Correspondence from Turner to Ganucheau (Clerk); Reply Brief for the United States
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March 23, 1990

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Case Files, Chisom Hardbacks. Correspondence from Turner to Ganucheau (Clerk); Reply Brief for the United States, 1990. 1d536ab4-f211-ef11-9f8a-6045bddbf119. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ae110e47-6ccc-479c-8e7a-64fe550bfe1d/correspondence-from-turner-to-ganucheau-clerk-reply-brief-for-the-united-states. Accessed July 01, 2025.
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U.S. Departuipt of Justice Civil Rights Division JPT:IG:pad DJ 166-32-63 Gilbert F. Ganucheau, Clerk United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 600 Camp Street, Room 102 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 Appellate Section P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 March 23, 1990 Re: Chisom & U.S. V. Roemer, No. 89-3654 Dear Mr. Ganucheau: Enclosed are seven copies of the Reply Brief for the United States. Sincerely, James P. Turner Acting Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division O_rt.0-vvuep-7 Irving Gornstein Attorney Appellate Section By: /cc: Counsel of record 3654 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT RONALD CHISOM, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant V. BUDDY ROEMER, et al., Defendants-Appellees APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA. REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES JOHN VOLZ JAMES P. TURNER United States Attorney Acting Assistant Attorney General JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER IRVING GORNSTEIN Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 633-2195 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 89-3654 RONALD CHISOM, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant V. BUDDY ROEMER, et al., Defendants-Appellees APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA REPLY BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES We argued in our opening brief that because of racially polarized voting and other factors, the State's use of a multimember district to elect two of its seven Supreme Court Justices deprives black voters of an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. In contrast, if the multimember district is divided into two districts, blacks will have an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice from one of the districts. For the most part, the State's response to this argument tracks the district court's opinion. Since we have already addressed the errors in the district court's reasoning in our opening brief, we will not do so again. The State has made several additional arguments, however, that were not expressly - 2 - adopted by the district court. We reply to those arguments here. 1. The State contends (Br. 25-26) that incumbency is the most important factor affecting the outcome of judicial elections. That contention is without merit. Of the outcome- determinative elections subjected to analysis, 18 did not even involve an incumbent (Gov't Exh. 49 at 11). In these open-seat elections, black candidates received an average of 86% of the black vote and 16% of the white vote (ibid.). Even when incumbents have run, voting has been racially polarized. In the four elections in which a white incumbent sought reelection, the black candidate received an average of 59% of the black vote and 19% of the white vote (id. at 11-12). And in the one election subjected to analysis in which a black candidate ran with the advantage of incumbency, he received 99% of the black vote, but only 13% of the white vote (Tr. 33; Stip. 78). This evidence shows that incumbency does not explain voting patterns in District 1. 2. The State also argues that the amount of money a candidate spends is a critical determinant of voting behavior and that blacks can win elections in District 1 as long as they raise enough money (Br. 36-39). To support this argument, the State relies on Dr. Weber's report, which asserts that there is a correlation between campaign spending and electoral success (Br. 39). The State's reliance on this report is misplaced. The report at most proves only that blacks who spend more money than their opponents can win elections in Orleans, where blacks - 3 - constitute an electoral majority (Deft. Exh. 1 at 29). The report does not suggest that blacks who outspend their opponents can achieve similar success in District 1, where blacks constitute an electoral minority. Indeed, the report does not even show that campaign funding is the key to black electoral success in Orleans. Of the 12 successful black candidates Dr. Weber included in his analysis, 5 actually spent less money on their campaigns than their opponents (Tr. 166). Moreover, as we have already discussed (Gov't Br. 36), because of socio-economic differences between blacks and whites, unless black candidates are able to raise money from whites, they will be less well financed than white candidates. Most whites, however, are unwilling to contribute money to black candidates (Tr. 97, 106). Thus, to the extent that campaign spending plays a role in determining the outcome of elections, it simply reinforces the conclusion that blacks do not have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 3. Finally, the State implies (Br. 7, 47) that the Department of Justice approved its use of a multimember district when it precleared the State's 1974 constitution under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The State is mistaken. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies only to "changes" affecting voting. See 42 U.S.C. 1973c. Since the State had used District 1 as a multimember district since 1921, its inclusion in the 1974 constitution did not constitute such a change (Stip. 24). Accordingly, in preclearing the 1974 constitution, the Department - 4 - of Justice did not consider, much less approve, the continued use of a multimember district. In any event, the question presented here is not whether the State illegally retained a multimember district in 1974; the question is whether the use of a multimember district results in vote dilution in violation of Section 2 today. As we have shown, the evidence compels a finding that it does. CONCLUSION The district court's judgment should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for the entry of appropriate relief. Respectfully submitted, JOHN VOLZ JAMES P. TURNER United States Attorney •Acting Assistant Attorney General JESSICA DUNSAY SILVER IRVING GORNSTEIN Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 (202) 633-2195 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On March 23, 1990, I mailed two copies of this brief to: Judith Reed NAACP Legal Defense Fund 99 Hudson Street New York, New York 10013 Roy J. Rodney, Jr. McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz, Cellini & Lang, PC 643 Magazine Street New Orleans, La. 70130-3477 Robert Pugh Commercial National Tower Suite 2100 333 Texas Shreveport, La. 71101-5302 George Strickler, Jr. 639 Loyola Street Suite 1075 New Orleans, La. 70113 Peter J. Butler 201 St. Charles Avenue 35th Floor New Orleans, La. 70170 William P. Quigley 901 Convention Center Blvd. Fulton Place Suite 119 New Orleans, La 70130 Moon Landrieu 717 Girod New Orleans, La 70130 Drz..01A44, Irving Gornstein Attorney