Griffin v. Maryland Brief and Record Extract of Appellants

    IN THE

Court  of Appea l s  of M a r y l a n d
September Term, 1960

No. 2 4 8

W illiam  L . Gr iffin , et al., Appellants, 
vs.

S tate of Maryland, Appellee, 
and

Cornelia Greene, et al., Appellants, 
vs.

S tate of Maryland, Appellee.

Appeal From the Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
(James H. Pugh, Judge)

BRIEF AND RECORD EXTRACT OF APPELLANTS

Charles T. D uncan 
J oseph H. S harlitt 
Claude B. K ahn  

8532 Freyman Drive 
Chevy Chase, Maryland 
Attorneys for Appellants

L ee M. H ydeman 
Of Counsel

P ress o f  B yro n  S. A d a m s , W a s h in g t o n , D . C.



INDEX

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Statement of the Case ...............................................  1
Questions Presented .....................................................  3
Statement of Facts ....................................................... 4
Summary of Arguments .............................................. 7
Argument .......................................................................  8

I . T h e  R equirements for Conviction U nder A r­
ticle 27, S ection 577, of the  A nnotated Code 
of Maryland (1957 E dition), W ere N ot Met 
in  T hat A ppellants’ A cts W ere N ot W anton, 
A ppellants W ere N ot Given P roper N otice, 
and A ppellants W ere A cting U nder A  B ona 
F ide Claim of R ight ................................................  8

II. T h e  A rrests and Convictions of A ppellants 
Constitute an E xercise of S tate P ower T o 
E nforce R acial S egregation in  V iolation of 
R ights P rotected B y th e  F ourteenth A mend­
ment to the  U nited S tates Constitution and
B y 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 ........................ 12

Conclusion .....................................................................  19

TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases :

Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 20
A.2d 485 (1941) .................................................  8

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) ......... ...15,16
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, (1917) ................  9
City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th 

Cir. 1957) ............................................................ 13,14
City of Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir.

1956), cert, denied 353 U.S. 922 ........................
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ......................

13
13



11 Index Continued

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ...........................  9
Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 

F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d per curiam 350
U.S. 877 ..................................................................  13

Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615
(4th Cir. 1956) cert, denied 352 U.S. 838 ...........  13

Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 57
A.2d 813 (1947) ...................................................  8

Drews v. Maryland, — Md. —, No. 113, September
Term, 1960 .......................................................... 14,18

Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259, 29 A.2d 253 (1942) .. 14
G-reenfeld v. Maryland Jockey Club of Baltimore, 190

Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948) ................................... 17
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.

1955), aff’d per curiam 350 U.S. 879 ....................  13
Interstate Amusement Co. v. Martin, 8 Ala. App. 481,

62 So. 404 (1913) .................................................  12
Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D.

Md. 1960) ................................................................  13
Kansas City, Mo. v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir.

1953), cert denied 346 U.S. 826 ...........................  13
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) .....................  16
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) .....................  16
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637

(1950) .....................................................................  14
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n., 202 F.2d 

275 (6th Cir. 1953), aff’d per curiam 347 U.S.
971 ........................................................................... 13

New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege,
252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958), aff’d per curiam 358
U.S. 54 ...................................................................  13

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) ..................  14
Rice v. Arnold, 45 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1950), vacated 340

U.S. 848 .................................................................. 13
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ......................15,16
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) .........................  15
Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.

I960) .......................................................................  13
Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1960) ............. 17

Page



Index Continued iii

Constitution and S tatutes: Page
Constitution of the United States:

Fourteenth Amendment...................................7, 8,13,14,
15,16,18

United States Code:
Title 42, Section 1981 ............................................7,11,17
Title 42, Section 1982 ............................................7,11,17

Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 edition):
Article 27, Section 576 ...............................................  8
Article 27, Section 577 ...................................... 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

7, 8, 9, 10
Article 27, Section 578 ...............................................  8
Article 27, Section 579 ...............................................  8
Article 27, Section 580 ...............................................  8

APPENDIX

Docket Entries and Judgment Appealed From
Warrants of Arrest (Griffin, et al.) ..................
Warrants of Arrest (Greene, et al.) ................
Proceedings (Griffin, et al.) ...............................
Testimony at Trial:

Francis J. Collins
Direct ..........................................................
Cross ............................................................

Abram Baker
Direct ..........................................................
C ross............................................................
Re-Redireet .................................................

Kay Freeman
Direct ..........................................................
Cross ................................

Page 
E. 1 
E. 11 
E. 12 
E. 13

E. 14 
E. 18

E. 22 
E. 24 
E. 26

E. 30 
E. 32



IV Index Continued

Opinion of Court (Griffin, et al.) ....................................E. 33
Proceedings (Greene, et al.) .......................................... E. 37
Testimony at Trial:

Francis J. Collins
Direct ......................................................................E. 37
C ross..........................................................................E. 39

Abram Baker
Direct ......................................................................E. 40
C ross....................................................................... E. 41
Redirect ..................................................................E. 44
Recross....................................................................E. 46
Re-Redireet ...................................................... E. 46

Lenord Woronoff
Direct ..................................................................... E. 46
C ross........................................................................E. 47

Ronyl J. Stewart
Direct ...............................................  E. 48

Martin A. Schain
Direct ......................................................................E. 51
C ross.................................................................  ,E. 51

Abram Baker (Recalled)
Direct ......................................................................E. 52
C ross.......................................................................... E. 53

William Brigfield
Direct ......................................................................E. 59

Opinion of Court (Greene, et al.) ..................................E. 60
State’s Exhibit No. 8 A .....................................................E. 66
State’s Exhibit No. 8 B .....................................................E. 75

Page



IN THE

C o u r t  of Appea l s  of M a r y l a n d
September Term, 1960

No. 248

W illiam  L. Gr iffin , et al., Appellants, 
vs.

S tate of Maryland, Appellee, 
and

Cornelia Greene, et al., Appellants, 
vs.

S tate of Maryland, Appellee.

Appeal From the Circuit Court for Montgomery County 
(Jam es H. Pugh, Judge)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEM ENT OF THE CASE

Appellants William L. Griffin, Marvous Saunders, Michael 
Proctor, Cecil T. Washington, Jr., and Gwendolyn Greene 
(hereinafter referred to as Appellants Griffin et al.) were 
arrested on June 30, 1960, and charged in warrants issued 
by a Justice of the Peace of Montgomery County with 
trespassing on June 30, 1960, on the property of Glen 
Echo Amusement Park in violation of Article 27, Section



2

577, of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 edition). 
All of the aforementioned Appellants are members of 
the Negro race.

Appellants Cornelia A. Greene, Helene D. Wilson, Mar­
tin A. Schain, Bonyl J. Stewart, and Janet A. Lewis 
(hereinafter referred to as Appellants Greene et al.) were 
arrested on July 2, 1960, and charged in warrants issued 
by a Justice of the Peace of Montgomery County with 
trespassing on July 2, 1960, on the property of Glen Echo 
Amusement Park in violation of the same statute cited 
above. Appellants Greene, Stewart, and Lewis are mem­
bers of the Negro race and Appellants Wilson and Schain 
are members of the Caucasian race.

Article 27, Section 577, of the Annotated Code of Mary­
land (1957 edition), provides as follows:

§ 577. Wanton trespass upon private land.

Any person or persons who shall enter upon or cross 
over the land, premises or private property of any 
person or persons in this State after having been duly 
notified by the owner or his agent not to do so shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction 
thereof before some justice of the peace in the county 
or city where such trespass may have been committed 
be fined by said justice of the peace not less than one, 
nor more than one hundred dollars, and shall stand 
committed to the jail of county or city until such fine 
and costs are paid; provided, however, that the person 
or persons so convicted shall have the right to appeal 
from the judgment of said justice of the peace to the 
circuit court for the county or Criminal Court of Balti­
more where such trespass was committed, at any time 
within ten days after such judgment was rendered; 
and, provided, further, that nothing in this section 
shall be construed to include within its provisions 
the entry upon or crossing over any land when such 
entry or crossing is done under a bona fide claim of



3

right or ownership of said land, it being the intention 
of this section only to prohibit any wanton trespass 
upon the private land of others.

Appellants were arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and waived 
a jury trial. The cases of Appellants Griffin et al., were 
consolidated for trial, by consent, and tried on September 
11, 1960, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 
Maryland, before Judge James H. Pugh. The cases of 
Appellants Greene et al., similarly were consolidated for 
trial and tried on September 11, 1960, in the same Court 
and before the same judge.* Each of the Appellants (de­
fendants below) was found guilty as charged and fined.

QUESTIONS PRESEN TED

1. Are the following elements of Article 27, Section 577, 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 edition), each of 
which is necessary to support a conviction, established by 
the record:

a. Were the actions of Appellants wanton within 
the meaning of the statute!

b. Was the statutory requirement of due notice by 
the owner or his agent not to enter upon or cross 
over the land in question met!

c. Were Appellants, who were attempting to assert 
constitutional, statutory, or common-law rights, acting 
under a bona fide claim of right within the meaning of 
the statute!

2. Did the arrest and conviction of Appellants violate 
or interfere with the rights secured to them by the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or the 
provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1982!

* The records of the two consolidated cases were consolidated into one 
record on appeal pursuant to a letter, dated November 16, 1960, from the 
Chief Deputy Clerk of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to counsel for 
the Appellants.



4

STATEM ENT OF FACTS

On June 30, 1960, Appellants Griffin et al. entered onto 
the property of Glen Echo Amusement Park (E. 15, 16), 
a park operated by Kebar, Inc., a Maryland corporation, 
under a lease from Rekab, Inc., also a Maryland corpora­
tion and the owner of the property (E. 22, 23). The officers, 
stockholders, and directors of both corporations are the 
same persons (E. 22, 26). The park is located in Mont­
gomery County, Maryland (E. 15). The owners' and oper­
ators of the park employ National Detective Agency, a 
District of Columbia corporation, to provide a force of 
guards at the park (E. 18, 24), and on June 30, 1960, 
and at all times pertinent to this action, the aforementioned 
guards were under the charge of Francis J. Collins (here­
inafter referred to as “ Lt. Collins” ), an employee of Na­
tional Detective Agency (E. 14, 18) who also holds a com­
mission from the State of Maryland as a Special Deputy 
Sheriff for Montgomery County, Maryland (E. 18).

When Appellants Griffin et al. entered the park, they 
proceeded to the carrousel which is located within the park 
and took seats thereon (E. 16). When an attendant ap­
peared, Appellants Griffin et al. tendered valid tickets for 
this ride which had been purchased and transferred to 
them by others (E. 20, 31). The attendant refused to 
accept the tickets and also refused to start the carrousel 
(E. 32). After a short time Lt. Collins approached 
Appellants Griffin et al. and advised them that the 
park was segregated and that Negroes were not per­
mitted therein; he further advised that Appellants Griffin 
et al. should leave the park or he would cause their arrest 
(E. 16, 17, 19). Appellants Griffin et al. refused to 
leave, whereupon Lt. Collins arrested them, transported 
them to an office located on the park property, and notified 
the Montgomery County Police, who came and took Appel­
lant to a police station located in Bethesda, Maryland (E. 
17), where they were charged with violations of Article 27,



5

Section 577, of the Maryland Code Annotated (1957 edi­
tion) (E. 11).

At all times pertinent hereto the conduct of Appellants 
Griffin et al. was orderly and peaceable (E. 21, 22, 31); 
the policy of the park was to refuse admission to Negroes 
solely on account of their race (E. 19, 23, 24, 25); and it was 
pursuant to this policy that Appellants Griffin et al. were 
refused service and arrested (E. 19, 24). Admission to the 
park is free and there is free and open access to the park 
through unobstructed entry ways (E. 20); the tickets 
which were in the possession of Appellants Griffin et al. 
were valid, duly purchased, and without limitation on 
transfer (E. 20, 31); said tickets could be purchased 
at a number of booths located within the park (E. 20); and 
no refund or offer to make good the tickets in any way was 
made by the operators of the park to Appellants Griffin 
et al. (E. 20).

Glen Echo Amusement Park advertises through various 
media, such as press, radio, and television, as to the avail­
ability of its facilities to the public and invites the public 
generally, without mention of its policies of racial dis­
crimination, to come to the park and use the facilities 
there provided (E. 25, 31). In addition to the car­
rousel the park offers various other facilities (E. 32).

Appellants Greene et al. were arrested on July 2, 1960, 
within the confines of a restaurant located in Glen Echo 
Amusement Park (E. 38), under circumstances sub­
stantially similar to those surrounding the arrest of Ap­
pellants Griffin et al. This restaurant was operated by 
B & B Catering Co., Inc., under an agreement with Kebar, 
Inc. (E. 40, 41).

In order to establish the relationship between these cor­
porations, two documents were admitted into evidence (E. 
53). The first, dated August 29, 1958, covered the “ 1959 
and 1960 Seasons” (E. 75). The second, undated and 
consisting of six pages, covered the period commencing on



6

or about April 1, 1957, and ending on or about Labor Day, 
September, 1958 (E. 66). Officers of Kebar, Inc., and 
B & B Catering Co., Inc., testified that the two documents 
constituted the entire agreement between the parties in 
effect on the day Appellants Greene et al. were arrested 
(E. 53, 59). Appellants objected to the introduction of 
the second document (E. 53).

When Appellants Greene et al. entered the restaurant, 
the attendants refused to serve them (E. 49, 51) and 
closed the counter (E. 51, 52). Shortly thereafter, Lt. 
Collins appeared and advised Appellants Greene et al. that 
they were undesirable and that if they did not leave, they 
would be arrested for trespassing (E. 38, 39, 49). 
Appellants Greene et al. refused to leave, whereupon Lt. 
Collins arrested them, transported them to an office located 
on the park property, and notified the Montgomery County 
Police, who took them to a police station located in Bethes- 
da, Maryland (E. 39), where Appellants Greene et al. were 
charged with violations of Article 27, Section 577, of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 edition) (E. 12). The 
arrests were made to implement the policy of the operators 
of the park to maintain racial segregation (E. 44, 47). 
Appellants’ conduct was peaceful and orderly at all times 
pertinent hereto (E. 39, 50). The facts' concerning 
ownership and operation of Glen Echo Amusement Park 
(E. 40) and its policies of racial exclusion (E. 44, 47), 
Francis J. Collins, and the National Detective Agency 
guards (E. 37, 38, 39), set forth above, apply equally to 
Appellants Greene et al. as they do to Appellants Griffin 
et al.

At the trials held on September 11 and 12, 1960, re­
spectively, all of the Appellants were found guilty as 
charged and fined (E. 36, 65). It is from these convictions 
that this appeal is taken.



7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The record does not support the convictions of Appel­
lants because of failure to meet the requirements of Ar­
ticle 27, Section 577, of the Annotated Code of Maryland 
(1957 edition), under which they were convicted. First, 
the acts of Appellants were not wanton but were at all 
times peaceable and orderly and cannot be characterized 
as reckless or malicious. Second, Appellants were not 
given the statutory notice required, since no notice was 
given to them at or prior to the time of entry into the place 
of public accommodation involved. Furthermore, Appel­
lants Greene et al. were given no notice whatever by duly 
authorized agents of the restaurant in which they were 
arrested. Third, Appellants entered and remained on the 
property in question under a bona fide claim of right and 
were acting under that claim when they were arrested.

The arrests and convictions of Appellants constituted 
an unlawful interference with the constitutionally pro­
tected rights of Appellants under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States. Appellants are 
protected by the Constitution against the use of state 
authority to enforce the private racially discriminatory 
policies of a person whose property is open to use by the 
public as a place of public service and accommodation. 
Further, appellants are entitled under the Constitution 
and as specified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 to be 
free from interference under color of state law with the 
making and enforcing of contracts or the purchasing of 
personal property on account of race or color. Moreover, 
the arrests and convictions of Appellants were not a rea­
sonable exercise of the police power of the state necessary 
to maintain law and order.



8

I
ARGUM ENT

The R equirem ents for Conviction U nder A rticle 27, Section 
577, of the A nnotated  Code of M aryland  (1957 Edition), 
W ere Not M et In  T hat A ppellan ts ' Acts W ere Not W anton, 
A ppellants W ere Not G iven P roper Notice, and  A ppellants 
W ere A cting U nder a Bona Fide C laim  of R ight.

A prerequisite to violation of Article 27, Section 577, of 
the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 edition), is wanton­
ness. The statute is clear on its face in this regard, since 
it is entitled “Wanton trespass upon private land.” In 
addition, the statute concludes with the statement that it is 
“ the intention of this section only to prohibit any wanton 
trespass upon the private land of others” (emphasis sup­
plied). Moreover, the use of “wanton” in this section is 
in contradistinction to other criminal provisions of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland relating to criminal trespass 
which do not contain this requirement. Article 27, Sections 
576, 578, 579, and 580, Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 
edition).

“ Wanton” normally means a malicious or destructive 
act. While this Court has not construed “ wanton” as used 
in Article 27, Section 577, it has construed “wanton” in 
other contexts. In Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 
Md. 610, 617, 56 A.2d 813 (1947), this Court stated. “ [t]he 
word wanton means characterized by extreme recklessness 
and utter disregard for the rights of others” , citing Balti­
more Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 602, 20 A.2d 485 
(1941). In recognizing the need for a finding that Appel­
lants’ conduct was wanton, the Trial Judge, in his opinion 
in one of these cases in the lower court stated that 
“ wanton” means “ . . . reckless, heedless, malicious, 
characterized by extreme recklessness, foolhardiness and 
reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others, or 
of other consequences” (E. 33).



9

It is difficult to comprehend the manner in which Appel­
lants’ conduct could be deemed wanton for purposes of 
conviction under the criminal statute here involved. The 
record is clear that the Appellants at all times conducted 
themselves in a peaceable and orderly manner. They en­
tered a place of public accommodation to which they, as 
members of the general public, had been invited through 
advertisement; they entered the usual and unobstructed 
route of ingress and egress ; and they were attempting to 
do no more than make use of the services offered at the 
time of their arrest. The act for which they were arrested 
was their refusal to leave under the belief that they were 
entitled to enjoy these servics free from interference by 
the state on account of race or color.

Moreover, they peacefully submitted to arrest. The 
Trial Judge, in part, seemed to base the finding of wanton­
ness on the possibility that the presence of a Negro in a 
place of public accommodation, the proprietors of which 
maintain a policy of racial discrimination, might produce 
a riot. Not only is this the result of archaic thinking; it 
also is contrary to the proposition frequently enunciated by 
the Supreme Court of the United States that the rights of 
private individuals are not to be sacrificed or yielded to 
potential violence and disorder brought about by others. 
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958); Buchanan v. 
Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).

The other basis for this finding of wantonness is the 
refusal of Appellants, because of their belief in their right 
to enjoy the services offered, to leave the premises upon 
being requested to do so. This, in and of itslf, is not a 
proper basis for a finding of wantonness, since the activity 
of Appellants was not characterized by that extreme reck­
lessness or foolhardiness which is required in order to 
arrive at a determination of the type of conduct punishable 
under the statute.

A second prerequisite to a valid conviction under Article 
27, Section 577, of the Annotated Code of Maryland, is due



10

notice by the owner or his agent not to enter upon or cross 
over his land, premises, or property. The language of the 
statute requires prior notice as a condition of conviction. 
It only applies to an entry or crossing “ after having been 
duly notified by the owner or his agent not to do so. ’ ’ In the 
instant cases, no notice was posted nor was any notice 
orally communicated to Appellants prior to their entry 
onto the land. Appellants had entered through an unre­
stricted means of ingress, open to the public, who were 
permitted and, in fact, invited to enter and use the facili­
ties of the park. Appellants Griffin et al. received no 
communication from anyone connected with the park until 
they were on the carrousel, and Appellants Greene et al. 
received no communication whatever until they were inside 
the restaurant, both of which were well within the bound­
aries of the property on which they allegedly trespassed. 
This Court is under the normal constraint to construe the 
statute narrowly, particularly since it is in derogation of 
the common law.

Even if the Court were to construe the statute broadly in 
the sense of meaning notice subsequent to entry, as to 
Appellants Greene et al., the record does not show that Lt. 
Collins was within the category of persons who are author­
ized to give notice under the statute, and therefore the pur­
ported notice was invalid. These Appellants were in a 
restaurant which was leased by Glen Echo Amusement 
Park (Kebar, Inc.) to B & B Catering Co., Inc. Appellants 
contend that, as a matter of law, the agreement between 
Kebar and B & B was contined in its entirety in the docu­
ment dated August 29, 1958 (E. 75). It did not purport to 
incorporate by reference or otherwise refer to any prior 
agreement. It was complete on its face and set forth the 
fact that it was “ the agreement” between the parties con­
taining the “ terms” thereof. The prior lease (E. 66), by 
its terms, expired in September, 1958, and, as a matter of 
law, was not and could not have been extended by the agree­
ment dated August 29, 1958. The testimony of the corpo­



11

rate officers to the contrary (E. 55, 56, 57, 59) is insufficient, 
appellants contend, to alter this conclusion. Further, the 
fact that the two agreements have overlapping and in some 
cases contradictory provisions demonstrates that the agree­
ment of August 29, 1958, was not intended as an extension 
of or supplement to the prior agreement. Unlike the prior 
agreement, the agreement of August 29, 1958, created a 
lease rather than a license, and contained no reservation 
of control over the operation and conduct of the lessee’s 
business beyond a restriction on employment of persons 
under eighteen years of age. It follows, if B & B was a 
lessee of the restaurant in which the arrests occurred, as 
distinguished from a licensee, that the evidence is wholly 
insufficient to support the contention that Lt. Collins was 
acting as the agent of the lessee when Appellants Greene 
et al. were “ notified” and subsequently arrested.

The third basis for setting aside Appellants conviction is 
the proviso that the statute does not apply to persons who 
are acting under a bona fide claim of right to be upon the 
property of another.

All of Appellants were members of the general public, 
invited to the park by the operators thereof. This invita­
tion was extended to the public, without qualification as 
to race or color, particularly to persons residing in the 
Washington metropolitan area, by way of advertisements 
in newspapers, signs on buses, and by radio and television. 
Entry to the park was free and unobstructed and open to 
all responding to such invitations. In view of these facts, 
Appellants’ bona fide claim of right to enter and cross 
over the property seems incontrovertible.

This claim of right is reinforced by the fact that all of 
the Appellants were trying to make or to enforce con­
tracts, or to purchase personal property, and thus their 
activity is given the express sanction of law, 42 TT.S.C.A. 
§4 1981, 1982, which give all persons, including Negroes,



12

the same right “ in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts . . .  as is enjoyed by white citizens, . . 
and an equivalent right to purchase personal property. A 
peaceable entry into a place of public business in order to 
purchase food, tickets, or other items on sale, or to make use 
of tickets duly purchased from the proprietor is certainly 
a proper exercise of these federally protected rights and, 
Appellants submit, gives rise to a bona fide claim of right, 
within the meaning of the statute involved.

In addition, in the case of Appellants Griffin et al., each 
of them had valid and duly purchased tickets for admit­
tance to the rides in the park. These Appellants, at the 
time of their arrest, were on one such ride and had ten­
dered the necessary tickets. Therefore, they were acting 
under a bona fide claim of right and were thereby excluded 
from operation of the statute since a ticket to a place of 
public amusement constitutes a contract between the pro­
prietor and the holder. Interstate Amusement Co. v. Mar­
tin, 8 Ala. App. 481, 62 So. 404 (1913).

II.
The A rrests  and Convictions of A ppellan ts C o n stitu te  An 

E xercise of S ta te  Pow er to Enforce R acial Segregation  in 
V iolation of R ights P ro tected  by  th e  F o u rteen th  A m end­
m ent to  the  U nited  S ta tes C onstitu tion  and  B y 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981 and  1S82.

The arrests and convictions of Appellants implemented 
the racially discriminatory policies of Glen Echo Amuse­
ment Park, a place of public accommodation. Such arrests 
and convictions constituted the use of the state police power 
to enforce those policies. Appellants contend that their 
federal rights thereby were violated. Although the federal 
questions presented here have not been squarely decided 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, the principles 
on which they rely have been clearly enunciated.



13

These basic principles were first expressed in the Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), in which the Supreme 
Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
rights and privileges secured thereby “nullifies and makes 
void . . . State action of every kind which impairs the priv­
ileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or 
which injures them in life, liberty or property without 
due process of law, or which denies to any of them the 
equal protection of the laws.” Supra at 11. Moreover, 
the Court stated that racially discriminatory policies of 
individuals are insulated from the proscription of the 
Fourteenth Amendment only in so far as they are “ un­
supported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs 
or judicial or executive proceedings,” or are “ not sanc­
tioned in some way by the State.” Supra at 17.

Consistent with these expressions, the doctrine has been 
clearly established that state power cannot be used affirma­
tively to deny access to or limit use of public recreational 
facilities because of race. This doctrine has been applied 
to such recreational facilities as swimming pools, Kansas 
City, Mo. v. Williams, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), cert, 
denied 346 U.S. 826; Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 
F.2d 890 (4th Cir. I960); public beaches and bathhouses, 
Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 
386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d per curiam 350 U.S. 877; Depart­
ment of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), 
cert, denied 3o2 U.S. 838; City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 
238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956), cert, denied 352 U.S. 922; golf 
courses, Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195, (Fla. 1950), vacated 
340 U.S. 848; Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th 
Cir. 1955) aff’d per curiam 350 U.S. 879; City of Greens­
boro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); parks and 
recreational facilities, New Orleans City Park Improve­
ment Association v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958), 
aff’d per curiam 358 U.S. 54; and theatres, Muir v. 
Louisville Park Theatrical A ss’n., 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 
1953), off d per curiam, 347 U.S. 971; Jones v. Marva 
Theatres, Inc., 180 F.Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).



14

Particularly pertinent to the instant case is the state­
ment contained in the decision of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the Dawson case, 
supra at 387:

. . it is obvious that racial segregation in recrea­
tional activities can no longer be sustained as a proper 
exercise of the police power of the state . . . ”

The Court of Appeals in that case specifically overruled 
Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259, 29 A.2d 253 (1942), which 
had espoused the doctrine of separate-but-equal in public 
recreational facilities. The Court, of course, based its 
view on the fact that Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), had in effect been overruled by the Supreme Court 
in a series of cases beginning with McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), as applied to educa­
tional facilities, and the Court stated that it was equally 
inapplicable to any other public facility.

This rule has been followed without distinction between 
recreational facilities which are operated by state authori­
ties in a “governmental” or “ proprietary” capacity, City 
of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, supra, and facilities which 
have been leased by state authorities to private operators, 
City of Greensboro v. Simkins, supra. The rule therefore 
has been applied in an all-inclusive manner.

The distinction between the cases cited above and the 
instant case is the fact that the facility here involved is 
not operated by or leased from the state, and therefore the 
owners or operators of the park are not themselves af­
fected by the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It follows, as has been held by this Court in Drews v. 
Maryland, — Md. — (1961), No. 113, September Term, 
1960, that a private owner or operator of a place of 
public amusement is free to choose his customers on such 
bases as he sees fit, including race or color. It is equally 
clear, however, that the state can no more lend its legisla­



15

tive, executive or judicial power to enforce private policies 
of racial discrimination in a place of public accommodation 
than it can adopt or enforce such policies in a facility 
operated by it directly. If one is an infringement of 
Fourteenth Amendment rights and an improper exercise 
of the state’s police power, so is the other. Cf. Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).

The Supreme Court also has enunciated the principle 
that the powers of the state, whether legislative, judicial, 
or executive, cannot he used to enforce racially discrimina­
tory policies of private persons relating to the purchase 
and sale of real property. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1 (1948), the Court held that state courts could not carry 
out the racially discriminatory policies of private land 
owners through judicial enforcement of racial restrictive 
covenants. Moreover, the Court was unwilling to permit 
state courts to grant damages against private landowners 
for breach of such covenants. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 
U.S. 249 (1953). The Court, in holding that judicial en­
forcement of racial discrimination violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment, made it clear “ that the action of the States 
to which the Amendment has reference, includes action of 
state courts and state judicial officers.” Shelley v. 
Kraemer, supra at 18. The assertion that property rights 
of private individuals were paramount was met by the 
Court in stating that:

The Constitution confers upon no individual the 
right to demand action by the State which results in 
the denial of equal protection of the laws to other 
individuals. Supra at 22.

We are not here concerned, nor was the Court in Shelley 
and Barrows, concerned with the questions whether or not 
private citizens are required to sell to Negroes or of the 
power of the state to force them so to sell. The question, 
here, as in Shelly and Barrows, is whether or not the state, 
consistent with the Constitution, can permit the full panoply 
of its power to be used to aid, abet, implement, and effec­



16

tuate discrimination by private entrepreneurs on account 
of race or color. And, in the instant case, the use of state 
power is more odious than in Shelly and Barrows because 
criminal, rather than civil, sanctions have been imposed.

Furthermore, if individuals are attempting to exercise 
federally protected rights, the fact that they are physically 
present on private property which has been opened up to 
the public is of no consequence and does not justify the 
imposition by the state of criminal trespass sanctions.

In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), privately 
owned land was being used as a “ company town.” The 
landowner caused the arrest (by a company employee who 
was also a county deputy sheriff) for trespass of a member 
of a religious sect who was distributing literature contrary 
to the wishes of the owner. It was argued in support of 
the arrest that the landowner’s right of control is coexten­
sive with the right of the homeowner to regulate the con­
duct of his guests. The Court stated:

“We cannot accept that contention. Ownership does 
not always mean absolute dominion. The more an 
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for 
use by the public in general, the more do his rights be­
come circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional 
rights of those who use it,” Supra at 505-6.

Obviously, the respective rights of the parties must be 
recognized and balanced. It should be noted, however, that 
even the homeowner does not have absolute and inviolable 
rights, as pointed out by the Court in Martin v. Struthers, 
319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door 
distribution of handbills held invalid as applied to ad­
vertisement of religious meeting).

Glen Echo Amusement Park has been opened by the 
owner as a place of public accommodation, for his finan­
cial advantage, and, following Marsh, he has thereby sub­
ordinated his rights as a private property owner to the con­
stitutional rights of the public who use it.



17

Appellants also rely on 42 U.S.C. §1981, which pro­
vides that “ all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States shall have the same right in every State 
and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . .  as is en­
joyed by white citizens, . . .” , and on 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 
which provides that “all citizens . . . shall have the same 
right . . .  as is enjoyed by white citizens to . . . purchase 
. . . personal property.” Appellants entered Glen Echo 
Amusement Park for the purpose of making contracts 
with the operators of the park to use the facilities located 
there and to purchase food, tickets, and other articles of 
personal property which were on sale to the public. Ap­
pellants Griffin et al, being in lawful possession of valid 
tickets, in fact had entered into contractual relations with 
the operators of the park (see Greenfeld v. Maryland 
Jockey Club of Baltimore, 190 Md. 96, 57 A.2d 335 (1948)), 
and were, at the time of their arrest, seeking to enforce 
those contracts. Without question, Appellants arrests con­
stituted unlawful interference with the exercise of their 
statutory rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.

The arguments advanced hereinabove by Appellants were 
urged on the court in Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3rd 
Cir. 1949), involving facts substantially similar to those in 
the instant case. In Valle, the court held that the convic­
tions of the defendants under the New Jersey trespass 
statute were void on the grounds that they constituted state 
enforcement of privately imposed racial discrimination in 
a place of public amusement in violation of defendants’ 
rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they constituted 
an unconstitutional interference with defendants’ equal 
rights to make and enforce contracts and to purchase per­
sonal property as set forth in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982. 
Appellants rely on that case.

The Court might well inquire as to the means available 
to the owner of a place of public accommodation to enforce



18

his right to pick and choose his customers and to remove 
unwanted persons from his property. Appellants submit 
that the owner may resort to his common-law right of 
reasonable self-help to remove such persons. If the person 
resists to the point of disorderly conduct, or if a breach 
of the peace is imminent or ensues, then resort may be 
had to state authority to redress or prevent such independ­
ent violations of the law. To permit state authorities to 
lend their aid by arresting unwanted persons solely on ac­
count of race or color in a place of public accommodation, 
and to enforce judicially such racially discriminatory poli­
cies through criminal prosecution and conviction goes too 
far.

Appellants are aware of the holding of this Court in 
Drews v. State of Maryland, — Md. — (1961), No. 113, 
September Term, 1960. That case is factually distinguish­
able on at least two grounds. In the Drews case, which 
involved convictions for disorderly conduct, this Court 
relied heavily upon the fact as established by the record 
that the crowd which gathered around the defendants at 
the time of their arrest was angry and on the verge of 
getting out of control, which led this Court to conclude 
that defendants were “inciting” the crowd by refusing 
to obey valid commands of police officers. In addition, it 
was found by the trial court that the Drews defendants in 
fact acted in a disorderly manner. In the instant case, the 
record is entirely barren of evidence that any element of 
incitement was present. Further, the record repeatedly 
shows that Appellants at all times conducted themselves in 
a peaceful and orderly manner. In this case, therefore, 
disorder and imminent violence were not present, and it 
cannot be said here, as it was said in Drews, that the ar­
rests were made to prevent violence or the further com­
mission of disorderly acts. Appellants submit that this 
case cannot be decided simply by following Drews v. Mary­
land, supra.

This Court is called upon to balance conflicting interests. 
On the one hand, the private businessman, having invited



19

the general public to come upon his land, nevertheless 
seeks to exclude particular members of that public on ac­
count of race and color and asks the state to assist him in 
so doing. On the other hand, members of the public, hav­
ing been invited to use the services offered by the private 
businessman, ask only that the state refrain from assist­
ing him in effectuating his dicriminatory policies.

In striking this balance, Appellants urge this Court to 
take judicial notice of the changes which have occurred in 
the State of Maryland in recent years. Discrimination on 
account of race is now contrary to the public policy of the 
State in all areas of public activity. Bills have been intro­
duced in the legislature to outlaw racial discrimination in 
privately owned places of public accommodation. At least 
one county has established a Human Relations Council to 
deal with residual areas of racial friction. In Baltimore, 
parts of Montgomery County, and elsewhere in the state, 
privately owned hotels, restaurants, bowling alleys and 
other places of public accommodation have been desegre­
gated by the voluntary action of their owners.

All of these developments stem from the recognition that 
racial discrimination is morally wrong, economically un­
sound, inconvenient in practice and unnecessary in fact.

In deciding these cases justice can permit but one result.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the judgments below 
should be reversed with directions to vacate the convic­
tions and to dismiss the proceedings against Appellants.

Charles T. D uncan 
J oseph H . S harlitt 
Claude B. K ahn  

Attorneys for Appellants
L ee M. H ydeman

Of Counsel



RECORD EXTRACT



E l

No. 3881 Criminal 
S tate oe Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
W illiam  L. Gr iffin  

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Recognizance, Demand for Jury 

Trial &c filed, Page No. 1.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed, Page No. 5.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3882, 3883, 3889 and 3892 Criminal.
Sep. 12,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 12, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Defendant was asked if he had anything to 

say before sentence.
Sep. 12, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, William L. 

Griffin, pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 dollars ($50.00) 
current money and costs, and in default in the payment 
of said fine and costs, that the Traverser, William L. 
Griffin be confined in the Montgomery County Jail until 
the fine and costs have been paid or until released by due 
process of law.

Sep. 12,1960—Appeal filed, Page No. 6.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed, Page No. 7.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J . H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E2

No. 3882 Criminal 
S tate of M aryland

Docket Entries

vs.
Michael A. P roctor 

TRESPASSING
Ang. 4, 1960—Warrant, Recognizance, Demand for Jury 

Trial &e. filed, Page No. 1.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed, Page No. 5.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3881, 3883, 3889 and 3892 Criminals.
Sep. 12,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 12,1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Defendant was asked if he had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 12, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Michael A. 

Proctor, pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 Dollars ($50.00) 
and costs, and in default in the payment of said fine and 
costs, that the Traverser, Michael A. Proctor, be con­
fined in the Montgomery County Jail until the fine and 
costs have been paid or until released by due process of 
law.

Sep. 12,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3881 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—'Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3881 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J . H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E3

No. 3883 Criminal 
S tate of Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
Cecil T. W ashington, J r.

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Recognizance, Demand for Jury 

Trial &c. filed, Page No. 1.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed, Page No. 6.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3881, 3882, 3889 and 3892 Criminals.
Sep. 12,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 12, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Defendant was asked if he had anything to 

say before sentence.
Sep. 12, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Cecil T. 

Washington, Jr., pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 Dollars 
($50.00) current money and costs and in default in the 
payment of said fine and costs, that the Traverser Cecil 
T. Washington, Jr., be confined in the Montgomery 
County Jail until the fine and costs have been paid or 
until released by due process of law.

Sep. 12,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3881 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3881 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J . H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E4

No. 3889 Criminal 
S tate op Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
Marvous S aunders 

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Demand for Jury Trial &c. filed, 

Page No. 1.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed, Page No. 6.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3881, 3882, 3883 and 3892 Criminal.
Sep. 12,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 12, 1960—The Court finds the defendant guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Defendant was asked if he had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 12, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Marvous 

Saunders, pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 Dollars ($50.00) 
current money and costs, and in default in the payment of 
said fine and costs that the Traverser, Marvous Saunders, 
be confined in the Montgomery County Jail until the fine 
and costs have been paid or until released by due process 
of law.

Sep. 12,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3881 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3881 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J. H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E5

No. 3892 Criminal 
S tate oe Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
Gwendolyn T. Greene 

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Demand for Jury Trial &c. filed, 

Page No. 1.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed, Page No. 6.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3881, 3882, 3883 and 3889 and 3892 Crim­
inals.

Sep. 12,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 12, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 12, 1960—Defendant was asked if she had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 12, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Gwendolyn 

T. Greene, pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 dollars ($50.00) 
current money and costs, and in default in the payment 
of said fine and costs, that the Traverser, Gwendolyn T. 
Greene, be confined in the Montgomery County Jail until 
the fine and costs have been paid or until released by 
due process of law.

Sep. 12,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3881 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3881 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J. H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E6

No. 3878 Criminal 
S tate oe Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
Cornelia A. Greene 

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Recognizance, Demand for Jury 

Trial &c. filed, Page No. 1.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with numbers 3879, 3890, 3891 and 3893 Criminals.
Sep. 13, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed, Page No. 6.
Sep. 13,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 13, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Defendant was asked if she had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 13, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Cornelia A. 

Greene, pay a fine of One hundred and no/100 dollars 
($100.00) current money and costs, and in default in the 
payment of said fine and costs that the Traverser, Cor­
nelia A. Greene, be confined in the Montgomery County 
Jail until the fine and costs have been paid or until 
released by due process of law.

Sep. 13,1960—Appeal filed, Page No. 7.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including the 15th day of November, 1960, Page No. 8.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J. H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E7

No. 3879 Criminal 
S tate of M aryland

Docket Entries

vs.
H elene D. W ilson 

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Recognizance, Demand for Jury 

Trial &c. filed.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3878, 3890, 3891 and 3893 Criminals.
Sep. 13, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed.
Sep. 13,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 13, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Defendant was asked if she had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 13, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Helene D. 

Wilson, pay a fine of One Hundred and no/100 dollars 
($100.00) current money, and costs, and in default in the 
payment of said fine and costs that the Traverser, Helene 
D. Wilson, be confined in the Montgomery County Jail 
until the fine and costs have been paid or until released 
by due process of law.

Sep. 13,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3878 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3878 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J . H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E8

No. 3890 Criminal 
S tate of Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
M artin A. S chain 

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Demand for Jury Trial &c. filed.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3878, 3879, 3891 and 3893 Criminal.
Sep. 13, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed.
Sep. 13,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 13, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Defendant was asked if he had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 13, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Martin A. 

Schain, pay a fine of One hundred and no/100 dollars 
($100.00) current money, and costs, and in default in the 
payment of said fine and costs, that the Traverser, Mar­
tin A. Schain, be confined in the Montgomery County 
Jail until the fine and costs have been paid or until 
released by due process of law.

Sep. 13,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3878 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to and including November 15, 
1960 filed in No. 3878 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J. H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E9

No. 3891 Criminal 
S tate of Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
R onyl J .  S tewart

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Demand for Jury Trial &c. filed.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and Leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3878, 3879, 3890 and 3893 Criminal.
Sep. 13, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed.
Sep. 13,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 13, 1960—The Court finds defendant guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Defendant was asked if he had anything to 

say before sentence.
Sep. 13, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Ronyl J. 

Stewart, pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 dollars ($50.00) 
current money, and costs, and in default in the payment 
of said fine and costs, that the Traverser Ronyl J. 
Stewart, be confined in the Montgomery County Jail, 
until the fine and costs have been paid or until released 
by due process of law.

Sep. 13,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3878 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3878 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J. H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E10

No. 3893 Criminal 
S tate of Maryland

Docket Entries

vs.
J anet A. L ewis 

TRESPASSING
Aug. 4, 1960—Warrant, Demand for Jury Trial &c. filed.
Sep. 12, 1960—Motion and leave to consolidate this case 

with Numbers 3878, 3879, 3890 and 3891 Criminal.
Sep. 13, 1960—Motion and leave to amend warrant and 

amendment filed.
Sep. 13,1960—Plea not guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Submitted to the Court and trial before 

Judge Pugh, Mrs. Slack reporting.
Sep. 13, 1960—The Court finds the defendant guilty.
Sep. 13, 1960—Defendant was asked if she had anything 

to say before sentence.
Sep. 13, 1960—Judgment that the Traverser, Janet A. 

Lewis, pay a fine of Fifty and no/100 dollars ($50.00) 
current money, and costs, and in default in the payment 
of said fine and costs, that the Traverser Janet A. Lewis,- 
be confined in the Montgomery County Jail until the 
fine and costs have been paid or until released by due 
process of law.

Sep. 13,1960—Appeal filed in No. 3878 Criminal.
Oct. 13, 1960—Petition and Order of Court extending time 

for transmittal of record to Court of Appeals to and 
including November 15, 1960 filed in No. 3878 Criminal.

L. T. Kardy—State’s Attorney
J. H. Sharlitt & C. T. Duncan—Attorneys for Defendant



E ll

State Warrant

S tate of Maryland, M ontgomery County, to w it:
To James S. McAuliffe, Superintendent of Police of said 

County, Greeting:
W hereas, Complaint hath been made upon the informa­

tion and oath of Lt. Francis Collins, Deputy Sheriff in and 
for the Glen Echo Park, who charges that William L. 
Griffin, late of the said County and State, on the 30th day 
of June, 1960, at the County and State aforesaid, did un­
lawfully and wantonly enter upon and cross over the land 
of Rekab, Inc., a Maryland corporation, in Montgomery 
County, Mryland, such land at that time having been leased 
to Kebar, Inc. a Maryland corporation, and operated as the 
Glen Echo Amusement Park, after having been duly noti­
fied by an Agent of Kebar, Inc., not to do so in violation of 
Article 27, Section 577 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 
1957 Edition as amended, contrary to the form of the Act 
of the General Assembly of Maryland, in such case made 
and provided, and against the peace, government and dig­
nity of the State.

You are hereby commanded immediately to apprehend
the said .............................—................ and bring ....h._.....
before ... ..... ........................................... ... Judge at _____
............. - ............ — Montgomery County, to be dealt with
according to law. Hereof fail not, and have you there 
this Warrant.

Justice of the Peace for Montgomery 
County, Maryland

Issued ...............................................19...... .
[Identical warrants were issued against Appellants 

Michael A. Proctor, No. 3882 Criminals, Cecil T. Wash­
ington, Jr., No. 3883 Criminals, Marvous Saunders, No. 
3889 Criminals, and Gwendolyn T. Greene, No. 3892, Crim­
inals.]



E12

State Warrant

S tate of Maryland, M ontgomery County, to w it:
To James S. McAuliffe, Superintendent of Police of said 

County, Greeting:
W hereas, Complaint hath been made upon the informa­

tion and oath of Lt. Francis Collins, Deputy Sheriff in and 
for the Glen Echo Park, who charges that Cornelia A. 
Greene, late of the said County and State, on the 2nd day 
of July, 1960, at the County and State aforesaid, did un­
lawfully and wantonly enter upon and cross over the land 
of Eekab, Inc., a Maryland corporation, in Montgomery 
County, Mryland, such land at that time having been leased 
to Kebar, Inc. a Maryland corporation, and operated as the 
Glen Echo Amusement Park, after having been duly noti­
fied by an Agent of Kebar, Inc., not to do so in violation of 
Article 27, Section 577 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, 
1957 Edition as amended, contrary to the form of the Act 
of the General Assembly of Maryland, in such case made 
and provided, and against the peace, government and dig­
nity of the State.

You are hereb)7- commanded immediately to apprehend
the said ...... ..................... —.............. . and bring ....h.......
before .............. .... ........................ ....... . Judge at _____
................... ..... .....  Montgomery County, to be dealt with
according to law. Hereof fail not, and have you there 
this Warrant.

Justice of the Peace for Montgomery 
County, Maryland

Issued .............................. - .......- .....19-----
[Identical warrants were issued against Appellants 

Helene D. Wilson, No. 3879 Criminals, Martin A. Sehain, 
No. 3890 Criminals, Ronyl J. Stewart, No. 3891 Criminals, 
and Janet A. Lewis, No. 3893 Criminals.]



E13

2 Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings (Griffin, et al.)

The above-entitled cause came on regularly for hearing, 
pursuant to notice, on September 12, 1960, at 10:00 o’clock 
a.m. before The Honorable James H. Pugh, Judge of said 
Court, when and where the following counsel were present 
on behalf of the respective parties, and the following pro­
ceedings were had and the f ollowing testimony was adduced.

By Mr. McAuliffe: Your Honor, the State will move to 
amend the warrants in all five oases, and I have prepared 
copies of the amendment that we would ask that the Court 
make to these warrants, and I would ask that in each case 
the copy which I have prepared be attached to the original 
warrant, as an amendment to it, and the amendment we 
desire to make is the same amendment in each ease and 
would read as follows:

By Judge Pugh: Have the defense lawyers seen it?
By Mr. Duncan: I would like to see it, your Honor. (Mr. 

McAuliffe hands a copy of the proposed amendment to 
defense attorneys). Defense counsel makes no objection to 
the motion for leave to amend the warrants, your Honor.

By Judge Pugh: The motion is granted. 
* * # # * * # # # #
3 By Judge Pugh: The pleas are “ not guilty?”

By Mr. Duncan: Yes, your Honor.
# * = & # # * # # # #
6 By Mr. Duncan: I would like, with the Court’s

leave, to reserve the opening statement on behalf of 
the defendants, and I would like to move to dismiss and 
quash the warrants. The prosecutor has stated that the ar­
rests in this case were made by a State officer for the pur­
pose of enforcing a policy of private segregation, put into 
effect and maintained by the owner and lessee of the prem­
ises involved. I submit to the Court that such use of State 
power is unconstitutional. That the application of the 
statute in this case is unconstitutional. The argument 
being that the State may not discriminate against citizens



E14

on the ground of race and color. It may not do so directly, 
and it cannot do so indirectly. I further move to dismiss 
the warrants—

By Judge Pugh: The Court is not allowed to direct a 
verdict on opening statements. If the Court sits without 
a jury, it is sitting as a jury, and then the Court is the 
Judge of the law and the facts, so, on opening statements 
we do not recognize motions for a directed verdict. The 
motion is over-ruled.
Whereupon,

Francis J. Collins

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the plaintiff, and having first been duly sworn, accord­
ing to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon
7 Direct Examination

By Mr. McAuliffe:
Q. Lieutenant, will you identify yourself to the Court? 

A. Francis J. Collins; 1207 E. Capitol Street, Washing­
ton, D. C.

Q. Lieutenant, by whom are you employed, and in what 
capacity? A. I am employed by the National Detective 
Agency and we are under contract to Kebar, Inc., and 
Rekab, Inc.,
# # # # * * * # * *

Q. By whom are you employed, Lieutenant Collins? 
A. National Detective Agency.

Q. And where are you stationed, pursuant to your em­
ployment with the National Detective Agency? A. My 
present assignment is Glen Echo Amusement Park.

Q. And at Glen Echo Amusement Park from whom
8 do you receive your instructions? A. From the 

Park Manager, Mr. Woronoff.
Q. And for how long have you been so assigned at the 

Glen Echo Amusement Park? A. Since April 2nd, 1960.



E15

Q. What is your connection and capacity with respect 
to the park special police force there? A. I am the head 
of the special police force at the park.

Q. What instructions have you received from Mr. 
Woronoff, the Park Manager, with respect to the operation 
of the park and your duties in connection therewith? 
# # # # # # # # # #

Q. Now then, Lieutenant, directing your attention to 
the date June 30, 1960, did you have occasion to he at the 
Glen Echo Park at that time? A. I was on duty on that 
date.

Q. And the Glen Echo Amusement Park is located in 
what County and State? A. Montgomery County, Mary­
land.

Q. Directing your attention again to June 30,
9 1960, at a time when you were on duty at Glen 

Echo Amusement Park, did you have occasion to see
the five defendants in this case on that date? A. I did.

Q. Will you relate to the Court the circumstances under 
which you first observed these five defendants at the Glen 
Echo Amusement Park?

10 Q. Now, Lieutenant, what first communication, or 
contact, did you have with the five defendants here,

and what were they doing at that time?
By Mr. Duncan: I  object, your Honor. That is the

same question, if I understand it correctly.
By Judge Pugh: The objection is over-ruled.
A. The defendants broke from the picket line and went 

from the picket line—
By Judge Pugh: (interrupting the witness)
Just tell when they came on to the private property of 

the Glen Echo Amusement Park.
A. Approximately 8 :15.

By Judge Pugh: All five of them?
11 A. Yes, sir.



E16

Q. What, if anything, occurred then?
By Judge Pugh: On the property of Glen Echo Amuse­

ment Park.
A. The five defendants went down through the park to 

the carousel and got on to the ride, on the horses and the 
different animals. I then went up to Mr. Woronoff and 
asked him what he wanted me to do. He said they were 
trespassing and he wanted them arrested for trespassing, 
if they didn’t get off the property.

Q. What did you tell them to do? A. I went to the 
12 defendants, individually, and gave them five minutes 

to get off the property.
By Mr. Duncan: I object and move to have that answer 

stricken. I t is not relevant.
By Judge Pugh: The objection is over-ruled.
Q. Then, Lieutenant, will you relate the circumstances 

under which you went to the carousel, and what you did 
when you arrived there with respect to these five defend­
ants? A. I went to each defendant and told them—

Q. (interrupting the witness) First of all, tell us what 
you found when you arrived there. Where they were, 
and what they were doing. A. Each defendant was either 
on a horse, or one of the other animals. I went to each 
defendant and told them it was private property and it 
was the policy of the park not to have colored people on 
the rides, or in the park.

Q. Now, will you look upon each of the five defendants 
and can you now state and identify each of the five de­
fendants' seated here as being the five that you have just 
referred to? A. These are the five defendants that I just 
referred to.

By Mr. Duncan: I would object to that and ask that he 
be required to identify each defendant individually. These 
are five separate warrants.

By Judge Pugh: Can you identify each one of these
defendants individually?

A. Yes.13



E17

By Judge Pugh:
Q. Did you tell them to get off the property! A. Yes.
Q. What did each one of them say when you told them 

that! A. They declined to leave.
Q. What did they say! A. They said they declined to 

leave the property. They said they declined to leave and 
that they had tickets.
* # # # * = * * # # *  
18 Q. During the five minute period that you testi­

fied to after you warned each of the five defendants 
to leave the park premises, what, if anything, did you do! 
A. I  went to each defendant and told them that the time 
was up and they were under arrest for trespassing. I 
then escorted them up to our office, with a crowd milling 
around there, to wait for transportation from the Mont­
gomery County Police, to take them to Bethesda to swear 
out the warrants.

By Mr. Duncan: At this point I renew my Motion to 
quash the warrants.

By Judge Pugh: The motion is denied.
By Mr. Duncan: May I state what the grounds are,

your Honor!
By Judge Pugh: You can state that at the end of the 

case.
By Mr. Duncan: I am required to state this at the

beginning.
By Judge Pugh: You have stated your Motion and the 

Court has ruled on it. You may argue it to the Court of 
Appeals.

20 Mr. McAuliffe Resumes Examination of the Witness:
Q. Lieutenant, how were you dressed at the time you 

approached the defendants and when you warned them! 
A. I  was in uniform.

Q. What uniform was that! A. Of the National Detec­



E18

tive Agency; blue pants, white shirt, black tie and white 
coat and wearing a Special Deputy Sheriff’s badge.

Q. What is your position, or capacity, with re-
21 spect to being a Deputy Sheriff? Are you, in fact, 

a Deputy Sheriff of Montgomery County? A. I  am
a Special Deputy Sheriff of Montgomery County, State 
of Maryland.

Q. And specifically by what two organizations are you 
employed? A. Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc.

By Mr. McAuliffe: You may cross-examine.
By Mr. Duncan: Is it my understanding that this

witness’s duties have been admitted, subject to proof?
By Judge Pugh: Subject to agency. Agency has not

been established yet. I  sustained the objection on that 
proffer.

Cross-Examination 
By Mr. Duncan:

Q. You just said you are employed by Rekab, Inc., and 
Kebar, Inc., is that correct? A. I  am employed by the 
National Detective Agency and they have a contract with 
Kebar, Inc., and Rekab, Inc.

Q. Who pays your salary? A. The National Detective 
Agency.

Q. And do you have any other income from any other 
source. A. No, sir.

Q. Do you receive any money directly from Rekab,
22 Inc., or Kebar, Inc.? A. No, sir.

Q. Your salary, in fact, is paid by the National 
Detective Agency; is that correct? A. Yes.

Q. What kind of agency is that? A. A private detective 
agency.

Q. Is it incorporated? A. Yes, sir.
Q. In what State? A. The District of Columbia.
Q. Are you an officer of that corporation? A. No, sir. 
Q. Are you an officer of either Rekab, Inc., or Kebar, 

Inc.? A. No, sir.



E19

Q. Mr. Collins, yon testified that you saw these defend­
ants prior to the time they entered the park; is that 
correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Had you ever seen them before? A. No, sir.
Q. When you saw them inside the park, did you recog­

nize them as the persons you had seen outside the park? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now you stated that you told them it was the policy 
of the park not to admit colored people. Is that, in fact, 

the policy of the park? A. Yes.
23 Q. Has1 it always been the policy of the park? 

A. As far as I  know.
Q. How long had you worked at Glen Echo Park? 

A. Since April 2, 1960.
Q. And before that time were you employed by the 

National Detective Agency? A. That is right.
Q. But you were assigned to a place other than Glen 

Echo? A. That is right.
Q. To your knowledge, had negroes previously ever been 

admitted to the park? A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Now did you arrest these defendants because they 

were negroes?
By Mr. McAuliffe: Objection.
By Judge Pugh: Over-ruled.
A. I arrested them on orders of Mr. Woronoff, due to 

the fact that the policy of the park was that they catered 
just to white people; not to colored people.

Q. I  repeat my question. Did you arrest these de­
fendants because they were negroes? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they in the company of other persons, to your 
knowledge? A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Were they in the company of white persons? 
A. Where?

Q. When they were on the carousel. A. There were 
white persons on the carousel when they were there.

Q. To your knowledge, were they in the company of 
white persons? A. One white person was with one of the 
colored people.



E20

Q. With which colored person was the white person 
with? A. This gentlemen right here (indicating one of 
the defendants).

Q. Do yon know his name? A. No, I don’t know.
Q. Did yon arrest the white person who was in his 

company? A. No, sir; I did not.
Q. Why not? A. At the time we got back to the carousel, 

she had left. By the time I had these defendants out, she 
had gone, as far as I know.

Q. Does this policy of Glen Echo Park extend to all 
negroes, no matter who they are?

By Mr. MeAuliffe: Objection.
By Mr. Duncan: I will rephrase it.

25 Q. Does it extend to negroes, without regard to 
how they are dressed, or how they conduct them­

selves ?
Mr. MeAuliffe: Objection.
By Judge Pugh: Over-ruled.
By Mr. Duncan: Will the Reporter read the question, 

please? (the last question was read back).
A. Yes; that is right.
Q. Did it come to your attention, Mr. Collins, that these 

defendants had tickets when they were arrested? A. They 
showed me tickets.

Q. Did you make any offer to these defendants with re­
spect to the tickets which they had? Did you offer to 
refund them any money? A. No, sir.

Q. Are you familiar with the manner in which tickets 
are acquired and sold at Glen Echo Amusement Park? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you tell the Court how that is? A. They are 
sold through ticket booths.

Q. Are the ticket booths' located inside the park, or are 
they located at the entrance? A. Inside the park.

Q. Is there any ticket booth at the entrance to the park? 
A. No.

26 Q. So the access to the park from the public 
highway is not obstructed? A. No, sir.



E21

Q. Now, if yon know, is it customary at the park for one 
person to purchase tickets and transfer them to another? 
A. I would not know.

Q. Are you ever at the park, Mr. Collins? A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever observed tickets being purchased? 

A. Yes. I have.
Q. Have you ever seen a father purchase tickets and 

give them to his children? A. Yes.
Q. Then you do know that that is done; is that correct? 

A. In that case; yes.
Q. Do you know of any other cases in which it is done? 

A. No.

36 Q. Would you say, Mr. Collins, that his conduct 
was peaceful and orderly? A. At the time I spoke to him.

Q. He didn’t become disorderly at any time, in fact did 
he A. No, sir.

37 Q. There was no loud talking? A. Not that I 
know of.

Q. And certainly no one was drunk or intoxicated, or 
anything like that? A. I wouldn’t know.

Q. You arrested them, didn’t you? A. You said no one. 
Q. No one of these defendants were intoxicated, were 

they? A. As far as I know; no.
Q. You had occasion to talk to each one of them, didn’t 

you? A. Yes.
Q. Can’t you say whether any of them had been drink­

ing or not? A. No.
Q. Have you had occasion to arrest people for being 

intoxicated in Glen Echo? A. Yes.
Q. You are a police officer, aren’t you? A. Yes.
Q. Don’t you claim some expert knowledge of such 

matters? A. Yes; by their actions.
Q. Based on the actions of these people can’t you say 

that -they were not, in fact, intoxicated? A. As far as 
I  know they were not intoxicated.
* * * * * * * * * *



E22

38 By Judge Pugh: He said they were not intoxi­
cated and did not appear to he. The objection is 

sustained. Did you smell any ordor of alcohol on any of 
them?

A. No, sir.
Mr. Duncan Continues Examination:

Q. You testified that the defendant, Griffiin, was peace­
ful and orderly. Was the same true as to all the other 
defendants? A. Yes.

Q. At all times throughout? A. Yes, sir.
Q. At the time you arrested them, Mr. Collins, did any 

of them ask to speak to the management? A. No, sir. 
Q. Did any of them tell you that they wanted to ride on

the merry-go-round? A. Yes, sir. 
* * * * * * * * * *
67 Abram Baker

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the plaintiff, and having first been duly sworn, accord­
ing to law, was examined and testified, upon

Direct Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Mr. Baker, will you state to the Court your name
68 and address? A. Abram Baker, 3315 Wisconsin 

Avenue, N. W.
Q. What is your position or capacity in connection with 

the Maryland Corporation Rekab, Inc.? A. I am President.
Q. What is your position with the Maryland Corporation 

Kebar, Inc.? A. I am President.
Q. For how long have you been President of Rekab, 

Inc.? A. Since June 17, 1955.
Q. How long have you been President of Kebar, Inc.? 

A. Since June 17, 1955.
Q. What is the relationship of Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, 

Inc., to the ownership and operation of the Glen Echo 
Amusement Park, here in Montgomery County, Maryland?



E23

A. Rekab, Inc., owns Kebar, Inc., Kebar, Inc., is the 
operating company.

Q. Which is the ownership of the land of Glen Echo 
Amusement Park? A. Rekab, Inc.
* * * * # * # # * #
72 Q. As President of Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc., 

I ask you whether the two respective corporations
are still in effect, and Maryland corporations! A. They 
are.

Q. Mr. Baker, I  show you this lease and ask you if you 
can identify it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what is that instrument? A. This is a lease 
on the ground from Rekab, Inc., turning it over to Kebar, 
Inc., as an operating company.

Q. Did you sign this lease? A. I sure did.
By Mr. McAuliffe: We offer this lease into evidence as 

State’s Exhibit #7.
73 Mr. Duncan: No objection.

Judge Pugh: Admit it in evidence.
Q. Is the carousel site a part of this lease? A. Yes; it 

is leased to Kebar, Inc.
Mr. McAuliffe Continues:

Q. Directing your attention to this lease, State’s Ex­
hibit #7, Mr. Baker, I ask you whether that lease was in 
effect on the date of June 30th of this year? A. Yes, sir; 
it was.

Q. Now, as President of Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc., 
will you describe what policy is maintained by the' two 
respective corporations' with respect to the admission of 
negroes to the Glen Echo Amusement Park? A. I don’t 
get your question.

Q. What policy is maintained by Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, 
Inc., with respect to the admission of negroes to the 
amusement park? A. They are not allowed in the park.

Q. And what instructions and what authority has been 
given by Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc., by you as President



E24

of each of these corporations, to Lieutenant Collins with 
respect to this park policy! A. To give them all dne 
respect and if they do not do what he asks them to do 
within a time that he thinks it should have been done, 
that he should arrest them.

74 Mr. McAuliffe Continues:
Q. Now then, Mr. Baker, what agency does the 

park employ, specifically what agency does Rekab, Inc., 
and Kebar, Inc., employ for purposes of maintaining law 
and order on the park property? A. This year it was the 
National Detective Agency.

Q. And who, in the National Detective Agency, was 
designated as the director or the man in charge of the 
police force on the park grounds? A. Lieutenant Collins. 

Q. And as such did you have occasion to give Lieutenant 
Collins any instructions with respect to a park

75 policy against admitting negroes? A. Yes.
Q. And what specific instructions' did you give 

him with respect to authority to order people off of the 
park premises? A. Well, he was supposed to stop them 
at the gate and tell them that they are not allowed; and if 
they come in, within a certain time, five or ten minutes— 
whatever he thinks, why he would escort them out.

Q. In the event they didn’t see fit to leave at his warn­
ing, did you authorize Lieutenant Collins to have these 
people arrested? A. Yes.

Q. On a charge of trespass? A. On a charge of 
trespassing.
* * * * * * * * * *

76 Cross-Examination
By Mr. Duncan:

* * * * * * * * * *  
84 Q. Would you tell the Court what you told 

Lieutenant Collins relating to the racial policies of



E25

the Glen Echo Park? A. We didn’t allow negroes and in 
his discretion, if anything happened, in any way, he was 
supposed to arrest them, if they went on our property.

Q. Did you specify to him what he was supposed to 
arrest them for? A. For trespassing.

Q. You used that word to him? A. Yes; that is right.
Q. And you used the word “ discretion”—what did you 

mean by that? A. To give them a chance to walk off; if 
they wanted to.

Q. Did you instruct Lieutenant Collins to arrest all 
negroes who came on the property, if they did not leave? 
A. Yes.

Q. That was your instructions? A. Yes.
Q. And did you instruct him to arrest them be- 

85 cause they were negroes? A. Yes.
Q. Did you instruct him to arrest white persons 

who came on the park property with colored persons? 
A. If they were doing something wrong, they are supposed 
to he arrested.

Q. In other words, your instruction as to negroes was to 
arrest them if they came into the park, and refused to 
leave, because they were negroes; and your instruction 
was to arrest white persons if they were doing something 
wrong? A. That is right.

92 Mr. Duncan Continues Cross-Examination of the 
Witness:

Q. Does Glen Echo, operating through its advertising 
agency, advertise in the Washington, D. C. area? A. I 

would say so.
93 Q. Does it advertise in the Press? A. What do 

you mean “ The Press?”
Q. By newspapers? A. Yes.
Q. By radio? A. Yes.
Q. And by television? A. Yes.
Q. On the back of Capital Transit Busses? A. No.
Q. It does not? A. No, sir.



E26

Q. Do any of the advertisements which the park makes 
refer to racial policies of the park'? A. I don’t get that.

Q. Do any of the advertisements which you have referred 
to, refer to the racial policies of the park? A. I don’t 
think so.

Q. Do any of them state that negroes are not welcome? 
A. They didn’t say they were.

Q. Are they addressed to the public generally A. I 
would say so.

100 Re-Re-Direct Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Who are the other officers of this corporation? A. 
My brother.

Q. What is his position? A. Secretary and Treasurer. 
Q. What is his name? A. Sam Baker.
Q. Who is the other officer of the corporation? A. My 

wife.
Q. And have you and your brother, and your wife, con­

ferred, and are you in agreement with respect to the policy 
to be followed at Glen Echo Park? A. We sure are.

101 Q. And who is your General Manager at the Glen 
Echo Park? A. Leonard Woronoff.

Q. And is he instructed to carry out all the policies by 
you and your brother and your wife, with respect to the 
operation of the park, as you see fit? A. He is.

Q. You take the position, Mr. Baker, that as the owner 
of this private property, or as President of the corpora­
tion, you have the right to determine who shall come on 
to your property, and the right to arrest them if they do 
not leave A. Yes.

Mr. McAuliffe: I object to that.
By Judge Pugh: Objection sustained.

* * # * * * * # # #
105 By Mr. McAuliffe: If the Court please, the State 

rests.



E27

By Mr. Duncan: May it please the Court, at this time 
I would like to move to quash the warrants of arrest, or 
to move for their dismissal, on a number of grounds which 
I would like to urge on the Court, and the first ground 
is constitutional grounds, namely, that the application of 
the Maryland trespass statute, Section 577, under the cir­
cumstances of this case, is unconstitutional and constitutes 
a denial of due process of law. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 
U. S. 501. The State of Maryland may not assist the 
owners of the park here in carrying out a pattern of 
private racial discrimination.

The Supreme Court held in 1947 that although the 
covenants were valid as private agreements, the State 
could not enforce them, so we say here the discrimination 
which may exist at Glen Echo Park is a private matter 
between the park and the would be negro patrons, but 
that Glen Echo cannot call upon the State of Maryland 

to enforce and carry out that policy.
106 In this case I think it is quite clear that the 

action of the state is resorted to for the purpose of 
enforcing racial discrimination. They were excluded from 
the park, not because they were trespassers, but because 
they were negroes. We contend that these defendants are 
entitled to the equal protection of the law.

By Judge Pugh: Are the proxjerty owners entitled to 
the equal protection of the law?

Mr. Duncan: Most assuredly. We contend further that 
the application of the statute in this way deprives the de­
fendants of due process of law, because it results in their 
arrest. We advance a second constitutional argument, 
your Honor, and that is the interference by the State 
officers in this case deprives these defendants of statutory 
rights which are secured to them by the laws of the 
United States. I refer specifically to Sections 1981, 1982 
and 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. As your 
Honor is aware, Section 1981 provides that every person 
within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have



E28

the same right, among other things, to make and enforce 
contracts, as is enjoyed by white persons, to purchase, 
acquire, hold and sell real property. It is declared to be a 
right which everyone shall enjoy. In Section 1983 it is 
made actionable for any person, acting under color of 
law, to deprive anyone in the exercise of his Section 1981 
right. We submit that the action of Lieutenant Collins in 

this case, in his capacity as a State police officer, 
107 interfered with the equal enjoyment of the right 

which these defendants had to attempt to enter into 
or make contracts with Glen Echo Amusement Park. 
Williams v. Kansas City, 104 Fed. (2nd). So on these two 
constitutional grounds we move that the warrants of ar­
rest be quashed and dismissed on the ground that the 
statute as applied to these facts is unconstitutional.

And then we make the same motion on a number of 
State grounds. First, the Maryland statute, Section 577, 
begins as follows: “ Any person or persons who shall
enter upon or cross over the premises of private property, 
after having been duly notified by the owner, or his agent, 
not to do so, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” 
This section has only been considered one time by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland. Krauss v. State, 216 Md. 
369. That was a case involving the entry into a garage, 
by employees of a finance company who were undertak­
ing to repossess an automobile which was in the garage. 
The owner of the garage land had a lien on the automobile 
and had had discussions with the defendants prior to their 
entry, when he notified the defendants that he had a lien 
on the automobile. Notwithstanding this the defendants 
entered the land and removed the automobile. Upon 
conviction, and appeal to the Court of Appeals, that con­
viction wTas reversed on the ground that there was in­
sufficiency of notice beforehand. Here we submit, and I 
think the testimony is uneontradicted on this point—Mr. 
Collins, himself, testified that his first communication was 
after they had come on to the land, and I submit to the



E29

Court that the statute cannot be violated. We base
108 our motion to dismiss on the ground that the 

statute, by its very terms applies only to wanton
trespass. Beading again from the statute: “ It being the 
intention of this section only to prohibit any wanton tres­
pass upon the private property of others.” We have 
been unable to find a case which defines the phrase “ wanton 
trespass.” The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, 
has construed the meaning of the word “ wanton” in other 
circumstances, and I cite on that Dennis v. Baltimore 
Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 617, and there, in discussing the 
meaning of the word “ wanton” the Court of Appeals said 
“ the word ‘wanton’ means characterized by extreme reck­
lessness and utter disregard for the rights of others” and 
I submit that if this Court were to take that as a test of 
wanton trespass, then the evidence would have to show 
that these defendants entered Glen Echo Park with ex­
treme recklessness and complete disregard of the rights of 
others.

Glen Echo advertised to the public generally. Its ad­
vertisements' were not restricted as to race and any 
member of the public was entitled to respond to this 
advertisement and even if it should eventuate that negroes 
were excluded wantonness under the statute is further 
negated by the fact that all of these defendants had 
tickets, and so far it doesn’t appear where they obtained 
the tickets, but there is testimony that the tickets were 
transferrable. They had tickets on the merry-go-round, 
and Mr. Collins testified that he saw the ticket in Mr. 
Griffin’s hand. I submit that a person who enters an 
amusement park and comes into possession of a ticket, 
whether purchased by him or given to him by someone 

else, cannot be said to be guilty of wanton trespass.
109 The third ground we base our motion on is that 

the statute, section 577, provides that—if I may read
that section—“ and further provided that nothing in this 
section shall be construed to include in its provisions the 
entry upon or crossing over any land when such entry or



E30

crossing is done under a bona fide claim of right or owner­
ship of said land.” Now, we submit that these defendants 
were on the land in the exercise of several bona fide rights. 
They were publicly invited on the land. Secondly, upon 
coming on the land they came into lawful possession of 
tickets, which, in the ordinary practice of the park, were 
clearly transferable. And it can be urged on their behalf 
that they have a constitutionally protected right to be 
on the land. If the federal statute gives to them the same 
right to make contracts: as white persons, at least they were 
on the land in the exercise of this federal statutory right 
and they cannot be said to be engaged in a wanton tres­
pass or that this was not a bona fide claim of right.

For all of these resons we urge that the warrants in 
these cases as against all five defendants should be dis­
missed and I move for a finding of not guilty, based on 
the insufficiency of the evidence.

By Judge Pugh: The motion for a directed verdict is 
denied.

110 Kay Freeman

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the defendants, and having first been duly sworn, ac­
cording to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination 
By Mr. Duncan:

Q. For the record, state your name and address. A. Kay 
Freeman; 732 Quebec Place, N. W.

Q. Miss Freeman, are you acquainted with the five de­
fendants in this case? A. Yes.

Q. Do you know them each by name? A. Yes.
Q. How long have you known them? A. I know some 

of them for different lengths of time. I guess' the longest 
would be two years.

Q. Did you have occasion to be present at Glen Echo 
Amusement Park on the night of June 30th, 1960? A. Yes.



E31

Q. Were you in the company of these defendants, and 
other persons'? A. Yes.

Q. Did yon enter the park? A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did yon enter it in company with these defendants? 

A. Yes.
Q. Were yon on the merry-go-round at the time

111 they were arrested? A. Yes.
Q. Did you see them arrested? A. Yes.

Q. Were you arrested? A. No.
Q. Did you see each of these defendants arrested? A. 

Yes.
Q. Prior to the time they were arrested, did they have 

tickets to ride on any of the rides? A. We all had tickets.
Q. Where did you acquire these tickets? A. They were 

given to us by friends.
Q. White friends? A. Yes.
Q. And they had made the purchase? A. That is right. 
Q. Prior to the time that you entered the premises of 

the Glen Echo Amusement Park, did anyone tell you 
personally that you should not enter? A. No one did.

Q. I mean anyone representing the park. A. No one. 
Q. Did Mr. Woronoff say anything to you? A. No.
Q. Did Mr. Collins say anything to you? A. No.
Q. Were there any signs posted anywhere around there? 

A. I didn’t see them.
112 Q. The conduct of these defendants at all times 

was proper, wasn’t it?
By Mr. McAuliffe: Objection.
By Mr. Ducan: I  will rephrase it.
Q. What was the conduct of these defendants, during 

the time they were in the park? A. Their conduct was 
orderly.

Q. Have you ever seen any advertisements relating to 
Glen Echo Amusement Park? A. Yes every day, on tele­
vision, on street oars and on radio.

Q. You say you went to Glen Echo in a group, with these 
defendants? A. That is right.

By Mr. Duncan: I have no further questions. 
# # * # # # # # # #



E32

113 Cross-Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Miss Freeman, this advertisement that you read, is 
that what brought you out to Glen Echo Park on June 
30th? A. I wanted to use the facilities and I thought this 
would be a good way of doing it.

Q. You thought you would be able to use the facilities 
of Glen Echo Park? A. I thought I might.

119 Q. Now, you were on the carousel, or the merry- 
go-round, were you not? A. Yes.

Q. Were you riding with these five defendants? A. I 
was near them.

Q. Well; how near? A. Perhaps two or three rides away. 
Q. And when you saw these five defendants being ar­

rested, and taken away, did you remain on the carousel? 
A. Yes; I did.

Q. For how long did you remain there? A. I remained 
for about thirty minutes.

Q. A half an hour? A. That is right.
120 Did the carousel start up during that time? A. No.

Q. So your best recollection is that it was approximately 
half an hour that you sat on the carousel, and the carousel 
did not start up? A. No, it did not.

Q. Did it start up after you left? A. I don’t know.
# # * # # * # * # #
128 By Mr. Duncan: We have no further evidence to 

offer your Honor, and I would like to renew my
motions.
# # # # ' # # # * # #
129 By Mr. Duncan: I renew my motion for a directed 

verdict, and to quash the warrants.
By Judge Pugh: The motion is over-ruled.



E33

130 Judge Pugh's Oral Opinion (Griffin, et al.)

It is very unfortunate that a case of this nature comes 
before the criminal court of our State and County. The 
nature of the case, basically, is very simple. The charge 
is simple trespass. Simple trespass is defined under Sec­
tion 577 of Article 27 of the Annotated Laws of Maryland, 
which states that “ any person or persons who shall enter 
upon or cross over the land, premises, or private property 
of any person or persons in this State, after having been 
duly notified by the owner or his agent not to do so shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” Trespass has been 
defined as an unlawful act, committed without violence, 
actual or implied, causing injury to the person, property 
or relative rights of another. This statute also has a 
provision in it which says that it is the intention of the 
Legislature as follows: “ It is the intention of this sec­
tion only to prohibit any wanton trespass upon the private 

land of others.” Wanton has been defined in our
131 legal dictionaries as reckless, heedless, malicious; 

characterized by extreme recklessness, foolhardiness
and reckless disregard for the rights or safety of others, 
or of other consequences.

There have been many trespass cases in Maryland. As a 
matter of fact, there is one case now pending before the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland where the racial question has 
been injected into a disorderly conduct ease, and that, is 
the case of “ State of Maryland versus Dale H. Drews”, 
decided some few months ago. In that case, Judge 
Menchine filed a lengthy written opinion, in which he 
touched upon the rights of a negro to go on private 
property, whether it is a semi-public or actually a public 
business, and in that case Judge Menchine said as follows:

“ The rights of an owner of property arbitrarily to re­
strict its use to invitees of his selection is the established 
law of Maryland.” This Court agrees with that opinion, 
and unless that case is reversed by the Court of Appeals



E34

of Maryland, at its session this Fall, that will continue to 
be the law of Maryland.

That statement by Judge Menchine is based upon author­
ities of this State, and not too far back, in the case of 
Greenfeld versus the Maryland Jockey Club, 190 Md. 96, 
in which the Court of Appeals of this State said: “ The 
rule that, except in cases of common carriers, inn-keepers 
and similar public callings, one may choose his customers, 
is not archaic.”

If the Court of Appeals changes its opinion in the 
132 190 Maryland case, then we will have new law in

this State on the question of the right of a negro to 
go on private property after he is told not to do so, or 
after being on it, he is told to get off.

In this Country, as well as many, many counties in the 
United States, we have accepted the decision of integration 
that has been promulgated by the Supreme Court in the 
school cases, and without and provocation or disputes of any 
consequence. There is no reason for this Court to change 
that method of accepting integration, but when you are con­
fronted with a question of whether or not that policy 
can be extended to private property, we are reaching into 
the fundamental principles of the foundation of this coun­
try.

The Constitution of the United States has many provi­
sions, and one of its most important provisions is that of 
due process of law. Due process of law applies to the right 
of ownership of property—that you cannot take that prop­
erty, or you cannot do anything to interfere with that man’s 
use of his property, without due process of law.

Now, clearly, in this case, which is really a simple case; 
it is a simple case of a group of negroes, forty in all, 
getting together in the City of Washington, and coming 
into Maryland, with the express intent, by the testimony of 
one of the defense witnesses, that they were going to make 
a private corporation change its policy of segregation. In 
other words, they were going to take the law in their own



E35

hands. Why they didn’t file a civil suit and test out
133 the right of the Glen Echo Park Amusement Com­

pany to follow that policy is very difficult for this
Court to understand, yet they chose to expose themselves 
to possible harm; to possible riots and to a breach of 
the peace. To be exposed to the possibility of a 
riot in a place of business, merely because these de­
fendants want to impress upon that business their 
right to use it, regardless of the policy of the corporation, 
should not be tolerated by the Courts. Unless the law of 
this State is changed, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
this Court will follow the law that has already been adopted 
by it, that a man’s property is his castle, whether it be 
offered to the public generally, or only to those he desires 
to serve.

There have been times in the past, not too many years 
back, when an incident of this kind would have caused a 
great deal of trouble. It could have caused race riots, and 
could have caused bloodshed, but now the Supreme Court, 
in the school case in 1954, has decided that public schools 
must be integrated, and the people of this County have ac­
cepted that decision. They have not quibbled about i t ; They 
have gone along with it without incident. We are one of 
the leading counties in the United States in accepting that 
decision. If the Court of Appeals of Maryland decides 
that a negro has the same right to use private property as 
was decided in the school cases, as to State or Government 
property, or if the Supreme Court of the United States so 

decides, you will find that the places of business in
134 this County will accept that decision, in the same 

manner, and in the same way that public authorities
and the people of the County did in the School Board 
decision, but there is nothing before this Court at this 
time except a simple case of criminal trespass. The 
evidence shows the defendants have trespassed upon 
this Corporation’s property, not by being told not to 
come on it, but after being on the property they were 
told to get off.



E36

Now it would be a ridiculous thing for this Court to 
say that when an individual comes on private property, and 
after being on it, either sitting on it or standing on it, and 
the owner comes up and says, “ Get off my property”, and 
then the party says “ You didn’t tell me to get off the prop­
erty before I came on it, and, therefore, you cannot tell 
me to get off now” he is not guilty of trespass because he 
was not told to stay off of the property. It is a wanton 
trespass when he refuses to get off the property, after being 
told to get off.

One of the definitions of wanton is “ foolhardy” and this 
surely was a foolhardy expedition; there is no question 
about that. When forty people get together and come 
out there, as they did, serious trouble could start. It is a 

simple case of trespass. It is not a breach of the 
135 peace, or a case of rioting, but it could very easily 

have been, and we can thank the Lord that nothing 
did take place of such a serious nature.

It is not up to the Court to tell the Glen Echo Amuse­
ment Company what policies they should follow. If they 
violate the law, and are found guilty, this Court will sen­
tence them.

It is most unfortunate that this matter comes before the 
Court in a criminal proceeding. It should have been 
brought in an orderly fashion, like the School Board case 
was brought, to find out whether or not, civilly, the Glen 
Echo Park Amusement Company could follow a policy of 
segregation, and then you will get a decision based on the 
rights of the property owner, as well as the rights of these 
defendants. So, the Court is very sorry that this case has 
been brought here in our courts.

It is my opinion that the law of trespass has been vio­
lated, and the Court finds all five defendants guilty as 
charged.



E37

Excerpts from Transcript of Proceedings (Greene, et al.)

2 The above-entitled cases, having been consolidated 
for purposes of trial, by stipulation of counsel, came

on for hearing, pursuant to notice, on September 13, 1960, 
at 9:30 o’clock a.m. before The Honorable James H. Pugh, 
Judge of said Court, when and where the following counsel 
■were present on behalf of the respective parties, and the 
following proceedings were had, and the following testi­
mony was adduced.

By Mr. McAuliffe: Your Honor, we will call No. 
3878, Cornelia A. Greene; No. 3879, Helene D. Wilson; 
No. 3890, Martin A. Schain; No. 3891, Ronvl J. Stewart and 
No. 3893, Janet A. Lewis, and the State in each of these 
cases will move to amend the respective warrants, and I 
have prepared copies of the proposed amendments for the 
Court and for counsel.

By Judge Pugh: Any objection, Mr. Sharlitt?
By Mr. Sharlitt: No objection.
By Judge Pugh: The motion for leave to amend is

granted. Pile an amended warrant in each case. What 
is the plea, Mr. Sharlitt?

By Mr. Sharlitt: Not guilty as to each defendant.
3 By Judge Pugh: Bo you submit it to the Court? 

Mr. Sharlitt: In each case, sir.
By Mr. McAuliffe: The State waives opening statement 
By Mr. Sharlitt : I will waive it until the close of the 

State’s case.
Whereupon,
# # * * * * # # # *  
11 Francis J. Collins
A witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the plaintiff, and having first been duly sworn, accord­
ing to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination 
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Give us your name and your address. A. Francis 
J. Collins, 1207 E. Capitol Street, Washington, D. C.



E38

Q. Where are you employed and in what capacity? A. 
I am employed at the National Detective Agency, and as­
signed to Glen Echo Amusement Park.

Q. Directing your attention to the date of July 2nd of 
this year, 1960, were you so assigned to the Glen Echo 
Amusement Park? A. Yes, sir.

Q. At the time you were assigned to the Glen Echo
12 Amusement Park on July 2,1960, from whom did you 

receive your instructions with respect to your duties
and responsibilities? A. The park Manager.

Q. Who was that? A. Leonard Woronoff.
Q. Now, Lieutenant, directing your attention to the five 

defendants who are seated here at the counsel table, did 
you have occasion to see them in and about the Glen Echo 
Park, in or about the end of June or the first of July? A. 
I did.
* * * * * * * * * *
13 Q. What were the circumstances under which they 

[Appellants] entered the Glen Echo Amusement
Park property? A. They broke out of the picket line and 

ran from the picket line to the Ranch Restaurant
14 which is located inside the park.

Q. Now, Lieutenant, what, if anything occurred 
after they broke from the picket line and ran to the res­
taurant? A. They ran up to the counter and requested 
service.

Q. And what, if anything, was done then, Lieutenant? 
A. I notified the five defendants that they were undesirable 
on the park property and I ordered them to leave immedi­
ately or be placed under arrest for trespassing.

Q. What occurred then? A. They immediately turned 
their backs on me and requested service again. 
* * * * * * * * * *
15 Q. They turned their backs on you, Lieutenant, 

following your ordering them out of the park? What
occurred then? A. I tapped each one on the shoulder, and



E39

as they turned around, I told them they were under arrest 
for trespassing.

Q. And then as you placed them under arrest for tres­
passing where did you take them? A. We escorted them 
to our office and then we had transportation by Montgomery 
County police to Bethesda, where we swore out the war­
rants.

Q. Was this restaurant on the property of the Glen Echo 
Amusement Park? A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Now then, Lieutenant—incidentally, what is 
your connection with Rekab and Kebar, Incorpo­

rated? A. I have charge of the police department, their 
officers and guards.
* * # * # # * # # #

17 Cross-Examination
By Mr. Sharlitt:

* * * * * * # » # #

23 Mr. Sharlitt Resumes Examination of the Witness
Q. Mr. Collins, at the time you came up to these defend­

ants in the restaurant, and instructed them to leave,
24 what did they do at that point? A. They immedi­

ately turned their backs on me and requested service.
Q. Did they each request service? A. I can’t say they 

did, but they were talking and requested service from the 
attendant there.

Q. It is your testimony that one of them, at least, re­
quested service? A. As I observed them; yes.

Q. Then what happened after that? A. I tapped each 
one on the shoulder and they turned around and I placed 
them under arrest for trespassing.

Q. And I believe you testified you escorted them to the 
park office. A. To our office in the park.

Q. And their conduct at that time was peaceful, was it 
not, Lieutenant Collins? A. Yes, sir.



E40

Q. And it was peaceful in the restaurant, was it not, 
Lieutenant Collins? A. They were quiet.

Q. And it was peaceful until they left the park, was it 
not? A. They were.
* # * # * # * # # #
31 Abram Baker

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the plaintiff, and having first been duly sworn, accord­
ing to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Mr. Baker, may we have your name and address? A. 
Abram Baker, 3315 Wisconsin Avenue, N. W.

Q. What is your position with the corporation,
32 Rekab, Inc? A. President,

Q. What is the relationship of Rekab, Inc., and 
Kebar, Inc., to the Glen Echo Amusement Park, here in 
Montgomery County, Maryland? A. Rekab, Inc., is the 
holding company and Kebar, Inc. is the operating company.

Q. You mean the land is titled in the name of Rekab, 
Inc., as owner? A. Yes, sir.
* * # * # # # * * #
33 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, are the corporations, Rekab, 

Inc. and Kebar, Inc., presently going corporations,
authorized to do business in this State? A. Yes, they are.

Q. Who are the other officers of the corporation? A. 
Sam Baker and Louise Baker.

Q. And are those officers the same for each corporation ? 
A. Yes, they are.
* * * * * * * * * *  
36 Q. As President of Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc., 

Mr. Baker, do you know who owns the restaurant 
on the Glen Echo Amusement Park?

By Mr. Sharlitt: It is the same question.



E41

By Judge Pugh: Objection over-ruled.
A. Rekab, Inc.
Q. And as President of Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc., 

do you know, on July 2, 1960, to whom the restaurant on 
the Glen Echo Amusement Park property in Montgomery 

County, Maryland, was leased to? A. B. & B. Cater-
37 ing Company.

Q. Do you know who operated the park, and to 
whom the lease was in effect; what corporation? A. Kebar, 
Inc.
# # # # # # # # # #  

By Mr. McAuliffe: Cross-examine him. 
Cross-Examination 

By Mr. Sharlitt:
Q. Mr. Baker, I believe it was your testimony that

38 as of July 2,1960 that Kebar, Inc., was not operating 
this restaurant; is that correct? A. Kebar, Inc.,

leased it out.
Q. Now, just answer my question, please, sir; were they 

operating the restaurant? A. No.
Q. Now on July 2nd, were there any employees of Kebar, 

Inc. present on the premises of that restaurant? A. I don’t 
know; I wasn’t there.

Q. Well, how long is that lease for, between you and 
the B. & B.? A. Two years.

Q. And that gives B. & B. the right to occupy the prem­
ises alone? A. At my discretion.

Q. Had your discretion been exercised to permit them 
to occupy and run the premises on July 2nd of this year? 
A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that B. & B. and its servants, and not Kebar and 
its servants were in occupancy of the restaurant on that 
day; is that correct? A. I can’t tell you. I wasn’t there. 

Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that B. & B. were



E42

operating that restaurant under its lease? A. They were 
operating i t ; yes, sir.

39 Q. So that Kebar, Inc., wasn’t? A. That is right.
Q. So the patrons of that restaurant were pa­

trons of B. & B. and not patrons of Kebar, Inc., isn’t that 
so? A. I don’t know. If the lease says so.

Q. Is there any doubt in your mind about that? A. I 
didn’t read the lease lately.

Q. The money that comes over the counter at that res­
taurant, does that go to B. & B.? Who gets the income 
from the restaurant? A. We rent it out.

Q. They pay you rental? A. Yes.
Q. And don’t they get the income from the customers 

and then pay you rental from that income? A. Yes.
Q. Who employs the waitresses there? A. B. & B. Cater­

ing Company.
Q. Who employs the cooks? A. B. & B. Catering Com­

pany.
Q. Who employs the bus boys and clean up people? A. 

B. & B.
Q. Are there any other employees on the premises

40 of the restaurant, or were there on July 2nd? A. 
I don’t know.

Q. Well you are an officer of Kebar, Inc., aren’t you, 
sir? A. That is right.

Q. And Kebar leased these premises to B. & B. did they 
not? A. Yes.

Q. And they are on the premises of the park. You have 
just testified to that, haven’t you? A. That is right.

Q. You have seen this restaurant in operation, haven’t 
you? A. Yes.

Q. You are familiar with the operation of the restaurant, 
as well as the operation of the park, aren’t you? A. Yes; 
they have a Manager and I have nothing to do with it.

Q. And Kebar, Inc., has nothing to do with it; isn’t 
that so? A. I collect the rent.

Q. I am talking about the operation. You said you didn’t



E43

have anything to do with it, and my question is, isn’t it 
true that Kebar, Inc., doesn’t have anything to do with the 

operation of the restaurant? A. In the lease it says
41 that anything wrong, in any way, that I, in my dis­

cretion, can tell them what to do.
Q. Prior to this incident—and is this something that you 

personally have the right to do? A. No. The company in 
operation.

Q. And prior to July 2nd, had you talked to any of the 
officials of B. & B. regarding an interference by you with 
their operation of that restaurant? A. Prior to that?

Q. That is right, A. Well, they understood it from the 
beginning.

Q. On July 2nd, sir, at any time during that day, did 
you have any conversation with any official of B. & B.?
A. I was out of town, sir.

Q. Now under ordinary circumstances— the operation of
B. & B., they are in full control of those premises, are 
they not, sir? A. If I say so.

Q. And your testimony was that you would have to talk 
to the officials of B. & B. if this would not be the case; 
otherwise it is the case, isn’t that true? A. I don’t under­
stand you.

Q. The ordinary situation, in the operation by B. & B. 
of that restaurant, is in their control unless you tell them 

otherwise; isn’t that so? A. That is right.
42 Q. Do you know of any reason at all why that 

would not have been the case on July 2nd? A. I
wasn’t there. I don’t know.

Q. So you don’t know of any reason at all why this 
would not have been the ease on July 2nd? A. I cannot 
answer it.

Q, My question is if you know of any reason why the 
operation of that restaurant by B. & B. to the exclusion of



E44

Kebar, Inc., would not have been so on July 2nd. Do yon 
know of any reason ? A. No.

43 By Judge Pugh: Did you instruct them with re­
spect to any incidents that might be caused by those

in the picket line coming over on the park property? A. 
Yes, sir.

Q. All right, tell us about that. A. Like I said before; 
on June 30th when we found out from the newspapers that 
they were coming out for the first time, I got Mr. Woronoff 
and Lieutenant Collins together and we talked it over, 
and the idea was that if they came over the picket line, that 
within a reasonable time they would be arrested for tres­

passing.
44 Q. And you so instructed Lieutenant Collins to 

that effect? A. Yes and Mr. Woronoff, if I was not
there.
* # * * = & # * # # #
47 Q. Now this instruction you gave Mr. Woronoff. 

This was consistent with all your policies in running
that park, wasn’t it, Mr. Baker? A. Consistent with 
running the park?

Q. Yes, sir. A. Well he did whatever I told him to do.
Q. This was to implement your policy of racial segre­

gation at that park, was it not?
By Mr. McAuliffe: Objection. There is no indication

of that in the testimony.
By Judge Pugh: Objection over-ruled.
A. What was the question? (The last question was 

read back by the reporter). It was. 
* # * * # * # # # *
48 Re-Direct Examination

By Mr. McAuliffe:
Q. Mr. Baker, does Lieutenant Collins receive his instruc­

tions from Rekab, Inc., and Kebar, Inc.? A. Yes, sir.



E45

Q. And B. & B. Catering Company is just a conces­
sionaire there at Glen Echo, is it not? A. That is right.

Q. You have a lot of concessionaires; don’t you? A. I 
have two.

Q. In your relationship with B. & B. do you reserve the 
right to enforce and maintain whatever policy Glen Echo 

has as a whole?
49 By Mr. Sharlitt: I object, your Honor. The lease 

will have to speak for itself.
Examination by the Court

By Judge Pugh:
Q. How large is the restaurant? As large as this Court 

room, or larger? A. Just about this size, besides an up­
stairs.

Q. Well you didn’t tell that company how to operate its 
business, do you? A. If they do not serve the right food 
to the customers, I have a right to tell them to improve it.

Q. Don’t they lease the building? A. They lease it from 
Kebar.

Q. Don’t they have a right to operate the restaurant as 
they see fit? A. Yes they do, but it is just the idea—about 
the food part of it, if I have complaints in my office which 
I have to protect, then I have to go and tell them.

Q. How far is the restaurant from the entrance to the 
park? A. About 150 feet.

Q. The park owns that property doesn’t it? A. That is 
right.

Mr. McAuliffe Resumes Re-direct Examination:
Q. And with respect to the restaurant and the

50 other concession that you mentioned in Glen Echo, 
do the special police enforce law and order there?

A. They do.
Q. And is that by agreement between you and the con­

cessionaire? A. That is right.



E46

Re-Cross Examination 
By Mr. Sharlitt:

* * * * * * * * * *
51 Q. Do you or anybody else from Kebar, Inc. come 

in and supervise anything that goes on inside that
restaurant, as a matter of routine? A. No.

By Mr. Sharlitt: I have no further questions.
Re-Be-Direct Examination

By Mr. McAuliffe:
Q. Mr. Baker, to whom does the concessionaire, B. & B. 

look to eject a disorderly person, or any person not desired 
in the restaurant?

By Mr. Sharlitt: Objection.
By Judge Pugh: You ought to have the lease. The

written agreement speaks for itself.
By Mr. McAuliffe: There is no question in our minds. 

The defense has raised the question.
Judge Pugh: The restaurant had a lease on the prop­

erty, and if they did not make a complaint, it would be a 
pretty good question whether they would be guilty of 

trespass. Do you have a written lease? A. Yes, sir.
52 Q. Where is it? A. It is at the office.

By Judge Pugh: You better get it out here, Mr. 
McAuliffe.
* * * * * * * * * *  

Leonard Woronoff

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the plaintiff, and having first been duly sworn, accord­
ing to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. State your name and address. A. Leonard Woronoff, 
1678 21st Street North, Arlington, Virginia.



E47

53 Q. What is your position if any, with the Glen 
Echo Amusement Park, and specifically with Rekab, 

Inc., and Kebar, Inc.? A. I am the General Manager.
Q. Directing your attention to the date of July 2nd, 

1960, were you the General Manager at that time? A. Yes, 
sir.

55 Cross-Examination
By Mr. Sharlitt:

Q. Mr. Woronoff, you have heard the testimony of Mr. 
Baker, that the instructions were that picketers, as well as 
negroes, were to be excluded. Were those instructions 
repeated by you to Lieutenant Collins on July 2nd? A. I 
think so.

Q. Do you know what crime you instructed Lieutenant 
Collins to arrest these people for, if they refused to leave? 
A. In my discussion with Lieutenant Collins, I would 
simply tell him that these people were not wanted in the 
park and if, after giving them due notice, they refused to 
leave, our only recourse was to arrest them for trespassing. 
* * * * * * * * * *
56 By Mr. McAuliffe: Subject to offering the lease; 

that will be the State’s case.
By Mr. Sharlitt: To save time I will make my federal 

motions and save my others until we read the lease.
By Judge Pugh: You are in a State Court. The Judge 

sitting without a jury is the judge of the law and the fact. 
By Mr. Sharlitt: We feel, your Honor, that the

57 action here, of these five arrests on July 2, 1960, 
involved a violation of these defendants’ rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States, both the equal protection clause and 
the due process clause, in that the State of Maryland and 
its instrumentalities were being used to implement the 
policy of race discrimination of Glen Echo Park; and fur­



E48

ther, that the instrumentalities of the State of Maryland 
were being used to deny these defendants” federal statu­
tory rights, under Secs. 1981, 1982 and 1983 of Title 43 
of the United States Code, and we support this by refer­
ence to the cases of Marks v. Alabama and Shelley v. 
Cramer, 334 U. S. 1. I simply make our motion to direct 
the verdict on this constitutional ground at this time.

By Judge Pugh: The motion is denied.
By Mr. Sharlitt: Your Honor, Defendants’ case will

attempt to show that Section 577 of Article 27 of the Code 
was not violated, in that notice was not given prior to 
entry upon the land; and, further, that in this case it is 
quite clear that these defendants were on this ground in an 
attempt to exercise what they felt to be a right to use the 
facilities of this park, and that their trespass, assuming 

it was a trespass, should be considered in that light. 
58 In this case we have two white defendants, which 

we did not have yesterday. Further the statute re­
quires^—this is a trespass statute, and the right to prose­
cute can be maintained solely by the lessor of the land; 
not by the owner. If sole possession has been passed to 
B. & B. Catering Company, as we feel is the case, then 
it is our contention that these complaining witnesses have 
no grounds for bringing a criminal action.

Ronyl J. Siewari

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the defendants, and having first been duly sworn, ac­
cording to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination
By Mr. Sharlitt:

Q. State your name and address. A. Ronyl J. Stewart; 
1734 Upshur Street, N. W.

Q. Are you employed, or are you a student? A. A 
student.



E49

Q. Where? A. At Goddard College, in Plainfield, 
Vermont.

Q. On the night of July 2, 1960, Miss Stewart, were 
you in the vicinity of Glen Echo Park, in Montgomery 
County? A. I was.

Q. Were you in the restaurant in Glen Echo Park
59 at that time? A. I was.

Q. At that time were you approached by Lieu­
tenant Collins, whom you have seen testify here? A. No.

Q. You were not approached by him in the restaurant? 
A. I was approached by him as a member of a group; not 
personally.

Q. Where were you standing, at the time he approached 
this group ? A. I was standing at the counter of the restau­
rant, facing him.

Q. Did Lieutenant Collins then say something to the 
group? A. He did.

Q. And did he say it in the earshot of all members of 
the group? A. He did.

Q. What did Lieutenant Collins say? A. I cannot quote 
him exactly.

Q. Give your best recollection. A. The best recollection I 
have is that he said “ You know that this park is segre­
gated and that you are not welcome here” and I can’t 
remember anything else. Oh yes, and “ You will be given 
a reasonable length of time to leave the park.”

Q. Then what happened? A. The group turned
60 away from him.

Q. Did you, or any other members of the group, 
in your presence, request service from the restaurant? A. 
Yes, we did.

Q. Did you? A. Yes.
Q. What did you ask for? A. I asked for a coke.
Q. What happened? A. There was no answer given.
Q. Miss Stewart, had you been on the premises of that 

restaurant before that time ? A. I do not understand your 
question.



E50

Q. Had you been in that restaurant at an earlier date? 
A. No.

Q. What happened after Lieutenant Collins made this 
statement to you regarding the park being segregated and 
that you weren’t welcome? A. The group as a whole 
turned away from him and again attempted to order.

Q. And again what happened? A. Lieutenant Collins 
went down the line and tapped each member of the group 
on the shoulder and turned him around and he again said 
to each member of the group 44 You are under arrest for 

trespass.” A question was asked by one of the
61 members of the group—I am not sure which one, I 

think Martin Schain—440n what grounds are we be­
ing arrested?” and Lieutenant Collins replied 44For tres­
passing” and then Lieutenant Collins went down and 
pointed to the three negro members of the group and said 
“ You are colored; 44you are colored” and “ you are col­
ored” and he pointed to the two white members of the group 
and he said 44You are undesirable” and “ you are undesir­
able. ’ ’

Q. And all your conversation with Lieutenant Collin s 
took place in that restaurant; is that correct? A. Yes.

Q. Then what happened, Miss Stewart? A. A conversa­
tion was entered upon between Helene and Lieutenant 
Collins and I don’t know just the gist of this conversation. 
After the conversation we were taken out of the restaurant 
and put in police cars and taken to the Montgomery County 
police station.

Q. From the time that Lieutenant Collins approached 
you to the time you left the park, was there any disorder 
what-so-ever ? A. No.

Q. Were you able to observe the conduct of the other 
four defendants ? A. I  was.

Q. From the time Lieutenant Collins first ap-
62 proached you to the time you left the park? A. Yes.

Q. And was their conduct peaceful in all respects? 
A. It was.
* * * * # # # # # #



E51

81 Martin A. Schain

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the defendants, and having first been duly sworn, 
according to law, was examined and testified as follows, 
upon

Direct Examination 
By Mr. Sharlitt:

Q. Mr. Schain, state your name and address. A. Martin 
Schain, 2131 0. Street, N. W.

Q. Are you employed, or are you a student? A. I am 
a student.

Q. Whereabouts? A. I go to New York University.
Q. On the night of July 2nd, 1960, were you present on 

the premises of Glen Echo Park? A. Yes, I was.
Q. Were you present on the premises of the restaurant 

at Glen Echo Park? A. Yes, I was.
Q. What was the purpose of your being present

82 at the restaurant in Glen Echo Park? A. On 
July 2nd?

Q. Yes. A. I wanted to get served, and I didn’t see 
any reason why they wouldn’t serve me.

Q. Were you served? A. No.
Q. Now, had you been present at the restaurant in 

Glen Echo Park prior to July 2nd, 1960? A. Yes, I had.
Q. When was that? A. That was the night before; 

Friday night.
Q. Were you approached by Lieutenant Collins on the 

night earlier and asked to leave? A. No.
= * * * * * # # # # *  
84 Cross-Examination

By Mr. McAuliffe:
* * * » # » # # # *
91 Q. Did they serve anybody when they came in? 

A. The counter closed; no.



E52

Q. And did it close down almost simultaneously with the 
appearance of negroes? A. It closed down a few minutes 
afterwards.
* * * * # # * « # #
106 Abram Baker

a witness of lawful age, recalled by counsel for the plaintiff, 
and having already been sworn, testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Mr. Baker, I show you this agreement and ask you 
if you can identify it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what is that agreement? A. That is an agree­
ment between B. & B. Catering Company and Kebar, Inc.

Q. And Mr. Baker, when was this agreement in effect? 
A. That agreement was in effect from the opening of the 
season of 1956 to the opening of the season for 1958.

Q. What did you do in 1958, Mr. Baker? A. I made a 
renewal agreement.

107 Q. I show you this and ask you if that is the 
renewal agreement?

By Mr. Sharlitt: I  object to that characterization “ re­
newal agreement” until I have a chance to look at that 
second document. (Mr. McAuliffe hands the document to 
Mr. Sharlitt, who examines it) Your Honor, I move to 
strike that answer, because this cannot purport to be a 
renewal agreement, since it doesn’t refer to any lease at 
all. It purports to be an agreement of itself.

By Judge Pugh: Let me see it. (Document is handed 
to the Court by Mr. McAuliffe). Mr. Baker, what are 
they referring to in this paper, this letter dated August 
29, 1958, when it states here “ if terms and conditions 
meet with your approval?” Is that referring to this 
matter? A. It is referring to the lease to B. & B. Catering 
Company.



E53

Q. Another lease other than the one Mr. McAuliffe had in 
his hand? A. No, sir.

Q. The same lease? In other words, this letter and the 
paper Mr. McAuliffe has in his hands, constitutes the trans­
action that was in force on July 2nd, 1960? A. That is 

right, sir.
108 By Mr. McAuliffe: We offer this letter in evi­

dence and ask that it be marked State’s Exhibit #8.
By Mr. Sharlitt: That document is completely un­

ambiguous and I don’t see how you can use it.
By Mr. McAuliffe: This recites the agreement and that 

recites the fact that this agreement is still in effect, or is 
a part of it, and Mr. Baker has testified that these two 
instruments together constituted the agreement. The Court 
asked Mr. Baker to produce the lease and he has done the 
best he could. He has produced these two papers.

By Judge Pugh: Is that all the papers that existed
between you and the B. & B. Catering Company?

A. Yes, sir.
And these are the documents under which the restaurant 

was holding the property on July 2nd, 1960? A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Sharlitt: I object to the inclusion of this docu­

ment.
By Judge Pugh: The objection is over-ruled. It will be 

admitted in evidence.
# * * * # # * * # #  
110 Cross-Examination

By Mr. Sharlitt:
Q. Mr. Baker, is this the original lease? A. I don’t know.
Q. Is there a document that purports to be a lease be­

tween you and B. & B. that contains the date? To refresh 
your recollection—this does not, sir. A. It starts at the be­
ginning of the season and winds up the season; that is all 
I know.

Q. If I may, I will ask you just to be responsive. Is there 
a document in existence between you and B. & B. that con­



E54

tains a date? A. The gentleman at B. & B. may have a 
date on his. He has a date on his.

By Mr. McAuliffe: The President of B. & B. is here in 
Court and will be our next witness.

Q. Well this lease terminated on or about September 1, 
1958, did it not, sir? A. Which one?

Q. This purported document. A. Yes, sir.
111 Q. Now, Mr. Baker, would you read the first sen­

tence of this letter dated August 29, 1958! A. (wit­
ness reads) “ This will confirm the agreement made with 
you for the exclusive privilege of operating—”

Q. (interrupting the witness) What agreement was that 
referring to? A. You have the agreement back of you.

Q. But this letter incorporates new provisions, doesn’t it, 
sir? Doesn’t this have new and different provisions than 
the ones in the original lease ? A. Maybe, of money value.

Q. Isn’t it true that as of August 29, 1958, you had dis­
cussions with representatives of the B. & B. about the fu­
ture arrangements between the two corporations. A. No, 
s ir; not before that letter.

Q. How were the terms in this letter arrived at? A. Well 
if you read it all, it says if he agrees he shall sign it, or 
otherwise talk to me about it.

Q. Well in effect then, what you were doing was setting 
new terms; Avere you not? A. With money, yes.

Q. Well, had you had any conversation Avith Mr. Bergfeld 
prior to the time you sent this letter to him? A. Not about 
the lease.

Q. So that you were setting new terms in this let-
112 ter? A. I really don’t know. I would have to look 

them over. That is September of 1958, you knoAV.
Q. In fact, it is August 29, 1958. It is your testimony is 

it not, sir, that there was no conversation between you and 
Mr. Bergfeld to the effect that you were merely continuing 
the other lease, because you hadn’t talked to him up until 
August 29, 1958; isn’t that so? A. We became good friends, 
so I didn’t think I had to talk to him.



E55

Q. Yes, but you wrote him about money. A. Well, that 
was up to him.

Q. That is a new term in this contract; isn’t it! A. I 
could shake hands on a thing like that, if it wasn’t on ac­
count of death, or your children.

Q. You couldn’t shake hands on the amount of money, 
could you?

By Mr. McAuliffe: Objection; it is argumentative.
Q. The point is, Mr. Baker, that there was no conversa­

tion between the two of you as to the continuation of this 
lease, when you sent this letter to Mr. Bergfeld; isn’t that 
a fact, sir? A. I didn’t think I would have to confer with 
him.

Q. So there was no understanding between you and Mr. 
Bergfeld that the lease was to be continued? A. I think 

there was.
113 Q. You said you didn’t talk to him. A. I didn’t 

have to. I said we were good friends.
Q. But you weren’t good enough friends for the change; 

is that correct ? A. If it were not on account of deaths in 
the family and Kebar, Inc., and Rekab, Inc.

Q. Well, did you have any conversation with Mr. Berg­
feld prior to the time that you got this signed copy back; 
that is to say, between the time you sent him this letter, 
asking for his signature, and the time it came back? A. 
He sent that in after I was gone from the Amusement Park; 
signed.

Q. Did you have any discussion with him after the time 
this was received, about any of the practices of the

114 park, which were not included in this ? A. I had no 
discussions at all with him, about anything in the

park.
Q. You thought you could rely on this? A. That; plus 

friendship.
Q. So that “ plus friendship” is not this plus any other 

written document. A. Plus the lease that went before it.



E56

Q. Isn’t it true that you just felt that you had a general 
understanding with him as to all the practices involved 
there! That you were just dealing between friends on any­
thing except the specific terms contained in this letter ? A. 
If we weren’t friends, I would have had to make out another 
one just like that.

Q. So it was just a matter of friendship as to anything 
that was not included in this letter? A. Yes. We had the 
other document to go along with it.

Q. You have testified that you didn’t even discuss the 
other document. A. Yes I did.

Q. You did, or you did not discuss it? A. I did not dis­
cuss it.

Q. So as of the time you entered into this thing, you had 
no detailed understanding with Mr. Bergfeld as to anything 

not included in here ? A. Plus the other contract.
115 Q. I thought you said you just went on the basis 

of friendship with Mr. Bergfeld, in August of 1958?
A. That is right.

Q. Well did you discuss with him, prior to August 29, 
1958, whether he was a lessee or a licensee? A. I didn’t 
think I had to.

Q. Did you, or didn’t you? A. No I did not.
Q. Did you discuss who would have control of the patron­

age of his restaurant? A. No, I did not.
Q. All those things were just left unsaid? A. That is 

right, sir.
Q. The only thing that was said between you was this 

letter? A. That is right, sir.
Q. And you felt that no agreement was necessary on 

these other things? A. That is right, sir. 
# # # * * = * = * # # *
116 Mr. Sharlitt continues:

Q. Why didn’t you renew the lease, on the lease? A. I 
can explain that to you.

Q. I don’t think you have. A. I said if it wasn’t for 
Kebar, Inc., and Rekab, Inc. and my children, I wouldn’t



E57

even have to have a lease. I would just have a handshake 
with the proposition. That is the way I felt about it.

Q. Well, lets take a look at the period after August 29, 
1958; were there any changes in the practices and the poli­
cies of the restaurant, commencing at the time the agree­
ment was made August 29, 1958? A. No, sir.

Q. And prior to that time, the restaurant had been oper­
ated by Mr. Bergfeld, fully under his control; isn’t that 
true? A. I don’t know.

Q. Well you testified this morning that they hired all the 
employees there. A. That is right.

Q. And that went on after this August 29, 1958,
117 agreement; did it not? A. That is right.

Q. Did you ever have any occasion to go in there 
and tell him to run his restaurant any differently than the 
way he was running it? A. I didn’t have to tell him in the 
restaurant. He would come in the office and I would ex­
plain to him if there was anything wrong, or wasn’t wrong.

Q. From the time they rented the restaurant, they had 
full charge of i t ; isn’t that so ? A. That’s what you say.

Q. I want to know what you say. A. If I saw anything 
wrong, in any way, I would explain it to him and try to 
change it.

Q. Who brought the fixtures in there? A. B. & B.
Q. They are attached to the property; aren’t they? A. 

I really don’t know.
Q. Do you know if at any time whatsoever there was ever 

an occasion when any agents or representatives or employ­
ees of Kebar, Inc., ever interfered with the patronage at 
that restaurant prior to July, 1960? A. The exact date I 
wouldn’t know, but there must have been times.

Q. What do you mean? A. We have complaints
118 downstairs, lots of times, and wTe have to get hold of 

somebody and straighten them out.
Q. I am just talking about complaints in the restaurant. 

When these complaints came up, you took them up with Mr. 
Bergfeld, didn’t you? A. Yes, sir.



E58

Q. You didn’t go in and correct them yourself? A. No, 
sir.

Q. Was there ever a time that you went in and told them, 
or, in fact, did pick and choose their customers? A. No, 
I did not.

Q. That was their decision, was it not? A. They knew 
who they wanted in and who they didn’t.

w  ty* W  w  -A- -*V -V  W w

119 By Judge Pugh: If the lease has a provision say­
ing that B. & B. has control over who shall go into

the property and who shall not, read it to him.
By Mr. Sharlitt: We feel this portion is relevant: “ Wit­

nessed, that the said. Park Company, for and in considera­
tion (and so forth) and the performance by the said Con­

cessionaire of all the covenants and agreements here-
120 in expressed, the prompt performance of all the cove­

nants herein contained being a condition precedent,
the Park company hereby extends to the Concessionaire, 
the exclusive privilege of maintaining and conducting at 
Glen Echo Park, situate in the County of Montgomery, 
State of Maryland, all concessions for the purpose of sell­
ing food and beverages.” We think that is exclusive, not 
only as to all other concessionaires but exclusive as to their 
own facility.

By Judge Pugh: We have been waiting here to get the 
original lease and have it in evidence, and now you are 
going into the parole evidence rule. You can argue the 
lease, but having this witness interpret the terms of a lease 
that is in writing, I can’t see how you can expect him to do 
that. He says the two papers together constitute the agree­
ment under which the B. & B. opened the restaurant in July, 
1960.

By Mr. Sharlitt: Nothing further.
* * * * # # # # » #



E59

121 William Birgfeld

a witness of lawful age, called for examination by counsel 
for the plaintiff, and having first been duly sworn, accord­
ing to law, was examined and testified as follows, upon

Direct Examination
By Mr. McAuliffe:

Q. Mr. Birgfeld, state your name and address. A. Wil­
liam Birgfield, 5107 Maryland Drive, Sumner, Maryland.

Q. What is your employment? A. 1 am an officer of 
B. & B. Catering Service.
* * * * * * * * * *

By Judge Pugh: Are you holding under the paper that 
has been introduced in evidence? Were you holding pos­

session of this restaurant on July 2, 1960, under
122 these two papers? Have you seen the papers? A. 

I am fairly familiar with all the facts involved in
this. This was apparently a previous lease wherein certain 
addendums were made by a letter I received.

By Judge Pugh:
Q. Do those two papers constitute your legal right to oc­

cupy the restaurant? A. Number one, this is the longer 
lease, which has the technical terms in it, and we are au­
thorized to operate under certain circumstances, and there 
were addendums made at a later date.

By Judge Pugh:
Q. Were the additions made in that letter? A. Yes, sir. 

This was a slight change in the rental and combined the 
advertising and promotion and rental, putting them all into 
one category, and Kebar, Inc., thought we should not hire 
anyone under the age of eighteen.

Q. I show you State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B and ask you, 
are they the papers under which you conduct and operate 
the restaurant in Glen Echo Amusement Park, and did on 
July 2nd, 1960? A. Yes, sir.



E60

Q. Are there any other papers that have anything to do 
with your occupancy of those premises! A. No, sir; 

123 no other papers.
Mr. McAuliffe Resumes Direct Examination:

Q. And does your agreement as of July 2, 1960, between 
B. & B. and Kebar, consist of both of those documents, 
State’s Exhibits 8A and 8B! A. Yes, sir; this is the agree­
ment and this is the addition to and in change thereof.

Q. What is your position with the B. & B. Catering Cor­
poration! A. I am President, sir.

133 By Mr. Sharlitt: Your Honor, I renew my motion 
for a directed verdict on constitutional grounds at 

this point for insufficiency of evidence.
By Judge Pugh: The motion for a directed verdict is 

denied.

139 Judge Pugh's Oral Opinion (Greene, ei al.)

As I stated yesterday, in a somewhat similar case, it 
is most unfortunate that these parties have used the 
method that they are attempting to use, in order to estab­
lish what they believe to be their constitutional rights, or 
whatever rights they may call them. To come out into 
this County, in large groups of thirty-five and forty people, 
and try to force a change of policy on the part of a private 
business is really unthinkable. That is the nearest thing 
to taking the law in your own hands that I can think of. 
If you want to litigate what you believe to be your rights, 
then litigate them civilly and in an atmosphere where 
the legal principles and the constitutional principles may 
be passed upon, without the fear or without the possibility, 
of stamping the individuals guilty of some misdemeanor.

It is a fundamental principle of this country, as I under­
stand the Constitution, that a man in business has a right 
to do business with anybody that he sees fit, whether they



E61

be black, white, yellow, or whatever color he might be, 
and for any reason that he may deem sufficient in his 
opinion. If that were not the law, then the man would not 
stay in business long. His idea of how he should transact 
business must be the controlling influence. If a man in 

business cannot run it the way he sees fit, he would
140 soon be out of business. If he is required to con­

duct his business on the ideas and fancies of groups
of people, it will no longer be Ms business. It may be 
that if he would listen to these groups of people, he might 
get more business, but that is not the question. He is 
responsible for his own livelihood and he has to make a 
living out of the business, and if he decides to exclude 
certain people, for any reason he sees fit, and he goes 
bankrupt, that is his hard luck. If the business firms of 
this County cannot stay in business in the way they desire 
to transact it with the public, they might as well close 
up all private business and let the government take it over 
and run it, under the rules of segregation as decided in 
the school cases. So I say, in private business a man 
has a right to transact business the way he sees fit, whether 
it be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or whatnot. The 
test as to whether or not he remains in business is whether 
or not the public wants to do business with him. If the 
public doesn’t want to do business with him, because he 
advocates certain racial policies, he will soon be out of 
business and then he is through. He will then no longer 
be making a livelihood out of his business. He will then 
have to do something else, or be put on public relief.

There is not a great deal of difference between this case 
and the case tried yesterday. This morning when we heard 

the testimony about the restaurant, I was a little in
141 doubt as to whether or not the lessees of the restau­

rant did desire or would refuse to serve these de­
fendants, had they had the authority or the opportunity 
to do so. While that question has been satisfactorily 
removed from this case by proof of the lease, there is no 
evidence that this Catering Company refused, or actually



E62

told them the get off of their restaurant property. There 
is evidence in this case that these defendants deliberately 
went on the property of the Glen Echo Park Amusement 
Company; that they ran across its property for the pur­
pose of going to this restaurant, and they did it after 
getting away from the policeman who was there watching 
the picketing outside of the grounds of the amusement 
park.

When you are running, and a policeman is behind you, 
it is a clear indication that you are doing wrong. If you 
are not doing wrong, then you have no business to run 
when you know there is a uniformed policeman behind 
you. It is plain from the evidence in this case that these 
defendants went out there for one purpose—for the pur­
pose of trying to force on the management of Glen Echo 
Park Amusement Company their asserted right to impress 
on the Amusement Company that it was wrong in maintain­
ing its policy of segregation. That is not within their 
authority. They did not have that right, in the opinion 
of this Court. Under the law of this State, as it stands 
today, if anyone decides he desires not to serve negroes, 

because they are negroes, they have a right to refuse 
142 to do so. Whether that is right or wrong will prob­

ably have to be determined by the Court of Appeals, 
but as of this time no decision has been cited; no authority 
has been cited in this State, where a man who operates 
a private business does not have the complete and absolute 
control of it.

Now getting into the question of Avhether or not you 
can use the facilities of the State to enforce a policy of 
that kind. I might say that we are now trying these de­
fendants under the law of trespass. By way of compar- 
sion, in answering the arguments of Mr. Sharlitt, wouldn’t 
it be a nice state of affairs if you owned a piece of prop­
erty out here in Rockville and somebody came on your 
property and just sat there, and you went out and saw 
him sitting there, and assuming, for the sake of argument, 
it is two or three o’clock in the morning, and you go out



E63

there and tell him to get off your property, and he refuses 
to get off, and then you still insist that he get off and you 
give him five minutes to leave and you tell him if he doesn’t 
get off that you are going to have him arrested for tres­
passing—wouldn’t it be a ridiculous state of affairs if 
the owner of this land could not secure a trespass warrant 
and have the use of the facilities of the police department 
to have that man arrested for remaining on your property! 
If that were the law, very clearly the people who own 
property would take the law in their own hands. In the 

rural sections of this County I can see some of the 
143 farmers going into the house and getting a shotgun 

and using it, and in my judgment, if the law did not 
protect him in his right to be secure in the ownership of 
his property and enjoy it, he would have a right to do so. 
I am not condoning shooting people for trespassing, but 
I am saying if the police department did not help the 
citizens of this County in the protection of their property, 
we would be in a sad state of affairs.

This situation in the Glen Echo Amusement Park is 
not exactly similar to that, but we are dealing with the 
law of trespass, and whether or not it is a wmnton tres­
pass. It is wanton when you are told to get off and you 
don’t get off. How many times you have to tell them 
that, I am not in a position to say, but in my own judg­
ment when a man comes on your property and you tell 
him to get off, and he doesn’t get off and remains there, 
it is time for the owner of the property to kick him off, 
or for the police department to come in and arrest that 
man for trespassing. This is the law today, and we are 
trying these defendants under that law. That is the law 
of trespass of this State, and if it were not we would be in 
a state of chaos with reference to the ownership and oc­
cupancy of our homes.

Wouldn’t it be a sad state of affairs if a man knocked 
at my door and I let him in, and after he entered the house 
he became boisterous and loud, and he tried to tell



E64

144 me this and that and I say, “ Get out of my house; 
you are ordered off my property” and then he re­

fused to get off the property and I call the police and 
then the defense is that I didn’t tell him not to come on 
the property; I invited him into my house and, therefore, 
it is not a wanton trespass?

In this case it is a wanton trespass when a group of 
people stand out in front of a man’s place of business and 
attempt to harass him or keep people away, and prevent 
them from doing business with him. The law seems to 
condone the fact that they can parade up and down out­
side, or pocket him. I do not condone that practice, but 
the law says they have that right—that picketing is proper. 
Still, I do not agree with that practice, but I have to abide 
by the Court’s decisions. When a man owns a business 
and there are a lot of people out there picketing, and try­
ing to keep possible customers from doing business with 
him, it is an interference with his right to do business.

Now that is what these defendants were doing in this 
case, and the evidence shows conclusively that they came 
out there to picket and harass the Amusement Park owners. 
The law says it is all right to picket, but why did they 
break the line and go on the private property of the com­
pany? They knew they didn’t have any right on the prop­
erty. They knew it by virtue of the fact that the papers 

were full of it, and two or three days before that it
145 had been all over the newspapers that there was a 

segregation policy in effect in Glen Echo Amusement
Park.

We are not trying the segregation question here. We 
are not trying the right of these defendants to test the 
policy of a private corporation to establish a segregation 
policy. In other words, the law of this State is, at this 
time, that he can select his own patrons and I dare say 
if that decision is changed, it will be a new revolution 
in the laws of this State and this Country.

So I say to you people that I have been very liberal 
with you, and very patient with you, and yesterday’s



E65

case was only the first of a series of cases that are to be 
tried in this Court. We are only bound by the law as 
established today. The Court finds each of you guilty 
of trespass and sentences each of you to pay a fine of One 
Hundred Dollars, and costs. Yesterday I gave the defend­
ants a lesser fine than the maximum allowed by the law. 
Frankly, I think your case is more aggravated. You were 
parading up and down outside of this park; you college 
students, one from New York, and the other college students 
from here in Washington, trying to force your ideas upon 
a private business in this manner. I cannot understand 
how you can get into the frame of mind to think that 
you can force your ideas upon them as to the way it should 
run its business. I dare say if you were in business, you 

would run it the way you wanted to, or you would 
146 close the door. So I say in this case it is really a 

wonder that you haven’t been charged with attempt­
ing to incite a riot. If there had been any disorder, or any 
bloodshed out there, because of your actions, and you 
came in here and were convicted of rioting, you would 
go to jail as quick as lighting, and I say you had better 
not cause any rioting; you better stay within your bounds 
and listen to your lawyers. You should go ahead and 
litigate your cases, the same way the school case was 
litigated—civilly, and in the proper courts, and advance 
your ideas there. If the Court agrees with you, that is 
one thing, and if the Court doesn’t agree with you, you 
must accept it, just like the people in this County have 
accepted school integration and the business men of this 
County would accept any change, once their doors are open 
to everyone.

Under the evidence in this case, the State has estab­
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants are 
guilty of wanton trespass, and the Court so finds you all 
guilty as charged.



E66

State's Exhibit No. 8A

THIS AGREEMENT
Made and concluded this day of A.D., 1956, 

by and between K ebab, Inc., a corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Maryland, herein­
after designated as the Park Company, as party of the 
first part, and B & B Industrial Catering Service, Inc., 
a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Maryland, hereinafter designated as the Conces­
sionaire, as party of the second part:

W itnesseth , That the said Park Company, for and in 
consideration of the sum of One D ollar, in hand paid, 
receipt of which before the execution hereof is hereby 
acknowledged, and the performance by the said Conces­
sionaire of all the covenants and agreements herein ex­
pressed, the prompt performance of all the covenants 
herein contained being a condition precedent, the Park 
Company hereby extends to the Concessionaire, the exclu­
sive privilege of maintaining and conducting at Glen Echo 
Park, situate in the County of Montgomery, State of 
Maryland, all concessions for the purpose of selling food 
and beverages.

All fixtures, appliances, supplies, and services required 
to operate the foregoing concessions are to be furnished 
by the Concessionaire, and all prices of goods or other 
matter sold are to be subject to the approval and agree­
ment of the Park Company, and none other, for the term 
of two summer seasons, said term to begin on or about the 
1st day of April, 1957, and to terminate on or about 
Labor Day, September, 1958. The concessions and licenses 
specified in this contract are to be used and exercised 
daily except when otherwise required by the Park Com­
pany; and the Concessionaire hereby agrees to maintain 
and conduct said concessions for the period named, for 
which the Concessionaire agrees to pay and provide in 
services to the Park Company:



E67

(1) The total rental for the 1957 and 1958 seasons shall 
be $85,000.00 based on $42,500.00 per season, payable 
in equal bi-annual installments on December 15, 1956, 
June 15, 1957, December 15, 1957 and June 15, 1958.

(2) Twenty-five percentum (25%) of the gross receipts 
from the operation of the Ballroom Refreshment 
Stand, payable once each week.

(3) Twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) per season 
for advertising and promotion to be paid in five (5) 
monthly installments on the 15th Day of May, June, 
July, August and on the last Wednesday of the 
seasons.

(4) One hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00) per season 
for share of the cost of Montgomery County licens­
ing, said sum, however, to be adjusted proportion­
ately to any changes in the Montgomery County 
licensing charges.

(5) A daily full course meal for the Park Company em­
ployees to consist of appetizer, meat, two vegetables, 
desert, and coffee, the menu and price subject to 
approval of the Park Company.

(6) The Concessionaire shall handle its own money.

It Is F urther A greed, that the space, buildings or struc­
tures used by the Concessionaire in the performance of 
this contract is not leased to the Concessionaire; that he 
is a licensee, not a lessee thereof; and his rights under this 
contract shall continue only so long as he strictly and 
promptly complies with the convenants, agreements and 
conditions herein expressed. The Concessionaire shall not 
sell, mortage, or assign or in any manner dispose of this 
contract or concessions, nor any interest herein, nor have 
the right or authority to allow any other person or party 
to have any interest in this concession, or the premises 
occupied, for any purpose, without the written consent of 
the Park Company.



E68

I t Is F urther A greed, That the Park Company, by its 
proper officers or agents, shall have the right at all times 
to enter upon said space, buildings, or structures, for the 
purpose of preserving and carrying out all the rules and 
regulations of the Park Company, and to determine that all 
the conditions of this contract are fulfilled, and to assist 
the Park Company in this, the Concessionaire shall furnish 
to the General Manager of the Park Company, duplicates 
of all keys used by the Concessionaire and necessary to this 
end.

It Is F urther A greed, That this contract shall be sub­
ject to the following covenants, stipulations and conditions:

F irst— The Manager of the Park Company shall have 
the power, during the existence of this contract, to pro­
hibit any show or exhibition, or any amusement, under 
the Concessionaire, which, in his opinion, shall appear to 
be against good morals, public safety, or health. And the 
Concessionaire shall, upon the order of the Manager, im­
mediately stop, or modify, said exhibition; and upon 
failure to obey such order, said Manager may summarily 
cause the removal of said show or amusement, or any part 
thereof, and terminate this contract or concession, and 
the Concessionaire forfeits' and reliquishes all claims for 
damages or loss occasioned by reason of such removal or 
closing and the termination of this contract.

S econd—The Concessionaire shall not allow any form of 
gambling, the renting of roms for any immoral purposes, 
or the making, manufacture, drinking, sale, or, in any form 
or manner whatsoever, disposal of intoxicating liquors, 
excepting beer however ; and upon a repition of such 
offenses in or upon Park Company premises occupied, the 
Park Company, by its proper officers or agents, shall have 
the right to seize and destroy any apparatus or device so 
used, or intended for such use, to take possession and 
close said premises occupied by the Concessionaire, with­
out notice to the Concessionaire or redress on his part, to 
cancel and terminate this contract, remove the property



E69

and effects of the Concessionaire, and the Concessionaire 
hereby waives all claims for damages or loss by reason 
of any acts of the Park Company under this section.

T hib.d— The Concessionaire and his employees shall, at 
all times, be subject to and strictly comply with the rules 
and regulations which shall from time to time be pre­
scribed by the Park Company, its officers and agents, and 
also to the regulation of admission of any persons or 
vehicles therein. The Park Company shall have the right 
to approve all employees used by the Concessionaire, and 
upon notice that any person employed as aforesaid is 
objectionable, such person shall be dismissed at once by the 
Concessionaire. The Concessionaire agrees that he shall 
not, by himself or agent, sell or peddle anything upon the 
grounds under this contract, or within the neighborhood of 
said grounds, any commodity, article, or exercise any other 
privileges other than within the terms of this contract. 
The Concessionaire convenants and agrees not to advertise 
his operations in any manner on or about the premises 
or outside the Glen Echo Park, or in any newspaper or 
otherwise, except by means of such signs or form-s as shall 
be approved by the Manager of the Park Company; and 
shall not employ any person known as a crier or spieler, 
not approved by the Manager of the Park Company.

F ourth—The Concessionaire covenants and agrees that 
it will not erect or construct and structure or make any 
alterations upon said premises except in accordance with 
plans approved in writing by the proper officers of the 
Park Company, and then only in such places designated in 
writing.

F ift h —The Concessionaire shall be solely responsible 
and answerable in damages for all accidents and injuries 
to person or property caused by any negligence on his 
part, or on the part of his agents or employees; and also 
the Concessionaire covenants and agrees to indemnify the 
Park Company, its officers and agents, from every claim 
for damages made and brought about by reason of such



E70

negligence, and to defend, at Ms own cost, any action or 
proceeding brought against the Park Company, its officers 
or agents, under such claim, whether the Park Company, 
its officers or agents, be sued jointly or with the Conces­
sionaire or otherwise. The Park Company shall be further 
protected by securing suitable public liability insurance, 
the premium of which is to be paid by the Concessionaire.

S ix th—If the Concessionaire cannot do business due to 
closing of his stands or stand, due to Park Company 
failure, the Concessionaire is to be refunded a daily rent, 
computed on a pro rata basis. However, if the closing 
of the stand or stands is brought about by failure of the 
Concessionaire, no refund is to be made.

S e v en t h—The Concessionaire hereby agrees to indem­
nify and save harmless the Park Company, its officers and 
agents, against all loss or damage, by action or otherwise, 
on account of patents or copyrights, or the infringement 
of the same in its operations.

E ig h t h —The Park Company, by i ts  officers or agents, 
may order the removal of any substances or explosives, 
at their option, from the space, buildings or structures 
under this contract. The Concessionaire agrees to keep 
said concessions and immediate surroundings in a clean 
and sanitary condition, free from all rubbish and dirt.

N in t h —It is further agreed that, should the premises 
occupied under this contract be so damaged as to be 
unihabitable for a period of ten consecutive days, at the 
option of the Park Company, by notice in writing to the 
Concessionaire, this concession may be conceded, without 
recourse for damages as against the Park Company, its 
officers or agents.

T e n t h —The Manager of the Park Company shall decide 
every dispute which may arise between the Concessionaire 
and any other concessionaire, and any dispute between the 
Concessionaire and the Park Company, and the decision 
shall be final and binding on all parties thereto. Upon



E71

failure to obey such decision, this contract may be termi­
nated.

E leventh— Nothing in this contract shall create a co­
partnership between the Park Company and the Conces­
sionaire, or constitute the Concessionaire an agent of the 
Park Company, to bind the Park Company, its officers 
or agents, in any way whatsoever.

T w elfth—The Concessionaire further agrees that, 
should the carrying out of the purposes of this concession, 
or any part therein, be stopped by legal proceedings, then 
the said Park Company, by its officers or agents, by written 
notice to the Concessionaire, may cancel and terminate this 
contract.

T hirteenth— The Concessionaire hereby covenants and 
agrees that the Park Company, its officers or agents, shall 
not be liable for the loss of or injury to any property, 
goods, or affects of the Concessionaire, due to any cause 
whatsoever.

F ourteenth—Except for the Montgomery County 
license, as to which the Concessionaire pays $125.00 as 
his proportionate share as hereinbefore provided, the Con­
cessionaire shall procure, at his own expense, all necessary 
licenses and official permits necessary for the purpose of 
carrying out the provisions of this contract; and they shall 
be paid and placed into the custody of the Manager of the 
Park Company.

F ifteen th— The Concessionaire shall keep a true and 
full record of the receipts from the operation of the Ball­
room Refreshment Stand, and said record shall, at any 
time, be open to the inspection of the Park Company’s 
officers or agents, and for this single operation only, dupli­
cate keys to any and all cash registers or other appliances 
used for the collection of the receipts shall be placed in 
the hands of the proper officers of the Park Company. The 
Concessionaire further agrees that the Park Company’s 
officers or agents shall have the right to audit directly



E72

from the cashiers, cash registers or appliances receiving 
money from this operation and that no adjustment of the 
readings of such registers or appliances shall be made 
without the approval of the Park Company.

S ixteenth— It is further mutually understood and agreed 
by and between the parties hereto that in case of default 
in the payments stipulated to be made by the Conces­
sionaire or any portion thereof, or in the case of non­
performance of any of the provisions herein contained to 
be performed by the Concessionaire, at the election of the 
Park Company, its successors or assigns, to consider the 
agreement at an end, the said Concessionaire, his heirs, 
executors or administrators, shall forthwith remove the 
paraphernalia and other things of any and every nature, 
belonging to the Concessionaire, therewith connected and 
concerned, from the Glen Echo Park premises, at his own 
cost and expense, and in the event of the failure, default 
or neglect of the failure to fully perform the obligations 
of this paragraph assumed, then, in that event, the Park 
Company, may, at the expense of the Concessionaire, his 
heirs, executors or administrators, dismantle and remove 
the same from said premises and charge the cost thereof 
to the Concessionaire; and should the Concessionaire be 
indebted to the Park Company by reason thereof or for 
any other matter, cause, or thing whatsoever, at the termi­
nation of this contract, the Park Company shall have a 
lien upon all the paraphernalia, g'oods, chattels, and money 
belonging to the Concessionaire or in which he is interested, 
which shall be located in or about Glen Echo Park or in 
the possession of the Park Company; and the Park Com­
pany shall have the right to satisfy and discharge the said 
lien by making sale of the said paraphernalia, goods or 
chattels in such manner as shall be satisfactory to it, either 
at public or private sale, but shall in any and every such 
sale, whether public or private, give at least ten (10) 
days notice to the Concessionaire before making sale, unless 
for any reason it shall be found to be impracticable, in



E73

which event, either public or private sale may be made 
without notice.

Upon termination of this contract the Park Company 
agrees to purchase for a price equal to the cost less depre­
ciation at the rate of ten percentum (10%) per annum 
from the date of purchase, all the capital improvements 
and items of equipment used by the Concessionaire in the 
performance of this contract.

It is further mutually understood and agreed that each 
and every of the terms, conditions, stipulations and agree­
ments in this instrument contained, shall be applicable and 
binding upon the Concessionaire, his Heirs and personal 
representatives; and should the said Concessionaire vio­
late any one or more of the covenants, agreements or condi­
tions upon his part to be performed, or should he fail to 
observe and fully keep each and every of the said cove­
nants, agreements and stipulations, then, in that event, the 
Park Company shall have the right to forfeit and terminate 
this agreement without notice of any kind or character to 
the said Concessionaire, and shall also have the right there­
upon to dispossess the said Concessionaire either with or 
without legal procedings to that end, as it may be deemed 
proper and advised; the waiver of one or more breaches 
and violations of the hereinbefore recited covenants and 
agreements shall not be construed as a waiver of subse­
quent violations or breaches of the covenants, agreements 
or stipulation itself.

Seventeenth—The personal pronoun used herein as re­
ferring to the Concessionaire shall be understood and con­
strued as having reference to either a natural person of 
either sex, a firm, or a corporation.

E ighteenth—All notices and orders herein provided to 
be given to the Concessionaire, may be served by mailing 
the same to him at his last known place of residence or 
business, outside of Glen Echo Park, or by delivering a 
copy thereof to him in person, or by leaving it addressed to



E74

him at his place of business, in said Glen Echo Park, with 
any person then in charge of the same.

Nineteenth—In all instances of the agreement providing 
for the cancelation of same, and particularly in paragraphs 
numbered 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, and 12, but not limited to said 
paragraphs, it is mutually understood and agreed that if 
the cancelation is not the direct result of any legal miscon­
duct on the part of the Concessionaire, or a willful and 
continued violation of the conditions of this agreement by 
Concessionaire after due written notice by the party of 
the first part, then, upon cancellation by the party of the 
first part, Concessionaire shall be entitled to a rebate ac­
cording to the formula set forth in the sixth paragraph 
herein, and any provisions of this agreement to the con­
trary, or in conflict with this provision notwithstanding.

I n W itness W hereof, the said parties of the first and 
second part have directed their proper officers to execute 
these presents in triplicate and to cause the corporate seal 
of said corporations to be hereto affixed.

K ebar, I n c .

By Abram Baker 
President

Attest:

By (illegible)
General Manager

B & B I ndustrial Catering 
Service, I nc.

By H. W. Birgeeld, J r. 
President

Secretary 
A ttest:

Secretary



E75

State's Exhibit No. 8B

Kebab, Into.
Glen E cho P ark
Playground of the Nations’s Capital 
Glen E cho
Montgomery County, Md.
OLiver 2-6743

August 29, 1958.
Mr. William Birgfeld 
B & B Catering Co., Inc.
Dear Mr. Birgfeld:

This will confirm the agreement made with me for the 
exclusive privilege of operating all the food and drink 
stands at Glen Echo Park. If the terms and conditions 
meet with your approval, please affix your signature to both 
copies and return to me, in order that I may sign them.

The following terms will cover the 1959 and 1960 Seasons:
1. The combined rental, which includes Advertising 

and Promotion, plus Montgomery County Operating 
License for 1959 and 1960 Seasons will be $126,250.00 
payable in four equal installments of $31,562.50, pay­
able on December 15, 1958, June 15, 1959, December 
15, 1959 and June 15, 1960.

2. No one under 18 years of age should work for 
your concern.

3. (25%) of the gross receipts from the operation 
of Ballroom Refreshment Stand. It is further under­
stood that you will pay the premiums on personal lia­
bility insurance secured by Kebar, Inc; that you will be 
solely responsible and answerable for all accidents or 
injuries, which might occur under these operations,



E76

and that you will indemnify Kebar, Inc. from any
claims.

Very truly yours,
Abram Baker 
Abram Baker, President
Kebar, Inc.

I agree with the terms outlined above:
H. W. Birgfeld, J r., Pres.
H. W. Birgfeld, Jr.
B & B Catering Co., Inc.

Sam Baker, Secretary-Treasurer