Response to Motion to Extend Time and Disposal of Pending Representation Motions
Public Court Documents
June 4, 1990
5 pages
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Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Response to Motion to Extend Time and Disposal of Pending Representation Motions, 1990. 9ebd8984-1b7c-f011-b4cc-6045bdffa665. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/adf8a91a-8839-4e5b-85a9-0e0aeeabcd84/response-to-motion-to-extend-time-and-disposal-of-pending-representation-motions. Accessed November 07, 2025.
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF TEXAS
JIM MATTOX
ATTORNEY GENERAL
June 4, 1990
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
Gilbert Ganucheau, Clerk
Fifth Circuit
600 Camp Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Re: LULAC v. Mattox, No. 90-8014
Dear Mr. Ganucheau:
Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced matter are the original and
twenty copies of the Attorney General's Response to Judge Wood's
Unopposed Motion to Extend Time for Oral Argument and Motion for the
Court to Dispose of Pending Representation Motions Prior to En Banc
Argument.
Sincerely,
Renea Hicks
Special Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
cc: Counsel of Record
S12/AGB3B3=22100 SUPREME COURT BUILDING AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2318
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN
AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VS. No. 90-8014
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants. on
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RESPONSE TO UNOPPOSED MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT AND MOTION FOR THE COURT TO DISPOSE OF PENDING
REPRESENTATION MOTIONS PRIOR TO EN BANC ARGUMENT
The Attorney General of Texas, on behalf of the State of Texas,
responds as follows to the Unopposed Motion by Judge Wood of Harris
County:
RESPONSE
1. While the State of Texas through the Attorney General does not
oppose the allocation of forty-five minutes per side for oral argument of this
case, it is important to stress what Judge Wood notes in the paragraph 5 of
her motion: that such additional time will not lessen the disagreement
between the Attorney General of Texas and private counsel unilaterally
designated by the Secretary of State about who constitutionally may be the
legal spokesperson for the State of Texas and its agencies and officials.
2. The same dispute is presented by the appearance of private
counsel for other state officials, and motions regarding them are pending;
however, at this point, private counsel for the Secretary of State is the only
one seeking to have time allotted for oral argument on June 19, 1990. The
Attorney General opposes the allocation of any time to the private counsel
for the Secretary of State.
MOTION
3. The Attorney General re-urges the Court to dispose of the
representation question before oral argument on June 19, 1990, by
disposing of the six pending motions which present the issue to the Court.
The motions seek to disqualify the private attorneys of three sets of state
officials appearing in this case in their official capacities: (a) the Secretary
of State of Texas; (b) eight members of the Texas Judicial Districts Board;
and (c) six putative intervenor Bexar County district judges.” In an order of
April 12, 1990, the panel in this case carried these motions with the case.
4. Failure to act on these motions effectively makes en banc law in
this Circuit which permits state officials appearing in their official capacities
to unilaterally retain private counsel to appear for them in federal court and
litigate on behalf of the state. Failure to act abrogates the state's
constitutional allocation of power to the elected Attorney General of Texas to
be the legal officer for the state. If left unattended, these circumstances can
only make this Court's job more difficult -- if not impossible -- in the many
future cases in which the Court must look to the states' legal officers to
articulate the state policy implicated by a legal issue before the Court.
5. The representation issue presented by the motions is not only of
fundamental importance; it is capable of easy resolution. The law is clear.
See, e.g., New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 247-48 n.1 (1984) (authority
to represent a state is a state concern); United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d
356, 368 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) (Attorney General of Texas has the exclusive
right to represent state agencies).
*®
These judges also seek to reverse the district court's denial of their intervention in their
personal capacities. Neither this motion nor the six pending motions challenge the
representation of these judges in their personal capacities.
“93.
6. Disposition now will aid the appellants’ attorneys in the division
of time for en banc oral argument. The Attorney General urges the Court to
grant the motions for disqualification or, in the alternative only, to certify
the state law question to the Supreme Court of Texas.
Respectfully submitted,
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY F. KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
Cg tod
RENEA HICKS
Special Assistant Attorney General
JAVIER GUAJARDO
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 4th day of June, 1990, I sent a copy of the
foregoing document by first class United States mail, postage prepaid, to
each of the following (except those marked with * to whom it was sent by
overnight courier, or those marked with **, to whom it was hand-delivered):
William L. Garrett, Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas, Suite 800,
Dallas, Texas 75225; Rolando Rios, Southwest Voter Registration &
Education Project, 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas 78205;
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 99
Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York 10013; Gabrielle K.
McDonald, 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701; Edward
B. Cloutman, III, Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm Street,
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637; J. Eugene Clements, Porter & Clements, 700
Louisiana, Suite 3500, Houston, Texas 77002-2730; Robert H. Mow, Jr.,
Hughes & Luce, 2800 Momentum Place, 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas
75201; John L. Hill, Jr., Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon, 3300 Texas
Commerce Tower, Houston, Texas 77002° ; Walter L. Irvin, 5787 South
La.
Hampton Road, Suite 210, Lock Box 122, Dallas, Texas 75232-2255; James
George, Jr., Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, NCNB Tower, Suite 3500,
515 Congress Ave., 6th & Congress, Austin, Texas 78711**; Paul Strohl, 100
Founders Square, 900 Jackson Street, Dallas, Texas 75202; Susan
Finkelstein, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600, San
Antonio, Texas 78205; and Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg,
Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc., 711 Navarro, Sixth Floor, San Antonio, Texas
78205,
i, QL uSe Lord
Renea Hicks