Shackney v USA Brief for Appellee

    No. 28,500

In the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit

D avid  I. S h a c k n e y , a p p e l l a n t

v.

U n ited  States  of A m e r ic a , appellee

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

Burke Marshall ,
Assistant Attorney General,

Robert C. Zam pano ,
United States Attorney,

H arold H. Greene,
Howard A . Glickstein , 
Gerald W. Jones,

Attorneys,
Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C. 20530



Statement of the Case................................................................... 1
A. Appellant Meets the Oros Family in Mexico...........  2
B. The Early Transactions Between Appellant and the

Oros Family..................................................................... 3
C. The Arrangements to Move the Oros Family to Con­

necticut............................................................................. 8
D. Conditions on Appellant’s Farm.... ......   10

1. The First Day........................................................... 10
2. Living Conditions..................................................... 11
3. Food, Clothing, etc.................................................. 11
4. Work........................................................................... 12
5. Schooling and Leisure............................................. 13
6. Mail Censorship......................................................... 14
7. Access to Outside World......................................... 15

E. Financial Dealings Between Appellant and the Oros
Family..............................................................................  18

F. The Atmosphere of Fear Created by Appellant.........  21
G. The Oros Family Leaves Appellant’s Farm.............  23
H. The Verdict and Sentence.................................-...... . 28

Statute Involved..............................................................................  30
Argument........................................................................................  30

I. The Evidence Sustains the Verdict........................  30
A. The Offense..............................................................  30

1. The Holding....................................................... 31
2. The Involuntary Nature of the Servitude.... 33

B. The Evidence Establishes that Appellant Acted
to Force the Oros Family to Work on his 
Farm........................................................................  35

C. The Holding was Wilfull....................................... 38
D. Luis Oros and His Children were Held to a Con­

dition of Involuntary Servitude......................... 41
II. 18 U.S.C. 1584, As Applied In This Case, Is Not

Vague And Indefinite................................................... 45
A. The History and Purpose of 18 U.S.C. 1584.....  45

I N D E X
Page



II

B. Whatever Its Outer Limits, 18 U.S.C. 1584
Clearly Covers Servitude Imposed by Threats of 
Deportation............................................................... 49

C. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 1584 as Ap­
plied to the Facts of This Case is Not Affected 
by the Fact that there are Some Situations to 
Which the Statute Might not be Applicable......... 50

III. Appellant’s Trial Was Fair In Every Respect..........  52
A. Alleged Deliberate Attempts to Influence the

Jury with Inadmissible Evidence.........................  52
1. The letters........................................................... 52
2. Hearsay conversations.....................................  55

B. Alleged Deliberate Injection of Numerous Ir­
relevant and Prejudicial Side Issues Into the
Case........................................................................... 57

C. Alleged Improper Remarks During Summation
to the Jury............................................................... 59

Conclusion......................................................................................... 71

CASES CITED
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).............................  49
Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 159 (1920).............  48
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)...................................  47
Bernal v. United States, 241 Fed. 339 (C.A. 5, 1917), cert.

denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).........................................32, 39, 40, 58
Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293 (C.A. 9, 1955).............  70
Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171 (C.A. 8, 1955).......  49
Christensen v. United States, 16 F.2d 29 (C.A. 9, 1926).....  64
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)............................ ..........  47
Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (C.A. 2, 1925), cert.

denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925).................................................  57,70
Pikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).....................................  34
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).........  50
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948)...........................  50
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936)...........................  48
Grobelny v. Cowan, 151 F.2d 810 (C.A. 2, 1945)...................  53
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)............................................. 41, 49
Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d 14 (C.A. 6, 1944).......  66, 71
Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465, 24 Pac. 979 (1890).....................  51
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906)............................. 47
Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F. 2d 338

(C.A. 9, 1951)......................................................................... 70
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958)............................. 61

Argument— Continued Page



Ill

Lewis-Kures v. Edward R. Walsh & Co., 102 F.2d 42 (C.A.
2, 1939)....................................................................................  34

Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)...............................  49
Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (C.A. 2, 1949)

cert, denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949)................................. .......  54
Mutual Life Ins-. Co., v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).........  54
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)............................. 48
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922)...........................  50
Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (C.A. 8, 1941), cert.

denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).................................................. 54
Padron v. United States, 254 F.2d 574 (C.A. 5, 1958).............  61, 62
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)..................................  49
Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (C.A. 5, 1944), cert.

denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945).........................................  32
Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).........31, 32, 33, 37, 43
In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686 (N.D. Fla. 1905).—33, 44, 47, 58 
People v. Rosenfeld, 11 N.Y. 2d 290 ,183 N.E. 2d 656 (1962).. 69
Pollock v. Williams-, 322 U.S. 4 (1944)..................................... 47
Powers v. United States, 294 Fed. 512 (C.A. 5, 1923).........  53
Randle v. United States, 113 F.2d 945 (C.A. D.C. 1940).....  33
Schino v. United States, 209 F.2d 67 (C.A. 9, 1954)...............  61
Schmidt v. United States, 237 F.2d 542 (C.A. 8, 1956).........  61, 66
Shores v. Simanton, 99 Vt. 191, 130 A. 697 (1925)......  58
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).................... 46,47
State v. Pearson, 39 N.J. Super. 50, 120 A. 2d 468 (1956)— 58
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)................................... 41,44
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942)..........................  32
Thompson v. United States, 272 F. 2d 919 (C.A. 5, 1959).... 66
United States v. Achilli, 234 F.2d 797 (C.A. 7, 1956)...........  61
United States v. Ancarola, 1 Fed. 676 (S.D. N.Y. 1880).......  33,36
United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (C.A.

2, 1946), cert, denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946)....................  66,70
United States v. Beekman, 155 F. 2d 580 (C.A. 2, 1946)........ 68
United States v. Buckner, 108 F.2d 921 (C.A. 2, 1940), cert.

denied, 309 U.S. 669 (1940)............................................. 58
United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974 (D.C. S.C. 1906)----  32,33,

34, 44
United States v. Cohen, Yll F.2d 523 (C.A. 2, 1949), cert.

denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950)............................................... 70
United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233 (1909).........................  48
United States v. Corrigan, 168 F.2d 641 (C.A. 2, 1948)........ 53
United States v. D’Ercole, 225 F.2d 611 (C.A. 2, 1955)........ 68
United States v. Doyle, 234 F.2d 788 (C.A. 7, 1956)...............  61
United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944)......................... 48
United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41 (1937)............................... 48
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).........................  52
United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (C.A. 2, 1950), cert.

denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951)..............................................  69

Cases— Continued Page



IV

United, States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947).....  33, 34,
40, 47, 58

United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (C.A. 2, 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963).......... ......................................  35

United States v. Kennedy, 291 F.2d 457 (C.A. 2, 1961)...........  54
United States v. Kiamie, 258 F.2d 924 (C.A. 2, 1958), cert.

denied, 358 U.S. 909 (1958)................................................  66
United States v. McCarthy, 170 F.2d 267 (C.A. 2, 1948).......  61
United States v. McClellan, 127 Fed. 971 (S.D. Ga. 1904).... 46
United States v. Morris, 269 F.2d 100 (C.A. 2, 1959), cert.

denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959)................................................  35
United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491 (C.A. 2, 1958).......  54
United States v. Pellegrino, 273 F.2d 570 (C.A. 2, I960).......  35
United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513 (1942)...........................  48
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).............................  51
United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540 (1938).........................  48
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).....................  32
United States v. Robertson, 298 F.2d 739 (C.A. 2, 1962).....  35
United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (C.A. 2, 1945)

cert, denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945)....................................... 58
United States v. So cony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150

(1940).....................................................................  59,62,63,64,71
United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (C.A. 2, 1958).....  68
United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256 (C.A. 2, 1959),

cert, denied, 361 U.S. 863 (1959).......................................  61
United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286 (C.A. 2, 1962).............  44
United States v. Tutino, 269 F.2d 488 (C.A. 2, 1959).........  35
United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (C.A. 2, 1955).......  54
United States v. Warren, 120 F.2d 211 (C.A. 2, 1941)...........  63, 69
United States v. Weinbren, 121 F.2d 826 (C.A. 2, 1941).......  53
United States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526 (C.A. 2, 1935), cert.

denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936).................................................  71
Vause v. United States, 53 F.2d 346 (C.A. 2, 1931)...............  53
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).........................................  49
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).......................................  49
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951)......................... 48

Cases— Continued Page

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 

United States Constitution:
Thirteenth Amendment......................................................... 46

Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 53................................................... 46
3 Stat. 450 (1818)....................................................................... 46
18 Stat. 251 (1874)....................................................................... 46
R.S. 5377 (1873-74)....................................................................... 46
35 Stat. 1139 (1909)....................................................................  46
35 Stat. 1153 (1909)..................................................................... 46



V

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions— Continued Page
18 U.S.C. 423 (1940)......................................  46
18 U.S.C. 446 (1940)...........................................  46
18 U.S.C. 1581..............................................................................  1,32
18 U.S.C. 1584.....................................1, 30, 32, 33, 35, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51
Connecticut (28 C.G.S.A. 53-40)...................................................  51

MISCELLANEOUS

Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, pp. 237-238...........  46
4 Elliot’s Debates 555..................................................................  50
Traver, Uncle Tom’s Granddaughter—Michigan State Bar

Journal, pp. 13-15 (March, 1961)..................................... 58
3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (1957 ed.) §§ 1396-

1400..........................................................................................  51



In the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit

No. 28,500

D avid  I. S h a c k n e y , a p p e l l a n t

v.

U n ited  States  op A m e r ic a , appellee

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 17, 1962, a nine-count indictment was filed in 
the United States District Court for the District of Con­
necticut charging that appellant had held certain persons 
in peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of 18 
U.S.C. 1581(a) and 18 U.S.C. 1584 (A. 12-14).1 It was 
charged that on or about July 12, 1961, and continuing 
until on or about March 3, 1962, in the City of Middle- 
field, Connecticut, appellant held Luis Oros and his wife 
Virginia Oros to a condition of peonage (Counts I and 
II) and that, during this same period, appellant, wilfully 
and knowingly, held Luis Oros, Virginia Oros, and their 
five children— Maria Elena, Maria Teresa, Sergio, Maria 
Virginia and Luz Maria—to a condition of involuntary 
servitude (Counts III to IX) (A. 12-14).

1 “ A” refers to appellant’s appendix and “ AA” to appellee’s ap­
pendix.

(1)



2

Appellant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of not 
guilty on all counts (A. 1). A jury was impanelled; on 
January 30, 1963, the trial began (A. 4, 23) at which the 
following evidence was adduced:2

A. Appellant Meets the Oros Family in Mexico

In June 1960, appellant went to Mexico to obtain 
workers for his chicken farm in Middlefield, Connecticut 
(A. 885-87, 894).3 He met Luis Oros4 soon thereafter in 
Mexico City when he hired a taxicab that was driven by 
Oros (A. 26).5 Appellant told Oros that he had come 
to Mexico to find three families to work on his chicken 
farms (A. 27). When appellant indicated that he was 
still in need of a third family, Oros urged that appellant 
consider hiring his family (A. 27).6 Thereafter, appel­
lant visited Oros’ house7 where he told Oros that he had

2 Because of the difficulty of the complaining witnesses to express 
themselves in English, an interpreter was constantly present and 
was frequently utilized. At the time of the incidents involved in 
this case, Oros spoke very little English and the other members of 
the family spoke almost no English at all (A. 76, 510, 528, 546, 740, 
834).

3 Appellant had had difficulty in hiring and retaining farm labor­
ers. Most workers left his employ as soon as they had saved a little 
money (A. 884-85).

4 Oros was forty-three years old at the time of the trial (A. 25). 
He is a native of Mexico with a sixth grade education in the Mexi­
can school system (A. 25, 76). Oros had worked as a shoe finisher 
and taxi-driver but was engaged in the latter occupation for the 
eleven years immediately preceding his initial contact with appel­
lant (A. 26, 31, 300).

5 Appellant testified that Oros was accompanied by a friend and 
he heard Oros tell the friend that he intended to overcharge ap­
pellant for the cab ride (A. 895-96). Oros denied this (A. 261).

6 Appellant testified that when Oros first suggested coming to 
work for him he told Oros that he had already obtained the people 
he needed and that Oros, trying to convince him to hire him, “ cried 
like a man that was desperate” (A. 897, 899, 901-02). Appellant 
also stated that Oros told him that he drank a great deal (A. 899). 
Oros denied that he was a heavy drinker (A. 230-31).

7 The house contained three large rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom 
and a small yard (A. 26).



3

a similar house on his farm (A. 28-29; cf. 902). Oros’ fam­
ily was not at home, and appellant requested that they 
be brought to his hotel room the following day so that 
he could meet them (A. 29). The meeting took place. 
Appellant liked the family8 but explained that he was 
leaving Mexico the next day and that Oros should obtain 
the papers needed for himself and his family to come to 
this country (A. 29-30; cf. 900-01).

B. The Early Transactions Between Appellant and the 
Oros Family

Between July and December 1960, Oros endeavored to 
arrange for his departure to the United States and wrote 
to appellant on a number of occasions explaining what 
steps he was taking (A. 30-32, 903). Appellant did not 
reply to these letters (A. 32), although Oros made many 
promises in an attempt to elicit a reply from appellant 
(A. 31). Oros stated: “ I don’t remember exactly what 
promise I put in the letters, but I promise too many 
things because decide to come to United States and live 
here for all my life he know. That is why I want to bring 
all my family here and stay here and make American 
citizens” (A. 31).9

In January 1961, Oros received a telegram from appel­
lant requesting that Oros telephone him. (P. Ex. A ; A. 
32, 903).10 Oros complied, and appellant asked whether 
Oros and his family still desired to come to the United 
States (A. 33-34). Appellant requested Oros to send him

8 Appellant testified that when he saw the family “ it was a mov­
ing sight. Really. A wonderful group of children that were half 
starved and dressed almost in rags . . .”  (A. 901). However, a 
photograph of the family (P. Ex. WWW), taken a short time after 
this incident, shows them to be well fed and well clothed.

9 Oros had been in the United States on two occasions at which 
times he had been employed for short periods performing work 
under a contractual arrangement between the United States and 
Mexico (A. 31).

10 Appellant testified that he contacted Oros at this time because 
he realized that the two families he then employed would not be 
able to complete the term of their contracts (A. 904).



4

a letter, signed by each member of the family, indicating 
their desire to come to the United States (A. 34, 908).11 
Such a letter was sent (A. 34). Thereafter, appellant re­
quested that Oros and his entire family telephone him and 
signify their desire to come to the United States, which 
was done (A. 34-35, 909). Subsequently, appellant sent 
Oros a document written in English which he requested 
be signed by Oros, his wife and his eldest daughter— 
Maria Elena (D. Ex. 11; A. 36, 194-97, 907). 
Oros had the document translated into Spanish when a 
Notary Public refused to notarize the English docu­
ment (P. Ex. C; A. 36-37). The signed and notarized 
Spanish document, as well as the English document, which 
was also signed, were returned to appellant (A. 37-38, 
194-95). However, in the translation process an error 
was made in the amount of wages to be paid,12 and, 
consequently, the defendant, after a telephone conversa­
tion in which he reprimanded Oros because of the error 
in the contract, sent Oros (on March 28, 1961) a third 
document— in Spanish— which was signed by Oros, his 
wife and eldest daughter, notarized, and returned to the

11 Initially, Oros had intended to bring his eldest son, Luis, Jr., 
with the family to the United States (A. 27, 30, 34). However, 
Luis, Jr. married before the family left Mexico and did not accom­
pany them (A. 163-65). Appellant testified that he had urged 
Oros not to bring either his eldest son or daughter with him since 
they would have no social life in Connecticut, but Oros insisted on 
bringing his entire family (A. 905).

12 The original document (in English) sent by appellant to Oros 
(D. Ex. 11) provided that "for the first year, cash salary shall be 
2000 pesos per month, or in American money $160. Then this sal­
ary for the second year shall be 3000 pesos per month or in 
American money $240" (A .196). The Spanish translation of this 
document (P. Ex. C, C-l) provided that “ during the first year 
[salary shall be] $240.00, that is 3,000.00 pesos, Mexican money” 
(A. 39, 115-17). When appellant discovered this discrepancy he 
sent a document to Oros (P. Ex. G, G -l)— in Spanish—which pro­
vided “ for the first year the salary will be 666.66 pesos for each one 
[Oros, his wife and eldest daughter], that is, $53.33 every month 
(2,000 pesos or $160.00 for the three). The second year the cash 
salary will be 1,000 pesos for each, that is, $80.00 every month 
(3,000 pesos or $240.00 for the three)” (A. 43, 119-21).



0

defendant (P. Ex. G, G -l; A. 37-38; 40-43, 119-22, 195- 
96, 253-55, 909-10). This document provided (P. Ex. 
G, G-l ; A. 119-22) :

We, Luis Oros Ubiarco, Virginia Espina de Oros 
Y Maria Elena Oros Espina, by the present acknowl­
edge that the original offer of employment granted 
by Rabbi David L. Shackney of Maytav Kosher Pack­
ing Company was based on our original declarations 
in relation to our experience as farm workers. We 
actually did not have any experience as farm 
workers, and therefore we agree that all pervious 
negotiation, written or oral, is null, and at the same 
time we agree to accept employment based on the 
following:

1 - The working contract is for a period of two 
years, beginning August 15, 1961, and ending Au­
gust 15, 1963.

2 - Together with other couple we will care for 
approximately 20,000 laying hens which are in five 
buildings. This care will include feeding, giving 
them water, daily washing of drinking recipients, 
careful collection of eggs, daily selection and grading 
of eggs for the day’s production, and other similar 
duties that may become necessary in an emergency.

3 - The hours of work will be from 6:30 a.m. to 
8:30 a.m., from 9:00 to 12:00 noon, from 1:00 p.m. 
to 3:30 p.m. and from 4:00 p.m. until the work has 
been completed.

4 - It is also understood that because of the fact 
that our work will be handling living things which 
must be carefully cared for, this work must be done 
every day, 7 days a week and 365 days a year with 
no exception.

5 - After the faithful fulfillment of the two years 
contract period, we will have the right to 24 days of 
rest with pay and at the rate of the last month’s 
salary. If the contract should be terminated for 
causes not depending on our will, that is, without



6

being our fault, then we will receive as compensa­
tion the salary of one full day of work for each 
month that we have worked. If the contract is ter­
minated due to our fault, we shall not receive any 
payment as compensation.

6 - Compensation includes a furnished place to live, 
with heat, electricity, and gas for cooking. We will 
provide our own cooking utensils, glassware, flatware, 
linen, etc. We will also receive sufficient and health­
ful food of average quality, consisting of bread, pas­
try, butter, greases, beef, and fowl, meats, eggs, 
beans, rice, sugar, coffee, salt, and canned milk. 
Moreover, for the first year the salary will be 666.66 
pesos for each one, that it $53.33 every month (2,000 
pesos or $160.00 for the three). The second year the 
cash salary will be 1,000 pesos for each, that is $80.00 
every month (3,000 pesos or $240.00 for the three).

7 - As security for the faithful fulfillment of the 
contract, half of our salary in money shall be de­
posited at a bank account in our name and in the 
name of Rabbi David I. Shackney. In the event that 
we should break this contract for any reason, or 
that we should neglect our responsibilities harming 
the business or endangering the health of production 
of the chickens, we agree that whatever amount in 
our bank account at that time would cease being 
ours and that the contract would be automatically 
null.

8 - In the event that the actual existence of chick­
ens should be sold, we agree to have this contract 
terminated at such a moment, and we will receive 
the amount of money which at that time should be 
at our bank account.

9 - In the event of sickness, the salary for a sub­
stitute workers shall be deducted from our salary 
if and when sickness should be of a short duration. 
If the sickness should be of long duration (con- 
finned by a physician) the contract shall be termin­
ated and we will receive the amount of money which 
at that time should be at our bank account.



7

Thereafter, appellant executed an affidavit which he 
mailed to Oros on April 26, 1961, and which, in a tele­
phone conversation on April 28, 1961, he instructed Oros 
to file with the United States Embassy in Mexico City 
(P. Ex. J ; A. 44-45; cf. 911). Oros described the telephone 
conversation in these words (A. 45) :

* * * He told me— . . . ‘This affidavit . . . bring 
to the American Embassy,’ and he told me, . . . ‘Don’t 
say anything in the American Embassy about the 
Spanish contract.’

I say, ‘Why?’
He say, ‘You don’t need nothing about this. Only 

you bring the affidavit to the American Embassy 
and don’t mention the Spanish contract. Then every 
day go to the American Embassy, you tell me—you 
ask for your visa,’ he tell me, ‘You cry to the Amer­
ican consuls, you,’ and he tell me, ‘Go every day and 
ask for your visa; sometimes you cry; sometimes 
you beg; sometimes you mad; but go to the American 
Embassy.’

The affidavit was filed with the United States Em­
bassy (A. 45; P. Ex. J). The affidavit states that ap­
pellant “will pay a starting salary of $225 per month 
for both man and wife named above. . . .  to increase to 
$250 per month after three-six months, provided workers 
adjust to our set-up” ; it did not indicate that Oros’ 
eldest daughter also would be a worker (P. Ex. J ; A. 
372-73, 911). In addition, the affidavit contains this 
statement (P. Ex. J; A. 373): “ Based upon these ap­
plicants’ long experience as a farm worker, I am sure 
that they can successfully discharge the responsibilities 
of the job.” 13 Subsequently, appellant repeated the latter 
statement to Mr. St. John Bargas, the then Chief of the 
Immigrant and Visa Section at the United States Em­
bassy in Mexico City. Bargas testified that appellant 
told him in June or July of 1961 “ that the man he was

13 Appellant testified that he recognized these erroneous state­
ments and that the purpose of his telephone call to Oros on April 
28, 1961, was to request him not to file the affidavit (A. 911, 1015).



8

sponsoring was an experienced specialist in chicken farm­
ing” (A. 731).14 Furthermore, Oros testified that, on one 
occasion, when he and appellant went to the United 
States Embassy, appellant told him that if he were 
asked whether he had ever worked on a farm before, he 
should indicate that he had (A. 58).15

Because of the difficulties encountered by Oros in ob­
taining his visa, appellant, at Oros’ suggestion, came to 
Mexico City on June 27, 1961, to help expedite matters 
(A. 46-48, 912-13).

C. The Arrangements to Move the Oros Family to 
Connecticut

After his arrival in Mexico City, appellant questioned 
Oros about his ability to pay for his visas and his trip 
to Connecticut (A. 49).16 Oros explained that he did not 
have any money but would attempt to obtain a loan 
(A. 49). He managed to borrow 1000 pesos— about 
$80.00—which he turned over to the appellant (A. 50).17 
Appellant indicated that this was not sufficient and that 
possibly he could arrange for a friend of his to advance 
additional funds (A. 50). Soon thereafter appellant ad­
vised Oros that his friend had agreed to loan money for 
the visas and trip expenses but that Oros, and a con­

14 Appellant claimed that when he spoke with Mr. Bargas, he told 
him that Oros and his family were without farming experience (A. 
1015-17).

15 Oros testified that he never told appellant that he had had ex­
perience handling chickens and eggs (A. 249). Appellant claimed 
that he had but that Oros later acknowledged that he had not (A. 
906-07).

16 Appellant testified that Oros had told him that his papers were 
in order but that after he arrived in Mexico he discovered that this 
was not so (A. 914-15). Appellant also stated that he saw Oros 
begging in the streets for money (A. 914-15). (Oros denied that 
he ever begged (A. 231)). Those two things “ shocked and dis­
tressed” appellant (A. 915).

17 Oros testified that when he gave this money to appellant, 
appellant said (A. 58) : “ This money, some this money I pay my 
hotel because I have no money to pay the hotel.”



9

signer, would have to sign twelve promissory notes for 
$100.00 each (A. 50-53). A friend of Oros, who 
owned his own home, was obtained as a co-signer, and the 
twelve notes, payable monthly, were signed (P. Ex. M; 
A. 53).

The day following the signing of the twelve promis­
sory notes, appellant requested Oros to sign six addition­
al notes for $100.00 each (A. 53). Oros asked why this 
was necessary, and appellant replied by telling Oros to 
have confidence in him (A. 53). Oros signed (without a 
co-signer) because “ . . . I can’t refuse, because I got 
everything ready to go to the United States . . .” (A.
53) .18

Appellant did not give Oros money in exchange for 
any of the notes but said that he would pay for the 
visas and transportation for Oros and his family (A.
54) . Appellant gave Oros bus tickets to Hartford, Con­
necticut, for himself and his family (P. Ex. N; A. 54). 
These tickets cost approximately $350.00 (A. 57). In 
addition, appellant paid approximately $210.00 in con­
nection with obtaining visas for Oros and his family (A. 
57). Appellant claimed that he expended considerably 
more.19

During appellant’s visit to Mexico City, he emphasized 
to Oros the extent of the Mexican’s obligation. Accord­
ing to Oros, appellant told him (A. 132) :

You have contract, if you break this contract, I 
deport you and you never more come back to the 
United States, not you, not your son, and not your

18 Oros testified that he had quit his job and sold such posses­
sions as furniture, clothing, a radio, and a guitar (A. 126).

19 Appellant claimed that he advanced a total of $500 in connec­
tion with obtaining visas for Oros and his family (A. 915-23). He 
also stated that he gave Oros $700 to purchase plane tickets but 
Oros used this money to pay off certain debts (A. 924-25). The 
first twelve notes that Oros signed, according to appellant, covered 
these expenditures (A. 926). The six notes subsequently signed 
covered $380 for bus tickets, $40 for spending money and a con­
tribution toward appellant’s expenses in coming to Mexico (A. 
927-29).



10

grandsons, nobody, because I have a lot of friends 
in Mexico and the United States, too, and I have a 
lot of money, and money is money here or any place.

Appellant also told Oros (A. 136) :
If you are nice man and you work in my farm the 

two years like say the contract, after two years you 
are American citizen and then you can go any place, 
you are free, you go to work in taxi-cab or you go to 
California if feel you want to go. You want stay in 
my farm, you can stay.

On July 7, 1961, appellant left Mexico City to return 
to the United States; Oros and his family left the follow­
ing day (A. 59, 928). The family traveled five nights 
and four days before reaching Hartford (A. 60). They 
had little money and subsisted largely on doughnuts and 
coffee (A. 60).

D. Conditions on Appellant’s Farm

1. The First Day. Oros and his family arrived at 
appellant’s farm at about 10:00 a.m. on July 12, 1961 
(A. 61-62, 930). Appellant told them that everything in 
sight was his property (A. 61, 551). Oros and his 
family were given a meal and then immediately, about 
11:00 a.m., they were put to work (A. 62, 555). (Com­
pare appellant’s testimony, A. 931-33).

Oros, his wife, Maria Teresa (14 years), and Sergio 
(12 years) collected eggs, placed them in baskets and 
brought them to the egg house; Maria Elena (16 years), 
Maria Virginia (9 years) and Luz Maria (7 years) 
worked in the egg house sorting eggs (A. 25, 62-64, 67, 
555, 690, 692, 740). They all worked from 11:00 a.m. 
to 3:00 p.m. when they stopped for twenty minutes for a 
meal of doughnuts and coffee and then they returned to 
work until about 7:00 p.m. that evening (A. 63, 558).20

20 The “ agreement” entered into between Oros, his wife and eld­
est daughter provided that working hours should be as follows (P.



11

2. Living Conditions. Oros and his family lived in one- 
half of a quonset hut (A. 73).21 The house was set upon 
wooden pilings and was open underneath; the walls of the 
house were corrugated cardboard (A. 61-62, 72-73, 552- 
53) ,22 There were holes in the floor which appellant refused 
to provide linoleum to cover but told Oros to use cardboard 
(A. 73). The house had two small bedrooms; each con­
tained a bed and one also contained a cot (A. 73-74, 554). 
There was another room which was used as a living 
room, dining room and kitchen and which, at first, con­
tained a television set and, three or four months later, 
also a radio, (A. 77, 554, 745-46). During the summer 
months, Oros and his wife slept in one bed, the four 
girls in the other and Sergio used the cot; during the 
winter, Sergio slept with his parents for warmth (A. 
73-74, 565, 698). The portion of the house in which 
Oros and his family lived was heated by a wood stove23 
for which Oros provided wood during his rest periods 
and in the evenings (A. 74, 565).

3. Food, Clothing, etc. Soon after the arrival of the 
Oros family, appellant requested Mrs. Oros to prepare a 
list of the food she desired (A. 65, 939). Most of the 
food requested was provided weekly thereafter (A. 562, 
629). In addition to other foods, they were provided 
with quantities of eggs, generally cracked, and with 
chickens, but most of the chickens were sick and were 
not eaten (A. 69-70, 563).24

Ex. G, G -l; A. 120) : “ The hours of work will be from 6 :30 a.m. 
to 8:30 a.m., from 9:00 to 12:00 noon, from 1:00 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. 
and from 4 :00 p.m. until the work has been completed.”

21 The other half of the house was partitioned off and used for 
grading and assorting eggs (A. 73, 553-54).

22 The hut— unlike its representation in D. Exh. 5—was not 
freshly painted at the time the Oros family arrived (A. 552). D. 
Ex. 5 also indicates that the underpart of the house is enclosed; 
this was done by Oros (A. 553).

23 The portion of the house used to assort eggs was heated by an 
oil heater (A. 73).

24 Appellant denied the chickens were sick (A. 940).



12

From time to time appellant provided Oros and his 
family with used clothing which appellant claimed had 
been given to him by his friends (A. 74-75, 568). Each 
time appellant gave them these things, he told them they 
would have to work a little harder (A. 75). Appellant 
also bought shoes, boots and socks for Oros and his fam­
ily and supplied them with toilet articles and postage 
stamps, all of which he told Oros would have to be paid 
for after the promissory notes had been liquidated (A. 
75, 105, 208, 213-14, 217, 385, 564, 757; cf. 946-47).

4. Work. Oros testified that the entire family began 
work at 6:30 a.m. and worked until 9:00 or 9:30 when 
they stopped for a rest period and breakfast (A. 66, 
558). They returned to work at 10:00 a.m., stopped at 
noon for lunch and rest a period, worked from 1:00 p.m. 
to 3:30 p.m., rested until 4:00 p.m. and worked until be­
tween 7:30 and 9:00 p.m. (A. 66-67, 558, 695-96).23 
Appellant made these work assignments (A. 62, 555-57). 
After about two weeks, the two youngest children, who 
were not looking well, began working at 10:00 a.m. 
instead of 6:30 a.m. (A. 67-68, 560). The family worked 
seven days a week (A. 77).25 26

25 Oros testified that he understood that the only duties of his 
younger children would be to “ help” after school (A. 102). As 
noted supra, the “ agreement” that was signed was between Oros, 
his wife and his eldest daughter and appellant. Appellant testified 
that he only spoke with Oros about the work that needed to be done 
and never told him which members of the family were to work (A. 
935). One defense witness testified that, in his opinion, the daily 
work on appellant’s farm could be completed by three adults, each 
working four hours (A. 867). Another witness, a person who had 
worked on chicken farms for fifteen years and was the sole worker 
on appellant’s farm at the time of the trial, testified that he com­
pleted the work on the farm—there were then about 10,000 chickens 
—by working from 6.30 a.m. to 4:30 with a half hour off for lunch 
and a coffee break (A. 872-74).

26 Appellant testified that j»n a number of occasions he discovered 
Oros watching television instead of working (A. 938-39). As a re­
sult, stated appellant, Sergio had to do Oros’ chores and this “ very 
much disturbed” appellant (A. 939). Appellant stated that he dis­
cussed this situation with Oros and was told not to interfere (A. 
939.)



13

There were about 18,000 chickens on the farm (A. 70). 
Oros, his wife, Sergio and Maria Teresa were primarily 
responsible for the work in the chicken coops (A. 66-67, 693- 
95, 740-41). Maria Elena, with the help of Luz Maria, 
and Maria Virginia, generally worked at washing, grad­
ing and packing the eggs (A. 556, 696). In January 
1962 the chickens were sold (A. 78). Thereafter, the 
Oros’ work consisted of thoroughly cleaning the chicken 
coops— a task that necessitated longer working hours 
than previously (A. 78-79, 697-98, 744).

5. Schooling and Leisure. None of the Oros children 
went to school during their stay on appellant’s farm (A. 
101, 702, 756). When, in Connecticut,27 Oros asked appel­
lant about sending the children to school, appellant said 
the school was too far away, that Oros had no money 
to pay for the school, the school bus and clothing, and 
that the children could not speak English (A. 102, 574, 
757). In addition, appellant said he did not want any of 
the Oroses to have contact with persons outside the farm 
because they might contract an infection or disease which 
would be transmitted to the chickens (A. 123, 575, 757). 
Oros raised the question of his children’s schooling on 
five or six occasions (A. 390). Appellant denied this testi- 
money and said that he had urged Oros to send the chil­
dren to school but Oros had objected (A. 956-57).

Oros was asked about his childrens’ opportunities to 
play while on the farm and he replied “ They never play 
. . . .” (A. 129). The family’s principal form of enter­
tainment was watching television which they did dur­
ing their rest periods and in the evenings (A. 77, 130, 
579-80). Occasionally, the younger children were relieved 
early from their chores by other members of the family 
and permitted to go to the house to watch television (A. 
130). At these times, they were always wary of being 
discovered by appellant and, when he came by, they would

27 The question of schooling for the children was also discussed 
in Mexico (A. 101-02, 548, 573-74). At that time, appellant indicated 
that his farm was far away from the school but that he would try 
to send the children (A. 102).



14

hide or run to the egg house (A. 130). If appellant noted 
they were missing from their work, he would inquire of 
their whereabouts, and the other members of the family 
would offer evasive excusses (A. 130).28 29

6. Mail Censorship. Oros and his family wrote many 
letters while they were on appellant’s farm (A. 112). 
Since the Oros family was without money, the letters 
were given to appellant for posting (A. 112, 383-84).29 Oros 
testified that he never received replies to some of his 
letters and that often replies were delayed for consider­
able periods (A. 142, 147). Mail delivered to appellant’s 
farm was placed in a rural post box, and all letters 
received by the Oros family were personally delivered to 
them by appellant (A. 112, 142, 580-81). Oros described the 
condition of the envelopes of some of the letters he re­
ceived (A. 143):

. . .  we see in the envelopes have something like glue 
or looks like is open and put again some glue and 
reseal the envelopes. This thing I see many times in 
the envelopes. One time can’t take out the letter 
inside because have glue, the letter in the envelope, 
and then put my finger and take out the glue and 
take out the letter.

* * * *

28 The family did have some leisure and recreation on Christmas 
Eve, 1961. In preparation for that evening, appellant asked Oros 
to provide him with a list of foods he wanted for his Christmas 
dinner (A. 126-27, 972). The family had been allowed to stop work 
at 4:30 p.m. on December 24, 1961, and at 6:00 p.m. appellant 
brought them some of the food they had asked for and told Oros 
that he would return at 8:00 p.m. with Mrs. Shackney to eat with 
the Oros family (A. 127-28). At 8:00 p.m. appellant returned 
with his wife and son (A. 128, 579, 973). He brought candy and 
h.e also brought presents for each member of the family— a guitar 
for Oros, an iron for Mrs. Oros, Timex watches for the two older 
girls, dolls for the two younger girls and a basketball for Sergio 
(A. 128, 579, 973). The Shackneys ate some tortilla and requested 
Oros to sing for them (A. 128-29). The following day— Christmas 
—was a full work day for the family (A. 149, 579).

29 As noted supra, p. 12, appellant made clear that any expenses 
he incurred for postage stamps would eventually have to be paid 
by Oros. See also A. 112.



15

One letter is open completely; is from my daughter’s 
boy friend. Mr. Shackney bring to my daughter and 
say this come open, this letter came open, but is 
completely open.

See also the testimony of Maria Elena (A. 581).
Appellant denied that he ever opened any mail sent or 

received by the Oroses (A. 962-63).
Often appellant would bring Oros a letter and tell Oros 

to open it (A. 143). Oros would try to avoid this but 
appellant would insist and ask to be told the contents of 
the letters (A. 143; cf. 962). When Oros read letters to 
appellant, occasionally he would omit portions he did not 
wish appellant to hear (A. 144). Many times, however, 
at some later date, appellant would discuss with Oros the 
contents of the portions of the letters that Oros had 
omitted reading (A. 144-45). See also testimony of 
Maria Elena (A. 581-82, 589-90, 591-93).

Oros testified that, as a result of the problems he had 
with his mail, “ I never say nothing, I never wrote any­
thing wrong about the farm . . .” (A. 148)30, and Maria 
Elena found it necessary to write some of her letters in 
code (A. 589-90). There were occasions, during the latter 
months of the Oros’ stay on the farm, when Oros re­
quested persons who came to the farm to mail letters for 
him and Maria Elena (A. 141, 147, 508-09, 531, 582, 
679; P. Exs. HH-1, KK, RR.).

7. Access to Outside World. Oros and his family were 
required, with rare exceptions, to remain continuously on 
the farm, and they were instructed to avoid contact with 
persons coming on the farm. From the beginning, Oros 
understood that he, his wife, and his eldest daughter

30 Appellant introduced in evidence a number of letters, written 
by Oros and members of his family, which spoke favorably of con­
ditions on the farm (See, e.g., D. Exs. 4, 4a; A. 162-65). Oros 
testified that he wrote such,things because “ I suspect Mr. Shackney 
read my letters” (A. 169). Oros also testified that some of the let­
ters to his son were written according to appellant’s instructions 
(A. 146).



16

would have to remain on the farm at all times,81 but Oros 
did not understand, and appellant never indicated prior 
to their coming, that this restriction also would be imposed 
on the young children (A. 103-04).31 32 Oros testified to 
only four instances during his over seven months stay on 
the farm when he, or members of his family, left the 
physical boundaries of the farm, and, on all but one of 
those occassions, appellant was present (A. 104-07).33 In 
addition, Sergio and Maria Teresa described occasions 
when they left the farm (A. 701, 752-53).34

31 Nevertheless, Oros once asked appellant for permission to go 
to the movies and, on another occasion, he requested to go to church 
(A. 294). Maria Elena, and other members of the Oros family, 
also asked for permission to go to church, but appellant refused and 
said (A. 575) : “ When you have something more important to do, 
you don’t have to go to church. For example, sometimes I have to 
take milk out of a cow and when I have this to do, I don’t go to 
church either.”

32 Oros related that while he was in Mexico City he had a tele­
phone conversation with appellant in which he was told “ No leave 
the farm any time, stay inside for two ye-ars and work” (A. 103- 
04). However, Oros believed that these conditions applied only to 
himself, his wife, his eldest daughter and his eldest son (who did 
not come to Connecticut with the family)—not to the young chil­
dren (A. 103-04).

33 A few days after the Oros family arrived in Connecticut, Oros 
and appellant went to the Hartford bus station to collect the fam­
ily’s baggage (A. 104-05). In November 1961, the entire Oros 
family was taken by appellant to buy winter footwear, and the 
following month Oros and his son were taken to the barber shop 
by appellant (A. 105-06, 576-77, 701, 752). On the last Sunday in 
February 1961, while appellant and his wife were away from the 
farm, Oros and his three youngest children went across the road 
to a neighbor’s property to play in the snow (A. 106-07, 491, 701). 
At another time, appellant advised Oros that the family would have 
to go to the local post office to complete alien registration cards, 
but appellant succeeded in avoiding taking the family from the 
farm for this purpose by obtaining the necessary forms from the 
post office and permitting Oros and his family to complete the 
forms on the farm (A. 107).

3i Sergio once was taken for a ride in a truck by a person working 
part-time on the farm, and, on another occasion, he went off the 
farm with appellant and his father to help weigh chickens (A. 681, 
701). Maria Teresa, accompanied by Luz Maria, was taken to a 
dentist by appellant (A. 752-53).



17

Other evidence also indicates that appellant desired to 
conceal the presence of the Oros family on his farm.35 On 
one occasion, Sergio was seen by a neighbor, Mrs. Sambor. 
When Mrs. Sambor asked who he was, she was told by 
Mrs. Shackney that he was a boy helping out for the 
day (A. 493).

On many occasions appellant instructed Oros not to talk 
with persons who came to the farm and that, if he were 
not on the farm, Oros should send away anyone who came 
(A. 108-11).36 A number of times, Oros was repri­
manded by appellant because appellant suspected that 
Oros had been speaking with a deliveryman (A. 108-10). 
When Oros was in the vicinity of truck drivers, he was 
watched by appellant (A. 108-09). Once, on a cold day in 
December, Oros gave a truck driver a cup of coffee (A. 
109). He was later severely admonished by appellant 
who claimed that he had received a telephone call from 
the driver’s employer who complained that the driver had 
been late in returning (A. 109). Appellant said to Oros (A. 
109-10) : “maybe the company no send me more food for the 
chickens. Maybe my chickens die for because no eat 
nothing. You pay for this thing? Why you make troubles 
like this?”

Oros testified that in January and February of 1962 he 
did have a number of conversations in appellant’s absence 
with persons who came to appellant’s farm and he gave 
letters to mail to some of these persons (A. 139-42). One

35 Appellant’s farm could be entered by two roads from School 
Street—the public roadway near the farm. One road provided di­
rect passage from the street to the hut but was closed off by a gate 
that was kept locked. The other road passed alongside of appel­
lant’s house and then entered the roadway that led directly from 
School Street to the Oros hut. (D. Exs. 5, 43, 49, 50; A. 459-63, 490, 
525-26).

36 Appellant told Oros that the reason he did not wish him to 
converse with deliverymen was that these persons would be delayed 
in their work and this would antagonize their employers (A. 108- 
10). Appellant denied that he told Oros to send away persons who 
came to the farm while he was away but claimed that he instructed 
Oros to find out what such persons wanted (A. 936).



18

of these persons, Francis Scarano, was a part-time em­
ployee who was instructed by appellant not to talk with 
Oros (A. 671).37

The evidence is undisputed that because of their teach­
ing obligations, appellant and his wife frequently were 
away from the farm (A. 112, 595, 849-55, 885, 936, 
1061-62). It is also undisputed that Oros had ready access 
to the road near the farm and that a truck, with keys in 
its ignition, was parked on the farm near Oros’ house 
(A. 955-56).

E. Financial Dealings Between Appellant and the 
Oros Family

The “agreement” between Oros, his wife and his eldest 
daughter and appellant provided that, during their first 
year, they would receive $160.00 per month (P. Ex. G, G -l; 
A. 120). The agreement also provided that “as security for 
the faithful fulfillment of the contract, half of our salary in 
money shall be deposited at a bank account in our name 
and in the name of Rabbi David I. Shackney” (P. Ex. 
G, G -l; A. 120).

On August 13, 1961, after the Oros family had been 
working on the farm for one month, appellant came to 
their house with two checks (A. 79-80, 568-69, 951). One 
check, for $180.00, was made out to Oros, Mrs. Oros and 
Maria Elena; the other check, for $20.00, was made out 
to Maria Teresa and Sergio (P. Exs. O, P; A. 79-81, 88).38 
Appellant obtained the proper endorsements on the two

37 Scarano, nevertheless, spoke with Oros, but never when appel­
lant was around (A. 672).

38 The “ contract” called for a payment of $160.00 for the work 
of three people, but appellant explained why the checks were for a 
greater amount. He testified that soon after the arrival of the 
Oros family, he told Oros that he intended to employ someone to 
work on the farm on Sundays (A. 949). Oros urged that appellant 
not do this but, instead, permit the family to work and earn addi­
tional money (A. 949-50), Appellant consented to this and agreed 
to pay Oros, his wife, and Maria Elena $20 additional per month 
and to pay Maria Teresa and Sergio $20 for their services (A  
950).



19

checks and retained both (A. 80, 952).39 He explained to 
Oros that one of the promissory notes would be satisfied 
with $100.00 of the money but that, according to their 
agreement, $100.00 would have to go to the bank to be 
saved for Oros (A. 80, 951-52). At this time, appellant 
tore up one of the promissory notes but Oros retained 
the pieces (P. Ex. M; A. 80). A short time thereafter, 
appellant told Oros that he had spoken with the bank and 
that it would be possible for Oros to avoid depositing 
$100.00 a month and, instead, pay off two notes a month 
(A. 80-81; 88-89; 266-69). At this time, appellant tore 
up a second $100.00 note (A. 88-89, 266-70. Ap­
pellant explained further that it would be nec­
essary for Oros, his wife and Maria Elena to write a 
letter to the bank, and a letter was prepared according 
to appellant’s instructions (D. Ex. 20, 20a; A. 88-89, 266- 
69, 377, 570; cf. 952-53).

In September 1961 appellant again presented the Oros 
family with checks for $180.00 and $20.00, obtained the 
appropriate endorsements, retained the checks, and tore 
up two $100.00 notes (P. Exs. Q, R; A. 81-82). This same 
procedure was followed every month through February 
1962 (P. Exs. S-Z, AA, BB; A. 82-86, 569, 953).40 Except 
for one instance when Oros and Sergio were given $10.00 
in cash for assisting a chicken purchaser,41 the Oros fam­
ily was never given any cash (A. 86-88).

In February 1962, when Oros was asked to endorse 
his monthly checks, he reminded appellant that he had 
already paid off the original twelve notes and did not

39 Maria Elena testified that her father asked the appellant for 
some cash but the appellant refused and said the notes had to be 
paid or else the house of the co-signer of the notes would be taken 
(A. 569).

40 Appellant maintained two bank accounts in different business 
names. The checks were drawn on one account and deposited in 
the other (A. 519-24).

41 On this occasion, the chicken purchaser asked appellant to ad­
vance the $10.00. Appellant complied with this request by drawing 
a check, obtaining the proper endorsement, and then giving Oros 
$10.00 in cash (P. Ex. CC; A. 87).



20

expect to have to pay the other six; he had only signed 
these notes on appellant’s request that he have confidence 
in him (A. 90). Oros testified that this conversation fol­
lowed his objections (A. 90) :

He told me, ‘And you know how much charge the 
interest, . . . about the money, about the notes you 
sign for your trip, from Mexico to Hartford? You 
don’t know how much is interest for these twelve 
notes?’

I say, ‘Well, I think you no spend $1200 in my 
trip, and I think I paid the interest.’

But he told me, ‘Oh, no, you no paid interest.’
The following day appellant gave Oros a piece of paper 

on which he had figured out the claimed debt and the 
interest due (P. Ex. DD; A. 90-94, 387, 571). Interest 
was computed at the rate of 10% per month (A. 93). 
Accordingly, at the end of Oros’ first month on the farm, 
he owed $1200 plus $120 in interest— a total of $1320 
(P. Ex. DD). Prom this sum appellant subtracted $200— 
the payment for the first month—-leaving a debt due of 
$1120. Appellant then added 10% interest to this amount 
for the second month resulting in a debt due of $1232 
at the end of the second month (P. Ex. DD).42 This 
method of computation was carried through until there 
would have remained a debt of only $137.44— in May 
1962. Appellant told Oros that the last of the eighteen 
notes would have been paid by the end of April 1962 and 
explained the additional sum owing for May 1962 by 
saying (A. 95) : “You understand after you pay the 
$1800, you need to pay $137.44.”  43

42 This form of computation resulted in Oros paying interest on 
interest (A. 668). Thus, his debt at the end of his first month was 
$1320 which included $120 interest. But after $200 was subtracted 
from that sum, a ten per cent interest charge was figured on the 
remainder—a remainder which already included the interest for 
the previous month. An accountant, called as a witness by the Gov­
ernment, testified that P. Ex. DD indicated that an interest rate 
of 134% per year was being charged (A. 665).

43 Appellant offered a totally different explanation of this inci­
dent. He claimed it occurred at the end of July and that he pre­



21

By the time Oros left the farm in March 1962 he had 
paid off fourteen of the notes (A. 94)

F. The Atmosphere of Fear Created by Appellant

Oros testified that although he, his wife and Maria 
Elena never told appellant that they wanted to leave their 
jobs, nevertheless, from the first day on the farm he 
wanted to leave but was afraid to do so (A. 131-32). He 
stated (A. 132) : . . I want to leave the farm because—
is true; I am afraid, very afraid.” Oros recalled that 
even before he came to Connecticut he was warned by 
appellant that if he broke his “contract” he would be 
deported and that neither he, his sons, nor his grandsons 
could ever come to the United States again. See supra, 
pp. 9-10. In Connecticut appellant warned Oros that, un­
less he satisfied all of the notes, the house of his friend 
who had co-signed the notes would be taken (A. 132).

Appellant also described to Oros what had occurred 
when previous employees had failed to satisfy him. He 
told of another couple he had had on his farm (A. 133) :

. . .  he told me he have a man, his wife, and one 
children . . .  a little girl . . . the wife is nice girl 
because she take care good, very good, the chicken 
coop, but the man he say is too lazy and don’t do 
everything, and say sometime he’s drunk, too, so is 
bad man; and sometime he do something Mr. Shack- 
ney don’t like, and this time Mr. Shackney say are 
very mad, and take him from . . . the chicken coop, 
and . . . send back to Mexico in half hour. He say 
spend lot of money, but he don’t care nothing. His 
wife, he say, his wife and the children crying, but he 
say the lady, his wife, is nice girl, and she stayed in 
his farm, but the man send back to Mexico.

pared Exhibit DD after a conversation with Oros in which Oros 
had requested appellant to calculate how long it would take him to 
pay off his debts in Mexico, on which he was paying 10 per cent 
interest, if he paid 200 pesos per month (A. 954-55). In other 
words, appellant claimed that Exhibit DD referred to a debt of 
pesos and not to the $1800 Oros owed appellant.



22

Many times appellant told Oros and his family stories 
of this type (A. 99, 604). Oros explained their 
effect on him (A. 100-01) : . . all these things I
have in my mind for many months. I want to do many 
things, but all time I am afraid, and that’s all I feel, 
afraid.”

Maria Elena also was afraid to leave the farm. She 
explained that despite the absence of physical obstacles 
that would have prevented her leaving she did not do so 
since (A. 595-96) : “ . . . I was afraid like maybe see me 
outside. He [appellant] told us everybody is his friends, 
the policemen, and he told us from Mexico if somebody try 
to go out, is better to come back to Mexico again, and the 
people who go to Mexico . . . would never be allowed to 
re-enter this country.” 44

On another occasion, the defendant came to Oros’ house 
and told Oros and his family that “ . . . I have trouble with 
other man in other farm. He make me a lie . . . he do 
something [I] don’t like, and I send back to Mexico, too, 
this man” (A. 134). As a result of this incident, Oros 
testified that “ I believe all of these things Mr. Shackney 
say about the deportation . . .” (A. 134).45 And Oros had 
no desire to go back to Mexico, for, as he stated (A. 136- 
37) :

. . .  in the first place, I want to make American 
citizen and then I don’t want come back to Mexico 
because I have no house, I have no furniture . . . 
and have many debts in Mexico.

On one occassion, appellant threatened Sergio with de­
portation (A. 699-700). This occured when appellant dis­
covered that Sergio was not doing his work properly. 
Appellant scolded Sergio and went to the hut where (A.

44 The other Oros children also feared appellant. See supra, pp. 
13-14.

45 Appellant also emphasized to Oros that all of his neighbors, 
the postman, the policemen—“ everybody”—were his friends (A. 
135-36).



23

700) : “He told to my family that I am irresponsible boy. 
If I don’t do the work, he going to send back to Mexico, 
then I have to go.”

Appellant also caused Oros and his family to fear that 
sickness would result in their deportation. On four or five 
occasions, he discussed this subject with them (A. 95-96, 
572; cf. 962). Once appellant told the Oros family that in 
this country doctors and medicine are expensive, that if 
any member of the family became sick a doctor would 
have to come from far away at great expense, that sick 
people were no good on the farm (they might infect the 
chickens) and that if anyone became sick it was best that 
they go back to Mexico (A. 96, 98). Maria Teresa testi­
fied that appellant “many times . . . told us that anyone 
who came sick will be sent to Mexico. He didn’t want 
sick persons on his farm” (A. 755).46 On another occasion 
Sergio did not feel well while working and was discovered 
resting by appellant (A. 96, 700-01). According to Oros, 
appellant said (A. 96-97) :

Oh, you don’t feel good, maybe you die . . . Well 
maybe is better. We fix a box . . . maybe is better 
you come back to Mexico.

G. The Oros Family Leaves Appellant’s Farm

In February 1962 Oros requested Mr. Sebastian Milar- 
do— a person who came to appellant’s farm to service 
heaters— to mail a letter addressed to Mr. Davalos in 
Philadelphia (A. 141, 147, 507-08). On or about the 
first of March 1962, Mr. and Mrs. Davalos received this 
letter and, after discussing it, decided to go to Connecti­
cut (A. 411).

On March 3, 1962, at about 1:00 p.m., Mr. and Mrs. 
Davalos arrived at the Shackney farm; they met with 
appellant and his wife and asked to see Oros (A. 411- 
13, 962). Appellant questioned them about their purpose

46 Maria Teresa described an occasion on which she fainted while 
working and did not disclose this incident to the appellant (A. 754).



24

and then told them that Oros was working (A. 413). Mr. 
and Mrs. Davalos said that they would wait until Oros 
was finished, but appellant said he did not permit Oros 
to have visitors on the farm (A. 413). Mrs. Davalos 
then suggested that she and her husband drive Oros to 
town (A. 413). Appellant, however, said that he did not 
allow Oros off the farm (A. 413). Mrs. Davalos objected 
and told appellant “we came all of the way from Philadel­
phia— We can’t go away without seeing him ; we want to 
see him” (A. 413). Mr. Davalos also objected (A. 413):

. . .  my husband said, ‘Why can’t we see him? Are 
they prisoners, or slaves, or what?’ Then he [ap­
pellant] said, ‘You sound is if you want to fight.’ 
Then my husband said, ‘No, I don’t want to fight. 
We just want to see him; we came all the way from 
Philadelphia.’

Appellant then suggested that Mr. and Mrs. Davalos re­
turn the following day, but finally he agreed to permit 
them to return at 4:00 p.m. that day (A. 413-14, 963).

At about 2:00 p.m. appellant told Oros that Mr. and 
Mrs. Davalos had been to the farm and would return at 
4:00 p.m. (A. 150-51). Appellant asked Oros and his 
family to clean themselves and clean their house (A. 151, 
600, 965). Appellant cautioned Oros that the guests were 
not to remain too long and he also offered to provide Oros 
with coffee, cake and milk to serve Mr. and Mrs. Davalos 
(A. 151).

After Mr. and Mrs. Davalos left appellant’s farm they 
contacted Robert Cabelus, the resident officer of the Con­
necticut State Police in Middlefield, Connecticut (A. 414- 
15; 437). They told Cabelus what had transpired at 
appellant’s house and showed him the letter in Spanish 
which had been received from Oros (A. 415).47 After Mrs.

47 Officer Cabelus was aware of the presence of the Oros family 
on appellant’s farm. On February 8, 1962, Mr, Franklin Plummer, 
of the Middlefield public school system, discussed the Oroses with 
Cabelus (A. 452, 480-81). As a result of this conversation, Cabelus, 
on two accasions, drove to the immediate vicinity of appellant’s farm 
and parked his car there in the hope of seeing Oros and speaking



25

Davalos translated the letter for Cabelus, he and Mr. 
Davalos left for appellant’s farm (A. 438-39).

Officer Cabelus and Mr. Davalos arrived at the farm 
about 5:00 p.m. (A. 439, 965). Cabelus described his con­
frontation with appellant (A. 439-40) :

After arriving on the farm, I identified myself, 
and Mr. Shackney knew who I was. At that time, I 
asked him if he had a Luis Oros residing on the farm. 
He told me he did. I told him at this time I wanted 
to speak with Mr. Oros. He then questioned me as 
to why, and I informed him this was just between 
myself as a State Policeman and Mr. Oros, that I 
just wanted to talk to him.

At that time, Mr. Shackney offered to translate the 
conversation involving Mr. Oros, stating Mr. Oros 
spoke only Spanish or very little English, I should 
say. I then told Mr. Shackney I had someone with 
me who could translate and that his services would 
not be desired, and at that time, he became a little 
bit insistent, and I just firmly told him that I didn’t 
want him accompanying me; I wanted to speak to 
Mr. Oros alone.

Cabelus and Mr. Davalos then went to the Oros quonset 
hut, spent about ten or fifteen minutes there, and then, 
about 6:00 p.m., returned to Cabelus’ office with Oros 
(A. 152-53, 440-43). Cabelus questioned Oros about life 
on the farm and received a written statement from him 
(A. 153-54, 443). During the evening Mrs. Davalos sug­
gested to Oros that he consult a lawyer (A. 416). Officer 
Cabelus, although reluctant, furnished the name of a 
lawyer, and an appointment was made for the following

with him about his work on the farm and his children not attend­
ing school. However, he never saw any of the Oros family and he 
did not enter the farm prior to March 3, 1962 (A. 452). (Cabelus 
also testified that between July 12, 1961 and March 4, 1962, he 
drove past appellant’s farm twice each day and never saw any 
member of the Oros family (A. 476)). On February 12, 1962, 
Officer Cabelus had a further conversation concerning the Oros 
family—this time with Plummer and FBI Agent Simms. On this 
occasion Plummer advised Simms of the information he had con­
cerning the Oros family (A. 453).



26

day (A. 416-17, 443-45, 473-74). At about 11:30 p.m.,
Officer Cabelus returned Oros to appellant’s farm (A. 154, 
416, 445).

Before leaving the farm that night, Officer Cabelus 
stopped at appellant’s house and had this conversation 
with him (A. 446) :

. . .  I told him that I was not completely aware of 
what was transpiring upon his farm, but it was my 
understanding Mr. Oros and his family were not al- 
lowed to leave the farm and that it was also my under­
standing that these children of Mr. Oros were not 
attending school.

Mr. Shackney at this time informed me that these 
people were free to come and go as they pleased, and 
he went on to say that he treated these people like 
his own family, and recently bought them Christmas 
presents, and so forth.

When I asked him about the children attending 
school, he told me this was the responsibility of the 
parents and not him, and if they didn’t want to send 
their children to school, that was something they 
should be concerned about, and not he.

*  *  *  #

I informed Mr. Shackney so far as I was concerned, 
these people in their free time were as free to come 
and go as anyone else, and if he in any way was keep­
ing them on the farm from going their rightful way, 
this should cease at this time.48

After Oros arrived back on the farm, at about 1:00 
a.m., he was visited by the appellant and his wife (A. 154, 
602, 968). Appellant asked where Oros had been, to whom 
he had talked, and what he had said (A. 154-56). In 
response to appellant’s question as to why the police had 
come, this conversation occurred (A. 155) :

‘Because [Oros told appellant] my friend asked 
your wife if myself and my family work in your 
farm, and your wife told my friend nobody in Oros

48 Compare A. 967-68.



27

name live in this farm, and that is why my friend go 
to the police and then come the police to here.’ And 
then Mr. Shackney say to Mrs. Shackney, . . .  ‘You 
say this?’ And Mrs. Shackney say, ‘No, I don’t say.’ 
And he say, ‘You [Mrs. Shackney] make me trouble 
like this.’

Oros was then asked further questions by appellant and 
he described his conversation in these words (A. 155-56) :

And say Mr. Shackney, ‘Well, anyway, what did 
you do in the police station for seven hours?’ Say, 
‘Well, ask me questions.’ ‘Questions about what?’ 
I say, ‘About the farm, about where and when I meet 
you, when I come to United States, and ask me for 
everything when I meet you to this day. Why don’t— 
why don’t go the police; why is I afraid and why am 
I scare, and everything.’

‘What more?’
‘What for my childrens don’t go to school.’

And he say, ‘What say?’
‘Well, because you don’t want my children to go out 

the farm.’
‘You say this?’
‘Yes; ask for the truth.’
‘And what more?’
‘I say, well, nobody go to the church.’
‘You say this, too?’
I say, ‘Yes; you don’t want never nobody go out 

the farm.’
And he [appellant] told me, ‘And you don’t know 

if you say this, this is a crime?’
I say, ‘Well, I don’t know. The police ask me ques­

tions and I answer and I say the truth, that’s all.’
He say, ‘Well, you are no good for work in my 

farm. Right now, take your things, everything, and 
go out.’

Oros urged appellant not to force him to leave immediately 
since it was 1 :00 a.m., it was cold, and he was without 
funds (A. 156). Appellant agreed to permit Oros and 
his family to remain on the farm until the following morn­
ing (A. 156).



28

About 10:00 a.m. on March 4, 1962, Mr. and Mrs. 
Davalos called for Oros and took him to the office of a law­
yer where there was a conference of about an hour (A. 
156-57, 417-18). Thereafter the Davaloses, Oros, and 
Officer Cabelus returned to the farm where the belong­
ings of the Oros family were packed into a truck that 
Mr. Davalos had hired (A. 157-58, 418-20, 447). Appel­
lant then asked Oros to come into his house and there, 
in the presence of Mrs. Shackney and Mr. Cabelus, ap­
pellant asked Oros to sign a piece of paper so that he 
could give him a check (A. 158-59, 448-49, 969). 
Oros could not understand what was written, and he 
secured the advice of Mrs. Davalos (A. 159, 420). The 
piece of paper indicated that Oros had been paid in full 
(A. 159; 420-21, 449). Appellant told Oros, “ Sign this 
paper . . . and I will give you the money” (A. 421) ; “ . . . 
if you don’t sign, no money” (A. 420). Oros asked, “ How 
about my contract?” and appellant said, “ There is no 
contract” (A. 420).49 Mrs. Davalos advised Oros not to 
sign, and appellant said, “Well, no money” (A. 159, 421).

Oros and his family then left appellant’s farm and 
moved into the home of Mr. and Mrs. Davalos in Phila­
delphia (A. 159-60, 421).

H. The Verdict and Sentence

The Government rested its case on February 26, 1963 
at which time appellant moved for a judgment of ac­
quittal (A. 7, 793-94). The District Court granted the 
motion as to Counts II and IV— those dealing with Mrs. 
Oros— since no testimony had been offered by the Govern­
ment regarding Mrs. Oros’ desire to leave the farm (A. 
7, 834). Appellant also moved that the Government be 
required to elect either Count I (peonage of Mr. Oros) 
or Count III (involuntary servitude of Mr. Oros) upon

49 Officer Cabelus testified that he, too, asked appellant about the 
contract appellant and Oros were supposed to have and appellant 
told him there was no contract (A. 449).



29

which to proceed (A. 8). The District Court granted 
the motion, and the Government chose to proceed on Count 
III (A. 9, 1129-30). On March 13, 1963, the jury re­
turned verdicts of guilty on all six remaining counts (A. 
10).

On April 17, 1963, the District Court sentenced the de­
fendant to a year’s imprisonment (suspended after sixty 
days), two years probation, and a $2,000 fine on Count 
III (A. 10-11; A A. 83 50). On the remaining five counts, the 
District Court imposed one year suspended sentences, con­
current with Count III (A. 10-11; AA. 83). In impos­
ing sentence, District Judge Blumenfield said (AA. 80-82) :

It is true that there were no physical restraints 
imposed upon their leaving at any time. It is true 
that the contract arrangements you made with them 
was a legal arrangement— the terms were harsh.

Now, the jury has found that in addition to what 
you arranged with Mr. Oros, you sought to imple­
ment that arrangement in order to secure and main­
tain his presence on your farm at all times, in re­
straint of their liberty and in restraint of their free­
dom of movement.

Now, some of the things that were done are, to me, 
at violence with what I regard, and what I suppose 
anyone with any knowledge of moral precepts regards, 
as quite inexcusable.

*  *  *  *

One of the things that was noticeable, I suppose to 
the jury, about the relationship which you had with 
these people on your farm, is that they never re­
ceived any money in cash. . . . These people had no 
cash, with the opportunity it might have given them 
to do the things that they complained they were un­
able to do. . . . And, certainly, as it was claimed, 
it deprived them of any opportunity, or at least a 
necessary aid to them if they sought the opportunity, 
to leave the farm.

50 As noted supra, note 1, “ AA” refers to appellee’s appendix.



30

Now, the problem of imposition of sentence upon 
you is not an easy one. . . .  As of now, and as the 
case unfolded and continued before me, it appeared 
at all times that there was never any doubt in your 
mind that what you had done was proper. Now, this 
is quite apart from whether what you done techni­
cally constituted a violation of the criminal law.

*  *  *  *

I doubt whether you will again engage in such 
conduct to the detriment of society. It may be that 
you might, because this is not the first time that you 
have sought to employ people of foreign tongue and 
under conditions which demand their constant pres­
ence on the farm, but I doubt that you will do that 
again.

Still, what you have done may not shock, but it 
does violate, soils the public conscience of the people, 
so that some punishment on that account would be 
called for. And this, it seems to me, is less difficult 
to determine, in the light of your own attitude, which 
is, that what you have done is completely and entirely 
appropriate and proper and in no way reprehensible.

STATUTE INVOLVED 

18 U.S.C. 1584 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully holds to involun­

tary servitude or sells into any condition of involun­
tary servitude, any other person for any term, or 
brings within the United States any person so held, 
shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years, or both.

ARGUMENT

I

The Evidence Sustains the Verdict 

A. The Offense

In order to constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584, 
it is necessary to prove that the person charged “knowing­



31

ly and willfully” “held” his victim to a condition of “ in­
voluntary servitude” for a term.51 Here, as appellant con­
cedes (Br. p. 13), there is no question but that the Oros 
famliy worked for appellant, i.e., the servitude, for a term. 
What must be demonstrated is that the servitude was 
involuntary and that it was the result of a knowing and 
wilfull holding on the part of appellant. In short, to estab­
lish the offense, three elements had to be proved: (1) that 
there was a “holding” ; (2) that this holding was knowing 
and wilfull; and (3) that it resulted in a certain reaction 
on the part of the Oros family— the involuntary character 
of their work.

Before proceeding with a discussion of the evidence 
which established each of these elements, it may be useful 
to discuss more specifically the legal principles applicable 
to the two52 principal elements of the offense.

1. The Holding

First, there must be proof that coercion or force was 
exerted to compel another to render service. In the Peon­
age Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 680 (M.C. Ala, 1903), the court 
formulated this requirement:

The holding or returning to a condition of peonage 
arises and exists wherever unlawful dominion is ex­
ercised over the person and freedom of one, whether

51 The district judge charged the jury that in order to return a 
verdict of guilty, these factors must be proven (A. 1223-24) : 
“ . . . first, that the Defendant did hold any or all of the persons 
named in each of the counts against his will for a term by the 
exercise of dominion over that person in restraint of his liberty. 
That is the holding. Second, that the Defendant did hold any or 
all of the persons named in those counts to involuntary servitude; 
that is to say, to require any or all of the persons so held to per­
form services for the Defendant against the will of the person 
or persons so named; and third, that the Defendant knowingly 
and wilfully held such persons and required such work or services 
from . . . any and all . . . of the persons . . . against their will.”

52 Here, as in similar cases, the wilfull nature of the conduct is 
determined by an evaluation of the specific factual setting. We 
discuss, infra, pp. 38-39 the facts that we believe show the wilfull 
nature of the crime involved here.



32

he has agreed or not to submit to such control, in 
order to exact compulsory performance of labor or 
service against his will; . . .

And, in United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974, 976 (D.C. 
S.C. 1909) the court prescribed that the nature of the 
required coercion be such as to induce the subjugated per­
sons “ to remain in his service against their will, over­
mastering their weaknesses by his strength, and thus sub­
duing their wills to his . . .

Second, the means of coercion employed are irrelevant. 
In Bernal v. United States, 241 Fed. 339, 342 (C.A. 5, 
1917), cert, denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918) the court, in in­
terpreting the anti-peonage statute (18 U.S.C. 1581),63 
stated:

The law takes no account of the debt or the means 
of coercion. It is sufficient to constitute the crime that 
a person is held against his will and made to work to 
pay a debt. Clyatt V. United States, 197 U.S. 207. 
(Emphasis added).

More recently, in Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 
(C.A. 5, 1944), cert, denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945), this 
construction was reaffirmed:

In a prosecution for peonage, the law takes no ac­
count of the amount of the debt, or the means and 
method of coercion. It is sufficient to allege and prove 
that a person is held against his will and made to 
work to pay a debt.

Third, the fact that the defendant is legally powerless 
to carry out his threat has no bearing on whether it is 
criminal. The Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 682-683 53 * * * * *

53 The essential difference between 18 U.S.C. 1581 and 18 U.S.C.
1584 is that the former requires that the additional element of
an indebtedness be established to prove a violation. In other re­
spects, peonage is considered a form of involuntary servitude. See
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) ; United States v. Reynolds,
235 U.S. 133 (1914); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (C.A. 
5, 1944) ; cert, denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945). Accordingly, cases inter­
preting 18 U.S.C. 1581 are relevant in construing 18 U.S.C. 1584.



33

(M.D. Ala. 1903) ; United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 
76 (S.D. Cal. 1947). As has been said in another context 
(.Randle v. United States, 113 F.2d 945, 951 (C.A. D.C. 
1940)) :

The objection that in its face the scheme [to de­
fraud] was impossible of execution, and therefore 
should have deceived no one is without merit. 
Schemes to defraud depend for success, not on what 
men can do, but upon what they can be made to be­
lieve, and the credulity of mankind remains yet un­
measured.

2. The Involuntary Nature of the Servitude
In addition to the coercive conduct on the part of the 

defendant it must also be shown that service was rendered 
“ involuntarily.” The courts have suggested various for­
mulations to describe a person who is rendering service in­
voluntarily. They have said that such a person must be 
acting “ against his will” or be deprived of “ freedom of 
choice,” Peonage Cases, supra at 680, 681, that
he must have had his will subdued, United States v. Clem­
ent, supra, or that “ little or no choice was left to him. . .” 
In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686, 689 (N.D. Fla. 
1905). The courts have also stated that a persons’ serv­
ice may be considered involuntary even though the person 
initially agreed to undertake the employment. Peon­
age Cases, supra; United States v. Ancarola, 1 Fed. 676, 
682 (S.D.N.Y. 1880).M

Of course, it is impossible to isolate the “ involuntary” 
nature of the work from the threats and coercion that pro­
duced it. A violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584 requires that there 54

54 This should dispose of appellant’s claim (Br. pp. 14-15) 
that there is no holding or involuntary servitude in this case 
because Oros voluntarily accepted employment after he knew 
of appellant’s threat of deportation. See also the district court’s 
charge (A. 1224) : . the holding by the Defendant exists when­
ever unlawful dominion is exercised over the person, whether 
or not he or she has agreed in advance to submit to such control,
. . .” Appellant’s argument is invalid for the additional reason 
that it attempts to isolate o-ne threat without viewing it in terms 
of what was said and done before and after. And we show infra, 
it is the totality of circumstances that must be considered.



34

be an interaction— that a certain course of conduct result 
in persons being deprived of their freedom of action.65 
Accordingly in evaluating an alleged 18 U.S.C. 1584 viola­
tion, it is necessary to bear in mind that “ [w]hat consti­
tutes force or intimidation is a question of fact, and each 
case must depend upon its own circumstances. The charac­
ter and condition of life of the two parties are always to be 
considered in deciding a question of this nature.” United 
States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974, 976 (D.C. S.C. 1909).66 
From this it is clear that cases of this type can not be 
evaluated by atomizing the evidence— as appellant does— 
and then endeavoring to demonstrate that each atom does 
not make a molecule. This is obvious. What is required 
is that all the interrelated facts and circumstances be 
weighed and analyzed to determine whether, in the cir­
cumstances of this case, illegal coercive force has been 
exerted.55 56 57

In our view, the evidence in this case can lead to but 
one conclusion—-that appellant knowingly and wilfully 
acted to force the Oros family to submit to his will and 
that the Oros family, as a result of the appellant’s con­
duct, were totally deprived of their freedom of action.58

55 As we show, infra, pp. 43-45, it is also necessary that the re­
action produced by coercion or threats be a reasonable one.

56 United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947), il­
lustrates the type of formulation a court uses to express its con­
clusion—based on an analysis of the facts— in cases such as this. 
The court held (73 F. Supp at p. 78) : “ These facts, gleaned from 
a great mass of other evidence of similar treatment, compel the 
conclusion that the servant, Dora L. Jones, was a person wholly 
subject to the will of defendant; and that she was one who had 
no freedom of action and whose person and services were wholly 
under the control of defendant and who was in a state of en­
forced compulsory service to the defendant.”

57 The Supreme Court has stated that, to determine whether a 
confession has been coerced, it is necessary to consider the “ totality 
of the circumstances. . . .” See Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 
197 (1957).

58 This Court has stated that “ after verdict . . .  all contro­
verted facts [must be assumed] in favor of the plaintiff . . .” 
Lewis-Kures v. Edward R. Walsh & Co., 102 F. 2d 42, 43 (C.A. 2,



35

An analysis of the facts, in relation to the elements 
required to sustain a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1584, con­
veniently may be divided into two parts. We first con­
sider the aspect of this offense which deals with the ap­
pellant’s overt acts—the knowing and wilfull holding. We 
show that appellant used coercion and restraint in an at­
tempt to hold the Oros family in his service. This leads 
to the second aspect of the offense: the effect of appel­
lant’s conduct on the Oros family. Here we demonstrate 
that appellant’s actions so deprived the Oros family of 
their freedom to act that their service was involuntary.

B. The Evidence Establishes that Appellant Acted to 
Force the Oros Family to Work on His Farm

The curtain rises on this drama during appellant’s 1960 
visit to Mexico City. Then the bait was offered. Ap­
pellant told Oros of his need for workers on his Con­
necticut chicken farm, and, as appellant might have an­
ticipated, Oros expressed a consuming desire to come to 
the United States. Appellant told Oros that he had already 
hired all the workers he required, but Oros continued to 
urge that his family be employed. When appellant left 
Mexico City, however, he left Oros with hopes: he told 
him to prepare his papers for possible employment in the 
United States. Oros immediately embarked on this under­
taking, and between July 1960 and January 1961, he 
maintained a correspondence with appellant describing the 
steps he was taking. However, for over five months 
Oros did not hear from appellant. Oros felt his dreams 
receding and, consequently, he made promises in his letters

1939), and that “we must take that view of the evidence most 
favorable to the government and sustain the verdict if there is 
in the the record substantial evidence to support it, sufficient to con­
vince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Questions of credi­
bility and choice of conflicting inferences are for the jury.” United 
States v. Robertson, 298 F. 2d 739, 741 (C.A. 2, 1962). See also 
United States v. Kahaner, 317 F. 2d 459, 467 (C.A. 2, 1963), cert, 
denied, 375 U.S. 836 (1963); United States v. Pellegrino, 273 F. 2d 
570, 572 (C.A. 2, 1960) ; United States v. Tutino, 269 F. 2d 488, 
490 (C.A. 2, 1959); United States v. Morris, 269 F. 2d 100, 103 
(C.A. 2, 1959), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).



36

— . . I promise too many things [Oros testified] because 
decide to come to United State and live here for all my life 
. . . and make American citizens . . (A. 31)— in an
attempt to elicit a reply from appellant. Finally, when 
it appeared that Oros was firmly committed in his own 
mind to coming to the United States, appellant contacted 
Oros. Then followed a series of telephone calls, letters, 
exchange of “contracts” and the transmission to Oros by 
appellant of a fradulent affidavit with the request that it 
be filed with the American Embassy.59

In June, 1961, appellant returned to Mexico City. On 
this occasion, he furthered Oros’ dependency by entering 
into certain financial transactions with the Mexican that 
resulted in Oros signing eighteen $100.00 promisory notes 
— notes for which Oros did not receive any cash. See 
supra, pp. 8-9. Now Oros and his family were fully pre­
pared for their departure to Connecticut; Oros had quit 
his job and the family sold its furniture and clothing, 
and other possessions. It was with the Oros family in this 
state of readiness and expectation that appellant stressed 
his influence in this country and warned Oros that if he 
broke his “contract” he would deport Oros and that 
neither he, nor his children or grandchildren could ever 
return to the United States.60 Despite this threat, Oros— 
perhaps discounting appellant’s threat or perhaps being

59 As noted supra, p. 7 the affidavit overstated the rate of pay, 
did not indicate that Oros’ eldest daughter was to be a worker and 
stated that Oros and his wife had long experience as farm workers.

60 Appellant’s contention (Br. p. 14) that this threat should be 
ignored because it was made “ at a time and place completely re­
mote to the indictment” is not persuasive. Appellant has not been 
indicted for making this threat. He has been indicted for holding 
Oros and five of his children to a condition of involuntary servi­
tude. This threat is one of the means he used to accomplish his 
purpose. As United States v. Ancarola, 1 Fed. 676 (S.D. N.Y. 
1880) demonstrates, conduct that occurs in a foreign country is 
entirely relevant to show intent and purpose. Moreover, the threat 
of deportation made in Mexico was reiterated—both indirectly 
and directly— during the stay of the Oros family on appellant’s 
farm.



37

resigned to two years of servitude as the price of Ameri­
can citizenship 61—left Mexico for appellant’s farm.

After the arrival of the Oros family in Connecticut, 
appellant continued in his efforts to gain complete do­
minion and control over their freedom of action. If Oros 
had reason to discount the threats made by appellant in 
Mexico, it was soon emphasized to him that these threats 
were very much alive and vital. Appellant again stressed 
his influence in the community and expressly repeated his 
threats of deportation. Sergio testified (A. 700) that on 
one occasion appellant “ told to my family that I am 
irresponsible boy. If I don’t do the work, he going to send 
back to Mexico. . . .” On many other occasions, appellant 
told the Oros family of workers that he had deported be­
cause they had displeased him. He described an incident 
where, within a half hour, he had placed a transgressing 
employee on a plane for Mexico, separating this employee 
from his wife and children who were left crying on the 
farm. Appellant stimulated further fear by warning the 
family that anyone who became sick would be deported.

In order to remove any possibility that Oros would dis­
cover the limitations on his power, appellant sought to 
keep the family from all contacts with the outside world.62 
Appellant, contrary to the commitment he made in Mex­
ico, refused to permit the Oros children to attend school. 
He prohibited church and movie attendance, and the fam­
ily, with rare exceptions, were required to remain con­
tinuously on the farm. In addition, appellant forbade 
Oros and his family to talk to persons who came on the

61 As the Peonage Cases, supra at 680 indicate, there is an unlaw­
ful holding “whether [the victim] . . . has agreed or not to submit to 
such control . . . .”

62 Appellant suggests (Br. 22-23) that the Oros family had the 
best opportunity to learn of their rights by means of the television 
set that had been supplied to them. It stretches credulity to sup­
pose that the Oros family, hardly able to speak English, would 
learn from the television entertainment programs that a private 
citizen could not deport any immigrant, that Connecticut had a 
compulsory school attendance law applicable to the Oros children, 
and that interest at the rate of 134% per annum was usurious.



38

farm, and, on one occasion, Oros was severely repri­
manded when he departed from this command. Finally, to 
remove all doubts that the every movement and thought 
of the Oros family was under his control, appellant cen­
sored the mail that they received and sent.

The ultimate step taken by appellant to remove the 
freedom of action of the Oros family was to keep them 
without funds. We have described in detail the financial 
dealings between appellant and Oros, see supra pp. 18-21 
and we have seen how appellant, in order to maintain the 
family’s financial subjugation, required the payment of 
interest at the rate of 134% per annum on the amount 
that was owed to him. Penniless, in fear of deportation, 
cut off from access with the outside world, the Oros fam­
ily indeed had had their wills subdued to that of appel­
lant’s.

C. The Holding was Wilfull

Our argument thus far has not attempted to isolate 
the evidence showing that appellant’s acts were done 
“knowingly and willfully.” We believe that a mere rec­
itation of the events we have described unquestionably 
proves that appellant acted “knowingly and willfully.” To 
remove any doubt on this point, however, we will brief­
ly recapitulate some of the direct evidence in the record 
which demonstrates that appellant acted with intent to vio­
late the law.

First, there is appellant’s direction to Oros that Oros 
not tell the American Embassy in Mexico City about the 
contract that had been executed. Second, there is the 
affidavit that appellant prepared which fraudulently de­
scribes the terms of Oros’ employment and his quali­
fications. Third, there is appellant’s false statement to 
Mr. Bargas that the Oros family were experienced farm 
workers. Fourth, there was the many efforts to conceal 
the Oros family from the outside world as evidenced 
especially by Mrs. Shackney’s false statement to Mrs. 
Sambor concerning Sergio’s identity and Mrs. Shackney’s 
denial to Mrs. Davalos that the Oros family was on the



39

farm. Fifth, there was a great deal of testimony by ap­
pellant that was so utterly unbelievable as to eliminate 
any reasonable hypothesis that he was an innocent man.63 
Plainly, in weighing these factors, and the other evi­
dence in the record, the jury had sufficient evidence to 
conclude that appellant acted knowingly and wilfully.

*  *  *  *

The foregoing facts— considered in relationship to each 
other and not as isolated, unconnected events— establish 
a clear, planned pattern of conduct by the appellant di­
rected at subjugating the Oros family to his will. What 
appellant has done here is not unique, and it would be 
appropriate to conclude this portion of our brief with 
a discussion of the analogous case of Bernal v. United 
States, 241 Fed. 339 (C.A. 5, 1917), cert, denied, 245 
U.S. 672 (1918), noting especially the court’s full con­
sideration of all the circumstances of the case. There, 
Rosenda Nava, a Mexican alien, while employed as a do­
mestic servant in Laredo, Texas at $4.00 per week, was 
offered a job by the defendant, the proprietor of a small 
hotel in San Antonio, at $6.00 per week. The defendant 
told Nava that if the work was not agreeable, she would 
be given a return ticket to Laredo. When Nava arrived 
in San Antonio, she discovered that the defendant oper­
ated a house of prostitution.

She refused to practice prostitution, and was told 
by defendant that she could not leave the house un­
til she had paid back the fare from Laredo to San

63 For example, on the one hand, appellant testified that work 
on a chicken farm required responsible people. On the other hand, 
appellant claimed that, while still in Mexico City, Oros tried to 
overcharge on a taxi fare, that Oros begged for money, that Oros 
admitted he was a heavy drinker, that Oros lied to him about 
having obtained his visa and passport, that Oros paid off debts with 
the $700 that appellant gave him to purchase airplane tickets, and 
that Oros unilaterally changed his “ contract of employment” to 
increase his wage. If Oros was so despicable, why was he em­
ployed for such responsible work? Another example of inherently 
incredible testimony is appellant’s explanation of Exhibit DD—the 
paper showing the computation of interest on Oros’ debt.



40

Antonio. She was sent on errands in the neighbor­
hood, but during these times the defendant watched 
her from an upper window. The defendant told her 
that, if she tried to leave, she would telegraph to the 
immigration officers and they would put her in jail 
for five years. When the defendant told her this, 
she was very much afraid of her. She had no money, 
did not know her way about town, and remained in 
fear of the defendant. She succeeded on one of her 
errands in sending a note to a cousin who resided in 
San Antonio. In response to the note, a friend of 
the cousin came and brought a policeman with him. 
She was unknown to him personally, and, when he 
inquired for her, he was told by the defendant that 
there was no such person in the house. She suc­
ceeded in making her identity known, and was taken 
from the house by the policeman, and eventually re­
stored to her family. While in the house of the de­
fendant, she and another girl named Sofia did all of 
the domestic work, but received no pay and very little 
to eat. She did not at any time engage in prostitu­
tion. There was evidence tending to corroborate her 
in part, and also evidence tending to rebut some of 
her testimony.64 241 Fed. at 341.

The defendant in that case flatly denied any threats 
or coercion but was found guilty by a jury. The appel­
late court concluded (241 Fed. at 342) :

The law takes no account of the amount of the debt 
or the means of coercion. It is sufficient to constitute 
the crime that a person is held against his will and 
made to work to pay a debt. Clyatt v. United States, 
197 U.S. 207 . . . .  The court charged the jury

64 The appellant asserts (Br. p. 11-12) that a “ host of evidence” 
presented by the Government is extraneous, and his brief ignores 
such evidence, although appellant states that “ [s]hould the gov­
ernment, after a year’s reflection, be able to find a place for such 
evidence in its case, we shall discuss those factors at argument or 
in a reply brief.” While appellant might prefer to consider certain 
evidence extraneous— evidence of the conditions under which the 
Oros family lived and worked—the Bernal case demonstrates that 
courts do not take such a myopic view. See also United States v. 
Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal., 1947).



41

clearly and explicitly on the law. The credibility of 
the witnesses, the weight and sufficiency of the evi­
dence, and the resolving of the conflicts in the testimony 
were matters for the jury. If they believed the witness 
Rosenda Nava, her testimony was sufficient to sup­
port the indictment.

D. Luis Oros and His Children were held to a Con­
dition of Involuntary Servitude

We have shown that the appellant’s actions were such 
that it was proper for the jury to conclude that he 
acted to coerce and restrain the Oros family to deprive 
them of their freedom of action. We will now demonstrate 
that these actions had the effect that appellant intended— 
that the wills of the Oros family were subjugated to ap­
pellant’s control and that they performed involuntarily 
service for him.

Of course, there is no calculus that will precisely meas­
ure the line between voluntary and involuntary conduct. 
This was noted by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a related 
area (Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606 (1948) :

Unhappily we have neither physical nor intellectual 
weights and measures by which judicial judgment 
can determine when pressures in securing a con­
fession reach the coercive intensity that calls for 
the exclusion of a statement so secured.

It is only a careful analysis of the facts and circum­
stances of this particular case which can illuminate the 
question of whether or not the conduct of Luis Oros and 
his family was involuntary. As the Supreme Court has 
stated in considering claims relating to involuntary con­
fessions (Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953)) :

The limits in any case depend upon a weighing 
of the circumstances of pressure against the power 
of resistance of the person confessing. What would be 
overpowering to the weak of will or mind might be 
utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal.

The first question we must consider to determine wheth­
er the Oros family rendered involuntary service is wheth­



42

er they were overcome by fear. The most appropriate 
starting point is the testimony of the complaining wit­
nesses themselves. Oros testified (A. 100-01) : “ I want to 
do many things, but all time I am afraid, and that’s all 
I feel, afraid.” 65 Similarly, Maria Elena testified that she 
was afraid, and there is evidence that the other children 
also were afraid of appellant.

Beyond this direct testimony, there is additional evi­
dence in the record that is entirely inconsistent with the 
belief that the Oros family lived on appellant’s farm as 
free persons. Perhaps the one most telling piece of evi­
dence-evidence which itself condemns appellant— is that 
the rescue of the Oros family was achieved only as the 
result of a smuggled letter. How could the jury help 
concluding that a man who had to resort to this subter­
fuge, that a man whose first free contact with the out­
side world resulted in the hurried trip of the Davaloses 
from Philadelphia to Middletown, was overcome with fear 
of his “ employer” and was performing his services invol­
untarily? Certainly, this is direct and clear evidence that 
appellant’s coercive acts had their intended affect.

That the Oros family was paralyzed from making any 
direct atempt to escape is further evidence of the extent 
to which they were overcome with fear of appellant 
The appellant and his wife were away from the 
farm for a good period of time. The farm was not sur­
rounded by a high wall; it was reasonably close to the 
highway. Most of the time, there was a truck available 
with the keys in the ignition. Yet the Oros family made 
no attempt to escape but remained and continued their 
labors. Appellant suggests that these facts show that the 
Oros family did not want to leave, that they voluntarily 
remained on the farm. On the other hand, as we have 
shown, there was considerable evidence that the Oros 
family was afraid of appellant. Admittedly, two con­
clusions may be drawn from these facts. The jury con­
cluded that appellant had so cowered the Oros family

65 On his first contact with a law enforcement officer, Oros 
described his state of fear (A. 155-56).



43

into submission that they did not possess the free will to 
take advantage of what might appear to be obvious means 
of escape. This plainly was a reasonable— if not compel­
ling— conclusion.

In view of the evidence, there is no gainsaying that 
the Oros family was held in fear. Appellant, however, 
contends that this fear was unreasonable and asserts 
(Br. pp. 16-19) that the involuntarily servitude cases do 
not furnish a guide to an applicable standard. The appel­
lant contends that if an “ objective” standard were ap­
plied,66 there could be no basis for concluding that the 
fear of the Oros family was reasonable.

But the cases in this area do furnish a standard. Thus, 
in the Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 681 (M.D. Ala. 
1903), the court stated:

The test often given for determining the influence, 
force, or threats which deprive a person of freedom 
of choice, and coerce his will, is that the force, in­
fluence, or threats must be sufficient to overcome the 
will of a reasonably firm man under like circum­
stances; but the better rule, which should be applied 
in these cases, is that, as all persons are not of like 
courage and firmness, the court or jury, as the case 
may be, must consider the situation of the parties, 
the relative inferiority or inequality between the per­
sons contracting to perform the service and the per­
son exercising the force or influence to compel its 
performance, and determine, in view of all the cir­
cumstances, whether the service was involuntary— 
upon compulsion. It will not do in all cases to say 
that the party should have relied upon the law for 
redress, and resisted the force or threats by legal 
proceedings, instead of submitting to the wrong; 
since the protection of the law, in many cases, may 
not be sufficiently immediate to prevent the threat­
ened injury, nor afford anything like sufficient and

66 Appellant does not press a “reasonable man” standard but be­
lieves he is entitled to some sort of a “ reasonable-Mexico-City-eab- 
driver-who-had-been-in-this-country-twice-before” type o f standard.



44

adequate compensation for the injury which would 
result if the force and influence were then resisted.67

Perhaps the above test says no more than that each 
case must be evaluated on its own facts. Here the jury, 
weighing all the facts, concluded that the Oros family 
was held in fear and that their fear was reasonable. 
Where this Court has had before it the question of wheth­
er a person acted from fear and whether the fear was 
reasonable, it has given decisive effect to the conclusion 
of the jury. See United States v. Tolub, 309 F.2d 286, 
288-89 (C.A. 2, 1962). What the appellant here asserts 
is that in this case the Court should hold, as a matter of 
law, that his conduct could not have produced fear in any 
member of the Oros family. But certainly this is not a 
question to be decided by this Court. Whether the fear of 
the Oros family was reasonable depends not only on the 
evaluation of what was said and done but how it was 
said and how it was done. The personal interreaction be­
tween the person making the threat and the person 
threatened is of utmost significance. It might be unrea­
sonable to react in fear to a threat from a Caspar Mil­
quetoast but a similar threat, made by a hardened crim­
inal, is likely to produce fear.68 In short, to judge proper­
ly whether the reaction to a threat was reasonable or not 
it is necessary to know something of the demeanor of the 
person threatening and the person being threatened. Here 
the jury saw and heard both Oros and the appellant. They 
were in the best position to determine whether it was 
reasonable for Oros to react in fear to appellant. The 
record before the Court cannot possibly recreate the 
impression made upon the jury by live witnesses. In this 
connection the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in Stein v. 
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 183-86 (1953) are appropriate:

67 See also In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686, 689 (N.D. Fla. 
1905); United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974, 976 (D.C. S.C. 1909).

68 In United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974, 978 (D.C.S.C. 1909), 
the court charged: “ The character of the defendant is always in 
issue in a criminal charge, as an element for the jury to consider 
in determining to guilt or innocence of the defendant.”



45

For seven weeks they [the trial judge and jury] 
observed the day-to-day demeanor of defendants, 
their attitudes and reactions; all the knowledge we 
have of their personalities is still photographs of the 
two of them. The trial judge and jury also for long 
periods could observe the police officers whose con­
duct were in. question, knew not only what they an­
swered but how they answered, could form some opin­
ions of their attitudes— of the personal characteris­
tics which never can get into a printed record but 
which make for belief or unbelief that they were guilty 
of cruelty and violence.

II

18 U.S.C. 1584, As Applied In This Case, Is Not 
Vague And Indefinite

Appellant argues that in order for 18 U.S.C. 1584 to 
escape invalidation as beiong unconstitutionally vague it 
must be interpreted, “ in accordance with its historical 
background,” only to encompass relationships analogous 
to the “ old institution of slavery” and that, accordingly, 
only threats of physical violence and extreme restraint 
such as imprisonment should be sufficient to constitute 
a violation of the statute (Br. pp. 26-28). Appellant poses a 
host of hypothetical cases in which he suggests it would 
be unconstitutional to apply this statute (Br. pp. 23-25).

Our answer to appellant is threefold: (1) The his­
tory and purpose of 18 U.S.C. 1584 indicates that it was 
intended to cover more than slavery as it existed prior 
to the Civil War; (2) a threat of deportation certainly 
is severe enough to come within the statute; (3) to up­
hold the statute, as applied in this case, the Court need 
not consider its applicability to other, hypothetical cases.

A. The History and Purpose of 18 U.S.C. 1584

Contrary to appellant’s assertion (Br. pp. 26-27), the 
“ involuntary servitude” proscription of 1584 does not 
antedate the Civil War and the abolition of slavery but



46

was intended to implement the Thirteenth Amendment.69 70 
The term “ involuntary servitude” was introduced into the 
Criminal Code by the Act of June 23, 1874 (18 Stat. 
251)— “An act to protect persons of foreign birth against 
forcible constraint or involuntary servitude.” The origin 
of this bill has been described as follows ( United States 
v. McClellan, 127 Fed. 971, 977-78 (S.D. Ga. 1904)) :

. . .  the bill was introduced by the Honorable Charles 
Sumner, but he died before its passage . . .  In ad­
vocacy of the bill, Mr. Sumner stated that there were 
about 5,000 Italian children in the United States 
who had been kidnapped or inveigled, brought to this 
country, and held in a condition of involuntary 
servitude. . . . [The statute shows] a constant pur­
pose on the part of the national legislature to pro­
tect all persons within our boundaries from involun­
tary servitude, of whatever sort. . . .™

69 The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits both slavery and in­
voluntary servitude. So far as we have been able to ascertain, the 
phrase “ involuntary servitude” was first used in the Northwest 
Ordinance, 1 Stat. 53. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 
49-50 (1872); Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, pp. 237-38'.

70 The appellant asserts that the original ancestor of 18 U.S.C 
1584 was an act passed on April 20, 1818 (3 Stat. 450, 452)—an 
act directed at penalyzing slave traffic. This act, passed pursuant 
to Congress’ power to regulate the slave trade, did not cover 
“ involuntary servitude.” With the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, however, the authority of Congress was broadened, 
and in the course of time, the provisions of the 1818 Act were 
amalgamated into the more general prohibition against involuntary 
servitude now found in 18 U.S.C. 1584. In other words, the broad 
and more inclusive prohibition against involuntary servitude made 
unnecessary a separate interdiction against the slave trade.

The actual origins of 18 U.S.C. 1584 are as follows: The Act 
of April 20, 1818 became Section 5377 of the Revised Statutes of 
1873-74. In 1909, R.S. 5377 was repealed (35 Stat. 1153) but its 
provisions were reenacted, in somewhat modified form, as Section 
248 of the Act of March 4, 1909 (35 Stat. 1139). Section 248 
became Section 423 of the 1940 United States Code. In 1948 
Section 423 was amalgamated with Section 446 to become present 
Section 1584. Section 446—the "involuntary servitude” prohibi­
tion—was derived from Senator Sumner’s Act of June 23, 1874, 
discussed above.



Repeatedly, the courts have held that “ involuntary 
servitude” encompasses much more than slavery. In 
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) the Su­
preme Court said:

The words involuntary servitude have a ‘larger 
meaning than slavery.’ . . . The plain intention was 
to abolish slavery of whatever name and form and 
all its badges and incidents; to render impossible any 
state of bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting 
that control by which the personal service of one man 
in disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit which 
is the essence of involuntary servitude (Emphasis 
added).

And, in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906), 
the Court stated:

The meaning of this [the Thirteenth Amend­
ment] is as clear as language can make it. 
The things denounced are slavery and involun­
tary servitude, and Congress is given power 
to enforce that denunciation. All understand by 
these terms a condition of enforced compulsory ser­
vice of one to another. . . .  It reaches every race and 
individual. . . . Slavery or involuntary servitude of 
the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon are 
as much within its compass as slavery or involuntary 
servitude of the African.

For similar expressions see Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 
4, 17-18 (1944) ;71 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 
(1883); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69, 90 
(1873); United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76, 78-79 
(S.D. Cal. 1947); In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686, 688 
(N.D. Fla. 1905).

In fact, the Supreme Court has considered the words 
“slavery” and “ involuntary servitude” so clear of mean­
ing that in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 
(1906) the Court was prompted to remark: “A reference

71 In Pollock, the Court said: “ The undoubted aim of the Thir­
teenth Amendment as implemented by the Antipeonage Act was not 
merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free 
and voluntary labor throughout the United States.”



48

to the definitions in the dictionaries of words whose mean­
ing is so thoroughly understood by all seems an affectation, 
. . And, as the cases discussed supra show, “ involun­
tary servitude” was recognized as being much broader 
than slavery.

In view of this clear historical background it is diffi­
cult to understand how appellant can now argue that the 
term “ involuntary servitude” is vague and indefinite. 
“ Only casuistry could make vague and nebulous what our 
constitutional scheme makes so clear and specific” Williams 
v. United States, 841 U.S. 97, 102 (1951). Courts have 
never applied the void for vagueness doctrine to statutes 
that use such ancient and well established terms as 
“ involuntary servitude.” 72 No constitutional problem is 
presented merely because a statute does not read like a 
mathematical formula. As Mr. Justice Holmes observed, 
“ the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends 
upon his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subse­
quently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his 
judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a 
short imprisonment, . . .  he may incur the penalty of 
death.” 73 What was said by the Supreme Court when the 
Antipeonage statute (18 U.S.C. 1581) was attacked for 
vagueness is apropos here ( United States v. Gaskin, 
320 U.S. 527, 529-30 (1944)) :

The appellee invokes the rule that criminal laws are 
to be strictly construed and defendants are not to be 
convicted under statutes too vague to apprise the 
citizen of the nature of his offense. That principle, 
however, does not require distortion or nullifica­
tion of the evident meaning and purpose of the legis­
lation.74

72 See, e.g., United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); 
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913).

™Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
74 See also United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552 (1938); 

United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48 (1937); Gooch v. United 
States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (i936) ; Ash Sheep Co. v. United States, 
252 U.S. 159, 170 (1920); United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233 
242-43 (1909).



49

B. Whatever its Outer Limits, 18 U.S.C. 1584 Clearly 
Covers Servitude Imposed by Threats of Deporta­
tion.

Appellant argues that there is no “ involuntary servi­
tude” where one performs services for another as a result 
of a threat of deportation (Br. p. 30). As we have shown, 
however, “ involuntary servitude” encompasses any coer­
cion by which one man is forced to give his services to 
another. We need not here attempt to delineate how re­
mote and subtle such coercion may be in order to create 
criminal liability. We need only deal with the problem 
in this case viz, does a threat of deportation amount to 
such coercion that services performed as a result of the 
threat may be deemed involuntary?

Appellant concedes that if he had threatened to use 
physical force to restrain the Oros family or if he had 
threatened to have them arrested if they left his farm, 
such threats would be sufficient to constitute a violation 
of 18 U.S.C. 1584. But certainly the validity of 18 
U.S.C. 1584 does not require that it be limited to threats 
of physical force or incarceration. Persons can be 
threatened with consequences that are equally severe.75 
It is irrational to assume that a person who threatens 
another with physical punishment or incarceration has 
notice that his conduct is criminal but a person who en­
gages in an equally extreme threat is unfairly treated if 76

76 There are numerous areas in which the law recognizes that 
a person can be coerced even though physical force is not applied. 
With respect to coerced confessions, the Supreme Court has said, 
{Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 566 (1958)): “ That petitioner 
was not physically tortured affords no answer to the question of 
whether the confession was coerced. . . See also Ashcraft v. 
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944), Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 
600-601 (1948) ; Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942); Lisenba 
v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237, 240-41 (1941). And Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter has stated {Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52-53 
(1949)): “ There is torture of mind as well as body; the will is 
as much affected by fear as by force. . . . When a suspect speaks 
because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been 
subjected to a physical or mental ordeal.” Cf. Callanan v. United 
States, 223 F. 2d 171 (C.A. 8, 1955).



50

criminal sanctions are imposed. Here, for the purpose of 
his argument, appellant admits that this case involves “ a 
‘threat’ to return a man to the place from whence he 
came” (Br. p. 30). Whatever else 18 U.S.C. 1584 may 
or may not cover, it certainly encompasses a situation 
where someone is forced to labor in fear of being deport­
ed.

Obviously, deportation is an extreme sanction. James 
Madison, in speaking of returning a person “ to the place 
from where he came,” said (4 Elliot’s Debates 555) : 
“ . . . if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, 
and among the severest punishments, it will be difficult 
to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.” 
The Supreme Court has said that “ deportation is a drastic 
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or 
exile . . Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 
(1948) and that deportation “ may result also in loss of . . . 
all that makes life worth living” Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).76

The Oros family worked for appellant because they 
feared his threat of deportation. There can be few clearer 
cases of holding to involuntary servitude within the mean­
ing of 18 U.S.C. 1584.

C. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 1584 as Applied 
to the Facts of this Case is not Affected by the 
Fact that there are Some Situations to Which the 
Statute Might not be Applicable

Appellant presents many hypothetical cases (Br. pp. 23- 
25) to which he suggests 18 U.S.C. 1584 might be applied 
if it is held applicable to the facts of this case. While we 
believe that each of the examples cited by appellant is

76 Mr. Justice Brewer, dissenting in Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) stated: “ . . . it needs no citation 
of authorities to support the proposition that deportation is punish­
ment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, 
and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across 
the ocean to a distant land, is punishment and that oftentimes most 
severe and cruel."



51

within 1584,77 we do not believe that the outer limits of 
that statute need be explored in this case. It is elemen­
tary, of course, that courts only decide cases and con­
troversies properly before them. United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960) emphasized this basic propo­
sition :

This Court, as is the case with all federal courts, 
‘has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either 
of a State or of the United States, void, because 
irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is 
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants 
in actual controversies. In the exercise of that juris­
diction, it is bound by two rules, to which it has 
rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question 
of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied.’ Liverpool, 
New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commis­
sioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 99. Kindred to 
these rules is the rule that one to whom application 
of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to 
attack the statute on the grond that impliedly it 
might also be taken as applying to other persons or

7718 U.S.C. 1584 is a simple statute. As w,e have shown, the 
proscription against involuntary servitude is intended to prevent 
a man from being coerced to work against his will. If coercion 
is exercised, if the coercion is successful and if the response to 
the coercion is a reasonable one, a case of involuntary servitude 
is presented. Of course, many cases present questions of degree 
which must be weighed by a jury. The analogies in other fields 
of law are numerous. If the threats described in appellant’s ex­
amples had been directed at preventing an employee from becom­
ing a union member or if the threats were an attempt at black­
mail or extortion there would certainly be a basis for legal pro­
ceedings. See e.g., the Connecticut blackmail statute (28 C.G.S.A. 
53-40) which proscribes threats “ to the person, property or repu­
tation of another . . . with intent to compel the person threatened 
to do any act against his will” . Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465, 467, 24 
Pac. 979, 980 (1890) which defines extortion as “ exaction of money, 
either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, 
or the exercise of an influence.” See also 3 Wharton, Criminal Law 
and Procedure (1957 ed.) §§ 1396-1400.



52

other situations in which its application might be 
unconstitutional [citing cases].

See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 
(1954).

The question in this case is not whether appellant 
could be convicted for threatening to prevent Sergio 
from going to Yale. The question is whether it is a viola­
tion of 18 U.S.C. 1584 to coerce labor from a family by 
means of threats of deportation.

Ill

Appellant’s Trial Was Fair In Every Respect
Appellant contends that certain misconduct of the 

prosecutor was so prejudicial as to warrant remanding 
this case for a new trial. The alleged misconduct falls 
into three categories: (1) deliberate attempts to influence 
the jury with inadmissible and unadmitted evidence; (2) 
deliberate injection into the case of numerous irrelevant 
but perjudicial “ side issues” , and (3) improper remarks 
during summation to the jury.

A. Alleged Deliberate Attempts to Influence the Jury 
with Inadmissible Evidence.

Appellant contends that the prosecutor improperly at­
tempted to influence the jury by reference to inadmissible 
letters and conversations. These incidents were totally 
insubstantial and in no way prejudicial.78

1. The letters. Appellant had marked for identification 
numerous letters that were written by the complaining 
witnesses while in Connecticut. On cross-examination, 
some of these letters were, in whole or in part, offered 
and received in evidence as prior inconsistent statements. 
Others, although marked for identification, were not so 
offered, thus leaving the clear impression that they, too, 
were prior inconsistent statements.

78 Appellant, has printed in his appendix only a portion of what 
transpired with respect to the incidents of which he complains. As 
a result, much of what he discusses is out of context. Our ap­
pendix contains the relevant portions of the record without omis­
sions.



53

On redirect, the prosecutor’s first reference to these 
letters was his attempt to introduce in evidence the por­
tion of one such letter (D. Ex. 40; A. 355) that ap­
pellant had failed to introduce when he offered the re­
mainder of the letter (AA. 1). Appellant objected and 
the court deferred his ruling on the matter (AA. 2-3).. 
Thereafter, the prosecutor sought to introduce a separate 
letter (D. Ex. 29) which appellant had had, during a 
long parade of “ inconsistent” letters, marked for identi­
fication (though not offered), apparently to indicate to the 
jury that it, too, was an inconsistent statement. Both 
of these offers were made on the ground that once a 
party puts into evidence part of a document or corres­
pondence, the opposing party may introduce the rest of the 
document or correspondence to explain or rebut the ad­
verse inferences which might arise from the fragmen­
tary or incomplete character of the evidence already in­
troduced (AA. 1-2).79 Appellant’s objection to the 
separate letter was sustained outright (AA. 3) and the 
prosecutor thereafter left the subject.80

79 See United States v. Corrigan, 168 F. 2d 641, 645 (C.A. 2, 
1948); Grobelny v. Cowan, 151 F. 2d 810 (C.A. 2, 1945), United 
States v. Weinbren, 121 F. 2d 826 (C.A. 2, 1941), Vause v. United 
States 53 F. 2d 346 (C.A. 2, 1931), Powers v. United States, 294 
Fed. 512 (C.A. 5, 1923).

80 Appellant states that the following morning the prosecutor, in 
the absence of the jury, again renewed his offer. This is misleading. 
What in fact happened is that the next morning, before the jury 
was' called, the court reminded counsel that there was some “ un­
finished business” from the previous day and indicated that the 
government could be heard further relative to the offer as to 
which the court had deferred his ruling. (AA. 3-5). To be sure, 
the prosecutor also went into the matter of the separate letter 
which had been excluded the day before and asked the court to 
reconsider his ruling thereon. But this was done on the specific 
invitation of the court who, after ruling on the offer of the portion 
of the letter, asked the prosecutor, “What is the other problem, 
Mr. O’Connor?” Even though counsel for the defense sought to 
interfere, the court continued “ You want me to review the ques­
tion of the subsequent letter?” (AA. 5). As a result of this invi­
tation, the prosecutor did argue further the admissibility of the 
excluded evidence.



54

Subsequently, the prosecutor attempted to offer one of 
the other letters which the defense had made a point 
of marking for identification during its process of in­
troducing inconsistent statements. But this offer was 
premised upon an entirely different theory of admissi­
bility, i.e., the “ state of mind” exception to the hearsay 
rule (A. 397-98).81 Appellant’s objection to its admission 
was sustained without comment (A. 398). Later, how­
ever, the court explained that letters had been introduced by 
the defense on cross-examination for the sole purpose of 
attacking Oros’ credibility, but letters could not be util­
ized on redirect to show “ state of mind” (AA. 12-13).

The prosecutor made no further efforts to introduce any 
of these letters through Oros. However, construing the 
court’s ruling as directed toward Oros’ testimony only, the 
prosecutor did seek to introduce some of Oros’ letters, on 
the basis of the “ state of mind” exception to the hearsay 
rule, through a recipient of one such letter (A. 410), and 
through persons who had mailed such letters for Oros (A. 
503-07, 530-31). This alternative approach also was 
barred by the court.82

Appellant attributes to the prosecutor a deliberate effort 
to get before the jury inadmissible evidence by way of 
these letters. This is not substantiated by the record. It

81 The prosecutor argued that this exception was applicable 
here since the state of mind of the complaining witnesses was an 
essential element of the case. Reliance was placed on Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892) ; Mattox v. News 
Syndicate Co., 176 F. 2d 897, 903-904 (C.A. 2, 1949) cert, denied, 
338 U.S. 858 (1949) ; United States v. Kennedy, 291 F. 2d 457 
(C.A. 2, 1961) ; United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F. 2d 491, 497 
(C.A. 2, 1958); United States v. Varlack, 225 F. 2d 665, 673 (C.A. 
2, 1955), Nick v. United States, 122 F. 2d 660, 671 (C.A. 8, 1941), 
cert, denied, 314 U.S. 687 (1941).

82 Appellant suggests that it was improper for the prosecutor 
repeatedly to refer to the envelopes in which the letters were mailed. 
But these envelopes were in evidence (A. 508, 509, 529). Certainly, 
it is not prejudicial to refer to evidence. And these envelopes had 
great significance. They showed that it was necessary for Oros 
to resort to subterfuge to communicate with the outside world, and 
they showed that, as a result of one of these letters, the Oros 
family secured its release.



55

is clear that the prosecutor, in his vigorous efforts to 
present the case, sought to utilize every ground available 
to him for the admission of this evidence, and in this he 
was justified. The fact that a great portion of the argu­
ment on the admissibility of the letters was made in the 
absence of the jury (AA. 3-10) and the fact that on 
at least one other occasion the prosecutor sought to have the 
jury excused during the course of these arguments (AA. 2) 
are evidence that his efforts were made in good 
faith.

Moreover, appellant cannot properly claim that he was 
prejudiced by reference to these letters. The injection of 
these letters into the case was entirely appellant’s doing; 
it was he who first had letters marked for identification. 
Appellant introduced some of these letters—and portions 
of one—to show that the Oros family had written favor­
ably about their life on the farm. No comment was re­
quired by the prosecutor to raise the inference that the 
letters identified, but not offered, were unfavorable to ap­
pellant’s defense. At the most, the prosecutor’s attempts 
to introduce these letters in evidence only emphasized the 
inference appellant himself had created.

2. Hearsay conversations

Appellant charges that the prosecutor sought to elicit 
hearsay evidence from witnesses. Certainly, it is not sur­
prising that in a record of this length it is possible to 
point to certain questions that allegedly were improper. 
What is significant here, however, is that in none of the 
instances of which appellant complains was there any im­
proper evidence adduced. Appellant’s objection in this re­
gard, therefore, are frivolous. More specifically, they can 
be answered as follows:

a. Appellant complains of repeated attempts to obtain 
testimony from Luis Oros and others concerning conver­
sations Oros had with such persons during his stay on the 
farm. In these instances, Oros had been permitted to 
testify—over objection— that he had had such con versa-



56

sions (A. 139, 140, 141, 391), that he had told of the 
conditions under which he was living (A. 392), and that 
he had sought the advice of the person with whom he had 
spoken (AA. 10). It was only when the prosecutor went 
further in his attempt to show Oros’ state of mind and 
asked Oros to reveal the text of the conversation that a 
successful objection was entered (A. 393, 395, AA. 11-12). 
While the prosecutor did attempt to revive this 
exploration of Oros’ state of mind with other witnesses, in 
each case (A. 496, 499, 500, 531, 672) the question was 
immediately objected to and disallowed before any answer 
was given. (A 496, 500, 531-32, 672). The fact that 
such conversations had taken place and that Oros had 
spoken about the conditions under which he was living and 
had sought the advice of the persons to whom he spoke 
had already been allowed into evidence by the 
court. It is difficult to see, therefore, how these ques­
tions alone could have influenced the jury to appellant’s 
detriment.

b. Appellant also claims that it was improper to ques­
tion one witness regarding the impression the Oros fam­
ily had made upon her on one occasion (A. 493) and 
that it was improper to ask Officer Cabelus to describe 
the reaction of the Oros children when they first saw 
him (A. 441-42).

One element of this case was the involuntary nature of 
the service involved which was alleged to have been 
brought about by threats and intimidation by appellant. 
It was necessary, therefore, to show that the wills of the 
complaining witnesses had been subdued through fear 
created by appellant. Thus, the state of mind of the 
complaining witnesses became most relevant. A reading 
of the record will show that the trial was a hard fought 
one by able defense counsel who sought to have excluded 
any evidence bearing on this issue. The prosecutor, 
knowing the necessity for showing what the state of mind 
of the complaining witnesses was at the time of their 
sojourn on the farm, sought to introduce evidence which 
conceivably could have fallen under the state of mind ex­



57

ception to the hearsay rule. It was on this ground that 
the prosecutor sought testimony as to the reaction of the 
Oros children and the impression which the conduct of the 
Oroses left on a third party.83

B. Alleged Deliberate Injection of Numerous Irrele­
vant and Prejudicial Side Issues into the Case

1. Appellant claims that the prosecutor deliberately and 
consistently injected into the trial “numerous irrelevant 
but prejudicial issues” (Br. p. 40). The foremost of these 
is what appellant refers to as “a rabbi unfrocked.”  The 
impropriety, contends appellant, consisted of the ef­
forts of the prosecutor to attack the appellant’s standing 
as a rabbi. A glance through the record will reveal that 
from the inception of this trial until its conclusion, de­
fense counsel referred to and addressed appellant as 
“ Rabbi” to such an extent that the subject was before 
the jury constantly. In an attempt to test the credibility 
of appellant (A. 1005-07) the prosecutor questioned him 
concerning his status as a rabbi (A. 1001-07).

Certainly this was not an irrelevant issue. To show 
that one has held himself out to be what he is not— par­

83 Appellant also objects to the prosecutor’s attempt to offer a 
statement made by his wife and to the questioning regarding Carlos 
Olguin coming to, working on and leaving appellant’s farm. These 
objections are trival. In Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 
(C.A. 2, 1925), cert, denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925), a witness was al­
lowed to testify that the wife of one of the defendants had 
asked him to secrete certain evidence. This court held that the 
question was proper. Surely, if the admission of such evidence 
is not improper, an attempt to get it admitted, merely because 
disallowed by the court, could not be improper conduct on the 
part of the prosecutor. As to Carlos Olguin, this was a matter 
opened up by appellant on direct examination. He testified ex­
tensively as to the circumfetances under which he had met Olguin 
(A. 887-88), brought him to the farm, reprimanded him about 
beating his wife, and, finally asked him to leave (A. 891-93). 
Certainly it was proper to cross-examine appellant further about 
these matters and to permit Olguin to set the record straight. 
Appellant concedes that no prejudicial evidence was elicited by 
the prosecutor’s questions, and since the questions raised no issues 
which appellant himself had not already testified to, it is hard to 
understand how the prosecutor’s questioning could have influenced 
the jury adversely to appellant.



58

ticularly where there is an issue of credibility and one 
claims to be a clergyman— is clearly relevant to the issue of 
whether or not the jury will believe such person’s testi­
mony, just as is the showing that the person has fabri­
cated stories in other respects.84

The line of questioning pursued by the prosecutor plain­
ly was proper, and the only error, if any, was not per­
mitting a fuller exploration into appellant’s back­
ground. In any event, appellant could not possibly have 
been prejudiced by this line of inquiry since the defense 
was permitted to introduce into evidence written proof 
(D. Ex. 77) purporting to show that appellant had, in fact, 
been “ordained” a rabbi (A. 1080).

2. Appellant also cites other “ irrelevant” and “preju­
dicial” issues which he claims were improperly injected 
into the case (Br. p. 43-44). But appellant’s objection on 
this point merely evinces a complete misunderstanding of 
what is involved in this case. All of the evidence to which 
appellant objects was offered to show the conditions under 
which the Oros family existed and the circumstances sur­
rounding their relationship with appellant. As we have 
shown, supra, p. 40, and as the cases attest, Bernal v. 
United States, 241 Fed. 339 (C.A. 5, 1917), cert, denied, 
245 U.S. 672 (1918) ; In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 
686 (N.D. Fla. 1905) ; United States v. Ingalls, 73 F. 
Supp. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947),85 evidence of this nature is 
proper, if not essential, in an involuntary servitude prose­
cution.

84 This Court has held that for the purpose of attacking credi­
bility it may be shown on cross-examination that a witness is a 
disbarred attorney. See United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F. 2d 
915, 919 (C.A. 2, 1945), cert, denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945); United 
States v. Buckner, 108 F. 2d 921 (C.A. 2, 1940), cert, denied, 309 
U.S. 669 (1940). See also State v. Pearson, 39 N. J. Super. 50, 
120 A. 2d 468 (1956). Cf Shores v. Simanton, 99 Vt. 191, 130 A. 
697 (1925) (where defendant purported to be a reputable business 
man it was proper, on cross-examination, to inquire into the true 
nature of his business).

85 The Ingalls case is commented on by Robert Traver in “ Uncle 
Tom’s Granddaughter,” Michigan State Bar Journal, pp. 13-15 
(March, 1961).



59

3. Finally, appellant objects to the Government’s wit­
nesses being “unusually well primed” and to the prose­
cutor’s alleged failure to admonish a witness about the 
use of inflammatory phrases (Br. p. 45). Whatever the 
truth of the former charge, it is certainly not grounds 
for a new trial that the Government’s case was well pre­
pared. As to the use of an inflamatory phrase by one of 
the witnesses, the record shows plainly that this was not 
sanctioned by the prosecutor and that, whatever detriment 
the testimony might have had was immediately cured by 
a detailed instruction from the court to the jury (A. 676- 
78).

C. Alleged Improper Remarks During Summation 
to the Jury

Appellant contends that the prosecutor’s conduct, dur­
ing summation, was improper in that (1) he attempted 
to testify (Br. p. 45), (2) he conveyed to the jury his 
own opinion of appellant’s guilt (Br. p. 46), and (3) 
he commented on evidence that had been excluded (Br. 
p. 36-37, 47-48).

The trial in this case was a long one involving twenty 
trial days over a period of almost seven weeks. The sum­
mations were extensive, covering some 229 pages in the 
transcript (A. 1149-1209; AA. 13-76). Most of the mat­
ters of which appellant now complains occurred dur­
ing the closing argument of the prosecutor, and it is only 
possible to assess fairly these remarks by reading the 
summation in its entirety.80 As the Supreme Court stated 
in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
242 (1940) :

[A] reading of the entire argument before the 
jury leads to the firm conviction that the comments 
which [appellant] now rely on for their assertions 
of error were isolated, casual episodes in a long 
summation . . . and not at all reflective of the quality 
of the argument as a whole. 86

86 We have reproduced the prosecutor’s entire summation in our 
appendix (A  A. 13-76). Appellant has presented only selected 
excerpts.



60

In this case, a reading of the summations of both counsel 
for appellant and the prosecutor reveals these facts: (1) 
some of the remarks appellant now objects to were made 
during rebuttal in response to attacks and provocations 
of counsel for appellant during his closing argument; (2) 
in some instances, appellant did not object to the alleged 
improper remarks; (3) appellant at no time moved for a 
mistrial; (4) the judge was careful to instruct the jury 
fully when he considered a remark improper; (5) none 
of the remarks was of sufficient significance to have de­
prived appellant of a fair trial; (6) all of the objections 
appellant now raises were raised— and rejected—below on 
his motion for a new trial.

We will now consider appellant’s objections more par­
ticularly.

1. Appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly 
testified concerning Oros’ compensation as a witness87 and 
the role of the F.B.I. in this case.88

During his summation, appellant dwelt for some time 
upon a discrepancy in Oros’ testimony as to who was 
paying his bills and the extent of his compensation as a 
witness (A. 1188-90). On rebuttal, the prosecutor ex­
plained that witnesses, like jurors, are paid fees by the 
Government (A. 1210) and that Oros was simply con­
fused as to who was paying his bills. In attempting to 
explain why Oros had changed his testimony on this latter 
point, the prosecutor inadvertently referred to the fact 
that he had taken Oros to the United States Marshal’s 
Office to have the fee system explained to him (A. 1210).

87 Oros had testified one day on cross examination that the Gov­
ernment was paying his expenses (A. 292). The next day Oros 
testified, still on cross examination, that he was paying the ex­
penses (A. 350). After Oros testified on the first occasion, the 
prosecutor had taken him to the Marshal’s Office where the matter 
of witness fees and allowances was explained to him. (Oros had in 
fact been receiving these fees and, with them, paying his expenses.) 
However, this fact was never placed into evidence.

8S There was evidence that the F.B.I. first learned of this case 
on February 12, 1962 (A. 453, 482) but Oros was not interviewed 
until mid-March 1962 (A. 284).



61

Appellant objected, and the court instructed the jury to 
disregard the prosecutor’s comment (A. 1211).

Still on rebuttal, the prosecutor attempted to reply to 
appellant’s arguments about the role of the F.B.I. in 
this case (A. 1168-69) and the inferences that had been 
created that there must have been some connivance be­
tween Oros and the federal government with respect to the 
effort of Oros’ attorney to make a financial settlement with 
appellant.89 The prosecutor stated (A. 1214) :

When did the Government get into this case? Febru­
ary 12, 1962. Thereafter, the processes of the Gov­
ernment, the F.B.I., the Justice Department, the Civil 
Rights Division of the Justice Department, all came 
into play and that takes time. Luis Oros never 
started this. He had no —

At this point the Court interrupted the prosecutor and 
warned him that there was no evidence in the case as to 
the time it takes the Government to get into operation, 
and admonished him to stick to the evidence. There was 
no objection from counsel for the defense (A. 1214).

As we have shown, the remarks of the prosecutor here 
under discussion were made in response to argument by 
appellant’s counsel. Under such circumstances, remarks 
that might otherwise be improper are permissible. See 
Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) ; Schmidt 
v. United States, 237 F. 2d 542 (C.A. 8, 1956) ; United
States v. Achilli, 234 F. 2d 797 (C.A. 7, 1956) ; United
States v. Doyle, 234 F. 2d 788 (C.A. 7, 1956) ; Schino v. 
United States, 209 F. 2d 67 (C.A. 9, 1954) ; Padron v. 
United States, 254 F. 2d 574 (C.A. 5, 1958); United 
States V. Stromberg, 268 F. 2d 256 (C.A. 2,
1959); cert, denied, 361 U.S. 863 (1959) United
States v. McCarthy, 170 F. 2d 267 (C.A. 2, 1948). In Mc­
Carthy, the defense counsel emphasized that one of the 
prosecution’s witnesses had failed to identify the defend­
ant. In rebuttal, the prosecutor suggested that the reason

89 Appellant had argued (A. 1169) : “ Isn’t that an awfully 
strange thing, ladies and gentlemen, that the arms of the Federi 
and State governments would just stand by for a month? Awfully 
strange. I don’t think it happened that way.”



62

for this might have been that the witness was afraid that 
the defendant would “ assault” him. This Court, in a per 
curiam opinion, noted that the prosecutor’s remarks had 
been made in response to argument by defense counsel and 
dismissed the whole matter as “ triviality.”  90

In any event, the prosecutor’s comments did not preju­
dice appellant. Strikingly similar to the present case is 
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 
(1940). There the defense, in its summation, had sought 
to create the impression that some of the responsibility 
for the conduct of defendant should be placed on certain 
government officials. In reply the prosecutor stated (310 
U.S. at 240) that it was the “ wish and the desire of the 
highest officials in the government of the United States” 
that the defendants be convicted. The defense objected and 
the trial court overruled the objection. The court of appeals 
reversed (105 F. 2d 809) but the Supreme Court reversed 
the court of appeals and affirmed the conviction. In hold­
ing that the statement was not prejudicial, the Court 
stated (310 U.S. at 242) :

Standing by themselves they appear to be highly im­
proper. Even as a rebuttal to the defense which had 
been interposed throughout the trial, they overstep the 
bounds. But in view of the justification which re­
spondents sought to establish for their acts, the sub­
ject matter of these statements was certainly rele­
vant. The fact that government counsel transgressed 
in his rebuttal certainly cannot be said to constitute

90 In Pad-ron, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
stated (254 F. 2d at 577): “ [T]he district judge of his own motion 
kept watch and ward on the arguments to keep them within proper 
bounds and in every instance, of which complaint is now made, he 
directed the district attorney not to continue the argument, the 
jury not to take it into consideration. But over and above all of 
this, the arguments complained of are not subject to the attacks 
made upon them. Made in large part as a reply to the attacks of 
counsel for the defendant upon, and his belittling of the govern­
ment’s chief witness, they were to a large extent invited and to 
the extent, if any, that they went beyond this, they did not so tran­
scend the bounds of legitimate argument as to consitute reversible 
error.”



63

prejudicial error. For a reading of the entire argu­
ment before the jury leads to firm conviction that the 
comments which respondents now rely on for their as­
sertions of error were isolated, casual episodes in a 
long summation of over 200 printed pages and not 
at all reflective of the quality of the argument as a 
whole.

But this was not the extent of the alleged misconduct 
in the Socony-Vacuum Oil case. In an attempt to rebut 
certain evidence in the record as to the navigability of the 
Mississippi River during the pertinent period, the prose­
cutor also stated that “ in 1935 and 1936, you couldn’t get 
a rowboat up the Mississippi River, north of Winona” 
(310 U.S. at 242). The respondents contended that this 
was prejudicial error in that the prosecutor had sought, 
by stating his personal knowledge, to contradict the record 
and thereby discredit an important defense witness. The 
Court stated, in answer to this argument (310 U.S. at 
243) :

[S]uch testimony was wholly irrelevant, since the 
reasonableness of the prices was not properly an issue 
in the case. Furthermore, when objection was made 
to the remark, counsel withdrew it and the jury was 
instructed to disregard it. That must be deemed to 
have cured the error if it could be considered such.

This Court also has recognized the fact that statements 
by prosecutors having no basis in the evidence are not 
necessarily prejudicial. In United States v. Warren, 120 
F. 2d 211 (C.A. 2, 1941), the prosecutor made comments 
to the jury that he had “ in his file” certain computations 
relating to the case, as to which there had been no evi­
dence introduced. Judge Learned Hand, speaking for 
this Court, stated that even though this certainly was im­
proper, the error, in view of the entire record, was not 
prejudicial enough to warrant a reversal.

Here the issue of the fee paid to Oros was trivial and 
irrelevant and could not have unfairly prejudiced appel­
lant. Moreover, the district court promptly admonished 
the jury to disregard the remark of government counsel



64

after the defense’s objection had been sustained. As far 
as the prosecutor’s remark concerning the “ processes of 
the Government” is concerned, the defense thought so little 
of it that no objection was raised, even though the court 
halted the prosecutor and indicated clearly that it was 
not to be considered (A. 1214).

2. Appellant next argues that it was reversible error 
for the prosecutor twice to inject “his own personal feel­
ings into the case” and express his opinion of the guilt 
of the accused (Br. pp. 46-47). The first of these in­
stances was in response to argument by appellant that 
suggested that the government, i.e., the prosecutor, had 
prepared a script for the witnesses from which they testi­
fied (A. 1186-1187). In response, the prosecutor ex­
pressed his shock at this accusation and went on to say 
(A. 1212):

I have no axe to grind on this case. I present the 
evidence, and that’s all. If a million dollars were 
riding on the outcome of this case—

The district judge intervened and this colloquy took place 
(A. 1212):

The Court: Just a moment. We are not concerned
with your reactions, counselor.
Mr. O’Connor: I feel very strongly about this, Your
Honor.
The Court: We are not concerned about that; I will
so instruct the Jury.

As we have already shown, it is not improper for a 
prosecutor to respond to plain provocation, especially 
when, as here, it implies misconduct on his part. See 
Christensen v. United States, 16 F. 2d 29 (C.A. 9, 1926). 
Moreover, while appellant objects to this comment before 
this Court, he raised no objection below.91

91 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra, at 238-39, 
the Court, in reference to an allegation of misconduct as to which the 
defense had made no objection at trial, said: “ [Cjounsel for the de­



65

The second comment to which the appellant refers as 
having “ improperly conveyed to the jury his own opinion 
of the guilt of the accused” occurred in this manner. The 
prosecutor was drawing to a close his final argument and 
stated (A. 1215-16) :

I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, 
that the Government has proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is not a pleasant task to stand 
before you and ask you to convict a fellow human 
being of a crime, but that is part of my duty and 
obligation if I think the evidence warrants it, and I 
sincerely do feel the evidence is—
The Court: Counsel, your evaluation of the evidence

is of no concern to the Jury; whether you feel so 
or not, does not matter. This is for the Jury to de­
termine.

Mr. O’Connor: I am sure—
The Court: I  just want the Jury to know that. 

This is not a case of supporting Mr. O’Connor’s 
judgment. This is a case of determining for your­
selves on the evidence arid the basis of the law as 
the Court will give it to you.

Don’t give us such references.
Mr. O’Connor: I apologize for that; that is, the in­

ference that any of the members of the Jury took.
I submit that the evidence before you, each and 

every one of you should carefully study and as a 
result of your study and your careful analysis of 
that evidence, the Government asks that you return 
a conviction against David I. Shackney on all counts. 
(Emphasis added)

Again, it is significant to note that counsel did not, at 
the time, consider the prosecutor’s comment deserving of 
an objection, and, we submit, rightly so. Even though the 
trial judge admonished the prosecutor and promptly cau­
tioned the jury that the prosecutor’s opinion should have 
no effect on their consideration of the evidence in the

fense cannot as a rule remain silent, interpose no objections, and 
after a verdict has been returned seize for the first time on the 
point that the comments to the jury were improper and preju­
dicial.”



66

case, the prosecutor’s remarks were entirely proper argu­
ment. It is well settled that it is not misconduct on the 
part of a prosecutor to express his individual belief in 
the guilt of the accused if such belief is based solely on 
the evidence introduced in the case. Schmidt v. United 
States, supra; Thompson v. United States, 272 F. 2d 919 
(C.A. 5 1959); Henderson v. United States, 218 F. 2d 14 
(C.A. 6, 1955) ; United States v. Kiamie, 258 F. 2d 924 
(C.A. 2, 1958), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 909 (1958) ; United 
States V. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F. 2d 631 (C.A. 2, 
1946), cert, denied, 329 U.S. 742 (1946). In the last cited 
case this Court stated (155 F. 2d at 637) :

Equally unmeritorious under the circumstances 
herea re defendants’ objections to certain expressions 
by the prosecutor of belief in the government’s wit­
nesses and in the guilt of the accussed, and 
that the evidence established guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . . . [P]art of the challenged argu­
ment here was expressly stated as a reply to an as­
sertion of a defense attorney that government counsel 
knew this to be a weak case; and the context shows 
this to be the quite natural response to that assertion. 
Defendants are now in no position to complain of 
what was thus invited [citing case]. . . .  Of course 
this affirmation of belief merely put into words what 
the very fact of prosecution implied; and its affect on 
the jury was therefore remote at most [citing cases]. 
. . . Moreover, any possible error was cured by the 
forthright charge of the court instructing the jury at 
the outset to disregard these remarks of government 
counsel, since the function of determining such ques­
tions of fact teas exclusively its own. (Emphasis 
added).

It is clear from the remark made by the prosecutor, and 
that which followed, that he was basing his opinion on 
the evidence before the jury in the instant case.

3. Appellant also urges that this case be reversed be­
cause the prosecutor, in his summation, commented on 
evidence that had been ruled inadmissible (Br. p. 36-37, 
47-48). One comment occurred when the prosecutor, 
noting that Oros had called upon a number of people to



67

mail letters for him, stated (A. 1148): “ You can decide 
for yourselves what those letters said.” 92 There was no 
objection by appellant to this remark. The other comment 
was made on rebuttal.93

The defense, during summation had gone into extensive 
argument as to why certain witnesses had not been called 
by the government during the trial (A. 1180-1181). In 
commenting on and responding to opposing counsel’s argu­
ment the prosecutor said (A. 1213) :

He raised the question of why. I think that since 
he asked you to ask yourselves that, why didn’t he 
put all the letters in? There were a great number 
of letters, letters written by Maria Elena. This was 
available to them. Did he introduce them? No, he 
didn’t.

There was one particular letter introduced and 
commented on by Mr. Jacobs, a letter in which a por­
tion had been excluded. Why did he exclude that?

The defense objected to these remarks and the objection 
was sustained. The court immediately reprimanded the 
prosecutor and told the jury that the exclusion of the 
evidence had been the act of the court and not the de­
fense; that the jury could not “ speculate” about anything 
excluded; and that the jury should concern itself only 
with the evidence that had been introduced in court (A. 
1213).

In his charge to the jury, the district judge referred 
further to both of the remarks discussed above. The judge 
cautioned the jury in detail that they were not allowed 
to conjecture or speculate as to what were in the letters

92 As we have noted, many of the letters referred to had been 
marked for identification by appellant but not offered in evidence.

93 There are certain other remarks made by the prosecutor dur­
ing summation that appellant suggests were improper (Br. p. 36). 
These remarks relate to the fact that Oros had called upon certain 
individuals to mail letters for him, and the prosecutor referred to 
the envelopes which were in evidence. Accordingly, all of these 
comments referred to matters in evidence and cannot conceivably 
be viewed as improper.



68

and they must confine themselves to the evidence admitted 
(A. 1238-39).

We believe that these instructions cured any impropriety 
connected with the remarks of the prosecutor.94 Beyond 
this, however, we submit that there is serious question of 
whether the remarks of the prosecutor were in any way 
improper, but, in any event, there is no question that the 
remarks could not have prejudiced appellant.

The prosecutor’s remarks, on rebuttal, were in response 
to appellant’s extended remarks on the failure of the gov­
ernment to call certain witnesses. Many of the letters 
that the prosecutor commented on had been marked for 
identification by appellant but not introduced in evidence. 
The prosecutor’s comment was intended merely to show 
that just as the government had not presented certain wit­
nesses it had under subpoena, so, too, appellant had 
not introduced some of the letters he had marked for 
identification.95

In any event, the prosecutor’s comments on these letters 
could not have prejudiced appellant. The jury knew that 
the letters were in the possession of appellant and 
some of them were letters that had been smuggled off the 
farm; they knew that certain letters, letters that aided 
appellant’s case, had been introduced in evidence. They 
also knew that the prosecutor had argued that some of 
the letters were inconsistent with the ones introduced and 
had sought to offer certain of these letters to show Oros’ 
state of mind.96 The prosecutor’s comment created no air

94 United States v. Spangelet, 258 F. 2d 338 (C.A. 2, 1958), 
relied on by appellant (Br. p. 49), is not to the contrary. There the 
court held that the trial judge’s instruction “was obviously in­
sufficient . . . [and] gave the jury the impression that the defendant’s 
counsel rather than the prosecution was being admonished” (258 
F. 2d at 343).

95 Certainly, it is proper for a prosecutor to comment on the 
defense’s failure to call certain witnesses or present particular 
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. D’Ercole, 225 F. 2d 611 (C.A. 
2, 1955); United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (C.A. 2, 1946).

96 As we noted supra, it seems plain that the letters should have 
been admitted for this purpose.



69

of mystery; it could not have suggested to the jury that 
substantial proof of appellant’s guilt was being kept from 
it. It was obvious to everyone that, at the most, these 
letters contained statements by Oros that he was not 
happy on the farm. The jury already had received direct 
evidence about the threats of deportation, about living and 
working conditions on the farm and about the economic 
stranglehold that had been imposed on Oros. The letters 
were only cumulative and were just one additional bit of 
evidence to demonstrate that Oros had been deprived of 
his freedom of action. Referring to them could not have 
conceivably prejudiced the appellant.07

4. We have shown that each of the alleged improprie­
ties that appellants point to either are not improper or 
were mere trivia.08 In view of this, there is obviously 
no basis for appellant’s argument that the totality of the 97 98

97 People v. Rosenfeld, 11 N.Y. 2d 290, 183 N.E. 2d 656 (1962), 
relied on by appellant (Br. p. 47-48) is entirely unlike this case. 
There the excluded evidence that the prosecutor commented on 
were recordings of conversations of the defendants—recordings 
which would have presented direct evidence of guilt. Moreover, the 
recordings would have corroborated testimony of the government’s 
chief witness—testimony that went to the central and crucial 
issue of whether the defendants actually had committed the acts 
charged. Here, however, the excluded evidence, standing alone, 
would not have shown appellant’s guilt; it was merely intended to 
supplement uncontradicted evidence already adduced as to the 
conditions under which the Oros family lived. Furthermore, the 
excluded letters themselves would not have been sufficient to estab­
lish that appellant was guilty of the crime charged. Cf. United 
States v. Warren, discussed supra at p. 63.

98 Not only did appellant never consider any of the prosecutor’s 
actions sufficiently objectionable to warrant moving for a mistrial 
but even after all of the incidents now complained of had taken 
place, appellant still aparently was so confident that the jury had 
not been “ influenced” by the prosecutor’s “ misconduct” that he 
was willing to allow a jury of eleven to determine the case (T. 
2911). As this Court said in United States v. Hiss, 185 F. 2d 822, 
832 (C.A. 2, 1950) cert, denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951) : “ Where a 
prosecutor is charged with conduct so prejudicial as to amount 
to reversible error, the' charge should be made good by showing 
a successful effort to influence the jury against the defendant by 
some means clearly indefensible as a matter of law. It is not enough 
if there are no more than minor lapses through a long trial.”



70

prosecutor’s conduct requires reversal. Of especial signifi­
cance is the fact that the trial judge, who saw and heard 
all that transpired, did not consider the conduct in ques­
tion prejudicial to appellant. In his motion for a new 
trial appellant raised the very same questions con­
cerning the very same conduct which he now cites. The 
trial judge heard argument thereon and denied the mo­
tion (A. 1265). As this Court stated in United States v. 
Cohen, 177 F. 2d 523, 527 (C.A. 2, 1949), cert, denied, 
339 U.S. 914 (1950) :

In general it is within the discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether or not invective based on 
the evidence and inferences flowing therefrom ex­
ceed the limits of professional propriety. An appel­
late court will review the exercise of that discretion 
only where the invective is so palpably improper as 
to have been clearly prejudicial."

This appeal is but another example of “ the not unusual 
attempt to turn the trial of the accused into a trial of 
government counsel.” 99 100 Certainly, the role of a prose­
cutor is not an easy one and often he may do or say 
things in the heat of trial or argument which, under more 
calm and relaxed conditions, he would not do. Judge 
Learned Hand recognized this human factor in Di Carlo 
v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364, 368 (C.A. 2, 1925), cert, de­
nied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925), where he said:

While, of course, we recognize that the prosecution 
is by custom more rigidly limited than the defense, 
we must decline to assimilate its position to that of 
either judge or jury, or to confine a prosecuting attorn­
ey to an impartial statement of the evidence. He is an 
advocate, and it is entirely proper for him as earnestly 
as he can to persuade the jury of the truth of his 
side, of which he ought to be thoroughly convinced 
before he begins at all. To shear him of all oratorical

99 See also Iva Ikuko Toguri D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F. 
2d 338, 367 (C.A. 9, 1951); Brown v. United States, 222 F 2d 
293 (C.A. 9, 1955).

100 See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., supra, at p. 636.



71

emphasis, while leaving wide latitude to the defense, 
is to load the scales of justice; it is to deny what has 
always been an accepted incident of jury trials. . . .

And in United States v. Wexler, 79 F. 2d 526, 529-530 
(C.A. 2, 1935), cert, denied, 297 U.S. 703 (1936), Judge 
Hand stated:

It is impossible to expect that a criminal trial shall 
be conducted without some show of feeling; the 
stakes are high, and the participants are inevitably 
charged with emotion. Courts make no such demand; 
they recognize that a jury inevitably catches this 
mood and that the truth is not likely to emerge, if 
the prosecution is confined to such detached exposition 
as would be appropriate in a lecture, while the de­
fense is allowed those appeals in misericordiam which 
long custom has come to sanction.101

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested 
that the conviction below be affirmed.

Burke Marshall ,
Assistant Attorney General.

Robert C. Zam pano ,
United States Attorney.

Harold H. Greene,
Howard A, Glickstein , 
Gerald W. Jones,

Attorneys,
Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C. 20530

February 1964.

101 See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum. Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
240 (1940) ; Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d 14, 19-20 (C.A. 
6, 1955).

☆  U. S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1 9 6 4 7 2 1 0 4 4 6 9 7