Petition for Permission to Appeal Certain Orders Involving Controlling Questions of Law
Public Court Documents
July 19, 1972

113 pages
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Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Petition for Permission to Appeal Certain Orders Involving Controlling Questions of Law, 1972. 0254b850-53e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/abd56b43-37b8-4f58-9c33-c9d18d9dc644/petition-for-permission-to-appeal-certain-orders-involving-controlling-questions-of-law. Accessed April 05, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RONALD BRADLEY, et al, v. Plaintiffs-Appellees, WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al, Defendants-Appe Hants, and DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant-Intervenor, and DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al, Defendants-Intervenor et al. • U. S. Court of Appeals No. U. S. District Court No. 35257 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL CERTAIN ORDERS INVOLVING CONTROLLING QUESTIONS OF LAW AS CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE PURSUANT TO 28 USC 1292(b) Business Address 720 Lav; Building 525 West Ottawa Street Lansing, Michigan FRANK J. KELLEY Attorney General Robert A. Derengoski Solicitor General Eugene Krasicky Gerald F. Young Assistant Attorneys General Attorneys for State Defendant IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 7\PPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RONALD BRADLEY, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al, Defendants-Appellants, and DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL--CIO, Defendant-Intervener, and DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al, Defendants-Intervener, et al. U.S. Court of Appeals No. U.S. District Court No. 35257 PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 7CPPEAL CERTAIN ORDERS INVOLVING CONTROLLING QUESTIONS OF LAW AS CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE PURSUANT TO 23 USC 1.292 (b) _______ Petitioners (defendants) William G. Milliken, Governor of the State of Michigan; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of the State of Michigan; Michigan State Board of Education; John W. Porter, Superintendent of Public Instruc tion; and Allison Green, Treasurer of the State of Michigan, by their attorneys Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of the + State of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Eugene Krasicky, Assistant Attorney General and Gerald F. Young, Assistant Attorney General, pursuant to 28 USC 1292(b) and FRApp P 5 petition this Court for permission to appeal certain orders of the district judge, which orders, when entered, will state that they involve controlling questions of law as to which there are substantial grounds for dif ferences of opinion and that an immediate appeal from such orders may materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. In support of this petition petitioners show: STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. Petitioners are duly elected or appointed offi cials of the State of Michigan. On August 18, 1970, this suit was instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by plaintiffs Bradley, et al, seeking (a) a determination that as a result of official policies and practices of these and Detroit School District defendants and their predecessors in office a con stitutionally impermissible racially identifiable pattern of faculty and student assignments existed in the Detroit public schools, and (b) a determination that legislative 2- enactment of the State of Michigan 1970 PA 48, being MCLA 388.171a et seq; MSA 15.2298(la) et seq, which "allegedly delayed and interferred with the implementation of a voluntary plan of partial high school pupil desegregation which had been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education," was uncon stitutional. 2. This Court ruled section 12 of said Act 48 invalid under US Const Am XIV. 433 F2d 897. 3. After lengthy trial the District Court, on September 27, 1971, entered its Ruling on Issue of Segrega tion, Appendix A attached. The Court concluded, both as a matter of fact and of lav;, that the public schools in Detroit are "segregated on a racial, basis" and that both state and local defendants "have committed acts which have been causal factors in the segregated condition." with regard to the Governor was that he was an ex officio member, without a vote, of the State Board of Education, he signed 1970 PA 48, which had been adopted by the legis lature with only 1 dissenting vote, and he appointed the boundary commission required by said Act 48. No testimony 4. The sole testimony introduced at the trial was introduced at the trial with regard to the Attorney General. - 3- 5. The sole testimony offered at the trial with regard to the State Board of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction was that the State Board of Education had joined with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission in 1966 in the issuance of a joint policy statement on the quality of educational opportunity, and that the State Board of Education's "School Plant Planning Handbook" stated that care in site selection must be taken if housing patterns in an area would result in a school largely segregated on racial, ethnic or socio-economic lines. Neither the State Board of Education nor the Superintendent of Public Instruc tion under Michigan law has the authority to approve site location. ■ 6. In its ruling the court found that the School District of the City of Detroit was not segregated with regard '• P to its teaching and administrative staff. 7. The principal evidence relied upon by the Dis trict Court in its ruling was evidence of housing segregation with regards to which neither these defendants nor the Detroit School District defendants played any part. These defendants continuously objected during the trial to the admissibility of such evidence pursuant to this Court's rulings in Deal v Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F2d 55 (1966), and Deal v Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F2d 1337 (1969). , - 4- 8. The District Court also relied upon evidence of a few isolated instances, such as the busing of a small number of black students past a white school to attend a newer school in a black neighborhood. Such incidents were promptly corrected as soon as they were brought to the atten tion of the proper Detroit Public School officials. 9. On March 24, 1972, the District Court entered its Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, Appendix C attached. The substance of this ruling was that if the court found an intra-Detroit school district plan inadequate, the court was bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court to decree a metropolitan remedy. 10. On March 28, 1972, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; on Detroit-Only Plan of Desegregation (Appendix C attached), in which it said that: I "The court must look beyond the limits of the Detroit school district for a solution to the problem of segregation in the Detroit public school." The substance of this ruling was that because of the com position of the student body in the Detroit school system ' - 5- (approximately 65% black; 35% white) it could not be deseg regated because every school would have a substantially black student body. 11. On June 14, 1972, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of Ruling on Desegregation Area and Development of Plan and its Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for Development of Plan of Desegregation, Appendix D attached. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court noted, initially, that it had taken no proofs and made no findings with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school districts in the Counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the Detroit school district, such school districts have committed acts of de_ jure segregation. It should be noted, further, that 18 of the school districts included in the desegregation area are not parties to this lawsuit. . 12. The substance of the court's ruling and order was to establish a desegregation area consisting of 53 inde pendent school districts, including the Detroit public schools; the appointment of a panel to develop a plan for the assignment of pupils within the desegregation area and to develop a plan for the transportation of pupils; the - 6- direction to the panel to make recommendations for the acquisition of transportation; the direction that all reason able costs of the panel be borne by the "state defendants"; the direction that faculty be assigned so that no less than 10% of the faculty and staff in each school building be black and that where more than one building administrator is required, a bi~racial team be assigned, the restructuring of curriculum and facility utilization to create uniforrntiy within the desegregation area; the direction to the State Board of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruc tion to disapprove all proposals for new construction or expansion where housing patterns in an area would result in a school largely segregated; the establishment of in-service training of the faculty and staff within the 53 school dis tricts at the expense of the defendants; and the hiring of black counsellors. 13. On July 11, 1972, the District Court entered its order for acquisition of transportation, Appendix E attached. In substance this order required the Detroit Board of Education, not later than July 13, 1972, to acquire by purchase, lease or other contractual arrangement at least 295 buses for the use in transporting pupils in the desegre gation area in the 1972-73 school year. The "state defend ants" were ordered to bear the costs of this acquisition. - 7- Also, this order added the Michigan State Treasurer, Allison Green, as an additional defendant. 14. Approximately simultaneously with the entry by this Court of an order staying the acquisition order of July 11, 1972, the District Court set a hearing for July 19, 1972, for the purpose of entering an order or orders pur suant to 28 USC 1292(b). At said hearing the District Court ruled that it would enter an order or orders to the effect that each of its rulings and orders, Appendices A-E attached, contained controlling questions of lav;. At the time of writing this petition, such order, or orders, .have not been entered, but petitioners are informed and believe that such order or orders will be entered on the morning of July 20, 1972. STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27, 1971, Appendix A 1. Based on the record in this case, is the Dis trict Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law of de jure segregation in the public schools of the Detroit School District in error? 2. Based on the record in this case, are the public schools of the Detroit School District de jure segregated - 8- schools as a result of the conduct of any of the state - defendants herein? 3. Whether the lower court erred in admitting into evidence and relying upon evidence of racial discrimination in housing by persons not parties to this cause, in finding de jure segregation in the Detroit public schools. 4. Whether the lower court erred in denying these defendants 41(b) motion made at the close of plaintiffs case in chief? 5. Whether the lower court, erred in making find ings against these defendants based on evidence introduced after these defendants had made their 4.1b motion and rested at the close of plaintiffs' case in chief? 6. Whether the lower court's legal conclusion of systematic educational inequality between Detroit and the surrounding suburban school districts, based upon transporta tion funds, bonding limitations, and the state school aid formula, is erroneous as a matter of law? 7. Whether the lower court's legal conclusion of de jure segregation by these defendants in the matter of site selection for school construction is erroneous as a matter of lav/? - 9 - • • - Ruling On Propriety of Considering a _ Metropolitan Remedy, Etc., March 24, 1972f Appendix B. 8. Where the Detroit School District has been found to have committed acts of do jure segregation, may the District Court properly issue a desegregation order extending to other geographically and politically independent school districts and require interdistrict transfers of students, (1) absent any claim or finding that such other school districts are themselves guilty of de_ jure segrega tion, or (2) absent any claim or finding that the boundary lines of such school districts were created and maintained for the purpose of creating or fostering a dual school system? Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law on-Detroit. Only Plans of Desegregation of March 28, 1972tAppendix C. 9. Based on the record in this case, can constitu tionally adequate unitary school systems be established within the geographical limits of the Detroit School District? 10. Whether a finding of de_ jure segregation as to some schools within the Detroit School District warrants a desegregation remedy for all schools in the school district or only for those schools within the school district found to be de jure segregated schools? - 10- Ruling on Desegregation Areva, Etc. , of June 14, 1972, Appendix D. . 11. The foregoing ruling, finding and conclusions of June 14, 3.9 72 , encompass all of the previously stated questions set forth above. In addition, the same presents the following question: Based on the record in this case, did the District Court exceed its equitable authority in ordering the remedial plan of metropolitan desegregation out lined and set forth therein? Order for Acquisition of Transportation, July 11, 1972, Appendix E. 12. Whether, in the absence of any proofs or findings concerning either the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school districts in Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties or whether any of these 86 school districts, with the exception of the School District of the City of Detroit, have committed any acts of de jure segregation, the District Court may adopt a metropolitan remedy? 13. Whether a district court may compel state offi cials to perform acts beyond their lawful authority to per form under state law in a school desegregation remedial order? 14. This petition for permission to appeal is filed on this early date at the direction of the clerk of 11- the Court of Appeals after only a matter of hours for prepara tion and the petitioner respectfully requests leave to amend the same to add additional questions, if necessary, within the 10 day period after entry of the amended orders of the District Court from which the within appeal is sought. STATEMENT OF (1) SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AND (2) IMMEDIATE APPEAL MAY MATERIALLY ADVANCE THE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION.__________ 1. Now involved in this litigation are approximately 800,000 public school children, roughly 1/3 of the public school children in the State of Michigan, and 53 school dis tricts, which, prior to the District Court's order of June 14, 1972, Appendix D, were independent bodies corporate vested with plenary powers by state lav; to educate the child ren residing within their respective boundaries. Eighteen of these bodies corporate are not parties to this lawsuilt. There has been no decision by the trial court that any of these bodies corporate, except the School District of the City of Detroit, were segregated de_ jure along racial lines. Neither has it been determined by the trial court (nor have proofs been taken) that the boundaries of these 53 independent bodies corporate were established for purposes of cte jure segregation, or, that the de_ jure segregation found in the Detroit schools was the result of these boundaries. - 12- The constitution and laws of the State of Michigan require unitary school systems. Const 1963, Art VIII, §2. MCLA 340.355; MSA 15.3355. See also Workman v Board of Educa tion of Detroit, 18 Mich 399 (1869). The principal basis for the District Court’s find ing of de jure segregation within the Detroit public schools was segregated housing patterns, evidence of which this Court ruled to be inadmissible in the two Deal cases, 369 F2d 55 (1966), and 419 F2d 1387 (1969). The District Court's find ing as to de jure segregation against the Board of Education of the City of Detroit at most rests upon a finding that a few schools were segregated as to race. Such a finding does not support a ruling that the Detroit school system is a de jure segregated system. Keyes v School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 445 F2d. 999 (1971), cert granted ___US __92 SCt 707, 30 L Ed 2d 728 (1972). The findings of de_ jure segregation with regard to petitioners is totally unsupported by the record. No findings were made against the Attorney General. The find ings against the Governor amounted to his signing a legisla tive enactment, only one section of which was found to be unconstitutional, and the appointment of the boundary com mission required by said act. - 13- The findings against the State Board of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction were that they had issued a policy statement in 1966 and a planning handbook, the latter involving site selection over which they had no authority. The metropolitan remedy ordered by the Court is totally unprecedented not only in its scope but for the total lack of supporting findings. A similar remedy of far less magnitude in a state which segregated the races in the schools by constitution and statute and which remedy was supported by findings of fact was recently reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Bradley v School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, ___ F2d ___ (June 5, 1972) . Further, the District Court's order for development of plan of desegregation, June 14, 1972, Appendix D, is pre dicated upon the misconception of a constitutional duty to achieve racial balance in the public schools, a misconception clearly denounced in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 US 1 (1971), and Spencer v Kugler, 326 F Supp 1235 (DC NJ, 1971), aff'd 404 US 1027 (1972). Petitioners respectfully submit that a substantial basis exists for a difference of opinion. - 14- 2. If the District Court's ruling on segregation, September 27, 1971, Appendix A, is reversed this litigation will terminate forthwith. If the District Court's rulings and orders, first with reference to the propriety of a metropolitan remedy, second with reference to the Detroit- Only Plans of Desegregation and third with reference to the desegregation area and development of plan of desegregation are reversed, this litigation will terminate forthwith for the vast majority of the parties in this action, and some 18 school districts that are not parties. If the decisions are reversed, state funds will not be expended contrary to state lav/ for the purchase of unneeded school buses. Last, a ruling by this Court, even if such a ruling affirmed all of the District Court's rulings and orders above referred to, will expedite an appeal to the United States Supreme Court and the final resolution and termination of the litigation. WHEREFORE, petitioners pray that their petition for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 USC 1292(b) be granted. Respectfully submitted, . FRANK J. KELLEY Attorney General Robert A. Derengoski Solicitor General - 15- Eugene Krasicky Gerald F. Young George McCargar Assistant Attorneys Genral Business Address: 720 Law Building 525 West Ottawa Lansing, Michigan Dated: July 19, 1972 16- UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ) RONALD BRADLEY, et al., • • ' • ) - - ) ’ Plaintiffs ) v. ) . ) WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., ) . ) ' Defendants ) ) DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, ) LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION ) OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, ) • Defendant- ) Intervenor ) •-/ ) and . ) ) DENISE MAGDOW8KI, et al., ) . ) . ‘ Defendants- ) • • Intervenor ) ____:________ ___________________________________ ) A T R U E - C O P Y FREDERICK W. JOHNSON BY a / DEPUTY CLERK CIVIL ACTION NO: 35257 RULING ON ISSUE OF SEGREGATION This action was commenced August 18, 1970, by plaintiffs, the Detroit Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and individual parents and students, on behalf of a class later defined by order of the Court dated February 16, 1971, to include "all school, children of the City of Detroit and all Detroit resident parents who have children of school age." Defendants are the Board of Education of the City of Detroit, its members and its former superintendent of schools, Dr. Norman A. Drachler, the Governor, Attorney General, State Board of Education and State Superin tendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan. In their complaint, plaintiffs attacked a statute of the State of Michigan known as Act 48 of the 1970 Legislature on the * The not contes no opinion standing of the NA7iCP as a proper party plaintiff was ted by the original defendants and the Court expresses on the matter. APPENDIX A ground that it put the State of Michigan in the position of unconstitutionally interfering with the execution and operation of a voluntary plan of partial high school desegregation (known as the April 7, 1970 Plan) which had been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education to be effective beginning with the fall 1970 semester. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the . . basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions of the defendants and their predecessors in office. . - Additional parties have intervened in the litigation since it was commenced. The Detroit Federation of Teachers v (DFT) which represents a majority of Detroit Public school teachers in collective bargaining negotiations with the defendant Board of Education, has intervened as a defendant, and a group of parents has intervened as defendants. Initially the matter was tried on plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of , Act 48 so as to permit the April 7 Plan to be implemented. On that issue, this Court ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction since there had been no proof that Detroit has a segregated school system. The Court of Appeals found that the "implementation of the April 7 Plan was thwarted by State action in the form of the Act of the Legislature of Michigan," (433 F.2d 897, 902), and that such action could not be interposed to delay, obstruct or nullify'steps lawfully taken for the purpose of protecting rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. ' . The plaintiffs then sought to have this Court direct the defendant Detroit Board to implement the .April 7 Plan by o . ' the start of the second semester (February, 1971) in order to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights wrought by the unconstitutional statute. In response to an order of the Court, defendant Board suggested_two other plans, along with the April 7 Plan, and noted priorities, with top' priority assigned to the so-called "Magnet Plan." The Court acceded to the wishes of the Board and approved the Magnet Plan. Again, plaintiffs appealed but the appellate court refused to pass on the merits of the plan. Instead, the case was remanded with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial on the merits of plaintiffs' substantive allegations about the Detroit School System. 438 F .2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). \ Trial, limited to the issue of segregation, began April 6, 1971 and concluded on July 22, 1971, consuming 41 trial days, interspersed by several brief recesses necessitated by other demands upon the time of Court and counsel. Plaintiffs introduced substantial evidence in support of their contentions, including expert and factual testimony, demonstrative exhibits and school board documents. At the close of plaintiffs' case,, in chief, the Court ruled that they had presented a prima facie case of state imposed segregation in the Detroit Public Schools; accordingly, the Court enjoined (with certain exceptions) all further school construction in Detroit pending the outcome of the litigation. ' The State defendants urged motions to dismiss as to them. These were denied' by the Court. . . - At the close of proofs intervening parent defendants (Denise Magdowski, et al.) filed a motion to join, as parties 05 « contiguous "suburban" school districts - all’within the so- • • called Larger Detroit Metropolitan area. This motion was taken under advisement pending the determination of the issue of segregation. . It should be noted that, in accordance' with’ earlier rulings of the Court, proofs submitted at previous hearings in the cause, were to be and are considered as part of the proofs of the hearing on the merits. In considering the present racial complexion of the . • * City of Detroit and its public.school system we must first look to the past and view in perspective what has happened in the last half century. In 1920 Detroit was a predominantly white city - 91% - and its population younger than in more recent times. By the year 1960 the largest segment of the city's white population was in the age range of 35 to 50 years, while its black population was younger and of childbearing age. The population of 0-15 years of age constituted 30% of the total population of which 60% were white and 40% were black. In 1970 the white population was principally aging--45 years— while the black population was younger and of childbearing age. Childbearing blacks equaled or exceeded the total white population. As older white families without children of school age leave the city they are replaced by younger black families with school age children, resulting in a doubling of enrollment in the local neighborhood school and a complete change in student population from white to black. As black inner city residents move out of the core city they "leap-frog" the residential areas nearest their former homes and move to areas recently occupied by whites. ' ' The population of the City of Detroit reached its - A _ highest point in 1950 and has been- declining by approximately 169,500 per decade since then. In 1950, the city population constituted 61% of the total population of.the standard1 metropolitan area and in 1970 it was but 36% of the metro politan area population. The suburban population has increased by 1,978,000 since 1940. There has been a steady out-migration of the Detroit population since 1940. Detroit today is principally a conglomerate of poor black and white plus the aged. Of the aged, 80% are white. If the population trends evidenced in the federal decennial census for the years 1940 through 1970 continue, the total black population in the City of Detroit in 1980 will be approximately 840,000, or 53.6% of the total. The total population of the city in' 197 0 is 1,511,000 and, if past trends continue, will be 1,338-, 000 in 1980. In school year 1960-61, there were 285,512 students in the Detroit Public Schools of which 130,765 were black. In school year 1966-67, there were 297,035 students, of which 168,299 were black. In school year 1970-71 there were 289,743 students of which 184,194 were black. The percentage of black students in the Detroit Public Schools in 1975-76 will be 72.0%, in 1980-81 will be 80.7% and in 1992 it will be virtually 100% if the present trends continue. In 1960, the non-white population, ages 0 years to 19 years, was as follows: 0 - 4 years 42% 5 - 9 years 36% 10 - 14 years 28% 15 19 years 18% jn 3.970 the non-white population, ages 0 years to 19 years, was as follows: 0 - 4 years 48% 5 - 9 “years 50% 10 - 14 years .. -50% 15 - 19 years 40% The black population as a percentage of the total population in the City of Detroit was: (a) 1900 1.4% (b) 1910 1.2% (c) 1920 4.1% (<2) 1930 7.7% (e) 194 0 9.2% (f) 1950 . 16.2% (g) 1960 vp3̂•COCM 00 1970 43.9% The black population as a percentage of total student population of the Detroit Public Schools was as follows: (a) 1961 45 .8% (b) 1963 51.3% (c) 1964 53.0% (d) 1965 54.8% (e) 1966 56.7% (f) 1967 58.2% (g) 1968 59.4% (h) 1969 61 .5% (i) 1970 63.8% For the years indicated the housing characteristics in the City of Detroit were as follows: . (a) 1960 total supply of housing - • units was 553,000 . - (b) 1970’ total supply of housing • . units was 530,770 The percentage decline* in the white students in the \ . . Detroit Public Schools during the period 1961-1970 (53.6% in 1960; 34.8% in 1970) has been greater than the percentage decline in the white population; in the City of Detroit during the same period (70.8% in 1960; 55.21% in 1970), and correlatively, the percentage increase in black students in the Detroit Public Schools during the nine-year period 1961 1970 (45.8% in 1961; 63.8% in 1970) has been greater than the percentage increase in the black population of the City of Detroit during the ten-year, period 1960-1370 (28.3% in 1960; 43.9% in 1970). In 1961 there were eight schools in the system without white pupils and 73 schools with no Negro pupils. In 1970 there were 30 schools with no white pupils and 11 schools with no Negro pupils, an increase in the number of schools without white pupils of 22 and a decrease in the number of schools without • Negro pupils of 62 in this ten-year period. Between 1968 and 1970 Detroit experienced the largest increase in percentage of black students in the student population of any major northern school district. The percentage increase in Detroit was 4.7% as contrasted with — New York 2.0% Los Angeles 1.5% Chicago 1.9% - 7 - • • Philadelphia 1.7% Cleveland 1.7% Milwaukee 2 .6% St. Louis 2.6% Columbus ' 1.4% Indianapolis ■ 2.6% Denver ■ . Boston 3.2% San Francisco 1.5% Seattle 2.4% . in I960, there were 266 schools in the Detroit School System. In 1970, there were 319 schools in the Detroit School System. - . . - . » . • • • In the Western, Northwestern, Northern, Murray, Northeastern, Kettering, King and Southeastern high school service areas, the following conditions exist at a level significantly higher than the city average: . (a) Poverty in children • (b) Family income below poverty level ■' (c) Rate of homicides per population (d) Number of households headed by females (e) Infant mortality rate (f) Surviving infants with neurological defects (g) Tuberculosis cases per 1,000 population (h) High pupil turnover, in schools The City of Detroit is a community generally dividea by racial lines. Residential segregation within the city and throughout the larger metropolitan area is substantial, per vasive and of long standing. Black citizens are located in - 0 - t separate and distinct areas within the city and are not generally to be found in the suburbs. While the racially ' unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors may have played some part in the development of this pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and customs of racial discrimina tion, both public and private, which have and do restrict the housing opportunities of black people. On the record there can be no other finding. . - » Governmental actions and-inaction at all levels, federal, state and local, have combined, with'those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan area. It is no answer to say that restricted practices grew gradually (as the -black population in the area increased between 1920 and 1970), or that since 1948 racial restrictions on the ownership of real property have been removed. The policies pursued by both government and private persons and agencies have a continuing and present • ' • effect upon the complexion of the.community - as we know, the choice of a residence is a relatively infrequent affair. Per many years FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the maintenance of "harmonious" neighborhoods, i_.j2., racially and economically harmonious. The conditions created continue. While it would be unfair to charge the present defendants with what other governmental officers or agencies i have done, it can be said that the actions or the failure to act by the responsible school authorities, both city and « state, were linked to that of these other governmental units. When we speak of governmental action we should not view the different agencies as a collection of unrelated units. Perhaps the most that can be said is that all of them, including the school authorities, are, in part, responsible - for the segregated condition which exists. 7\nd we note that just as there is an interaction between residential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so there is a corresponding effect on the residential x^attern by the racial composition of the schools. Turning now to the specific and pertinent (for our purposes) history of the Detroit school system so far as it involves both the local school authorities and the state school authorities, we find the following: During the decade beginning in 1950 the Board created and maintained optional attendance zones in neighbor hoods undergoing racial transition and between high school attendance areas of opposite predominant racial compositions. In 1959 there were eight basic optional attendance areas affecting 21 schools. Optional attendance areas provided pupils living within certain elementary areas a choice of attendance at one of two high schools. In addition there was at least one optional area either created or existing in. 1960 between two junior high schools of opposite predominant racial components. All of the high school optional areas, except two, were in neighborhoods undergoing racial transition (from white to black) during the 1950s. The two exceptions were: (1) the option between Southwestern (61.6% black in 1960) and Western (15.3% black); (2) the option between Denby (0% black) and Southeastern (30.9% black) Wit}', the exception of the Denby-Southeastern option (just - 10 - noted) all of the options were between high schools of opposite predominant racial compositions. The Southwestern- Western and Denby-Southeastern optional areas are all white on the 1950, 1960 and 1970 census maps. Both Southwestern and Southeastern, however, had substantial white pupil populations, and the option allowed whites to escape integra tion. The natural, probable, forseeable and actual effect of these optional zones was to allow white youngsters to escape identifiably "black" schools. There had also been an optional zone (eliminated between 1956 and 1959) created in "an attempt . . . to separate Jews and Gentiles within the system," the effect of which was that Jewish youngsters went to Mumford High School and Gentile youngsters went to Cooley. Although many of these optional areas had served their purpose by 1960 due to the fact that most of the areas had become predominantly black, one optional area (Southwestern Western affecting Wilson Junior High graduates) continued until the present school year (and will continue to effect 11th and 12th grade white youngsters who elected to escape from predominantly black Southwestern to predominantly white Western High School). Mr. Henrickson, the Board's general fact witness, who was employed in 1959 to, inter alia, eliminate optional areas, noted in 1967 that: "In operation Western appears to be still the school to which white students escape from predominantly Negro surrounding schools." The effect of eliminating this optional area (which affected only 10th graders for the 1970-71 school year) was to decrease Southwestern from 86.7%'black in 1969 to 74.3% black in 1970. . The Board, in the operation of its transportation « to relieve overcrowding policy, has admittedly bused black - 11 - pupils past or away from closer white schools with available space to black schools. This practice has continued in several instances in recent years despite the Board's pvowed policy, adopted in 1967, to utilize transportation to increase integration. ■ ■ . With one exception (necessitated by the burning of a white school), defendant Board' has never bused white children to predominantly black schools. The Board has not bused white pupils to black schools despite the enormous amount of space available in inner-city schools. There were 22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or more black. The Board has created and altered attendance zones, maintained and altered grade structures and created and altered feeder school patterns in a manner which has had the natural, probable and actual effect of continuing bla^.k and white pupils in racially segregated schools. The Board admits at least one instance where it purposefully and intentionally built and maintained a school and its attendance zone to contain black students. Throughout the last decade (and presently) school attendance zones of opposite racial compositions have been separated by north—south boundary lines despite the Board's awareness (since at least 1962) that drawing boundary lines in an east-west direction would result in significant integration. The natural and actual effect of these acts and failures to act has been the creation and perpetuation of school segregation. There has never been a feeder pattern or zoning change which placed a predominantly white residential area into a predominantly black school zone or feeder pattern. Every school which was 90% or more black in I960, and which is still in use today, remains 90% or more black. Whereas 65.8% of Detroit's black students attended 90%. or more black schools in I960, 74.9% of the black students attended 90% or more black schools during the 1970-71 school year. ' • • The public schools operated by defendant Board are thus segregated on a racial basis. This racial segregation is in part the result of. the discriminatory acts and omissions of defendant Board. In 1966 the defendant State Board of Education and Michigan Civil Rights Commission issued a Joint Policy State ment on Equality of Educational Opportunity, requiring that "Local school boards must consider the factor of . racial balance along with other educational considerations in making decisions about selection - of new school sites, expansion of present facilities . . . . Each of these situations presents an opportunity for integration." ■ - ■ Defendant State Board's "School Plant Planning Handbook" requires that . ' ‘‘ • "Care in site location must be taken if a serious transportation problem exists or if.housing patterns in an area would result -in a school largely segregated on racial, ethnic, or socio- , economic lines." The defendant City Board has paid little heed to these statements and guidelines. The State defendants have similarly failed to take any action to effectuate these policies. Exhibit NN reflects construction (new or additional) at 14 schools which opened for use in 1970-71; of these 14 schools, 11 opened over 90% black and one opened less than 10% black. School con struction costing $9,222,000 is opening at Northwestern High School which is 99.9% black, and new construction opens at Brooks Junior High, which is 1.5% black, at a- cost of $2,500,000. The construction at Brooks Junior High plays a dual segregatory role: not only is the construction segregated, it will result 1; . ' in a feeder pattern change which will remove the last,majority ' . I _ white school from the already almost all-black Mackenzie High School attendance area. . . ' Since 1959 the Board has constructed at least.13 snuill primary schools with capacities of from 300 to 400 pupils. This practice negates opportunities to integrate, "contains" the black population and x^erpetuates and compounds school segregation. / .■ - ■ The State and its agencies, in addition to their • general responsibility for and supervision of public education, have acted directly to control and maintain the pattern of segregation in the Detroit schools. The State refused, until this session of the legislature, to provide authorization or funds for the transportation of pupils within Detroit regardless of their poverty or distance from the school to which they were assigned, while providing in many neighboring, mostly white, suburban districts the full range of state supported transportation. This and other financial limitations, such • « as those on bonding and the working of the state aid formula whereby suburban districts were able to make far larger per pupil expenditures desx^ite less tax effort, have created and perpetuated systematic educational inequalities. ■ The State, exercising what Michigan courts have held to be is "plenary power" which includes power "to use a statutory scheme, to create, alter, reorganize or even dissolve a school district, despite any desire of the school district, ( its board, or the inhabitants thereof," acted to reorganize - 14 - the school district of the City of Detroit. 'The State acted through Act 48 to impede, delay and minimize racial integration in Detroit schools. |f.he first sentence of Sec. 12 of the Act was directly related to the April 7, 1970 desegregation plan. The remainder of the section sought to prescribe for each school in the eight districts criterion of "free choice" (open enrollment) and "neighborhood schools" ("nearest School priority acceptance"), which had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of segregation. ' In view of our findings of fact already noted we think it unnecessary to parse in detail the activities of the local board and the state authorities in the area of school construction and the furnishing of school facilities. It. is our conclusion that these activities were in keeping, generally, with the discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated racial segregation in these schools. It would be unfair for us not to recognize the many fine steps the Board has taken to advance the cause of quality education for all in terms of racial integration and human relations. The most obvious of these is in the field of faculty integration. Plaintiffs urge the Court to consider allegedly discriminatory practices of the Board with respect to tne hiring, assignment and transfer of teachers and school administrators during a period reaching back more than 15 years. The short answer to that must be that black teachers and school administrative personnel were not readily available in that period. The Board and the intervening defendant union -1 5 have followed a most advanced and exemplary course in adopting and"carrying out what is called the "balanced staff concept" - which seeks to balance faculties in each school with respect to race, sex and experience, with primary emphasis on race. - More particularly, we find: • ' - 1. With the exception of affirmative policies designed to achieve racial balance in instructional staff, no teacher in the Detroit Public Schools is hired, promoted or I assigned to any school by reason of his race. • ■ 2. In 1956, the Detroit Board of Education adopted the rules and regulations of the Fair Employment Practices Act as its hiring and promotion policy and has adhered to this policy to date. 3. The Board has actively and affirmatively sought out and hired minority employees, particularly teachers and administrators, during the-past decade. - 4. Between 1960 and 1970, the Detroit Board of Education has increased black representation among its teachers from 23.3% to 42.1%, and among its administrators from 4.5% to 37.8%. ' ■ . 5. Detroit has a higher proportion of black administrators than any other city in the country. 6. Detroit ranked second to Cleveland in 1968 among the 20 largest northern city school districts in the percentage of blacks among the teaching faculty and in 1970 surpassed Cleveland by several percentage points. . - 1 6 - employs black teachers in a greater percentage than the percentage of adult black persons in the City of Detroit. 8. Since 1967, more blacks than whites have! been placed in high administrative posts with the Detro'it Board of Education. ' . . 9. The allegation that the Board assigns black teachers to black schools is not supported by the record. 10. Teacher transfers are not granted in the Detroit Public Schools unless they conform with the balanced staff concept. 11. Between 1960 and 1970, the Detroit Board of Education reduced the percentage of schools without black faculty from 36.3% to 1.2%, and of the four schools currently without black faculty, three are specialized trade schools where minority faculty cannot easily be secured. 12. In 1968, of the 20 largest northern city - school districts, Detroit ranked fourth in the percentage of schools having one or more black teachers and third in t the percentage of schools having three or more black teachers. 13. In 1970, the Board held open 240 positions in schools with less than 25% black, rejecting white applicants for these positions until qualified black applicants could be found and assigned. 14. In recent years, the Board has come under pressure from large segments of the black community to assign male black -administrators to predominantly black schools to serve 1 7 - £is male role models for students, but such assignments have been made .only where consistent with the balanced staff concept. . ' 15. The numbers and percentages of black teachers in Detroit increased from 2,275 and 21.6%, respectively, in February, 1961, to 5,106 and 41.6%, respectively, in. October, 1970. . • 16. The number of schools by percent black of staffs changed from October, 1963 to October, 1970 as - -.- follows: ' . Number of schools without black teachers— decreased from 41, to 4. ■ . Number of schools with more than 0%, but less - than 10% black teachers~-decreased from 58, to 8. Total number of schools with less than 10% black teachers— decreased from 99, to 12. • Number of schools with 50% or more black teachers— increased from 72, to 124. 17. The number of schools by percent black of staffs changed from October, 1969 to October, 1970, as follows: - Number of schools without black teachers— decreased from 6, to 4. Number of schools with more than 0%, but less than 10% black teachers— decreased from 41, to 8. Total number of schools with less than 10% black ■ teachers— decreased from 47, to 12. Number of schools with 50% or more black teachers— increased from 120, to 124. 18. Tlie total number of transfers necessary to achieve, a faculty racial quota in each school corresponding to the system-wide ratio, and ignoring all other elements is, as of 1970, 1,026. 3-9. If account is taken of other elements necessary to assure quality integrated education, including qualifies- • tions to teach the subject area and grade level, balance of experience, and balance of sex, and further account is taken of the uneven distribution of black teachers by subject taught and sex, the total number of transfers which would be necessary to achieve a faculty racial quota in each school corresponding to the system-wide ratio, if attainable at all, would be infinitely greater. 20. Balancing of staff by qualifications for subject., and grade level, then by race, experience and sex, is educationally desirable and important. 21. It is important for students to have a success ful role model, especially black students in certain schools, and at certain grade levels-. ' 22. A quota of racial balance for faculty in each school which is equivalent to the system-wide ratio and without more is educationally undesirable and arbitrary. 23., A severe teacher shortage in the 1950s and 1960s impeded integration-of-facuity opportunities. 24. Disadvantageous teaching conditions in Detroit .in the 1960s— salaries, pupil mobility and transiency, class size, building conditions, distance from teacher residence, shortage of teacher substitutes, etc.— made teacher recruitment and placement difficult. 25. The Board did not segregate faculty by race, but rather attempted to fill vacancies with certified and qualified - 1 9 - teachers who would take offered assignments. f ̂ ■ 26. Teaelier seniority in the Detroit system, . although measured by system-wide servi.ee, has been applied ' .consistently to protect against involuntary transfers and "bumping" in given schools. " 27. Involuntary transfers of teachers have occurred only because of unsatisfactory ratings or because of decrease of teacher services in a school, and then only in accordance with balanced staff concept, r '...--- ------ 28. There is no evidence in the record that Detroit teacher seniority rights had other than equitable purpose * • or effect. - . 29. Substantial racial integration of staff can be achieved, without disruption of seniority and stable teaching relationships, by application of the balanced staff concept to naturally occurring vacancies and increases and reductions of teacher services. • . 30. The Detroit Board of Education has entered into ■ • -successive collective bargaining contracts with the Detroit Federation of Teachers, which contracts have included provisions promoting integration of staff and students. ■ The Detroit School Board has, in many other instances cind in many other respects, undertaken to lessen the impact of the forces of -segregation and attempted to advance the cause of integration. Perhaps the most obvious one was the adoption of the April 7 Plan. Among other things, it lias 4 denied the use of its facilities to groups which practice racial discrimination; it does not permit the use of its facilities state legislation which would have the effect of segregating j the district; it has worked to placed black students in craft . _ I ’ positions in industry and the building trades; it ha^ brought about a substantial increase in the percentage 'of black students in manufacturing and construction.trade apprentice ship classes; it became the first public agency in Michigan to adopt and implement a policy requiring affirmative act of contractors with which it deals to insure equal employment opportunities in their work forces; it has been a leader in IV j>ioneering the use of multi-ethnic .instructional material, and in so doing has had an impact on publishers specializing in producing school texts and instructional materials; and it has taken other noteworthy pioneering steps to advance relations between the white and black races. In conclusion, however, we find that both the State of Michigan and the Detroit Board of Education hav^ committed acts which have been causal factors in the segregated condition of the public schools of the City of Detroit. As we assay the principles essential to a finding of de jure segregation, as outlined in rulings of the United States Supreme Court, t It. 0 s it 0 * 1. The State, through its officers and agencies, and usually, the school administration,- must have taken some action or actions with a'purpose of segregation. - 2. This action or these actions must have created or aggravated segregation in the schools in question. . • V> n 3. h current condition of segregation exists. -2.1 - recognize that causation in the case before us is both several and comparative. The pri ca in d e n i *hly have been popoulation movement and housing patterns, but _ state and local governmental actions, including school board actions, have ployed a substantial role in promoting segregation. It is, the Court believes, unfortunate that we cannot deal with public school segregation on. a no-fault basis, for if racial segregation in our public schools is an evil, then it should make no difference whether we classify it de jure or de facto. Our objective, logically, it seems to us, should be to remedy a condition which we believe needs correction. In the most realistic sense, if fault or blame must be found it is that of the community as a whole, including, of course, the black coirponents. We need not minimize the effect of the actions of federal, state and local governmental officers and agencies, and the actions of loaning institutions and real estate firms, in the establishment and maintenance' of segregated residential patterns - which lead to school segregation - to observe that blacks, like ethnic group in the past, have tended to separate from the larger group and associate together. The ghetto is at once both a place of confinement and a refuge. There is enough blame for everyone to share. . CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . 1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this ^5ction under 28 U.S.C. 1331(a), 1343(3) and (4), 2201 and 2202; 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988, and 2000 d . 2. In considering the evidence and in applying legal standards it is not necessary that the Court find thatf ■ the policies and practices, which it has found to be dis criminatory, have as their motivating forces any evil intent' or motive. Keyes v. Sch, Pint. #1, Denver, 383 F. Supp. 279. Motive, ill will and bad faith have long ago been rejected as a requirement to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against racial discrimination. Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, 407-8. . 3. School districts^-are accountable for the natural, probable and foreseeable consequences of their policies and practices, and where racially identifiable schools are the result of such policies, the school authorities bear the burden of showing that such policies are based on educationally required, non-racial considerations. Keyes v. Sch. Dist., supra, and Davis v. Sch._Dist. of Pontiac, 3 09 F-. Supp. 734, and 443 F.2d 573. ■ 4. In determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, proof that a pattern of racially segregated schools has existed for a considerable period of time amounts . - to a showing of racial classification by the state and its agencies, which must be justified by clear and convincing evidence. State of Alabama v, U.S., 304 F .2d 583. 5. The Board's practice of shaping school attendance zones on a north-south rather than an east-west orientation, with the result that zone boundaries conformed to racial residential dividing lines, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Kortbcross v. Bel. of Ed., Memphis, 333 F . 2 d 661. segregation result-School System and the residential racial *r • ing primarily from public and private racial discrimination are interdependent phenomena. The affirmative obligation of the defendant Board has been and■is to adopt and implement pupil assignment practices and policies that compensate for and avoid incorporation into the school system the . effects of residential racial segregation. The Board's building upon housing segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See, Davis v . Sch. D.ist. of Pontiac, supra, and—. - i " authorities there noted. -- --...— 7. The Board's policy of selective optional attendance zones, to the extent that it facilitated the separation' of pupils on the basis of rcice, was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F .2d 175. 8. The practice of the Board of transporting black students from overcrowded black schools to other identifiably black schools, while passing closer identifiably white schools, which could have accepted these pupils, amounted to an act of segregation by the school authorities. Spangler v . Pasadena City Bd. of Ed., 311 F. Supp. 501. . 9. The manner in which the Board formulated and modified attendance zones for elementary schools had the natural and predictable effect of perpetuating racial segregation of students. Such conduct is an act of de jure discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. M yO . v . School D j s t r i c t. 15]., 286 F. Supp. 786; Brewer v., City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37. - ? . A Fourteenth Amendment, maintain segregated elementary schools ■ I ! _or permit educations3. choices to be influenced by community sentiment or the wishes of a majority of voters. Coopcy v . Zniron, 358 U.S. 1, 12-13, 13 - i 6 . . • • "h citizen's constitutional rights can hairdly be infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be." Lucas v. 44th Gen'l Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-/37. 11. Under the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, the responsibility for providing educational opportunity to all children on constitutional terms is ultimately that of the state. Turner v, Warren County Board of Education, 313 F. Supp, 380; Art. VIII, §§ 1 and 2, Mich. Constitution; Dasiewicz v . Bd. of Ed. of the City of Detroit, 3 N.W.2d 71. 12. That a state's form of government may delegate the power of daily administration of public schools to officials with less than state-wide jurisdiction does not dispel the obligation of those who have broader control to use the authority they have consistently with the constitution. In such instances the constitutional obligation toward the individual school children is a shared one. Bradley v. Sch. Bd., City of Richmond, 51 F.R.D. 139, 143. • 13. Leadership and general supervision over all public education is vested in the State Board of Education. Art. VIII, § 3, Mich. Constitution of 1963. The duties of the State Board and superintendent include, but are not limited to, specifying the number of hours necessary to constitute a school day; approval until .1962 of school sites; approval of school construction plans; accreditation of schools; approval of loans r> n cr1-' C-i• 0 hi Oil S tlci Lc aic it• i i O.l :■ ) I 0 V X C \ 2 o y. S U 8 ] J 011 •■j x o n s and o>q:>ulsion mi *-■ O .individual student s for misconduct [Op. A tty. Gen. ) July 7, 1970, No. 4701 i>] ; authority over tr;.i n Sjjo rtation routes and disbursement of transportation funds; teacher certification and the like. M.S.A. 15..1023 (1). State lav; provides review procedures from actions of local or intermediate districts ' (See M.S.A. 15.3442), with authority in the State Board to ratify, reject, amend or modify the actions of these inferior state agencies. See M.S.A. 15.3467; 15.1919(61); 15.1919 (68b); 15.2299(1); 15.1951; 15.3402; Bridgetamoton School District No. 2 Fractional of Carsonville, Mich, v. Supt. of Public Instruction, 323 Mich. 615. In general, the state superintendent is given the duty "[t]o do all things necessary to promote the welfare of the public schools and public educational instructions and provide proper educational facilities for the youth of the state." M.S.A.' 15.3252. See also M.S.A. 15.2299(57), providing in certain instances for reorganization of school districts. • 14. State officials, including all of the defendants, are charged under the Michigan constitution with the duty of providing pupils an education without discrimination with respect to race. Art. VIII, § 2, Mich. Constitution of 1963. Art. I, § 2, of the constitution provides: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation." . 15. established an The State Department of Education has recently Equal Educational' Opportunities section having - 2 6 - responsibility t.c> identity r daily ini olanced s c; i o o 1 d i s 11: i c t s and develop desegregation plans. ' M.S.A. 15.3355 provides that no school or department shall .be'kept - for any person or persons on account of race or color. ■ 16. The state further provides special funds to local districts for compensatory education which are administered on a per school basis under direct review of the State Board. All other state aid is subject to fiscal review and accounting by the state. M.S.A. 15.1919. See also M.S.A. 15.1919 (68b), providing for special supplements to merged districts "for the purpose of bringing about uniformity of educational opportunity for all pupils of the district." The general consolidation lav; M.S.A. 15.3401 authorizes annexation for even noncontiguous school districts upon approval of the superintendent of public instruction and electors, as provided by law. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 5, 1964, No. 4193. Consolidation with respect to so- called "first class" districts, _i._e. , Detroit, is generally treated as an annexation with the first class district being the.surviving entity. The law provides procedures covering all necessary considerations. M.S.A. 15.3184, 15.3186. 17. Where a pattern of violation of constitutional rights is established the affirmative obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment is imposed on not only individual school districts, but upon the State defendants in this case. Cooper v. Aaron, 358, U . S . .1;. Griffin v. County School Board of Pr ince Edward _Countv, 3 37 U .S . 218; U.S. v. State of Georgia, Civ. No. 12972 (N.D. Ga., December 17, 1970), rev1d on other grounds, 428 F.2d 377; Godwin v, Johnston County Board of Education, 301 F. Supp. 1337; Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff‘d sub nom., - 2 7 - V.' a J. 1 • * c\ v , t . a . , a U . b1 • (2. X -J* f i' i..t $'} ; v i. < n v. W t :iiUi n Cov.i.i.V Board of Bducci1ion, 288 P . S upp. 50 9; Smith v. North Caro 1 i n a *' ' State Board of Educationi, Ho. 15, 07 2 (4th Cir., June 14, 1971) The foregoing const1tutes o'.:<r findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of segregation in the public schools of the City of Detroit. Having found a de jure segregated public school system in operation in the City of Detroit, our first step, in considering what judicial remedial steps must be taken, is the consideration of intervening parent defendants1 motion to add as parties defendant a great number of Michigan school districts located out county in Wayne County, and in Macomb and Oakland Counties, on the principal premise or ground that effective relief cannot be achieved or ordered in their absence. plaintiffs have opposed the motion to join the additional school districts, arguing that the presence of the State defendants is sufficient and all that is required, even if, in shaping a remedy, the affairs of these other - districts will be affected. In considering the motion to eidd the listed school districts we pause to note that the proposed action has to do with relief. Having determined that the circumstances of the case require judicial intervention and equitable relief, it would be improper for us to act on this.motion until the other parties to the action have had an opportunity to submit their proposals for desegregation. Accordingly, we shall not rule on the motion to add parties at this time. Considered as a plan for desegregation the motion is lacking in specifi-ty - 2 8 - and is framed in the broadest general terms. The . ' _ i ' may wish to amend its proposal and resubmit it as prehensive plan of desegregation. V moving party j a com- In order that the further proceedings, 'in this cause may be conducted on a reasonable time schedule, and because the views of counsel respecting further proceedings cannot but be of assistance to them and to the Court, this cause will be set down for pre-trial conference on the matter of relief., The conference will be held in our Courtroom in the City of • " . ■ * Detroit at ten o'clock in the morning, October 4, 1971. DATED: September 27_, 1971. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION • RONALD BRADLEY-, et al, Plaintiffs WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., Defendants A f R U E C O P Y FREDERICK W. JOHNSON, Clerk DEPUTY. CLERK DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,' ;nd DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al., et al. Dsfendant- latervenor Defendants- Intervenor CIVIL ACTION NO: 352 57 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . ORT■ _ ■ D K T R O T T —ONT-Y' n T antq OF E E S E O R E O ETT0 >T In accordance with orders of the court defendant Detroit Board of Education submitted two plans, limited to the corporate limits of the city, for desegregation of the public schools of the City of Detroit, which we will refer to as Plan A and plan C; plaintiffs submitted a similarly limited plan, which will be referred to as the Foster Plan. Hearings were had on said plans on March 14, 15, 16, 17 and 21, 1972. In considering these plans the court docs not limit itself to the proofs offered at the hearing just concluded; it considers as part of the evidence bearing on the issue (_i.e. , City-Only Plans) all proofs submitted in the case to this point, and it specifically L a v a •! V>» » -T rsv -ci c-'w-o liv-r o j. n a.v_-o_'w-a. Conclusions contained in its filed September 27, 1971. v~s « J , ' ----------- ------------ -3 u w w u i i c i x i i u x i i u j o a u u "Ruling on Issue of Segregation," APPENDIX B The court makes the following factual findings: . ■ i nr t\ vrt £T vi £i_ • 1. The court finds that this plan is an elabora tion and extension of the so-called Magnet Plan, previously authorized for implementation as e.n interim plan pending hearing and determination on the issue of segregation. 2. As proposed we find, at the high school level, that it offers a greater and wider degree of specialization, but any hope' that it would be effective to desegregate the public schools of the City of Detroit at that level is virtually ruled out by the failure of the current model to achieve any appreciable success. 3. We find, at the Middle School level’, that the expanded model would affect, directly, about 24,000 pupils ot a total or ±h\j, uuu in trie yiauet> cuvcieu; emu •\ - O ' - ■ i . j . ' - ' V ' would be to set up a school system within the school system, and would intensify the segregation in schools not included in the Middle School program. In this sense, it would increase segregation. . 4. As conceded by its author, Plan A is neither a desegregation nor an integration plan. PLAN C „ ’ ■ - 1. The court finds that Plan C is a token or part time desegregation effort. ' 2. We find that this plan covers only a portion of the grades and would leave the base schools no less tracially identifiable. . - 2 - PLAINTIFFS' PLAN accomplish more desegregation than now obtains in the ystem, or would be achieved under Plan A or Plan C. 2. V.e find further that the racial composition of the student body i uch that, the plan's implementation would clearly make the entire Detroit public school system racially identifiable as Black 3. The plan would require the development of trans- ■ portation on a vast scale which, according to the evidence, could not be furnished, ready for operation, by the opening of the 1972-73 school year. The plan contemplates the • transportation of 82,000 pupils and would require the or a great nuirrer or drivers, tne procurement or space for storage and maintenance, the recruitment of maintenance and the not negligible task of designing a transportation ' '// ' system to service the schools. that it would not have to undergo another reorganization if a metropolitan plan is adopted. . . 5. It would involve the expenditure of vast sums of money and effort which would be wasted or lost. . 6. The plan does not lend itself as a building block for a metropolitan plan. • . more identifiably Black, and leave many of its schools 75 to acquisition of some 900 vehicles, the hiring and training 4. The plan would entail an overall recasting of the Detroit school system, when there is little assurance 7. The plan would make the Detroit school system - 3 - • • 90 per cent Black. 8. It would change a school system which is now Black and White to one that - would be perceived as Black, thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and the system, thereby increasing the Black student population. 9. It would subject the students and parents, faculty and administration, to the trauma of reassignments, with little likelihood that such reassignments would continue for any appreciable time. In summary, we find that none of the three plans would result in the desegregation of the public schools of the Detroit school district. - - • CONCLUSIONS OF LAW . ,.v ■ i # The court has continuing jurisdiction of this action for all purposes, including the granting of effective relief. See Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27, 1971. • • 2. On the basis of the court's finding of illegal school segregation, the obligation of the school defendants is to adopt and implement an educationally sound, practicable plan of desegregation that promises realistically to achieve now and hereafter the greatest possible degree of actual school desegregation. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430; Alexander -v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19; Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290; -Swann v. Charlotta-MecklenburH Board it ion, - 4 - 402 U.S. 1. .3 . Detroit Board of Education Plans A and C are legally insufficient because they go not promise to ' ' I effect significant desegregation. Green v..County fcchool Board, supra, at 439-440. • 4. Plaintiffs' Plan, while it would provide a C • racial mix more in keeping with the Black-White proportions of the student population than under either of t e Boar d s plans or as the system now stands, would accentuate the . racial identiflability of the district as a Black school system, and would not accomplish desegregation. . 5. The conclusion, under the evidence in this case, is inescapable that relief of segregation in the r ■ public schools of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits of the city. The state, however, cannot escape its constitutional duty to • desegregate the public schools of the City of Detroit by pleading local authority. As Judge Merhige pointed out in Bradley v. Richmond, (slip opinion p. 64): "The power conferred by state law on central and local officials to determine the shape of school attendance units cannot be employed, as it has been here, for the purpose and with the effect of sealing off white conclaves of a racial composition more appealing to the local electorate and obstructing the desegregation of schools. The equal protection clause has required far greater inroads on local • government structure than the relief sought here, which is attainable without deviating- from state statutory forms. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. . 533; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339; Serrano v. Priest, 40 U.S.L.W. 2128 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1971) "In any case, if political boundaries amount to - insuperable obstacles to desegregation because of - " structural reason, such obstacles are self-imposed. - ■ Political subdivision lines are creations of the state itself, after all." School district lines are simply matters of constitutional rights. If the boundary lines of thje school districts of the City of Detroit and the suriound- jjig suburbs were drawn today few would doubt that they for solutions to the problem of school segregation, other federal courts have not "treated as immune from intervention the administrative structure of a state's educational system, to the extent that it affects the capacity to desegregate. Geographically or administratively independent units have been compelled to merge or to inititate or continue cooperative operation as a single system for school' . r 1 'desegregation purposes." Detroit scnoox district: tor a solution to m e p r o b l e m of that it has the authority, nay more, the duty to (under the circumstances of this case) do so appears plainly could not withstand constitutional challenge. In seeking segregation in the Detroit public schools is obvious; anticipated by Brown II, seventeen years ago. While other school cases have not had to deal with our exact *5 situation,' the logic of their application of the command of Brown II supports our view of our duty. Date: MARCH V , 1972. - 6 FOOTNOTES 1 Bradley v. Richmond, supra (slip opinion p. 68). \ 2 \Brown v.-Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, pp. 300-301 3 Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969); Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, supra, slip opinion pp. 664-65; Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd. 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961) and 368 U.S. 515 (1962); Lee v.- Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School Dist., 442 F.2d 584' (4th Cir. 1.971); United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1971); Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 446 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1971). ■ - ; - UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN S ouT} IERH DIVISION Si ? 0 J 7 RONALD BRADLEY, et al. Plaintiffs v , WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., Defendants DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant™ Intervenor and ■ . . DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al., e t a 1 Defendants- Intervenor I ) I ) ) CIVIL ACTION NO 3 5257 ML4731G_0N PROPRIETY OF CONSIDERING A METROPOLITAN REMEDY TO ACCOMPLISH DRSKORKC/triOE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF THE CITY OF DETROIT In its prior ruling, "Ruling on Issue of Segregation" (September 27, 1971), the court has found that segregation exists in the public schools of the City of Detroit because of, among other causes, the acts of the State of Michigan and the Detroit Board of Education. In the language of 1 . . . . . 2Svxmn, "a right and a violation have been shown." Given the constitutional violation, judicial authority, when properly .invoiced, must be exercised to right the wrong. In addressing itself to this task the Supreme Court lias said that the "scope of a district court's equitable- powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedi or;. " And, it pointed out, APPENDIX C A TRVi'', t '. t;*v I’-'.i ,i m t.i .; m , at'! : >:. cr " a scliooX d e s e g r e g a t i o n on go f liv " ' nr,i- a -■ r r , r• -J uu.., not ail,.or fundamentally from other corns involving the fronting of equitable remedies to lC1>dlr tho uonlaj ol a constitutional right.11 The task ' ' is to correct the condition which offends tho Constitution. Illustrative of what was meant by the Supreme Court, see the legislative and congressional ^apportionment cases.5 Under the circumstances of this case,6 tho question presented is whether the court may consider relief in the form of a metropolitan plan, encompassing not only tho city of Detroit, but the larger Detroit metropolitan area which, for the present purposes, we may define as comprising the three councies of Bayne, Oakland and Macomb. It should be noted that the court has just concluded its hearing on plans submitted by the plaintiffs and tiro Detroit Board of Education for the intra-city desegregation of the Detroit public schools. A ruling has not yet been made on these plans, but in accordance with the mandate of the Court of Appeals that a hearing on the merits be concluded at the earliest possible time, wo consider it necessary to proceed apace with a resolution of the issue before us, i.o., the propriety of weighing the legal availability of a metropolitan remedy for segregation. The State defendants in this case take the position/ as wo understand it, that no "state action" Iras had a part 111 tho segregation found to exist This v.i- , • , th° £incUmjS alroacly hY this court, and the decision of UU> COUrt °f Ai;)paalS aS Wo11*7 Additional] y, they appear to tlU' <K-lt •|ul-lon ol the State’s powers and duties w:i th r,'SJ,"C'k °dU(’aLi(- govt i/iv/roi)ta! hodies as vesting lhl' ■K '1 ,l'‘" v;in“ I-oviu-s which may he d:i s I »u bed by either the State or the court. This we cannot accept. Political subdivisions of the states have never been considered sovereign entities, rather "they have been ' * traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instru- • mentalities created by the state to assist it in carrying out. of state governmental functions." Reynolds v. Sims, 3/7 U.s. 533, 575. Perhaps the clearest refutation of the State's asserted lack of power to act in the field of education is Acc 48 of 1970. The State cannot evade its constitutional responsibility by a delegation of powers to local units of government. The State defendants' position is in error in two other respects: 1. The local school districts are not fully autonomous bodies, for to the extent it has seen fit the State retains control and supervision; and 2. it assumes that any metropolitan plan, if one is adopted, would, of necessity, require the dismantling of school districts included in the plan. The m a m thrust of the objections to the consideration of a metropolitan remedy advanced by intervening school districts is that, absent a finding of acts of segregation on their part, individually, they may not be considered in fashioning a remedy for relief of the plaintiffs. It must be conceded that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on this issue; accordingly, we can only proceed by feeling our way through its'past decisions with respect to the goal to be achieved in school desegregation cases. Green v. County ^ISSlJIoard, 391 U.S. 4 30, teaches us that it is our o). ligation to assess the effectiveness of proposed plans of desegregation in the light of circumstances present and the available alternatives; and to choose the alternative or alternatives hereafter to which promise realistically to work now and produce the maximum actual desegregation. As Chief Justice Burger said in Swann, "in seeking to define the scope of remedial power of courts in an area as sensitive as we deal with here, words are poor instruments j to convey the sense of basic fairness inherent in equity." Substance, not semantics, must govern. issue: It seems to us that Brown is dispositive of the "In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call ror elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional' principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them." * * * " * the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of . the school plant, the school transportation systems, ' personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems." ■ We conclude that it is proper for the court to on.,idei i.k Lj.opolitan plans directed toward the desegregat °f the Detroit public schools as an alternative to the Present intra-city desegregation plans before it and, in th h the count, finds such ‘ j ntra-city plans inadequate ion “ 4 » I to desegregate such schools, the court is of the opinion that it is required to consider a metropolitan remedy for desegregation. The schedule previously established for the hearing on metropolitan plans will go forward as noticed, beginning March DATE : 1 Swann, v . CharXotterMecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S8 1. 2 . . . • Ibid., p. 15. - • 3 . • 'Ibid., p. 15. • 4 ■ Ibid., pp. 15, 16. 5 Reynolds v. Sims, 377-U.S. 533. 6 • See' "Ruling on Issue of Segregation," supra, indicating a black student projection for the school year 1980-01 of 80.7%. 7 • See "Ruling on Issue of Segregation," supra; Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897. 0 • Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, at 300 and 301. 11 El " - v :y . y ’ ■ ; .. y EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN S 0 UTH E PI 5 DIVI510N ' ) RONALD BRADLEY, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs } v. . ) ) WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., ) ) . Defendants ) and } ) DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, ) LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION ) OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, h ) , ) . Defendant- ) Intervenor ) and ’ ) ' ) DENISE MAGpOWSKI, et al,, ) . ' > . Defendants™ ) Intervener } et al. ' ’ • ' ) * * S' ‘ • • sei >:U;■ \ \ ) jf-'EfV i u : ... sLi'Ur/ Ci.i CIVIL ACTION NO t 352 57 RULING m DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN_OF_desegregation On September 27, 1971 the court made its Ruling on Issue of Segregation, holding that illegal segregation exists in the public schools of the City of Detroit, as a result of a course of conduct on the part of the State of Michigan and the Detroit Board of Education. Having found a constitutional violation as established; on October 4, 1971 the court directed the school board defendants, city and State, to * 1. develop and submit plans of desegregation, designed to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of {.ho. situation. The directive called for the submission of both a '’Detroit-only" and a "Metropolitan" plan. APPENDIX D Plans for th<- d ? . •— r-'■ ■< f ■'-v.-. i*n4 t- >-phor,i <-■ were submitted by the Detroit Board of Education and by the plaintiffs. Following five days of hearings the'court found that while plaintiffs' plan would accomplish more desegregation than now obtains in the system, or which would be achieved under either Plan A or C of the Detroit Board of Education submissions, none of the plans would result in the desegregation of the public schools of the Detroit school district. The court, ' * _ in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluded that "relief of segregation in the Detroit, public schools cannot be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits -of the city," and that it had the authority and the duty to .look beyond such limits for a solution to the illegal segre gation in the Detroit public schools, Accordingly, the court ruled,it had to consider a metropolitan remedy for segregation. The parties submitted a number of plans for metropolitan desegregation. The State Board of Education submitted six - ' without recommendation, and without indicating any preference. With the exception of one of these, none could be considered as designed to accomplish desegregation. On the other hand the proposals of intervening defendant Magaowski, et al., .■ the Detroit Board or Education and the plaintiffs were all good faith efforts to accomplish desegregation in the Detroit metropolitan area. The three plans submitted by these parties have many similarities, and all of them propose to incorporate, geographically, ..most— and in one instance, all— of the three- county area of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb. The hearing on the proposals have set the framework, and have articulated the criteria and considerations, for developing and evaluating an effective plan of metropolitan Kone of the submissions represent a complete 'desegregation. plan for the effective and equitable do?..egrogation oi ->‘- metropolitan area, capable of implementation in its present form. The court will therefore draw upon the resources of the parties to devise, pursuant to it.' oire :tion, , constitutional plan of desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Based on the entire record herein, the previous oral and written rulings and orders of this court, ana the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; filed herewith, IT IS ORDERED: ' ' A« As a panel charged with the responsibility of, preparing and submitting an effective desegregation plan in accordance with the provisions of this order, the court appoints the following: 1. a designee of the State Superinteno.ent of . . public Instruction,-' 2„ Harold Wagner, Supervisor of the Transportation Unit .in the Safety and Traffic Education . . Program of the State Department of Education; 3. Merle Henrickson, Detroit Board of Education? .. 4. Aubrey McCutche.on, Detroit Board of Education? . 5. Freeman Flynn, Detroit Board of Education? 6. Gordon Foster, expert for plaintiffs? 7. Richard Morshead, representing defendant ■ Magdowski, et al.; .. 8. A designee of the newly intervening defendants; 9. Rita Scott, of the Michigan Civil Rights . Commission,. X - k The designees of the State Superintendent of Public ̂ _ Instruction and newly intervening defendants shal] be coimuunicai.ee to the court within seven days of the entry of this order. 1>* the event the newly intervening defendants cannot agree upon a designee, they may each submit a nominee within seven days f ro!a the entry of this order, and. the coma: vh.slJ ;-eJ.e<-t- L nominees as r e p r e s e n t a t i v c oi s a id oolen.e. s . cie panel be unable to serve, the other members of the panel shall elect any necessary replacements, upon notice to the court and the parties. In the absence of objections within five days of the notice, and pending a final ruling, such designated, replacement shall act as a member of the panel. B . As soon as possible, but in no event later than 45 days after the issuance of this order, the panel is to develop a plan for the assignment of pupils as set forth below in order to provide the maximum actual desegregation, and shall develop as well a plan for the transportation of pupils, for Implementation for all grades, schools and clusters in the desegregation area. Insofar as required by she circumstances, which are to be detailed in pciruicular, the panel may recommend immediate implementation ox an interim desegregation plan for grades K-6, K—8 or K—9 in all or in as many clusters as practicable, with complete and final desegregation to proceed in no event later than the fall 1973 term. In its transportation plan the panel shall, to meet the needs of the proposed pupil assignment plan, make recommendations, including the shortest possible time table, for acquiring sufficient additional transportation facilities for any interim or final plan of desegregation. Such recommendations shall be filed forthwith and in no event later thpn 45 days after the entry of this order. Should it develop that some additional transportation equipment is needed for an interim plan, the panel shall make recommendations for such acquisition within 20 days of this order. C. The parties, their agents, employees, successors,, and all others having actual notice of this order shall • cooperate 'fully with the panel in their assigned mission, including, but not limited to, the provision of data and reasonable full and part-time staff assistance as requested by the panel. The State defendants shall provide support, accreditation, funds, and otherwise take all actions necessary to insure that local officials and employees cooperate fully with the panel. All reasonable costs incurred by the panel shall be borne by the State defendants; provided, however, that staff assistance or other services provided by any . school district, its employees or agents, shall be without charge, and the cost thereof shall be borne by such school district. . ■ . . ■' II. • . A. Pupil reassignment to accomplish desegregation of the Detroit public schools is required within the geographical area which may be described as encompassing the following school districts (see Exhibit P.M. 12), and hereinafter Fairlane . . Garden City North Dearborn Heigh Cherry Hill Inkster Wayne . • Westwood Ecorse Romulus Taylor River Rouge Riverview Wyandotte Allen Park Lincoln Park Melvindale Southgate Detroit referred to as the 'Lakeshore Lakeview Roseville South Lake ' East Detroit Grosse Pointe Centerline . .Fitzgerald Van Dyke Fraser Harper Woods Warren Warren Woods Clawson Hamtramck Lamphere M a d i s o n H o i gh t s' Troy desegregation area"; Birmingham Hazel Park Highland Park Royal oak Berkley . Ferndale Southfield Bloomfield Hills Oak Park Redford Union West Bloomfield Clarencevi .13. e Farmington Livonia South Bedford Crcstwood Dearborn Dearborn Hoights Provided, however, that pupils it appears necess and complete racial dese if in the actual assignment of ary and feasible to achieve effective gregation to reassign pupils of * ’ another district or other districts, the desegregation panel rnay, upon notice to the parties, apply to the Court for an appropriate modification of this order. . B, Within the limitations of reasonable travel time and distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be effected within the clusters described in Exhibit P„M„ 12 so as to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation i the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or class room be substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial composition. The panel may, upon notice to the parties, recommend reorganization of clusters within the desegregation area in order to minimize administrative inconvenience, or time and/or numbers of pupils requiring transportation. C. Appropriate and safe transportation arrangements shall due made available without cost to all pupils assigned to schools deemed by the panel to be other than "walk-in" schools. • . D. Consistent with the requirements of maximum actual desegregation, every effort should be made to minimize the numbers of pupils to be reassigned and requiring trans * i portaeion, the time pupils spend in transit, and the number and cost of new transportation facilities to be acquired by utilizing such techniques as clustering, the "skip" technique, island zoning, reasonable staggering of school hours, and maximization of use of existing transportation facilities, including buses owned or leased by school districts and buses operated by public transit authorities and private . charter companies. The panel shall develop appropriate recommendations for limiting transfers which affect the desegregation of particu1ar schoo1 s. E. Transportation and pupil assignment shall, to the extent consistent with maximum feasible desegregation, be a two-way process with both black and white pupils sharing the responsibility for transportation requirements at all grade levels. In the determination of the utilization of existing, and the construction of new, facilities, care shall be taken to randomize the location of particular grade levels. ' . F. Faculty and. staff shall be reassigned, in keeping with pupil desegregation, so as to prevent the creation or continuation of the identification of schools by reference to past racial composition, or the continuation of substantially disproportionate racial composition of the faculty and staffs, of the schools in the desegregation area. The faculty and staffs assigned to the schools within the desegregation area shall be substantially desegregated, bearing in mind, however, that the desideratum is the balance, of faculty and staff by qualifications for- subject and grade level, and then by race, experience and sex. In the context of the evidence in this case, it is appropriate to require assignment of no less than 1 0% black faculty and staff at each school, and where there is more than one building administrator, every effort should be made to assign a bi-racial administrative team. G. In the hiring, assignment, promotion, demotion criteria must be developed and used,* provided, however, there shall be no reduction in efforts to increase minority group representation among faculty and staff in the desegregation area. Affirmative action shall be taken to increase minority employment in all levels of teaching and a dmini s tr at ion. . H. The restructuring of school facility utilization necessitated by pupil reassignments should produce schools of substantially like quality, facilities, extra-curricular activities and staffs; and the utilization of existing school capacity through the desegregation area shall be made on the basis of uniform criteria. making decisions about new school sites, expansion of present facilities * ** and shall, within the desegregation area disapprove all proposals for new construction or expansion result in a school largely segregated on racial * * * lines, I. The State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of. Education shall with respect to all school construction and expansion, "consider the factor of racial balance along with other educational considerations in of all in accordance with the 1966 directive issued by the State Board of Education to local school boards and the State of segregation, p. 13.) arrangements will be maintained arid continued., except to the extent necessary to effect pupil and faculty desegregation as sc t £ o r t h h c r c i n; pro v i d c d, n o w ever, t h a t e x i s t i n g a din inis t r a ™ tive, financial, contractual, property and governance arrange ments shall be examined, and recommendations for their temporary and permanent retention or modification shall be made, in light of the need to operate an effectively desegregated system of schools. K. At each school within the desegregated area provision shall be made to insure that the curriculum, activities, and conduct standards respect the diversity of students from differing ethnic backgrounds and the dignity and safety of each individual, students, faculty, staff and parents. L. The defendants shall, to insure the effective desegregation of the schools in the desegregation area, take immediate action including, but not limited to, the • establishment or expansion of in-service training of faculty and staff, create bi-racial committees, employ black counselors, and require bi-racial and non-discriminatory extra-curricular activities. ■ III. . ' The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, with the assistance of the other state defendants, shall examine, and make recommendations, consistent with the principles established above, for appropriate interim and final arrange ments .for the (1 ). financial, (2 ) administrative and school governance, and (3) contractual arrangements for the operation of the schools within the desegregation area, including steps for unifying, or otherwise making uniform the personnel polic i c pro c ecu -'.ncf ( iicin of the various school districts. . Wxehin iu days or use c.- w. ___ oj, oiuuj. ,• ‘.-pc Superintendent shall advise the court and the parties of his progress in preparing such recommendations by filing a . written report with the court and serving it on the parties. In not later than 45 days after the entry of this order, the Superintendent shall file with the court his recommendations for appropriate interim and final relief in these respects. In his examination and recommendations, the Superintendent, consistent with the rulings and orders of this court, may be guided, but not limited, by existing stale law; where state law provides a convenient and adequate fra aework for interim or ultimate relief, it should be followed, where state law either is silent or conflicts with what is n -cessary to achieve the objectives of this order, the Superintendent shall independently recommend what he deems necessary. In particular, the Superintendent shall examine and c h o o s e one appropriate interim arrangement to oversee the immediate implementation of a plan of desegregation. IV. ■ Each party may file appropriate plans or proposals for inclusion in any final order which may issue in th.'s cause. The intent of this order is to permit all the parties to proceed apace with the task before us: fashioning ar ' t effective plan for the desegregation of the Detroit pul lie schools. Fifteen days after the filing of the reports required herein, hearings will begin on any proposal to modify any interim plan•prepared by the panel and all other matters The partiesany interim plan of desegregation submitted, are places on notice cnau tmy a m cq oo prepared ui ensu time to present their objections, alternatives and modifications At such hearing the court will not consider objections to desegregation or proposals offered "instead" of desegregation. • Hearings on a final plan, of desegregation will be . set as circumstances require. DATE: JUNE 14 , 1972. UK IT ED STT■>TE S DI ST EICT CC)U R? EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN D1VISION RONALD BRADLEY, et al., ' Plaintiffs • v „ WILLIAM G, MILLIKEN, et al., Defendants and DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL NO. 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant- . Intervenor and A / 1 r*$i p r\ n \/ CIVIL ACTION NO: 35257 DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al., Defendants- Intervenor et al ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW , ■ ' IN SUPPORT OF RULING . ' ON DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN On the basis of the entire record in this action, including particularly the evidence heard by the court from March 28 through April 14, 1972, the court now makes the follow ing Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect to the establishment of the boundaries of the 8 6 public school- districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of Detroit school district, such school districts have committed . nets of be jure segregation. ■ • ■ INTRODUCTION OL«. On September 27, 1.971, this court .issued its Ruling on Issue of Segregation. On' October 4, 1971, this court • • issued f roiri the bench guidelines to Jrind the parties in the submr ssion of plans to remedy the: CO!a s t i t u t i o n a 1 v i o 1 a tion found, i_„ c „, school sogregation; a t i d in particular this court noted that the primary objective U w J~ vore us was to cievaiop o nd implement a plan which attempts to "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities of the situation." The same day this court reitercited these requirements by orders "that the Detroit Board of Education submit a plan for the desegregation of its schools within 60 days'1 and "that the State defendants submit a metropolitan plan of desegregation within 120 days." In response to these orders hearings were held, and thereafter rulings issued, on Detroit-only plans (see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation) and on the propriety of considering remedies which extend beyond t h e corporate geographxc ixiuxcs of t h e cxty of Detroit. (See Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the city of Detroit.) Between March 28, 1972 and April 14, 1972, hearings were held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation of the Detroit public schools. 2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971, to this day, the basis of the proceedings has been and remains the violation: dejure school segregation. Since Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court has consistently held that the remedy for such illegal segregation is desegre gation. The racial history of this country is writ large by constitutional adjudication from Dred Scott v. Sanford to Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown. The message in Brown was simple: the Fourteenth Amendment was to be applied full force in :public schooling. The Court held that "state-imposed" school segregation immeasurably taints the education received by all children in the public schools; perpetuates racia 1 dis;crimination and a history of public action attaching a badge of inferiorityi! to the black race in a public forum which importantly 'shapes . the minds and hearts of succeeding generations of our young people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification. Since Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with increasing force, held that the remedy upon finding de jure segregation is prompt and maximum actual desegregation of the public schools by all reasonable, feasible, and practicable means available. This court finds that there is nothing in the law, wisdom, or facts, and the particular.circumstances and arguments, presented in this case which suggest anything except the affirmance of these principles in both fact and 1 aw, . 3. The task before this court, therefore, is now, and, since September 27, 1971, has always been, Iiuw Lo desegregate the Detroit public schools. The issue, despite efforts of the intervenors to suggest a new rationale for h Ja return to the discredited "separate but equal" policy, is not whether to desegregate. That question has been foreclosed by the prior and settled commands of the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit. Our duty now is to "grapple 2 / •with the flinty, intractable realities"— of implementing the constitutional commands. ■ 4, In the most recent set of hearings, several issues were addressed generally, including appropriate methods of pupil reassignment to desegregate schools; quality and capacity of school facilities; transportation needs incident to school desegregation; the effects of new school construction, and judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of desegregation; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring of facilities incident to pupil reassignment to accomplish school desegregation; appropriate and necessary interim and i xna.J. aominxs tr a rj.v e * x o **. .l i l d ilu-i-C L a, C2 j. t s ; a pp r op r rare community, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the desegregation process; and attention to individual, cultural and ethnic values, respect, dignity and identity. But the primary question addressed by these hearings, in the absence of submission of a complete desegregation plan by the state, remains the determination of the area necessary and practicable effectively to eliminate "root and branch" the effects of state-imposed and supported segregation and to desegregate the Detroit public schools. . SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT A. The Desegregation Area 5. The State Board of Education filed six (G) "plans" without recommendation or preference; intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation which included most of the tri-county area; the defendant Detroit Board of Education filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation ' 3 /which included the entire tri-county area.— At the hearing plaintiffs presented a modification of the three proposals which actually described areas within which pupil desegregation was to be accomplished. . 6 . In the consideration of metropolitan plans of desegregation of the Detroit public schools, the State defendants stand as the primary defendants. They bear the initial burden of coming forward with a proposal that promises to work. In . 4 /the context of this case, they represent the "school authorities" to whom equity courts traditionally have shown deference in 3 / . .these matters. Yet in its submission without recommendation of six (6 ) "plans" the State Board of Education has failed to meet, or .even attempt to meet, that burden and none of the other State defendants has filled the void. 7 . The. State Board refused t o make any recommendation to t h e c o u r t a b o u t u t e a p p r o p r r a t e a re a i o r U e e e g r e g u e i o n . I n State Defendant Porter's words, the State Board "didn't make a decision, period." Defendants Milliken and Kelley merely filed objections to all. six (6 ) plans. 8 . -Three of the State "plans" merely proposed- concepts alternative to maximum actual desegregation. The Racial Proportion Plan described a statistical method of determining the number of transfers involved in achieving a particular racial ratio in each school once an area of desegrega tion had been chosen. The Equal Educational opportunity and Quality Integration Plan was admitted to be a non-plan and described criteria for education which, in whole or part, might, or might not, be applicable to any school system. 9 . Only one State "plan," the Metropolitan District Reorganization Plan, attempted to describe an area within which desegregation should occur, called the "initial operating zone" (sometimes referred to hereafter as the "State Proposal"). That "plan," however, was primarily concerned with -discussing a new governance structure for the desegregation area. Pupil reassignment was mentioned only in passing and no foundation was laid by State defendants for the particular area of desegregation described. Further, it suffered from the default of the State defendants by their stubborn insistence that under their self-serving, and therefore self-limiting, view of their powers they were free to ignore the clear order of this court and abdicate their responsibility vested in them by both the Michigan and Federal Constitution for supervision of public e-.ucation and equal protection for all citizens. 10. From the very limited evidence in the record in support of the area in that state proposal, the primary foundation appears to be the particular racial ratio attained in that plan, approximately 65% blacK, 3ay'- worse, v;iuii the provision that the area could be expended if “white flight" ensued1. In the absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area xs I _ „ ..... i 1 1 .? cr -m- ni n obi e cr i teria for not based on any dcij.nuiJ.e -u....u .. ̂ .... either inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the concept of an "initial operating zone" raises serious practical questions, which should be avoided if a more permanent solution is now possible. In short, the area described by the "initial operating zone" does not appear to be based primarily on relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools; accomplishing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public schools; or avoiding, where possible, maintaining a pattern of schools substantially disproportionate to the relevant school community1s racial composition by force of deliberate action by public authority. Nor, on the evidence in this record, is the "initial operating zone" based on any practical limitation of reasonable times and distances for transportation of pupils. These factors seem to have played little part in the creation of the "initial operating zone" and are reflected less in its result. . 1 1 . At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants did not purport to present evidence in support, or even in opposition, to the State Proposal. The State, despite prodding by the court, presented only one witness, who merely explained what appeared on the face of the various State "Plans" submitted. The State's cross examination of witnesses was of no assistance to the court in ascertaining any preference, legal or educational. Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing deliberately chose not to assist the court in choosing an appropriate area for effective desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their ' 'resistance and abdication of .responsibility throughout h a s been consistent with the other failures to meet their obligations noted court1s earlier ru J- i .i i in a Indeed, some of the submissions s clearI y C:yi vi toluon L< d ; reoregat ic>n as did the ture in tec. 12 of Act 4 8 r u .1 c' d u n c o n s \;.itut ional by the sixth Circe 12. In such circumstances little weight or deference can be given to the unsupported submission of the State/ Board of Education. In light of the available alternatives and the facts produced at the hearing bearing on the' issue, the court finds that State defendants offered no basis for ruling that the "initial operating zone" is the appropriate area within which to effectively desegregate the Detroit public schools. 1 3 . Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant school districts did not attempt at the hearing to assist the court in determining which area was appropriate to accomplish effecurve utJsegregaLxon. They were given the opportunity, by express written order and several admonitions during the course of the hearings, to assist the court in the task at hand but chose in their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest their view that separate schools were preferable. The failure of the group of 40 districts to even comment that the court should exclude certain districts under any number of available . rationales may in part be explained by the awkward position chosen by them and their counsel of having single representation for districts on different sides of the various suggested perimeters. 14. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., and the defendant Detroit Boarcl of Education are similar With slight variations they include the entire tri-county, metropolitan Detroit area, with that area divided into several .regions or clusters to .make the planning for accomplishing A],though both have as their maindesegregation more manageable. objective desegregation, 111 eir from a heavy emphasis api>r opr late soc io-eco larger area arises primarily on such factors as white flight and an . 6 /oisig balance xn each cluster and school. ne ant ad I-laqdowskx plans readily admit' that the regions or clusters for pupil reassignment which involve Mt. Clemens and Pontiac are not directly related to desegregation of the Detroit public schools and may be disregarded without any substantial adverse effect on accomplishing our objective. No other party has expressed any disagreement with that view. And the court finds that these two regions or clusters, for purposes of pupil reassignment, need not be included at this time in the desegregation area. 16. With the elimination of these two clusters there are, then, three basic proposals to be considered for the desegregation area; the State Proposal; the Detroit Board Proposal, and the proposal of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al. In addition, as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three proposals. ' 17. Each of these proposals starts from the same . . 7 /two premises: (1 ) the tri-county area constitutes the relevant school community which can serve as an initial benchmark in beginning the evaluation of how to effectively eliminate the racial segregation of Detroit schools; (2 ) but in some instances reasonable time and distance limitations for pupil transportation, and in other instances the actual area required to eliminate the pattern of racially identifiable schools, limit the area within which pupil k aassignm'-nt should occur. In terms of proof, putting aside arguments of impotence by the State defendants, there was .absolutely no contradictory evidence on these two criteria. The entire tri-county area includes areas, pupils, and - 0 - schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one million students; of: chon ep;;>.r: Basea on the evidence concerning school and non-school factors,'8 / S £~id XTGclSOHcibiC t XuiC d }}(J. ClXL> L-cl 1 ix G X a.iiiXtc-t a XOi AS XO X p U pX X transportation, the court finds that both premises are accurate. 18. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils and school in 36 school districts; approximately 550,000 students are included of whom 36% are black. The Detroit Board Proposal (excluding clusters 8 and 12) includes the areas, pupils, and schools in 69 school districts; approximately. 10 / 850,000 students are included, of whom 25% are minority. The CCBE Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in some 62 school districts; approximately 777,000 students are included of whom 197,000 (25.4%) are black. plaintiffs' proposal includes liho xrcc uupxls/ snH schools m 3u Rfhooi districts; approximately 780,000 students are included, of whom 197,000 (25.3%) are black. 19. The State Proposal approaches what may be considered a substantial disproportion in the context of this case. It is to be remembered that within any desegregation area, the racial composition of desegregated schools will vary from the area's racial mix. Given the variations in school plant, demographic and geographic factors, limiting the desegregation area to the State Proposal would result in some schools being substantially disproportionate in their racial composition to the tri-county area, and other schools racially identifiable, all without any justification in law or fact. This finding is supported by the lack of any apparent justification for the desegregation area described by the State Proposal except a desire to achieve an arbitrary racial ratio. 20 . T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of children by school bus is a common practice throughout m e nation, xn the biaie 01 Michigan, and in the tri-county area. Within appropriai_e time limits it is a considerably safer, more reliable, healthful and efficient means of getting children to scuool than either car pools or walking, and this is especially true for younger children. 21. in Michigan and the tri-county area, pupils often spend upwards of one hour, and up to one and one half hours, one-way on the bus ride to school each day. Consistent with its interest in the health, welfare and safety of children and in avoiding impingement on the educational process, state educational authorities routinely fund such transportation for school children. Such transportation of school children is .a long-standing, sound practice in elementary and secondary V..- V I V-- V- "and throughout the country. And the court finds such transportation times, used by the state ana recommended here, are reasonable in the circumstance here presented and will not endanger the health or safety of the child nor impinge on the educational process. For school authorities or private citizens to now object to such transportation practices raises the inference not of hostility to pupil transportation but rather racially motivated hostility to the desegregated school at the end of the ride. 22. The Plaintiffs' Proposal made reference to P.M.8 , based on the TALUS regional transportation and travel times study. Although there was dispute over the meaning of the study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable that major governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for a variety of planning functions. When used by the plaintiff-, p.M. 8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board s sui\cy of maximum school to school travel limes, s e r v e d as a rough, j ' - .1 irie with in v;hieh attempted to stay without any more the plaintiff in an effort '.ran sport at i s 1 to modification of other proposals provide maximum desegregation ' 1 'o, o t h a 11 5 _ r- q 0 ■q i ]- o g p q desegregate. two factors, result, is a circumst a nces This court finds that the utilization of these and the lower travel time estimates which should reasonable basis for the modification in the of this case. The court's duty and objective is not to maximize transportation but to maximize desegregation and within that standard it will always be reasonable to minimize transportation. To that end the court has accepted the more conservative perimeter for the desegregation area suggested as a modification by plaintiffs because it provides no less effective desegregation. 23. Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is too narrowly drawn. A T> ^ 4~ 1- --- --- 1 J-- - 1 -- 1- , r- x i_ _ _ »_ .* « ‘ X v C U v J i x t w t o e o r x u ; j p ^ c - t x . U - 0 KJ X. U 1 U X L Board Proposal are too sweeping. 25. Based on these criteria, the CCBE'proposal and the Plaintiffs1 Proposal, rough].y approximate the area so 1 1 / ...... described. ' - 26. There is general agreement among the parties, and the court so finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and pupils in the Huron, Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth, and Novi 12 / districts (1 ) ax'e beyond the rough 40-minute travel time line; (2 ) are not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved in the regions and clusters abutting those schools; and, (3 ) at this writing, are not otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil assignment is concerned, to provide an effective remedy now . and hereafter. (See Findings 63-69 below.) . 27. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven, Gilbralter, Flat Rock, Grosso lie and Trenton are within set forth above.reasonable time and distance criteria These virtually all-white districts are included in the Detroit Board Proposal but excluded from the plaintiffs' modification. The areas, schools and pupils in such school districts are - . similarly not necessary to effectively desegregate. (Clusters 13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs' proposal are 20.5%, 24.4% and 22.7% black respectively.) There is nothing in the record which suggests that these districts need be included in the desegregation area in order to disestablish the racial identiflability of the Detroit public schools. From the • ' ' jevidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board's interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not racial desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters. In terms of what this court views as the primary obligation establishc by the Constitution— racial .desegregation--the court deems the ir-*- -f- r~\ ,o> p -' '~\ > -P V-. rl r. A 4- appropriate to confine the desegregation area to its smallest effective limits. This court weighs more heavily the judicially recognized concern for limiting the time and distance of pupil transportation as much as possible, consistent with the constitutional requirement to eliminate racially identifiable schools, than a concern for expanding the desegregation area to raise somewhat the average socio-economic balance of a 13 /relatively few clusters of schools.-— — 28. To the north and northeast, the only major disagreement among the Detroit Board Proposal and plaintiffs' modification relates to the areas, schools, and pupils in the Utica School District. This district is a virtually all-white, long, relatively narrow area extending several miles in a north-south direction away from the city of Detroit. Only the southern part of the .district is within the rough, TALUS 4 0 -in i n u t c t r a v e 1 t i me 1 i n e. 29. The; Detroit Boar that 1)1 Co should be included in order to raise the average socio-economic balance of the abutting clusters and schools. In this instance, however, the overall racial composition of the cluster, 27.0% black, may tend toward disproportionate • black relative to the tri-county starting point. * ■ ■ 30. Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board, also suggested that Cluster 3 of plaintiffs' Proposal, because of its omission of Utica, might present some problems, which he admitted could be solved, in designing a plan of pupil reassignment for the desegregation of schools. (See Findings 34-39 below.). ' 31. In light of these relevant, and competing, considerations the question presented by the Utica situation .is close; however, at this writing, the court determines that the areas, schools, and pupils in the Utica School District need not be included, and therefore, should not be included in the desegregation area 14/ 32. The court finds that the appropriate desegre gation area is described by plaintiffs' modification of the three primary proposals. Within that area the racial identifiability of schools may be disestablished by implementa tion of an appropriate pupil desegregation plan. The area as a whole is substantially proportionate to the tri-county starting point. Within the area it is practicable, feasible, and sound to effectively desegregate all schools without imposing any undue transportation burden on the children or on the state's system of public schooling. The time or > distance children need be transported to desegregate schools in the area will impose' no risk to the children's health and will not significantly impinge'on the educational process. or e or xb clusters are arranged along major surface arteries and utilize the "skip," or noncontiguous zoning, technique to minimize the time and distance any child need spend in planning for pupil reassignment within the desegregation area into a series of smaller, manageable and basically independent plans. Thus, although as the new interveners suggest devising a desegregation plan for a system with some 800,000 pupils has never been attempted, the practical and manageable reality is that desegregation plans fox* systems with .from 36,000 to .1 0 0 , 0 0 0 pupils has been done and such plans have been implemented. , .... • 3 4 . Plaintiffs' Proposal uses the same cluster technique and the same clusters, modified to fit the desegrega tion area. The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils and from 20.5% to 30.8% black. Only three relevant objections were raised by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified. 3 5 . First, Cluster 4 was challenged as "concealing" a "problem," namely effective desegregation of other schools resulting from the omission of Utica from plaintiffs' modifica tion. On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the "problem" of actual pupil desegregation fox* these other schools could be "solved," that all schools within Cluster 4 could be effectively desegregated, and that Cluster 4 was smaller than the Detroit Board Cluster 6 . The objection was thus narrowed to the possibility that a suburban high school constellation feeder pattern might have to be split between two Detroi'c i.trgii ci e s e gre g a t e . cilso contain 36 Several of the D two Detroit high . Th.1 s objection e t:r o i. t B o a r d ' s e 1 u s t e r s school feeder patterns. , splitting an existing pattern, was raised-directly in reference to Cluster neither instance, however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest however | * feeder 3 2 . In that the e time or distance of transportation involved was too long or that it would present administrative difficulty in.devising a pupil assignment plan for either cluster. The objection relates solely to a matter of administrative convenience, namely the use of existing feeder patterns in preparing pupil assignments.. For example, Mr. Henrickson previously admitted that in drawing a pupil assignment plan, an alternative to use of existing feeder patterns would be to "wipe the slate clean," and disregard existing feeder patterns. In fact one of the State plans suggested use of census tracts 15 / . . . .as an alternative. On numerous occasions in the past Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned parts of one feeder pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding and/ or accomplish desegregation. The objection to such practice, therefore, is admittedly insubstantial. 37. The third objection relates to the exchange of Detroit Northern for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15 requiring that the students transported, if they proceed on their entire journey lay way of the expressway, encounter an interchange which tends to be rather slow-moving. Such transportation time and distance, however, is well within the rough criteria for reasonableness and is shorter than or comparable to the maximum trips required in the Detroit Board's clusters. In other instances, Mr. Henrickson admitted that pupils in the Detroit proposal might also have to travel through similar interchanges. Moreover, the objection to this particular increase in travel tirue must be weighed ugainst the apparent general decrease in time v. nxch would ba required in i plaintiff's1 modified clusters as compared with the Detroit Board's clusters. In any event the desegregation panel, based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assignment, remains free to suggest a xnodification or these clusters in order to reduce the time and number of children requiring transportation. 38. With that caveat, the court finds that plaintiffs' modification of the Detroit Board's clusters provides a workable, practicable, and sound framework for the design of a plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools. C. Pupil Assignment and Transportation 39. Example of various methods of pupil assignment to accomplish desegregation have been brought to the attention of the court by the parties: pairing, grouping, and clustering of schools; various strip, skip, island, and non-contiguous zoning; various lotteries based on combinations of present school assignment, geographic location, name, or birthday. Judicious use of these techniques— coupled with reasonable staggering of school hours and maximizing use or existing transportation facilities— -can lead to maximum actual desegregation with a minimum of additional transportation. 40. Quite apart from desegregation, under any . circumstances, transportation for secondary pupils living more than 1 1 / 2 miles, and elementary pupils living more than 1 mile from school, is often demanded by parents and should be provided. Moreoever, it is essential to the effectiveness of any desegregation plan that transportation be provided free to all students requiring it under that ■ vcriteria. • ' fBrevrcr ' :v.. '.Dorfolk Board ol Education,____ f .----- (Apr i 1 1972) (4 th C i r .) .) 41. In 1-1)o rcocnu punt 11- 1 uuc.ii j00, COO pupiIn in the tri-county area regularly rode to school on some type of bus; this figure excludes the countless children who • arrive at school in car pools, which are many, many times more dangerous than riding on the school bus. • 42. Throughout the state approximately 35-40% of all students arrive at school on a bus. In school- districts eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs in the three affected counties, the percent of pupils transported in 1969-70 ranged from 42 to 52%. ’ - 43. In' comparison approximately 40%, or 310,000, of the 780,000 children within the desegregation area will require transportation in order to accomplish maximum actual desegregation. 44. Hence, any increase in the numbers of pupils to be "transported upon implementation of a complete desegrega tion plan over the number presently transported, relative to the state and the tri-county area, should be minimal. Indeed, any increase may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils who would be transported in any event but for the state practice, which affected the segregation found in this case, and which denies state reimbrusement to students and districts wholly within city limits regardless of the 16 % distance of the child from the school to which assigned. (Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 14.) The greatest change is the direction of the buses. 45. There is uncontradicted evidence that the actual cost of transportation for a two-way plan of desegregation should be no greater than 50 to 60 dollars per 17 / pupil transported,---comparable to the present costs per . pupil through the state. Increases in the total costs • • of pupi 1 transportation in the descgr.■•ration area, therefore, will result primarily from evicting a3J children requiring transportation a free ride instead of imposing the costs of transportation for many on the families in districts which are ineligible fox* state reimbursement and which fail to provide transportation. ■ 1 46* By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and economies of scale resulting from a comprehensive system of pupil transportation, it may be possible to achieve savings in per pupil costs. For example in 1969-1970 many school districts in the tri-county area which used the same bus for even two loads per day lowered their per pupil costs to $40 ox* less. In a coordinated, urban pupil transportation system it may be possible to raise the bus use factor to thx~ee or more. (See "First Report" State Survey and Evaluation.) 47. In the tri-county area in the recent past there were approximately 1,800 buses (and another 1 0 0 smaller vans) used for the tx*ansportation of pupils. Assuming a rough average of 50 pupi1s per bus carrying three loads of students pex* day, this transportation fleet may prove sufficient to carry.some 270,000 pupils. . 48. Various public transit authorities now transport an additional 60,000 pupils on theix* regular public runs. 49. The degree to which these plausible bus-use factors can be realized to their maximum, and whether these public transit facilities may be fully utilized in a plan of desegregation, must be answered upon careful investigation by a panel of experts. ■■ 50. There is no disagreement among the parties, and the court so finds, that additional transportation facilities, at least to the number of 350 buses,-will hove to b e p u r c h a s e d *to meet' the 'increase in the number of students who should be p r o v i d c d t r a n s p a r t a 11 o n for e.i i.hct an interim or final plan 01 d e s e gr e g a t i o n 51. For all the reasons stated heretofore including >1 s— desegregation withintime, distance, and transportation facto: the area described is physically easier and more practicable and. feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate geographic limits of the city or Detroit. 52. The issue of transportation of kindergarten children, and their inclusion in part or in full in the desegregation plan, may require further study. There was general agreement among the experts who testified that kinder garten, but for "political" considerations, should be included, if practicable, in the desegregation plan. Kindergarten, however, is generally a half-day program. Transportation of kindergarten children for upwards of 45 minutes, one-way, does not appear unreasonable, harmful, or unsafe in any way. In the absence of some compelling justification, which does not yet appear, kindergarten children should be included in the final plan of desegregation. . 5 3 , Every effort should be made to insure that transportation and reassignment of students to accomplish desegregation is "two-way" and falls as fairly as possible on both races. Although the number of black and white children transported and reassigned at the outset will be roughly equal, it is inevitable that a larger proportion of black children will be transported for a greater proportion of their school years than white children, if transportation overall is to be minimized. To mitigate this disproportion, every effort should be made at the outset to randomize the location of particular grade centers. In the short term, full utilization of vastly V under-capacity inner-city schools may also help to mitigate Inc disproportion for some black children; and in the long tc u.«, s c • ioo J. c cii■ ■ cic x u\5 ( co11 s x '■ x o i’11' \•’xth v.>xii&x con x fc x111 c ioi1;.11 'C O ir u r s a n c ■ - L 1 : c .1...... x O } i B r C: ci ci IX d the surrounding arc!, should be added in Detroit, in relative P i . j - i u i . u y o o c o i i c e n o r - j 1.l? £*• X / .1. < ■-.. o c.' •- ■*.i J, U P * j X Ci O z i C D. Restructuring of Facilities and Reassignment of Teachers 54. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish desegregation the court finds that facilities must be substantially reallocated and faculty substantially reassigned by reason of the clustering, pairing and grouping-of schools. 55. In order to make the pupil desegregation process fully effective the court finds that it is essential to integrate faculty and staff and to insure that black faculty and staff representation at every school is more than token. The court has previously found and reaffirms that "a quota or racial balance in each school which is equivalent to the system-wide ratio and without mere" is educationally unsound, and that the desideratum is the balance of staff by qualifications for subject and grade level, and then by race, experience and sex. It is obvious, given the racial composition of the faculty and staff in the schools in the metropolitan plan . area, and the adjusted racial composition of the students, that vacancies and increases and reductions in faculty and staff cannot effectively achieve the needed racial balance, in this area of the school operation. Active steps must be taken to even out the distribution of black teachers and staff throughout the system. , . . 56. In the desegregation area approximately 16% of the faculty and 12% of the principals and assistant principals are black. In this context "token" means roughly less than 10% black. Moreover, where there is more than one building administrator in any - school, ■ a bi-racia.1 administrative team 20™ • • is required wherever possible« 57. Every effort should be made to hire and promote, and to increase such on-going efforts as there may be to hire and promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of the systematic and substantial under-employment of black administrators and teachers in the tri-county area, an affirmative program for black employment should be developed and implemented. ' - . 58. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit public schools is 32; in some of the suburban districts the average rated capacity is as low as 24 or 25. Utilization should be redetermined on a uniform basis. 59. In respect to faculty and staff, school facilities, and the utilization of existing school capacity, normal administrative practice in handling the substantial reallocation and reassignment incident to pupil desegregation should produce schools substantially alike. 60. In the circumstances of this case, the pairing, grouping and clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation with minimum transportation often requires use of grade arrangements such as K-4, K-5, or even K-6 . In so planning pupil reassignments, it is sometimes necessary, and often administratively practicable, to include grades K- 8 or even K-9 to achieve the maximum actual desegregation with the minimum transportation. Grade structures in most elementary schools in the desegregation area is a basic K-6 ; however, almost all other combinations are found. They differ within and among various districts. ' . 61. In the reassignments of pupils and teachers and tlie reallocation of equipment and facilities required to accomplish desegregation, the elementary grades and schools present relatively few administrative difficulties, while the h iqn liooi uxeaier cl 1 f f 1. C l.1 til •: *• 13, r't j r*;; ! c\ -■ ] y With S O e C1 : 1 A,, am curriculum, 62. For h interim choices must be made because of the impossibility of .immediate desegregation of all grades, schools, and clusters in the desegregation area, the weight of the evidence is, and the court so finds, that desegregation should begin-first at the earliest grades for entire elementary school groupings throughout as many clusters as possible. ' E. School Construction ; 63. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit public schools, as a whole, are considerably over-capacity. (See also Finding 58, supra.) To alleviate this overcrowding, equalize rated capacity and minimize and equalize transportation burdens borne by black pupils in the city, needed new school i capacity, consistent with other requirements of a desegregation plan, should be added on a priority basis in the city of Detroit. 64. Relevant to the court's choice of a desegregation area more limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the testimony, elicited on cross-examination from two of the primary authors of that proposal, related to the effects of controlling new school construction. The broader area in the Detroit proposal was chosen without any real consideration • of the impact of controlling school construction in an area larger than the desegregation area. Upon reflection, both Dr. Flynn and Mr. Henrickson admitted that closely scrutinizing and limiting the addition of capacity to areas outside the desegregation area might lead them to re-evaluate the need,■in the context of maintaining now and hereafter a unitary system, to include an area as sweeping as recommended by the Detroit Board proposal. 65. in our Ruling on Issue or ;t:.grcg<. Lion, PP- this court found that the ''residential segregation throughout the larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and or long standing" and that "governmental actions and inaction at a h r, i _j. _ -ann Tnfpil hav© combined wi eh all levels, Federal, State and lo-ar, na.o ^ those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of associations and brokerage firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation through the Detroit metropolitan area." Be also noted"that this deliberate setting of residential patterns had an important effect not only on the racial composition of inner-city schools but the entire School District of the City -of Detroit. (Ruling on Issue of segregation at 3-10.) Just as evident is the fact that suburban school districts in the main contain virtually all-white schools. The white population of the city declined and in the suburbs grew; the black population in the city grew, and largely, was contained theiem by force of public and private racial discrimination at all levels. - 6 6 . We also noted the important interaction of school and residential segregation; "Just as there is an inter action between residential patterns and the racial composition of the schools, so there is a corresponding-effect on the residential pattern by the racial composition of schools." Ruling on Issue of Segregregation at 10. Cf. fhi§nn__v_. rhar 1 ottc-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 Pt'0i- 1 gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools arG ~ in response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on c.c -ul ' ’ t of inner city no ign borl..oocir . " 67. Within the context ot the seyrcgaeory Housing market, it is obvious that the white families who left the . city schools would not bo as likely to leave in the absence of schools, not to mention white schools, to attract, or at least 1 Q /serve, their children. Immigrating families were affecued in their school and housing choices in a similar manner. Between 1950 and 1969 in the tri-county area, approximately 13,900 "regular classrooms," capable of serving and attracting over 19/ . . . . .400,000 pupils, were added in school districts which were less than 2% black in their pupil racial composition in the 1970-71 school year. (P«M. 14; P.M„ 15). 0 3 . The precise effect of this massive school construction on the racial composition of Detroit area public schools cannot be measured. It is clear, however, that the 2 0 / , - ,effect has been substantial.” Unfortunately, the State, despite its awareness of the important impact of school construction and announced policy to control it, acted in keeping generally, with the discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated racial segregation in these schools." Ruling on Issue of Segregation at .15; see also id., at 13. 69. In addition to the interim re-evaluation of new school construction required in the order, pursuant to the State Board's own requirements, the final plan will consider other appropriate provisions for future construction throughout the metropolitan area. . F. Governance, Finance and Administrative Arrangements 70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the Detroit Board, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, ct al., discuss generally possible governance, finance, and administrative 2 1 / v;hich may be appropriate for operation of an arrangements— w " ' J -1- ~ J "interim or final plan of desegregation. V!ithout parsing m O A # 1 1 C 1 1 i v. C:r CS L1n -j ■*■11 at >?a< ’ll contcm! >la1 overlaying come blood educational authority over the $rea, " “ " . I . use or eventual redrawing of: existing districts), ana considerable input at the individual school, level. The court has made no decision in this regard and v/ill consider the matter at a subsequent hearing. - 73 Each concept needs to be "fleshed-out" in the hard prospect of implementation of a final plan of desegregation and what is necessary and essential, and only that, for the successful operation of that plan of school desegregation now on an interim basis and hereafter on a permanent foot ing. 72.. There are now some 8 6 school districts in the tri-county area of varying size, numbers or pupils, shapes, and wealth. 73. In another context, the State Board ox Education found each related to a "metropolitan, core city" (Detroit) as "city," "town," or "urban fringe" districts. 74. The boundaries of these school dis’ m general bear no relationship to other municipal, county, 22 / or special district governments, needs or services":.. 75. Some educational services are already provided to students on an interdistrict, county, inter county, or metropolitan basis; and many support services are provided by the intermediate school districts and the State Department of Education. For various reasons many pupils already cross school district lines to attend school . £ 1 /or receive educational services. 76. In many respects— pattorns of economic life, woih, play, population, planning, transportation, health services- the comma) n: . ! C ;ut th the Urn. S t a t c i C ensus Bxxreau, s m J.e .rci metropolitan statistic area. 77, Local, units of government in the metropolitan* area have in many instances joined together for the purpose of providing better solutions to problems confronting them. In such instances various units of government have either disregarded local boundaries or have concluded that the problems were such as to call for a metropolitan solution. In some cases they have created overlay organizations, SEli COG, recreational authorities, a metropolitan sewage system, SEMTA, and the Detroit Water System are examples of these metropolitan approaches. ' . 78. Indeed, the State defendants at this very moment are attempting in state court to strike down one irrationality, and the discriminatory effect, of the existing school district arrangement, j_. e_. , finance, apparently in the hope of moving to a virtual state-wide assumption of costs. 7 9 > In such circumstances there has been no showing that the existing school district boundaries are rationally related to any legitimate purpose; and the court finds that the particular welter of existing boundaries for 8 6 school districts is not necessary to the promotion of any compelling state interest. ■ BO. On the basis of the present record, the court is of the view that the shifts in faculty, staff, resources and equipment and the exchanges of pupils necessary to accomplish maximum actual desegregation may be made, at least on an interim basis, by contractual agreements or otherwise among and between the existing school districts. The court has serious reservations, however, whether such procedures will inevitably threaten the continuing effectiveness of a I • 0 plan or cnar.:cgr>;pa rion ever tno icny-unerar bn 1he:- >■; leeaos rn o r e e v i. d e r> c e a;nd further hearings v/i}I bo neccscary bef:or< r e a c h i n g a f i n a 1 c>. e c i s i oi i - 1 81 T h e S t a i: e d e f e n d a n t s , Said in par | ticular the State Board of }ducation which is chSrged with the primary re s p on sib i1i t y for public education in Michigan , are the p r i m a r y p a r t i e s t o b e c h a r g e d w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o u n d e r t a k e t h a t v i t a l i n q u i r y a n d r e t u r n w i t h r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a b o u t t h o s e g o v e r n a n c e , f i n a n c i a l , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h a r e n e c e s s a r y a n d e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f a p l a n o f d e s e g r e g a t i o n o n a n i n t e r i m a n d c o n t i n u i n g b a s i s . G . I n v o l v e m e n t o f A f f e c t e d P e r s o n s a n d C o m m u n i t i e s a n d P r o t e c t i o n A g a i n s t R a c i a l D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e D e s e g r e g a t i o n P r o c e s s 8 2 . T h e c o u r t h a s r e c e i v e d i n t h e p l a n s f i l e d b y e v e r y p a r t y a n d a d v i c e i n s e v e r a l b r i e f s a m i c u s c u r i a e t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s uncontroverted evidence in t e s t imony, and , and the court finds, are essentia1 to i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d o p e r a t i o n o f a n e f f e c t i v e p l a n o f d e s e g r e g a t i o n i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s c a s e : ( a ) B i - r a c i a l c o u n c i l s m a d e u p o f t h e p a r e n t s a n d s t a f f , a n d , w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e , p u p i l s , s h o u l d . b e s e t u p a t e a c h s c h o o l ; t h e p e r s o n s m o s t a f f e c t e d m u s t b e e n c o u r a g e d a n d g i v e n e v e r y o p p o r t u n i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f d e s e g r e g a t i o n . ( b ) C u r r i c u l u m c o n t e n t , a n d a l l c u r r i c u l u m m a t e r i a l s a n d s t u d e n t c o d e s , m u s t b e r e - e v a l u a t e d a n d r e f l e c t t h e d i v e r s i t y o f e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d s o f t h e c h i l d r e n n o w i n t h e s c h o o l s . ' A s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , t h o s e i m m e d i a t e l y a f f e c t e d b y t h e s e d e c i s i o n s a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s c h o o l l e v e l s h o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h a t p r o c e s s . ( c ) I n - s e r v i c e t r a i n i n g f o r f a c u l t y a n d s t a f f l o r m u l t i - e t h n i c s t u d i e s a n d h u m a n r e l a t i o n s s h o u l d b e r e q u i r e d ; w e m u s t , a f t e r a l l , r e l y p r i m a r i l y *'"■ . o n o u r t e a c h e r s a n d c h i l d r e n t o r e s p e c t , n u r t u r e , a n d d e a l w i t h t h e d i v e r s i t y o f s t u d e n t s p r e s e n t - i n t h e d e s e g r e g a t e d s c h o o l . . . ( d ) T h e e n t i r e g r a d i n g , r e p o r t i n g , c o u n s e l l i n g , a n d , • t e s t i n g p r o g r a m s h o u l d b o r e v i e w e d i n l i g h t oi. O *7 Is c t . r e d to traditional id iio.posi.riC! the effects of ■ on the eh a Iclren , Ttack.lfiq, a : ; i 0 1.. 0 Cl , vOi.... eh b£iS do? ■ d:: s c r i >d pa racial effects should not be utilizecl;j within schools a pattern oi; classes which are: • r . -v *| -s f - -j - -• - *1 1 > -t • v- - - * ■ •; - - p 4- p o -.•** ~ p r - ' F! 1 composition from the relevant school or grade mix should be closely scrutinised and maintained only if necessary to promote a compelling e d u c a t i on a 1 object i ve. . 83. In making the finding above, we remind the parties that this court's task is to enforce constitutional rights not to act as a schoolmaster;! the court’s task is to protect the constitutional rights here found violated with as little intrusion into the education process as possible. The court’s objective is to establish the minimum constitutional framework within which the system of public schools may operate now and hereafter in a racially unified, non-discriminatory fashion. Within that framework the body politic, educators, parents, and most particularly the children must be given the maximum opportunity to experiment and secure a high quality, and equal, educational opportunity. However, experience has proven that specific goals, deadlines and methods of reporting and review must be required in all desegregation cases to insure compliance. • show why desegregation for all schools, grades, classrooms, and pupils in the desegregation area should not proceed now, i_.e_. , in the context of this litigation, for the 1972 fall term. The design and implementation of desegregation plans for all grades in 15 clusters— including pupil assignments, necessary reassignment of faculty and restructuring of facilities, planning and acquiring the needed transportation -.facilities— is conceded .by all parties to be a major undertakin Yet next fall will already be a full year, not just four or six II. Timing 84. The burden remains with State defendants to • • S C; "i O O j f ’ f < i 7 ] 2 S 0 (1970) , aTtey the initial rv. l ' no by this court of the need for maximum fear.ito-le desegrpgation i •s* t *"now. In such ciro i c~ ■* ■ y- Th r' fy p b o "~<r] I;O DfOVG 1the i n f ea sit o i1 ity of implementation of complet e relief is high. 85. The deseqregation panel, theref ore , must make every e f f or t t o p 1 a n to implement as much actual de s e g r eg a t i on for as many clusterI , schoo 1 s , g rad es , c 1 aasrooms , and student as pos sible . 8 6 . At a minimum, there is agreement among, and evidence from, the experts that desegregating severa1 g rad e s, and more particularly entire elementary schools, within many, if not all, clusters-may toe accomplished in the fall. 87. In view of pindings 60 to 62, supra, if hard choices must toe made for the fall, any interim plan should attempt to desegregate grades K—5, K~8 , or K--9 in as many entire clusters as possible; and, in the absence of some other showing, there appears no reason why a complete plan may not toe implemented toy fa3.1 1973. ' " 8 8 . A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay in any way, shape, kind, degree or extent to convince the court that maximum actual desegregation cannot proceed . effectively forthwith. 89. In view of the time constraints, the need to discharge this burden forthwith, the State defendants' default in assisting this court to determine the appropriate desegregation area, and the State defendants' asserted and evident lack of available planning capacity suited to the task, the court finds that some additional entity must toe charged with the task of preparing a pupil assignment plan to accomplish maximum actual desegregation and a transportation plan within the framework this day established. To that end a pane] of ski lied experts, broadly representative of the a s s i q n e d t h a t t a sk requn. red to uxscnarqe erreetiveb and promptly these two tasks, 90. State defendants remain charged with the duty, however,•of coming forward with, other necessary reports and plans concerning those governance, administrative, and financial'arrangements necessary and essential to the implementation of an effective plan of desegregation on an interim and on-going basis. - I. The Plan ■ 91. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this case, the court finds that an educationally sound, administratively feasible, constitutionally adequate, practicable and effective plan of desegregation rnay be developed implemented and operated hereafter for'the desegregation area as set forth in findings .1-90 above. ■ 3 0 - CO 1. The court has continuing jurisdiction of this action for all purposes, including the granting of effective ' relief. Bradley v. Milliken, Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27, 1971; Findings of Fact and Conclusions or Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 28, 1972. 2 . A de jure segregation violation having been found, the minimum remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking 21 into account the practicalities of the situation. V Bradley v, Mil,liken, Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 28, 1972; Brown v„ Board of Education, 347 IBS. 383 (1954), 349 UoS0 294 (1954); Green v, County School Bd., 391 U„S„ 430 (1968) ; Alexander v. Holmes Coun.ty Bd._of Ed« , ‘396 U.S. 19 (1969) ; Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U 0S 0 290 (1970); Swann v. Char .lotto fleck lonberg Bd, of Ed., 402 U 0S. 1 (1971) ; Davis v . Board of _School Commissioners of Mobile , 402 U DS . 33 (1971); Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573, cert, denied, 925 U 0S„ 233 (1971). 3. The remedial obligation rests with school authorities; but where in any way they fail, or are unable because of the circumstances of the case, to fulfill any part of the obligation promptly and fully, the court has broad equity power, and the duty, to insure that demonstrable progress be made now; that a schedule for planning be adopted forthwith; and that necessary planning be specifically ordered and immediately undertaken in order that a constitutionally adequate plan may be fashioned and finally ordered implemented as soon as possib 1 e . Swann_ v.. Chariot! c---Hccklonhorg Board of EdiKxytjmgn., 311 'F- Supp- 265 (VhBJLC. 1970) , nff^d, 402 U*S. 3 (1973 ); Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U.S. 226, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8 • • (1569) , on'r. xr c* ') Q { 1 Q 7 •'■V} . Arr-,(. ., _ ■ ■ , y j?r>- F cd . R . n i - p p 7\ ;> p v. .MVciiSsi i 3 J4 F 1 a Supp. 1247, 1266™7 (E ,D . Pa . 1971) . <Only then will the courfc i. n fc. li x s case be apprised fully of the practicalities of the situation and what is reasonable and feasible, in order that a final order may issue, School authorities, of course., will be given an opportunity to (.1) raise relevant objections, (2 ) make suggestions for modifications, (3} or present an alternative plan of desegregation; and their judgment and expertise will be considered and given appropriate weight by the court. 4. Funds must either be raised or reallocated, where necessary, to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights and to insure that no such unconstitutional neglect recurs again. Shapiro v. Thompson, 397 U„S. 254, 265-266 (1970); Bod die v . Con n e c t i c u t , 91 S.Ct. 780, 788 (1971) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U„S0 365, 374-375 (1971); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971); Griffin v« Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hoosier v. Evans, 3.14 F. Supp. 316, 320-321 (D„St. Croix, 1970) ; United States v. School District 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 232 (N.Do 111. 1969), aff'd as modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U CS. 943 (1971); Plaquemines Parish School Board v. U 0S ., 415 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Richmond, ___ __F. Supp.______ _ (April 1971); Brewer v. Norfolk, No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., March 7, 1972)(Slip op. at pp. 7-8). It would be a cruel mockery of constitutional law if a different rule were to be applied to school desegregation cases. After all schooling is this nation's biggest industry and the most important task of government left to the states by the ...Constitution. In this case, were a different rule to be applied, it would constitute a aiaantic hvoocr i s v : A f t e r a 1.1 iii«3xnLc$ in in 9 Lnt- s c cj r o 9 & *c gg cone' x i; i on f ■£ Jig x" g 1 z t ti i v g 3 y si^nl 1 amounts of money required to undo that segregation can be found. The law, surely, reoujpc’s a t ! o; ■ st -f- ’, -■? -?- jnp m -,„ application of the.commands of Swarm does require that in almost every senool desegregation case which has been brought to this court's attention. . 5* In the substantial reassignment of faculty and restructuring of facilities required by the clustering, pairing, and grouping of schools to accomplish pupil desegregation, normal administrative practice should lead to schools with substantially like facilities, faculty and staff, and equipment. Swcann, supra, 402 U.S. at 18-20. Moreover, special care should be taken in the necessary reassignment of faculty to avoid creating or maintaining the racial identification of schools simply Jay reference to the racial composition of teachers and staff." Swann, supra, 402 U.SC at 18. In any event, the equitable discretion of the court is broad enough to insure that those aspects of faculty desegregation and equalization Oj_ facilities which are essential to the effective operation of a desegregation plan are included in the planning and final order, Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 15; UkS. v. Montgomery County jjoprcL.0f Ed.. , 395 U0S c 225 (1969) ; Hecht v . Bowles ; 321 U.S . 329-330 (1944); and no contract, union agreement or otherwise, or Board policy or practice may impede these Fourteenth ■ Amendment obligations. U.S._v. Greenwood Municipal Separate ^ 1 2 °LJDl§trict, 406 F . 2 d 1086, 1094 (5th C i r.) , cert, denied , 395 U.S. 90/ (1.969) ; Berry v. Benton Harbor, _ F. Supp. (W.D.Mich. 1971). 6 . The Federal courts have repeatedly rejected plans exempting the lower grades from integration, relying less on iCU < {n v t} > o non of; the lav/. See, e.q., United States v . o r fere on C o u n t y Bd . of fcliic. , 372 2d 8^6 (9t h C '<" 1 f'sr<) - •" * " 1 ■ , 380 F . 2d 385 (5th Cir. 19G7) . from a desegregation plan "root and brancli. " Green To leave grades K through 3 exempt is not to eliminate segregation v. Countv'School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). . 7. The consistent application of settled const!- tuional law invests this court with the equitable power, and the duty, to order preparation, and thereafter implementation, of a practicable and sound plan which embodies the principles set forth in these findings and conclusions and the attached memorandum and order. See, generally, Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, March 24, .1972; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans, March 24, 1972; oral ruling on offers of proof, April 13, 1972; and the cases cited therein. 8 „. School construction practices throughout the metropolitan area have added to and reinforced the pattern of segregation referred to. Although there were vacant seats throughout the city to which students could have been assigned at lesser cost and with the achievement of integration, continued sums were expended for construction of new schools designed to service particular areas of racial concentration, and such schools opened as and have continued to be racially ientifiahle in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann v. Chari o11 o-Meck3,enberg Bd i of F.duc. , 402 U.S 0 1, 18-20 (1971) ; . United States v. School pis!, 15 3., 404 F.2d 1125, 1132-33 , (7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. School Pi st . of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. • > '; i / , 1971) : : -y ; p \ (> u 1 i L 5. 50.1, !> i. 1 ~~18 (Cc LJ V ■ v O,, .1. J. J- «. ...t, .F / U l t In w i v, Son Franc i sco limit 1uu 5ch oo.l J •' A > t- t f C.- j.. V » i\ O • L» i ’*-3 J. O ..L { i\ & JJ o C cl X J- i April 28, 1971,) ; Brower v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 397 F. 2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1968) ; C f , S1 oa n v. Tenth S ch ao 1 D i. s t. o f SOD Oaunty, F. 2d (6 th Cir. 1970) ; Unit e0 Sta te s v. Board of Educ. of Polk County, F . 2d (4th Cir. 1968) r Kc1 lev v,. Altheime;r, F . 2 d (8 u li. 0 x it o .1967) ; Bradley v. School Bd. , F • Supp....._ (E„Do Va. 1971) ; Clark v. Boa r d _ _qf E d u c v o f Ilittle Rock., 401 U 0S. 971 (1971) . 9. The legal effects of racially discriminatory confinement to a school district are not different from the effects of such containment within a district. E_. , Lee v . Macon County Board of Education, 558 F,2d 746 (5th Cir. 1571); ilanev v. County Board Sevier, 410 F.2d 920 (8 th Cir. 1969) , 429 F . 2d 364 (8 th Cir. 1970). 10. Where the actions of state defendants and local school authorities throughout the metropolitan area have had the natural, foreseeable, and actual effect of building upon, taking advantage of, and encouraging racially segregated demographic patterns deliberately fixed by governmental action at all levels with the effect of creating and maintaining racial segregation in the public schools, there is a present obligation to eliminate the continuing effects of such violation; and . the District Court has the duty, upon default by school authorities, to intervene to secure compliance with the Constitution pursuant to the sound exercise of traditional equity powers consistent with the practicalities of,the local situation. Swann v. Char] ntte-Mec onberg, '4 02 II, 1, 15-16, 20-21, 31- A"X » J J ) established, it is the responsibility of school authorities and abandonment is.not used and does not serve to perpetuate or re-establish the violation. Swann, supra, 402 U 0S 0 at 21. are substantially implicated in the segregation violation found and are ultimately responsible f.or public schooling throughout the state, the consistent application of constitutional principles requires that this court take all steps necessary and essential to require them to desegregate the Detroit public schools effectively and maintain, now and hereafter, a racially unified, non-discriminatory system in the absence of a showing that the judicial intervention here contemplated will frustrate the promotion of a legitimate and compelling state policy or interest. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U 0S C 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U,S. 161, 178-179 (1907); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U 0S. 204, 212-213 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U 0S. 621, 633 (1969); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U 0S 0 235, 244-45 (1970); Shelton v. Tuckcr, 364 U 0S„ 479, 488 (1966); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U 0S 0 430, 439, 442; Swann v , Char1otte-Mook 1enberg, 402 U 0S. 1 (1971) Davis v. Bd. of School Commissioners, 402 U 0S 0 33 (1971); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U 0S 0 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U CS. 292, 300 (1955); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968). - district courts to see to it that future school construction and' 1 1 . Moreover, where the State, and named defendants, • • 1 . In the main such proof entirely misses the point: the violation here found has to do with school segregation caused in substantial part by force of public authority and action; yet the intervening defendants' questions and .offer of- proof speak mainly to educational theory and recent and some times contradictory research about narrowly measured educational effects, mostly on achievement test scores, of quite limited beginnings of racial, or socio-economic integration of various types and as compared with the effects of dollar or other resource inputs and continued segregation. .This court does not understand, however, that such research, from the Coleman report to its many reanalyses, formed the primary bases for the Brown decision or any of its progeny. See, e.g.', Brunson v. Bd. of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (J. Sobeloff, concurring). In a context similar to newly intervening defendants' objections to desegregation, the Supreme Court in Swann specifically held that such factors constitute an impermissible limit upon the duty to desegregate. 402 U CS* at 24, Fn. 8 . Citation to such research, either in support or rejection of school desegregation, misses the primary point: insofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system of public schooling in every state must be operated in a racially non-discriminatory, unified fashion; until that objective is met, the very system of public schooling constitutes an invidious racial classification. The adoption of an education theory having the effect of maintaining a pattern of de jure segre gation is therefore clearly impermissible. (Whether such theories, research, or evidence on educational quality or __ _ T 4 J - _C J - V , ^ ̂ ^ 4 r - v o> ̂ -y -C v» v* ^ -4 i 4 c> 1 r~ \r\ / i w .'—i a - c- y J- v_/ i i i t m - c* .x. O j -<•** ~ ^ - and relief in. the absence of a finding of de jure segregation • is a question this court need not face.) • In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, on June 19, 1970, that greater, not less, desegregation is the proper manner to alleviate the problem of disparity in achievement. Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, Jackson, Tenn., 427 F.2d 1005, 1008 (C0A„ 6 , 1970) . 2. Chief Justice Burger in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U„S. 1, 6 . . 3. DefendantsMagdowski, et al., originally opposed to desegregation, during the course of the taking of proofs on the issue of segregation, conceded that the public schools of the city of Detroit were in fact segregated, and took the early lead in suggesting that the only effective avenue for desegregation was a metropolitan plan. The Detroit Board of Education, while continuing to deny that it has been guilty of any act of segregation, took the position that if desegregation were to be undertaken it could be done only on a metropolitan basis. So that now the white parents of the city of Detroit and its Board of Education— the .parties most, directly involved with the lot of the students in the Detroit school system— see no alternative to, and, for all practical purposes seek a metropolitan solution to the basic Detroit school problem. • 4. . In the context of this hearing, the defendant Detroit Board of Education is not in a position to act as the usual i "school a appropria does not Detroit. expertise uthority" primarily responsible for suggesting an te desegregation area' simply because its authority extend beyond the geographic limits of the city of The competence, knowledge of local conditions, and of those schoolmen who helped prepare the Detroit Board's proposal, however, may be utilized and given appropriate weight. 5. In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, #K88-71, Judge Fox pointed out the primary responsibility of the state: "The State of Michigan is represented by two entities, but the entity is an agent of the State . . . [T]he Constitution says something about your [the State's] responsibility." The court went on to order the State to take an active role. Pre-trial order and transcript, May 1, 1972. 6 . The Detroit Board plan places heavier reliance on white flight and socio-economic factors, while the Magdowski •proposal in addition places an emphasis on maintaining a minimum percentage black in each school. These considerations in no way determine the court's choice of a desegregation area necessary to meet constitutional requirements. In fairness, however, it also should be noted that the desegregation area, which the court deems to best meet constitutional requirements, also happens in the main, to meet the other concerns expressed in these two proposals. That the Board's interest in socio economic integration is largely met by racial desegregation is not surprising. - There is uncontroverted evidence in the record, and the court so finds, that there is a high correlation between blacks and nersons of a low sori o—econom.i c status , the result, in the main, of the cumulative effects of past and • present'racial discrimination including discrimination in education. At some point hereafter, of course, school authorities with responsibility for implementation and operation of the racially-unified non-discriminatory school system contemplated, or parts thereof, may and should include in its plan other educational goals and needs whether or not they are required by the law or any court. Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. at 16. • 7. If a state is constitutionally forbidden to institute a system of racial segregation by the vise of artifical boundary lines, it is likewise forbidden to perpetuate a system whose effect is to maintain segregation. "There is no legally protected vested interest in segregation. If there were, then Brown v. Board of Education and the numerous decisions based on that case would be pointless. Courts will not say in one breath that public school systems may not practice segregation, and in the next that they may do nothing to eliminate it." Wanner v. School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452, (Soboloff, Cir. J.), pp. 454 and 455. The historic fact is that existing conditions are based on a design to segregate the races. To hold that segregation, once accomplished, is sacrosanct and beyond constitutional reach, is to say that the united Staves Constitution and its Amendments, find their provisions for equality, are mere rhetoric. • 8 . See Findings 70-78, infra. ii • • 9. The interplay of these two factors summarizes two other guideposts or starting points: maximum feasible desegregation and eliminating racially identifiable schools. Factors such as time and distance limitations, together with the rough definitions of substantial disproportion with the relevant school community's’ pupil racial composition, in turn largely determine the meaning of "eliminating racially identifiable schools" and what con stitutes "maximum feasible desegregation," in the particular circumstances here present and in the-context of a prior finding of segregation. •' 10. The Detroit Board Proposal contemplates desegregation on a "minority"-white basis. The proof in this cause, however, has been aimed at the segregation of black children and white children; similarly the remedy has been so defined, argued, and in the main presented by parties. The court finds, therefore, that the area, and further planning, should, in the main, be confined to a black-white breakdown. 11. To the Southwest, Plaintiffs' Proposal falls on the side of less time in transit than the 40-minute guideline because inclusion of more area is not required to desegregate. (See Finding 27, infra.) 12. Moreover, in the main, the areas, schools, and pupils in these districts are not as fully members of the greater Detroit school community: many are less urban; they are the furthest in terms of time, distance, and contact from the Detroit area's economic and social acitivities; and many are more oriented, if anything, to urban areas other than Detroit, for example, the Ann Arbor - Ypsilanti area. 13. The court notes, however, that the range of average socio-economic status for the various regions or clusters in Plaintiffs' Proposal is similar to that in the Detroit Board Proposal: based on the Michigan Assessment the range in Plaintiffs' Proposal happens to be 44.7 to 53.7, while in the Detroit Board Proposal the range is 46.3 to 53; and only three of the 15 clusters of schools in Plaintiffs' Proposal fall below 46.3. 14. Because of the closeness of the question, particularly as it relates to any problems which may arise hereafter in . establishing a pupil desegregation plan, the court feels that some opportunity should be given to the expert panel to suggest a modification of this tentative resolution. See also Findings 34 38 below. ' . . 15. A common practice in other cases is the use of "pupil locator" maps. See Northcross v. School Board of City of Memphis,____F.2d____ (6 th Cir. 1971). 16. For years these city-contained school districts, which include some suburban districts in the desegregation areai, as well as the Detroit Public Schools, have demanded without -success that this inequitable state practice be changed so that all districts could be reimbursed on the same basis for pupil transportation. ! 17. The figure almost twice that which appears in several of the State "plans" was based on the assumption that busing would be "one-way" with black children being assigned to suburban schools. Mr. Wagner, the state official in charge of pupil transportation, provided the information on wbicjh that estimate was based and also informed his superiors that a two way plan of desegregation and transportation would cost much less per pupil. The State defendants did not bring this important fact to the court's attention in any of their submissions; it was uncovered and fully explored in the deposition of Mr. Wagner taken by plaintiffs. • 18. This phenomenon was noted in Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21. The principle was long known, and actively, supported by the F.H.A. For example, consider that public agency's early understanding in its 1936 manual that white subdivision developments require white schools: "if the children of people living in such area are compelled to attend school where the majority or a good number of the pupils represent a far lower’ level of society or an incompatible racial element, the neighborhood under consideration will prove far less stable and desirable than if the condition did not exist." 19. This figure assumes 30 children/regular classroom. Although rated capacities may be lower, the figure for regular classrooms does not include several types of instructional, recreational, laboratory, and other rooms which add overall pupil capacity to schools. . 20. The resulting pattern is unmistakable: "Residential segregation within the city and throughout the larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long standing. Black citizens are located in separate and distinct areas within the city and are not generally found in the suburbs. While the racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors may have played some part in the development of this pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result of past and present practices and customs or racial discrimination, both public and private, which have and do restrict the housing opportunities of black people. Perhaps the most that can be said is that all of them [various governmental units], including school authorities, are, in part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists." Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 8 and 10. Moreover, an examination of PX 181, 192 and 185 shows that black children often remain isolated in predominately black schools in the few suburban school districts' with any numbers of black pupils. In the last several weeks the local press has reported that the United States Office of Education cut off funds for one such district. 21 . Included in this set of arrangements are contract .relationships of various types concerning personnel, property and debts. • 22. The defendant, William G. Milliken, Governor of the v.State of Michigan, in his amicus brief filed in the Supreme 'Court of tire United States, No. 71-1332, San Antonio Independent School District v. Demetrio P. Rodriguez, says, page II: "1 . Amici, whose individual and particular interests are set forth in more detail below, are the Governors of the above-listed States. As Governors and chief executive officers of their respective States, Amici are responsible for upholding and carrying out the commands of the Constitutions and laws of their various States, including - the provisions thereof requiring the establishment of public schools and school districts and commanding the children of their States to attend school. Amici are responsible for financial decisions affecting all State operations, including those pertaining to support and financing of the public schools. • "Amici are deeply concerned about the ongoing and continuing crisis in public education and the difficulties facing public educational systems in their States and around the nation. Amici recognize that grave inequities exist because of variation in local property tax bases upon which local school districts must rely in order to support their school systems. Amici believe that these inequalities in educational resources violate the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and that these inequalities must be eliminated* * * *" The Governors' amicus brief, speaking of the State of Texas, could as well be said of the State of Michigan, when it used these words: "It is also undisputed that the local school districts and ’ their boundaries, and hence the aggregate value of the property they contain, are entirely the creation of and their main tenance is the responsibility of the State of Texas. Further . more, the detailed regulation of public education financing in Texas * * * is a state not a local responsibility. Indeed, the school districts have the power to raise funds for education only as a result of delegation by the State of its own power to tax for the general welfare." (Page 8 of brief.) "Since the State could not discriminate directly against students residing in,poorer localities, it should not be permitted to accomplish the same result by dividing its responsibility for equal education with .local school districts and failing to supplement the funds raised by the school districts sufficiently to eliminate discrimination." * (Page 11 of brief.) * Compare Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) . While a State may delegate certain of its functions to smaller subdivisions such as cities or counties, it cannot escape accountability for their actions. Such subdivisions are "created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them* * * * The number, nature, and duration of [their] powers * * * and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State." Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U 0S 0 161, 178 (1907). . ■ 23. For years black children in the Carver School District were assigned to black schools in the inner city because no white suburban -district (or white school in the city) would take the children. ‘ v • • 24. These findings are made on the basis of the present record and are subject to modification based on evidence which may be developed once the specific problems o'f actual desegrega tion are faced in the planning process. 25. See, Kelley, et al. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., - CCA 6 , Nos. 71-1778-79, page 22, slip opinion, May 30, 1972: "Perhaps the primary thing that the Swann case decided was that in devising plans to terminate such residual effects, it is appropriate for the school system and the District Judge to take note of the proportion of white and black students within the area* and seek as practical a plan as may be for ending white schools and black schools and substituting therefor schools which are representative of the area in which the students live. *The area referred to in this case is all of Davidson County, including the City of Nashville, which is included in the jurisdiction of defendant .Metropolitan Board of Education. WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN , et al, Defendants, and • DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Defendant-Intervenor, and DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al, Defendants-Intervenor, et al. Civil Action No. 35257 ORDER '. FOR ACQUISITION OF TRANSPORTATION At a session of the United States District Court, Federal Building, Detroit, Michigan, on the /.J day of ___19727 The Court has received a recommendation from the Panel appointed under its previous orders that 295 buses,which it had determined are available, should be acquired for the purpose of providing transportation under an interim plan. The Court also had before it the still pending motion of Plaintiffs for the purchase of 350 buses. Having heard the arguments of counsel, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: t f 1. The Defendant Detroit Board of Education shall acquire by purchase, lease or other contractual arrangement at least 295 buses for use in the "interim desegregation plan during the 1972-73 school year.- All financial obligations incurred as APPENDIX E * the result of this Order shall be the sole financial obligation of the State Defendants, including the added State Defendant State Treasurer Allison Green, as set forth below in Paragraph 2. Said order, lease, or other contract shall be entered into by negotiation and without the necessity for bids forthwith and in no event later than Thursday, July 13, 1972. 2. The State Defendants shall bear the cost of this acquisition and State Defendants, including the added State __ Defendant Green, shall take .all necessary steps utilizing existing funds and sources of revenue, to be acquired State funds, legis latively authorized and funds directed by the State Constitution to the State School Aid Funds and by re-allocation of existing or new funds to pay for said transportation acquisition either directly or through the Defendant Detroit Board. Approved as to form only: George T. Roumell, Jr. Attorney for Defendant Detroit Board of Education, and other Defendants United States District.Judge ' -2