Correspondence from Turner to Ganucheau (Clerk); Reply Brief for the United States
Public Court Documents
March 23, 1990
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Case Files, Chisom Hardbacks. Correspondence from Turner to Ganucheau (Clerk); Reply Brief for the United States, 1990. 1d536ab4-f211-ef11-9f8a-6045bddbf119. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ae110e47-6ccc-479c-8e7a-64fe550bfe1d/correspondence-from-turner-to-ganucheau-clerk-reply-brief-for-the-united-states. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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U.S. Departuipt of Justice
Civil Rights Division
JPT:IG:pad
DJ 166-32-63
Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
600 Camp Street, Room 102
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
Appellate Section
P.O. Box 66078
Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
March 23, 1990
Re: Chisom & U.S. V. Roemer, No. 89-3654
Dear Mr. Ganucheau:
Enclosed are seven copies of the Reply Brief for the United
States.
Sincerely,
James P. Turner
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights Division
O_rt.0-vvuep-7
Irving Gornstein
Attorney
Appellate Section
By:
/cc: Counsel of record
3654
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
RONALD CHISOM, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
BUDDY ROEMER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
JOHN VOLZ JAMES P. TURNER
United States Attorney Acting Assistant Attorney General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
IRVING GORNSTEIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 66078
Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
(202) 633-2195
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 89-3654
RONALD CHISOM, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
BUDDY ROEMER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
We argued in our opening brief that because of racially
polarized voting and other factors, the State's use of a
multimember district to elect two of its seven Supreme Court
Justices deprives black voters of an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice. In contrast, if the multimember
district is divided into two districts, blacks will have an
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice from one of the
districts. For the most part, the State's response to this
argument tracks the district court's opinion. Since we have
already addressed the errors in the district court's reasoning in
our opening brief, we will not do so again. The State has made
several additional arguments, however, that were not expressly
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adopted by the district court. We reply to those arguments here.
1. The State contends (Br. 25-26) that incumbency is the
most important factor affecting the outcome of judicial
elections. That contention is without merit. Of the outcome-
determinative elections subjected to analysis, 18 did not even
involve an incumbent (Gov't Exh. 49 at 11). In these open-seat
elections, black candidates received an average of 86% of the
black vote and 16% of the white vote (ibid.). Even when
incumbents have run, voting has been racially polarized. In the
four elections in which a white incumbent sought reelection, the
black candidate received an average of 59% of the black vote and
19% of the white vote (id. at 11-12). And in the one election
subjected to analysis in which a black candidate ran with the
advantage of incumbency, he received 99% of the black vote, but
only 13% of the white vote (Tr. 33; Stip. 78). This evidence
shows that incumbency does not explain voting patterns in
District 1.
2. The State also argues that the amount of money a
candidate spends is a critical determinant of voting behavior and
that blacks can win elections in District 1 as long as they raise
enough money (Br. 36-39). To support this argument, the State
relies on Dr. Weber's report, which asserts that there is a
correlation between campaign spending and electoral success (Br.
39). The State's reliance on this report is misplaced. The
report at most proves only that blacks who spend more money than
their opponents can win elections in Orleans, where blacks
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constitute an electoral majority (Deft. Exh. 1 at 29). The
report does not suggest that blacks who outspend their opponents
can achieve similar success in District 1, where blacks
constitute an electoral minority. Indeed, the report does not
even show that campaign funding is the key to black electoral
success in Orleans. Of the 12 successful black candidates Dr.
Weber included in his analysis, 5 actually spent less money on
their campaigns than their opponents (Tr. 166).
Moreover, as we have already discussed (Gov't Br. 36),
because of socio-economic differences between blacks and whites,
unless black candidates are able to raise money from whites, they
will be less well financed than white candidates. Most whites,
however, are unwilling to contribute money to black candidates
(Tr. 97, 106). Thus, to the extent that campaign spending plays
a role in determining the outcome of elections, it simply
reinforces the conclusion that blacks do not have an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.
3. Finally, the State implies (Br. 7, 47) that the
Department of Justice approved its use of a multimember district
when it precleared the State's 1974 constitution under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act. The State is mistaken. Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act applies only to "changes" affecting voting.
See 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Since the State had used District 1 as a
multimember district since 1921, its inclusion in the 1974
constitution did not constitute such a change (Stip. 24).
Accordingly, in preclearing the 1974 constitution, the Department
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of Justice did not consider, much less approve, the continued use
of a multimember district.
In any event, the question presented here is not whether
the State illegally retained a multimember district in 1974; the
question is whether the use of a multimember district results in
vote dilution in violation of Section 2 today. As we have shown,
the evidence compels a finding that it does.
CONCLUSION
The district court's judgment should be reversed, and the
case should be remanded for the entry of appropriate relief.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN VOLZ JAMES P. TURNER
United States Attorney •Acting Assistant Attorney General
JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER
IRVING GORNSTEIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
P.O. Box 66078
Washington, D.C. 20035-6078
(202) 633-2195
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On March 23, 1990, I mailed two copies of this brief to:
Judith Reed
NAACP Legal Defense Fund
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
Roy J. Rodney, Jr.
McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz,
Cellini & Lang, PC
643 Magazine Street
New Orleans, La. 70130-3477
Robert Pugh
Commercial National Tower
Suite 2100
333 Texas
Shreveport, La. 71101-5302
George Strickler, Jr.
639 Loyola Street
Suite 1075
New Orleans, La. 70113
Peter J. Butler
201 St. Charles Avenue
35th Floor
New Orleans, La. 70170
William P. Quigley
901 Convention Center Blvd.
Fulton Place
Suite 119
New Orleans, La 70130
Moon Landrieu
717 Girod
New Orleans, La 70130
Drz..01A44,
Irving Gornstein
Attorney