA-126 (W.D.
Tex. Sept. 26, 1 9 7 6 )............................................................... 33
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)......................................... 18
Torres v. SACS, 73 Civ. 3921 (S.D.N.Y. July 25,
1974).............................................. 16
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409
U.S. 205 (1 9 7 2 ) .............................- .........................................9
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1 9 7 0 ) .................................. 25
Cases, continued: *>a*’ e
Cases, continued:
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965), rehearing
denied, 380 U.S. 989 (1965)...................................................... 9
United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950).......................... 12
United States v. American Trucking Association, 310
U.S. 534 (1 9 4 0 ) ...................................................................... 12
United States v. Interim Board o f Trustees o f the
Westheimer Independent School District, et ai,
Civ. Ac. No. H-77-121 (S.D. Tex.) (pending).................. „ 42
United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex.),
aff’d per curiam, 384 U.S. 155 (1 9 6 6 )............................... 18
Weaver v. Commissioners Court, Nacogodoches
County, Civ. Ac. No. TY-73-CA-209 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 15, 1974)................................................................ 30
Weaver v. Muckleroy, Civ. Ac. No. 5524 (E.D. Tex.
Jan. 27, 1975).....................................................................31, 38
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)............................... 37
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)
.................................... 4, 5, 27, 28, 35, 36, 37
White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1 9 7 5 ).................................. 36
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973)...................................... 29
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1 9 6 8 ).................................. 27
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1 9 7 1 )...............................10, 11
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1973), aff’d sub nom. East Carroll Parish
School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636
(1976)........................................................................................ 37
Statutes:
28 U.S.C. §2282 ............................ .. .........................................8, 10
42 U.S.C. §1973 et seq..................................................................... 3
42 U.S.C. § 1973b ( b ) ....................................................................10
42 U.S.C.A. §1973b (b)(l)(1976 Supp.).....................................16
42 U.S.C.A. §1973b (f)(l)(1976 S u p p .)...................................... 6
42 U.S.C.A. §1973aa-la(a) (1976 Supp.).......................................6
(v)
Page
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 42 U.S.C.A. §1973 et seq. (1976
Supp.)......................................................................................5, 6
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 1.08a (1976-77 Supp.)
(V ernon )................................................................................... 16
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 5.11a (Vernon).................................. 19
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 5.18(b) (repealed) ..........................19
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 8.13 (1976-77 Supp.)
(V ernon )...................................................................................... 15
Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 8.15 (Vernon).....................................22
TEX. CONST, art. VI, §2 (V.A.T.C. 1 966 )....................... 19
Miscellaneous:
Brief for the Petitioners................................................. 9, 10, 17
Derfner, Racial Discrimination and The Right to Vote,
216 Vand.L.Rev. 523 (1 9 7 3 )............................. 43
Greenfield and Kates, Mexican Americans, Racial Dis
crimination and The Civil Rights Act o f 1866, 63
Calif.L.Rev. 662 (1 9 7 5 )......................................................... 48
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Con
stitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judic
iary, House o f Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1 9 7 5 ).........................................................................passim
Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitu
tional Rights, Extension of the Voting Rights Act
o f 1965, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)............................... passim
H.R. Rep. No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) . . . passim
“ Interim Report: The Voting Rights Act in Texas” by
The Committee on Elections of the Texas House of
Representatives........................................................................... 45
Kibbe, P., Latin Americans in Texas (1946)..................... 48, 49
Letter from United States Attorney General to the
General Counsel for the Secretary o f State of
Texas, dated March 8, 1976 .................... 17
Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections
(1974) . ........................................................................... 27
(vi)
Statutes, continued: --------
(vii)
Mittelbach, F., and Marshall, G., The Burden o f
Poverty, Mexican American Study Project,
UCLA Advance Report V (1966)........................................... 48
Moore, J., Mexican Americans, 60 (1 9 7 0 )................................. 48
Moore, J., and Mittelbach, F., Residential Segre
gation in the Urban Southwest, Mexican Amer
ican Study Project, UCLA Advance Report IV
(1966 )....................................................................................... 48
N.Y. Times, January 18, 1977 at A 1 6 .................................... 47
Miscellaneous, continued: _5
Project Report: Dejure Segregation o f Chicanos in
Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties
L.Rev. 307 (1972)................................................................... 47
Rohan, H., The Mexican American (1968) (Staff Paper
prepared for the United States Commission on Civil
Rights) ........................................................................................49
S. Rep. No. 94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).................. 13
Texas Senate Bill 300 (1 9 7 5 ) .................................................... 19
United States Attorney General, Letters of Objection
Pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:
December 10, 1975 ...................................................
January 23, 1976 ......................................................
January 26, 1976 ......................................................
April 2, 1976 ...................................................... - • •
April 16, 1976 ...........................................................
May 24, 1976 ...........................................................
July 7, 1976...........................................................
July 27, 1976 ...........................................................
October 13, 1976 ...................................................
January 13, 1977 ................ ...............................
United States Commission on Civil Rights, “ Ethnic-
Isolation of Mexican Americans in Public Schools
o f the Southwest,” Report I (1970).....................
. . 20
27, 33
. . 33
. . 42
41
31
32
32
42
47
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Staff
Memorandum, Expansion of the Coverage of
The Voting Rights Act (June 5, 1975)
................................. 15, 16, 20, 21. 22, 24. 47
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Staff
Memorandum, Summary o f Preliminary Re
search on the Problems of Participation by
Spanish Speaking Voters in the Electoral
Process (April 23, 1975)........................................................... 28
United States Commission on Civil Rights, “ Mexican
American Education in Texas: A Function of
Wealth,” Report IV (1972) .................................................... 47
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Mexican
Americans and the Administration of Justice
in the Southwest (1970)......................................................... 48
United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Vo ting
Rights Act: Ten Years After (1975).............................3, 5, 43
Young, The Place System in Texas Elections, Austin,
Texas: Institute o f Public Affairs (1965)............................. 37
40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (Sept. 23, 1975)............................................6
121 Cong. Rec. (June 2, 1975) at 4712 (Remarks of
Cong. Edwards) . ..........................................................................13
121 Cong. Rec. (June 2, 1975) at 4746 (Remarks o f
Congresswoman Jordan)............................................................ 13
(viii)
Miscellaneous, continued: ^aSe
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1976
No. 76-60
D o l p h B r i s c o e ,
Governor of the State of Texas, et al.,
G r if f in B . B e l l ,
Attorney General of the United States, ct al.,
Respondents.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW,
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF THE DECISION BELOW
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
Fund (MALDEF) is a nonprofit corporation dedicated
to ensuring that the civil rights of Mexican Americans
are properly protected. With offices throughout the
Southwest, in California, and in Washington, D.C.,
MALDEF provides legal assistance to safeguard the Mexi
can American community’s educational, political and
voting rights.
Protecting the voting rights of IMexican Americans has
long been one of MALDEF’s key concerns. It has repre
sented Mexican American voters throughout the South-
1
2
west, and provided technical assistance to the Congres
sional committees which held hearings on the Voting
Rights Act Amendments o f 1975. The voting rights of
Mexican American citizens in Texas have been of particu
lar concern to MALDEF. It has devoted substantial
resources to monitor and implement the 1975 Amend
ments, and through its office in San Antonio has brought
many cases under the Act and filed other actions chal
lenging discriminatory voting practices and procedures
on behalf of Mexican American voters in Texas. How
ever, MALDEF does not have sufficient resources to
challenge all such practices. Thus, continued enforcement
of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, which
are here challenged by the State o f Texas, is essential if
the voting rights o f the State’s minority citizens are to be
fully protected.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., is a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State o f New York. It was founded to assist
Negroes to secure their constitutional rights by the prose
cution of lawsuits. Its charter declares that its purposes
include rendering legal services gratuitously to Negroes
suffering injustice by reason o f racial discrimination. For
many years attorneys of the Legal Defense Fund have
represented minorities before this Court and the lower
courts in litigation to secure their constitutionally pro
tected right to vote. East Carroll Parish School Board v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976); National Association for
the Advancement o f Colored People v. New York, 413
U.S. 345 (1973); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights comprises
137 civil rights, fraternal, religious, labor, and civic
organizations, as well as organizations for the rights of
women and the handicapped. In its strive for civil rights
the Leadership Conference has been especially concerned
with the right to vote and has worked for the enactment
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, its successors and ex-
3
tensions, and for the full implementation and enforce
ment of these laws in the interest of the right to vote for
all Americans.
The Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law is
a nonprofit corporation organized in 1963 at the request
of the President of the United States; its Board of
Trustees includes thirteen past presidents of the Ameri
can Bar Association, three former Attorneys General, and
two former Solicitors General of the United States. The
Committee’s primary mission is to involve private lawyers
throughout the country in the quest of all citizens to
secure their civil rights through the legal process. Among
its activities has been the provision o f counsel in voting
rights cases throughout the South; in this regard, the
Committee has been particularly concerned with enforce
ment of the Voting Rights Act.
The written consent of the parties, pursuant to Rule
42(2) o f the Supreme Court of the United States, is
filed herewith.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §1973 et
seq., (hereinafter the “ 1965 Act” ), has been hailed as the
most effective civil rights legislation ever passed.1 Since
its enactment, the number o f blacks registered to vote in
the seven southern states covered by the Act has nearly
doubled, and the number of black elected officials has
increased almost tenfold.2 The Chairman of the United
*H.R. Rep. No. 94-196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 4
[hereinafter “ H.R. Rep. 94-196” ].
2Senate Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights, Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) at 121, [hereinafter “ 1975 Senate Hearings” ].Se<?
also United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights
Act: Ten Years After (1975) at 40-52 [hereinafter “ Ten Years
After” ) .
4
States Civil Rights Commission has underscored the im
portance o f the 1965 Act:
The Voting Rights Act, as a symbol o f national
commitment and as a set of enforcement mechan
isms, has contributed greatly to the changing politi
cal circumstances o f minorities in the covered juris
dictions. Where earlier legislation proved ineffective,
the Voting Rights Act has made the 15th amend
ment a living, forceful entity in many areas. Vigor
ously enforced, the act can ensure that minority
citizens will not be deprived of their right to partici
pate in their own government.3
The 1965 Act, however, proved deficient in one major
respect: it provided no protection to Mexican Americans
and other language minorities subjected to the same
forms of voting discrimination suffered by southern
blacks. Like blacks, Mexican Americans have long been
excluded from the electoral process. In White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 768 (1973), this Court affirmed the dis
trict court’s findings that:
“ [A] cultural incompatibility . . . conjoined with
the poll tax and the most restrictive voter registra
tion procedures in the nation have operated to effec
tively deny Mexican-Americans access to the politi
cal processes in Texas even longer than blacks were
formerly denied access by the white primary.”
English-only elections, intimidation, discriminatory en
forcement of electoral laws, gerrymandering, multi
member districting, and widespread use of at-large elec
tions also have denied Mexican Americans equal access to
the electoral process.4 In 1974 the disparity between
Mexican American and white registration in some areas of
3 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu
tional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Repre
sentatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 29 [hereinafter “ 1975
House Hearings” ] .
4 See discussion, infra, at 28-42. See also H.R. Rep. 94-196 at
16-23.
5
Texas was estimated at 10-15 percent,5 and Mexican
Americans held only 2.5 percent of the State’s elected
offices even though they comprise approximately 18 per
cent o f its population.6 Blacks in Texas, who comprise
approximately 12 percent o f the State’s population, have
suffered similar treatment, with similar results.7 In 1974,
blacks held only .5 percent of the elected offices in
Texas.8
In January 1975 the United States Commission on
Civil Rights recommended that Congress expand the
1965 Act to protect the voting rights of language minor
ity citizens.9 Following the Commission’s recommenda
tion, Congress held hearings to examine the evidence of
voting discrimination against language minorities. The
voluminous hearing record documented a pattern of
voting discrim ination against Mexican Americans
throughout the Southwest similar to that which led to
enactment of the 1965 A ct.10
Confronted with such evidence, Congress voted over
whelmingly11 to enact the Voting Rights Act Amend
ments o f 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 et
5 1975 House Hearings at 807-09.
6Id. at 276.
^1975 House Hearings at 276, 360-61, 367-69. See also
White v. Regester, supra. There are more blacks living in Texas than
in any of the southern states covered by the 1965 Act, Texas has
almost 1.5 million minority residents over the age of 25, or three
times the number of minorities in the largest of the southern
covered jurisdictions. 1975 House Hearings at 360.
^1975 House Hearings at 248, 276.
9Ten Years After, at 355a.
111See generally H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 16-23. See also 19/5
Senate Hearings at 96-97, 1975 House Hearings at 399-405.
11 The House vote was 341 yeas, 70 nays; the Senate vote 77
yeas, 12 nays.
6
seq. (1976 Supp.) (hereinafter the “ 1975 Amend
ments” ). Congress found that . . voting discrimination
against citizens of language minorities is pervasive and
national in scope,” that “ through the use o f various prac
tices and procedures, citizens o f language minorities have
been effectively excluded from participation in the elec
toral process,” and that “ in many areas of the country,
this exclusion is aggravated by acts of physical, economic
and political intimidation.” 42 U.S.C.A. § § 1973b(f)(l),
1973aa-la(a) (1976 Supp.).
In September, 1975, the Attorney General and the
Director o f the Census determined that the entire state of
Texas is subject to Title II of the 1975 Amendments. 12
As a consequence, Texas and all political subdivisions
within it may no longer conduct English-only elections
and, like the Southern states covered by the Voting
Rights Act since 1965, may not enforce changes in elec
toral laws or procedures without first establishing to the
satisfaction o f the Attorney General or a three-judge dis
trict court in the District of Columbia that the change
does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The
1975 Amendments also made applicable to Texas the pro
visions of the 1965 Act which authorize the Attorney
General to assign federal examiners and observers to
register eligible voters and observe the conduct of elec
tions.
Extension o f the Voting Rights Act to Texas has given
its Mexican American and black citizens reason to hope
that they may finally be able to participate in the elec-
1240 Fed. Reg. 43746 (Sept. 23, 1975).
7
toral process in a free and unimpaired manner, and there
by protect their full range o f political and civil rights.
Texas, however, now seeks to avoid this result, arguing
that the Attorney General and Director of the Census, to
whom Congress delegated enforcement responsibility,
made technical errors in the interpretation and applica
tion of the coverage formula of the 1975 Amendments.
The decisions below, as well as the brief herein of the
Attorney General and Director of the Census, demon
strate that the arguments Texas makes are without merit.
Accordingly, this brief will not repeat the Attorney Gen
eral’s arguments. Rather, Section I discusses several addi
tional reasons why Texas’ arguments are without merit,
and Sections II and III demonstrate that the Attorney
General’s interpretation of the statute is consistent with
one of the primary purposes of the 1975 Amendments,
namely, the extension of the protections of the Voting
Rights Act to Mexican American and black voters in
Texas. Finally, Section IV demonstrates that extension of
the Act to Texas will better enable its minority citizens
to eliminate discrimination in education, housing and
other areas.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The brief for the Attorney General and Director of the
Census demonstrates that petitioners’ arguments regard
ing the construction and application of the Voting Rights
Act Amendments o f 1975 are without merit. The con
struction of the statute by the Attorney General and the
Director of the Census should be given great deference
because Congress has delegated to them responsibility for
enforcing it. Section 4(b) of the statute expressly pre
cludes judicial review of findings of fact by the Attorney
General and the Director o f the Census made to deter
mine which jurisdictions are covered by the 1975 Amend
ments. This Court does not have jurisdiction to hear
8
petitioners’ constitutional argument because it was not
presented to a three-judge district court as required by
28 U.S.C. §2282.
The Attorney General’s construction of the 1975
Amendments implements a primary Congressional pur
pose, namely, the extension of the protections of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to minority voters in Texas.
The legislative history of the Amendments demonstrates
that Texas was among the jurisdictions Congress intended
to be covered by the preclearance and related provisions
of the 1965 Act. The legislative record reveals that
English-only elections, discriminatory enforcement of
registration and election laws, overt discrimination
against minority voters and candidates, and sophisticated
devices which dilute minority votes have combined to
exclude Mexican Americans and blacks from participa
tion in the Texas political system. Congress found that
these practices are strikingly similar to those which
existed in the South prior to the enactment of the Voting
Rights Act o f 1965. As in the South, case-by-case litiga
tion challenging voting discrimination in Texas has not
been effective; political jurisdictions intent on discrimina
tion have either ignored court decrees or evaded them by
adopting new but equally discriminatory practices. For
these reasons, Congress intended to extend the provisions
of the Voting Rights Act to Texas. Thus, petitioners’
arguments, which if accepted would exclude it from the
Act’ s coverage, should be rejected.
Extension o f the Voting Rights Act to Texas will help
to eliminate other forms o f discrimination. Mexican
Americans in Texas have long suffered discrimination in
education, housing, employment and law enforcement.
Congress recognized that these forms of discrimination
can best be eliminated by guaranteeing Mexican Ameri
cans the right to vote and an equal opportunity to partici
pate in the State’s political system.
9
ARGUMENT
I .
TEXAS’ ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE CONSTRUC
TION AND APPLICATION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1975 ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Texas contends that the Attorney General miscon
strued the phrase “ test or device” as used in Section 4(b)
by failing to consider the factors set forth in Section 4(d)
relating to suits to terminate coverage. Brief for the Peti
tioners at 13-17 (hereinafter “ Pet. Br,” ). It also contends
that the Director of the Census misconstrued the phrase
“ such persons” as used in Section 4(b) to mean voting
age citizens rather than registered voters. Pet. Br. at 8-13.
As the Attorney General’s brief shows, judicial deci
sions and the legislative history o f Section 4(b) establish
that these arguments are without merit. The Attorney
General’s and Director of the Census’ construction of
Section 4(b) is especially important because Congress has
delegated to them responsibility for enforcing the Act.
This Court has stated that “ When faced with a problem
of statutory construction, this Court shows great defer
ence to the interpretation given the statute by the offi
cers or agency charged with its administration.” Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), rehearing denied, 380
U.S. 989 (1965).13 Such deference is particularly appro
priate where, as here, the enforcing agencies’ construction
of the statute is consistent with their prior practices. Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205,
210 (1972); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
Texas also contends that, assuming the Director of the
Census correctly construed Section 4(b), he improperly
D Accord, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971).
10
applied it in determining the number o f voting age citi
zens in the state by miscounting the number of non
citizens of voting age. Pet. Br. at 22-26. This argument,
however, disregards the last sentence of Section 4(b),
which states:
The determination or certification of the Attorney
General or o f the Director o f the Census under this
section . . . shall not be reviewable in any court and
shall be effective upon publication in the Federal
Register. [42 U.S.C. §1973b(b)].
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 322
(1966), this Court upheld the constitutionality of this
provision, and emphasized that it precludes judicial re
view of Census Bureau statistical findings like those Texas
now challenges.14
Finally, Texas argues that the principles of Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and related cases entitled it
to a predetermination hearing. Pet. Br. at 18-21, 26-28.
The Court o f Appeals properly rejected this argument
because it amounted to a constitutional challenge to the
Voting Rights Act which could only be heard by a three-
judge court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2282. Briscoe v.
Levi, 535 F.2d 1259, 1265-66 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Even if this Court had jurisdiction to hear petitioners’
constitutional challenge, it is important to note that the
cases Texas cites neither limit Congress’ authority under
14It should be noted that the scope of review issues presented
in this case are different than those presented in Morris v. Gres-
sette, prob. juris, noted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3407 (Dec. 6, 1976) (No.
75-1538). Morris involves issues regarding the scope o f review
o f Attorney General determinations pursuant to the preclearance
provisions o f Section 5, whereas this case involves initial coverage
determinations pursuant to Section 4(b). Section 5, unlike Section
4(b), does not in any way limit the scope o f judicial review.
11
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to protect
the voting rights of racial and language minorities, nor
provide any basis for Texas’ assertion that it was entitled
to a predetermination hearing. For example, Younger v.
Harris, supra, involved the power of federal courts to
enjoin state court proceedings, and by its terms has no
applicability to situations where state court proceedings
are not pending. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
In National League o f Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465
(1976), upon which petitioners also rely, this Court held
that Congress may not wield its power under the Com
merce Clause to enact statutes which “ impair the States’
‘ability to function effectively within a federal system,’ ”
96 S.Ct. at 2474, so as to ‘ “ devour the essentials of state
sovereignty,” ’ 96 S.Ct. at 2476, unless, of course, “ the
federal interest is demonstrably greater” under a “ balan
cing approach.” 96 S.Ct. at 2476 (Blackman, J., con
curring). National League o f Cities has no appli
cability where, as here, Congress has exercised its
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend
ments to protect the voting rights of minorities in Texas
and elsewhere against well-documented, widespread
attack. This Court has held that the extension of similar
protections to black voters in the South does not un
constitutionally infringe state sovereignty. South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, supra. Moreover, twelve years of experi
ence since the enactment o f the Voting Rights Act
demonstrates conclusively that it has not “ impair [ed] the
[states’ ] ability to function effectively within a federal
system.” In fact, federal laws guaranteeing voting equal
ity preserve the federal system and protect the sover
eignty of the people.
Similarly, nothing in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976), affects the power of Congress to enact legislation
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. That
12
decision merely overturned a federal court injunction
which this Court held ran against city officials who had
not themselves committed any constitutional violation.
Here, however, Congress has acted to protect the voting
rights o f Mexican Americans and other language minori
ties, and has limited the applicability of the statute to
those jurisdictions where severe voting discrimination has
been documented.
II.
CONGRESS INTENDED THE 1975 AMENDMENTS TO
EXTEND THE PROTECTIONS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT OF 1965 TO MEXICAN AMERICAN AND BLACK
VOTERS IN TEXAS.
It is a well accepted principle o f statutory construction
that courts interpret legislation to effectuate Congress’
intent. In United States v. American Trucking Associa
tion, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940), this Court held that, “ In
the interpretation o f statutes, the function of the courts
is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give
effect to the intent o f Congress.” 15
The legislative history of the 1975 Amendments
demonstrates that Congress intended to extend the pro
tections o f the 1965 Act to Mexican American voters in
the Southwest, and that it was particularly concerned
about widespread voting discrimination in Texas. The Re
port o f the House Judiciary Committee states:
The state o f Texas . . . has a substantial minority
population, comprised primarily o f Mexican Amer
icans and blacks. Evidence before the Subcommittee
documented that Texas also has a long history of dis
criminating against members o f both minority
15Accord., United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950); Harri
son v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943).
13
groups in ways similar to the myriad forms of dis
crimination practiced against blacks in the South. . . .
Outright exclusion and intimidation at the polls are
only two of the problems they face. . . .The central
problem documented is that of dilution of the vote
. . . . As one witness noted, ‘As the Mexican American
or Black voter appears to threaten potentially local
power structures, a wide variety of legal devices are
employed to intimidate, exclude and otherwise deny
voting rights to minority citizens.’ 16
The House Report further indicates that voter turnout in
Texas in recent Presidential elections has been below 50%
of the voting age population, and that “ the only reason
the state was not covered by the Voting Rights Act of
1965 or by the 1970 Amendments was that it has em
ployed restrictive devices other than a formal literacy re
quirement.” 17
The House Report,18 various tables included in the
record,19 and numerous statements during the Congres
sional debates20 indicate that Texas was among the juris
dictions Congress intended would be covered by Title II
of the 1975 Amendments.21 The House Report also
16H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 17-19. The Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1975 is virtually identical to the House Report. S. Rep. No.
94-295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
17H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 17.
18/d. at 24.
19E.g„ id, at 62-63.
20See, e.g., 121 Cong. Rec. (June 2, 1975) at 4712,jRemarks of
Cong. Edwards); Id. at 4746 (Remarks of Congresswoman Jordan).
21 The legislative record also indicates that Congress intended
Title II coverage to be triggered for the entire state of Alaska,
certain counties in California, and certain areas of Arizona, Florida,
Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, New York, North Carolina,
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia and Hawaii. H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 24.
14
states that Congress intended to reserve Title II coverage
for those jurisdictions where “ severe voting discrimination
was documented.” 22 As shown below, the legislative
record contains extensive evidence of severe voting dis
crimination against Mexican Americans and blacks in
Texas. Thus, in order to effectuate Congress’ intent, as
well as for the reasons set forth in the Attorney General’s
brief, the arguments Texas makes, which if accepted
would exclude it from the coverage of Title II, should be
rejected.
III.
THE LEGISLATIVE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT
MEXICAN AMERICANS AND BLACKS IN TEXAS HAVE
BEEN SUBJECTED TO SYSTEMATIC AND PERVASIVE
VOTING DISCRIMINATION.
The legislative record reveals voting discrimination in
Texas on a scale paralleling that which existed in the
South prior to the enactment of the 1965 Act. English-
only elections, discriminatory enforcement of registra
tion and election laws, overt discrimination against mi
nority voters and candidates, and sophisticated devices
which dilute minority votes have combined to exclude
Mexican Americans and blacks from participation in the
Texas political system. The record also demonstrates
that widespread voting discrimination persists in Texas
notwithstanding the fact that many discriminatory prac
tices have been invalidated by federal courts; like the
southern states, Texas has evaded the effect of court
orders by adopting new modes o f discrimination.
at 3. Title II incorporates the preclearance provisions of
Section 5, authorizes the employment of federal examiners and
observers by the Attorney General, and requires bilingual elections.
Title III of the 1975 Amendments, which applies in areas where
“ discrimination was less egregious,” merely requires bilingual elec
tions. Id.
15
A. English-only elections
The 2.2 million Mexican Americans in Texas comprise
approximately eighteen percent of the State’s population.
An estimated 50 percent of the Mexican American popu
lation speak only Spanish, and an estimated 90 percent
speak Spanish at home. Nevertheless, until 1975, Texas
printed all registration and other electoral materials, in
cluding ballots, in the English language only.24 To make
matters worse, Texas statutes long prohibited assistance
at the polls to Spanish speaking citizens and others illit
erate in English. In Garza v. Smith, 320 F. Supp. 131
(W.D. Tex. 1970), vacated and remanded for appeal to
the Fifth Circuit, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971), appeal dismissed
for lack o f jurisdiction, 450 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1971),
the court invalidated these statutes, stating:
We cannot perceive how exercise of the ‘ funda
mental right to vote,’ which Texas undeniably grants
to all illiterates who meet the qualifications pre
scribed by the state constitution, can be more than
an empty ritual if the right itself does not include
the right to be informed of the effect that a given
physical act of voting will produce. [320 F. Supp.
at 137] .
Despite the Garza decision and the fact that Texas stat
utes now require that assistance be given non-English
speaking and illiterate voters,25 election officials in a
number of Texas counties continue to refuse to provide
or allow it.26 Congressional witnesses testified that these
2^1975 House Hearings at 804.
2AId. at 806.
^T ex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 8.13 (1976-77 Supp.) (Vernon).
^United States Commission on Civil Rights, Staff Memoran
dum, Expansion of the Coverage of the Voting Rights Act, 21-23
[footnote continued]
16
practices have impaired the voting rights of Texas citizens
illiterate in English just as effectively as literacy tests long
abridged the voting rights of southern blacks.27 This
testimony is substantiated by federal court decisions
which have struck down English-only elections in areas
where substantial numbers o f non-English speaking voters
reside.28
Texas now argues that a newly enacted bilingual elec
tion statute29 has corrected the discriminatory impact of
(June 5, 1975), [hereafter “June 1975 CRC Staff Memorandum” ] ;
1975 House Hearings at 819. The June 1975 CRC Staff Memoran
dum was prepared at the request of Senator Tunney, Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
27E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 78, 369, 806.
2%See, e.g., Arroyo v. Tucker, 372 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa.
1974); Torres v. SACS, 73 Civ. 3921 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1974);
Puerto Rican Organization For Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F.
Supp. 606 (N.D. 111. 1972), aff’d,490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973). See
also New York v. United States, 419 U.S. 888 (1974), aff’g 65
F.R.D. 10 (D.D.C. 1974) (an election conducted only in English
where significant concentrations of Spanish speaking voters reside
is a discriminatory “ test or device” ). The discriminatory impact of
English-only elections in Texas is caused in part by the segregated
and unequal education provided Mexican Americans. Infra, at
46-47. In enacting the 1975 Amendments, Congress found that:
Citizens of language minorities . . . are from environments in
which the dominant language is other than English. In addi
tion they have been denied equal educational opportunities
by state and local governments, resulting in severe disabilities
and continuing illiteracy in the English language. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1973b(b)(l) (1976 Supp.).
The legislative record and judicial decisions establish that
these conditions are particularly serious in Texas. E.g., 1975 House
Hearings at 803-04, 864; Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
School District, 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff’d in rele
vant part, 469 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc),cert, denied, 413
U.S. 920 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973). In <Gas-
ton County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), this Court
recognized the relationship between education disparities and
voting discrimination.
79Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 1.08a (1976-77 Supp.) (Vernon).
17
English-only elections. Pet. Br. at 14. However, Congress
viewed the use of English-only elections as evidence of
prior discrimination requiring the application of the
Voting Rights Act. The fact that Texas now claims to
have ended English-only elections no more eliminates the
need for the application of the Act to it than the end of
literacy tests eliminated the need for the Act in the
South.
In any event, several witnesses testified that the bi
lingual election law was passed to dissuade Congress from
extending the Voting Rights Act to the state, 30 and as
drawn provides little if any assistance to Spanish speaking
voters. For example, Congresswoman Jordan testified that
the law exempts from its requirements 102 of Texas’ 254
counties and “ countless precincts within the remaining
counties if the precinct contains less than 5% of persons
of Spanish origin. Nobody knows how many Mexican
Americans are passed over by this exclusion.” 31 Con
gresswoman Jordan also emphasized that “ . . . more
importantly, by excluding precincts within counties from
coverage, local officials are provided an incentive to
gerrymander precinct lines . . . and thereby escape the re
quirement that bilingual ballots be provided.” 32
3(~* 1975 Senate Hearings at 457, 462-63, 913.
31Id. at 246.
32Id. By letter dated March 8, 1976, to the General Counsel for
the Secretary of State of Texas, the Attorney General indicated
that he would not object to implementation of the Texas bilingual
election law. The letter notes, however, that Section 4(f)(4) of the
Voting Rights Act applies to the entire State of Texas, and requires
that effective bilingual materials and assistance be provided at all
stages of the electoral process and within all Texas counties, “ in
cluding those that are allowed, but not mandated, to comply with
the provisions of the Texas bilingual election law.” Another
Congressional witness testified that subdivision 2(c)(3) of the
Texas Bilingual Election Statute:
[footnote continued]
18
B. Registration
The history o f registration in Texas provides stark evi
dence of systematic efforts to ignore and evade the effect
of judicial decrees entered to remedy voting discrimina
tion against Mexican Americans and blacks. The process
began several generations ago when it took five lawsuits
over a twenty-five year period to eliminate the white
primary.33 But those decisions did not end the State’s
effort to exclude minorities from the electoral process. In
1966, Texas was one o f the few states which still imposed
a poll tax. In United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234
(W.D. Tex.), aff’d per curiam, 384 U.S. 155 (1966), the
tax was invalidated;34 the district court found that the
tax had been enacted to disenfranchise minority citizens.
252 F. Supp. at 245.
In the wake o f this decision, the Texas legislature
enacted what one federal court has described as “ the
most restrictive voter registration procedures in the
nation. . . .” Graves v. Barnes I, 343 F. Supp. 704,
731 (W.D. T ex. 1972), affd in relevant part sub nom.,
White v. Reg ester, supra. This new law required
. . . provides that ballots can either be printed in bilingual
form or, at the decision of local officials, the election ma
terials could continue to be printed only in English if a trans
lation ballot were posted. . . .
. . . it is quite common to hold more than one election at the
same time — thus requiring the voter to consider as many as
three or more separate ballots. There was great concern on
the part o f the Mexican American leaders . . . that this post
ing alternative would only add to the confusion present on
Election Day. [1975 Senate Hearings at 456].
33Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73 (1932); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935);
Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953).
34See Harper v. Virginia Board o f Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966).
19
annual registration and prescribed a four-month registra
tion period ending nine months prior to November elec
tions.35 In Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Tex.
1971), aff’d sub nom., Beare v. Briscoe, 498 F.2d 244
(5th Cir. 1974), these requirements were held to violate
the equal protection clause because they disenfranchised
over a million Texans otherwise qualified to vote. 321
F. Supp. at 1108. See also Graves v. Barnes I, supra.
Following Beare v. Smith, the Texas registration law
was again modified, this time to authorize an automatic
three-year registration renewal whenever a voter voted in
a state or county election.36 The law also required that
notice be sent to all persons whose registration was ex
piring, but witnesses testified that the reregistration
forms were in English only, and that a high proportion
of Mexican Americans were required to reregister because
past discrimination had inhibited them from voting.37
In 1975, after the Voting Rights Act was extended to
Texas, the state again amended its registration procedures
to require a purge of all currently registered voters.38
The purge was never implemented because the Attorney
General, acting pursuant to Section 5, objected on the
ground that it would have a discriminatory impact on
blacks and Mexican Americans. The letter of objection
states:
. . . We cannot conclude that the effect of the total
purge to initiate the reregistration program will not
be discriminatory in a prohibited way.
With regard to cognizable minority groups in Texas,
namely, blacks and Mexican Americans, a study of
35TEX. CONST, art. VI, §2 (V.A.T.C.) (1966); Tex. Elec.
Code Ann. art. 5.11a (Vernon).
36Tex. Elec. Code Ann. art. 5.18(b) (1975) (repealed).
37E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 806; 1975 Senate Hearings at
745.
38Texas Senate Bill 300 (1975).
20
their historical voting problems and a review of sta
tistical data, including that relating to literacy, dis
closed that a total voter registration purge under
existing circumstances may have a discriminatory
effect on their voting rights. Comments from in
terested parties as well as our own investigation,
indicate that a substantial number o f minority regis
trants may be confused, unable to comply with the
statutory registration requirements of Section 2, or
only able to comply with substantial difficulty.
Moreover, representations have been made to this
office that a requirement that everyone register
anew, on the heels o f registration difficulties experi
enced in the past, could cause significant frustration
and result in creating voting apathy among minority
citizens, thus, erasing the gains already accomplished
in registering minority voters.39
Finally, numerous witnesses testified that Mexican
Americans and blacks in Texas are subjected to discrim
inatory treatment by local registrars. The abuses de
scribed include failure to place the names of duly regis
tered minorities on the voting lists, unavailability of voter
registration applications for registration drives, refusals to
appoint minorities as deputy registrars,40 and discrimina
tory enforcement of residence requirements.41
39Letter of objection dated December 10, 1975.
40E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 854; 1975 Senate Hearings at
245, 767, 1004-1007. See also H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 16; June 1975
CRC Staff Memorandum at 21-24.
41E.g., 1975 Senate Hearings at 245-46, 947-49. Texas courts
have characterized residency as an “ elastic” concept which is
extremely difficult to define and dependent primarily upon the
intention o f the applicant. This “ elasticity,” coupled with the
presumption under Texas law that decisions of local officials
[footnote continued]
21
C. Discrimination at the polls
Civil Rights Commission reports and other testimony
document widespread physical and economic intimida
tion of minority voters. Again and again, witnesses indi
cated that official harassment and fear of economic
reprisals deter minority voting as well as registration in
Texas.42
Civil Rights Commission observers reported physical
intimidation and harassment of minority poll watchers
and voters, and instances of police officers making “ ex
cessive and unnecessary appearances” at predominantly
Mexican American precincts and threatening Mexican
American voters.43 After Mexican Americans in Pearsall
had conducted a drive to encourage absentee voting, the
sheriff “ went to the homes o f the Mexican Americans
who had voted or were going to vote absentee intimi
dating them by warning that they had to be out of the
area on election day. . . d’44 Law enforcement officers in
Pearsall have also frequented predominantly Mexican
American precincts and taken pictures of those voting.45
Other witnesses described economic intimidation of
minority voters, including threatened loss of jobs, credit,
and business.46 A telegram to the Department of Justice
from the Chairman of the Texas Advisory Committee to
will be overturned only if contestants meet a heavy burden of
proof, facilitates discriminatory application of registration require
ments. See Guerra v. Pena, 406 S.W.2d 769 (C.C.A. Tex. 1966).
^E .g ., 1975 House Hearings at 483-85, 521-23, 819-20,
853-56; 1975 Senate Hearings at 751-54; 967-71; H.R. Rep.
94-196 at 18.
43June 1975 CRC Staff Memorandum at 24-28.
441975 House Hearings at 522. See also 1975 Senate Hear
ings at 947.
45 1975 Senate Hearings at 948. See also Allee v. Medrano,
416 U.S. 802 (1974).
46E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 521-22.
22
the Civil Rights Commission stated that the Committee
had received complaints that “ voters have been eco
nomically intimidated by threats of financial loss for
failure to support certain candidates.” 47 48 The Civil Rights
Commission study o f Uvalde County reported that fear
of job loss and reduction o f welfare benefits is a major
J . . . 4Qdeterrent to Mexican American political participation. 0
Economic and physical intimidation of minority voters
is facilitated by certain features of Texas election law,
including the often unbridled discretion vested in local
officials. A former Texas Secretary o f State noted:
The underlying problem is economic or physical
intimidation at the local level o f minority voters
who are predominantly in lower income groups.
Texas statutes place all election duties upon local
officials. Even if the Secretary of State has access to
information concerning intimidation or improper
influence of a voter, the office has no statutory
authority to take even minimal action. In addition,
the [state] Attorney General can intervene only
where irregularities involve more than one coun
ty.49
Other witnesses testified that a Texas “ stub law”
which requires voters to sign a ballot stub facilitates elec
tion challenges which intimidate Mexican American and
black voters.50 The testimony describes the opening of
471975 House Hearings at 819.
48June 1975 CRC Staff Memorandum at 33.
491 9 75 Senate Hearings at 247-48. See also n. 41, supra.
50Texas Election Code Ann. Art. 8.15 requires that a voter sign
a ballot stub containing a serial number corresponding to the serial
number on the ballot. The stubs and ballots are deposited in
separate boxes. If an election is challenged both boxes may be
opened and the stubs used to trace ballots to the voters who cast
them.
23
ballot boxes, the subpoenaing of minority voters, and the
tracing of their votes followed by economic reprisals, all
of which have a chilling effect on minority political par
ticipation.51 In Pearsall, for example, a petition chal
lenging election results stated precisely the number of
votes being challenged and the reasons each vote was
allegedly invalid. Specific allegations of this type could
not have been made unless the ballot box had already
been opened. Approximately 200 Mexican American
voters were subpoenaed (no whites were subpoenaed),
and the challenged votes were ultimately declared in
valid.52 In the course of a similar election challenge in
Cotulla over 150 voters were subpoenaed, all of whom
were Mexican Americans.53 The discriminatory impact
of such election challenges was summarized during the
Congressional hearings:
The manner in which these investigations are carried
out as perceived by the Mexican American com
munities involved has the effect of discouraging
further registration and voting. The effect is intimi
dation—the result is fear of exercising the constitu
tionally guaranteed right to vote.54
The legislative record also indicates that the stub law
operates as a literacy test because it requires voters to
sign their ballot stubs. One witness described an election
won by a Mexican American candidate by 65 votes. The
results were challenged, the stub box opened, a deter
mination made that approximately 100 Mexican Ameri-
s lE.g., 1975 House Hearings at 363-64, 485, 521-22; 1975
Senate Hearings at 731-33, 946-49.
521975 Senate Hearings at 946-47.
E.g., id. at 948-49.
4̂ 1975 House Hearings at 404.
24
can voters had signed their stubs with an “ X ,” and the
opposing white candidate was declared elected.55
Official intimidation, harassment, and discrimination
infect all stages of the voting process in Texas. Election
officials in La Salle, Uvalde and Frio Counties denied
assistance to non-English speaking voters even after Texas
laws were amended to require it.56 Other witnesses de
scribed excessive demands for personal identification re
quired only o f Mexican American voters,57 challenges to
the residence of voters whom election officials felt might
vote for the Raza Unida candidate, harassment of Raza
Unida campaign workers even though they were working
the polls outside the distance markers,58 selective invali
dation o f ballots cast by minority voters, last minute un
announced changes in voting times and locations,59 and
the location of polling places in areas traditionally off-
limits to or inconvenient for minorities. For example, in
Jefferson County, which is approximately 25% black,
polling places were located in a rod and gun club which
had a totally white membership, and in a white school in
an all-white section of a precinct.60 In Villa Coronado,
voting officials refused to set up a polling place in a Mexi
can American neighborhood where 75% of the district’ s
551975 House Hearings at 732.
56Id. at 818.
57E.g., id. at 810, 820; 1975 Senate Hearings at 767-69.
5&E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 820; 1975 Senate Hearings at
741-43, 967-71. The Raza Unida party is one of three political
parties that Texas law officially recognizes. It is supported pre
dominantly by Mexican American voters.
5^1975 House Hearings at 810,860. See generally June 1975
CRC Staff Memorandum at 24-27.
6°June 1975 CRC Staff Memorandum at 26.
25
population resided, thus forcing those voters to travel
seven miles in order to cast their ballots.61
D. Discrimination against minority candidates
Mexican Americans and blacks in Texas have also been
denied an equal opportunity to run for elective office.
Until 1972, a filing fee discriminated against minority
candidates just as effectively as the poll tax discriminated
against minority voters. Over 35% of the Mexican Ameri
cans and blacks in Texas are impoverished.62 In Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), this Court invalidated
Texas’ filing fee system on the ground that it denied less
affluent citizens an equal opportunity to run for office.
Several courts on similar grounds have invalidated re
quirements that a candidate own real property within the
district in which he or she is running.63 In Pablo Puente
v. City o f Crystal City, Civ. Ac. No. DR-70-CA-4 (W.D.
Tex. April 3, 1970), the court found that a requirement
that city council members be property owners discrim
inated against Mexican Americans.64 Likewise in Graves
v. Barnes I, supra, the court found that the cost o f con-
611975 House Hearings at 856. See also 1975 Senate Hearings
at 947, where evidence was given that when the polling place in
Pearsall, Texas was located in the Mexican American part of town,
voting participation among Mexican Americans rose to the highest
levels ever; when the polling place was relocated in the white sec
tion of town, Mexican American participation dropped by 400
votes.
6~ Infra, at 47.
63E.g., Connerton v. Oliver, 333 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Tex.
1971); Duncantell v. Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Gonzales v. Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See also
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
64 A Texas law that only persons who have rendered property
for taxation may vote in bond issue elections was invalidated in
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975), rehearing denied, 422 U.S.
1029 (1975).
26
ducting electoral campaigns in at-large state legislature
races in Bexar County was so excessive that it inhibited
the recruitment and nomination or election of Mexican
American candidates. 343 F. Supp. at 731.
The expense o f running in at-large elections is not the
only reason their widespread use throughout the state65
discriminates against minority candidates. One witness
testified that considerably fewer minority candidates
compete in the Demo era tic primary in at-large districts
because of a common sense realization that their pros
pects o f winning at-large races are slim.66
Testimony also established that in nine major Texas
counties studied, candidates most often were selected
either by slate-making groups, such as organized labor or
businessmen, or by a more informal process which re
quires the candidate to have access to social, business,
educational and professional associations.67 Minorities
have been denied access to both processes. In Graves v.
Barnes II, 378 F. Supp. 640, 649 (W.D. Tex. 1974) va
cated and remanded for determination o f mootness
sub nom. White v. Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975),
the court found that in Jefferson County endorse
ment by a local labor organization usually leads to
election, but that the local organization had never
slated a black man or woman. The court noted
“ When called upon to explain their lack of enthusiasm
for black candidates, the local labor leaders reported to
the state . . . [organization] and the local black com
munity that they would not support a black person
because o f the racial hostility of their predominantly
white membership.” 68
6^Infra, at 37.
661975 House Hearings at 436. See Graves v. Barnes I, supra, at
731-32.
671975 House Hearings at 436.
68The hearing record also describes a discriminatory tactic
adopted by the City Council of Uvalde, which met and decided in
27
The long and pervasive history of discrimination
against minority candidates by traditional, well-estab
lished political organizations has encouraged minorities to
establish new political parties.* 69 This development, how
ever, has not escaped the attention of Texas officials
intent on perpetuating discrimination against minority
candidates and voters. After American Party o f Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974), rehearing denied, 416 U.S.
1000 (1974), invalidated a Texas law which denied minor
party candidates a place on absentee ballots, a new law
was passed prohibiting minor political parties from hold
ing primary elections. Texas reimburses the costs of con
ducting primary elections, but not the costs of holding
conventions. The'Attorney General objected to this new
law because its impact would fall “ only on one party, the
Raza Unida party, and significantly limit the opportunity
for Mexican Americans to nominate, on an equal basis
with others, a candidate of their choice.” 70
There is also substantial evidence of racially based cam
paign tactics in Texas. In White v. Regester, supra, this
Court emphasized the district court’s finding that the Dal
las Committee for Responsible Government, a white
dominated organization that effectively controls Demo
cratic party slating in Dallas County, had as recently as
1970 relied upon “ racial campaign tactics in white pre
secret not to put on the ballot the name of a duly qualified Chi-
cano candidate for the Council. The candidate filed an action in
state court. The court found that his constitutional rights had been
violated. 1975 House Hearings at 854. See also Garcia v. Carpenter,
525 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1975) (arbitrary refusal to place
Mexican American candidate’s name on the ballot as a candidate
for mayor).
69See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See generally
Mazmanian, Third Parties in Presidential Elections (1974).
70Letter of objection dated January 23, 1976.
28
cincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming
support o f the black community.” 412 U.S. at 767. One
Congressional witness described thirty-second spots on
Spanish radio stations which warned Mexican American
voters that if they did not comply with all election laws,
they could be sent to jail or fined $500.71 Another wit
ness said that racial campaigning was evident in nine
major Texas counties studied, and that such campaigning
is particularly discriminatory given racially polarized
voting patterns in at-large election districts.72
Finally, the Civil Rights Commission advised Congress
that it found economic and physical intimidation of
minority candidates in Texas. One candidate who re
ported that he had suffered harassment on the job told a
Commission interviewer:
“ . . . you see why we have such a difficult time even
convincing some Chicanos to file for office, the fear
for their jobs, fear of all kinds of pressure.” 73
E. Dilution of minority votes
The hearing record also documents continuous efforts
by Texas officials to subject minority voters and candi
dates to “ sophisticated” discriminatory devices such as
malapportionment, gerrymandering, at-large elections,
majority runoff requirements and the place system, all of
which dilute the value of the vote. The House Judiciary
Committee concluded that blatant intimidation and other
7^1975 House Hearings at 806.
12Id. at 454-55.
73 1975 Senate Hearings at 999. See generally United States
Commission on Civil Rights, Staff Memorandum, Summary of Pre
liminary Research on the Problems o f Participation by Spanish
Speaking Voters in the Electoral Process, April 23, 1975. Num
erous witnesses described many instances o f outright intimidation
of minority candidates. E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 521, 826-27,
854, 861; 1975 Senate Hearings at 735, 753-56, 774.
29
forms o f discrimination against Mexican American and
black voters in Texas
are not the only barriers obstructing equal oppor
tunity for political participation . . . The central
problem documented is that o f dilution of the vote
-arrangements by which the vote of minority elec
tors are made to count less than the votes of the
majority. 74
1. Malapportionment and gerrymandering
The record is replete with descriptions of malappor-
tioned or gerrymandered electoral districts in Texas. 5 In
1969 and again in 1974 the Commissioners Court in
Anderson County reapportioned and redistricted the
county’s four precincts.76 In Robinson v. Commissioners
Court, Anderson County, Civ. Ac. No. TY-CA-73-236
(E.D. Tex. March 15, 1974, affd in relevant part, 505
F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1974), 77 the district court held that
“ Since the Commissioners Court did not rely on available
1970 census data in effecting the modification of the
precinct lines, but rather placed exclusive reliance upon
voting registration figures, the reapportionment is dis
torted.” The court also found that the realignment fol
lowed neither established census enumeration districts
” H.R. Report 94-196 at 18.
76 Cf White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973), where this
Court invalidated reapportionment of Texas’ Congressional dis
tricts because o f an unequal distribution of population.
76The Commissioners Court of Anderson County, like Commis
sioners Courts throughout Texas, is a legislative body for the
county and is comprised of Commissioners and a County Judge.
Each Commissioner is elected from a separate precinct, but the
Judge is elected at-large.
77The district court’s opinion is reprinted in the 1975 Senate
Hearings at 248.
30
nor logical boundaries. Rather, “ The Commissioners drew
a ‘wedge’ through the greatest black concentration within
the southwestern portion of the city of Palestine, dividing
the black community . . . into three Commissioner pre
cincts.” The court concluded that the redistricting and
reapportionment were racially motivated. The Fifth Cir
cuit affirmed, stating:
. . . Unfortunately, the disrespect o f voting rights is
not a recent innovation in county government in
Texas. See generally, Graves v. Barnes, W.D. Tex.
1972 (3 judge), 343 F. Supp. 704, aff’d in part sub
nom. White v. Regester, 1973, 412 U.S. 755, 93
S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314; Avery v. Midland-
County, 1968, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20
L.Ed.2d 45. Nor, unfortunately, is unconstitutional
dilution o f voting rights only a very old part of our
history. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, W.D. Tex. 1974
(3 judge), 378 F. Supp. 640. Caesar found Gaul
divided into three parts. Here we are confronted
with a County Commissioners Court which has cut
the county’s black community into three illogical
parts in order to dilute the black vote in precinct
elections, acting as a modern Caesar dissecting its
private Gaul. Such apportionment poisons our repre
sentative democracy at its roots. Our constitution
cannot abide it. [505 F.2d at 676].
In Weaver v. Commissioners Court, Nacogodoches
County, Civ. Ac. No. TY-73-CA-209 (E.D. Tex. March
15, 1974), another case discussed in the hearing record,78
it similarly was held that an apportionment plan in
Nacogodoches County constituted a racial gerryman
der which “ effectively fragment [ed] black voting strength
. . . by dividing the area of heavy black population
. . . into separate commissioner [districts].” The
court found a “ general lack o f responsiveness on the part
7^1975 House Hearings at 366.
31
of city and county officials in Nacogodoches to the par
ticular lives, needs and interests of black citizens of the
county.” 79
In Crockett County reapportionment was used to
dilute the value of Mexican American votes. In 1974, a
Mexican American received the Democratic nomination,
usually tantamount to election, for a seat on the County
Commissioners Court. The precinct from which he was
nominated was substantially Mexican American, as was
one other. Prior to the general election, the Commis
sioners Court reapportioned the county on the basis of
registered voters, not population. Since registration
among Mexican Americans had been low, the Commis
sioners were able to isolate practically all of the Mexican
Americans into one Commissioner’s district, thus en
suring that only one Mexican American would be
elected.80
Extension of the Voting Rights Act to Texas already
has limited malapportionment and gerrymandering of
electoral districts. The Attorney General objected to the
Crockett County Commissioners Court’s reapportion
ment of its precincts. The letter o f objection states:
Our experience indicates that Mexican Americans
generally have a lower rate of voter registration than
do Anglos. Thus an apportionment based on regis
tration data is likely to have a dilutive effect on the
vote of Mexican Americans. See Eli v. Klahr, 403
U.S. 108, 118-19 (1971) (Douglas, J., con
curring).81
79See discussion of Weaver v. Muckleroy, Civ. Ac. No. 5524
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 1975), infra, at 38-39, for evidence of the per
sistent efforts of Nacogodoches to dilute the value of black votes.
1975 House Hearings at 366.
Letter of objection dated July 7, 1976.
32
The Attorney General also objected to reapportion
ment o f Commissioners Court’s precincts in Uvalde
County, stating:
. , . According to the 1970 census, Uvalde County is
50.7% Mexican American, 47.8% Anglo and 1.5%
black. Information available to us indicates that the
Commissioner Precinct 2 under the redistricting plan
has an overwhelming concentration of Mexican
Americans and in addition exceeds the norm of an
ideal (population) district by a percentage o f at least
11%. The other precincts, two o f which are sub
stantially over-represented, apparently have devia
tions of similar scope resulting in a total deviation
range in excess o f 20%. Thus, it would appear that
the precinct with the highest percentage of Mexican
Americans is the most under-represented while at
least two of the remaining precincts, each with evi
dent Anglo population majorities, show deviations
indicating over-representation.82
In addition, the Attorney General has objected to gerry
mandered and registration-based reapportionments in
Waller83 and Frio84 Counties, and has twice objected to
plans submitted by the state of Texas sub districting
^Letter of objection dated October 13, 1976.
3̂Letter of objection dated July 27, 1976.
^Letter of objection dated April 16, 1976. In Padillo v. Val-
verde County, Civ. Ac. No. 9062 (C.C.A. Tex.) an action was filed
in 1969 in Texas District Court charging malapportionment and
gerrymandering of Valverde County Commissioner Court pre
cincts. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint alleged that 94% of the
county’s population resided in one precinct and that the remain
ing 6% o f the county’s residents lived in the other three pre
cincts. The amended complaint also alleged that precinct lines
had been gerrymandered to discriminate against the county’s sub
stantial Mexican American population. The parties agreed to a re
districting plan, and settled the matter out of court.
33
multi-member Texas House of Representative districts on
the ground that the plans gerrymander minority areas.85
Despite the Attorney General’s objection, the Frio
County Commissioners announced they would conduct a
May 1, 1976 primary election pursuant to the objection
able plan. Mexican American voters in Frio County se
cured a temporary restraining order enjoining the pri
mary, Sylva v. Fitch, Civ. Ac. No. SA-76-CA-126, (W.D.
Tex. Sept. 26, 1976), and subsequently reached an
agreement with the County Commissioners regarding a
new apportionment plan. The new plan was approved by
the federal court, but the Commissioners are now at
tempting to set it aside on appeal.
Congressional witnesses underscored the widespread
use and discriminatory impact of malapportionment and
gerrymandering. 86 One witness stated:
. . . There are 254 counties in Texas each electing a
County Commissioners Court. . . . In almost every
plan I have been asked to look into, minority politi
cal rights have been gerrymandered in ways similar
8 ̂Letters of objection dated January 23, 1976 and January 26,
1976. In the January 23 letter of objection, the Attorney General
notes:
Regarding Districts 32A-32I in Tarrant County, it appears
that portions of the new single-member districting lines are
drawn through cognizable minority residential concentra
tions resulting in an apportionment or fragmenting of these
areas into four districts, only one of which has a significant
minority population, while fairly drawn alternative district
ing plans would avoid placing portions of the minority resi
dential concentrations in as many districts and would result
in two districts with significant minority populations.
See Graves v. Barnes 1 and II, supra.
8^E.g., 1975 House Hearings at 395-96, 494-95; 1975 Senate
Hearings at 245.
34
to those documented in Anderson, Nacogodoches
and Crockett Counties.
2. Multi-member districting
Congress found and federal courts have held that
multi-member districting in Texas unconstitutionally
dilutes the value of Mexican American and black votes.
Several courts have also found that minority votes are
further diluted by the use in such districts (and in multi
member districts that do not themselves have a diluting
effect) of the place system and the requirement of a
majority runoff. 87 88
The reapportionment plan adopted for the Texas State
House of Representatives based on the 1970 census is
illustrative o f the discriminatory use o f multi-member
districting and official evasion of judicial decrees. The
hearing record indicates that the initial plan was declared
unconstitutional by a state district court within days
after it was enacted.89 The Texas Supreme Court af
firmed. Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1971). Although the Texas Constitution states that in
such a situation the state Legislative Redistricting Board
must prepare an alternate plan of apportionment, the
members of the Board refused to act until expressly
ordered to do so by the Texas Supreme Court. Mauzy v.
Legislative Redistricting Board, 471 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.
(Sup. Ct. 1971). The court warned the Board that the use
of multi-member districts might dilute the electoral
rights of Mexican Americans and blacks:
In exercising its discretion as to whether to create
multi-member districts within a single county, we
871975 Senate Hearings at 956.
88See discussion, infra, at 36-41
891975 House Hearings at 366.
35
must assume that the Board will give careful con
sideration to the question o f whether or not the
creation o f any particular multi-member district
would result in discrimination by minimizing the
voting strength of any political or racial elements of
the voting population. [471 S.W.2d at 575].
Notwithstanding this warning, Board members ad
mitted under oath that they did not at any point consider
the possible effect o f multi-member districts on Mexican
Americans or blacks.90 Instead, the Board adopted a multi
member districting plan which was invalidated in a series
of federal court actions. In the first of these actions,
White v. Regester, supra, this Court affirmed the judg
ment of a three-judge district court (Graves v. Barnes I,
supra) invalidating multi-member districts in Dallas and
Bexar Counties and ordering those districts to be redrawn
into single-member districts. This Court reiterated the
lower court’s findings regarding the history of official
racial discrimination in Texas, Texas laws requiring a ma
jority vote as a prerequisite to nomination, the use of a
“ place system,” racial campaign tactics, and the district
court’s conclusion that “ ‘the black community has been
effectively excluded from participation in the Demo
cratic primary selection process,’ . . . and was therefore
generally not permitted to enter into the political process
in a reliable and meaningful manner.” 412 U.S. at 766-
67. This Court also relied on the lower court’s findings
that Mexican Americans in the Bexar community along
with other Mexican Americans in Texas had long suf
fered from invidious voting discrimination, and sustained
the judgment o f the district court that:
. . . the multi-member districts, as designed and op
erated in Bexar County, invidiously excluded Mexi
can Americans from effective participation in politi-
9^1975 House Hearings at 366-67.
36
cal life, specifically in the election of representatives
to the Texas House o f Representatives [412 U.S. at
769],
On remand, multi-member districts in Tarrant, El Paso,
Travis, Jefferson, Lubbock, McClennan, and Nueces
Counties were found to deny Mexican American and
black voters an equal opportunity to participate in the
electoral process. Graves v. Barnes II, supra. In addition,
the Galveston County multi-member district was held to
be the result o f an unconstitutional gerrymander. Sub
sequently, Texas adopted a new reapportionment plan
which replaced the multi-member districts with single
member districts. For this reason, this Court vacated and
remanded for a determination of mootness. White v.
Regester, 422 U.S. 935 (1975). However, before the
district court could consider the matter the Attorney
General objected to three gerrymandered districts con
tained in the plan.91 Graves v. Barnes III, 408 F. Supp.
1050, 1052 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
3. The place system, majority runoff requirements,
and at-large elections
The foregoing multi-member districting decisions have
not ended efforts in Texas to dilute the value of minority
votes. Congress found that a substantial number of Texas
jurisdictions have now adopted the place system, major
ity runoff requirements, and at-large elections, and that
each of these “ sophisticated” devices abridges the voting
rights o f Texas Mexican Americans and blacks.92
The place system requires candidates in multi-member
districts or at-large elections to run for a specified num
bered post. Each voter casts one vote for one candidate
See discussion, supra, at n. 85.
92H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 18-19.
37
for each post. The system thus lends visibility to specific
candidates in an at-large field, and makes it possible to
“ spotlight” minority candidates in specific match races.
By matching minority candidates with particularly strong
opposing candidates, minority voters are effectively pre
vented from combining their voting strength in support of
a candidate running at-large.93
Majority runoff and at-large election requirements like
wise dilute the votes of minorities. Both devices are par
ticularly discriminatory when adopted by jurisdictions
with a substantial, but not majority, minority population.
This is especially true when these devices are combined
with a place system. Each tends to ensure that through
bloc voting the white majority can elect the candidate of
its choice, but that minority populations cannot.94
The record establishes that the at-large structure, with
accompanying variations o f the majority runoff and num
bered place system, is used in at least 1,300 political
subdivisions in Texas, including all of the more than
1,100 school districts in the state and 174 of its largest
cities.
The House Judiciary Committee concluded that these
devices had become particularly widespread “ in the wake
of the recent emergence o f minority attempts to exercise
the right to vote,” and that their use “ . . . effectively
den[ies] Mexican American and black voters in Texas
93 1975 House Hearings at 402, 422-23. See generally Young,
The Place System in Texas Elections, Austin, Texas: Institute of
Public Affairs, 1965, reprinted in part in the 1975 House Hearings
at 986 et seq.
941975 House Hearings at 389-90, 402-03, 417-28, 1975 Sen
ate Hearings at 488-93. See also White v. Regester, supra: Whit
comb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Zimmer v. McKeiihen, 485
F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d sub nom. East Carroll Parish
School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
9~*1975 Senate Hearings at 462.
38
political access in terms of recruitment, nomination, elec
tion, and ultimately, representation.” 96 This finding is
substantiated by a number of judicial decisions reprinted
or summarized in the legislative record. For example,
in Lipscomb v. Wise, 399 F. Supp. 782, 790 (N.D. Tex.
19 7 5), 97 the court held that at-large voting in Dallas
dilutes the value o f black votes, stating:
. . . it is clear that the present system of requiring all
members of the Dallas City Council to run at-large
on a city-wide basis involves dilution. In this regard
. . . two factors are of particular significance. These
are the existence o f past discrimination in general,
which precludes effective participation in the elec
toral system and a customary lesser degree of access
to the process o f slating candidates than enjoyed by
the white community.
. . . Meaningful participation in the political process
must not be a function of grace, but rather is a
matter of right.
Similarly, in David v. Garrison, Civ. Ac. No. TY-73-
CA-113 (E.D. Tex. 19 7 5),98 the court invalidated the city
of Lufkin’s use of at-large elections combined with a
majority vote requirement and place system. The first
black to run for the City Commission obtained a plurality
of votes in the initial election, but was defeated in the
runoff. The black candidate received total support from
black voters but negligible support from whites. The
court held that:
The majority place system, as utilized by the City of
Lufkin, operates to minimize the voting strength of
the black residents, and, coupled with the at-large
system, tends to create a racial polarization in
voting.
96h .R. Rep. 94-196 at 19-20.
97 Discussed in the 1975 Senate Hearings at 915.
98Discussed in the 1975 Senate Hearings at 919.
39
The discriminatory use of a majority runoff require
ment and place system in the context of at-large elections
was also invalidated in Weaver v. Muckleroy, Civ. Ac. No.
5524 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 1975)." The case arose in the
city o f Nacogodoches, which has a 15% black population.
The court’s opinion reveals that no black had ever won a
county-wide or city election. The city charter provided
for a five-member commission form of government, and
had not been amended since 1929. Since that time city
elections had been held at-large, with the office awarded
to candidates securing a plurality of the votes.
In the spring o f 1972, a black ran for the City Com
mission. He came close to winning a plurality in an elec
tion which registered the highest turnout in the history of
Nacogodoches city elections. In June, 1972, the all-white
City Commission proposed the first amendment to the
city charter in 43 years, the institution of a majority
runoff, numbered place system. The proposal was
adopted by Nacogodoches voters.
In April 1973 another black ran for City Commis
sioner. He won a plurality o f the votes in the first elec
tion, but lost the runoff. At the same time, the City
Commissioners changed the date o f election from April
to mid-July in order to avoid the impact of the votes of
students at a predominantly black college in the area. On
the basis o f these facts, the district court held that the at-
large, majority runoff, numbered place system tended to
abridge the voting rights of black citizens, and ordered
the institution o f single-member districts. See also Graves
v. Barnes II, supra, 378 F. Supp. at 659.
The hearing record contains additional testimony re
garding the discriminatory purpose and effect of at-large,
"Discussed in the 1975 House Hearings at 400-401; re
printed in 1975 Senate Hearings at 252-54.
40
majority runoff, place system elections. One witness testi
fied that, as a consequence o f the widespread use of at-
large elections, “ you will find little or no representation
in the so-called impact area, the heavily concentrated
Mexican American, black and minority areas.” 100 A study
included in the record concluded that fear of bloc voting
by minority voters caused several Texas communities to
adopt the place system:
A member of one city charter commission admits
that the place system was written into the charter
“ to prevent minority groups from voting against all
candidates but one in order to ensure their man got
the most votes.” An individual who helped to draft
another charter candidly acknowledged that the
place system was selected so that the Negro minor
ity in his city would be unable to elect a council
man.100 101
Congress was informed that the preclearance pro
visions of Section 5 would protect minority voters from
the discriminatory use of at-large, majority runoff, and
numbered place rules.102 This prediction has proven true.
To date, the Attorney General has issued numerous let
ters of objection barring implementation of such devices.
Submissions objected to were filed by independent school
districts, municipalities, and Commissioners Courts. The
Attorney General’s objection to the designation o f a
place system and the adoption of a majority vote re
quirement by the Hereford Independent School District
is illustrative. The letter of objection notes:
With respect to the designation o f election by place
and the majority vote requirement . . . [w] e have
noted particularly the growing minority population
100 1975 House Hearings at 483.
101 1975 Senate Hearings at 988.
102 1975 Senate Hearings at 489.
41
of the district, the electoral history o f the district,
the increase in minority political activity, the lack of
any minority representation on the Board of Trust
ees o f the district, and the fact that these features
would be added to an at-large election system.
. . . The opportunity for minority voters to elect a
representative o f their choice to the school board is
significantly lessened by the addition o f the num
bered place requirement. . . . The majority vote re
quirement exacerbates this problem, by preventing a
minority candidate who receives a plurality against
two or more majority candidates from being elected
without facing a run-off election against a single
majority candidate.103
4. Annexations and de-annexations
Annexations and de-annexations o f areas with large
white voting populations are also used in Texas to reduce
minority participation in the electoral process. For ex
ample, in 1972, the Pearsall City Council annexed a 100%
white development but refused to annex compact, con
tiguous areas of high Mexican American concentration,
and San Antonio, where the City Council is elected at-
large, made massive annexations including irregular or
finger annexations on the city’s heavily white north
side.104 The Attorney General subsequently objected
to the San Antonio annexation on the ground that the
proportional strength o f the Mexican American popu
lation necessarily has been reduced. . . .” 105
3®3 Letter o f objection dated May 24, 1976.
104 1 9 75 House Hearings at 368. See City o f Petersburg, Vir
ginia v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972), aff’d,
410 U.S. 962 (1973), where the court affirmed a finding that an
annexation of predominently white areas diluted the votes of
black citizens.
3®3Letter of objection dated April 2, 1976. This letter of objec
tion was withdrawn after San Antonio voters approved a plan for
the election of the City Council from single-member districts.
42
The Attorney General also objected to a proposal to
establish the Westheimer Independent School District in
an area which had been part of the Houston Independent
School District (HISD). The letter of objection states
that the Justice Department had received comments from
interested persons alleging that the proposal had a dis
criminatory purpose, and that:
. . Such comments point out that the Westheimer
district was first proposed shortly after . . . minority-
backed candidates first gained control of the board
and shortly after the HISD had been ordered to
undertake substantial school desegregation. The
materials which accompany your submission do not
refute such allegations. In addition, it appears that
minority residents in the proposed Westheimer dis
trict have no realistic opportunity to achieve the
sort of representation in the proposed Westheimer
Independent School District that they now enjoy
in the Houston Independent School District.106
106 Letter of objection dated January 13, 1977. On January
15, 1977, the Westheimer Independent School District held special
elections to select school trustees pursuant to the reapportionment
and new electoral procedures to which the Attorney General had
objected. The certified winners assumed official responsibilities
the following day. On January 20, 1977 the Attorney General
filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, United States v. Interim Board o f Trustees o f
the Westheimer Independent School District, et al., (Civ. Ac. No.
H-77-121), seeking to set aside the election and enjoin defendants
from taking any action purported to be official action of the West
heimer Independent School District by virtue o f their election
pursuant to the objectionable procedures.
43
The hearing record, together with events subsequent to
the passage of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1975, thus establishes a systematic and pervasive pattern
of voting discrimination against Mexican Americans and
blacks in Texas. The pattern revealed is strikingly similar
to that which existed in the South and led to the enact
ment of the Voting Rights Act o f 1965.107 The record
also establishes that case-by-case litigation has not and
cannot end voting discrimination in Texas. 108 Prepara
tion of voting rights cases is extraordinarily costly and
time consuming, and neither the Justice Department nor
private parties have the resources to remedy all discrim
inatory voting practices. More important, political juris
dictions in Texas, intent on perpetuating the political
subordination o f minorities, persistently violate court
orders or evade them by adopting new modes of discrim
ination not covered by the letter o f the decree.109
10?c f Ten Years After.
108H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 26-27; 1975 House Hearings at 499;
1975 Senate Hearings at 767-68. Case-by-case litigation was equal
ly ineffective in the South. From 1957 until 1965, the Justice De
partment filed 71 actions under the 1957, 1960 and 1964 Civil
Rights Acts. These actions included challenges to discriminatory
registration practices, private and official intimidation, and omnibus
actions against the discriminatory application of voter qualification
tests. Despite such efforts, the percentage registration of blacks and
the percentage of black elected officials in the South increased by
only nominal amounts, if at all. Derfner, Racial Discrimination and
The Right to Vote, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 523, 548-49 (1973).
109 This was also characteristic of the southern states now cov
ered by the Voting Rights Act. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
supra, 383 U.S. at 314, 335, this Court stated:
Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the
ample opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and
others involved in the proceedings. Even when favorable de
cisions have finally been obtained, some of the states
affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices not
[footnote continued]
44
It was for similar reasons that Congress enacted the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. That Act proved effec
tive, 110 and evidence of widespread voting discrimina
tion against Mexican Americans led Congress in 1975 to
extend its protections to language minorities in Texas and
elsewhere.111 The preclearance provisions of Section 5
already have operated to prevent the implementation of
many discriminatory changes in Texas voting pro-
covered by federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests
designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and
Negro registration. . . . Congress knew that some of the States
covered by Section 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the
extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various
kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimina
tion in the face of adverse federal court decrees.
It is also noteworthy that the bulk o f Section 5 objections en
tered against southern jurisdictions have involved the same types
of discriminatory devices, for example, at-large elections and
multi-member districting, that the Attorney General most often
has objected to when employed in Texas. See H.R. Rep. 94-196 at
9-10; 1975 House Hearings at 183-85, 629.
HO See discussion, supra, at 3-4. While the significant increase in
black registration and turnout in the South is attributable in part
to the presence o f federal examiners and observers, the preclear
ance provisions of Section 5 have had the most significant impact
on voting discrimination. Section 5 avoids the cost, delay and
randomness o f the case-by-case approach. Shifting the burden
of proof to covered jurisdictions has prevented the enforcement
of subtle discriminatory devices such as gerrymandering, multi
member districting, and the numbered place system which tend
to dilute the value of the vote. Moreover, covered jurisdictions
are discouraged from contriving new modes of discrimination
for the purpose of evading the effect of judicial decrees. 1975
House Hearings at 331-32, 640-41.
111 H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 16-27.
45
cedures.112 As Congress found, it is only through con
tinued enforcement of the Voting Rights Act that Mexi
can Americans as well as blacks in Texas will enjoy their
full range of political and civil rights.113
IV.
EXTENSION OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
TO TEXAS WILL FACILITATE THE ELIMINATION OF
OTHER FORMS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DISCRIM
INATION.
Protection of the constitutional right to vote is the
primary objective of the Voting Rights Act o f 1965 and
112As 0f January 1, 1977, approximately 36 letters o f objection
had been interposed in response to submissions from Texas. Signifi
cantly, most of these objections involve malapportionment, gerry
mandering, at-large elections, majority runoff requirements, place
system, and other forms of “ sophisticated” discriminatory devices
which are difficult and time consuming to challenge through litiga
tion. The Committee on Elections of the Texas House of Repre
sentatives reported in “ Interim Report: The Voting Rights Act
in Texas” [hereinafter “ Interim Report” ] that during the first
twelve months o f Voting Rights Act coverage the Attorney
General had objected to approximately 3% of Texas’ Section
5 submissions. Interim Report at 171. This compares to an objec
tion rate over a 10-year period o f approximately 1.1% for Virginia
and 2% for South Carolina. See 1973 Senate Hearings at 596-600.
The Committee Report also notes that the number of objections
(25) “ has pushed Texas into fourth place among all the states
covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. This figure includes
the deep southern states now entering their twelfth year of cover
age, as only Georgia and Louisiana (who have an estimated 37
objections each) and Mississippi (with 29) are running ahead of
Texas in the number of VRA objections.” Interim Report at
172. The Committee states that more objections had been inter
posed in a sirgle year in Texas than in any of the southern states
subject to the Act. Id. at 172-73. The Report further notes
that many Texas governmental bodies “ have felt obliged to risk
a court attack on their changes and, perhaps, even the overturning
of their elections by going ahead and using changes before receiv
ing a no objection ruling from the Justice Department.” Id. at 177.
113See H.R. Rep. 94-196 at 21-22, 26-27; 1975 House Hearings
at 492.
46
the 1975 Amendments. However, the Voting Rights Act
has a critical secondary objective. As this Court held in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964), the right
“ to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired man
ner is preservative o f other basic civil and political
rights.” Minorities able to participate fully in the elec
toral process are in a better position to deal effectively
with other forms of economic and social discrimination.
This secondary objective of the Voting Rights Act has
particular importance in Texas where Mexican Ameri
cans and blacks have long been subject to a variety of
discriminatory practices.114 In Graves v. Barnes 1, supra,
the three-judge district court found:
Because of long-standing educational, social, legal,
economic, political and widespread prevalent restric
tions, customs, traditions, biases and prejudices,
some of a so-called de jure and some of a so-called
de facto, the Mexican American population of
Texas, which amounts to about 20%, has historically
suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the re
sults and effects of invidious discrimination and
treatment in the field of education, employment,
economics, health, politics and others. [343 F.Supp.
at 728].
Pervasive discrimination in education is illustrated by
the fact that most major metropolitan school districts in
the state have been ordered by federal courts to eliminate
114See 1975 House Hearings at 175-78, 277-79 for testimony
that the Justice Department has had to bring lawsuits against state
and local governments to protect Mexican Americans m Texas
against discrimination in education, employment, housing and law
enforcement. The legislative record also includes a memorandum
from a member of the Texas House of Representatives which cites
examples of the state legislature’s failure to fund programs in
tended to benefit Mexican Americans and blacks. 1975 Senate
Hearings at 920-21.
47
unconstitutional dual school systems.115 Three of the six
school districts now facing the loss o f federal funds be
cause of Title VI violations are in Texas. 116 Two-thirds
of all Mexican American students in Texas attend pre
dominantly Mexican American schools; 40% attend
schools that are nearly all Mexican American. 117 More
over, the amount o f money spent in Texas to educate
most Mexican American students is approximately 60%
of that spent to educate whites.118 The illiteracy rate for
persons of Spanish origin in Texas is 33.8% compared to
8.6% for whites,119 and 35.6% of Texas Mexican Ameri
can families have incomes below the poverty level.120
Residential segregation is also widespread. In many
towns and cities Mexican Americans “ are not permitted
to own property anywhere except in the Mexican ‘col
ony,’ regardless of their social, educational or economic
115See generally, Project Report: De jure Segregation o f Chi-
canos in Texas Schools, 7 Harv. Civil Rights-Civil Liberties L. Rev.
307 (1972). See also Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent
School District, supra, n. 28.
Y. Times, January 18, 1977 at A16.
117U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “ Ethnic Isolation of Mexi
can Americans in Public Schools of the Southwest,” Report I at 60
(1970).
1*8United States Commission on Civil Rights, “Mexican Ameri
can Education in Texas: A Function of Wealth,” Report IV at 26
(1972).
119June 1975 CRC Memorandum at 4. Comparable figures for
blacks in the South range from 18.4% in Virginia to 28.4% in
Mississippi. 1975 House Hearings at 364, 369. The illiteracy rate
for persons of Spanish origin in Texas is 14.4% higher than in any
of the other Southwestern states. June 1975 CRC Memorandum at
4.
1201975 Senate Hearings at 766. Approximately 40% o f the
blacks in Texas are living below the poverty level. 1975 House
Hearings at 802.
48
status.” 121 The housing that is available to Mexican
Americans is generally inadequate. A 1966 study re
ported that 46.5% of the Mexican American families in
Texas occupied overcrowded housing compared to 25.9%
of the non-white and 9.4% of the white families.122
Mexican Americans have also suffered severe employ
ment discrimination. During the 1940’s, the majority of
Texas industries discriminated against Mexican American
workers with regard to employment, wage scales, and
opportunities for promotion. 123 In 1959, Spanish sur-
named males in the Southwest earned 57 cents for every
dollar earned by whites,124 Even today Mexican Ameri
cans are limited in employment and promotional oppor
tunities by tests, seniority systems and other devices
which perpetuate the results of past discrimination.125
Discrimination against Mexican Americans in the ad
ministration of justice is also well documented.126 The
Civil Rights Commission has reported severe police dis
crimination against Mexican Americans, and found that
121P. Kibbe, Latin Americans in Texas, 123-24 (1946) (herein
after Kibbe). See also J. Moore and F. Mittelbach, Residential
Segregation in the Urban Southwest (Advance Report IV, Mexican
American Study Project, UCLA Advance Report IV at 32, 38
(1966).
122 p_ Mittelbach and G. Marshall, The Burden o f Poverty, Mexi
can American Study Project, UCLA Advance Report V at 44
(1966).
^^Kibbe at 157.
124j_ Moore, Mexican Americans, 60 (1970).
125See, e.g., Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 362 F.Supp. 1142
(S.D. Tex. 1973), aff’d in relevant part, 516 F.2d 1251 (5th
Cir. 1975). See also Greenfield and Kates, Mexican Ameri
cans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act o f 1866, 63
Calif. L. Rev. 662, 718-23 (1975).
126s ee generally United States Commission on Civil Rights,
Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice in the South
west (1970).
49
in Nueces County, Texas, where Mexican Americans com
prise over 40 percent of the population, of 288 grand
jurors selected over a nine-year period only 16 were
Mexican Americans.127
The elimination of economic, social, and other forms
of discrimination in Texas depends, to a significant
extent, on the elimination of discrimination against
Mexican American and black voters. In Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966), this Court
recognized that the Voting Rights Act helps minority citi
zens gain “ nondiscriminatory treatment in public serv
ices,” and thereby enables them “ better to obtain ‘per
fect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of
the law.’ ” Likewise, in Robinson v. Commissioners
Court, supra, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s findings that segregation of the county’s public
schools and other facilities, discrimination in county
employment, and the Commissioners Court’s general “ un
responsiveness to the needs and interests of the black
community” was a direct result of “ oppressive and re
strictive voting legislation and racial discrimination
generally in the state of Texas.” 505 F.2d at 679. 128
Once able to participate in the electoral process in a free
and unimpaired manner, Mexican Americans and blacks
in Texas will be in a position to insist that elected offi-
127h . Rohan, The Mexican American 20 (1968) (Staff paper
prepared for the United States Commission on Civil Rights). See
also Kibbe, at 229. In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), it
was held that discrimination against Mexican Americans in the
selection of grand jury panels violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
128See also Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dis
trict, supra, 324 F. Supp. at 604-05 n.27.
50
cials desegregate public school systems, enforce laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment and housing,
and take whatever action is necessary to eliminate dis
crimination by law enforcement and other public agen
cies.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set
forth in the brief for respondents, the decision below
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
J o s e p h L . R a u h , J r .
General Counsel,
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
ON CIVIL RIGHTS
1001 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
J a m e s T . D a n a h e r
A r m a n d G. D e r f n e r
A l e x a n d e r D . F o r g e r
A l b e r t E . J e n w e r , J r .
N ic h o l a s d e B . K a t z e n b a c h
S t e p h e n J . P o l l a k
N o r m a n R e d l ic h
LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
R o b e r t A . M u r p h y
W il l ia m E . C a l d w e l l
733 - 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
V i l m a S . M a r t i n e z
J o a q u i n A v i l a
A l I. P e r e z
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL
FUND
145 Ninth Street
San Francisco, Calif. 94103
J a c k G r e e n b e r g
E r ic S c h n a p p e r
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
D a v i d S . T a t e l
D a l e F. S w a r t z
HOGAN & HARTSON
815 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Attorneys for Amici Curiae.
February 25, 1977