Board of Education of the City of Birmingham v. Armstrong Petitioners' Reply
Public Court Documents
January 17, 1964
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Board of Education of the City of Birmingham v. Armstrong Petitioners' Reply, 1964. a505dce4-c69a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/afad9cf9-b89b-4989-98ac-90b7c11e0e69/board-of-education-of-the-city-of-birmingham-v-armstrong-petitioners-reply. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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IN THE
i>itpnmtT ©curt ni % Inttefc BtaUz
OCTOBER TERM, 1963
No. 670
T h e B oard of E ducation of t h e C it y of
B ir m in g h a m , et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
D w ig h t A rm strong , et al.,
Respondents.
L inda S u e G ib so n , et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
C arolyn E leanor H arris, et al.,
Respondents.
L aw rence R oberts, et al.,
v.
Petitioners,
R a l ph S t e l l , et al.,
Respondents.
PETITIONERS’ REPLY
Petitioners, having this day received respondents’ brief
opposition, respectfully submit for their reply:
J A'M£s . M. NABRjU, IU
2
I.
1. Timeliness as to all three cases arises from the
authority of 28 USC §2101(e) to apply for writ of
certiorari “at any time before judgment [in the Court of
Appeals].”
2. Additionally, timeliness of the application as to
Gibson is conceded. Since the single petition authorized
by Rule 23(5) is timely in part, it must be timely as to
all, since the issue is unitary in character.
3. Respondents argue without citation that this Court
is limited under §2101 (e) to consideration of the merits
of the action of the District Court which the Court of
Appeals is reviewing.
(a) There is no such limitation in the statutory
language.
(b) It is §2101 (c)—the 90 day provision—rather
than 2101(e) which is limited to “judgment or
decree” as opposed to the authority of this Court
under §2106 over “judgment, decree, or order.”
The questioned rulings are clearly “orders” in this
legislative classification.
4. There has been no delay. One or two such orders
as are here complained of may be error, but they do not
rise to the status of a judicial practice meriting extra
ordinary review. It is the cumulation of the four uniquely
similar orders that creates the situation of “imperative
public importance” described in Rule 20.
II.
The merits are not here in issue, and petitioners accord
ingly have been prejudiced by respondents’ characteriza
tions and comments on the lower court rulings. If the
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underlying issues are deemed pertinent to the Court’s
decision, petitioners pray an opportunity to be heard in
opposition.
III.
The absence of any citation of precedent or textual
support in respondents’ brief for the assertion of sub
stantially unlimited writ powers in Courts of Appeals
confirms the conclusion of our own research that no orders
of the character of the four here sought to be reviewed
have ever previously been issued by any Court of the
United States.
Geo . S t e p h e n L eonard
R eid B . B arnes
1730 K Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.
Counsel for Petitioners
January 17, 1964