Petition for Permission to Appeal Certain Orders Involving Controlling Questions of Law
Public Court Documents
July 19, 1972
113 pages
Cite this item
-
Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Petition for Permission to Appeal Certain Orders Involving Controlling Questions of Law, 1972. 0254b850-53e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/abd56b43-37b8-4f58-9c33-c9d18d9dc644/petition-for-permission-to-appeal-certain-orders-involving-controlling-questions-of-law. Accessed November 28, 2025.
Copied!
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RONALD BRADLEY, et al,
v.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants-Appe Hants,
and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,
Defendant-Intervenor,
and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al,
Defendants-Intervenor
et al. •
U. S. Court
of Appeals
No.
U. S. District
Court No. 35257
On Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Southern Division
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL CERTAIN
ORDERS INVOLVING CONTROLLING QUESTIONS
OF LAW AS CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE
PURSUANT TO 28 USC 1292(b)
Business Address
720 Lav; Building
525 West Ottawa Street
Lansing, Michigan
FRANK J. KELLEY
Attorney General
Robert A. Derengoski
Solicitor General
Eugene Krasicky
Gerald F. Young
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for State Defendant
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF 7\PPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RONALD BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS, AFL--CIO,
Defendant-Intervener,
and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al,
Defendants-Intervener,
et al.
U.S. Court
of Appeals
No.
U.S. District
Court No. 35257
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 7CPPEAL CERTAIN
ORDERS INVOLVING CONTROLLING QUESTIONS
OF LAW AS CERTIFIED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE
PURSUANT TO 23 USC 1.292 (b) _______
Petitioners (defendants) William G. Milliken,
Governor of the State of Michigan; Frank J. Kelley, Attorney
General of the State of Michigan; Michigan State Board of
Education; John W. Porter, Superintendent of Public Instruc
tion; and Allison Green, Treasurer of the State of Michigan,
by their attorneys Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of the
+
State of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General,
Eugene Krasicky, Assistant Attorney General and Gerald F.
Young, Assistant Attorney General, pursuant to 28 USC 1292(b)
and FRApp P 5 petition this Court for permission to appeal
certain orders of the district judge, which orders, when
entered, will state that they involve controlling questions
of law as to which there are substantial grounds for dif
ferences of opinion and that an immediate appeal from such
orders may materially advance the ultimate termination of
this litigation.
In support of this petition petitioners show:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Petitioners are duly elected or appointed offi
cials of the State of Michigan. On August 18, 1970, this
suit was instituted in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan by plaintiffs Bradley, et
al, seeking (a) a determination that as a result of
official policies and practices of these and Detroit School
District defendants and their predecessors in office a con
stitutionally impermissible racially identifiable pattern
of faculty and student assignments existed in the Detroit
public schools, and (b) a determination that legislative
2-
enactment of the State of Michigan 1970 PA 48, being MCLA
388.171a et seq; MSA 15.2298(la) et seq, which "allegedly
delayed and interferred with the implementation of a voluntary
plan of partial high school pupil desegregation which had
been adopted by the Detroit Board of Education," was uncon
stitutional.
2. This Court ruled section 12 of said Act 48
invalid under US Const Am XIV. 433 F2d 897.
3. After lengthy trial the District Court, on
September 27, 1971, entered its Ruling on Issue of Segrega
tion, Appendix A attached. The Court concluded, both as
a matter of fact and of lav;, that the public schools in
Detroit are "segregated on a racial, basis" and that both
state and local defendants "have committed acts which have
been causal factors in the segregated condition."
with regard to the Governor was that he was an ex officio
member, without a vote, of the State Board of Education,
he signed 1970 PA 48, which had been adopted by the legis
lature with only 1 dissenting vote, and he appointed the
boundary commission required by said Act 48. No testimony
4. The sole testimony introduced at the trial
was introduced at the trial with regard to the Attorney
General.
- 3-
5. The sole testimony offered at the trial with
regard to the State Board of Education and the Superintendent
of Public Instruction was that the State Board of Education
had joined with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission in 1966
in the issuance of a joint policy statement on the quality
of educational opportunity, and that the State Board of
Education's "School Plant Planning Handbook" stated
that care in site selection must be taken if housing patterns
in an area would result in a school largely segregated on
racial, ethnic or socio-economic lines. Neither the State
Board of Education nor the Superintendent of Public Instruc
tion under Michigan law has the authority to approve site
location. ■
6. In its ruling the court found that the School
District of the City of Detroit was not segregated with regard
'• P
to its teaching and administrative staff.
7. The principal evidence relied upon by the Dis
trict Court in its ruling was evidence of housing segregation
with regards to which neither these defendants nor the Detroit
School District defendants played any part. These defendants
continuously objected during the trial to the admissibility
of such evidence pursuant to this Court's rulings in Deal v
Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F2d 55 (1966), and Deal
v Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F2d 1337 (1969).
, - 4-
8. The District Court also relied upon evidence
of a few isolated instances, such as the busing of a small
number of black students past a white school to attend a
newer school in a black neighborhood. Such incidents were
promptly corrected as soon as they were brought to the atten
tion of the proper Detroit Public School officials.
9. On March 24, 1972, the District Court entered
its Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy
to Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the
City of Detroit, Appendix C attached. The substance of this
ruling was that if the court found an intra-Detroit school
district plan inadequate, the court was bound by the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court to decree a metropolitan
remedy.
10. On March 28, 1972, the District Court issued
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; on Detroit-Only
Plan of Desegregation (Appendix C attached), in which it
said that: I
"The court must look beyond the limits of
the Detroit school district for a solution
to the problem of segregation in the
Detroit public school."
The substance of this ruling was that because of the com
position of the student body in the Detroit school system
' - 5-
(approximately 65% black; 35% white) it could not be deseg
regated because every school would have a substantially
black student body.
11. On June 14, 1972, the District Court entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Support of
Ruling on Desegregation Area and Development of Plan and
its Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for Development
of Plan of Desegregation, Appendix D attached. In its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court noted, initially,
that it had taken no proofs and made no findings with respect
to the establishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school
districts in the Counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor
on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the Detroit
school district, such school districts have committed acts
of de_ jure segregation. It should be noted, further, that
18 of the school districts included in the desegregation area
are not parties to this lawsuit.
. 12. The substance of the court's ruling and order
was to establish a desegregation area consisting of 53 inde
pendent school districts, including the Detroit public
schools; the appointment of a panel to develop a plan for
the assignment of pupils within the desegregation area and
to develop a plan for the transportation of pupils; the
- 6-
direction to the panel to make recommendations for the
acquisition of transportation; the direction that all reason
able costs of the panel be borne by the "state defendants";
the direction that faculty be assigned so that no less than
10% of the faculty and staff in each school building be
black and that where more than one building administrator
is required, a bi~racial team be assigned, the restructuring
of curriculum and facility utilization to create uniforrntiy
within the desegregation area; the direction to the State
Board of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruc
tion to disapprove all proposals for new construction or
expansion where housing patterns in an area would result in
a school largely segregated; the establishment of in-service
training of the faculty and staff within the 53 school dis
tricts at the expense of the defendants; and the hiring of
black counsellors.
13. On July 11, 1972, the District Court entered
its order for acquisition of transportation, Appendix E
attached. In substance this order required the Detroit
Board of Education, not later than July 13, 1972, to acquire
by purchase, lease or other contractual arrangement at least
295 buses for the use in transporting pupils in the desegre
gation area in the 1972-73 school year. The "state defend
ants" were ordered to bear the costs of this acquisition.
- 7-
Also, this order added the Michigan State Treasurer, Allison
Green, as an additional defendant.
14. Approximately simultaneously with the entry
by this Court of an order staying the acquisition order of
July 11, 1972, the District Court set a hearing for July
19, 1972, for the purpose of entering an order or orders pur
suant to 28 USC 1292(b). At said hearing the District Court
ruled that it would enter an order or orders to the effect
that each of its rulings and orders, Appendices A-E attached,
contained controlling questions of lav;. At the time of
writing this petition, such order, or orders, .have not been
entered, but petitioners are informed and believe that such
order or orders will be entered on the morning of July 20,
1972.
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS
Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September
27, 1971, Appendix A
1. Based on the record in this case, is the Dis
trict Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law of
de jure segregation in the public schools of the Detroit
School District in error?
2. Based on the record in this case, are the public
schools of the Detroit School District de jure segregated
- 8-
schools as a result of the conduct of any of the state -
defendants herein?
3. Whether the lower court erred in admitting into
evidence and relying upon evidence of racial discrimination
in housing by persons not parties to this cause, in finding
de jure segregation in the Detroit public schools.
4. Whether the lower court erred in denying these
defendants 41(b) motion made at the close of plaintiffs case
in chief?
5. Whether the lower court, erred in making find
ings against these defendants based on evidence introduced
after these defendants had made their 4.1b motion and rested
at the close of plaintiffs' case in chief?
6. Whether the lower court's legal conclusion of
systematic educational inequality between Detroit and the
surrounding suburban school districts, based upon transporta
tion funds, bonding limitations, and the state school aid
formula, is erroneous as a matter of law?
7. Whether the lower court's legal conclusion of
de jure segregation by these defendants in the matter of
site selection for school construction is erroneous as a
matter of lav/?
- 9 -
• • -
Ruling On Propriety of Considering a _
Metropolitan Remedy, Etc., March 24,
1972f Appendix B.
8. Where the Detroit School District has been
found to have committed acts of do jure segregation, may
the District Court properly issue a desegregation order
extending to other geographically and politically independent
school districts and require interdistrict transfers of
students, (1) absent any claim or finding that such other
school districts are themselves guilty of de_ jure segrega
tion, or (2) absent any claim or finding that the boundary
lines of such school districts were created and maintained
for the purpose of creating or fostering a dual school system?
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law
on-Detroit. Only Plans of Desegregation
of March 28, 1972tAppendix C.
9. Based on the record in this case, can constitu
tionally adequate unitary school systems be established within
the geographical limits of the Detroit School District?
10. Whether a finding of de_ jure segregation as
to some schools within the Detroit School District warrants
a desegregation remedy for all schools in the school district
or only for those schools within the school district found to
be de jure segregated schools?
- 10-
Ruling on Desegregation Areva, Etc. , of
June 14, 1972, Appendix D. .
11. The foregoing ruling, finding and conclusions
of June 14, 3.9 72 , encompass all of the previously stated
questions set forth above. In addition, the same presents
the following question: Based on the record in this case,
did the District Court exceed its equitable authority in
ordering the remedial plan of metropolitan desegregation out
lined and set forth therein?
Order for Acquisition of Transportation,
July 11, 1972, Appendix E.
12. Whether, in the absence of any proofs or
findings concerning either the establishment of the boundaries
of the 86 public school districts in Wayne, Oakland and
Macomb Counties or whether any of these 86 school districts,
with the exception of the School District of the City of
Detroit, have committed any acts of de jure segregation,
the District Court may adopt a metropolitan remedy?
13. Whether a district court may compel state offi
cials to perform acts beyond their lawful authority to per
form under state law in a school desegregation remedial order?
14. This petition for permission to appeal is
filed on this early date at the direction of the clerk of
11-
the Court of Appeals after only a matter of hours for prepara
tion and the petitioner respectfully requests leave to amend
the same to add additional questions, if necessary, within
the 10 day period after entry of the amended orders of the
District Court from which the within appeal is sought.
STATEMENT OF (1) SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR
DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AND (2) IMMEDIATE
APPEAL MAY MATERIALLY ADVANCE THE
TERMINATION OF LITIGATION.__________
1. Now involved in this litigation are approximately
800,000 public school children, roughly 1/3 of the public
school children in the State of Michigan, and 53 school dis
tricts, which, prior to the District Court's order of June
14, 1972, Appendix D, were independent bodies corporate
vested with plenary powers by state lav; to educate the child
ren residing within their respective boundaries. Eighteen
of these bodies corporate are not parties to this lawsuilt.
There has been no decision by the trial court that any of
these bodies corporate, except the School District of the
City of Detroit, were segregated de_ jure along racial lines.
Neither has it been determined by the trial court (nor have
proofs been taken) that the boundaries of these 53 independent
bodies corporate were established for purposes of cte jure
segregation, or, that the de_ jure segregation found in the
Detroit schools was the result of these boundaries.
- 12-
The constitution and laws of the State of Michigan
require unitary school systems. Const 1963, Art VIII, §2.
MCLA 340.355; MSA 15.3355. See also Workman v Board of Educa
tion of Detroit, 18 Mich 399 (1869).
The principal basis for the District Court’s find
ing of de jure segregation within the Detroit public schools
was segregated housing patterns, evidence of which this Court
ruled to be inadmissible in the two Deal cases, 369 F2d 55
(1966), and 419 F2d 1387 (1969). The District Court's find
ing as to de jure segregation against the Board of Education
of the City of Detroit at most rests upon a finding that a
few schools were segregated as to race. Such a finding does
not support a ruling that the Detroit school system is a de
jure segregated system. Keyes v School District No. 1,
Denver, Colorado, 445 F2d. 999 (1971), cert granted ___US
__92 SCt 707, 30 L Ed 2d 728 (1972).
The findings of de_ jure segregation with regard
to petitioners is totally unsupported by the record. No
findings were made against the Attorney General. The find
ings against the Governor amounted to his signing a legisla
tive enactment, only one section of which was found to be
unconstitutional, and the appointment of the boundary com
mission required by said act.
- 13-
The findings against the State Board of Education
and the Superintendent of Public Instruction were that they
had issued a policy statement in 1966 and a planning handbook,
the latter involving site selection over which they had no
authority.
The metropolitan remedy ordered by the Court is
totally unprecedented not only in its scope but for the
total lack of supporting findings. A similar remedy of far
less magnitude in a state which segregated the races in the
schools by constitution and statute and which remedy was
supported by findings of fact was recently reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Bradley v School
Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, ___ F2d ___ (June 5,
1972) .
Further, the District Court's order for development
of plan of desegregation, June 14, 1972, Appendix D, is pre
dicated upon the misconception of a constitutional duty to
achieve racial balance in the public schools, a misconception
clearly denounced in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 US 1 (1971), and Spencer v Kugler, 326 F Supp
1235 (DC NJ, 1971), aff'd 404 US 1027 (1972).
Petitioners respectfully submit that a substantial
basis exists for a difference of opinion.
- 14-
2. If the District Court's ruling on segregation,
September 27, 1971, Appendix A, is reversed this litigation
will terminate forthwith. If the District Court's rulings
and orders, first with reference to the propriety of a
metropolitan remedy, second with reference to the Detroit-
Only Plans of Desegregation and third with reference to the
desegregation area and development of plan of desegregation
are reversed, this litigation will terminate forthwith for
the vast majority of the parties in this action, and some
18 school districts that are not parties. If the decisions
are reversed, state funds will not be expended contrary to
state lav/ for the purchase of unneeded school buses.
Last, a ruling by this Court, even if such a ruling
affirmed all of the District Court's rulings and orders above
referred to, will expedite an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court and the final resolution and termination of
the litigation.
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray that their petition
for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 USC 1292(b) be granted.
Respectfully submitted, .
FRANK J. KELLEY
Attorney General
Robert A. Derengoski
Solicitor General
- 15-
Eugene Krasicky
Gerald F. Young
George McCargar
Assistant Attorneys Genral
Business Address:
720 Law Building
525 West Ottawa
Lansing, Michigan
Dated: July 19, 1972
16-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
)
RONALD BRADLEY, et al., • • ' • )
- - )
’ Plaintiffs )
v. ) .
)
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., )
. )
' Defendants )
)
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, )
LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION )
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, )
• Defendant- )
Intervenor )
•-/ )
and . )
)
DENISE MAGDOW8KI, et al., )
. )
. ‘ Defendants- )
• • Intervenor )
____:________ ___________________________________ )
A T R U E - C O P Y
FREDERICK W. JOHNSON
BY a /
DEPUTY CLERK
CIVIL ACTION NO:
35257
RULING ON ISSUE OF SEGREGATION
This action was commenced August 18, 1970, by
plaintiffs, the Detroit Branch of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People and individual parents and
students, on behalf of a class later defined by order of the
Court dated February 16, 1971, to include "all school, children
of the City of Detroit and all Detroit resident parents who
have children of school age." Defendants are the Board of
Education of the City of Detroit, its members and its former
superintendent of schools, Dr. Norman A. Drachler, the Governor,
Attorney General, State Board of Education and State Superin
tendent of Public Instruction of the State of Michigan. In
their complaint, plaintiffs attacked a statute of the State
of Michigan known as Act 48 of the 1970 Legislature on the
*
The
not contes
no opinion
standing of the NA7iCP as a proper party plaintiff was
ted by the original defendants and the Court expresses
on the matter.
APPENDIX A
ground that it put the State of Michigan in the position of
unconstitutionally interfering with the execution and operation
of a voluntary plan of partial high school desegregation
(known as the April 7, 1970 Plan) which had been adopted by
the Detroit Board of Education to be effective beginning with
the fall 1970 semester. Plaintiffs also alleged that the
Detroit Public School System was and is segregated on the .
. basis of race as a result of the official policies and actions
of the defendants and their predecessors in office.
. -
Additional parties have intervened in the litigation
since it was commenced. The Detroit Federation of Teachers v
(DFT) which represents a majority of Detroit Public school
teachers in collective bargaining negotiations with the defendant
Board of Education, has intervened as a defendant, and a group
of parents has intervened as defendants.
Initially the matter was tried on plaintiffs' motion
for preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of ,
Act 48 so as to permit the April 7 Plan to be implemented. On
that issue, this Court ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled
to a preliminary injunction since there had been no proof that
Detroit has a segregated school system. The Court of Appeals
found that the "implementation of the April 7 Plan was thwarted
by State action in the form of the Act of the Legislature of
Michigan," (433 F.2d 897, 902), and that such action could not
be interposed to delay, obstruct or nullify'steps lawfully
taken for the purpose of protecting rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. ' .
The plaintiffs then sought to have this Court direct
the defendant Detroit Board to implement the .April 7 Plan by
o . '
the start of the second semester (February, 1971) in order to
remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights wrought by the
unconstitutional statute. In response to an order of the Court,
defendant Board suggested_two other plans, along with the
April 7 Plan, and noted priorities, with top' priority assigned
to the so-called "Magnet Plan." The Court acceded to the
wishes of the Board and approved the Magnet Plan. Again,
plaintiffs appealed but the appellate court refused to pass
on the merits of the plan. Instead, the case was remanded
with instructions to proceed immediately to a trial on the
merits of plaintiffs' substantive allegations about the Detroit
School System. 438 F .2d 945 (6th Cir. 1971). \
Trial, limited to the issue of segregation, began
April 6, 1971 and concluded on July 22, 1971, consuming 41
trial days, interspersed by several brief recesses necessitated
by other demands upon the time of Court and counsel. Plaintiffs
introduced substantial evidence in support of their contentions,
including expert and factual testimony, demonstrative exhibits
and school board documents. At the close of plaintiffs' case,,
in chief, the Court ruled that they had presented a prima facie
case of state imposed segregation in the Detroit Public Schools;
accordingly, the Court enjoined (with certain exceptions) all
further school construction in Detroit pending the outcome
of the litigation. '
The State defendants urged motions to dismiss as to
them. These were denied' by the Court. . .
- At the close of proofs intervening parent defendants
(Denise Magdowski, et al.) filed a motion to join, as parties 05
«
contiguous "suburban" school districts - all’within the so-
• •
called Larger Detroit Metropolitan area. This motion was
taken under advisement pending the determination of the issue
of segregation.
. It should be noted that, in accordance' with’ earlier
rulings of the Court, proofs submitted at previous hearings
in the cause, were to be and are considered as part of the
proofs of the hearing on the merits.
In considering the present racial complexion of the
. • *
City of Detroit and its public.school system we must first look
to the past and view in perspective what has happened in the
last half century. In 1920 Detroit was a predominantly white
city - 91% - and its population younger than in more recent
times. By the year 1960 the largest segment of the city's
white population was in the age range of 35 to 50 years, while
its black population was younger and of childbearing age. The
population of 0-15 years of age constituted 30% of the total
population of which 60% were white and 40% were black. In
1970 the white population was principally aging--45 years—
while the black population was younger and of childbearing age.
Childbearing blacks equaled or exceeded the total white
population. As older white families without children of
school age leave the city they are replaced by younger black
families with school age children, resulting in a doubling
of enrollment in the local neighborhood school and a complete
change in student population from white to black. As black
inner city residents move out of the core city they "leap-frog"
the residential areas nearest their former homes and move to
areas recently occupied by whites. ' '
The population of the City of Detroit reached its
- A _
highest point in 1950 and has been- declining by approximately
169,500 per decade since then. In 1950, the city population
constituted 61% of the total population of.the standard1
metropolitan area and in 1970 it was but 36% of the metro
politan area population. The suburban population has
increased by 1,978,000 since 1940. There has been a steady
out-migration of the Detroit population since 1940. Detroit
today is principally a conglomerate of poor black and white
plus the aged. Of the aged, 80% are white.
If the population trends evidenced in the federal
decennial census for the years 1940 through 1970 continue,
the total black population in the City of Detroit in 1980
will be approximately 840,000, or 53.6% of the total. The
total population of the city in' 197 0 is 1,511,000 and, if
past trends continue, will be 1,338-, 000 in 1980. In school
year 1960-61, there were 285,512 students in the Detroit
Public Schools of which 130,765 were black. In school year
1966-67, there were 297,035 students, of which 168,299 were
black. In school year 1970-71 there were 289,743 students of
which 184,194 were black. The percentage of black students
in the Detroit Public Schools in 1975-76 will be 72.0%,
in 1980-81 will be 80.7% and in 1992 it will be virtually
100% if the present trends continue. In 1960, the non-white
population, ages 0 years to 19 years, was as follows:
0 - 4 years 42%
5 - 9 years 36%
10 - 14 years 28%
15 19 years 18%
jn 3.970 the non-white population, ages 0 years to 19 years,
was as follows:
0 - 4 years 48%
5 - 9 “years 50%
10 - 14 years .. -50%
15 - 19 years 40%
The black population as a percentage of the total population
in the City of Detroit was:
(a) 1900 1.4%
(b) 1910 1.2%
(c) 1920 4.1%
(<2) 1930 7.7%
(e) 194 0 9.2%
(f) 1950 . 16.2%
(g) 1960 vp3̂•COCM
00 1970 43.9%
The black population as a percentage of total student
population of the Detroit Public Schools was as follows:
(a) 1961 45 .8%
(b) 1963 51.3%
(c) 1964 53.0%
(d) 1965 54.8%
(e) 1966 56.7%
(f) 1967 58.2%
(g) 1968 59.4%
(h) 1969 61 .5%
(i) 1970 63.8%
For the years indicated the housing characteristics in the
City of Detroit were as follows:
.
(a) 1960 total supply of housing -
• units was 553,000 . -
(b) 1970’ total supply of housing
• . units was 530,770
The percentage decline* in the white students in the
\ . .
Detroit Public Schools during the period 1961-1970 (53.6%
in 1960; 34.8% in 1970) has been greater than the percentage
decline in the white population; in the City of Detroit during
the same period (70.8% in 1960; 55.21% in 1970), and
correlatively, the percentage increase in black students in
the Detroit Public Schools during the nine-year period 1961
1970 (45.8% in 1961; 63.8% in 1970) has been greater than the
percentage increase in the black population of the City of
Detroit during the ten-year, period 1960-1370 (28.3% in
1960; 43.9% in 1970). In 1961 there were eight schools in
the system without white pupils and 73 schools with no
Negro pupils. In 1970 there were 30 schools with no
white pupils and 11 schools with no Negro pupils, an
increase in the number of schools without white pupils of
22 and a decrease in the number of schools without •
Negro pupils of 62 in this ten-year period. Between
1968 and 1970 Detroit experienced the largest increase in
percentage of black students in the student population of any
major northern school district. The percentage increase in
Detroit was 4.7% as contrasted with —
New York 2.0%
Los Angeles 1.5%
Chicago 1.9%
- 7 -
• •
Philadelphia 1.7%
Cleveland 1.7%
Milwaukee 2 .6%
St. Louis 2.6%
Columbus ' 1.4%
Indianapolis ■ 2.6%
Denver ■ .
Boston 3.2%
San Francisco 1.5%
Seattle 2.4%
. in I960, there were 266 schools in the Detroit
School System. In 1970, there were 319 schools in the
Detroit School System. - . . - .
» . • •
• In the Western, Northwestern, Northern, Murray,
Northeastern, Kettering, King and Southeastern high school
service areas, the following conditions exist at a level
significantly higher than the city average:
. (a) Poverty in children •
(b) Family income below poverty level
■' (c) Rate of homicides per population
(d) Number of households headed by females
(e) Infant mortality rate
(f) Surviving infants with neurological
defects
(g) Tuberculosis cases per 1,000 population
(h) High pupil turnover, in schools
The City of Detroit is a community generally dividea
by racial lines. Residential segregation within the city and
throughout the larger metropolitan area is substantial, per
vasive and of long standing. Black citizens are located in
- 0 - t
separate and distinct areas within the city and are not
generally to be found in the suburbs. While the racially '
unrestricted choice of black persons and economic factors
may have played some part in the development of this pattern
of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the result
of past and present practices and customs of racial discrimina
tion, both public and private, which have and do restrict the
housing opportunities of black people. On the record there
can be no other finding.
. - »
Governmental actions and-inaction at all levels,
federal, state and local, have combined, with'those of
private organizations, such as loaning institutions and real
estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish and
to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout
the Detroit metropolitan area. It is no answer to say that
restricted practices grew gradually (as the -black population
in the area increased between 1920 and 1970), or that since
1948 racial restrictions on the ownership of real property
have been removed. The policies pursued by both government
and private persons and agencies have a continuing and present
• ' • effect upon the complexion of the.community - as we know,
the choice of a residence is a relatively infrequent affair.
Per many years FHA and VA openly advised and advocated the
maintenance of "harmonious" neighborhoods, i_.j2., racially
and economically harmonious. The conditions created
continue. While it would be unfair to charge the present
defendants with what other governmental officers or agencies
i
have done, it can be said that the actions or the failure to
act by the responsible school authorities, both city and
«
state, were linked to that of these other governmental units.
When we speak of governmental action we should not view the
different agencies as a collection of unrelated units.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that all of them,
including the school authorities, are, in part, responsible -
for the segregated condition which exists. 7\nd we note that
just as there is an interaction between residential patterns
and the racial composition of the schools, so there is a
corresponding effect on the residential x^attern by the racial
composition of the schools.
Turning now to the specific and pertinent (for our
purposes) history of the Detroit school system so far as it
involves both the local school authorities and the state
school authorities, we find the following:
During the decade beginning in 1950 the Board
created and maintained optional attendance zones in neighbor
hoods undergoing racial transition and between high school
attendance areas of opposite predominant racial compositions.
In 1959 there were eight basic optional attendance areas
affecting 21 schools. Optional attendance areas provided
pupils living within certain elementary areas a choice of
attendance at one of two high schools. In addition there
was at least one optional area either created or existing in.
1960 between two junior high schools of opposite predominant
racial components. All of the high school optional areas,
except two, were in neighborhoods undergoing racial
transition (from white to black) during the 1950s. The two
exceptions were: (1) the option between Southwestern
(61.6% black in 1960) and Western (15.3% black); (2) the
option between Denby (0% black) and Southeastern (30.9% black)
Wit}', the exception of the Denby-Southeastern option (just
- 10 -
noted) all of the options were between high schools of
opposite predominant racial compositions. The Southwestern-
Western and Denby-Southeastern optional areas are all white
on the 1950, 1960 and 1970 census maps. Both Southwestern
and Southeastern, however, had substantial white pupil
populations, and the option allowed whites to escape integra
tion. The natural, probable, forseeable and actual effect of
these optional zones was to allow white youngsters to escape
identifiably "black" schools. There had also been an optional
zone (eliminated between 1956 and 1959) created in "an
attempt . . . to separate Jews and Gentiles within the
system," the effect of which was that Jewish youngsters
went to Mumford High School and Gentile youngsters went to
Cooley. Although many of these optional areas had served
their purpose by 1960 due to the fact that most of the areas
had become predominantly black, one optional area (Southwestern
Western affecting Wilson Junior High graduates) continued until
the present school year (and will continue to effect 11th and
12th grade white youngsters who elected to escape from
predominantly black Southwestern to predominantly white Western
High School). Mr. Henrickson, the Board's general fact witness,
who was employed in 1959 to, inter alia, eliminate optional
areas, noted in 1967 that: "In operation Western appears to
be still the school to which white students escape from
predominantly Negro surrounding schools." The effect of
eliminating this optional area (which affected only 10th
graders for the 1970-71 school year) was to decrease
Southwestern from 86.7%'black in 1969 to 74.3% black in 1970.
. The Board, in the operation of its transportation
«
to relieve overcrowding policy, has admittedly bused black
- 11 -
pupils past or away from closer white schools with available
space to black schools. This practice has continued in
several instances in recent years despite the Board's pvowed
policy, adopted in 1967, to utilize transportation to
increase integration. ■ ■
. With one exception (necessitated by the burning of
a white school), defendant Board' has never bused white
children to predominantly black schools. The Board has not
bused white pupils to black schools despite the enormous
amount of space available in inner-city schools. There were
22,961 vacant seats in schools 90% or more black.
The Board has created and altered attendance zones,
maintained and altered grade structures and created and
altered feeder school patterns in a manner which has had the
natural, probable and actual effect of continuing bla^.k and
white pupils in racially segregated schools. The Board admits
at least one instance where it purposefully and intentionally
built and maintained a school and its attendance zone to
contain black students. Throughout the last decade (and
presently) school attendance zones of opposite racial
compositions have been separated by north—south boundary lines
despite the Board's awareness (since at least 1962) that
drawing boundary lines in an east-west direction would result
in significant integration. The natural and actual effect of
these acts and failures to act has been the creation and
perpetuation of school segregation. There has never been a
feeder pattern or zoning change which placed a predominantly
white residential area into a predominantly black school zone
or feeder pattern. Every school which was 90% or more black
in I960, and which is still in use today, remains 90% or more
black. Whereas 65.8% of Detroit's black students attended
90%. or more black schools in I960, 74.9% of the black students
attended 90% or more black schools during the 1970-71 school
year. ' • •
The public schools operated by defendant Board are
thus segregated on a racial basis. This racial segregation
is in part the result of. the discriminatory acts and omissions
of defendant Board.
In 1966 the defendant State Board of Education and
Michigan Civil Rights Commission issued a Joint Policy State
ment on Equality of Educational Opportunity, requiring that
"Local school boards must consider the factor of
. racial balance along with other educational
considerations in making decisions about selection
- of new school sites, expansion of present
facilities . . . . Each of these situations
presents an opportunity for integration." ■ - ■
Defendant State Board's "School Plant Planning Handbook" requires
that . ' ‘‘ •
"Care in site location must be taken if a serious
transportation problem exists or if.housing
patterns in an area would result -in a school
largely segregated on racial, ethnic, or socio-
, economic lines."
The defendant City Board has paid little heed to these statements
and guidelines. The State defendants have similarly failed to
take any action to effectuate these policies. Exhibit NN
reflects construction (new or additional) at 14 schools which
opened for use in 1970-71; of these 14 schools, 11 opened over
90% black and one opened less than 10% black. School con
struction costing $9,222,000 is opening at Northwestern High
School which is 99.9% black, and new construction opens at
Brooks Junior High, which is 1.5% black, at a- cost of $2,500,000.
The construction at Brooks Junior High plays a dual segregatory
role: not only is the construction segregated, it will result
1; . '
in a feeder pattern change which will remove the last,majority
' . I _
white school from the already almost all-black Mackenzie High
School attendance area. . . '
Since 1959 the Board has constructed at least.13
snuill primary schools with capacities of from 300 to 400 pupils.
This practice negates opportunities to integrate, "contains"
the black population and x^erpetuates and compounds school
segregation. / .■ - ■
The State and its agencies, in addition to their •
general responsibility for and supervision of public education,
have acted directly to control and maintain the pattern of
segregation in the Detroit schools. The State refused, until
this session of the legislature, to provide authorization or
funds for the transportation of pupils within Detroit regardless
of their poverty or distance from the school to which they
were assigned, while providing in many neighboring, mostly
white, suburban districts the full range of state supported
transportation. This and other financial limitations, such
• «
as those on bonding and the working of the state aid formula
whereby suburban districts were able to make far larger per
pupil expenditures desx^ite less tax effort, have created and
perpetuated systematic educational inequalities.
■ The State, exercising what Michigan courts have held
to be is "plenary power" which includes power "to use a
statutory scheme, to create, alter, reorganize or even dissolve
a school district, despite any desire of the school district,
(
its board, or the inhabitants thereof," acted to reorganize
- 14 -
the school district of the City of Detroit.
'The State acted through Act 48 to impede, delay
and minimize racial integration in Detroit schools. |f.he
first sentence of Sec. 12 of the Act was directly related to
the April 7, 1970 desegregation plan. The remainder of the
section sought to prescribe for each school in the eight
districts criterion of "free choice" (open enrollment) and
"neighborhood schools" ("nearest School priority acceptance"),
which had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of
segregation. '
In view of our findings of fact already noted we
think it unnecessary to parse in detail the activities of the
local board and the state authorities in the area of school
construction and the furnishing of school facilities. It. is
our conclusion that these activities were in keeping, generally,
with the discriminatory practices which advanced or perpetuated
racial segregation in these schools.
It would be unfair for us not to recognize the
many fine steps the Board has taken to advance the cause of
quality education for all in terms of racial integration and
human relations. The most obvious of these is in the field
of faculty integration.
Plaintiffs urge the Court to consider allegedly
discriminatory practices of the Board with respect to tne
hiring, assignment and transfer of teachers and school
administrators during a period reaching back more than 15
years. The short answer to that must be that black teachers
and school administrative personnel were not readily available
in that period. The Board and the intervening defendant union
-1 5
have followed a most advanced and exemplary course in adopting
and"carrying out what is called the "balanced staff concept" -
which seeks to balance faculties in each school with respect
to race, sex and experience, with primary emphasis on race. -
More particularly, we find: • ' -
1. With the exception of affirmative policies
designed to achieve racial balance in instructional staff, no
teacher in the Detroit Public Schools is hired, promoted or
I
assigned to any school by reason of his race. • ■
2. In 1956, the Detroit Board of Education adopted
the rules and regulations of the Fair Employment Practices
Act as its hiring and promotion policy and has adhered to
this policy to date.
3. The Board has actively and affirmatively sought
out and hired minority employees, particularly teachers and
administrators, during the-past decade. -
4. Between 1960 and 1970, the Detroit Board of
Education has increased black representation among its
teachers from 23.3% to 42.1%, and among its administrators
from 4.5% to 37.8%. ' ■ .
5. Detroit has a higher proportion of black
administrators than any other city in the country.
6. Detroit ranked second to Cleveland in 1968
among the 20 largest northern city school districts in the
percentage of blacks among the teaching faculty and in 1970
surpassed Cleveland by several percentage points. .
- 1 6 -
employs black teachers in a greater percentage than the
percentage of adult black persons in the City of Detroit.
8. Since 1967, more blacks than whites have! been
placed in high administrative posts with the Detro'it Board
of Education. ' .
. 9. The allegation that the Board assigns black
teachers to black schools is not supported by the record.
10. Teacher transfers are not granted in the Detroit
Public Schools unless they conform with the balanced staff
concept.
11. Between 1960 and 1970, the Detroit Board of
Education reduced the percentage of schools without black
faculty from 36.3% to 1.2%, and of the four schools currently
without black faculty, three are specialized trade schools
where minority faculty cannot easily be secured.
12. In 1968, of the 20 largest northern city -
school districts, Detroit ranked fourth in the percentage
of schools having one or more black teachers and third in t
the percentage of schools having three or more black teachers.
13. In 1970, the Board held open 240 positions in
schools with less than 25% black, rejecting white applicants
for these positions until qualified black applicants could
be found and assigned.
14. In recent years, the Board has come under pressure
from large segments of the black community to assign male
black -administrators to predominantly black schools to serve
1 7 -
£is male role models for students, but such assignments have
been made .only where consistent with the balanced staff
concept. . '
15. The numbers and percentages of black teachers
in Detroit increased from 2,275 and 21.6%, respectively,
in February, 1961, to 5,106 and 41.6%, respectively, in.
October, 1970. .
• 16. The number of schools by percent black of
staffs changed from October, 1963 to October, 1970 as - -.-
follows: ' .
Number of schools without black teachers—
decreased from 41, to 4. ■
. Number of schools with more than 0%, but less
- than 10% black teachers~-decreased from 58, to 8.
Total number of schools with less than 10% black
teachers— decreased from 99, to 12.
• Number of schools with 50% or more black teachers—
increased from 72, to 124.
17. The number of schools by percent black of staffs
changed from October, 1969 to October, 1970, as follows:
- Number of schools without black teachers— decreased
from 6, to 4.
Number of schools with more than 0%, but less than
10% black teachers— decreased from 41, to 8.
Total number of schools with less than 10% black
■ teachers— decreased from 47, to 12.
Number of schools with 50% or more black teachers—
increased from 120, to 124.
18. Tlie total number of transfers necessary to
achieve, a faculty racial quota in each school corresponding to
the system-wide ratio, and ignoring all other elements is,
as of 1970, 1,026.
3-9. If account is taken of other elements necessary
to assure quality integrated education, including qualifies- •
tions to teach the subject area and grade level, balance of
experience, and balance of sex, and further account is taken
of the uneven distribution of black teachers by subject
taught and sex, the total number of transfers which would be
necessary to achieve a faculty racial quota in each school
corresponding to the system-wide ratio, if attainable at all,
would be infinitely greater.
20. Balancing of staff by qualifications for subject.,
and grade level, then by race, experience and sex, is educationally
desirable and important.
21. It is important for students to have a success
ful role model, especially black students in certain schools,
and at certain grade levels-. '
22. A quota of racial balance for faculty in each
school which is equivalent to the system-wide ratio and
without more is educationally undesirable and arbitrary.
23., A severe teacher shortage in the 1950s and
1960s impeded integration-of-facuity opportunities.
24. Disadvantageous teaching conditions in Detroit
.in the 1960s— salaries, pupil mobility and transiency, class
size, building conditions, distance from teacher residence,
shortage of teacher substitutes, etc.— made teacher recruitment
and placement difficult.
25. The Board did not segregate faculty by race, but
rather attempted to fill vacancies with certified and qualified
- 1 9 -
teachers who would take offered assignments.
f ̂ ■
26. Teaelier seniority in the Detroit system, .
although measured by system-wide servi.ee, has been applied '
.consistently to protect against involuntary transfers and
"bumping" in given schools. "
27. Involuntary transfers of teachers have occurred
only because of unsatisfactory ratings or because of decrease
of teacher services in a school, and then only in accordance
with balanced staff concept, r '...--- ------
28. There is no evidence in the record that Detroit
teacher seniority rights had other than equitable purpose
* •
or effect. - .
29. Substantial racial integration of staff can be
achieved, without disruption of seniority and stable teaching
relationships, by application of the balanced staff concept
to naturally occurring vacancies and increases and reductions
of teacher services. • .
30. The Detroit Board of Education has entered into
■ •
-successive collective bargaining contracts with the Detroit
Federation of Teachers, which contracts have included provisions
promoting integration of staff and students.
■ The Detroit School Board has, in many other instances
cind in many other respects, undertaken to lessen the impact
of the forces of -segregation and attempted to advance the
cause of integration. Perhaps the most obvious one was the
adoption of the April 7 Plan. Among other things, it lias
4
denied the use of its facilities to groups which practice racial
discrimination; it does not permit the use of its facilities
state legislation which would have the effect of segregating
j
the district; it has worked to placed black students in craft
. _ I ’
positions in industry and the building trades; it ha^ brought
about a substantial increase in the percentage 'of black
students in manufacturing and construction.trade apprentice
ship classes; it became the first public agency in Michigan
to adopt and implement a policy requiring affirmative act of
contractors with which it deals to insure equal employment
opportunities in their work forces; it has been a leader in
IV
j>ioneering the use of multi-ethnic .instructional material,
and in so doing has had an impact on publishers specializing
in producing school texts and instructional materials; and
it has taken other noteworthy pioneering steps to advance
relations between the white and black races.
In conclusion, however, we find that both the State
of Michigan and the Detroit Board of Education hav^ committed
acts which have been causal factors in the segregated condition
of the public schools of the City of Detroit. As we assay
the principles essential to a finding of de jure segregation,
as outlined in rulings of the United States Supreme Court,
t It. 0 s it 0 *
1. The State, through its officers and agencies,
and usually, the school administration,- must have taken some
action or actions with a'purpose of segregation.
- 2. This action or these actions must have created
or aggravated segregation in the schools in question.
. • V> n
3. h current condition of segregation exists.
-2.1 -
recognize that causation in the case before us is both
several and comparative. The pri ca in d e n i *hly
have been popoulation movement and housing patterns, but _
state and local governmental actions, including school board
actions, have ployed a substantial role in promoting
segregation. It is, the Court believes, unfortunate that we
cannot deal with public school segregation on. a no-fault
basis, for if racial segregation in our public schools is an
evil, then it should make no difference whether we classify
it de jure or de facto. Our objective, logically, it seems
to us, should be to remedy a condition which we believe needs
correction. In the most realistic sense, if fault or blame
must be found it is that of the community as a whole,
including, of course, the black coirponents. We need not
minimize the effect of the actions of federal, state and local
governmental officers and agencies, and the actions of loaning
institutions and real estate firms, in the establishment and
maintenance' of segregated residential patterns - which lead to
school segregation - to observe that blacks, like ethnic group
in the past, have tended to separate from the larger group and
associate together. The ghetto is at once both a place of
confinement and a refuge. There is enough blame for everyone
to share. .
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter of this ^5ction under 28 U.S.C. 1331(a),
1343(3) and (4), 2201 and 2202; 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1988, and
2000 d .
2. In considering the evidence and in applying
legal standards it is not necessary that the Court find thatf ■
the policies and practices, which it has found to be dis
criminatory, have as their motivating forces any evil intent'
or motive. Keyes v. Sch, Pint. #1, Denver, 383 F. Supp. 279.
Motive, ill will and bad faith have long ago been rejected
as a requirement to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment against racial discrimination. Sims v. Georgia,
389 U.S. 404, 407-8. .
3. School districts^-are accountable for the natural,
probable and foreseeable consequences of their policies and
practices, and where racially identifiable schools are the
result of such policies, the school authorities bear the
burden of showing that such policies are based on educationally
required, non-racial considerations. Keyes v. Sch. Dist.,
supra, and Davis v. Sch._Dist. of Pontiac, 3 09 F-. Supp. 734,
and 443 F.2d 573. ■
4. In determining whether a constitutional violation
has occurred, proof that a pattern of racially segregated
schools has existed for a considerable period of time amounts .
- to a showing of racial classification by the state and its
agencies, which must be justified by clear and convincing
evidence. State of Alabama v, U.S., 304 F .2d 583.
5. The Board's practice of shaping school attendance
zones on a north-south rather than an east-west orientation,
with the result that zone boundaries conformed to racial
residential dividing lines, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Kortbcross v. Bel. of Ed., Memphis, 333 F . 2 d 661.
segregation result-School System and the residential racial
*r •
ing primarily from public and private racial discrimination
are interdependent phenomena. The affirmative obligation of
the defendant Board has been and■is to adopt and implement
pupil assignment practices and policies that compensate
for and avoid incorporation into the school system the .
effects of residential racial segregation. The Board's
building upon housing segregation violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. See, Davis v . Sch. D.ist. of Pontiac, supra, and—. - i "
authorities there noted. -- --...—
7. The Board's policy of selective optional
attendance zones, to the extent that it facilitated the
separation' of pupils on the basis of rcice, was in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp.
401, aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F .2d 175.
8. The practice of the Board of transporting black
students from overcrowded black schools to other identifiably
black schools, while passing closer identifiably white schools,
which could have accepted these pupils, amounted to an act
of segregation by the school authorities. Spangler v . Pasadena
City Bd. of Ed., 311 F. Supp. 501. .
9. The manner in which the Board formulated and
modified attendance zones for elementary schools had the
natural and predictable effect of perpetuating racial
segregation of students. Such conduct is an act of de jure
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
M yO . v . School D j s t r i c t. 15]., 286 F. Supp. 786; Brewer v., City
of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37.
- ? . A
Fourteenth Amendment, maintain segregated elementary schools
■ I ! _or permit educations3. choices to be influenced by community
sentiment or the wishes of a majority of voters. Coopcy v .
Zniron, 358 U.S. 1, 12-13, 13 - i 6 . . • •
"h citizen's constitutional rights can hairdly be
infringed simply because a majority of the people
choose that it be." Lucas v. 44th Gen'l Assembly
of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736-/37.
11. Under the Constitution of the United States
and the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, the
responsibility for providing educational opportunity to all
children on constitutional terms is ultimately that of the
state. Turner v, Warren County Board of Education, 313 F. Supp,
380; Art. VIII, §§ 1 and 2, Mich. Constitution; Dasiewicz v .
Bd. of Ed. of the City of Detroit, 3 N.W.2d 71.
12. That a state's form of government may delegate
the power of daily administration of public schools to officials
with less than state-wide jurisdiction does not dispel the
obligation of those who have broader control to use the
authority they have consistently with the constitution. In
such instances the constitutional obligation toward the
individual school children is a shared one. Bradley v. Sch.
Bd., City of Richmond, 51 F.R.D. 139, 143. •
13. Leadership and general supervision over all
public education is vested in the State Board of Education.
Art. VIII, § 3, Mich. Constitution of 1963. The duties of the
State Board and superintendent include, but are not limited to,
specifying the number of hours necessary to constitute a school
day; approval until .1962 of school sites; approval of school
construction plans; accreditation of schools; approval of loans
r> n cr1-' C-i• 0 hi Oil S tlci Lc aic it• i i O.l :■ ) I 0 V X C \ 2 o y. S U 8 ] J 011 •■j x o n s and o>q:>ulsion
mi *-■
O .individual student s for misconduct [Op. A tty. Gen. )
July 7, 1970, No. 4701 i>] ; authority over tr;.i n Sjjo rtation routes
and disbursement of transportation funds; teacher certification
and the like. M.S.A. 15..1023 (1). State lav; provides review
procedures from actions of local or intermediate districts '
(See M.S.A. 15.3442), with authority in the State Board to
ratify, reject, amend or modify the actions of these inferior
state agencies. See M.S.A. 15.3467; 15.1919(61); 15.1919 (68b);
15.2299(1); 15.1951; 15.3402; Bridgetamoton School District
No. 2 Fractional of Carsonville, Mich, v. Supt. of Public
Instruction, 323 Mich. 615. In general, the state
superintendent is given the duty "[t]o do all things necessary
to promote the welfare of the public schools and public
educational instructions and provide proper educational
facilities for the youth of the state." M.S.A.' 15.3252.
See also M.S.A. 15.2299(57), providing in certain instances
for reorganization of school districts.
• 14. State officials, including all of the defendants,
are charged under the Michigan constitution with the duty of
providing pupils an education without discrimination with
respect to race. Art. VIII, § 2, Mich. Constitution of 1963.
Art. I, § 2, of the constitution provides:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the
enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be
discriminated against in the exercise thereof
because of religion, race, color or national
origin. The legislature shall implement this
section by appropriate legislation."
. 15.
established an
The State Department of Education has recently
Equal Educational' Opportunities section having
- 2 6 -
responsibility t.c> identity r daily ini olanced s c; i o o 1 d i s 11: i c t s
and develop desegregation plans. ' M.S.A. 15.3355 provides
that no school or department shall .be'kept - for any person or
persons on account of race or color. ■
16. The state further provides special funds to
local districts for compensatory education which are administered
on a per school basis under direct review of the State Board.
All other state aid is subject to fiscal review and accounting
by the state. M.S.A. 15.1919. See also M.S.A. 15.1919 (68b),
providing for special supplements to merged districts "for the
purpose of bringing about uniformity of educational opportunity
for all pupils of the district." The general consolidation lav;
M.S.A. 15.3401 authorizes annexation for even noncontiguous
school districts upon approval of the superintendent of public
instruction and electors, as provided by law. Op. Atty. Gen.,
Feb. 5, 1964, No. 4193. Consolidation with respect to so-
called "first class" districts, _i._e. , Detroit, is generally
treated as an annexation with the first class district being
the.surviving entity. The law provides procedures covering
all necessary considerations. M.S.A. 15.3184, 15.3186.
17. Where a pattern of violation of constitutional
rights is established the affirmative obligation under the
Fourteenth Amendment is imposed on not only individual school
districts, but upon the State defendants in this case.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358, U . S . .1;. Griffin v. County School Board
of Pr ince Edward _Countv, 3 37 U .S . 218; U.S. v. State of Georgia,
Civ. No. 12972 (N.D. Ga., December 17, 1970), rev1d on other
grounds, 428 F.2d 377; Godwin v, Johnston County Board of
Education, 301 F. Supp. 1337; Lee v. Macon County Board of
Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), aff‘d sub nom.,
- 2 7 -
V.' a J. 1 • * c\ v , t . a . , a U . b1 • (2. X -J* f i' i..t $'} ; v i. < n v. W t :iiUi n Cov.i.i.V
Board of Bducci1ion, 288 P . S upp. 50 9; Smith v. North Caro 1 i n a
*' '
State Board of Educationi, Ho. 15, 07 2 (4th Cir., June 14, 1971)
The foregoing const1tutes o'.:<r findings of fact and
conclusions of law on the issue of segregation in the public
schools of the City of Detroit.
Having found a de jure segregated public school
system in operation in the City of Detroit, our first step,
in considering what judicial remedial steps must be taken,
is the consideration of intervening parent defendants1
motion to add as parties defendant a great number of Michigan
school districts located out county in Wayne County, and in
Macomb and Oakland Counties, on the principal premise or
ground that effective relief cannot be achieved or ordered in
their absence. plaintiffs have opposed the motion to join
the additional school districts, arguing that the presence
of the State defendants is sufficient and all that is required,
even if, in shaping a remedy, the affairs of these other -
districts will be affected.
In considering the motion to eidd the listed school
districts we pause to note that the proposed action has to
do with relief. Having determined that the circumstances of
the case require judicial intervention and equitable relief,
it would be improper for us to act on this.motion until the
other parties to the action have had an opportunity to submit
their proposals for desegregation. Accordingly, we shall not
rule on the motion to add parties at this time. Considered
as a plan for desegregation the motion is lacking in specifi-ty
- 2 8 -
and is framed in the broadest general terms. The
. ' _ i '
may wish to amend its proposal and resubmit it as
prehensive plan of desegregation. V
moving party
j
a com-
In order that the further proceedings, 'in this cause
may be conducted on a reasonable time schedule, and because
the views of counsel respecting further proceedings cannot but
be of assistance to them and to the Court, this cause will be
set down for pre-trial conference on the matter of relief.,
The conference will be held in our Courtroom in the City of •
" . ■ *
Detroit at ten o'clock in the morning, October 4, 1971.
DATED: September 27_, 1971.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION •
RONALD BRADLEY-, et al,
Plaintiffs
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,
Defendants
A f R U E C O P Y
FREDERICK W. JOHNSON, Clerk
DEPUTY. CLERK
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,'
;nd
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,
et al.
Dsfendant-
latervenor
Defendants-
Intervenor
CIVIL ACTION NO:
352 57
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .
ORT■ _
■ D K T R O T T —ONT-Y' n T antq OF E E S E O R E O ETT0 >T
In accordance with orders of the court defendant
Detroit Board of Education submitted two plans, limited
to the corporate limits of the city, for desegregation
of the public schools of the City of Detroit, which we will
refer to as Plan A and plan C; plaintiffs submitted a
similarly limited plan, which will be referred to as the
Foster Plan. Hearings were had on said plans on March 14,
15, 16, 17 and 21, 1972. In considering these plans the
court docs not limit itself to the proofs offered at the
hearing just concluded; it considers as part of the evidence
bearing on the issue (_i.e. , City-Only Plans) all proofs
submitted in the case to this point, and it specifically
L a v a •! V>» » -T rsv -ci c-'w-o liv-r o j. n a.v_-o_'w-a.
Conclusions contained in its
filed September 27, 1971.
v~s « J , ' ----------- ------------ -3
u w w u i i c i x i i u x i i u j o a u u
"Ruling on Issue of Segregation,"
APPENDIX B
The court makes the following factual findings:
. ■ i
nr t\ vrt £T vi £i_ •
1. The court finds that this plan is an elabora
tion and extension of the so-called Magnet Plan, previously
authorized for implementation as e.n interim plan pending
hearing and determination on the issue of segregation.
2. As proposed we find, at the high school level,
that it offers a greater and wider degree of specialization,
but any hope' that it would be effective to desegregate the
public schools of the City of Detroit at that level is
virtually ruled out by the failure of the current model to
achieve any appreciable success.
3. We find, at the Middle School level’, that the
expanded model would affect, directly, about 24,000 pupils
ot a total or ±h\j, uuu in trie yiauet> cuvcieu; emu •\
- O ' - ■ i . j . ' - ' V '
would be to set up a school system within the school system,
and would intensify the segregation in schools not included
in the Middle School program. In this sense, it would
increase segregation. .
4. As conceded by its author, Plan A is neither a
desegregation nor an integration plan.
PLAN C „ ’ ■
- 1. The court finds that Plan C is a token or part
time desegregation effort. '
2. We find that this plan covers only a portion
of the grades and would leave the base schools no less
tracially identifiable. .
- 2 -
PLAINTIFFS' PLAN
accomplish more desegregation than now obtains in the ystem,
or would be achieved under Plan A or Plan C.
2. V.e find further that the racial composition of
the student body i uch that, the plan's implementation would
clearly make the entire Detroit public school system
racially identifiable as Black
3. The plan would require the development of trans-
■ portation on a vast scale which, according to the evidence,
could not be furnished, ready for operation, by the opening
of the 1972-73 school year. The plan contemplates the
• transportation of 82,000 pupils and would require the
or a great nuirrer or drivers, tne procurement or space
for storage and maintenance, the recruitment of maintenance
and the not negligible task of designing a transportation
' '// '
system to service the schools.
that it would not have to undergo another reorganization if
a metropolitan plan is adopted. .
. 5. It would involve the expenditure of vast sums
of money and effort which would be wasted or lost.
. 6. The plan does not lend itself as a building
block for a metropolitan plan. • .
more identifiably Black, and leave many of its schools 75 to
acquisition of some 900 vehicles, the hiring and training
4. The plan would entail an overall recasting
of the Detroit school system, when there is little assurance
7. The plan would make the Detroit school system
- 3 -
• •
90 per cent Black.
8. It would change a school system which is now
Black and White to one that - would be perceived as Black,
thereby increasing the flight of Whites from the city and
the system, thereby increasing the Black student population.
9. It would subject the students and parents,
faculty and administration, to the trauma of reassignments,
with little likelihood that such reassignments would
continue for any appreciable time.
In summary, we find that none of the three plans
would result in the desegregation of the public schools of
the Detroit school district. -
- • CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .
,.v ■ i # The court has continuing jurisdiction of this
action for all purposes, including the granting of effective
relief. See Ruling on Issue of Segregation, September 27,
1971. •
• 2. On the basis of the court's finding of illegal
school segregation, the obligation of the school defendants
is to adopt and implement an educationally sound, practicable
plan of desegregation that promises realistically to achieve
now and hereafter the greatest possible degree of actual
school desegregation. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S.
430; Alexander -v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S.
19; Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S.
290; -Swann v. Charlotta-MecklenburH Board it ion,
- 4 -
402 U.S. 1.
.3 . Detroit Board of Education Plans A and C
are legally insufficient because they go not promise to
' ' I
effect significant desegregation. Green v..County fcchool
Board, supra, at 439-440. •
4. Plaintiffs' Plan, while it would provide a
C •
racial mix more in keeping with the Black-White proportions
of the student population than under either of t e Boar d s
plans or as the system now stands, would accentuate the .
racial identiflability of the district as a Black school
system, and would not accomplish desegregation. .
5. The conclusion, under the evidence in this
case, is inescapable that relief of segregation in the
r ■
public schools of the City of Detroit cannot be accomplished
within the corporate geographical limits of the city. The
state, however, cannot escape its constitutional duty to •
desegregate the public schools of the City of Detroit by
pleading local authority. As Judge Merhige pointed out
in Bradley v. Richmond, (slip opinion p. 64):
"The power conferred by state law on central and
local officials to determine the shape of school
attendance units cannot be employed, as it has been
here, for the purpose and with the effect of sealing
off white conclaves of a racial composition more
appealing to the local electorate and obstructing the
desegregation of schools. The equal protection
clause has required far greater inroads on local •
government structure than the relief sought here,
which is attainable without deviating- from state
statutory forms. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
. 533; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339; Serrano v.
Priest, 40 U.S.L.W. 2128 (Calif. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1971)
"In any case, if political boundaries amount to -
insuperable obstacles to desegregation because of
- " structural reason, such obstacles are self-imposed.
- ■ Political subdivision lines are creations of the state
itself, after all."
School district lines are simply matters of
constitutional rights. If the boundary lines of thje
school districts of the City of Detroit and the suriound-
jjig suburbs were drawn today few would doubt that they
for solutions to the problem of school segregation, other
federal courts have not "treated as immune from intervention
the administrative structure of a state's educational
system, to the extent that it affects the capacity to
desegregate. Geographically or administratively independent
units have been compelled to merge or to inititate or
continue cooperative operation as a single system for school' . r
1 'desegregation purposes."
Detroit scnoox district: tor a solution to m e p r o b l e m of
that it has the authority, nay more, the duty to (under
the circumstances of this case) do so appears plainly
could not withstand constitutional challenge. In seeking
segregation in the Detroit public schools is obvious;
anticipated by Brown II, seventeen years ago. While other
school cases have not had to deal with our exact
*5
situation,' the logic of their application of the command
of Brown II supports our view of our duty.
Date: MARCH V , 1972.
- 6
FOOTNOTES
1
Bradley v. Richmond, supra (slip opinion p. 68).
\
2 \Brown v.-Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, pp. 300-301
3
Haney v. County Board of Education of Sevier County,
410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969); Bradley v. School Board of the
City of Richmond, supra, slip opinion pp. 664-65; Hall v.
St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La.
1961), aff'd. 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1961) and 368 U.S. 515
(1962); Lee v.- Macon County Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 746, 752
(5th Cir. 1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960);
Turner v. Littleton-Lake Gaston School Dist., 442 F.2d 584'
(4th Cir. 1.971); United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 551
(5th Cir. 1971); Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 446
F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1971). ■ - ;
-
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
S ouT} IERH DIVISION
Si ?
0
J 7
RONALD BRADLEY, et al.
Plaintiffs
v ,
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,
Defendants
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,
Defendant™
Intervenor
and ■ . .
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,
e t a 1
Defendants-
Intervenor
I )
I )
)
CIVIL ACTION NO
3 5257
ML4731G_0N PROPRIETY OF CONSIDERING A METROPOLITAN REMEDY
TO ACCOMPLISH DRSKORKC/triOE OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
OF THE CITY OF DETROIT
In its prior ruling, "Ruling on Issue of Segregation"
(September 27, 1971), the court has found that segregation
exists in the public schools of the City of Detroit because
of, among other causes, the acts of the State of Michigan
and the Detroit Board of Education. In the language of
1 . . . . . 2Svxmn, "a right and a violation have been shown." Given
the constitutional violation, judicial authority, when
properly .invoiced, must be exercised to right the wrong. In
addressing itself to this task the Supreme Court lias said
that the "scope of a district court's equitable- powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are
inherent in equitable remedi or;. " And, it pointed out,
APPENDIX C A TRVi'', t '. t;*v
I’-'.i ,i m t.i .; m , at'! : >:. cr
" a scliooX d e s e g r e g a t i o n on go f liv " ' nr,i- a -■ r r , r• -J uu.., not ail,.or fundamentally
from other corns involving the fronting of equitable remedies to
lC1>dlr tho uonlaj ol a constitutional right.11 The task '
' is to correct the condition which offends tho Constitution.
Illustrative of what was meant by the Supreme Court, see
the legislative and congressional ^apportionment cases.5
Under the circumstances of this case,6 tho question
presented is whether the court may consider relief in the
form of a metropolitan plan, encompassing not only tho city
of Detroit, but the larger Detroit metropolitan area which,
for the present purposes, we may define as comprising the
three councies of Bayne, Oakland and Macomb. It should be
noted that the court has just concluded its hearing on plans
submitted by the plaintiffs and tiro Detroit Board of Education
for the intra-city desegregation of the Detroit public schools.
A ruling has not yet been made on these plans, but in
accordance with the mandate of the Court of Appeals that a
hearing on the merits be concluded at the earliest possible
time, wo consider it necessary to proceed apace with a
resolution of the issue before us, i.o., the propriety of
weighing the legal availability of a metropolitan remedy for
segregation.
The State defendants in this case take the position/
as wo understand it, that no "state action" Iras had a part
111 tho segregation found to exist This v.i- , • ,
th° £incUmjS alroacly hY this court, and the decision of
UU> COUrt °f Ai;)paalS aS Wo11*7 Additional] y, they appear to
tlU' <K-lt •|ul-lon ol the State’s powers and duties w:i th
r,'SJ,"C'k °dU(’aLi(- govt i/iv/roi)ta! hodies as vesting
lhl' ■K '1 ,l'‘" v;in“ I-oviu-s which may he d:i s I »u bed
by either the State or the court. This we cannot accept.
Political subdivisions of the states have never been
considered sovereign entities, rather "they have been ' *
traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instru- •
mentalities created by the state to assist it in carrying
out. of state governmental functions." Reynolds v. Sims,
3/7 U.s. 533, 575. Perhaps the clearest refutation of the
State's asserted lack of power to act in the field of education
is Acc 48 of 1970. The State cannot evade its constitutional
responsibility by a delegation of powers to local units of
government. The State defendants' position is in error in two
other respects: 1. The local school districts are not
fully autonomous bodies, for to the extent it has seen fit the
State retains control and supervision; and 2. it assumes that
any metropolitan plan, if one is adopted, would, of necessity,
require the dismantling of school districts included in the
plan.
The m a m thrust of the objections to the consideration
of a metropolitan remedy advanced by intervening school
districts is that, absent a finding of acts of segregation on
their part, individually, they may not be considered in
fashioning a remedy for relief of the plaintiffs. It must
be conceded that the Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly
on this issue; accordingly, we can only proceed by feeling
our way through its'past decisions with respect to the goal
to be achieved in school desegregation cases. Green v. County
^ISSlJIoard, 391 U.S. 4 30, teaches us that it is our
o). ligation to assess the effectiveness of proposed plans of
desegregation in the light of circumstances present and the
available alternatives; and to choose the alternative or
alternatives
hereafter to
which promise realistically to work now and
produce the maximum actual desegregation. As
Chief Justice Burger said in Swann, "in seeking to define
the scope of remedial power of courts in an area as
sensitive as we deal with here, words are poor instruments
j
to convey the sense of basic fairness inherent in equity."
Substance, not semantics, must govern.
issue:
It seems to us that Brown is dispositive of the
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the
courts will be guided by equitable principles.
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by
a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and
private needs. These cases call for the exercise of
these traditional attributes of equity power. At
stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in
admission to public schools as soon as practicable on
a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest
may call ror elimination of a variety of obstacles in
making the transition to school systems operated in
accordance with the constitutional principles set forth
in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may
properly take into account the public interest in the
elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and
effective manner. But it should go without saying that
the vitality of these constitutional' principles cannot
be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with
them."
* * *
" * the courts may consider problems related to
administration, arising from the physical condition of
. the school plant, the school transportation systems,
' personnel, revision of school districts and attendance
areas into compact units to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and
regulations which may be necessary in solving the
foregoing problems." ■
We conclude that it is proper for the court to
on.,idei i.k Lj.opolitan plans directed toward the desegregat
°f the Detroit public schools as an alternative to the
Present intra-city desegregation plans before it and, in th
h the count, finds such ‘ j ntra-city plans inadequate
ion
“ 4 »
I
to desegregate such schools, the court is of the opinion that
it is required to consider a metropolitan remedy for
desegregation.
The schedule previously established for the hearing
on metropolitan plans will go forward as noticed, beginning
March
DATE :
1
Swann, v . CharXotterMecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S8 1.
2 . . . •
Ibid., p. 15. - •
3 . • 'Ibid., p. 15. •
4 ■
Ibid., pp. 15, 16.
5
Reynolds v. Sims, 377-U.S. 533.
6 •
See' "Ruling on Issue of Segregation," supra, indicating a
black student projection for the school year 1980-01 of 80.7%.
7 •
See "Ruling on Issue of Segregation," supra; Bradley v.
Milliken, 433 F.2d 897.
0 •
Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, at 300 and 301.
11 El " - v :y . y ’ ■ ; .. y
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
S 0 UTH E PI 5 DIVI510N
' )
RONALD BRADLEY, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs }
v. . )
)
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., )
)
. Defendants )
and }
)
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, )
LOCAL 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION )
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, h )
, )
. Defendant- )
Intervenor )
and ’ )
' )
DENISE MAGpOWSKI, et al,, )
. ' >
. Defendants™ )
Intervener }
et al. ' ’ • ' ) * *
S'
‘ • • sei >:U;■ \ \ ) jf-'EfV i
u : ... sLi'Ur/ Ci.i
CIVIL ACTION NO t
352 57
RULING m DESEGREGATION AREA
AND
DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN_OF_desegregation
On September 27, 1971 the court made its Ruling on
Issue of Segregation, holding that illegal segregation exists
in the public schools of the City of Detroit, as a result of a
course of conduct on the part of the State of Michigan and the
Detroit Board of Education. Having found a constitutional
violation as established; on October 4, 1971 the court
directed the school board defendants, city and State, to
* 1.
develop and submit plans of desegregation, designed to
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,
taking into account the practicalities of {.ho. situation. The
directive called for the submission of both a '’Detroit-only"
and a "Metropolitan" plan.
APPENDIX D
Plans for th<- d ? . •— r-'■ ■< f ■'-v.-. i*n4 t- >-phor,i <-■
were submitted by the Detroit Board of Education and by the
plaintiffs. Following five days of hearings the'court found
that while plaintiffs' plan would accomplish more desegregation
than now obtains in the system, or which would be achieved under
either Plan A or C of the Detroit Board of Education submissions,
none of the plans would result in the desegregation of the
public schools of the Detroit school district. The court, '
* _
in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, concluded that
"relief of segregation in the Detroit, public schools cannot
be accomplished within the corporate geographical limits -of
the city," and that it had the authority and the duty to
.look beyond such limits for a solution to the illegal segre
gation in the Detroit public schools, Accordingly, the court
ruled,it had to consider a metropolitan remedy for segregation.
The parties submitted a number of plans for metropolitan
desegregation. The State Board of Education submitted six - '
without recommendation, and without indicating any preference.
With the exception of one of these, none could be considered as
designed to accomplish desegregation. On the other hand
the proposals of intervening defendant Magaowski, et al., .■
the Detroit Board or Education and the plaintiffs were all
good faith efforts to accomplish desegregation in the Detroit
metropolitan area. The three plans submitted by these parties
have many similarities, and all of them propose to incorporate,
geographically, ..most— and in one instance, all— of the three-
county area of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb.
The hearing on the proposals have set the framework,
and have articulated the criteria and considerations, for
developing and evaluating an effective plan of metropolitan
Kone of the submissions represent a complete 'desegregation.
plan for the effective and equitable do?..egrogation oi ->‘-
metropolitan area, capable of implementation in its present
form. The court will therefore draw upon the resources of
the parties to devise, pursuant to it.' oire :tion, ,
constitutional plan of desegregation of the Detroit public
schools.
Based on the entire record herein, the previous oral
and written rulings and orders of this court, ana the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav; filed herewith,
IT IS ORDERED: ' '
A« As a panel charged with the responsibility of,
preparing and submitting an effective desegregation plan in
accordance with the provisions of this order, the court
appoints the following:
1. a designee of the State Superinteno.ent of
. . public Instruction,-'
2„ Harold Wagner, Supervisor of the Transportation
Unit .in the Safety and Traffic Education
. . Program of the State Department of Education;
3. Merle Henrickson, Detroit Board of Education?
.. 4. Aubrey McCutche.on, Detroit Board of Education? .
5. Freeman Flynn, Detroit Board of Education?
6. Gordon Foster, expert for plaintiffs?
7. Richard Morshead, representing defendant ■
Magdowski, et al.;
.. 8. A designee of the newly intervening defendants;
9. Rita Scott, of the Michigan Civil Rights
. Commission,.
X - k
The designees of the State Superintendent of Public ̂ _
Instruction and newly intervening defendants shal] be coimuunicai.ee
to the court within seven days of the entry of this order. 1>*
the event the newly intervening defendants cannot agree upon a
designee, they may each submit a nominee within seven days f ro!a
the entry of this order, and. the coma: vh.slJ ;-eJ.e<-t- L
nominees as r e p r e s e n t a t i v c oi s a id oolen.e. s .
cie panel be unable
to serve, the other members of the panel shall elect any
necessary replacements, upon notice to the court and the
parties. In the absence of objections within five days of
the notice, and pending a final ruling, such designated,
replacement shall act as a member of the panel.
B . As soon as possible, but in no event later than
45 days after the issuance of this order, the panel is to
develop a plan for the assignment of pupils as set forth below
in order to provide the maximum actual desegregation, and
shall develop as well a plan for the transportation of pupils,
for Implementation for all grades, schools and clusters in
the desegregation area. Insofar as required by she
circumstances, which are to be detailed in pciruicular, the
panel may recommend immediate implementation ox an interim
desegregation plan for grades K-6, K—8 or K—9 in all or in
as many clusters as practicable, with complete and final
desegregation to proceed in no event later than the fall
1973 term. In its transportation plan the panel shall,
to meet the needs of the proposed pupil assignment plan,
make recommendations, including the shortest possible time
table, for acquiring sufficient additional transportation
facilities for any interim or final plan of desegregation.
Such recommendations shall be filed forthwith and in no
event later thpn 45 days after the entry of this order.
Should it develop that some additional transportation
equipment is needed for an interim plan, the panel shall
make recommendations for such acquisition within 20 days
of this order.
C. The parties, their agents, employees, successors,,
and all others having actual notice of this order shall •
cooperate 'fully with the panel in their assigned mission,
including, but not limited to, the provision of data and
reasonable full and part-time staff assistance as requested
by the panel. The State defendants shall provide support,
accreditation, funds, and otherwise take all actions necessary
to insure that local officials and employees cooperate fully
with the panel. All reasonable costs incurred by the panel
shall be borne by the State defendants; provided, however,
that staff assistance or other services provided by any .
school district, its employees or agents, shall be without
charge, and the cost thereof shall be borne by such school
district. .
■ . . ■' II. • .
A. Pupil reassignment to accomplish desegregation
of the Detroit public schools is required within the geographical
area which may be described as encompassing the following
school districts (see Exhibit P.M. 12), and hereinafter
Fairlane . .
Garden City
North Dearborn Heigh
Cherry Hill
Inkster
Wayne . •
Westwood
Ecorse
Romulus
Taylor
River Rouge
Riverview
Wyandotte
Allen Park
Lincoln Park
Melvindale
Southgate
Detroit
referred to as the
'Lakeshore
Lakeview
Roseville
South Lake
' East Detroit
Grosse Pointe
Centerline .
.Fitzgerald
Van Dyke
Fraser
Harper Woods
Warren
Warren Woods
Clawson
Hamtramck
Lamphere
M a d i s o n H o i gh t s'
Troy
desegregation area";
Birmingham
Hazel Park
Highland Park
Royal oak
Berkley .
Ferndale
Southfield
Bloomfield Hills
Oak Park
Redford Union
West Bloomfield
Clarencevi .13. e
Farmington
Livonia
South Bedford
Crcstwood
Dearborn
Dearborn Hoights
Provided, however, that
pupils it appears necess
and complete racial dese
if in the actual assignment of
ary and feasible to achieve effective
gregation to reassign pupils of * ’
another district or other districts, the desegregation panel
rnay, upon notice to the parties, apply to the Court for
an appropriate modification of this order. .
B, Within the limitations of reasonable travel
time and distance factors, pupil reassignments shall be
effected within the clusters described in Exhibit P„M„ 12
so as to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation i
the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or class
room be substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil
racial composition. The panel may, upon notice to the
parties, recommend reorganization of clusters within the
desegregation area in order to minimize administrative
inconvenience, or time and/or numbers of pupils requiring
transportation.
C. Appropriate and safe transportation arrangements
shall due made available without cost to all pupils assigned to
schools deemed by the panel to be other than "walk-in"
schools. • .
D. Consistent with the requirements of maximum
actual desegregation, every effort should be made to minimize
the numbers of pupils to be reassigned and requiring trans
* i
portaeion, the time pupils spend in transit, and the number
and cost of new transportation facilities to be acquired by
utilizing such techniques as clustering, the "skip" technique,
island zoning, reasonable staggering of school hours, and
maximization of use of existing transportation facilities,
including buses owned or leased by school districts and
buses operated by public transit authorities and private .
charter companies. The panel shall develop appropriate
recommendations for limiting transfers which affect the
desegregation of particu1ar schoo1 s.
E. Transportation and pupil assignment shall,
to the extent consistent with maximum feasible desegregation,
be a two-way process with both black and white pupils sharing
the responsibility for transportation requirements at all
grade levels. In the determination of the utilization of
existing, and the construction of new, facilities, care
shall be taken to randomize the location of particular
grade levels. ' .
F. Faculty and. staff shall be reassigned, in
keeping with pupil desegregation, so as to prevent the
creation or continuation of the identification of schools by
reference to past racial composition, or the continuation of
substantially disproportionate racial composition of the
faculty and staffs, of the schools in the desegregation area.
The faculty and staffs assigned to the schools within the
desegregation area shall be substantially desegregated,
bearing in mind, however, that the desideratum is the balance,
of faculty and staff by qualifications for- subject and grade
level, and then by race, experience and sex. In the context
of the evidence in this case, it is appropriate to require
assignment of no less than 1 0% black faculty and staff at
each school, and where there is more than one building
administrator, every effort should be made to assign a
bi-racial administrative team.
G. In the hiring, assignment, promotion, demotion
criteria must be developed and used,* provided, however,
there shall be no reduction in efforts to increase minority
group representation among faculty and staff in the
desegregation area. Affirmative action shall be taken to
increase minority employment in all levels of teaching and
a dmini s tr at ion. .
H. The restructuring of school facility utilization
necessitated by pupil reassignments should produce schools
of substantially like quality, facilities, extra-curricular
activities and staffs; and the utilization of existing
school capacity through the desegregation area shall be
made on the basis of uniform criteria.
making decisions about new school sites, expansion of
present facilities * ** and shall, within the desegregation
area disapprove all proposals for new construction or expansion
result in a school largely segregated on racial * * * lines,
I. The State Board of Education and the State
Superintendent of. Education shall with respect to all school
construction and expansion, "consider the factor of racial
balance along with other educational considerations in
of
all in accordance with the 1966 directive issued by the State
Board of Education to local school boards and the State
of segregation, p. 13.)
arrangements will be maintained arid continued., except to
the extent necessary to effect pupil and faculty desegregation
as sc t £ o r t h h c r c i n; pro v i d c d, n o w ever, t h a t e x i s t i n g a din inis t r a ™
tive, financial, contractual, property and governance arrange
ments shall be examined, and recommendations for their
temporary and permanent retention or modification shall be
made, in light of the need to operate an effectively desegregated
system of schools.
K. At each school within the desegregated area
provision shall be made to insure that the curriculum,
activities, and conduct standards respect the diversity of
students from differing ethnic backgrounds and the dignity and
safety of each individual, students, faculty, staff and parents.
L. The defendants shall, to insure the effective
desegregation of the schools in the desegregation area, take
immediate action including, but not limited to, the •
establishment or expansion of in-service training of faculty
and staff, create bi-racial committees, employ black counselors,
and require bi-racial and non-discriminatory extra-curricular
activities.
■ III. . '
The State Superintendent of Public Instruction, with
the assistance of the other state defendants, shall examine,
and make recommendations, consistent with the principles
established above, for appropriate interim and final arrange
ments .for the (1 ). financial, (2 ) administrative and school
governance, and (3) contractual arrangements for the operation
of the schools within the desegregation area, including steps
for unifying, or otherwise making uniform the personnel
polic i c pro c ecu -'.ncf ( iicin
of the various school districts. .
Wxehin iu days or use c.- w. ___ oj, oiuuj. ,• ‘.-pc
Superintendent shall advise the court and the parties of his
progress in preparing such recommendations by filing a .
written report with the court and serving it on the parties.
In not later than 45 days after the entry of this order,
the Superintendent shall file with the court his recommendations
for appropriate interim and final relief in these respects.
In his examination and recommendations, the
Superintendent, consistent with the rulings and orders of this
court, may be guided, but not limited, by existing stale law;
where state law provides a convenient and adequate fra aework
for interim or ultimate relief, it should be followed, where
state law either is silent or conflicts with what is n -cessary
to achieve the objectives of this order, the Superintendent
shall independently recommend what he deems necessary. In
particular, the Superintendent shall examine and c h o o s e one
appropriate interim arrangement to oversee the immediate
implementation of a plan of desegregation.
IV. ■
Each party may file appropriate plans or proposals
for inclusion in any final order which may issue in th.'s
cause. The intent of this order is to permit all the parties
to proceed apace with the task before us: fashioning ar
' t
effective plan for the desegregation of the Detroit pul lie
schools.
Fifteen days after the filing of the reports
required herein, hearings will begin on any proposal to modify
any interim plan•prepared by the panel and all other matters
The partiesany interim plan of desegregation submitted,
are places on notice cnau tmy a m cq oo prepared ui ensu
time to present their objections, alternatives and modifications
At such hearing the court will not consider objections to
desegregation or proposals offered "instead" of desegregation.
• Hearings on a final plan, of desegregation will be .
set as circumstances require.
DATE: JUNE 14 , 1972.
UK IT ED STT■>TE S DI ST EICT CC)U R?
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN D1VISION
RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,
' Plaintiffs •
v „
WILLIAM G, MILLIKEN, et al.,
Defendants
and
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
LOCAL NO. 231, AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO,
Defendant- .
Intervenor
and
A / 1
r*$i p r\ n \/
CIVIL ACTION NO:
35257
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,
Defendants-
Intervenor
et al
)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
, ■ ' IN SUPPORT OF RULING . '
ON DESEGREGATION AREA AND DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN
On the basis of the entire record in this action,
including particularly the evidence heard by the court from
March 28 through April 14, 1972, the court now makes the follow
ing Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It
should be noted that the court has taken no proofs with respect
to the establishment of the boundaries of the 8 6 public school-
districts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb, nor
on the issue of whether, with the exclusion of the city of
Detroit school district, such school districts have committed
. nets of be jure segregation. ■ •
■ INTRODUCTION
OL«. On September 27, 1.971, this court .issued its
Ruling on Issue of Segregation. On' October 4, 1971, this court
• •
issued f roiri the bench guidelines to Jrind the parties in the
submr ssion of plans to remedy the: CO!a s t i t u t i o n a 1 v i o 1 a tion
found, i_„ c „, school sogregation; a t i d in particular this court
noted that the primary objective U w J~ vore us was to cievaiop o nd
implement a plan which attempts to "achieve the greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into account
the practicalities of the situation." The same day this
court reitercited these requirements by orders "that the Detroit
Board of Education submit a plan for the desegregation of its
schools within 60 days'1 and "that the State defendants submit
a metropolitan plan of desegregation within 120 days." In
response to these orders hearings were held, and thereafter
rulings issued, on Detroit-only plans (see Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation)
and on the propriety of considering remedies which extend beyond
t h e corporate geographxc ixiuxcs of t h e cxty of Detroit. (See
Ruling on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to
Accomplish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the city
of Detroit.) Between March 28, 1972 and April 14, 1972,
hearings were held on metropolitan proposals for desegregation
of the Detroit public schools.
2. From the initial ruling on September 27, 1971,
to this day, the basis of the proceedings has been and
remains the violation: dejure school segregation. Since
Brown v. Board of Education the Supreme Court has consistently
held that the remedy for such illegal segregation is desegre
gation. The racial history of this country is writ large by
constitutional adjudication from Dred Scott v. Sanford to
Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown. The message in Brown was simple:
the Fourteenth Amendment was to be applied full force in
:public schooling. The Court held that "state-imposed" school
segregation immeasurably taints the education received by all
children in the public schools; perpetuates racia 1 dis;crimination
and a history of public action attaching a badge of inferiorityi!
to the black race in a public forum which importantly 'shapes .
the minds and hearts of succeeding generations of our young
people; and amounts to an invidious racial classification.
Since Brown the Supreme Court has consistently, and with
increasing force, held that the remedy upon finding de jure
segregation is prompt and maximum actual desegregation of
the public schools by all reasonable, feasible, and practicable
means available. This court finds that there is nothing in
the law, wisdom, or facts, and the particular.circumstances
and arguments, presented in this case which suggest anything
except the affirmance of these principles in both fact and
1 aw, .
3. The task before this court, therefore, is now,
and, since September 27, 1971, has always been, Iiuw Lo
desegregate the Detroit public schools. The issue, despite
efforts of the intervenors to suggest a new rationale for
h Ja return to the discredited "separate but equal" policy,
is not whether to desegregate. That question has been
foreclosed by the prior and settled commands of the Supreme
Court and the Sixth Circuit. Our duty now is to "grapple
2 / •with the flinty, intractable realities"— of implementing the
constitutional commands. ■
4, In the most recent set of hearings, several
issues were addressed generally, including appropriate methods
of pupil reassignment to desegregate schools; quality and
capacity of school facilities; transportation needs incident
to school desegregation; the effects of new school construction,
and judicially established controls thereon, on any plan of
desegregation; the reassignment of faculty and restructuring
of facilities incident to pupil reassignment to accomplish
school desegregation; appropriate and necessary interim and
i xna.J. aominxs tr a rj.v e * x o **. .l i l d ilu-i-C L a, C2 j. t s ; a pp r op r rare
community, parental, staff, and pupil involvement in the
desegregation process; and attention to individual, cultural
and ethnic values, respect, dignity and identity. But the
primary question addressed by these hearings, in the absence of
submission of a complete desegregation plan by the state,
remains the determination of the area necessary and practicable
effectively to eliminate "root and branch" the effects of
state-imposed and supported segregation and to desegregate
the Detroit public schools. .
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Desegregation Area
5. The State Board of Education filed six (G)
"plans" without recommendation or preference; intervening defendants
Magdowski, et al., filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation
which included most of the tri-county area; the defendant Detroit
Board of Education filed a proposal for metropolitan desegregation
' 3 /which included the entire tri-county area.— At the hearing
plaintiffs presented a modification of the three proposals which
actually described areas within which pupil desegregation was to
be accomplished. .
6 . In the consideration of metropolitan plans of
desegregation of the Detroit public schools, the State defendants
stand as the primary defendants. They bear the initial burden
of coming forward with a proposal that promises to work. In
. 4 /the context of this case, they represent the "school authorities"
to whom equity courts traditionally have shown deference in
3 / . .these matters. Yet in its submission without recommendation
of six (6 ) "plans" the State Board of Education has failed to
meet, or .even attempt to meet, that burden and none of the other
State defendants has filled the void.
7 . The. State Board refused t o make any recommendation
to t h e c o u r t a b o u t u t e a p p r o p r r a t e a re a i o r U e e e g r e g u e i o n . I n
State Defendant Porter's words, the State Board "didn't make a
decision, period." Defendants Milliken and Kelley merely filed
objections to all. six (6 ) plans.
8 . -Three of the State "plans" merely proposed-
concepts alternative to maximum actual desegregation. The
Racial Proportion Plan described a statistical method of
determining the number of transfers involved in achieving a
particular racial ratio in each school once an area of desegrega
tion had been chosen. The Equal Educational opportunity and
Quality Integration Plan was admitted to be a non-plan and
described criteria for education which, in whole or part, might,
or might not, be applicable to any school system.
9 . Only one State "plan," the Metropolitan District
Reorganization Plan, attempted to describe an area within
which desegregation should occur, called the "initial operating
zone" (sometimes referred to hereafter as the "State Proposal").
That "plan," however, was primarily concerned with -discussing
a new governance structure for the desegregation area. Pupil
reassignment was mentioned only in passing and no foundation
was laid by State defendants for the particular area of
desegregation described. Further, it suffered from the default
of the State defendants by their stubborn insistence that under
their self-serving, and therefore self-limiting, view of their
powers they were free to ignore the clear order of this court
and abdicate their responsibility vested in them by both the
Michigan and Federal Constitution for supervision of public
e-.ucation and equal protection for all citizens.
10. From the very limited evidence in the record in
support of the area in that state proposal, the primary
foundation appears to be the particular racial ratio attained in
that plan, approximately 65% blacK, 3ay'- worse, v;iuii the provision
that the area could be expended if “white flight" ensued1. In
the absence of any other persuasive foundation, such area xs
I _
„ ..... i 1 1 .? cr -m- ni n obi e cr i teria for not based on any dcij.nuiJ.e -u....u .. ̂ ....
either inclusion or exclusion of particular areas; and the
concept of an "initial operating zone" raises serious practical
questions, which should be avoided if a more permanent solution
is now possible. In short, the area described by the "initial
operating zone" does not appear to be based primarily on
relevant factors, like eliminating racially identifiable schools;
accomplishing maximum actual desegregation of the Detroit public
schools; or avoiding, where possible, maintaining a pattern of
schools substantially disproportionate to the relevant school
community1s racial composition by force of deliberate action
by public authority. Nor, on the evidence in this record, is
the "initial operating zone" based on any practical limitation
of reasonable times and distances for transportation of pupils.
These factors seem to have played little part in the creation of
the "initial operating zone" and are reflected less in its
result. .
1 1 . At the hearings, moreover, the State defendants
did not purport to present evidence in support, or even in
opposition, to the State Proposal. The State, despite prodding
by the court, presented only one witness, who merely explained
what appeared on the face of the various State "Plans" submitted.
The State's cross examination of witnesses was of no assistance
to the court in ascertaining any preference, legal or educational.
Put bluntly, State defendants in this hearing deliberately chose
not to assist the court in choosing an appropriate area for
effective desegregation of the Detroit public schools. Their
' 'resistance and abdication of .responsibility throughout h a s been
consistent with the other failures to meet their obligations noted
court1s earlier ru J- i .i i in a Indeed, some of the submissions
s clearI y C:yi vi toluon L< d ; reoregat ic>n as did the
ture in tec. 12 of Act 4 8 r u .1 c' d u n c o n s \;.itut ional by
the sixth Circe
12. In such circumstances little weight or deference
can be given to the unsupported submission of the State/
Board of Education. In light of the available alternatives
and the facts produced at the hearing bearing on the' issue,
the court finds that State defendants offered no basis for
ruling that the "initial operating zone" is the appropriate
area within which to effectively desegregate the Detroit public
schools.
1 3 . Similarly, the newly intervening, defendant
school districts did not attempt at the hearing to assist the
court in determining which area was appropriate to accomplish
effecurve utJsegregaLxon. They were given the opportunity, by
express written order and several admonitions during the course
of the hearings, to assist the court in the task at hand but
chose in their best judgment instead, in the main, to suggest
their view that separate schools were preferable. The failure
of the group of 40 districts to even comment that the court
should exclude certain districts under any number of available .
rationales may in part be explained by the awkward position
chosen by them and their counsel of having single representation
for districts on different sides of the various suggested
perimeters.
14. The plans of intervening defendants Magdowski,
et al., and the defendant Detroit Boarcl of Education are similar
With slight variations they include the entire tri-county,
metropolitan Detroit area, with that area divided into several
.regions or clusters to .make the planning for accomplishing
A],though both have as their maindesegregation more manageable.
objective desegregation, 111 eir
from a heavy emphasis
api>r opr late soc io-eco
larger area arises primarily
on such factors as white flight and an
. 6 /oisig balance xn each cluster and school.
ne ant ad I-laqdowskx
plans readily admit' that the regions or clusters for pupil
reassignment which involve Mt. Clemens and Pontiac are not
directly related to desegregation of the Detroit public
schools and may be disregarded without any substantial adverse
effect on accomplishing our objective. No other party has
expressed any disagreement with that view. And the court finds
that these two regions or clusters, for purposes of pupil
reassignment, need not be included at this time in the
desegregation area.
16. With the elimination of these two clusters there are,
then, three basic proposals to be considered for the desegregation
area; the State Proposal; the Detroit Board Proposal, and the
proposal of defendant-intervenors Magdowski, et al. In addition,
as noted, plaintiffs filed a modification of these three
proposals. '
17. Each of these proposals starts from the same
. . 7 /two premises: (1 ) the tri-county area constitutes the
relevant school community which can serve as an initial
benchmark in beginning the evaluation of how to effectively
eliminate the racial segregation of Detroit schools;
(2 ) but in some instances reasonable time and distance
limitations for pupil transportation, and in other instances
the actual area required to eliminate the pattern of racially
identifiable schools, limit the area within which pupil
k aassignm'-nt should occur. In terms of proof, putting aside
arguments of impotence by the State defendants, there was
.absolutely no contradictory evidence on these two criteria.
The entire tri-county area includes areas, pupils, and
- 0 -
schools in 86 school districts; it includes approximately one
million students; of: chon ep;;>.r: Basea
on the evidence concerning school and non-school factors,'8 /
S £~id XTGclSOHcibiC t XuiC d }}(J. ClXL> L-cl 1 ix G X a.iiiXtc-t a XOi AS XO X p U pX X
transportation, the court finds that both premises are
accurate.
18. The State Proposal includes the areas, pupils
and school in 36 school districts; approximately 550,000
students are included of whom 36% are black. The Detroit
Board Proposal (excluding clusters 8 and 12) includes the
areas, pupils, and schools in 69 school districts; approximately.
10 /
850,000 students are included, of whom 25% are minority.
The CCBE Proposal includes the areas, pupils, and schools in
some 62 school districts; approximately 777,000 students are
included of whom 197,000 (25.4%) are black. plaintiffs'
proposal includes liho xrcc uupxls/ snH schools m 3u Rfhooi
districts; approximately 780,000 students are included, of
whom 197,000 (25.3%) are black.
19. The State Proposal approaches what may be
considered a substantial disproportion in the context of this
case. It is to be remembered that within any desegregation
area, the racial composition of desegregated schools will vary
from the area's racial mix. Given the variations in school
plant, demographic and geographic factors, limiting the
desegregation area to the State Proposal would result in some
schools being substantially disproportionate in their racial
composition to the tri-county area, and other schools racially
identifiable, all without any justification in law or fact.
This finding is supported by the lack of any apparent
justification for the desegregation area described by the
State Proposal except a desire to achieve an arbitrary racial
ratio.
20 . T r a n s p o r t a t i o n of children by school bus is a
common practice throughout m e nation, xn the biaie 01
Michigan, and in the tri-county area. Within appropriai_e
time limits it is a considerably safer, more reliable,
healthful and efficient means of getting children to scuool
than either car pools or walking, and this is especially true
for younger children.
21. in Michigan and the tri-county area, pupils
often spend upwards of one hour, and up to one and one half
hours, one-way on the bus ride to school each day. Consistent
with its interest in the health, welfare and safety of children
and in avoiding impingement on the educational process, state
educational authorities routinely fund such transportation
for school children. Such transportation of school children is
.a long-standing, sound practice in elementary and secondary
V..- V I V-- V-
"and throughout the country. And the
court finds such transportation times, used by the state ana
recommended here, are reasonable in the circumstance here
presented and will not endanger the health or safety of the
child nor impinge on the educational process. For school
authorities or private citizens to now object to such
transportation practices raises the inference not of hostility
to pupil transportation but rather racially motivated hostility
to the desegregated school at the end of the ride.
22. The Plaintiffs' Proposal made reference to
P.M.8 , based on the TALUS regional transportation and travel
times study. Although there was dispute over the meaning of the
study, such studies are deemed sufficiently reliable that major
governmental agencies customarily rely on their projection for
a variety of planning functions. When used by the plaintiff-,
p.M. 8, in conjunction with the Detroit Board s sui\cy of
maximum school to school travel limes, s e r v e d as a rough, j ' -
.1 irie with in v;hieh
attempted to stay
without any more
the plaintiff
in an effort
'.ran sport at i
s 1
to
modification of other proposals
provide maximum desegregation '
1 'o, o t h a 11 5 _ r- q 0 ■q i ]- o g p q
desegregate.
two factors,
result, is a
circumst a nces
This court finds that the utilization of these
and the lower travel time estimates which should
reasonable basis for the modification in the
of this case. The court's duty and objective
is not to maximize transportation but to maximize desegregation
and within that standard it will always be reasonable to
minimize transportation. To that end the court has accepted
the more conservative perimeter for the desegregation area suggested
as a modification by plaintiffs because it provides no less
effective desegregation.
23. Based on these criteria, the State Proposal is
too narrowly drawn.
A T> ^ 4~ 1- --- --- 1 J-- - 1 -- 1- , r- x i_ _ _ »_ .* «
‘ X v C U v J i x t w t o e o r x u ; j p ^ c - t x . U - 0 KJ X. U 1 U X L
Board Proposal are too sweeping.
25. Based on these criteria, the CCBE'proposal
and the Plaintiffs1 Proposal, rough].y approximate the area so
1 1 / ......
described. ' -
26. There is general agreement among the parties,
and the court so finds, that on the west the areas, schools, and
pupils in the Huron, Van Buren, Northville, Plymouth, and Novi
12 /
districts (1 ) ax'e beyond the rough 40-minute travel time line;
(2 ) are not necessary to effectively desegregate schools involved
in the regions and clusters abutting those schools; and, (3 ) at
this writing, are not otherwise necessary, insofar as pupil
assignment is concerned, to provide an effective remedy now .
and hereafter. (See Findings 63-69 below.) .
27. In the southwest the school districts of Woodhaven,
Gilbralter, Flat Rock, Grosso lie and Trenton are within
set forth above.reasonable time and distance criteria These
virtually all-white districts are included in the Detroit
Board Proposal but excluded from the plaintiffs' modification.
The areas, schools and pupils in such school districts are - .
similarly not necessary to effectively desegregate. (Clusters
13, 14, and 15 in Plaintiffs' proposal are 20.5%, 24.4% and
22.7% black respectively.) There is nothing in the record
which suggests that these districts need be included in the
desegregation area in order to disestablish the racial
identiflability of the Detroit public schools. From the
• ' ' jevidence, the primary reason for the Detroit School Board's
interest in the inclusion of these school districts is not
racial desegregation but to increase the average socio-economic
balance of all the schools in the abutting regions and clusters.
In terms of what this court views as the primary obligation establishc
by the Constitution— racial .desegregation--the court deems the
ir-*- -f- r~\ ,o> p -' '~\ > -P V-. rl r. A 4-
appropriate to confine the desegregation area to its smallest
effective limits. This court weighs more heavily the judicially
recognized concern for limiting the time and distance of pupil
transportation as much as possible, consistent with the
constitutional requirement to eliminate racially identifiable
schools, than a concern for expanding the desegregation area to
raise somewhat the average socio-economic balance of a
13 /relatively few clusters of schools.-— —
28. To the north and northeast, the only major
disagreement among the Detroit Board Proposal and plaintiffs'
modification relates to the areas, schools, and pupils in the
Utica School District. This district is a virtually all-white,
long, relatively narrow area extending several miles in a
north-south direction away from the city of Detroit. Only
the southern part of the .district is within the rough, TALUS
4 0 -in i n u t c t r a v e 1 t i me 1 i n e.
29. The; Detroit Boar that 1)1 Co should
be included in order to raise the average socio-economic
balance of the abutting clusters and schools. In this
instance, however, the overall racial composition of the
cluster, 27.0% black, may tend toward disproportionate •
black relative to the tri-county starting point. * ■ ■
30. Mr. Henrickson, the planner for the Board,
also suggested that Cluster 3 of plaintiffs' Proposal, because
of its omission of Utica, might present some problems, which
he admitted could be solved, in designing a plan of pupil
reassignment for the desegregation of schools. (See
Findings 34-39 below.). '
31. In light of these relevant, and competing,
considerations the question presented by the Utica situation
.is close; however, at this writing, the court determines
that the areas, schools, and pupils in the Utica School District
need not be included, and therefore, should not be included in
the desegregation area 14/
32. The court finds that the appropriate desegre
gation area is described by plaintiffs' modification of the
three primary proposals. Within that area the racial
identifiability of schools may be disestablished by implementa
tion of an appropriate pupil desegregation plan. The area
as a whole is substantially proportionate to the tri-county
starting point. Within the area it is practicable, feasible,
and sound to effectively desegregate all schools without
imposing any undue transportation burden on the children or
on the state's system of public schooling. The time or
> distance children need be transported to desegregate schools
in the area will impose' no risk to the children's health and
will not significantly impinge'on the educational process.
or
e or xb
clusters are arranged along major surface arteries and
utilize the "skip," or noncontiguous zoning, technique to
minimize the time and distance any child need spend in
planning for pupil reassignment within the desegregation area
into a series of smaller, manageable and basically independent
plans. Thus, although as the new interveners suggest devising
a desegregation plan for a system with some 800,000 pupils
has never been attempted, the practical and manageable reality
is that desegregation plans fox* systems with .from 36,000 to
.1 0 0 , 0 0 0 pupils has been done and such plans have been
implemented. , .... •
3 4 . Plaintiffs' Proposal uses the same cluster
technique and the same clusters, modified to fit the desegrega
tion area. The 15 clusters range from 27,000 to 93,000 pupils
and from 20.5% to 30.8% black. Only three relevant objections
were raised by Mr. Henrickson, to the clusters as modified.
3 5 . First, Cluster 4 was challenged as "concealing"
a "problem," namely effective desegregation of other schools
resulting from the omission of Utica from plaintiffs' modifica
tion. On cross-examination Mr. Henrickson admitted that the
"problem" of actual pupil desegregation fox* these other
schools could be "solved," that all schools within Cluster 4
could be effectively desegregated, and that Cluster 4 was
smaller than the Detroit Board Cluster 6 . The objection was
thus narrowed to the possibility that a suburban high school
constellation feeder pattern might have to be split between two
Detroi'c i.trgii
ci e s e gre g a t e .
cilso contain
36
Several of the D
two Detroit high
. Th.1 s objection
e t:r o i. t B o a r d ' s e 1 u s t e r s
school feeder patterns.
, splitting an existing
pattern, was raised-directly in reference to Cluster
neither instance, however, did Mr. Henrickson suggest
however
|
* feeder
3 2 . In
that the
e
time or distance of transportation involved was too long or
that it would present administrative difficulty in.devising
a pupil assignment plan for either cluster. The objection
relates solely to a matter of administrative convenience,
namely the use of existing feeder patterns in preparing
pupil assignments.. For example, Mr. Henrickson previously
admitted that in drawing a pupil assignment plan, an
alternative to use of existing feeder patterns would be to
"wipe the slate clean," and disregard existing feeder patterns.
In fact one of the State plans suggested use of census tracts
15 / . . . .as an alternative. On numerous occasions in the past
Mr. Henrickson himself has reassigned parts of one feeder
pattern to another school in order to relieve overcrowding and/
or accomplish desegregation. The objection to such practice,
therefore, is admittedly insubstantial.
37. The third objection relates to the exchange
of Detroit Northern for Detroit Murray in Clusters 6 and 15
requiring that the students transported, if they proceed on
their entire journey lay way of the expressway, encounter an
interchange which tends to be rather slow-moving. Such
transportation time and distance, however, is well within the
rough criteria for reasonableness and is shorter than or
comparable to the maximum trips required in the Detroit Board's
clusters. In other instances, Mr. Henrickson admitted that
pupils in the Detroit proposal might also have to travel
through similar interchanges. Moreover, the objection to this
particular increase in travel tirue must be weighed ugainst the
apparent general decrease in time v. nxch would ba required in
i
plaintiff's1 modified clusters as compared with the Detroit
Board's clusters. In any event the desegregation panel,
based on its investigation of all aspects of pupil assignment,
remains free to suggest a xnodification or these clusters in
order to reduce the time and number of children requiring
transportation.
38. With that caveat, the court finds that
plaintiffs' modification of the Detroit Board's clusters
provides a workable, practicable, and sound framework for the
design of a plan to desegregate the Detroit public schools.
C. Pupil Assignment and Transportation
39. Example of various methods of pupil assignment
to accomplish desegregation have been brought to the attention
of the court by the parties: pairing, grouping, and clustering
of schools; various strip, skip, island, and non-contiguous
zoning; various lotteries based on combinations of present
school assignment, geographic location, name, or birthday.
Judicious use of these techniques— coupled with reasonable
staggering of school hours and maximizing use or existing
transportation facilities— -can lead to maximum actual desegregation
with a minimum of additional transportation.
40. Quite apart from desegregation, under any .
circumstances, transportation for secondary pupils living
more than 1 1 / 2 miles, and elementary pupils living more
than 1 mile from school, is often demanded by parents and
should be provided. Moreoever, it is essential to the
effectiveness of any desegregation plan that transportation
be provided free to all students requiring it under that
■ vcriteria. • ' fBrevrcr ' :v.. '.Dorfolk Board ol Education,____ f .-----
(Apr i 1 1972) (4 th C i r .) .)
41. In 1-1)o rcocnu punt 11- 1 uuc.ii j00, COO pupiIn
in the tri-county area regularly rode to school on some type
of bus; this figure excludes the countless children who •
arrive at school in car pools, which are many, many times
more dangerous than riding on the school bus. •
42. Throughout the state approximately 35-40% of
all students arrive at school on a bus. In school- districts
eligible for state reimbursement of transportation costs in
the three affected counties, the percent of pupils transported
in 1969-70 ranged from 42 to 52%. ’ -
43. In' comparison approximately 40%, or 310,000,
of the 780,000 children within the desegregation area will
require transportation in order to accomplish maximum
actual desegregation.
44. Hence, any increase in the numbers of pupils
to be "transported upon implementation of a complete desegrega
tion plan over the number presently transported, relative to
the state and the tri-county area, should be minimal. Indeed,
any increase may only reflect the greater numbers of pupils
who would be transported in any event but for the state
practice, which affected the segregation found in this
case, and which denies state reimbrusement to students and
districts wholly within city limits regardless of the
16 %
distance of the child from the school to which assigned.
(Ruling on Issue of Segregation at 14.) The greatest change
is the direction of the buses.
45. There is uncontradicted evidence that the
actual cost of transportation for a two-way plan of
desegregation should be no greater than 50 to 60 dollars per
17 /
pupil transported,---comparable to the present costs per .
pupil through the state. Increases in the total costs
• •
of pupi 1 transportation in the descgr.■•ration area, therefore,
will result primarily from evicting a3J children requiring
transportation a free ride instead of imposing the costs of
transportation for many on the families in districts which are
ineligible fox* state reimbursement and which fail to provide
transportation. ■ 1
46* By multiple use of buses, careful routing, and
economies of scale resulting from a comprehensive system of
pupil transportation, it may be possible to achieve savings
in per pupil costs. For example in 1969-1970 many school
districts in the tri-county area which used the same bus for
even two loads per day lowered their per pupil costs to $40
ox* less. In a coordinated, urban pupil transportation system
it may be possible to raise the bus use factor to thx~ee or
more. (See "First Report" State Survey and Evaluation.)
47. In the tri-county area in the recent past there
were approximately 1,800 buses (and another 1 0 0 smaller vans)
used for the tx*ansportation of pupils. Assuming a rough
average of 50 pupi1s per bus carrying three loads of students
pex* day, this transportation fleet may prove sufficient to
carry.some 270,000 pupils. .
48. Various public transit authorities now transport
an additional 60,000 pupils on theix* regular public runs.
49. The degree to which these plausible bus-use
factors can be realized to their maximum, and whether these
public transit facilities may be fully utilized in a plan of
desegregation, must be answered upon careful investigation by
a panel of experts. ■■
50. There is no disagreement among the parties, and
the court so finds, that additional transportation facilities,
at least to the number of 350 buses,-will hove to b e p u r c h a s e d
*to meet' the 'increase in the number of students who should be
p r o v i d c d t r a n s p a r t a 11 o n for e.i i.hct an interim or final plan 01
d e s e gr e g a t i o n
51. For all the reasons stated heretofore including
>1 s— desegregation withintime, distance, and transportation facto:
the area described is physically easier and more practicable
and. feasible, than desegregation efforts limited to the corporate
geographic limits of the city or Detroit.
52. The issue of transportation of kindergarten
children, and their inclusion in part or in full in the
desegregation plan, may require further study. There was
general agreement among the experts who testified that kinder
garten, but for "political" considerations, should be included,
if practicable, in the desegregation plan. Kindergarten,
however, is generally a half-day program. Transportation of
kindergarten children for upwards of 45 minutes, one-way, does
not appear unreasonable, harmful, or unsafe in any way. In
the absence of some compelling justification, which does not
yet appear, kindergarten children should be included in the
final plan of desegregation. .
5 3 , Every effort should be made to insure that
transportation and reassignment of students to accomplish
desegregation is "two-way" and falls as fairly as possible
on both races. Although the number of black and white children
transported and reassigned at the outset will be roughly equal,
it is inevitable that a larger proportion of black children will
be transported for a greater proportion of their school years
than white children, if transportation overall is to be
minimized. To mitigate this disproportion, every effort should
be made at the outset to randomize the location of particular
grade centers. In the short term, full utilization of vastly
V under-capacity inner-city schools may also help to mitigate Inc
disproportion for some black children; and in the long tc u.«,
s c • ioo J. c cii■ ■ cic x u\5 ( co11 s x '■ x o i’11' \•’xth v.>xii&x con x fc x111 c ioi1;.11
'C O ir u r s a n c ■ - L 1 : c .1...... x O } i B r C: ci ci IX d
the surrounding arc!, should be added in Detroit, in relative
P i . j - i u i . u y o o c o i i c e n o r - j 1.l? £*• X / .1. < ■-.. o c.' •- ■*.i J, U P * j X Ci O z i C
D. Restructuring of Facilities and Reassignment of Teachers
54. In the reassignment of pupils to accomplish
desegregation the court finds that facilities must be substantially
reallocated and faculty substantially reassigned by reason of
the clustering, pairing and grouping-of schools.
55. In order to make the pupil desegregation process
fully effective the court finds that it is essential to integrate
faculty and staff and to insure that black faculty and staff
representation at every school is more than token. The court
has previously found and reaffirms that "a quota or racial
balance in each school which is equivalent to the system-wide
ratio and without mere" is educationally unsound, and that
the desideratum is the balance of staff by qualifications for
subject and grade level, and then by race, experience and
sex. It is obvious, given the racial composition of the
faculty and staff in the schools in the metropolitan plan .
area, and the adjusted racial composition of the students,
that vacancies and increases and reductions in faculty and
staff cannot effectively achieve the needed racial balance,
in this area of the school operation. Active steps must be
taken to even out the distribution of black teachers and staff
throughout the system. , .
. 56. In the desegregation area approximately 16% of
the faculty and 12% of the principals and assistant principals
are black. In this context "token" means roughly less than
10% black. Moreover, where there is more than one building
administrator in any - school, ■ a bi-racia.1 administrative team
20™
• •
is required wherever possible«
57. Every effort should be made to hire and promote,
and to increase such on-going efforts as there may be to hire
and promote, additional black faculty and staff. Because of
the systematic and substantial under-employment of black
administrators and teachers in the tri-county area, an
affirmative program for black employment should be developed
and implemented. ' - .
58. The rated capacity of classrooms in the Detroit
public schools is 32; in some of the suburban districts the
average rated capacity is as low as 24 or 25. Utilization
should be redetermined on a uniform basis.
59. In respect to faculty and staff, school
facilities, and the utilization of existing school capacity,
normal administrative practice in handling the substantial
reallocation and reassignment incident to pupil desegregation
should produce schools substantially alike.
60. In the circumstances of this case, the pairing,
grouping and clustering of schools to accomplish desegregation
with minimum transportation often requires use of grade
arrangements such as K-4, K-5, or even K-6 . In so planning
pupil reassignments, it is sometimes necessary, and often
administratively practicable, to include grades K- 8 or even
K-9 to achieve the maximum actual desegregation with the
minimum transportation. Grade structures in most elementary
schools in the desegregation area is a basic K-6 ; however,
almost all other combinations are found. They differ within
and among various districts. ' .
61. In the reassignments of pupils and teachers
and tlie reallocation of equipment and facilities required to
accomplish desegregation, the elementary grades and schools
present relatively few administrative difficulties, while the
h iqn liooi uxeaier
cl 1 f f 1. C l.1 til •: *• 13, r't j r*;; ! c\ -■ ] y With S O e C1 : 1 A,, am
curriculum,
62. For h
interim choices must be made because of the impossibility of
.immediate desegregation of all grades, schools, and clusters
in the desegregation area, the weight of the evidence is, and
the court so finds, that desegregation should begin-first
at the earliest grades for entire elementary school groupings
throughout as many clusters as possible.
' E. School Construction ;
63. Relative to suburban districts the Detroit
public schools, as a whole, are considerably over-capacity.
(See also Finding 58, supra.) To alleviate this overcrowding,
equalize rated capacity and minimize and equalize transportation
burdens borne by black pupils in the city, needed new school
i
capacity, consistent with other requirements of a desegregation
plan, should be added on a priority basis in the city of
Detroit.
64. Relevant to the court's choice of a desegregation
area more limited than the Detroit Board Proposal is the
testimony, elicited on cross-examination from two of the
primary authors of that proposal, related to the effects of
controlling new school construction. The broader area in the
Detroit proposal was chosen without any real consideration •
of the impact of controlling school construction in an area
larger than the desegregation area. Upon reflection, both
Dr. Flynn and Mr. Henrickson admitted that closely
scrutinizing and limiting the addition of capacity to areas
outside the desegregation area might lead them to re-evaluate
the need,■in the context of maintaining now and hereafter a
unitary system, to include an area as sweeping as recommended
by the Detroit Board proposal.
65. in our Ruling on Issue or ;t:.grcg<. Lion, PP-
this court found that the ''residential segregation throughout
the larger metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and or
long standing" and that "governmental actions and inaction at
a h r, i _j. _ -ann Tnfpil hav© combined wi eh all levels, Federal, State and lo-ar, na.o ^
those of private organizations, such as loaning institutions
and real estate associations and brokerage firms, to establish
and to maintain the pattern of associations and brokerage
firms, to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential
segregation through the Detroit metropolitan area." Be also
noted"that this deliberate setting of residential patterns had
an important effect not only on the racial composition of
inner-city schools but the entire School District of the City
-of Detroit. (Ruling on Issue of segregation at 3-10.) Just
as evident is the fact that suburban school districts in the
main contain virtually all-white schools. The white population
of the city declined and in the suburbs grew; the black
population in the city grew, and largely, was contained theiem
by force of public and private racial discrimination at all
levels. -
6 6 . We also noted the important interaction of
school and residential segregation; "Just as there is an inter
action between residential patterns and the racial composition
of the schools, so there is a corresponding-effect on the
residential pattern by the racial composition of schools."
Ruling on Issue of Segregregation at 10. Cf. fhi§nn__v_.
rhar 1 ottc-Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 Pt'0i- 1
gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools arG ~
in response to the needs of people. The location of schools
may thus influence the patterns of residential development of a
metropolitan area and have important impact on c.c -ul ' ’
t
of inner city no ign borl..oocir . "
67. Within the context ot the seyrcgaeory Housing
market, it is obvious that the white families who left the .
city schools would not bo as likely to leave in the absence of
schools, not to mention white schools, to attract, or at least
1 Q /serve, their children. Immigrating families were affecued
in their school and housing choices in a similar manner. Between
1950 and 1969 in the tri-county area, approximately 13,900
"regular classrooms," capable of serving and attracting over
19/ . . . . .400,000 pupils, were added in school districts which were less
than 2% black in their pupil racial composition in the 1970-71
school year. (P«M. 14; P.M„ 15).
0 3 . The precise effect of this massive school
construction on the racial composition of Detroit area public
schools cannot be measured. It is clear, however, that the
2 0 / , - ,effect has been substantial.” Unfortunately, the State,
despite its awareness of the important impact of school
construction and announced policy to control it, acted in
keeping generally, with the discriminatory practices which
advanced or perpetuated racial segregation in these schools."
Ruling on Issue of Segregation at .15; see also id., at 13.
69. In addition to the interim re-evaluation of new
school construction required in the order, pursuant to the
State Board's own requirements, the final plan will consider
other appropriate provisions for future construction throughout
the metropolitan area. .
F. Governance, Finance and Administrative Arrangements
70. The plans submitted by the State Board, the
Detroit Board, and the intervening defendants Magdowski, ct al.,
discuss generally possible governance, finance, and administrative
2 1 / v;hich may be appropriate for operation of an arrangements— w " ' J -1- ~ J
"interim or final plan of desegregation. V!ithout parsing m
O A
#
1 1 C 1 1 i v. C:r CS L1n -j
■*■11 at >?a< ’ll contcm! >la1
overlaying come blood educational authority over the $rea,
" “ " . I .
use or eventual redrawing of: existing districts), ana
considerable input at the individual school, level. The court
has made no decision in this regard and v/ill consider the
matter at a subsequent hearing. -
73 Each concept needs to be "fleshed-out" in the
hard prospect of implementation of a final plan of
desegregation and what is necessary and essential, and only
that, for the successful operation of that plan of school
desegregation now on an interim basis and hereafter on a
permanent foot ing.
72.. There are now some 8 6 school districts in the
tri-county area of varying size, numbers or pupils, shapes,
and wealth.
73. In another context, the State Board ox Education
found each related to a "metropolitan, core city" (Detroit) as
"city," "town," or "urban fringe" districts.
74. The boundaries of these school dis’ m
general bear no relationship to other municipal, county,
22 /
or special district governments, needs or services":..
75. Some educational services are already
provided to students on an interdistrict, county, inter
county, or metropolitan basis; and many support services
are provided by the intermediate school districts and the
State Department of Education. For various reasons many
pupils already cross school district lines to attend school
. £ 1 /or receive educational services.
76. In many respects— pattorns of economic life, woih,
play, population, planning, transportation, health services- the
comma) n: . ! C ;ut th the Urn. S t a t c i
C ensus Bxxreau, s m J.e .rci metropolitan statistic area.
77, Local, units of government in the metropolitan*
area have in many instances joined together for the purpose
of providing better solutions to problems confronting them.
In such instances various units of government have either
disregarded local boundaries or have concluded that the
problems were such as to call for a metropolitan solution.
In some cases they have created overlay organizations,
SEli COG, recreational authorities, a metropolitan sewage system,
SEMTA, and the Detroit Water System are examples of these
metropolitan approaches. ' .
78. Indeed, the State defendants at this very
moment are attempting in state court to strike down one
irrationality, and the discriminatory effect, of the existing
school district arrangement, j_. e_. , finance, apparently in the
hope of moving to a virtual state-wide assumption of costs.
7 9 > In such circumstances there has been no showing
that the existing school district boundaries are rationally
related to any legitimate purpose; and the court finds that the
particular welter of existing boundaries for 8 6 school districts
is not necessary to the promotion of any compelling state
interest. ■
BO. On the basis of the present record, the court
is of the view that the shifts in faculty, staff, resources
and equipment and the exchanges of pupils necessary to
accomplish maximum actual desegregation may be made, at least
on an interim basis, by contractual agreements or otherwise
among and between the existing school districts. The court
has serious reservations, however, whether such procedures
will inevitably threaten the continuing effectiveness of a
I
• 0
plan or cnar.:cgr>;pa rion ever tno icny-unerar bn 1he:- >■; leeaos
rn o r e e v i. d e r> c e a;nd further hearings v/i}I bo neccscary bef:or<
r e a c h i n g a f i n a 1 c>. e c i s i oi i - 1
81 T h e S t a i: e d e f e n d a n t s , Said in par
|
ticular the
State Board of }ducation which is chSrged with the primary
re s p on sib i1i t y for public education in Michigan , are the
p r i m a r y p a r t i e s t o b e c h a r g e d w i t h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o u n d e r t a k e
t h a t v i t a l i n q u i r y a n d r e t u r n w i t h r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s a b o u t t h o s e
g o v e r n a n c e , f i n a n c i a l , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h
a r e n e c e s s a r y a n d e s s e n t i a l t o t h e s u c c e s s f u l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
o f a p l a n o f d e s e g r e g a t i o n o n a n i n t e r i m a n d c o n t i n u i n g b a s i s .
G . I n v o l v e m e n t o f A f f e c t e d P e r s o n s a n d C o m m u n i t i e s a n d
P r o t e c t i o n A g a i n s t R a c i a l D i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n t h e
D e s e g r e g a t i o n P r o c e s s
8 2 . T h e c o u r t h a s r e c e i v e d
i n t h e p l a n s f i l e d b y e v e r y p a r t y a n d
a d v i c e i n s e v e r a l b r i e f s a m i c u s c u r i a e
t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l f a c t o r s
uncontroverted evidence
in t e s t imony, and
, and the court finds,
are essentia1 to
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d o p e r a t i o n o f a n e f f e c t i v e p l a n o f
d e s e g r e g a t i o n i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s c a s e :
( a ) B i - r a c i a l c o u n c i l s m a d e u p o f t h e p a r e n t s a n d
s t a f f , a n d , w h e r e a p p r o p r i a t e , p u p i l s , s h o u l d
. b e s e t u p a t e a c h s c h o o l ; t h e p e r s o n s m o s t
a f f e c t e d m u s t b e e n c o u r a g e d a n d g i v e n e v e r y
o p p o r t u n i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
o f d e s e g r e g a t i o n .
( b ) C u r r i c u l u m c o n t e n t , a n d a l l c u r r i c u l u m m a t e r i a l s
a n d s t u d e n t c o d e s , m u s t b e r e - e v a l u a t e d a n d
r e f l e c t t h e d i v e r s i t y o f e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l
b a c k g r o u n d s o f t h e c h i l d r e n n o w i n t h e s c h o o l s .
' A s f a r a s p o s s i b l e , t h o s e i m m e d i a t e l y a f f e c t e d
b y t h e s e d e c i s i o n s a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l s c h o o l
l e v e l s h o u l d p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h a t p r o c e s s .
( c ) I n - s e r v i c e t r a i n i n g f o r f a c u l t y a n d s t a f f l o r
m u l t i - e t h n i c s t u d i e s a n d h u m a n r e l a t i o n s s h o u l d
b e r e q u i r e d ; w e m u s t , a f t e r a l l , r e l y p r i m a r i l y
*'"■ . o n o u r t e a c h e r s a n d c h i l d r e n t o r e s p e c t , n u r t u r e ,
a n d d e a l w i t h t h e d i v e r s i t y o f s t u d e n t s p r e s e n t -
i n t h e d e s e g r e g a t e d s c h o o l .
. . ( d ) T h e e n t i r e g r a d i n g , r e p o r t i n g , c o u n s e l l i n g , a n d
, • t e s t i n g p r o g r a m s h o u l d b o r e v i e w e d i n l i g h t oi.
O *7
Is c t . r e d to traditional
id iio.posi.riC! the effects of
■ on the eh a Iclren , Ttack.lfiq,
a : ; i 0 1.. 0 Cl , vOi.... eh b£iS
do? ■ d:: s c r i >d pa
racial effects should not be utilizecl;j within
schools a pattern oi; classes which are:
• r . -v *| -s f - -j - -• - *1 1 > -t • v- - - * ■ •; - - p 4- p o -.•** ~ p r - ' F! 1
composition from the relevant school or grade
mix should be closely scrutinised and maintained
only if necessary to promote a compelling
e d u c a t i on a 1 object i ve. .
83. In making the finding above, we remind the
parties that this court's task is to enforce constitutional
rights not to act as a schoolmaster;! the court’s task is to
protect the constitutional rights here found violated with as
little intrusion into the education process as possible. The
court’s objective is to establish the minimum constitutional
framework within which the system of public schools may operate
now and hereafter in a racially unified, non-discriminatory
fashion. Within that framework the body politic, educators,
parents, and most particularly the children must be given the
maximum opportunity to experiment and secure a high quality,
and equal, educational opportunity. However, experience has
proven that specific goals, deadlines and methods of
reporting and review must be required in all desegregation
cases to insure compliance. •
show why desegregation for all schools, grades, classrooms,
and pupils in the desegregation area should not proceed now,
i_.e_. , in the context of this litigation, for the 1972 fall
term. The design and implementation of desegregation plans
for all grades in 15 clusters— including pupil assignments,
necessary reassignment of faculty and restructuring of
facilities, planning and acquiring the needed transportation
-.facilities— is conceded .by all parties to be a major undertakin
Yet next fall will already be a full year, not just four or six
II. Timing
84. The burden remains with State defendants to
• •
S C; "i O O j f ’ f < i 7 ] 2 S 0 (1970) , aTtey the initial rv. l ' no
by this court of the need for maximum fear.ito-le desegrpgation
i
•s* t *"now. In such ciro i c~ ■* ■ y- Th r' fy p b o "~<r] I;O DfOVG 1the
i n f ea sit o i1 ity of implementation of complet e relief is high.
85. The deseqregation panel, theref ore , must make
every e f f or t t o p 1 a n to implement as much actual de s e g r eg a t i on
for as many clusterI , schoo 1 s , g rad es , c 1 aasrooms , and student
as pos sible .
8 6 . At a minimum, there is agreement among, and
evidence from, the experts that desegregating severa1 g rad e s,
and more particularly entire elementary schools, within many,
if not all, clusters-may toe accomplished in the fall.
87. In view of pindings 60 to 62, supra, if
hard choices must toe made for the fall, any interim plan
should attempt to desegregate grades K—5, K~8 , or K--9
in as many entire clusters as possible; and, in the absence
of some other showing, there appears no reason why a complete
plan may not toe implemented toy fa3.1 1973. ' "
8 8 . A heavy burden rests with those who seek delay
in any way, shape, kind, degree or extent to convince the
court that maximum actual desegregation cannot proceed .
effectively forthwith.
89. In view of the time constraints, the need
to discharge this burden forthwith, the State defendants'
default in assisting this court to determine the appropriate
desegregation area, and the State defendants' asserted and
evident lack of available planning capacity suited to the
task, the court finds that some additional entity must toe
charged with the task of preparing a pupil assignment plan to
accomplish maximum actual desegregation and a transportation
plan within the framework this day established. To that end
a pane] of ski lied experts, broadly representative of the
a s s i q n e d t h a t t a sk requn. red to uxscnarqe erreetiveb
and promptly these two tasks,
90. State defendants remain charged with the duty,
however,•of coming forward with, other necessary reports and
plans concerning those governance, administrative, and
financial'arrangements necessary and essential to the
implementation of an effective plan of desegregation on an
interim and on-going basis.
- I. The Plan ■
91. Based on the entire evidence amassed in this
case, the court finds that an educationally sound,
administratively feasible, constitutionally adequate,
practicable and effective plan of desegregation rnay be developed
implemented and operated hereafter for'the desegregation area
as set forth in findings .1-90 above. ■
3 0 -
CO
1. The court has continuing jurisdiction of this
action for all purposes, including the granting of effective '
relief. Bradley v. Milliken, Ruling on Issue of Segregation,
September 27, 1971; Findings of Fact and Conclusions or Law
on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation, March 28, 1972.
2 . A de jure segregation violation having been found,
the minimum remedy is maximum actual desegregation, taking
21
into account the practicalities of the situation. V Bradley v,
Mil,liken, Oral Order, October 4, 1971; Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation,
March 28, 1972; Brown v„ Board of Education, 347 IBS. 383 (1954),
349 UoS0 294 (1954); Green v, County School Bd., 391 U„S„ 430
(1968) ; Alexander v. Holmes Coun.ty Bd._of Ed« , ‘396 U.S. 19
(1969) ; Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U 0S 0 290 (1970);
Swann v. Char .lotto fleck lonberg Bd, of Ed., 402 U 0S. 1 (1971) ;
Davis v . Board of _School Commissioners of Mobile , 402 U DS . 33
(1971); Davis v. School District of City of Pontiac, 443 F.2d
573, cert, denied, 925 U 0S„ 233 (1971).
3. The remedial obligation rests with school
authorities; but where in any way they fail, or are unable
because of the circumstances of the case, to fulfill any part
of the obligation promptly and fully, the court has broad
equity power, and the duty, to insure that demonstrable progress
be made now; that a schedule for planning be adopted forthwith;
and that necessary planning be specifically ordered and
immediately undertaken in order that a constitutionally adequate
plan may be fashioned and finally ordered implemented as soon
as possib 1 e . Swann_ v.. Chariot! c---Hccklonhorg Board of EdiKxytjmgn.,
311 'F- Supp- 265 (VhBJLC. 1970) , nff^d, 402 U*S. 3 (1973 );
Carter v. West Feliciano School Bd., 396 U.S. 226, 2 2 7 - 2 2 8
• •
(1569) , on'r. xr c* ') Q { 1 Q 7 •'■V} . Arr-,(. ., _ ■ ■ , y j?r>-
F cd . R . n i - p p 7\ ;> p v. .MVciiSsi i 3 J4 F
1
a Supp. 1247,
1266™7 (E ,D . Pa . 1971) . <Only then will the courfc i. n fc. li x s
case be apprised fully of the practicalities of the situation
and what is reasonable and feasible, in order that a final
order may issue, School authorities, of course., will be given
an opportunity to (.1) raise relevant objections, (2 ) make
suggestions for modifications, (3} or present an alternative
plan of desegregation; and their judgment and expertise will
be considered and given appropriate weight by the court.
4. Funds must either be raised or reallocated, where
necessary, to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional
rights and to insure that no such unconstitutional neglect
recurs again. Shapiro v. Thompson, 397 U„S. 254, 265-266 (1970);
Bod die v . Con n e c t i c u t , 91 S.Ct. 780, 788 (1971) ; Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U„S0
365, 374-375 (1971); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971);
Griffin v« Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hoosier v.
Evans, 3.14 F. Supp. 316, 320-321 (D„St. Croix, 1970) ; United
States v. School District 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 232 (N.Do
111. 1969), aff'd as modified, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970),
cert, denied, 402 U CS. 943 (1971); Plaquemines Parish School
Board v. U 0S ., 415 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970); Bradley v.
Richmond, ___ __F. Supp.______ _ (April 1971); Brewer v. Norfolk,
No. 71-1900 (4th Cir., March 7, 1972)(Slip op. at pp. 7-8).
It would be a cruel mockery of constitutional law if a
different rule were to be applied to school desegregation cases.
After all schooling is this nation's biggest industry and the
most important task of government left to the states by the
...Constitution. In this case, were a different rule to be
applied, it would constitute a aiaantic hvoocr i s v : A f t e r a 1.1
iii«3xnLc$ in in 9 Lnt- s c cj r o 9 & *c gg cone' x i; i on f ■£ Jig x" g 1 z t ti i v g 3 y si^nl 1
amounts of money required to undo that segregation can be
found. The law, surely, reoujpc’s a t ! o; ■ st -f- ’, -■? -?- jnp m -,„
application of the.commands of Swarm does require that in almost
every senool desegregation case which has been brought to this
court's attention. .
5* In the substantial reassignment of faculty and
restructuring of facilities required by the clustering, pairing,
and grouping of schools to accomplish pupil desegregation,
normal administrative practice should lead to schools with
substantially like facilities, faculty and staff, and equipment.
Swcann, supra, 402 U.S. at 18-20. Moreover, special care should
be taken in the necessary reassignment of faculty to avoid
creating or maintaining the racial identification of schools
simply Jay reference to the racial composition of teachers and
staff." Swann, supra, 402 U.SC at 18. In any event, the
equitable discretion of the court is broad enough to insure
that those aspects of faculty desegregation and equalization
Oj_ facilities which are essential to the effective operation of
a desegregation plan are included in the planning and final
order, Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 15; UkS. v. Montgomery County
jjoprcL.0f Ed.. , 395 U0S c 225 (1969) ; Hecht v . Bowles ; 321 U.S .
329-330 (1944); and no contract, union agreement or otherwise,
or Board policy or practice may impede these Fourteenth ■
Amendment obligations. U.S._v. Greenwood Municipal Separate
^ 1 2 °LJDl§trict, 406 F . 2 d 1086, 1094 (5th C i r.) , cert, denied ,
395 U.S. 90/ (1.969) ; Berry v. Benton Harbor, _ F. Supp.
(W.D.Mich. 1971).
6 . The Federal courts have repeatedly rejected plans
exempting the lower grades from integration, relying less on
iCU
< {n v t} > o non of; the lav/. See,
e.q., United States v . o r fere on C o u n t y Bd . of fcliic. , 372
2d 8^6 (9t h C '<" 1 f'sr<) - •" * " 1 ■ , 380
F . 2d 385 (5th Cir. 19G7) .
from a desegregation plan
"root and brancli. " Green
To leave grades K through 3 exempt
is not to eliminate segregation
v. Countv'School Board of New Kent
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). .
7. The consistent application of settled const!-
tuional law invests this court with the equitable power, and
the duty, to order preparation, and thereafter implementation,
of a practicable and sound plan which embodies the principles
set forth in these findings and conclusions and the attached
memorandum and order. See, generally, Ruling on Propriety of
Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation
of the Public Schools of the City of Detroit, March 24, .1972;
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only
Plans, March 24, 1972; oral ruling on offers of proof, April 13,
1972; and the cases cited therein.
8 „. School construction practices throughout the
metropolitan area have added to and reinforced the pattern of
segregation referred to. Although there were vacant seats
throughout the city to which students could have been assigned
at lesser cost and with the achievement of integration,
continued sums were expended for construction of new schools
designed to service particular areas of racial concentration, and
such schools opened as and have continued to be racially
ientifiahle in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann v.
Chari o11 o-Meck3,enberg Bd i of F.duc. , 402 U.S 0 1, 18-20 (1971) ;
. United States v. School pis!, 15 3., 404 F.2d 1125, 1132-33 ,
(7th Cir. 1968); Davis v. School Pi st . of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp.
• > '; i / ,
1971) : :
-y ; p \ (> u 1 i L 5.
50.1, !> i. 1 ~~18 (Cc LJ V ■ v O,, .1. J. J- «. ...t, .F / U l t In w i v, Son Franc i sco
limit 1uu 5ch oo.l J •' A > t- t f C.- j.. V » i\ O • L» i ’*-3 J. O ..L { i\ & JJ o C cl X J- i
April 28, 1971,) ; Brower v. School Board of the City of
Norfolk, 397 F. 2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1968) ; C f , S1 oa n v. Tenth
S ch ao 1 D i. s t. o f SOD Oaunty, F. 2d (6 th Cir. 1970) ;
Unit e0 Sta te s v. Board of Educ. of Polk County, F . 2d
(4th Cir. 1968) r Kc1 lev v,. Altheime;r, F . 2 d (8 u li. 0 x it o
.1967) ; Bradley v. School Bd. , F • Supp....._ (E„Do Va.
1971) ; Clark v. Boa r d _ _qf E d u c v o f Ilittle Rock., 401 U 0S. 971
(1971) .
9. The legal effects of racially discriminatory
confinement to a school district are not different from the
effects of such containment within a district. E_. , Lee v .
Macon County Board of Education, 558 F,2d 746 (5th Cir. 1571);
ilanev v. County Board Sevier, 410 F.2d 920 (8 th Cir. 1969) , 429
F . 2d 364 (8 th Cir. 1970).
10. Where the actions of state defendants and local
school authorities throughout the metropolitan area have had
the natural, foreseeable, and actual effect of building upon,
taking advantage of, and encouraging racially segregated
demographic patterns deliberately fixed by governmental action
at all levels with the effect of creating and maintaining racial
segregation in the public schools, there is a present obligation
to eliminate the continuing effects of such violation; and .
the District Court has the duty, upon default by school
authorities, to intervene to secure compliance with the
Constitution pursuant to the sound exercise of traditional equity
powers consistent with the practicalities of,the local situation.
Swann v. Char] ntte-Mec onberg, '4 02 II, 1, 15-16, 20-21, 31-
A"X » J J )
established, it is the responsibility of school authorities and
abandonment is.not used and does not serve to perpetuate or
re-establish the violation. Swann, supra, 402 U 0S 0 at 21.
are substantially implicated in the segregation violation found
and are ultimately responsible f.or public schooling throughout
the state, the consistent application of constitutional
principles requires that this court take all steps necessary
and essential to require them to desegregate the Detroit public
schools effectively and maintain, now and hereafter, a racially
unified, non-discriminatory system in the absence of a showing
that the judicial intervention here contemplated will frustrate
the promotion of a legitimate and compelling state policy or
interest. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U 0S C 533, 575 (1964); Hunter v.
City of Pittsburg, 207 U,S. 161, 178-179 (1907); Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U 0S. 204, 212-213 (1970); Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U 0S. 621, 633 (1969); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U 0S 0 235, 244-45 (1970); Shelton v. Tuckcr,
364 U 0S„ 479, 488 (1966); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U 0S 0
430, 439, 442; Swann v , Char1otte-Mook 1enberg, 402 U 0S. 1 (1971)
Davis v. Bd. of School Commissioners, 402 U 0S 0 33 (1971);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U 0S 0 483 (1954); Brown v. Board
of Education, 349 U CS. 292, 300 (1955); Monroe v. Board of
Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968). -
district courts to see to it that future school construction and'
1 1 . Moreover, where the State, and named defendants,
• •
1 . In the main such proof entirely misses the point:
the violation here found has to do with school segregation
caused in substantial part by force of public authority and
action; yet the intervening defendants' questions and .offer of-
proof speak mainly to educational theory and recent and some
times contradictory research about narrowly measured educational
effects, mostly on achievement test scores, of quite limited
beginnings of racial, or socio-economic integration of various
types and as compared with the effects of dollar or other
resource inputs and continued segregation. .This court does
not understand, however, that such research, from the Coleman
report to its many reanalyses, formed the primary bases for
the Brown decision or any of its progeny. See, e.g.', Brunson v.
Bd. of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (J. Sobeloff,
concurring). In a context similar to newly intervening
defendants' objections to desegregation, the Supreme Court in
Swann specifically held that such factors constitute an
impermissible limit upon the duty to desegregate. 402 U CS*
at 24, Fn. 8 . Citation to such research, either in support
or rejection of school desegregation, misses the primary point:
insofar as pupil assignments are concerned, the system of
public schooling in every state must be operated in a racially
non-discriminatory, unified fashion; until that objective is
met, the very system of public schooling constitutes an invidious
racial classification. The adoption of an education theory
having the effect of maintaining a pattern of de jure segre
gation is therefore clearly impermissible. (Whether such
theories, research, or evidence on educational quality or
__ _ T 4 J - _C J - V , ^ ̂ ^ 4 r - v o> ̂ -y -C v» v* ^ -4 i 4 c> 1 r~ \r\
/ i w .'—i a - c- y J- v_/ i i i t m - c* .x. O j -<•** ~ ^ -
and relief in. the absence of a finding of de jure segregation •
is a question this court need not face.) •
In any event, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held, on June 19, 1970, that greater, not less,
desegregation is the proper manner to alleviate the problem of
disparity in achievement. Monroe v. Board of Commissioners,
Jackson, Tenn., 427 F.2d 1005, 1008 (C0A„ 6 , 1970) .
2. Chief Justice Burger in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U„S. 1, 6 . .
3. DefendantsMagdowski, et al., originally opposed to
desegregation, during the course of the taking of proofs on
the issue of segregation, conceded that the public schools of
the city of Detroit were in fact segregated, and took the
early lead in suggesting that the only effective avenue for
desegregation was a metropolitan plan. The Detroit Board of
Education, while continuing to deny that it has been guilty of
any act of segregation, took the position that if desegregation
were to be undertaken it could be done only on a metropolitan
basis. So that now the white parents of the city of Detroit and
its Board of Education— the .parties most, directly involved with
the lot of the students in the Detroit school system— see no
alternative to, and, for all practical purposes seek a
metropolitan solution to the basic Detroit school problem.
• 4. . In the context of this hearing, the defendant Detroit
Board of Education is not in a position to act as the usual
i
"school a
appropria
does not
Detroit.
expertise
uthority" primarily responsible for suggesting an
te desegregation area' simply because its authority
extend beyond the geographic limits of the city of
The competence, knowledge of local conditions, and
of those schoolmen who helped prepare the Detroit
Board's proposal, however, may be utilized and given appropriate
weight.
5. In Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education, #K88-71,
Judge Fox pointed out the primary responsibility of the state:
"The State of Michigan is represented by two entities, but
the entity is an agent of the State . . . [T]he Constitution
says something about your [the State's] responsibility."
The court went on to order the State to take an active role.
Pre-trial order and transcript, May 1, 1972.
6 . The Detroit Board plan places heavier reliance on
white flight and socio-economic factors, while the Magdowski
•proposal in addition places an emphasis on maintaining a minimum
percentage black in each school. These considerations in
no way determine the court's choice of a desegregation area
necessary to meet constitutional requirements. In fairness,
however, it also should be noted that the desegregation area,
which the court deems to best meet constitutional requirements,
also happens in the main, to meet the other concerns expressed
in these two proposals. That the Board's interest in socio
economic integration is largely met by racial desegregation
is not surprising. - There is uncontroverted evidence in the
record, and the court so finds, that there is a high correlation
between blacks and nersons of a low sori o—econom.i c status , the
result, in the main, of the cumulative effects of past and •
present'racial discrimination including discrimination in
education. At some point hereafter, of course, school
authorities with responsibility for implementation and operation
of the racially-unified non-discriminatory school system
contemplated, or parts thereof, may and should include in its
plan other educational goals and needs whether or not they are
required by the law or any court. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg, 402 U.S. at 16. •
7. If a state is constitutionally forbidden to institute
a system of racial segregation by the vise of artifical
boundary lines, it is likewise forbidden to perpetuate a system
whose effect is to maintain segregation. "There is no legally
protected vested interest in segregation. If there were, then
Brown v. Board of Education and the numerous decisions based
on that case would be pointless. Courts will not say in one
breath that public school systems may not practice segregation,
and in the next that they may do nothing to eliminate it."
Wanner v. School Bd. of Arlington County, 357 F.2d 452,
(Soboloff, Cir. J.), pp. 454 and 455. The historic fact is
that existing conditions are based on a design to segregate
the races. To hold that segregation, once accomplished, is
sacrosanct and beyond constitutional reach, is to say that the
united Staves Constitution and its Amendments, find their
provisions for equality, are mere rhetoric.
• 8 . See Findings 70-78, infra.
ii
• •
9. The interplay of these two factors summarizes two
other guideposts or starting points: maximum feasible desegregation
and eliminating racially identifiable schools. Factors such as
time and distance limitations, together with the rough definitions
of substantial disproportion with the relevant school community's’
pupil racial composition, in turn largely determine the meaning
of "eliminating racially identifiable schools" and what con
stitutes "maximum feasible desegregation," in the particular
circumstances here present and in the-context of a prior finding
of segregation. •'
10. The Detroit Board Proposal contemplates desegregation
on a "minority"-white basis. The proof in this cause, however,
has been aimed at the segregation of black children and white
children; similarly the remedy has been so defined, argued,
and in the main presented by parties. The court finds,
therefore, that the area, and further planning, should, in the
main, be confined to a black-white breakdown.
11. To the Southwest, Plaintiffs' Proposal falls on the
side of less time in transit than the 40-minute guideline
because inclusion of more area is not required to desegregate.
(See Finding 27, infra.)
12. Moreover, in the main, the areas, schools, and pupils
in these districts are not as fully members of the greater
Detroit school community: many are less urban; they are the
furthest in terms of time, distance, and contact from the
Detroit area's economic and social acitivities; and many are
more oriented, if anything, to urban areas other than Detroit,
for example, the Ann Arbor - Ypsilanti area.
13. The court notes, however, that the range of average
socio-economic status for the various regions or clusters
in Plaintiffs' Proposal is similar to that in the Detroit Board
Proposal: based on the Michigan Assessment the range in
Plaintiffs' Proposal happens to be 44.7 to 53.7, while in the
Detroit Board Proposal the range is 46.3 to 53; and only three
of the 15 clusters of schools in Plaintiffs' Proposal fall
below 46.3.
14. Because of the closeness of the question, particularly
as it relates to any problems which may arise hereafter in .
establishing a pupil desegregation plan, the court feels that
some opportunity should be given to the expert panel to suggest
a modification of this tentative resolution. See also Findings 34
38 below. ' . .
15. A common practice in other cases is the use of "pupil
locator" maps. See Northcross v. School Board of City of
Memphis,____F.2d____ (6 th Cir. 1971).
16. For years these city-contained school districts,
which include some suburban districts in the desegregation areai,
as well as the Detroit Public Schools, have demanded without
-success that this inequitable state practice be changed so that
all districts could be reimbursed on the same basis for pupil
transportation.
!
17. The figure almost twice that which appears in
several of the State "plans" was based on the assumption that
busing would be "one-way" with black children being assigned to
suburban schools. Mr. Wagner, the state official in charge of
pupil transportation, provided the information on wbicjh that
estimate was based and also informed his superiors that a two
way plan of desegregation and transportation would cost much
less per pupil. The State defendants did not bring this
important fact to the court's attention in any of their
submissions; it was uncovered and fully explored in the
deposition of Mr. Wagner taken by plaintiffs. •
18. This phenomenon was noted in Swann, 402 U.S. 1, 20-21.
The principle was long known, and actively, supported by the
F.H.A. For example, consider that public agency's early
understanding in its 1936 manual that white subdivision
developments require white schools: "if the children of
people living in such area are compelled to attend school
where the majority or a good number of the pupils represent
a far lower’ level of society or an incompatible racial element,
the neighborhood under consideration will prove far less stable
and desirable than if the condition did not exist."
19. This figure assumes 30 children/regular classroom.
Although rated capacities may be lower, the figure for
regular classrooms does not include several types of
instructional, recreational, laboratory, and other rooms which
add overall pupil capacity to schools. .
20. The resulting pattern is unmistakable: "Residential
segregation within the city and throughout the larger
metropolitan area is substantial, pervasive and of long standing.
Black citizens are located in separate and distinct areas within
the city and are not generally found in the suburbs. While the
racially unrestricted choice of black persons and economic
factors may have played some part in the development of this
pattern of residential segregation, it is, in the main, the
result of past and present practices and customs or racial
discrimination, both public and private, which have and do
restrict the housing opportunities of black people. Perhaps
the most that can be said is that all of them [various
governmental units], including school authorities, are, in
part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists."
Ruling on Issue of Segregation, 8 and 10. Moreover, an
examination of PX 181, 192 and 185 shows that black children often
remain isolated in predominately black schools in the few
suburban school districts' with any numbers of black pupils.
In the last several weeks the local press has reported that
the United States Office of Education cut off funds for one
such district.
21 . Included in this set of arrangements are contract
.relationships of various types concerning personnel, property
and debts. •
22. The defendant, William G. Milliken, Governor of the
v.State of Michigan, in his amicus brief filed in the Supreme
'Court of tire United States, No. 71-1332, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Demetrio P. Rodriguez, says, page II:
"1 . Amici, whose individual and particular interests
are set forth in more detail below, are the Governors of the
above-listed States. As Governors and chief executive
officers of their respective States, Amici are responsible
for upholding and carrying out the commands of the
Constitutions and laws of their various States, including -
the provisions thereof requiring the establishment of
public schools and school districts and commanding the
children of their States to attend school. Amici are
responsible for financial decisions affecting all State
operations, including those pertaining to support and
financing of the public schools.
• "Amici are deeply concerned about the ongoing and
continuing crisis in public education and the difficulties
facing public educational systems in their States and around
the nation. Amici recognize that grave inequities exist
because of variation in local property tax bases upon which
local school districts must rely in order to support their
school systems. Amici believe that these inequalities in
educational resources violate the requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and that these inequalities
must be eliminated* * * *"
The Governors' amicus brief, speaking of the
State of Texas, could as well be said of the State of Michigan, when
it used these words:
"It is also undisputed that the local school districts and
’ their boundaries, and hence the aggregate value of the property
they contain, are entirely the creation of and their main
tenance is the responsibility of the State of Texas. Further
. more, the detailed regulation of public education financing
in Texas * * * is a state not a local responsibility.
Indeed, the school districts have the power to raise funds
for education only as a result of delegation by the State of
its own power to tax for the general welfare." (Page 8 of
brief.)
"Since the State could not discriminate directly against
students residing in,poorer localities, it should not be
permitted to accomplish the same result by dividing its
responsibility for equal education with .local school districts
and failing to supplement the funds raised by the school
districts sufficiently to eliminate discrimination." * (Page 11
of brief.)
* Compare Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) .
While a State may delegate certain of its functions to smaller
subdivisions such as cities or counties, it cannot escape
accountability for their actions. Such subdivisions are "created
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them* * * * The
number, nature, and duration of [their] powers * * * and
the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the
absolute discretion of the State." Hunter v. City of Pittsburg,
207 U 0S 0 161, 178 (1907). . ■
23. For years black children in the Carver School District
were assigned to black schools in the inner city because no white
suburban -district (or white school in the city) would take the
children. ‘
v
• •
24. These findings are made on the basis of the present
record and are subject to modification based on evidence which
may be developed once the specific problems o'f actual desegrega
tion are faced in the planning process.
25. See, Kelley, et al. v. Metropolitan Bd. of Educ., -
CCA 6 , Nos. 71-1778-79, page 22, slip opinion, May 30, 1972:
"Perhaps the primary thing that the Swann case
decided was that in devising plans to terminate such
residual effects, it is appropriate for the school system
and the District Judge to take note of the proportion of
white and black students within the area* and seek as
practical a plan as may be for ending white schools and
black schools and substituting therefor schools which
are representative of the area in which the students live.
*The area referred to in this case is all of Davidson
County, including the City of Nashville, which is
included in the jurisdiction of defendant
.Metropolitan Board of Education.
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN , et al,
Defendants,
and •
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL
231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
AFL-CIO,
Defendant-Intervenor,
and
DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al,
Defendants-Intervenor,
et al.
Civil Action
No. 35257
ORDER '.
FOR ACQUISITION OF TRANSPORTATION
At a session of the United States
District Court, Federal Building,
Detroit, Michigan, on the /.J
day of ___19727
The Court has received a recommendation from the Panel
appointed under its previous orders that 295 buses,which it had
determined are available, should be acquired for the purpose of
providing transportation under an interim plan. The Court also
had before it the still pending motion of Plaintiffs for the
purchase of 350 buses. Having heard the arguments of counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
t f
1. The Defendant Detroit Board of Education shall
acquire by purchase, lease or other contractual arrangement at
least 295 buses for use in the "interim desegregation plan during
the 1972-73 school year.- All financial obligations incurred as
APPENDIX E
*
the result of this Order shall be the sole financial obligation
of the State Defendants, including the added State Defendant
State Treasurer Allison Green, as set forth below in Paragraph 2.
Said order, lease, or other contract shall be entered into by
negotiation and without the necessity for bids forthwith and in
no event later than Thursday, July 13, 1972.
2. The State Defendants shall bear the cost of this
acquisition and State Defendants, including the added State __
Defendant Green, shall take .all necessary steps utilizing existing
funds and sources of revenue, to be acquired State funds, legis
latively authorized and funds directed by the State Constitution
to the State School Aid Funds and by re-allocation of existing or
new funds to pay for said transportation acquisition either
directly or through the Defendant Detroit Board.
Approved as to form only:
George T. Roumell, Jr.
Attorney for Defendant Detroit
Board of Education, and other
Defendants
United States District.Judge
' -2