Westinghouse Electric Company v. Vaughn Brief for the Respondent

    No. 82-2042

I n  the

i&ttprettt# (Em irt of Ujt Mntteii States
October Teem , 1988

WBBTTNGHOUSB ELECTRIC CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

v.
Christine V au gh n ,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

Jack  Greenberg 
J ames M. N auru-. I l l  
Clyde E . M u rph y*
Charles Stephen  R alston 
0 . P eter Sherwood 
R onald L. E llis 
J udith  R eed 

16th Floor 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900

J ohn \V. W alker
1191 First National Building 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

ZiMMERY Crutcher, J r.
Mays, Crutcher & Brown 

Suite 836
One Union National Plaza 
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201

Counsel for Respondent
* Counsel of Record



QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Once a de fendant  has a r t i c u l a t e d  a 

l e g i t i m a t e  n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  reason f o r  

i t s  c h a l l e n g e d  c o n d u c t ,  i s  t h e  c o u r t  

l i m i t e d  in  the  t y p e  o f  e v i d e n c e  i t  may 

c o n s i d e r  in  d e t e r m i n i n g  w h e t h e r  t h a t  

a r t i c u l a t i o n  i s  p r e t e x t u a l ?

2 .  W h e t h e r  t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  

f i n d i n g  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  a f f i r me d  tw i ce  

by t h e  C o u r t  o f  A p p e a l s ,  was c l e a r l y  

e r roneous?

3.  When d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  animus has 

b e e n  shown  t o  h a v e  b e e n  a s u b s t a n t i a l  

f a c t o r  in an employment d e c i s i o n ,  can an 

employer  e scape  l i a b i l i t y  under T i t l e  VII  

by s h o w i n g  t h a t  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  p l a y e d  

a pa r t  in the employment d e c i s i o n ?



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Quest i ons  Presented  .....................    i

Opinions  B e l o w ..............  1

Statement o f  the Case ..................................  2

Summary o f  Argument .................................... . 17

ARGUMENT

I .  The D i s t r i c t  Court In A T i t l e  
VII  Case Has An O b l i g a t i o n  To
Cons ider  The Ent i re  Record In
Making I t s  Determinat ion o f
Whether D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  Has
Occurred . ................................................  . 21

I I .  The F ind ings  o f  the D i s t r i c t  
Court Were Not C l e a r l y
Erroneous . ........................ .. 32

I I I .  The C i r c u i t  Courts  Have Con­
s i s t e n t l y  And A p p r o p r i a t e l y  
App l i ed  The McDonnell  Douglas -  
Burdine Formulat ion . . . . . . . . . . .  38

IV. An Employer Cannot Escape L i a b i l i t y  
Under T i t l e  VII  Once D is c r im i n a t o r y  
Animus Has Been Shown To Have Been
A S u b s t a n t i a l  Fac tor  In An Employment 
D e c i s i o n   .......... ......................... .. 40

CONCLUSION 47



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Board o f  Trus te es  o f  Keene S ta te  C o l l e g e  
v .  Sweeney,  439 U.S.  24
(1978)  .........................................................  12,29

Danzl v .  North S t .  Paul Maplewood- 
Oakdale Independent  School  
D i s t r i c t  No. 622,  706 F.2d 813 
(8th C i r .  1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40

Furnco C o n s t r u c t i o n  Corp.  v.
Waters ,  438 U.S.  567 (1978)  . . . .  12,29

Johnson v.  Bunny Bread Company, 646
F. 2d 1250 (8th C i r .  1981) . . . . . .  39

James v .  Stockham Valves  & F i t t i n g s  
C o . ,  559 F .2d 310 (5th C i r .
1977) ,  c e r t . d e n i e d , 434 U.S.
1034 (1978)  .............................................. 36

Locke v .  Kansas C i t y  Power & Light  C o . ,
660 F.2d 359 (8th C i r .  1981) . . .  40

McDonnell  Douglas Corp.  v .  Green,  411
U.S. 792 (1973)  ............................  passim

Page

Morton v .  Mancari ,  417 U.S.  535
( 1974) ......................................................... 43

Mount Healthy C i t y  Schoo l  D i s t r i c t  
Board o f  Educat ion v .  Doyle ,
429 U.S.  274 ( 1977) ------ . . . . . .  20 ,4 0 ,4 5

Pul lman-Standard v.  Swint ,  456 U.S.

- iii -



Page
Robbins v.  Whi te-Wi l son Medical  

C l i n i c ,  642 F.2d 153 (5th
C i r .  1981) .......... ........... . . . . . . . . . . .  36

Robinson v .  Arkansas S ta te  Highway 
and T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  Commission,
698 F .2d 957 (8th C i r .
1983) ...........................................................  40

Texas Department o f  Community
A f f a i r s  v .  Bur d i ne , 450 U.S.
248 ( 1981) ................................................

United S ta te s  P o s t a l  S e r v i c e  Board o f
Governors  v .  A i k e n s , U.S.  ,
103 S .C t .  1478,  75 L.Ed.2d 403
(1983)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  passim

United S ta te s  v .  Ye l low Cab, 338
U.S. 338 (1949)  ................... .. 20,36

Vaughn v .  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c
Corp.  471 F. Supp. 281 (E.D.  Ark.
1979) a f f ' d , 620 F.2d 655 (8th C i r .
19 8 0 )  , vaca ted  sub nom, Westinghouse 
E l e c t r i c  Corp.  v .  Vaughn, 450 U.S.
972 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  on remand, 646 F.2d
335 (8th C i r .  1981) ........................ passim

Vaughn v.  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  
C o r p . ,  523 F. Supp. 368 
(E.D.  Ark.  1981) ,  a f f ' d ,
702 F .2d 137 (8th C i r .  1983) 
c e r t . granted  sub nom West ing -  
house E l e c t r i c  Corp.  v .  Vaughn,
___  U.S.  , 52 U.S.L.W. 3309
(Oct .  17, 1983) .......... .................... .. passim

Vaughn v .  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  C o r p . ,
No. LR-C-215 (E.D.  A r k . ,  Order
f i l e d  May 23,  1979) ........................... 1 1

IV



Page
S ta t u t e s  and Rules

T i t l e  VII  o f  the C i v i l  R ights  Act  o f
1964, 42 U.S.C.  § 2G00e e t  s e q . . 2 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 4 3

The Equal Employment Opportun ity
Act  o f  1 972,  P.L.  92-261 ------ . . .  31,43

Rule 5 2 ( a ) ,  Peel. R. C iv .  P. ••••••••• 32,34

Other A u t h o r i t i e s

L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s t o r y  o f  T i t l e  VII  
and XI o f  the C i v i l  Rights  
Act  o f  1964 .............................................. 42

Leg.  H i s t . ,  1972 A c t ,  p.  1767 ............... 44 ,45

v



No. 82-2042
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October  Terra, 1983

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION,

P e t i t i o n e r ,

v.

CHRISTINE VAUGHN

Respondent .

On Writ  o f  C e r t i o r a r i  t o  the United 
S ta tes  Court o f  Appeals  f o r  the 

Eighth C i r c u i t

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

Opinions  Below

The o p i n i o n  o f  the United S t a te s  Court 

o f  Appeals  f o r  the Eighth C i r c u i t  appears 

in Appendix A t o  the P e t i t i o n  f o r  C e r t i o r a r i  

( P e t  A) and i s  r e p o r t e d  at  702 F .2d  137



2 -

(8th C i r .  198 3 ) .  The o p i n i o n  o f  the United 

S t a t e s  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  f o r  t h e  E a s t e r n  

D i s t r i c t  o f  Arkansas appears in Appendix B 

t o  the P e t i t i o n  f o r  C e r t i o r a r i  (Pet  B) and 

i s  r e p o r t e d  at  523 F. Supp. 368 (E.D.  Ark.

1981) .  The i n i t i a l  o p i n i o n  by the c o u r t  o f  

a p p e a l s  ( J o i n t  A pp e n d i x  ( J . A . )  346)  i s  

r e p o r t e d  at  620 F . 2d 655 ( 8th C i r .  1980) .  

The i n i t i a l  o p i n i o n  by the d i s t r i c t  c o ur t  

( J .A .  324) i s  r e p o r te d  at  471 F. Supp. 281 

(E.D.  Ark.  1979) .

Statement o f  the Case

This  l a ws u i t  was f i l e d  under T i t l e  VII  

o f  the C i v i l  Rights  Act  o f  1964,  42 U.S.C.  

§ 2 0 0 0 e e t  s e q .  , t o  r e d r e s s  c l a i m s  o f  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in employment on the ground 

o f  r a c e .

The r e s p o n d e n t ,  C h r i s t i n e  Vaughn,  a 

b la ck  f emale ,  was h i red  by the p e t i t i o n e r ,  

West inghouse  E l e c t r i c  C o r p o r a t i o n ,  on Ju ly



3

13 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  as a s e a l e x  machine  o p e r a t o r ,

l a b o r  grade 4 (J .A .  2 4 ) ,  Ms. Vaughn fu nc ­

t i o n e d  as  a s e a l e x  o p e r a t o r  u n d e r  t h e  

s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  Mr. Roger Maynard (J .A .  27)

and, under h i s  s u p e r v i s i o n  became a f u l l y  

q u a l i f i e d  , s e a l e x  m a c h i n e  o p e r a t o r  on 

November 16,  1970 (J .A .  249-250 ;  Tr.  685,

6 4 6 - 4 7 ) .  On t h a t  day she  t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  

t h e  s e c o n d  s h i f t  under  the  s u p e r v i s i o n  

o f  Mr. 0 .  D. B r a z i l  ( J . A .  287 ,  DX 3 5 a ) .

Mr. B r a z i l  had been  the  s u b j e c t  o f  a 

number o f  e m pl o ye e  c o m p l a i n t s  ( T r .  523 ;  

J . A .  1 5 2 - 1 5 3 )  and had been c o u n s e l l e d  by 

both p e t i t i o n e r ' s  c h i e f  per so nn e l  o f f i c e r ,  

W.T. Hunni cutt ,  and the p lant  manager (Tr .  

6 8 3 - 8 4 ) .  R es po n d e n t  Vaughn e n c o u n t e r e d  

c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i f f i c u l t y  under  B r a z i l ' s  

s u p e r v i s i o n  due t o  the d i s p a r i t y  in t r e a t ­

ment he e x h i b i t e d  t oward  b l a c k  and w h i t e  

employees  (J .A .  3 8 - 3 9 ) .  She complained on

s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s  a b o u t  h a r a s s m e n t  by



Brazil t o  t h e  p e t i t i o n e r ’ s p e r s o n n e l

o f f i c e r ,  but t o  no a v a i l :

[H]e was c o n s t a n t l y  on more b l a c k s  . . .  
t h a n  he was w h i t e s .  I t  was some 
w h i t e s  t h a t  he gave  p r o b l e m s ,  but

- 4 -

b a s i c a l l y ,  b l a c k s .

( T r . 11; J . A .  31 ) .  A f t e r s e e in g no r e s u l t s

f rom h e r  c o m p l a i n t s to management ,  Ms.

Vaughn f i l e d  a charge with the EEOC (Tr .

12;  J . A .  3 2 ) .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  Ms. V a u g h n ' s

a c t i v i t i e s  came under c l o s e  company s u r -
1/v e i l i a n c e  (Tr .  13; J .A .  3 2 - 3 3 ) .

The p r i n c i p a l  c o n c e r n  Mr.  B r a z i l  

ex pr es se d  reg ar d i n g  the respondent  in vo lv e d  

Ms.  V a u g h n ’ s a t t e n d a n c e  r e c o r d ,  and 

he w r o t e  two memos t o  the  f i l e  on t h a t  

s u b j e c t  ( J .A .  246;  DX 460a,  b ) .  Although

B r a z i l  t e s t i f i e d  that  he was a l s o  unhappy

1 /  The re cor d  in t h i s  case a l s o  r e v e a l s  
the e x p e r i e n c e  o f  another  b la ck  employee ,  
G l e n d a  C r u t c h e r ,  who a p p a r e n t l y  was 
i d e n t i f i e d  as a " t r o ub le -m ak e r "  under one 
s u p e r v i s o r  and became the o b j e c t  o f  c l o s e  
s c r u t i n y  under  a n o t h e r .  ( T r . 3 5 0 - 3 6 3 ) .



5

with Ms. Vaughn's  l e v e l  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  he 

never  documented these  c o n c e r n s .  A w r i t t e n  

contemporaneous e x p r e s s i o n  o f  h i s  view o f  

her  competence t o  per form the j o b ,  s igned 

by both Ms. Vaughn and Sup e r v i s o r  B r a z i l  on 

January 18, 1971, r e v e a l s  that  he was s a t i s ­

f i e d  wi th her  per formance  (J .A .  295,  DX 36 ) .  

However  two days  l a t e r  Mr. B r a z i l  w r o t e  

another  memo i n d i c a t i n g  h i s  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  

with Ms. Vaughn's performance (J .A .  293 -4 ;  

DX 3 4 ) .  At  no t i m e  has  B r a z i l  o r  any 

w i t ne ss  f o r  p e t i t i o n e r  sought  t o  e x p l a in

away these  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  e v a l u a t i o n s  o f  Ms.
2/

Vaughn s per fo rmance .

On Janua ry  25 ,  1 970 Ms. Vaughn was

again t r a n s f e r r e d ,  t h i s  time t o  the t h i r d

2 /  In i t s  b r i e f  p e t i t i o n e r  now contends  
t h a t  the  Ja nu ary  18 memo was " i n a d v e r ­
t e n t l y  e r r o n e o u s l y  r e c o r d e d , "  however there  
i s  no thing  in t h i s  r e co rd  t o  suppor t  that  
c o n t e n t i o n .  P e t i t i o n e r  a l s o  i n t r o d u c e d  
i n t o  ev i de nce  a "bump s h e e t " ,  which i n d i ­
c a t e s  where an employee may be p lace d  in 
the event  o f  a r e d u c t i o n  in f o r c e ,  dated



-  6

s h i f t  under the s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  Mr. C l i n t  T. 

Tusnage (J .A .  28,  286,  DX 3 5 p ) . Ms. Vaughn 

t e s t i f i e d  that  she was aware chat employees  

were  e x p e c t e d  t o  make a c e r t a i n  r a t e  o f  

p r o d u c t i o n  but had never  been adv ised  that  

e x c e s s i v e  waste cou ld  be a cause  f o r  d i s ­

q u a l i f i c a t i o n  (J .A .  4 3 ) .  Turnage t e s t i f i e d

t h a t  Vaughn had been warned on s e v e r a l  

o c c a s i o n s  about inadequate p r o d u c t i o n  and 

e x c e s s i v e  shr inkage  (J .A .  22 4 ) .  He conceded 

that  he d id  not  t e l l  Ms. Vaughn what produc ­

t i o n  standard she was expec ted  t o  a c h i e v e ,  

( J . A  224)  but  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  she  had been 

warned ab o ut  the  s h r i n k a g e  p r o b l e m  ( J . A .  

2 2 4 ) .  P e t i t i o n e r  i n t r o d u c e d  some hand­

w r i t t e n  no t es  Turnage c la ims  t o  have made at

2 /  c ont inued

December 8,  1975,  which de s ig na te d  Vaughn
as q u a l i f i e d  t o  ho ld  the p o s i t i o n  o f  s e a l e x  
machine o p e r a t o r  by v i r t u e  o f  p r i o r  s a t i s ­
f a c t o r y  p e r f o r m a n c e .  P e t i t i o n e r  c l a i m e d  
t h i s  document t o  be the r e s u l t  o f  a 
c l e r i c a l  e r r o r  ( J . A .  1 3 6 - 1 3 8 ;  DX 4 5 ) .



7

the t ime he d i s c u s s e d  pr o d u c t i o n  and s h r in k ­

age w i t h  Ms. Vaughn,  but  i t  d e c l i n e d  t o  

o f f e r  c o r r o b o r a t i n g  t est imony  by any o f  the 

union shop stewards  Turnage c laimed were 

p r e s e n t  at those  meet ings  with Ms. Vaughn.

On A p r i l  19, 1971,  Mr. Turnage d i s q u a l ­

i f i e d  Ms. Vaughn as a s e a l e x  o p e r a t o r .  He 

communicated t h i s  d e c i s i o n  d i r e c t l y  t o  Ms. 

Vaughn but t o l d  her he had been n o t i f i e d  by 

the  f r o n t  o f f i c e  t o  d i s q u a l i f y  her (J .A .  

51 ) .  However,  Turnage not  o n l y  d i s q u a l i ­

f i e d  respondent  but he a l s o  decreed  that  

she would never  in the fu tu re  be e l i g i b l e  

t o  become a s e a le x  o p e r a t o r  ( J .A .  312,  DX

4 1 ) .  Her p o s i t i o n  was then  f i l l e d  by a 

white  employee (J .A .  3 5 ) .

There i s  no i n d i c a t i o n  in the r e co rd  

that  d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  always c a r r i e s  with 

i t  a s t i p u l a t i o n  that  the employee could  

never  in the fu tur e  be g iven  an o p p o r t u n i t y  

t o  r e q u a l i f y .  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  p e r s o n n e l



8

o f f i c e r  ex p l a in ed  that  permanent d i s q u a l i ­

f i c a t i o n  i s  warranted o n l y  in the event  o f  

an assessment  that  the employee in q u e s t i o n  

was p h y s i c a l l y  in cap ab le  o f  per f o rming  the 

j o b  (J .A .  139 -1 41 ) .  Yet Turnage and r e ­

spondent  b e l i e v e d  that  Ms. Vaughn's  f a i l u r e  

t o  make p r o d u c t i o n  was a r e s u l t  o f  her  

d e s i r e  t o  b id  o f f  the s e a l e x  o p e r a t o r  j o b ,  

not  a b i l i t y  ( J .A .  223,  22 6 ) .  I f  Turnage 

b e l i e v e d  Ms. Vaughn's  problems r e l a t e d  t o  a 

l a c k  o f  m o t i v a t i o n , i t  was s imply  in appro ­

p r i a t e  f o r  him to  d i s q u a l i f y  her and bar 

her  f o r e v e r  from r e - q u a l i f y i n g  un les s  h i s  

m o t i v a t i o n  was to  " f i x "  t h i s  compla in ing  

employee " f o r  g o o d . "

In a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  ev id enc e  s p e c i f i ­

c a l l y  c h a l l e n g i n g  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  o f  the  

r e s p o n d e n t  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  Ms. 

V a u g h n ' s  d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  the  d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t  a l s o  gave c a r e f u l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  to 

o t h e r  re co r d  ev id ence  in an e f f o r t  t o  p l a c e



9

the dec i s i onmaking  regard ing  Ms. Vaughn and 

the o t h e r  named p l a i n t i f f s  in the proper  

c o n t e x t ,  and t o  determine the m ot i v a t i o n  

f o r  that  dec i s i on ma kin g .  Vaughn, 523 F.

Supp.  a t  37 0 ,  ( P e t .  B - 4 ) . The d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t  noted the pas t  h i s t o r y  o f  d i s c r i m i n a ­

t o r y  employment p r a c t i c e s  o f  the de fendant  

and i t s  l a ck  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  improvement up 

t o  the t ime o f  t r i a l .  The c o u r t  found that  

go ing  back to  Ju ly  2,  1965, the e f f e c t i v e

date  o f  T i t l e  V I I ,  almost  no b l ac ks  were 

employed by the de fe nda nt .  471 F. Supp. 

2 8 1 ,  284 ( E . D .  A r k .  1 9 7 9 )  ( J . A .  3 2 6 ) .

S i m i l a r l y ,  the  c o u r t  found that  o n l y  3 o f  

22 o f f i c e  and c l e r i c a l  employees were b l a c k ;  

that  no b l ac ks  had ever  been employed as 

s u p e r v i s o r s  in the d e f e n d a n t ' s  o f f i c e  f o r c e ;

that  o n l y  2 o f  25 o r  26 s u p e r v i s o r s  who held
4 /

e n t r y - l e v e l  management j o b s  were b l a c k ;  and 

that  wh i l e  the d e f e n d a n t ' s  o v e r a l l  work-

47 At the time Ms. Vaughn was d i s q u a l i f i e d



10

f o r c e  was r o u g h l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the  

p r o p o r t i o n  o f  b l a c k s  and w h i t e s  in  the  

r e l e v a n t  p o p u l a t i o n ,  b l a c k s  were  a l m o s t  

e x c l u s i v e l y  c o n c e n t ra te d  in p r o d u c t i o n  j o b s ,  

which were lower  pay ing .  .Id. at 284 (J .A .

326) .

The c o u r t  a l s o  deemed p r o b a t i v e  o f  

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  i n t e n t ,  the  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

i n a b i l i t y  t o  e x p l a i n  the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y

4 /  c ont inued

as a s e a l e x  machine o p e r a t o r  a l l  foremen 
were white  (Tr .  20,  6 9 - 7 0 ) .  During t h i s
p e r i o d  t h e r e  was c o n s i d e r a b l e  r a c i a l  
t e n s i o n  at the p l a n t  between b l ac k  workers  
and f i r s t - l i n e  s u p e r v i s o r s  ( T r .  30 ,  64 ,
151, 3 5 0 - 1 ) .  This  c o n d i t i o n  r e s u l t e d  in
s e v e r a l  c ompla ints  to  management o f  mis ­
t reatment  and i t  spawned the f i l i n g  o f  a 
number o f  c ompla in ts  with the Equal Employ­
ment Opportun i ty  Commission,  (Tr .  12, 54,  
159,  180, 35 8 ) .  Accor d in g  t o  a union shop 
steward who handled many o f  the compla ints  
o f  b l ac k  employees ,  the f r i c t i o n  between 
b l a c k  employees  and foremen was g r e a t e s t  on 
the t h i r d  s h i f t .  (Tr .  143) .  Ms. Vaughn 
was ass igned  t o  the t h i r d  s h i f t  at  the time 
o f  h e r  d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n .  ( T r .  5 6 4 ) .



low number o f  b l ac ks  o b t a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n s

g iven  the high number o f  b l a c k s  apply ing

f o r  j o b s  at  W e s t i n g h o u s e  id_. a t  2 8 4 -2 8 4
1 /( J . A .  3 2 7 ) ;  as  w e l l  as t h e  f a c t  t h a t

o f  65 persons  d i s ch arg ed  between 1972 and 

1978,  39,  o r  60%, were b l ac k  -  a f i g u r e  f a r  

above the p r o p o r t i o n  o f  b l ac k  employees ,  

which was approximate ly  24 o r  25%. Id_. at 

285 (J .A .  32 8 ) .

In an u n p u b l i s h e d  o r d e r ,  th e  t r i a l

c o u r t  e x p l a i n e d  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  i t s

h o l d i n g :  " D e f e n d a n t  s i m p l y  f a i l e d  t o

a r t i c u l a t e  a l e g i t i m a t e ,  n o n d i s c r im i n a t o r y

reason f o r  Ms. Vaughn's d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n . "

Vaughn v .  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  Corp . ,  No.

L R - C - 7 4 - 2 1 5  (E . D .  A r k . ,  Order  f i l e d  May
6/

23, 1 9 7 9 ) . “

5 /  Tr .  277-279.

6 /  The r e l e v a n t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h i s  Order i s  
r e p r o d u c e d  a t  V aug hn v . Wes t i n g h o u s e 
E l e c t r i c  C o r p . ,  620 F . 2 d  a t  659 ( J . A .
340)

- 1 1 -



12

The p e t i t i o n e r ,  W es t inghouse , appealed 

that  d e c i s i o n  a l l e g i n g  (1)  that  the d i s ­

t r i c t  c o u r t  m i s a p p l i e d  the  a p p r o p r i a t e  

burden o f  p r o o f  s tandards  and (2)  th at  the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  were 

c l e a r l y  e r ro n e o u s .  Vaughn v .  Westinghouse 

E l e c t r i c  C or p . ,  620 F.2d 655,  656 (8th C i r .  

19 80 ) .  ( J .A .  346) The c o u r t  o f  appeal s  

he ld  that  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  o p i n i o n  was 

c o n s i s t e n t  with the d e c i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  Court 

in  McDonnel l  Douglas Corp.  v .  Green , 411 

U.S.  792 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  Furnco C o n s t r u c t i o n  C or p . 

v .  W at ers , 438 U.S.  567 (1 97 8 ) ;  and Board 

o f  Tru  s t e e s _ o f  K e e ne S t a t e  Co l l e g e  v . 

Sweeney, 439 U.S.  24 ( 1 97 8 ) .

R e v i e w i n g  t h e  r e c o r d  and t h e  t r i a l  

c o u r t ' s  r e a s o n i n g ,  the Eighth C i r c u i t ,  one 

judge  d i s s e n t i n g ,  he ld  that  the lower  c o u r t  

had not  mi sap p l i ed  the a p p r o p r ia t e  burden 

o f  p r o o f  s ta nd ar ds ,  and f u r t h e r  he ld  t h a t ,  

e v e n  i f  t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t  had f o u n d  t h e



13

r e a s o n s  a r t i c u l a t e d  by W e s t i n g h o u s e  t o  

be l e g i t i m a t e  and n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y , there  

was s u f f i c i e n t  ev idence  in the re co r d  to  

f i n d  t h o s e  r e a s o n s  t o  be a p r e t e x t  f o r  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  Vaughn, 620 F.2d at 660 n. 

4 ( J .A .  35 5 ) .

S i m i l a r l y ,  the Eighth C i r c u i t  r e j e c t e d

West i ngh ou se ' s c o n t e n t i o n  that  the t r i a l

c o u r t ' s  f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  w e r e  c l e a r l y

er r o n e o u s ,  ho ld in g  in s te ad :

[W]e are not  " l e f t  with the d e f i n i t e  
and f i rm c o n v i c t i o n  that  a mistake has 
been  c o m m i t t e d . "  U n i t e d S t a t e s  v .  
U n i t ed  S t a t e s  Gypsum C o . ,  333 U.S .  
368 , 395 , 68 S . C t .  525 , 542 , 92
L.Ed.  746 (1 94 8 ) .

Vaughn, 620 F.2d at 660 (J .A .  35 4 ) .  The

E i g h t h  C i r c u i t  d e n i e d  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  

p e t i t i o n  f o r  r e h e a r i n g  e_n banc  and the  

d e f e n d a n t  s u b s e q u e n t l y  p e t i t i o n e d  f o r  

r ev i ew  in t h i s  Court .

On March 9,  1981,  the Court  granted a 

w r i t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  and summarily vacated 

t h e  j u d g m e n t  o f  t h e  c o u r t  o f  a p p e a l s ,



14

remanding the cause t o  the Eighth C i r c u i t  

f o r  f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  in l i g h t  o f  Texas 

Department o f  Community A f f a i r s  v .  B u r d i n e , 

450 U . S ,  248 ( 19 8 1 ) ,  w h i c h  had b e e n

de c id e d  f i v e  days e a r l i e r .  West inghouse

E l e c t r i c  C o r p .  v .__Vau ghn , 450 U . S .  972

( 1 9 8 1 ) .  The c o u r t  o f  a p p e a l s  in tu rn  

remanded the cause  t o  the t r i a l  c o u r t  with 

d i r e c t i o n s  t o  r e c o n s i d e r  in l i g h t  o f  B ur d i ne . 

Vaughn v . We s t i n g h o u s e El e c t r i c  Corp . , 646

F . 2 d  335 ( 8 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 1 ) .  ( J . A .  3 6 1 )

F o l l o w i n g  an i n - c h a m b e r s  c o n f e r e n c e  

with c o u n s e l ,  the p a r t i e s  were i n s t r u c t e d  

t o  b r i e f  two  i s s u e s :  ( 1 )  w h e t h e r ,  in

l i g h t  o f  B ur d i ne , the t r i a l  c o u r t  e r red  in 

i t s  i n i t i a l  ho l d in g  that  the de fendant  had 

f a i l e d  t o  meet i t s  s e c o n d - s t a g e  burden o f  

a r t i c u l a t i n g  a l e g i t i m a t e ,  n o n d i s c r im i n a -  

t o r y  r e a s o n  f o r  d i s q u a l i f y i n g  p l a i n t i f f  

from her j o b ;  and (2)  whether ,  i f  de f endant



15

d id  in f a c t  meet t h i s  s e c o n d - s t a g e  burden 

o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  p l a i n t i f f  should n ev er t he ­

l e s s  r e c o v e r  because  she has ,  on the whole 

c a s e ,  met her  burden o f  p e r s u a d i n g  t h e  

C o ur t  by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e  o f  th e  e v i d e n c e  

that  her d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  was mot iva ted  at 

l e a s t  in p a r t  by her  r a c e .  Vau ghn , 523

F.2d at 369 (P e t .  B - 2 ) .

The t r i a l  c o u r t ,  a c k n o w l e d g i n g  the  

h o l d i n g  in  Burd i n e , t h a t  " A l t h o u g h  ' t h e  

d e f e n d a n t ' s  ex p l an at i o n  o f  i t s  l e g i t i m a t e  

r e a s o n s  must  be c l e a r  and r e a s o n a b l y  

s p e c i f i c , '  101 S . C t .  at  10 96 ,  ' [ i ] t  i s

s u f f i c i e n t  i f  the  d e f e n d a n t ' s  e v i d e n c e  

r a i s e s  a g e n u i n e  i s s u e  o f  f a c t  as t o  

w h e t h e r  i t  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  

p l a i n t i f f . '  I_d. at  1 0 9 4 " ,  answered  the  

i n i t i a l  q u e s t i o n  in  t h e  a f f i r m a t i v e ,  

o b s e r v i n g :

Burd in e  h o l d s  t h a t  the  d e f e n d a n t ' s  
burden o nc e  p l a i n t i f f  makes a pr im a 
f a c i e  c a s e ,  i s  one o f  p r o d u c t i o n  o n l y ,  
not  o f  pe r s u a s i o n .



16

Vaughn v .  Westinghouse E l e c t r i c  C or p . , 523

F. Supp.  368 ,  370 ( E .D .  A r k .  198 1 )  ( P e t .

B - 2 ) .

As t o  the  s e c o n d  q u e s t i o n ,  t h e  t r i a l  

c o u r t ,  r e v i e w i n g  t h e  t e s t i m o n y  and o t h e r  

ev i d en ce  o f f e r e d  at t r i a l ,  and c o n s i d e r i n g  

the r e c o r d  as a whole ,  r e a f f i r m e d  i t s  p r i o r  

f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s ,  and he ld  that  because  the 

p l a i n t i f f  was d i s q u a l i f i e d  in p a r t  because  

o f  her r a c e ,  the d e f e n d a n t ' s  c onduct  v i o ­

l a t e d  T i t l e  V I I .  Id .  at 371.  (Pe t .  B - 6 ) .

R e v i e w i n g  t h i s  r e c o r d  f o r  a s e c o n d  

t ime ,  the c o u r t  o f  appeal s  found that  the 

lower  c o u r t ' s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the r e co rd  

as a who le  was s u f f i c i e n t  a l o n g  w i t h  i t s  

d e t a i l e d  f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s ,  t o  s u p p o r t  a 

c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  Vaughn  was u n l a w f u l l y  

d i s q u a l i f i e d  f r o m  h e r  j o b  as  a s e a l e x  

o p e r a t o r .  S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  c o u r t  o f  

appeal s  he ld that  the d e c i s i o n  o f  the lower  

c o u r t  was not  c l e a r l y  e r ro n eo us .  Vaughn v .



17

Westinghouse E l e c t r i c Corp . ,  702 F.2d 137,  

139 (8th C i r .  1983) (P e t .  A - 4 ) .

Summary o f  Argument

In i t s  ques t  f o r  new f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  

in t h i s  Court ,  the p e t i t i o n e r  has couched 

i t s  argument in terms which sugges t  that  

i t s  " a r t i c u l a t i o n "  under McDonnell  Dou g l as 

and Burdin e , went unanswered in the d i s ­

t r i c t  c o u r t .  In so d o i n g ,  the p e t i t i o n e r  

m i s r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r e c o r d  b e l o w ,  and 

seeks  a r u l i n g  that  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  with 

t h i s  C o u r t ' s  a p pr oa c h  o f  a l l o w i n g  some 

leeway f o r  the lower c ou r t s  t o  ad ju s t  to  

vary ing  f a c t  p a t t e r n s :  an approach which

a v o i d s  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t h i s  C our t  t o  

s t a t e  i n f l e x i b l e  r u l e s  r e g a r d i n g  when 

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  in te n t  has been e s t a b l i s h e d .  

P u l l m a n - S t a n d a r d  v .  S w i n t , 456 U .S .  273

(1982)  .

This  Court has made i t  p l a i n ,  and the 

c o u r t s  o f  a p p e a l  have g e n e r a l l y  u n d e r -



18

s t o o d ,  that  McDonnell  Douglas p r o v i d e s  an 

a n a l y t i c a l  framework f o r  e v a l u a t i n g  c laims  

o f  employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  which should 

be  a p p l i e d  in  a s e n s i b l e  and f l e x i b l e  

m a n n e r .  Texas  Department  o f  Community

A f f a i r s  v .  B u r d i n e , 450 U .S .  248 ( 1 9 8 1 ) ;

I H i ^ e d ^ S t a t e s _ P o s t a l  s e r v i c e B o a r d o f

Gov e r n o r s  v .  A i k e n s  , ____ U . S . ______ , 7 5

L . Ed„2d 403 (1 98 3 ) .

Here,  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  and the c o u r t  

o f  appeal s  r e c o n s i d e r e d  t h e i r  h o l d in g s  in 

l i g h t  o f  Burdine and c o r r e c t l y  a n t i c i p a t e d  

t h e  t h r u s t  o f  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  h o l d i n g  in  

A i k e n s . The l o w e r  c o u r t  c o n s i d e r e d  and 

weighed a l l  the ev i d e nc e  and was persuaded 

t h a t  a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  r e a s o n  more than 

l i k e l y  m o t i v a t e d  t h e  e m p l o y e r .  B u r d i n e , 

450 U.S .  a t  25 6 ;  A i k e n s , 75 L . E d . 2 d  at

410.

C o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  o f  t h e  

p e t i t i o n e r ,  documentary ev i d e nc e  was i n t r o ­



19

duced at t r i a l  which supported the a s s e r ­

t i o n s  o f  r e s p o n d e n t  t h a t  s h e  w a s ,  and 

cont inued  to  be ,  q u a l i f i e d .  Moreover ,  in 

i t s  e f f o r t  to  determine the m o t i v a t i o n  or  

i n t e n t  o f  an act  that  had o c cu rr e d  e ig h t  

years  p r e v i o u s l y ,  the c o u r t  a l s o  c o n s id e r e d  

s t a t i s t i c a l  and t e s t i m o n i a l  p r o o f  as to  the 

d e f e n d a n t ' s  p r a c t i c e s  as w e l l  as t h e  

e f f e c t s  o f  t h o s e  p r a c t i c e s ,  and f i r m l y  

e s t a b l i s h e d  t h e  c o n t e x t  in  w h i c h  t h e  

d e f e n d a n t ' s  employment d e c i s i o n s  must be 

j u d g e d .  N o t a b l y ,  w h i l e  the  p o l i c y  and 

p r a c t i c e  type  ev idence  s u r e ly  app l i ed  to  

each  o f  the  t h r e e  o r i g i n a l  p l a i n t i f f s '  

c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i t  was o n l y  the respondent ,  

Ms.  V a u g h n ,  who t h r o u g h  t e s t i m o n y  and 

documentary ev id ence  countered  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

c l a i m s  o f  i n c o m p e t e n c e  and u l t i m a t e l y  

p r e v a i l e d  under T i t l e  V I I .

The i s s ue  b e f o r e  t h i s  Court  i s  whether

the ev i d e nc e  taken as a whole e s t a b l i s h e s



20

s u f f i c i e n t  ev id enc e  from which the d i s t r i c t  

c o u r t  c o u ld  have drawn the c o n c l u s i o n  that  

a v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  V I I  o c c u r r e d .  The 

E ig h t h  C i r c u i t  has on two o c c a s i o n s  s u p ­

po r t ed  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ,  a f f i r m i n g  

t h a t  i t s  f i n d i n g s  were  n o t  c l e a r l y  e r r o ­

neous .  Sw int . See a l s o  United S t a te s  v . 

Yel low Cab, 338 U.S.  338 (1 94 3 ) .

The p e t i t i o n e r ' s  r e l i a n c e  on Mount 

H e a l t h y  C i t y  S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t B o a rd o f  

Educat ion v .  D o y l e , 429 U.S.  274 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  i s  

s i m i l a r l y  m i s p l a c e d .  The l e g i s l a t i v e  

h i s t o r y  o f  T i t l e  V I I  makes i t  c l e a r  t h a t  

Congress  intended that  i f  race  p layed  any 

p a r t  i n  an e m p l o y m e n t  d e c i s i o n  t h e n  a 

v i o l a t i o n  o f  the s t a t u t e  has o c c u r r e d .  The 

q u e s t i o n  o f  whether o t h e r  f a c t o r s  would have 

r e s u l t e d  in the same d e c i s i o n  in the absence 

o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  a f f e c t s  o n l y  the remedy 

t h a t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  n o t  wh e th e r  a s u b ­

s t a n t i v e  v i o l a t i o n  has o c c u r r e d .



21

ARGUMENT

I

The D i s t r i c t  Court In A T i t l e  VII 
Case Has An O b l i g a t i o n  To Con­
s i d e r  The Ent i re  Record In Making 
I t s  Determinat ion o f  Whether D i s -  
c r i m in a c i o n  Has Occurred__________

In McDonnel l  Douglas Corp.  v .  Green , 

411 U.S.  792,  802-804,  t h i s  Court  s e t  f o r t h  

the b a s i c  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  burdens and o rd er  

o f  p r o o f  in  a T i t l e  V I I  c a s e  a l l e g i n g  

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  t rea tment .

In T e x a s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  Commun i t y  

A f f a i r s  v .  B ur d i ne , 450 U.S.  248 (1 98 1 ) ,

t h i s  Court  made p l a i n  the l i m i t e d  nature 

o f  the d e f e n d a n t ' s  second s tage  " a r t i c u l a ­

t i o n "  r e q u i r e m e n t .  There  the  C ou r t  h e l d  

t h a t  t h e  b u r d e n  w h i c h  s h i f t s  t o  t h e  

d e f e n d a n t  at  s t a g e  two i s  t o  r e b u t  the  

presumption o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  by "produc ing  

e v i d e n c e "  t h a t  the  d i s p u t e d  employment  

a c t i o n  was made f o r  a " l e g i t i m a t e ,  no n d i s ­



22

c r i m i n a t o r y  r e a s o n . "  This  i s  a c comp l i she d ,  

the Court  h e l d ,  through the i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  

ad m i s s i b l e  ev id ence  o f  the reasons  f o r  the 

employment a c t i o n .  450 U.S.  at 255.

Burdine r e a f f i r m s  the f o r c e  o f  McDon­

n e l l  Douglas and emphasizes the f a c t  t h a t ,  

n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  m i n i m a l  b u r d e n  o f  

p r o d u c i n g  e v i d e n c e  which the  d e f e n d a n t  

f a c e s ,  he n o n e t h e l e s s  has  a p o w e r f u l  

i n c e n t i v e  t o  p r o d u c e  more  i f  he i s  t o  

p r e v a i l .  Burd i n e , 450 U .S .  at  258 .  I t

f o l l o w s  that  meet ing that  burden does  not  

assure  s u c c e ss  f o r  the de fe nd a nt ,  even i f  

t h e  p l a i n t i f f  o f f e r s  no new e v i d e n c e  in 

suppor t  o f  h i s  c la im that  the d e f e n d a n t ' s  

r eason  i s  p r e t e x t u a l .  B ur d i ne , 450 U.S,  at 

255,  n . 1 0 .  Rather ,  the a r t i c u l a t i o n  merely  

e s t a b l i s h e s  the e x i s t e n c e  o f  a q u e s t i o n  o f  

f a c t  f o r  the  t r i a l  c o u r t .  I d .  at  255 .

Once t h a t  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  t h e  c o u r t  must 

we igh  the  e v i d e n c e ,  g i v i n g  i t  w h a te v e r



23

c redence  o r  weight  i t  d e s e r v e s ,  and d e c id e  

the i s s ue  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  v e l  non on the 

r e c o r d  as a whole .  See United S t a te s  P os ta l

S e r v i c e  Board o f  Governors  v .  A i k e n s , ____

U.S.  ____, 75 L . Ed.2d 403 (1 98 3 ) .

Here the p e t i t i o n e r  argues f o r  a ru le  

that  would s t r i c t l y  l i m i t  the o rd er  as w e l l  

as  t h e  t y p e  o f  p r o o f  t h a t  a c o u r t  may 

r e v i e w  in  d e t e r m i n i n g  who p r e v a i l s  on 

t h e  u l t i m a t e  q u e s t i o n  in an i n d i v i d u a l  

T i t l e  VII  l a w s u i t .  Moreover ,  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

f o r m u la t i on  e f f e c t i v e l y  s t r i p s  p l a i n t i f f  o f  

the o p p o r t u n i t y  to  show, " th a t  a d i s c r i m i ­

n a t o r y  r e a s o n  more l i k e l y  m o t i v a t e d  the  

e m p l o y e r "  Burd i n e , 450 U.S .  at  25 6 ,  and

s t r i c t l y  l i m i t s  the  p l a i n t i f f ' s  p r o o f  t o  

d i r e c t l y  a t t ac k i n g  the employee ' s  a r t i c u ­

l a t e d  r e a s o n ,  t h e r e b y  " s h o w i n g  t h a t  the  

e m p l o y e r ' s  p r o f f e r e d  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  un­

w o r t h y  o f  c r e d e n c e " ,  Id  . Of  c o u r s e ,

n e i t h e r  B u r d i n e ,  450 U .S .  at 255 ,  n . 1 0 ,



24 -

McDonnell  Douglas , 411 U.S. at 804-805 nor

A ikens ,  75 L.Ed.2d at 409, n.3 r e q u i r e  or

endorse  such a f o r m u l a t i o n .

In the  c a s e  a t  b a r ,  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ' s  

p r im a  f a c i e  c a s e  was e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  

f a c t  t h a t  she  i s  a member o f  a p r o t e c t e d  

group ;  she was f u l l y  q u a l i f i e d  f o r  her p o s i ­

t i o n ;  she was d i s q u a l i f i e d  by her s u p e r v i s o r  

f rom t h a t  p o s i t i o n ;  and th e  p o s i t i o n  was 

s u b s e q u e n t l y  f i l l e d  by a member o f  the  

m a j o r i t y  group .

The de fendant  s a t i s f i e d  i t s  burden o f  

a r t i c u l a t i o n  by  an a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  Ms.  

Vaughn was d i s q u a l i f i e d  b e c a u s e  o f  her  

f a i l u r e  t o  make p r o d u c t i o n .

The e m p l o y e r ' s  a r t i c u l a t i o n  e s t a b ­

l i s h e d  that  there  was an i s s ue  o f  f a c t  t o  

be d e c i d e d ,  and paved the way f o r  the c our t  

t o  d e t e r m i n e  wh eth er  the  p l a i n t i f f  had 

proven by a preponderance that  the reasons  

s t a t e d  were mere p r e t e x t s  f o r  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .



25

Burd in e  d o e s  no t  demand t h a t  o n l y  

ev i d en ce  o f  a s p e c i f i c  type  or  c h a r a c t e r  

may be  c o n s i d e r e d  in o p p o s i t i o n  t o  the  

d e f e n d a n t ' s  a r t i c u l a t i o n .  Indeed ,  the type 

o f  ev i de nce  prese nted  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  turn 

on the s p e c i f i c s  o f  the p a r t i c u l a r  case  and 

the s t r en g th  o f  the d e f e n d a n t ' s  a r t i c u l a ­

t i o n .  As t h i s  Court s ta te d  u n e q u i v o c a l l y  

in A i k e n s :

As in any l a w s u i t ,  the p l a i n t i f f  may 
p r o v e  h i s  c a s e  by d i r e c t  o r  c i r c u m ­
s t a n t i a l  e v id e n c e .  The t r i e r  o f  f a c t  
s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  a l l  the  e v i d e n c e ,  
g i v i n g  i t  whatever  weight  and c redence  
i t  d e s e r v e s .  Thus,  we agree with the 
C ou r t  o f  A p p e a l s  t h a t  the  D i s t r i c t  
Court  should not  have r e q u i re d  Aikens 
t o  submit d i r e c t  ev id enc e  o f  d i s c r i m i ­
n a t o r y  i n t e n t .  See IBT v . U. S . ,  431 
U.S.  324,  358 n.  44,  52 L.Ed.  2d 396,  
97 S .C t .  1843 (1977)  ( " [ T ] h e  McDonnell  
Do u g 1 as  f o r m u l a  d o e s  n o t  r e q u i r e  
d i r e c t  p r o o f  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " . )

A i k e n s , 75 L . E d . 2d at  409,  n . 3 .

C o n s i s t e n t  w i th  McDonnel l  D o u g l a s ,

Burd in e  and A i k e n s , t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t

c o n s i d e r e d  r e s p o n d e n t ' s  d i r e c t  e v i d e n c e

c h a l l e n g i n g  the  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  a r t i c u l a t i o n ,



26

as w e l l  as r e s p o n d e n t ' s  c i r c u m s t a n t i a l

ev id e n c e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the ge n e ra l  p o l i c y

and p r a c t i c e s  o f  the de fendant  which p l a c e d

the dec i s i on ma king  in c o n t e x t  and a ided the

c o u r t  in determin ing  the  m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  the
2 /

e m p l o y e r ' s  a c t .

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  c a r e f u l  c o n s i d e r a ­

t i o n  o f  the r e c o r d  below i s  amply demonstra­

ted by the c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  i t  gave t o  the 

c la i ms  o f  r espondent  Vaughn and the o t h e r  

o r i g i n a l  p l a i n t i f f s ,  Ms.  Gee and Ms. 

C r ut ch er .  Notwi ths tanding  the f a c t  that

2 /  The p e t i t i o n e r  c o n c e d e s ,  as i t  must,  
tha t  under Aikens "a  t r i a l  c o u r t  must not  
u s e  t h e  M c : D o n n e r  d i_n e f o r m u l a  as  a 
s t i l t e d  mechanism by which t o  s t r u c t u r e  the 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o f  the p a r t i e s , "  and that  
"because  o f  the very  nature o f  ' s t a t e  o f  
mind'  o r  ' i n t e n t '  e v i d e n c e ,  the p l a i n t i f f s  
may o f f e r  e i t h e r  d i r e c t  o r  c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  
p r o o f ,  o r  bo t h ,  in o r de r  t o  show p r e t e x t .
A i k e n s , supra at ____, 103 S .C t .  1 2 8 2 - 8 3 . "
( B r i e f  f o r  P e t i t i o n e r s  1 3 . )  P e t i t i o n e r  
s i m i l a r l y  c on c e d e s ,  " t h a t  the e m pl o ye r ' s  
p a t t e r n  o r  p r a c t i c e  o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i s  
a d m i s s i b l e  t o  show p r e t e x t "  and that  the 
t r i a l  c o u r t  " s h o u l d  c o n s i d e r  the  e n t i r e  
r e c o r d "  in o r d e r  t o  d e c i d e  t h e  u l t i m a t e  
q u e s t i o n .  (22* at  13. )



27

each o f  the p l a i n t i f f s  r e l i e d  on much the

same c o n t e x t u a l  e v i d e n c e ,  o n l y  respondent
8/

p r e v a i l e d  on the whole r e c o r d .

In the cases  o f  Ms. Crutcher  and Ms.

Gee the c ou r t  made d e t a i l e d  f i n d i n g s  and

conc luded  that  the ev id enc e  unambiguously

demonstrated that  the two women performed

p o o r l y ;  had been g iven  adequate t r a i n i n g ;

were t r e a t e d  f a i r l y ;  and had been in one

in s ta n c e  abus ive  with s u p e r v i s o r s  and in

another  so incompetent  as t o  have n ea r l y

caused an i n j u r y  t o  a f e l l o w  worker o r  harm
1 /to  the machine.

However,  with r e s p e c t  t o  Ms. Vaughn, 

t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  f ound  t h a t  t h e r e  was 

d o c u m e n t a r y  e v i d e n c e  s h o w i n g  V a u g h n ' s  

s a t i s f a c t o r y  performance as a s e a le x  machine

8 /  Indeed the d i s t r i c t  c o ur t  found aga ins t  
Vaughn on f o u r  o t h e r  c l a i m s  o f  r a c i a l  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  Vaug h n , 471 F.  S u p p .  
at  289 (J . A . 336) .

9 /  Vaughn, 471 F. Supp. at 286-288 (J .A .  
33 0 -3 3 5 ) .



28

o p e r a t o r ,  Vaughn, 523 F. Supp. at 372 (P e t .
JO/

B - 5 ) ;  and that  she had r e c e i v e d  r e g u la r  

r a i s e s  in her p o s i t i o n ,  which was an i n d i ­

c a t i o n  o f  s a t i s f a c t o r y  per f o rmance ,  u n t i l

s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  she  was d i s q u a l i f i e d  I d .
11/( P e t .  B - 5 ) .  ( J . A . 3 3 8 ) .  S e v e r a l  w i t ­

n e s s e s  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  b l a c k s  were  more 

c l o s e l y  s c r u t i n i z e d  than t h e i r  whi te  p e e r s .  

P l a n t  r u l e s  were  e n f o r c e d  a g a i n s t  b l a c k s  

b u t  i g n o r e d  as  t o  w h i t e s ;  b l a c k s  w e r e  

r e q u i r e d  t o  per form tasks  not  r e qu i r ed  by 

s i m i l a r l y  s i t u a t e d  w h i t e s ;  when b l a c k  

employees  complained management appeared to  

f i n d  ways t o  uphold even a r b i t r a r y  s u p e r v i ­

s o r y  a c t i o n .  Not  s u r p r i s i n g l y  b l a c k s  

tended t o  be d i s c i p l i n e d ,  and d i s c ha rg ed  in 

g r o s s l y  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  numbers .  (See  

s u p r a , pp.  2 - 1 1 . )

1 0 / See J .A . 295,, DX 36, DX 45.

1 1 / See J .A . 287--292,. DX 35q -v .



29

On remand,  the  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  n o t e d

that  i t s  p r i o r  o p i n i o n  d e s c r i b e d  in d e t a i l

the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l  ev id enc e  o f  i n te n t  which

served  t o  p l a c e  the e m p lo ye r ' s  i n d i v i d u a l

p er so nn e l  a c t i o n  " i n  the broader  c o n t e x t  o f

d e f e n d a n t ' s  a c t i o n s  o v e r  a s u b s t a n t i a l
12/

p e r i o d  o f  t im e . "  The co ur t  then went on 

t o  r e a f f i r m  i t s  p r i o r  f i n d i n g s ,  obs e r v i n g  

that  they had been upheld by the c o u r t  o f  

a p p e a l s ,  and made a d d i t i o n a l  f i n d i n g s  which 

r e l a t e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  Ms. Vaughn's  d i s q u a l i ­

f i c a t i o n .  Vaughn, 523 F. Supp. at 370-381

(Pet .  B - 4 , 5 ) .

T h i s  C o u r t ' s  l i n e  o f  c a s e s  f r o m
13/

McDonnell  Douglas t o  Aikens f u l l y  r e c o g -

11 /  Vaughn, 523 F. Supp. 368,  370 (P e t .  A 
B - 4 ) ,  c i t i n g  Vaughn, 471 F. Supp. at 283-86 
(J . A. 326-329)

13/  Furnco C o ns t ru c t i o n  Corp.  v .  Wate rs , 
438 U.S.  567 (1 97 8 ) ;  Board o f  Trus tees  o f  
Keene S ta te  C o l l e g e  v.  Sweeney, 439 U.S.  24 
( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  T e x a s  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  C o mm un i t y  
A f f a i r s  v .  B u r d i n e ,  450 U .S .  248 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .



30

n i z e  that  the u l t im a te  burden o f  p r o o f  in a 

p a r t i c u l a r  employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  c a s e , 

as with any o t h e r  type  o f  c i v i l  l i t i g a t i o n ,  

r e s t s  w i t h  the  p l a i n t i f f ,  and r e s p o n d e n t  

d o e s  n o t  s e e k  t o  e s c a p e  t h a t  b u r d e n .  

However,  the p e t i t i o n e r  ap par en t l y  seeks  to  

add s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t o  that  burden by s e v e r e l y  

r e s t r i c t i n g  the type  o f  e v i d e nc e  a p l a i n t i f f  

may p r e s e n t  and how t h a t  e v i d e n c e  may be 

weighed on the q u e s t i o n  o f  p r e t e x t ,  thereby  

i s o l a t i n g  the  i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n  from i t s  

g e n e r a l  p r a c t i c e s  r e g a r d i n g  m i n o r i t i e s .

McDon n e l l  D o u g l a s  and i t s  p r o g e n y  

ex pr es s  a keen s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  and awareness 

o f  t h e  s o c i e t a l  c o n c e r n s  t h a t  l e d  t o  the  

p a s s a g e  o f  T i t l e  V I I  in 1964 . The A c t  

r e f l e c t s  a n a t i o n a l  c onsensus  that  d i s c r i m i ­

n a t i o n  b a s e d  on r a c e  and sex  has  been  a 

p e r v a s i v e  p r o b l e m  in  Am er i c an  s o c i e t y .  

Moreover ,  a primary f o c u s  o f  that  problem was 

employment,  in which b l a c k s ,  o t h e r  m i n o r i ­



31

t i e s ,  and women were c o n s i s t e n t l y  r e l e g a t e d  

t o  l o w e r  p a y i n g  p o s i t i o n s  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  

o t h e r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  or  m e r i t .  Given the 

p e r v a s i v e  and a l l - e n co m p a ss in g  nature  o f  the 

prob lem,  Congress  not  o n l y  enacted  T i t l e  VII  

in 1964, but s trengthened i t  and broadened 

i t s  s cope  by the Equal Employment Opportun­

i t y  Act  o f  1972.

T h i s  C o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  in Burd i ne made 

p l a i n  the s imple  nature o f  the em pl o ye r ' s  

bu rd en  in m e e t i n g  t h e  p l a i n t i f f ' s  pr ima 

f a c i e  c a s e .  To f o l l o w  t h a t  r u l i n g  by 

g r e a t l y  r e s t r i c t i n g  the p l a i n t i f f ' s  a b i l i t y  

t o  p l a c e  t h e  e m p l o y e r ' s  a c t i o n  in  t h e  

c o n t e x t  o f  h i s  ge ne ra l  p o l i c y  with regard to  

m i n o r i t y  e m p l o y m e n t ,  w o u l d  s e r i o u s l y  

c u r t a i l  the a b i l i t y  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  p l a i n ­

t i f f  t o  e s t a b l i s h  the s t a t e  o f  mind o f  h i s  

employer ,  o r  t o  o t he r w is e  e s t a b l i s h  p r e t e x t .  

The ev id enc e  adduced below showed an employ­

ment s i t u a t i o n  o f  s u b j e c t i v i t y  and d i s c r e ­



32

t i o n  reg ar d i n g  a l l  t ypes  o f  employment d e c i ­

s i o n s .  ( J . A . 170 . )  The same s u b j e c t i v e  and 

d i s c r e t i o n a r y  dec i s i onmaking  p r o c e s s  that  

l e d  t o  the d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  Ms. Vaughn 

was a l s o  at  work in h i r i n g ,  d i s c i p l i n e ,  and 

d i s m i s s a l  d e c i s i o n s  which were shown to  be 

c o n s i s t e n t l y  adverse  t o  b l a c k s .

I I

The F i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  
W e r e  N ot  C l e a r l y E r r o n e o u s ____________

In Pul lman-Standard v .  Swint ,  456 U.S.  

273 (1982)  t h i s  Court  un der l ined  the impor t ­

ance  o f  the  p r o p e r  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Rule  

5 2 ( a ) ,  Federal  Rules  o f  C i v i l  P roc edu re ,  in 

r ev i ew in g  the f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  made by the 

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  Moreover ,  the Court  e x p l i ­

c i t l y  he ld  th at  i s s u e s  o f  i n t e n t  are p r o p e r ­

l y  t r e a t e d  as f a c t u a l  mat ters  by the t r i e r  

o f  f a c t .  Id_ at  288.

The c o n c e r n s  e x p r e s s e d  in  Swint  were  

c e r t a i n l y  understood  by the  Eighth C i r c u i t ,



33

which on two separate  o c c a s i o n s  has upheld 

the  f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  

In i t s  most  r e c e n t  o p i n i o n  in  t h i s  c a s e ,  

that  c o u r t  he l d :

T he  f a c t u a l  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h e  
d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  s h o u l d  n o t  be 
o v e r t u r n e d  u n l e s s  the  r e v i e w i n g  
c o u r t  i s  l e f t  w i t h  th e  d e f i n i t e  
c o n v i c t i o n  that  a mistake has been 
c o m m i t t e d .  Uni t e d  S t a t e s -  v .  
U n i t e d S t a t e s  Gypsum C o . ,  333 
U.S.  364,  395 (1948 ) .  We cannot
say ,  a f t e r  a r ev iew o f  the r e c o r d ,  
that  we are l e f t  with a d e f i n i t e  
c o n v i c t i o n  t h a t  a m i s t a k e  was 
committed in the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  
f i n d i n g s  o f  f a c t .

Vaughn, 702 F.2d at 139 (Pet  A - 4 ) .

As the  r e v i e w i n g  c o u r t  f ound  on two 

o c c a s i o n s  the  r e c o r d  amply s u p p o r t s  the  

f i n d i n g s  made by the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  In­

deed whi l e  the p e t i t i o n e r  c la ims  that  i t s  

a l l e g a t i o n s  o f  incompetence were unrebut ted ,  

i t s  r ev i ew  o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g s  

n e c e s s a r i l y  p o i n t s  t o  the f a c t u a l  b a s i s  f o r  

t h e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  h o l d i n g  t o  the  c o n ­

t r a r y .



34

The c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g s  are b u t t r e s s e d  by 

the f a c t  that  the d i s t r i c t  judge  made a t our  

o f  the p l a n t  t o  o bs e r ve  the o p e r a t i o n  o f  the 

p e t i t i o n e r .  The p e t i t i o n e r  has not  c h a l ­

l e n g e d  the  a c c u r a c y  o f  the  t e s t i m o n y  o r  

s t a t i s t i c a l  ev i d en ce  which formed the b a s i s  

o f  the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t ' s  h o l d i n g .  Ins tead  i t  

seems t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  w e i g h t  g i v e n  t h i s  

ev i d en ce  by the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t .  Respondent 

submits  that  such an a t ta ck  cannot  p r e v a i l  

under Rule 52 (a )  o r  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  ho l d in g  in 

Sw int .

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  was w e l l  aware o f  

i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  make the " s e n s i t i v e  

and d i f f i c u l t "  d e t er mi n at i on  o f  an employ­

e r ' s  " s t a t e  o f  m i n d . "  S ee  A i k e n s , 7 5 

L . E d . 2 d  at  411 .  As s u c h ,  t h a t  c o u r t  was 

ever  mindful  o f  the f a c t  that  o t h e r  ev i de nce  

o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o c c u r r i n g  d u r i n g  the  

r e l e v a n t  time p e r i o d  might be p r o b a t i v e  o f  

the  e m p l o y e r ' s  m o t i v a t i o n .  A c c o r d i n g l y



35

the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  admitted e v i d e nc e  tending  

t o  show the a r b i t r a r y  and unequal e x e r c i s e  

o f  s u p e r v i s o r y  d i s c r e t i o n .  ( J .A .  61 , 17 0 ;  

see  a l s o  Tr .  69,  206-07 ,  275,  309) .

Whi l e  on the  one  hand t h e  p e t i t i o n e r  

pr es ent ed  t est imony  that  Ms. Vaughn had p e r ­

formed her j o b  p o o r l y ,  there  was c o nt ra ry  

documentary ev id enc e  that  her p r i o r  sup er ­

v i s o r s  had c o n s i d e r e d  h e r  work e n t i r e l y  

s a t i s f a c t o r y .  I n d e e d ,  the  f a c t  t h a t  Ms. 

Vaughn r e c e i v e d  p r o g r e s s i v e  pay in c r e a s e s  

s t r o n g l y  sugg es t s  that  her per formance  had 

been adequate t o  the task (Tr .  640-637 ;  J .A .  

33 8 ) .  In the fa ce  o f  c o n f l i c t i n g  a s s e r t i o n s  

o f  c ompetence ,  with no o b j e c t i v e  standards  

t o  a p p l y  in r e s o l v i n g  t h a t  c o n f l i c t ,  and 

p e t i t i o n e r ' s  u n s u c c e s s f u l  e f f o r t s  t o  e x p l a i n  

away i t s  own admiss i ons  that  Ms. Vaughn was 

q u a l i f i e d  t o  p e r f o r m  the  j o b ,  the  t r i a l  

judge  p r o p e r l y  conc luded  that  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  

had o c c u r r e d .  This c o n c l u s i o n  was reached



36

a f t e r  the  t r i a l  c o u r t  t o u r e d  t h e  p l a n t ,

heard t est imony  whi l e  o b s e r v in g  the  demeanor

o f  the  w i t n e s s e s ,  and c o n s i d e r e d  a l l  t h e

ev i d en ce  b e f o r e  i t .  P e t i t i o n e r ,  d e s p i t e  two

o p p o r t u n i t i e s  t o  do s o ,  has not  shown the
1 3 /

f i n d i n g s  o f  the c o u r t  t o  be e r ro n e o u s .  The 

high d i s c h a r g e  r a t e  among b l a c k s ,  and the 

p r es en c e  o f  an overwhelmingly  white  super ­

v i s o r y  s t a f f ,  the  group most l i k e l y  t o  make
± 4 /

recommendations f o r  d i s c h a r g e  o r  demot i on ;  

the f a c t  that  the j o b  from which Ms. Vaughn 

was demoted was held l a r g e l y  by whites  and 

the j o b  t o  which she was demoted was held 

l a r g e l y  by b l a c k s ;  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  she  was 

r e p l a c e d  by a white  employee (Tr .  1 5 ) ;  the

13/  See ,  United S ta te s  v .  Ye l l ow Cab C o . , 
338 U.S.  338 (1949)  .

14/  S u b j e c t i v e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  i n v o l v ­
i n g  w h i t e  s u p e r v i s o r s  p r o v i d e  a r e a d y  
m e c h a n i s m  f o r  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  
Robbins v .  Whi te -Wi l son  Medical  C l i n i c , 642
F .2d  153,  C i r .  1 9 8 1 ) .  James v .  Stockham 
V a l v e s  & F i t t i n g s  C o . , 559 F .2d  310 ,  345
(5th C i r .  1977) c e r t ,  d e n i e d , 434 U.S.  1034 
( 1978) .



37

f a c t  t h a t  b l a c k s  were  o f t e n  h a r a s s e d  by 

s u p e r v i s o r s  and s u b j e c t e d  t o  work demands 

d i f f e r e n t  from t h e i r  white  c o u n t e r p a r t s ;  the 

f a c t  t h a t  the  o n g o i n g  f r i c t i o n s  be t ween  

b l a c k  employees and p e t i t i o n e r ' s  a l l - w h i t e  

s u p e r v i s o r y  w o r k f o r c e  were p a r t i c u l a r l y
IV

acute  on Ms. Vaughn's s h i f t ,  a l l  suggest  

a working environment in which employment 

d e c i s i o n s  are l i k e l y  t o  be permeated with 

r a c i a l  animus. In the cases  o f  Ms. Crutcher  

and Ms. Gee,  the t r i a l  c o u r t ,  on rev i ewing  

the e v i d e n c e ,  found that  they had not  e s ­

t a b l i s h e d  by a preponderance  o f  the ev id ence  

that  they had been d i s c r i m i n a t e d  a g a i n s t .  

On the o t h e r  hand, in the case  o f  Ms. Vaughn, 

a f t e r  tw ice  rev i ewing  the e n t i r e  r e co r d  in 

t h e  c a s e  the  t r i a l  c o u r t  r e a f f i r m e d  i t s  

h o l d i n g  t h a t  the  r e s p o n d e n t  had met t h a t  

burden.  C l e a r l y  the d i s t r i c t  c o ur t  d id  not

1 5 /  Vaughn,  471 F .S u p p .  at  285 .  
3 2 8 - 3 29 ) .

( J . A .



38

r e l y  on s t a t i s t i c a l  and background ev i d en ce  

a l one  in f i n d i n g  that  Ms. Vaughn's  demotion 

was m o t i v a t e d  by  i m p e r m i s s i b l e  r a c i a l  

c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .

I I I .

The C i r c u i t  C o u r t ' s  Have C o n s i s t e n t l y  
And A p p r o p r i a t e l y  App l i ed  The McDonnell  
Douglas -Burdine  Formulat ion_______________

The c o u r t s  o f  a p p e a l  have  g e n e r a l l y

unders tood  that  McDonnell  Douglas p r o v i d e s

an a n a l y t i c a l  f ramework f o r  e v a l u a t i n g

c la ims  o f  employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  and they

have  been s e n s i b l e  and f l e x i b l e  in t h e i r

a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  i t s  s tand ar ds .  Indeed the

o n l y  c o n t r o v e r s y  c o n c e r n i n g  t h i s  i s s u e

has i n v o l v e d  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  sho wi ng  a

d e f e n d a n t  must  make in  o r d e r  t o  r e b u t
J_6/

p l a i n t i f f ' s  prima f a c i e  c a s e .

16/  This  c o n t r o v e r s y  was r e s o l v e d ,  however,  
by t h i s  C o u r t ' s  r u l i n g  in B ur d i ne , 450 U.S.  
248 ( 1 98 1 ) .



39
Now, with t h i s  C o u r t ' s ,  r e c e n t  o p i n i o n  

in A i k e n s , there  would seem to  be even l e s s  

room f o r  c o n f u s i o n  regard ing  the ba lan c i ng  

o f  burdens o r  o t h e r  l e g a l  r i t u a l s .  Rather ,  

once  the p a r t i e s  have made t h e i r  p r e s e n t a ­

t i o n s ,  and the de fendant  has done a l l  that  

would be r eq u i re d  o f  him assuming that  the 

p l a i n t i f f  has made out  a prima f a c i e  c a s e ,

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  has b e f o r e  i t  
a l l  t h e  e v i d e n c e  i t  n e e d s  t o  
d e c i d e  w h e t h e r  ' t h e  d e f e n d a n t  
i n t e n t i o n a l l y  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  
ag a i n s t  the p l a i n t i f f s . '  B ur d i ne , 
supra at 253,  67 L.Ed.  2d 207,  101 
S .C t .  1089.

A i k e n s , 75 L . E d . 2d at  410.

Nothing more c l e a r l y  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  

g e n e r a l  l a c k  o f  c o n f u s i o n  then  the.  p e t i ­

t i o n e r ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  c i t e  s p e c i f i c  examples

o f  such purported  c o n f u s i o n  from any c i r c u i t
11/

o t h er  than the Eighth.

17/  Indeed,  even the Eighth C i r c u i t  cases  
c i t e d  by the  p e t i t i o n e r  do no t  e v i d e n c e  
c o n f u s i o n  o r  any f a i l u r e  t o  understand the 
a p p r o p r ia t e  approach under McDonnell  Douglas 
-  Burdine .  Rather ,  Johnson v .  Bunny Bread 

646 F . 2d 1 2 5 0 , 1 2 5 4 - 1 2 5 5  ( 3 t h  C i r .Co • f



40

IV

An Employer  Cannot  Esca pe  L i a b i l i t y  
Under T i t l e  V I I  Once D i s c r i m i n a t o r y  
Animus Has Been Shown t o  Have Been A 
S u b s t a n t i a l  F a c t o r  In An Employment 
D e c i s i o n

P e t i t i o n e r ' s  attempted r e l i a n c e  on the 

d e c i s i o n  o f  t h i s  C ou r t  in Mount H e a l t h y

C i t y  S c h o o l  D i s t r i c t  Board o f  Educat ion v.
18/

D o y l e , 429 U.S.  274 (1977)  i s  m is p la ce d .

17/  c ont inued

( 1 9 8 1 ) ;  Locke v . Kansas C i t y  Power & Light  
Co. , 660 F.2d 359 (8th C i r .  1981) ;  Rob inson 
v .  Arkansas S ta te  Highway and T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
Commission, 698 F.2d 957 (8th C i r .  1983) and 
Danzl  v .  Nor th  S t .  Paul  Map lewood -Oakda le
I n d e p e n d e n t  Sc h o o l  D i s t r i c t  No.__62 2,  706
F . 2 d  813 ( 8 t h  C i r .  1 9 8 3 ) ,  a l l  i n v o l v e  
re v i ewing  c o u r t s  bear ing  t h e i r  o b l i g a t i o n  
t o  r ev i ew  the r e co r d  as a whole ,  weighing 
the ge ne ra l  p o l i c y  o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  ev id enc e  
i f  i t  was a v a i l a b l e ,  and o v e r r u l i n g  t h e  
d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  i f  ther e  was an i n a p p r o p r i a t e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a n d a r d  o r  a f i n d i n g  
that  the lower  c o u r t ' s  f i n d i n g s  were c l e a r l y  
e r r o n e o u s .

18/  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h i s  i s s ue  i s  s imply  not  
p r e s e n t  h e r e  in t h a t  the  r e c o r d  d o e s  no t  
suppor t  a s i n g l e ,  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  and un­
t a i n t e d  reason f o r  Ms. Vaughn's d i s q u a l i f i ­
c a t i o n  .



41

The i s s ue  b e f o r e  t h i s  Court  i s  whether the 

ev i d en ce  taken as a whole was s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  

the d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  t o  have drawn an i n f e r ­

ence o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  i . e . , whether that  

ev i d en ce  e s t a b l i s h e s  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  T i t l e  

V I I .

Respondent contends  that  the l e g i s l a ­

t i v e  h i s t o r y  o f  T i t l e  V I I  makes i t  c l e a r  

that  Congress  intended that  i f  race  p layed 

any part  in an employment d e c i s i o n  then a 

v i o l a t i o n  o f  the  s t a t u t e  has o c c u r r e d .  

T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  i s s u e  o f  w h e t h e r  o t h e r  

f a c t o r s  would  have r e s u l t e d  in the  same 

e m p l o y m e n t  d e c i s i o n  in  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  o n l y  e f f e c t s  the remedy that  

i s  a p p r o p r i a t e ,  not  whether there  has been a 

s u b s t a n t i v e  v i o l a t i o n  t o  b e g i n  w i t h .

The l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  o f  the 1964 Act  

makes c l e a r  C o n g r e s s  was c o n v i n c e d  t h a t  

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in a l l  f a c e t s  o f  Amer ican  

l i f e ,  in c l ud in g  employment,  was pe r v a s i v e



42

and needed t o  be r o o te d  out  in t o t o .  Thus,

the House Report  s t a t e s  that  i t s  purpose  " i s

t o  e l i m i n a t e "  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  by p r o t e c t i n g

the r i g h t s  o f  a l l  per sons  " t o  be f r e e "  from
± 9/

i t .  Senator  Humphrey, the f l o o r  l e a d e r  in 

the Senate ,  s i m i l a r l y  s t a t e d  that  the b i l l

makes " i t  an i l l e g a l  p r a c t i c e  t o  use race  as
20/

a f a c t o r  in denying employment. "  And the 

S e n a t e  r e j e c t e d  a p r o p o s a l  by  S e n a t o r  

McCle l lan t o  amend S e c t i o n  7 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 )  which 

d e f i n e s  the s u b s t a n t i v e  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  T i t l e  

V I I ,  so  that  pe rs on n e l  a c t i o n s  were p r o h i b i ­

ted on l y  i f  they were taken " s o l e l y  because

19/  H. Rep.  No.  8 8 - 9 1 4  ( 8 8 t h  Cong .  1 s t .
S e s s . ) ,  r e p r i n t e d  in L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s t o r y  o f  
T i t l e  VII  and XI o f  C i v i l  R ights  Act  o f  1964 
(United S t a te s  Equal Employment Opportun ity  
C o m m i s s i o n ) ( H e r e i n a f t e r  L e g i s .  H i s t ,  o f  
T i t l e  V I I ) ,  at  p .  2026.  See a l s o  remarks o f  
Sen.  Byrd,  jid at  3119,  Cong. R e c . ,  Senate 
June 9,  1964,  p .  13169.

20/  Id .  at 3107,  Cong. R e c . ,  Senate ,  June 
9,  1964,  p .  13088 (Emphasis added) .



43

o f  r a c e ,  e t c . "  The amendment was opposed

by the B i l l ' s  sponsors  because  i t  would make
22/

i t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  p r o v e  a v i o l a t i o n .

S i m i l a r l y ,  in  1972 when C o n g r e s s

ree nac te d  and amended s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n s  
2 3 /

o f  T i t l e  V I I  i t  made i t  c l e a r  t h a t  

in i t s  view employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  was so 

p e r v a s i v e  t h a t  i t  had t o  be e x t i r p a t e d  

c o m p l e t e l y .  For example,  added t o  T i t l e  VII 

was S e c t i o n  717 (42 U.S.C.  § 2000e-16)  which 

e x t e n d e d  t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  T i t l e  V I I  t o  

f e d e r a l  a g e n c i e s .  As t h i s  Court has h e l d ,  

the purpose  o f  S e c t i o n  717 was t o  make the 

same s u b s t a n t i v e  law gover n ing  the p r i v a t e  

s e c t o r  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  the f e d e r a l  government.  

Morton v .  Mancar i , 417 U.S.  535,  547 (1 97 4 ) .

21 /  Id .  at 3124,  Cong. R e c . ,  Senate ,  June 
15,  1964,  pp.  13837-838.

22/  I b i d .

23 /  The Equal Employment Opportun i ty  Act  o f  
1972,  P .L.  92 -261.

1 1 /



44

S e c t i o n  717 p r o v i d e s  that  " a l l  p er so n ­

ne l  a c t i o n s  a f f e c t i n g  [ f e d e r a l  employees]

. . s h a l l  be made f r e e  from any d i s c r i m i n a ­

t i o n  based on r a c e ,  c o l o r ,  r e l i g i o n ,  sex or  

n a t i o n a l  o r i g i n . "  (Emphasis added. )  The 

c l e a r  language o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  would make i t  

im per mi ss i b l e  in the f e d e r a l  s e c t o r  t o  ho ld 

t h a t  an employment  a c t i o n  in whi ch  r a c e  

p layed  any par t  d id  not  v i o l a t e  T i t l e  V I I .

The l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  o f  the 1972 Act 

l e a d s  t o  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  same 

s tandards  e x p r e s s l y  s ta te d  in S e c t i o n  717 

should be app l i ed  t o  a l l  o t h e r  employers ,  

i n c l u d i n g  t h o s e  in the  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  

Thus,  Senator  W i l l i a m s ,  the f l o o r  manager o f

1972 Act  spoke o f  the need t o  "end j o b  d i s -
. 2 4 /

c r i m i n a t i o n  in our s o c i e t y .  Throughout

24/  L e g i s l a t i v e  H i s t o r y  o f  the Equal Em­
ployment Opportun i ty  Act  o f  1972,  Prepared 
by the Subcommittee in Labor o f  the Commit­
t e e  on Labor  and P u b l i c  W e l f a r e ,  Un i ted  
S t a t e s  S e n a t e  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  ( h e r e i n a f t e r ,  Leg .  
H i s t . ,  1972 A c t ) ,  p .  1767.



45

the debates  are r e f e r e n c e s  t o  the need t o

e l i m i n a t e  a l l  r e m a i n i n g  v e s t i g e s  o f  d i s -  
25 /

c r i m i n a t i o n .

F i n a l l y ,  t h e  d e c i s i o n  in  Mt . H e a l t h y  

was based in l a r g e  par t  on a concern  that  

e m p l o y e e s  c o u l d  i n s u l a t e  t h e m s e l v e s  f rom 

p l a n n e d  p e r s o n n e l  a c t i o n s  by the  s i m p l e  

e x p e d i e n t  o f  e n g a g i n g  in  F i r s t  Amendment 

a c t i v i t i e s .  429 U.S.  at 286.  In the case  

o f  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  based on r a c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  

the employee has no such power.

The r e c o r d  in  t h i s  c a s e  c l e a r l y  s u p ­

p o r t s  the  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  the  employment  

d e c i s i o n  c h a l l e n g e d  h e r e  was i n f l u e n c e d  

by r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  Thus,  respondent  

Vaughn was one o f  the few b l ac ks  t o  ho ld the

25/  See ,  e . g . , remarks o f  Senator  Wi l l i am s ,  
Leg.  H i s t . ,  1972 Act  at 653,  speaking o f  the 
need o f  " e r a d i c a t i n g  employment d i s c r i m i n a ­
t i o n "  and the remarks o f  Senator  Humphrey, 
the c h i e f  sponsor  o f  the 1964 A c t ,  at Leg.  
H i s t .  pp.  670-71 .



46

p o s i t i o n .  She was demoted by a new super ­

v i s o r  d e s p i t e  her one year  per formance  in 

the p o s i t i o n  which another  s u p e r v i s o r  had 

i n i t i a l l y  s t a t e d  was s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  and 

ther e  were no c o n c r e t e  o b j e c t i v e  s tandards  

used t o  measure her per formance a g a in s t  that  

o f  he r  w h i t e  p e e r s .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  the  

d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  was c l e a r l y  c o r r e c t  in  

c o n c lu d in g  that  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  was a 

s i g n i f i c a n t  e l e m e n t  in the  d e c i s i o n  t o  

remove her from the j o b  he ld and t o  put her 

i n t o  a lower  paying  p o s i t i o n .

The p u r p o s e s  o f  T i t l e  V I I  would be 

t o t a l l y  f r u s t r a t e d  i f  an e m p l o y e r  c o u l d  

e va de  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  such a c t i o n s  by 

a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  was 

o n l y  one o f  many f a c t o r s  which r e s u l t e d  in 

the  employment d e c i s i o n  at  i s s u e .



47

CONCLUSION

For the f o r e g o i n g  r e a s o n s ,  the  d e c i s i o n  

o f  the  c o u r t  b e l o w  s h o u l d  be a f f i r m e d .

R e s p e c t f u l l y  submi t ted ,

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
CLYDE E. MURPHY*
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON 
0 .  PETER SHERWOOD 
RONALD L. ELLIS 
JUDITH REED 

16th F loor  
99 Hudson S t r e e t  
New York,  New York 10013 
(212) 219-1900

JOHN W. WALKER
1191 F i r s t  Nat iona l  B u i ld ing  
L i t t l e  Rock,  Arkansas 72201

ZIMMERY CRUTCHER, JR.
Mays, Crutcher  & Brown 
Su i t e  836
One Union Nat i onal  Plaza 
L i t t l e  Rock,  Arkansas 72201

Counsel  f o r  Respondent

*Counsel  o f  Record



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