County of Los Angeles v. Van Davis Petition and Briefs

    The Supreme Court 
of the United States

County ©f Los Angeles
versus
Van Davis, et al.

Petition and Briefs

Law Reprints
Labor Series 
Volume 12, no. 6 A  
1978/1979 Term



IN THE
SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1977 

No.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
vs.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, individually 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, WILLIE C. BURSEY, 
ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. SMITH, WILLIAM CLADY,
STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE ROY TUCKER, LEON AUBRY, 
RONALD CRAWFORD, JAMES HEARD, ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, 
OSBALDO A. AMPARAH, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN H. LARSON 
County Counsel

WILLIAM F. STEWART 
Chief, Labor Relations Division

648 Hall of Administration 
Los Angeles, California 90012 

(213) 974-1829

Attorneys for Petitioners

1



TOPICAL INDEX
Page

Table of Authorities iii

OPINION AND IUDGMENT BELOW 1

IURISDICTION 2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
PROVISIONS INVOLVED 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE 
PETITION 10

11

I CONSTITUTIONAL, NOT TITLE VII,
STANDARDS OF DISCRIMINATION 
SHOULD GOVERN CLAIMS UNDER 
42 U.S.C. SEC. 1981; PURPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION IS THE CORRECT 
CRITERION FOR ADJUDING A 
VIOLATION OF SEC. 1981. 11

II THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE 
SUPREME COURT’S RULING ON THE 
INTENT STANDARD FOR CONSTITU­
TIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
WASHINGTON V. DA VIS AND ITS 
DECISION ON STANDING IN EAST
TEXAS FREIGHT CO, V. RODRIGUEZ 16

III THE OPINION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER CIRCUIT 
COURT OPINIONS. 17

2



IV THE AFFIRMED QUOTA HIRING ORDER 
CLEARLY EXCEEDS THE COURT’S 
REMEDIAL AUTHORITY.

CONCLUSION 24

20

li.
3



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Arnold v. Ballard,
12 EPD par. 11,224 (1976) 18

City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe,
546 F.2d 693 (1976) 19

Chicano Police Officers Association v. Stover,
426 U.S. 944 (1976) 16,17,18

Crocker v. Boeing Co.,
437 F.Supp. 1138 (1977) 18

East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez,
431 U.S. 395, 14 FEP Cases 1505 (1977) 16

Franks v. Bowman,
424 U.S. 747 (1976) 22,23

Griggs v. Duke Power,
401 U.S. 424 (1971) 14,15

Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District,
___ F .2d____ , 14 EPD, par. 7669,
5295 (1977) 20

Hazelwood School District v. United States,
___ U.S.____ , 97 Sup.Ct. 2736,
15 FEP Cases 1 (1977) 21,22

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,

431 U.S. 324, 14 FEP Cases 1514 
(1977) 12,21,11,12

Johnson v. Alexander,
____F .2d____ , 16 FEP Cases 894
(8th Cir., February 17, 1978) 19



Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
491 F.2d 1364 (5 Cir. 1974) 23

Johnson v. Ry Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454 (1975) 13

Jones v. City of San Antonio,
568 F.2d 1224 (5 Cir., 1978) 12

Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
440 F.Supp. 949 (1977) 18

Mills v. Small,
446 Fed.2d 249 (1971) 22

United Air Lines v. Evans,
431 U.S. 553 (1977) 12,22

United States v. Chicago,
549 F.2d 415 (1977) 19

United States v. State of So. Carolina,
___ F.Supp.____ , 15 FEP Cases 1196
(1977) 18

Van Davis, et al. v. County of Los Angeles, et al,
566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977) 2,8,11

Veizaga v. National Board of Respiratory Therapy,
13 EPD par. 1 1, 525 (N.D. Ill,,
January 27,1977) 18

Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service,
528 F.2d 508 (1976) 20

Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) 7 ,8 ,1 0 ,1 1 ,1 2

13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19

Constitution

United States Constitution:

iv.

5



Constitution

United States Constitution:

Fifth Amendment 3,

Thirteenth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment 3, 10,

Statutes

Rule 19(1 )(b)

28 U.S.C.:

Section 1254(1)

Section 1343

42 U.S.C.:

Section 1981 2, 3, 4, 5
8, 10, 11, 12,

14, 14, 16,

Section 1982

42 U.S.C.:

Section 1983 5, 7, 10,
13, 14, 16, 17, 18,

Sections 2000e, et seq.

Section 2000e-16

Miscellaneous

Army Reg. 40-501, par. 2-34(a)

19

13

19

2

2

2

,7
13
17

7

12
19

4

5

19

6



IN THE
SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES 
October Term, 1977 

N o._________

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
vs.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHAL CLADY and FRED VEGA, individually 
and on behalf of all others similarly situated, WILLIE C. BURSEY, 
ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. SMITH, WILLIAM CLADY,
STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE ROY TUCKER, LEON AUBRY, 
RONALD CRAWFORD, JAMES HEARD, ALFRED R, BALTAZAR, 
OSB ALDO A. AMPARAH, individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated,

___  Respondents.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Petitioners pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review 
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit entered on this proceeding on December 14, 1977.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT BELOW

The opinion of rehearing (including dissent) of the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is

1. 7



printed as Appendix A, p. 1, and is reported in Van Davis, 
et al. v. County o f  Los Angeles, etal., 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 
1977). The unreported original opinion of the circuit court 
is printed as Appendix B. The judgment and findings of the 
district court are printed as Appendices C, and D, respectively.

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment were entered on 
December 14, 1977. A timely petition for rehearing was filed 
by the respondents, Van Davis, et al. (plaintiffs-appellants below), 
and was denied on January 30, 1978.

Jurisdiction of the District Court was based on 
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343.

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
Sec. 1254(1), and Rule 19(1 )(b).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Is proof of purposeful racial discriminatory 
intent required to establish a cause of action for employment 
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 or can an employer 
be held liable for pre-Title VII employment practices under 
Sec. 1981, merely by a showing of disproportionate impact.

2. Is a racial quota hiring order to be effective 
until the entire fire department achieves current racial parity 
with the general population beyond the jurisdiction of the court 
when:

8 2.



a. The District Court expressly found no 
discriminatory intent was present;

b. The quota hiring order attempts to remedy 
hiring practices occurring prior to the effective date of Title VII 
and time barred by the applicable 3-year Statute of Limitations 
on Sec. 1981 actions;

c. The plaintiffs had no standing to represent 
any pre-March 24, 1972 applicants and no discriminatory hiring 
has occurred subsequent to Title VII’s effective date.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. The 5th and 14th Amendments to the United 
States Constitution; in particular, the due process and equal 
protection clauses thereof;

2. The following provisions of the United States
Code:

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. Equal rights under the law: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the 

United States shall have the same right in every 
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed 
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like

3. 9



punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and extractions of every kind, and to 
no other.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, et seq. (Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended in 1972).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this proceeding, the County of Los Angeles was 
found liable for employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1981 and Title VII and ordered to engage in quota hiring 
of blacks and Mexican-Americans until the entire fire depart­
ment of 1760 firefighters achieved racial parity with the County’s 
general population, despite the existence of the following facts:

1. No discriminatory hiring occurred after the 
effective date of Title VII;

2. The trial court found that the County had 
not engaged in purposeful discrimination and, to 
the contrary, found that the County had engaged 
in efforts designed to increase minority representa­
tion in the fire department;

3. None of the plaintiffs had been applicants 
for any firefighter position prior to 1972, and the 
Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
to challenge the County’s use of qualification tests 
given at any time prior to 1972;

4.
10



4. All plaintiff applicants taking the 1972 written 
exam passed, and all hiring from the resulting 
eligibility list was conceded by plaintiffs prior to 
trial to be accomplished in a non-discriminatory 
manner.

The plaintiffs in their complaint filed on January 11, 
1973 challenged two written employment tests of the County 
of Los Angeles - one given in 1969 and the other in 1972.
While also claiming the 5’7” minimum height standard was 
discriminatory, they expressly declined to seek an injunction 
against its use in both the district and circuit courts. None 
of the plaintiffs was disqualified by the minimum height 
standard. In an amended complaint the plaintiffs conceded 
that the hiring as a result of the 1972 test was not discriminatory. 
Ultimately the Ninth Circuit in the decision sought to be reviewed 
by this petition held that the plaintiffs had no standing to chal­
lenge the 1969 written tests or any hiring practices occurring 
before 1972. The following summarizes the proceedings in 
the case.

In July, 1973, the trial court found that petitioner 
County of Los Angeles had violated 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981,
1983, and Sec. 2000e-16 (Title VII) by administering a written 
employment qualification test for entry-level firefighter in 
1969, and January, 1972, which had an adverse effect on blacks 
and Mexican-Americans and was not shown to be job-related.
The District Court upheld the departments 5*7” minimum

5.

11



height standard. The court further found that neither the 
defendants nor their officials had engaged in employment 
practices with a wilfull or conscious purpose of excluding 
blacks and Mexican-Americans from employment, but to the 
contrary, had engaged in efforts designed to increase minority 
representation in the Fire Department. App. D, p. 4. As a 
remedy, the court ordered that the County hire all future 
entry-level firemen in accordance with a hiring quota of 20% 
black and 20% Mexican-American until such time as the per­
centage representation of those minorities in the entire Fire 
Department in all ranks equaled their representation in the 
County’s general population.^

The only named plaintiffs in this case were individuals 
who had applied for and taken only the 1972 written examina­
tion and who were certified on a hiring list from that exam 
which was conceded by plaintiffs to have been prepared and 
utilized in a non-discriminatory manner. No individual who had 
been unsuccessful on the 1969 or any prior exam was named as 
a plaintiff, nor did the plaintiffs seek to represent such prior 
applicants, the complaint alleging that it was filed only on behalf 
of “blacks or Mexican-Americans” who are current or future 
applicants for employment as Los Angeles County Firemen. 
(Clerks Transcript, lines 20-24, p. 62.)

17
At the time of judgment, blacks and Mexican-Americans comprised 

0.5% and 3% respectively of the Fire Department’s firefighter personnel 
(approximately 1762) and 10.9 and 18.3% of the County’s general 
population.

12
6.



On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, in its original decision, reversed the judgment 
under Sec. 1983 because the County was not a “person,” and 
affirmed the judgment finding the County in violation of Sec.
1981. The court found no violation of Title VII because the 
tests administered in 1972 had not been implemented; that is, 
no civil service list was promulgated or hires made as a conse­
quence of the test results. Nevertheless, the court ruled that 
Title VII standards were applicable to Sec. 1981 claims and that 
a violation of Sec. 1982 could be established merely by a showing 
that a hiring practice had a disparate effect on minorities and 
the employer was unable to validate the test as job-related. The 
circuit court reversed the trial court’s judgment upholding 
petitioner’s 5’7” minimum height standard and remanded for 
reconsideration of the quota.

Subsequent to its original decision, the Ninth Circuit, 
upon petitioner’s request, granted a rehearing to determine, in 
light of this Court’s recent decision in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), whether proof of purposeful discriminatory 
intent is required for a violation of Sec. 1981. On rehearing, 
the Ninth Circuit (Judge Wallace dissenting) affirmed its original 
finding that there was no operational distinction between a 
cause of action based upon Title VII and Sec. 1981 and that the 
adverse impact standards evolving from Title VII cases were 
sufficient to establish liability under Sec. 1981. It was held that 
a showing of deliberate intent to discriminate was not a require­
ment under Sec. 1981 as it was under the United States Constitution,

7 . 13



as determined by this Court in Washington v. Davis. The 
Ninth Circuit, however, did rule that respondents lacked 
standing to represent prior unsuccessful applicants including 
those taking the 1969 test because the class did not include 
any prior unsuccessful applicants. Van Davis, et at. v. County 
o f Los Angeles, et al., 566 F.2d 1334 at 1338.

Judge Wallace dissented, being of the opinion that 
constitutional standards were applicable to proving discrimination 
under Sec. 1981 and noting that, even if it were otherwise, the 
quota hiring order was improper in view of the court’s finding 
that respondents lacked standing to represent former applicants.

The written civil service test challenged in this litiga­
tion was administered to applicants for entry-level firefigher 
positions twice, once in 1969 and again in January 1972. The 
oral interview and physical agility portions of the examination 
process were not attacked because they had no disproprotionate 
impact on minorities. The 1972 administered test was utilized 
only on a pass-fail basis with 97% of all applicants passing. As 
to these passing applicants, their subsequent oral interviews 
and physical examinations had no adverse impact.

The County of Los Angeles hired no firemen from 
well before March 24, 1972 (the effective date of Title VII) 
until the Spring of 1973, when the first recruit class was composed 
50% of minorities (10 blacks and 20 Mexican-Americans).2^

~ u
The respondents, in their first and second amended complaints, 

conceded that the hiring of this recruit class was done in a non-discriminatory 
manner (Clerks Transcript p. 62, lines 20-22).

8 .
14



All subsequent hiring has been pursuant to the trial court’s 
40% preferential minority hiring order of July, 1973. At no 
time was there any discriminatory hiring since March 24, 1972, 
or as a consequence of the 1972 written test.

The 1969 written exam as utilized in the hiring of 
new firefighters had an adverse impact on blacks and Mexican- 
Americans. The County, however, in the administration of 
the subsequent 1972 exam, initially intended (as ultimately 
occurred) to set the cutoff score extremely low so that 97% of 
the applicants passed, and then process through the oral interview 
and physical agility phases of the selection process approximately 
500 of those applicants. These 500 would be chosen totally 
by random selection so that the minority applicant percentage 
which approximated their community representation would be 
maintained throughout the subsequent stages of the selection 
process which had shown no adverse impact.

A state lawsuit enjoined the proposed random 
selection and after a year’s delay, the County, because of the 
pressing need for new firemen, initially contemplated interview­
ing the top 544 applicants on the 1972 written test. No such 
selection or interviews were ever commenced. Instead, all passing 
applicants were interviewed and hires were made in a non- 
discriminatory manner.

During the five-year pendency of the appeal, the 
petitioners observed and in most cases exceeded the quota 
hiring order and as of July, 1977 had hired as firemen recruits

9 . 15



267 persons, of which 158 (59.1%) were blacks or Mexican- 
Ameircans. Pursuant to the terms of the judgment the district 
court receives annual reports and retains jurisdiction over the 
case until the entire department reaches community racial 
parity.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
PETITION

The reasons for granting the petition are:

1. An important question of federal law of great 
public importance should be settled by this court in order
to harmonize the standards for discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 
Secs. 1981, 1983, and the United States Constitution. More 
specifically, are Title VII standards of presumptive discrimina­
tion (without a requirement of purposeful intent) applicable 
to actions under Sec. 1981 but not applicable to claims of dis- 
crmination under Sec. 1983 or the 14th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution?

2. The decision of the Ninth Circuit appears to be 
in conflict with an applicable decision of this court, to wit: 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

3. The decision of the Ninth Circuit, ruling that 
purposeful discriminatory intent is not required for a cause of 
action under Sec. 1981, is in conflict with decisions of at least 
two other Courts of Appeal.

16
10.



CONSTITUTIONAL, NOT TITLE VII,
STANDARDS OF DISCRIMINATION 
SHOULD GOVERN CLAIMS UNDER 
42U.S.C. SEC. 1981; PURPOSEFUL 
DISCRIMINATION IS THE CORRECT 
CRITERION FOR ADJUDGING A 
VIOLATION OF SEC. 1981.

A federal issue of extreme importance is created by 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding that “ [w] e cannot conclude that 
Washington embraced a ruling that a showing of disproportionate 
impact no longer will suffice to establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination under Sec. 1981. In our view, there 
remains no operational distinction in this context between 
liability based upon Title VII and Sec. 1981,” Van Davis v. 
County o f  Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 at 1340. The liability 
of the petitioner under Sec. 1981 was predicated solely upon 
a showing of adverse impact on minorities, the trial court 
affirmatively finding that no deliberate intent to discriminate 
was present. The application to Sec. 1981 of a presumption of 
discrimination based on adverse impact, originating from inter­
pretations of Title VII, is incorrect, at variance with this 
Court’s decision in Washington v. Davis, and has ramifications 
extending far beyond employment discrimination cases. Such 
a holding would:

I

11. 17



1. Encompass non-employment discrimination actions 
brought under Sec. 1981 which, as this Court observed in 
Washington v. Davis, would raise serious questions about, and 
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may have a disproportionate 
impact. This Court in Washington v, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 at 
244-245, footnote 12, specifically rejected the application of 
Title VII presumption standards to those areas of government 
action;

2. Permit the procedural and statutory prerequisites 
and administrative enforcement procedures of Title VII to be 
circumvented by the mere allegation of a cause of action under 
Sec. 1981, thus opening the federal courts to a flood of litigation 
that Congress intended should be channeled through and 
reduced by the EEOC administrative machinery;

3. Create differing standards for proving discrimina­
tion between Secs. 1983 and 1981, although both statutes are 
premised on the protection of constitutional rights;

4. Negate the recent decisions of this Court and 
circuit courts of appeal in International Brotherhood o f  
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Jones v.
City o f San Antonio, 568 F.2d 1224 (5 Cir. 1978), which held that 
the extension of Title VII to governmental entities in March, 1972 
was not retroactive and the decision in United Air Lines v. Evans, 
431 U.S. 553 (1977), that a discriminatory act that has not been 
made the basis of a timely charge cannot constitute a present

18 12.



violation of Title VII under the theory of a continuing effect of 
past discrimination.

The filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII 
administrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution 
of a Sec. 1981 action. Johnson v. Ry Express Agency, Inc.,
421 U.S. 454 (1975). Thus, Title VII administrative require­
ments could be easily circumvented merely by casting the 
complaint in the form of a Sec. 1981 action. Moreover, if 
Title VII standards of proof and liability are equally applicable 
to Sec. 1981 actions, there was little reason for Congress to 
extend Title VII to public entities in 1972.

The decision of the Ninth Circuit in the instant case, 
that the adverse impact standards enunciated in the Title VII 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power are perforce applicable to Sec. 1981 
actions, is inconsistent with this Court’s decision, in Washington 
v. Davis, supra, holding that they are not applicable to consti­
tutional claims. Both Secs. 1981 and 1983 are statutes enacted 
to enforce constitutional rights and are not specifically employ­
ment discrimination statutes supported by the same congressional 
intent this Court ruled was present in the 1964 enactment of 
Title VII.

Section 1981 is a post-Civil War Reconstruction Era 
statute enacted in 1866 to enforce the 13th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution which prohibits involuntary servitude, 
and extends to others the same right to make and enforce 
contracts enjoyed by white citizens -  that is, equal protection

13. 19



of the laws. Section 1981 was subsequently reenacted as 
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was designed to 
implement the 14th Amendment.

Section 1981 prohibits racial distinctions in the terms 
of or in the right to make a contract. It does not incorporate 
the subtleties and rigorous standards relating to adverse impact 
and test validation that have evolved with the passage of 
Title VII and its subsequent interpretation by the courts and 
administrative agencies. Indeed, none of these concepts could 
have possibly been in the minds of the enactors of that statute 
in 1866.

The rationale enunciated by this Court in Washington v. 

Davis, with regard to constitutional protections against discrimination 
applies equally to Sec. 1981. Thus, if the employer deliberately 
discriminates in making an employment contract based on race, 
or specifies different terms and conditions thereof based solely 
on race, then those statutes as well as the United States Consti­
tution have been violated. But this is clearly not what occurred 
in the instant case or in Washington v. Davis. In both instances, 
the same test was administered to all races and the same grading 
and scoring standards for determination of eligibility for appoint­
ment were applied equally and consistently to all races. The 
respondents have predicated their entire case solely upon showing 
an adverse impact and a claim that the defendants cannot prove 
the test to be job-related — evidentiary principles that have 
evolved solely from Title VII decisions.

20
14.



In addition to disagreeing with the application of the 
Griggs standard in previous employment discrimination cases 
under Secs. 1981-1983, this Court in Washington v. Davis expressly 
ruled it inapplicable to constitutional discrimination claims in 
other contexts. Racial discrimination cases not involving employ­
ment have been and will continue to be brought under Sec.
1981 as well as Sec. 1983 and the Constitution. There is nothing 
in the legislative history of Sec. 1981 which suggests that liability 
is to be premised merely upon a showing of disproportionate 
impact or that employment cases are to be accorded special 
treatment or be subject to different standards of proof than other 
civil rights cases brought under that statute.

Title VII, however, is a statute with a unique legislative 
history intended to deal specifically with employment discrimina­
tion, and its adverse impact standaxd has evolved through 
subsequent judicial interpretations premised on the seminal 
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. It is rightly accorded different 
standards and methods of proof as distinguished from Secs.
1981, 1983, and the Constitution. Proof of intentional dis­
crimination, however, should be the consistent standard applic­
able to claims under Sec. 1981 as well as Sec. 1983 and the 
United States Constitution.

15. 21



THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE 
SUPREME COURT S RULING ON THE 
INTENT STANDARD FOR CONSTITU­
TIONAL DISCRIMINATION IN
WASHINGTON V. DA VIS AND ITS 
DECISION ON STANDING IN EAST 
TEXAS MOTOR FREIGHT V. RODRIGUEZ

In Washington v, Davis, supra, This Court ruled that 
the standard for adjudicating claims of racial discrimination 
under Title VII was not the same standard for adjudicating 
such claims under the Constitution. Although the complaint 
in Washington alleged a cause of action under Sec. 1981 as 
well as the Constitution, the Court did not specifically refer to 
Sec. 1981 in its opinion. The rationale behind the Court’s 
decision, however, would appear equally applicable to actions 
under Sec. 1981 because that statute, like Sec. 1983, was intended 
to provide statutory protection to constitutional rights and, 
while originating in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was reenacted 
with Sec. 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. This 
Court in footnote 12 of Washington disagreed with a long line of 
earlier employment discrimination cases brought under both 
Secs. 1983 and 1981 applying Title VII standards of proof.

A few days after deciding Washington v. Davis, 
this Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case of 
Chicano Police Officers Association v. Stover, 426 U.S. 944 
(1976), an action brought under Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983 but

II

22 16.



not Title VII, for reconsideration in light of the opinion in 
Washington v. Davis. In Chicano Police Officers Association. 
the Tenth Circuit Court, similarly to the Ninth Circuit in the 
instant case, had concluded that the measure of a claim under 
the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 was the same as that 
applicable to Title VII cases. In view of the district and 
circuit court express findings of adverse impact and lack of job 
relatedness, remand would not have been necessary if Title 
VII standards were, in fact, applicable to Sec. 1981 claims, 
regardless of the effect of Washington v. Davis on the Sec.
1983 claim. It should be apparent that because Sec. 1981 has been 
held to apply to a wide range of equal protection cases, congruent 
with those actionable under Sec. 1983 and the Constitution, this 
Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis, distinguishing claims 
under Title VII from those under the Constitution, is subject 
to circumvention in most equal protection cases by the simple 
expedient of alleging a claim under Sec. 1981. Since Sec.
1981 is applicable in every case in which constitutional claims 
of employment discrimination based on race are asserted, the 
Supreme Court’s decision on employment discrimination in 
Washington v. Davis would be rendered essentially meaningless.

Ill
THE OPINION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
IS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER CIRCUIT 
COURT OPINIONS

The Courts of Appeals of the Tenth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Circuits have all held that purposeful intent is

17. 23



required to prove a cause of action under Sec. 1981. Numerous 
District Courts have reached he same conclusion.^ With the excep­
tion of the Ninth Circuit in the instant case, no Circuit Court subse­
quent to Washington v. Davis has ruled that Title VII standards not 
requiring proof of discriminatory intent are applicable to actions 
under Sec. 1981.

The Tenth Circuit, upon remand in Chicano Police 
Officers Assn. v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 (March 2, 1977), 
construed this Court’s purposeful intent ruling in Washington 
v. Davis as pertaining to claims under Sec. 1981, and remanded the 
case to the district court for a determination of whether such intent 
existed.^/ The Sixth Circuit in Arnold v. Ballard, 12 EPD par.
11, 224 (1976), a suit brought under Sec. 1981, Sec. 1983, and 
the U.S. Constitution, vacated their previous decision and

II
Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp-,440 F.Supp. 949, 963 (1977).

United States v. State o f  So. Carolina,__ F.Supp.___ , 15 FEP
Cases 1196 (1977), (3-judge panel that included two circuit judges).

Crocker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.Supp. 1138 (1977).

Veizaga v. National Board o f  Respiratory Therapy, 13 EPD par. 11 
525, 6878, 6881 (N.D. 111., January 27, 1977).

41
The circuit court’s opinion stated:

“ [T] he error in our holding and the views expressed by us is 
clear. We stated that we agreed . .  . with the view that the 
measure of a claim under the Civil Rights Act is in essence that 
applied to a suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
526 F.2d at 438, 11 FEP Cases at 1061. This was contrary to 
the principle holding that came in Washington v. Davis, supra, 
at 238, 12 FEP Cases at 1418. All of our reasoning and treat­
ment of the case which proceeded from the erroneous standard 
must be corrected.” Supra, at 920.

18.



with any discriminatory intent, it did not violate Sec. 1981 simply 
because in operation it bore harder on minority groups than 
whites. The Eighth Circuit specifically rejected appellant’s 
contention that Title VII standards should be applied to plain­
tiffs Sec. 1981 claim.

The Fifth Circuit in Harkless v. Sweeny Independent
School District,___ F.2d____ , 14 EPD, par. 7669, 5295 (1977),
held that Sec. 1981' requires a showing of purposeful discrimina­
tion. In accord was their decision in Wade v. Mississippi 
Cooperative Extension Service, 528 F.2d 508, 518 (1976).

IV
THE AFFIRMED QUOTA HIRING ORDER
CLEARLY EXCEEDS THE COURT’S
REMEDIAL AUTHORITY.

The instant case was brought on behalf of the 1972 
and future applicants, not one of which proved he had been 
discriminatorily denied a job. The Circuit Court held that 
respondents had no standing to represent any applicants prior 
to the 1972 exam, and as to the hiring resulting from the 1972 
examination process, the respondents conceded that it had 
been done in a nondiscriminatory manner. With no post-Title 
VII discriminatory hiring proven, it is clear that despite their 
lack of standing the respondents were challenging pre-Title 
VII hiring practices. The quota order they sought and obtained 
was solely intended to provide a remedy only for pre-Act 
hiring. It was affirmed by the appellate court totally absent

20. 25



remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in 
light of Washington v. Davis. Upon remand the District Court 
recently concluded that purposeful discriminatory intent was 
required under Sec. 1981 and expressly declined to follow the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the case at bar, relying instead upon 
the reasoning of Judge Wallace’s dissent (Memorandum Decision 
and Order, C73-478, Mar. 14, 1978).

The Seventh Circuit in two recent cases appears to have 
concluded that a showing of racially discriminatory purpose is 
required to establish a violation of Sec, 1981. In United States 
v. City o f Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (1977), the court affirmed 
liability only under Title VII and reversed the district court’s 
judgment on all other grounds, including Sec. 1981, because of 
the failure to meet the intentional discrimination standard.
In City o f  Milwaukee v. Saxhe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (1976), the 
same court held that the burden in Sec. 1981 cases is the same 
as the constitutional burden under the Fifth Amendment.

The Eighth Circuit most recently in Johnson v.
Alexander,___ F.2d___ , 16 FEP Cases 894 (8th Cir.,
February 17, 1978), affirmed a district court judgment which,
in reliance on Washington v. Davis, found inter alia that the
protection against racial discrimination under Secs. 1981, 1983
does not extend beyond the equal protection guarantees of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and
that since the challenged Army regulation^was not adopted 
_

Army Reg. 40-501, par. 2-34(a), disqualifies prospective enlistees 
who have had “frequent encounters with law enforcement agencies or 
antisocial attitudes or behavior.” The Plaintiff, a black, contended 
that disclosure of arrest records had an adverse impact on minorities.

19.



a showing of discriminatory intent, and necessarily on the 
theory that it remedied a violation of Sec. 1981 as no post- 
Title VII discriminatory hiring had occurred. Assuming, 
arguendo, that discriminatory intent is not required for a cause 
of action under Sec. 1981, the quota order nevertheless is in 
excess of the court’s jurisdiction because of the respondents’ 
lack of standing as well as the sweeping scope of the order 
requiring the entire department achieve racial parity.

The petitioners’ uneffectuated proposal to interview 
the top 544 applicants on the 1972 written test cannot form 
the basis of a violation of Title VII, much less justification for 
an order requiring racial parity in the entire work force. A 
violation of Title VII requires proof of a pattern and practice 
of discrimination. Isolated incidents, even if effectuated, are 
insufficient to establish liability under that statute. Hazelwood
School District v. United States,___ U.S.____ , 97 Sup.Ct.
2736, 15 FEPCases 1 (1977); International Brotherhood o f  
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 FEPCases 1514 
at 1519 (1977).

Quota hiring orders unrelated to the injury established 
are not within the remedial power of the court. The respondents 
in this action, suing only on behalf of present and future appli­
cants, did not establish that any of their number had been 
discriminatorily refused a job. The proposal to interview the 
top 544 candiates had no impact on the departmental composi­
tion as no hires were made as a result of such proposal and the

21. 27



interviews were not restricted to the top 544 persons.

The decision of the Circuit Court affirming the quota 
hiring order disregards the applicable statute of limitations on 
Sec. 1981 claims,^ ignores this court’s ruling in the United 
Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), that past discriminatory 
acts not the subject of a timely complaint have no present legal 
consequences, and, to the extent Title VII is even applicable, 
purports to retroactively remedy acts occurring before its 
March 24, 1972, effective date.^  It is clear that the majority 
misconstrued the decision in United Airlines v. Evans in their 
holding at page 1344, footnote 20, that time-barred claims may 
be remedied retroactively.

Within the past two years, this Court has in several 
opinions expressly declined to extend Title VII remedies 
retroactive to the Act’s effective date, International Brotherhood 
o f Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324; Franks v. Bowman,
424 U.S. 747 (1976). In Teamsters, and particularly in Hazelwood 
School District v. United States, supra, this Court clearly dis­
tinguished between pre and post-Title VII hiring practices, 
observing that the employer must be given an opportunity to

6/
The applicable Statute of Limitations is three years. See Mills v. 

Small, 446 Fed.2d 249 (1971).
7/

Indeed, unless one assumes that all of the 1760 firefighters on the 
force had been hired in the eight years immediately preceding the lawsuit, 
the quota order seeks to remedy unproven discrimination occurring even 
before the original enactment of the Title VII in 1964.

28 22.



show the claimed discriminatory pattern was a product of 
pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination.
This necessarily implies not only a time limitation on Title 
VII standards of proof, but also limitations on the reach of 
judicially imposed remedies.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision establishes an unjustified 
dichotomy between injunctive (preferential hiring) relief and 
other accepted remedies, such as back pay and retroactive 
seniority which have been consistently held to be limited in 
scope by the applicable statute of limitations or the effective 
date of Title VII and similar employment discrimination statutes. 
Franks v. Bowman, supra; International Brotherhood o f  Teamsters 
v. United States, supra. Back pay awards in Sec. 1981 employ­
ment discrimination suits have been held to be limited to the 
applicable 3-year Statute of Limitations period preceding the 
filing of the action. Johnson v, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
491 F.2d 1364 (5 Cir. 1974).

The quota ruling has consequences extending far 
beyond the impact on the parties herein. It, of course, effectively 
makes Title VII retroactive, reduces the administrative filing 
requirements of Title VII to meaningless technicalities, and 
provides a remedy for time-barred claims. Moreover, it permits 
federal trial courts, on the most tenuous of grounds, to issue 
quota orders requiring parity of the employer’s work force 
with the current community ethnic representation.

23.
29



CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested 
that this Court grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari herein.

Executed this 26th day of April, 1978, at Los Angeles,
California.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. LARSON 
County Counsel

WILLIAM F. STEWART 
Chief, Labor Relations Division

Attorneys for Appellants

24.
30



INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A
Opinion on Rehearing of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in “ Van Davis, et al. v. County o f  Los Angeles, 
etal.” Reported in 566 F.2d 1334 (Dec. 14, 
1977), rehearing denied Jan. 30, 1978

Wallace, J., Dissenting

APPENDIX B
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in “Van Davis, et al. 
v. County o f  Los Angeles, et al. ”
(Unreported)

Wallace, J., Dissenting

APPENDIX C
Judgment of the United States District 
Court, Central District of California, in 
“Van Davis, e ta l v. County o f  Los Angeles, 
et al. ”

APPENDIX D
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of 
the United States District Court, Central 
District of California, in “Van Davis, et al. 
v. County o f  Los Angeles, et al. ”





IN THE
SUPREME COURT 

OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1977 

No. 77-1553

COUNTY O F LOS AN GELES; BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS O F TH E COUNTY O F 
LOS AN GELES; and CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION O F TH E COUNTY OF 
LOS A N G ELES,

P e t i t io n e r s ,
v s .

VAN DAVIS, H ERSH EL CLADY and F R E D  VEGA, 
ind iv idually  and on b e h a lf  of a l l  o th e r s  s im i la r ly  
s itu a te d , W IL LIE  C. BU RSEY , E L IJA H  HARRIS, 
JAM ES W. SM ITH, W ILLIAM  CLADY , ST E PH E N  
HAYNES, JIM M IE ROY T U C K E R , LEO N  AUBRY, 
RONALD CRAW FORD, JAM ES H EA RD , A L FR E D  R. 
BA LTA ZA R , OSBALDO A. AM PA RA H, in d iv id u a lly  
and on b e h a lf  of a l l  o th e r s  s im i la r ly  s i tu a te d ,

R esp o n d e n ts .

OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

A. THOMAS HUNT 
TIMOTHY B. FLYNN 
Center for Law in the Public Interest 
WALTER COCHRAN-BOND 
10203 Santa  M o n ica  B o u lev a rd  
L os A n g e le s , C a lifo rn ia  90067 

(213) 879- 5588

A t t o r n e y s  f o r  R e s p o n d e n t s 33



T O PIC A L  INDEX

Page

T a b le  of A u th o r it ie s  i i i

STA TEM EN T O F TH E CASE 2

SUMMARY O F ARGUM ENT 4

ARGUM ENT 5

I P U R P O S E F U L  DISCRIM INATION 
NEED NOT BE PR O V ED  UNDER 
42 U. S. C. §1981 5

A. THIS COURT A LREA DY HAS
H ELD  THAT PU R PO SE FU L  
DISCRIM INATION IS NOT 
REQ U IRED  UNDER 42 U. S. C. 
§1981 6

B. T H E  NINTH C IR C U IT 'S
§1981 RULING IS CONSISTENT 
W ITH W ELL ESTA BLISH ED  
PR IN C IPA L S O F STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION AND WITH 
42 U. S. C. §1988 12

C. NO CIRCUIT HAS HELD THAT
P U R P O S E F U L  DISCRIM INATION 
MUST BE PROVED IN E M PL O Y ­
M ENT CASES BROUGHT 
UNDER SECTIO N  1981 16

34
l .



D. A L L  CIRC U ITS WHICH HAVE 
ADDRESSED TH E SECTION
1981 ISSUE A R E IN ACCORD 20

E . ASSUMING ARGUENDO TH AT
IN TEN TIO N A L DISCRIM INATION 
MUST BE PR O V ED  IN THIS 
C A SE, T H E R E  IS O V ER ­
W HELM ING EV ID EN C E, 
INCLUDING ADMISSIONS O F 
RA CIALLY DISCRIM INATION 
PU R PO SE , IN TH E RECORD 
BELO W . 22

TH E ISSUANCE O F TH E R EM ED IA L
HIRING ORDER H ER EIN  WAS
W ITHIN TH E JU R ISD ICTIO N  O F
TH E D ISTR IC T COURT 26

A. A FINDING O F IN TEN TIONA L
DISCRIM INATION IS NOT 
REQUIRED FO R A HIRING 
ORDER UNDER §1981 28

B. TH E  EX T E N T  O F A REM ED IA L
HIRING ORDER IS NOT LIM ITED  
BY TH E STATUTE O F 
LIM ITA TIONS 29

C. P L A IN T IF F S  HAVE STANDING
TO SEEK P R O SP E C T IV E  
HIRING ORDER R E L IE F  31

CONCLUSION 34



T A B L E  O F  A U T H O R IT IE S

C a s e s  P ag e

A rno ld  v . B a l la rd ,
16 F E P  C a s e s  396,
12 E P D  p a r a .  11 ,2 2 4
(6th  C ir .  1976) 18

C hicano  P o lic e  O ffice r A ssn . v. S to v e r ,
552 F . 2d 918 (10th C ir .  1977) 16

C hicano  P o lic e  O ffice r A ssn . v . S to v e r ,
526 F . 2d 431 (10th C ir .  1975) 32

C ity  of M ilw aukee v. Saxbe,
546 F . 2d 693 (7th C ir .  1976) 17

C ope v. C ope,
137 U. S. 682 (1891) 13

D av is  v. County o f L o s  A n g e le s ,
8 F E P  C a se s  239
(C. D. C al. 1973) 2 , 3 , 22

26 , 33

D avis v. County of L os A n g e le s ,
566 F . 2d 1334 (9th C ir .  1977) 3 , 27 , 28

30, 31

EEO C v. B e ll H e lic o p te r  Co. ,
426 F . Supp. 785 (N .D . T ex . 1976) 30

EEO C v. C h r is t ia n s b u rg  G a rm e n t Co. , Inc. ,
376 F . Supp. 1067 (W .D . Va. 1974) 30

i i i .
36



30
EEO C v. Duff B ro s . , Inc. ,

364 F .S u p p . 405 (E . D. T enn . 1973)

EEO C v. E ag le  Iro n  W o rk s ,
367 F .S u p p . 817 (S .D . Iowa 1973) 30

EEO C v. G riff in  W heel,
511 F . 2d 456 (5th C ir .  1975) 30

EEO C v. K im b erly  C la rk  C o rp . ,
511 F . 2d 1352 (6th  C ir .  1975) 30

EEO C v. L a ack e  & Joys Co. ,
375 F .S u p p . 852 (E . D. W is. 1974) 30

EEO C v. O c c id en ta l L ife  In su ra n c e  Co. ,
535 F .  2d 533 (9th C ir .  1976) 
a ff 'd  on  o th e r  g ro u n d s ,
432 U. S. 355 (1977) 30

G ray v . G reyhound  L in e s ,  E a s t ,
545 F . 2d 169 (D. C. C ir .  1976) 32

H a rk le s s  v. Sweeny Independen t 
School D is t r ic t ,

554 F . 2d 1353 (5th C ir . 1977) 19

In te rn a tio n a l B ro th e rh o o d  o f T e a m s te r s  
v. U nited  S ta te s ,

431 U. S. 324 (1977) 5 , 14 , 26 , 27

Johnson  v. A le x a n d e r ,
F . 2d , 16 F E P  C a s e s  894 

(8th  C ir .  1978) 17, 18

Johnson  v. R ailw ay  E x p re s s  A gency , Inc. ,
421 U. S. 454 (1975) 4 , 10, 1 1 , 12

iv .
37



J o h n s o n  v .  R y d e r  T r u c k  L i n e s ,  Inc .  ,
_ F . 2 d ___ ( 4 t h  C i r . ,  M ay 2 ,  1978;

No. 76-1293) 14, 21

K insey  v . F i r s t  R eg io n a l S e c u r i t ie s ,  Inc. ,
557 F . 2d 830 (D .C . C ir .  1977) 21

S tover v . C hicano  P o lic e  O ff ic e rs  A ssn . ,
426 U. S. 944 (1976) 16

T ig e r  v. W e s te rn  In v e s tm e n t Co. ,
221 U. S. 286 (1910) 14

U nited  S ta te s  v . C ity  of C h icag o ,
549 F . 2d 415 (7th  C ir .  1977), 
c e r t , d e n ie d , U. S. ,
54 L . E d . 2d 155 (1978) 17

U nited  S ta te s  v. F re e m a n ,
3 How. 556 (1845) 13

U nited  S ta te s  v. U nited  S ta te s  
G ypsum  Co. ,

333 U .S . 364 (1948) 22

V illage  of A rlin g to n  H e ig h ts  v.
M e tro p o lita n  H ousing  D evelopm en t C o rp o ra tio n , 

429 U. S. 252 (1977) 23 , 24

W ade v . M is s is s ip p i  C o o p e ra tiv e  E x te n tio n  
S e rv ic e ,

528 F . 2d 508 (5 th  C ir . 1976) 19, 20

W ash ing ton  v . D a v is ,
426 U. S. 229 (1976)

38 v.

4 , 6 , 7 , 9 
10, 15, 16 
19, 2 2 , 23



32

C o n s titu tio n s

W a te rs  v . H ub le in , Inc. ,
547 F .  2d 466 (9th C ir .  1976)

U nited  S ta te s  C o n s titu tio n ,
F if th  and F o u r te e n th  A m en d m en ts

S ta tu te s

7 , 8 
19

D. C. Code §1-320  9

42 U. S. C. :

S ection  1981 4 , 5, 6 , 7 , 9
1 1 , 12 , 14, 15, 16
17, 18, 19, 2 0 , 21

28, 29

S ec tio n  1983 8 , 16, 17, 20

S ec tion  1985 16, 17

S ec tion  1988 12 , 14, 15

S ec tions  2000d, e t seq . 20

S ec tio n s  2000e, e t se q . , 2 , 4 , 9 , 10
T itle  VII of the C iv il R igh ts 1 1 . 12 , 14
A ct of 1964, a s am en d ed 15, 17, 19

2 0 , 2 1 , 25
28 , 29

v i. 39



IN TH E
SU PREM E COURT 

O F TH E U N ITED STA TES 
O cto b e r T e r m , 1977 

No. 77-1553

COUNTY O F LOS AN GELES; BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS O F  TH E COUNTY O F 
LOS A N G ELES; and CIVIL SERV ICE 
COMMISSION O F  TH E COUNTY O F 
LOS A N G ELES,

P e t i t io n e r s ,
v s.

VAN DAVIS, H ERSH EL CLADY and  F R E D  VEGA, 
in d iv id u a lly  and on b e h a lf  o f a l l  o th e r s  s im i la r ly  
s i tu a te d , W IL LIE  C. BU RSEY , E L IJA H  HARRIS, 
JA M ES W. SM ITH, W ILLIAM  CLA D Y , ST E PH E N  
HAYNES, JIM M IE ROY T U C K E R , LEO N AUBRY, 
RONALD CRAW FO RD, JAM ES H EA RD , A L FR E D  R 
B A LTA ZA R , OSBALDO A. A M PA RA H , in d iv id u a lly  
and on b e h a lf  of a ll  o th e r s  s im i la r ly  s itu a te d ,

R esp o n d e n ts .

O PPO SITIO N  TO
P E T IT IO N  FO R W RIT O F CERTIO R A RI

40 1 .



S T A T E M E N T  O F  T H E  CA SE

D e fen d an ts ' s ta te m e n t o f the c a s e  found a t 
p a g e s  4 -1 0  in  th e i r  P e t it io n  is  in c o m p le te , in ­
a c c u ra te  and m is le a d in g  in  s e v e r a l  m a te r ia l  
r e s p e c ts .

P e rh a p s  the m o s t s e r io u s  d e fe c t in  D efen ­
d a n ts ' s ta te m e n t  is  the f a i lu re  to s ta te  th a t the 
p r im a ry  g round  fo r  the D is t r ic t  C o u r t 's  find ing  of 
p a s t  i l le g a l  d is c r im in a t io n  and the D is tr ic t  C o u r t 's  
find ing  th a t a h ir in g  o r d e r  w as r e q u i r e d  in  the 
in s ta n t c a s e  w as the a lm o s t  a b so lu te  n o n -e x is te n c e  
of m in o r it ie s  in  D e fen d an ts ' w o rk fo rc e  d e sp ite  the 
e x is te n c e  of a  la rg e  m in o r ity  p o p u la tio n  in  
L os A ngeles C ounty. T he D is tr ic t  C o u r t 's  fa c tu a l 
and le g a l ru lin g s  on th e se  p o in ts  a r e  found a t 
8 F E P  C a se s  239 , 240-42  (C. D. C al. 1973).

D efen d an ts ' s ta te m e n t a t  page  fo u r of th e ir  
P e tit io n  th a t no d is c r im in a to ry  h ir in g  o c c u r r e d  
a f te r  the e ffe c tiv e  da te  o f T itle  VII of the C iv il 
R ight A ct of 1964, a s  a m e n d e d , 42 U. S. C. §20QQe, 
e t seq . ("T it le  VII") is  m is le a d n in g . A m o re  
co m p le te  and a c c u ra te  s ta te m e n t is  th a t in  e a r ly  
1973, a lm o s t one y e a r  a f te r  T itle  VII b e c am e  
ap p lic ab le  to pub lic  e m p lo y e rs ,  D efendan ts  
w ere  in  the p r o c e s s  of know ingly  v io la tin g  
T itle  VII by u til iz in g  p r a c t ic e s  they  knew  to be 
v io la tiv e  of T itle  VII, bu t c e a s e d  u t il iz a tio n  of 
th ese  p r a c t ic e s  only  upon le a rn in g  th a t th is  
law su it w as b e ing  c o m m en ced  (R. 140-41; R. T. 
48 -49 ). F u r th e r ,  the D is t r ic t  C o u rt s p e c if ic a lly  
found a s  a fa c t th a t D efendan ts  w ere  u til iz in g  
ille g a l  w r i t te n  t e s t s  "u n til le a rn in g  that th is  law su it 
w as about to c o m m e n ce . " 8 F E P  C a s e s  240-41 .

2. 41



It a ls o  is  m is le a d in g  fo r  D efendan ts  to a rg u e  
th a t the D is t r ic t  C o u rt found th a t th e re  w as no 
d e lib e ra te  o r  p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n . T h is  
find ing  w as m ade by the D is t r ic t  C ou rt w hen it 
w as b e lie v e d  to be "of no m o m en t. " T he t ru th  o f 
the m a t te r  is  tha t p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  w as 
p ro v e d  to the e x te n t th a t it w as a d m itte d  by h igh 
o f f ic ia ls  of the  L os A n g e les  County F i r e  D e p a r t­
m en t (se e  S ec tion  "i. E . " i n f r a ).

At page  five  of D efen d an ts ' P e t i t io n  is  found 
a to ta lly  in a c c u ra te  s ta te m e n t. H ere  it  is  s ta te d  
th a t the N inth C irc u i t  u ltim a te ly  he ld  th a t the 
P la in tif fs  had no s tan d in g  to c h a llen g e  "any  h ir in g  
p r a c t ic e s  o c c u r r in g  b e fo re  1972. " No such  
ho ld ing  w as m ade by the N inth C irc u it . The 
C irc u i t  C o u rt h e ld  only th a t P la in tif fs  lac k e d  
s tan d in g  to c h a llen g e  one p a r t ic u la r  p re -1 9 7 2  te s t ,
i . e .  , a  w r itte n  te s t  a d m in is te re d  in  1969; a l l  
o th e r  p re -1 9 7 2  p r a c t ic e s  r e m a in  su b je c t to 
c h a llen g e . 566 F . 2d 1337-38 .

A n o th er to ta lly  in a c c u ra te  s ta te m e n t  is  found 
a t page s ix  o f the P e tit io n . H ere  it is  s ta te d :
"The only n am ed  p la in tif fs  in  th is  c a s e  w ere  
in d iv id u a ls  who had ap p lied  fo r and  tak en  only  the 
1972 w r itte n  e x a m in a tio n . . . . "  The P la in t if fs  
a lso  in c lude  m in o r ity  f ir e m e n  a lre a d y  on the job . 
See the F in d in g s  of F a c t  a t 8 F E P  C a s e s  240, 
p a ra .  1 .

42 3.



SU M M A R Y  O F  A R G U M E N T

The r e a s o n s  th is  C o u rt shou ld  r e fu s e  to 
g ra n t D e fe n d a n ts ' P e t i t io n  fo r  W rit of C e r t io r a r i  
on the 42 U. S. C. §1981 ("§1981") is s u e  a r e  a s  
fo llow s:

1. T h is  C o u rt a lr e a d y  h a s  ru le d  on the 
is s u e  w h e th e r the T itle  VII s ta n d a rd s  
fo r  l ia b il i ty  a r e  a p p lic a b le  to e m p lo y ­
m en t d is c r im in a t io n  c a s e s  b ro u g h t 
p u rsu a n t  to  §1981 in  i ts  d e c is io n s  in 
Jo h n so n  v. Ry. E x p re s s  A gency , In c . , 
421 U. S. 454 (1975) and W ash ing ton
v. D a v is , 426 U. S. 229 (1976).

2. T he C irc u i t  C o u rt ru lin g  in  the in s ta n t 
c a se  is  c o n s is te n t  w ith a c c e p te d  
p r in c ip le s  of s ta tu to ry  c o n s tru c tio n .

3. T h e re  is  no c o n flic t  am ong  the c i r c u i t s  
c o n c e rn in g  the §1981 is s u e ;  in d ee d , 
a l l  c i r c u i t s  w hich have a d d re s s e d  the 
is s u e  a r e  in  a c c o rd  w ith  the ru lin g  in 
the in s ta n t  c a s e .

4. A ru lin g  by th is  C o u rt on w h e th e r 
p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  is  r e q u ir e d  
u n d e r 42 U. S. C. §1981 w ould not 
a ffe c t the o u tcom e of th is  c a se  
b e c a u s e  p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  w as 
p ro v e n , indeed  a d m itte d , a t the t r i a l  
below .

4. 43



T h is  C o u rt shou ld  re fu s e  to g ra n t  D e fe n d an ts ' 
P e t i t io n  on the  r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  o r d e r  i s s u e s  fo r  the 
fo llow ing  r e a s o n s :

1. T he C irc u i t  C o u r t 's  d e c is io n  on  the 
a p p ro p r ia te n e s s  o f the r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  
o r d e r  h e re in  is  in  a c c o rd  w ith  th is  
C o u r t 's  d e c is io n  in  In te rn a tio n a l 
B ro th e rh o o d  of T e a m s te r s  v . U nited  
S ta te s , 431 U. S. 324 (1977).

2. T h e re  is  no c o n flic t  am ong  the c i r c u i t s  
c o n c e rn in g  the r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  o r d e r  
i s s u e s  p re s e n te d  by  D e fe n d an ts '
P e tit io n .

3. The sp e c if ic  g ro u n d s  D e fen d an ts  r a i s e  
fo r  the p ro p o s it io n  th a t the r e m e d ia l  
h ir in g  o r d e r  w as beyond the  D is t r ic t  
C o u r t 's  ju r i s d ic t io n  do not d is tin g u ish  
the  in s ta n t  c a se  f ro m  th o se  in  w hich 
such  r e l i e f  h a s  been  upheld .

ARGUM ENT

I

PU R P O S E F U L  DISCRIM INATION 
NEED NOT BE PRO V ED  UNDER 
42 U .S .C . §1981

D efendan ts  have v ig o ro u s ly  co n ten d ed  in 
th e i r  P e tit io n  fo r  W rit o f C e r t i o r a r i  th a t b e fo re  
a  v io la tio n  of 42 U. S. C. §1981 is  m ade o u t,

5.44



p la in tif f  m u st show  p u rp o s e fu l,  i . e .  , w illfu l o r  
d e l ib e ra te ,  d is c r im in a t io n  b a s e d  on r a c e .

T h e re  is  no m e r i t  to  D efe n d an ts ' a s s e r t io n s .  
F i r s t ly ,  the  c o n te n tio n  by  D efendan ts  is  c o n tr a ry  
to th is  C o u r t 's  p r io r  ho ld ing  in  W ash ing ton  v.
D a v is , the v e ry  d e c is io n  upon  w hich D efendan ts  
so  h e a v ily  r e ly .  S econd ly , the N inth C ir c u i t 's  
holding in  the in s ta n t c a s e  is  c o n s is te n t  w ith  lo n g - 
s e tt le d  can o n s o f s ta tu to ry  c o n s tru c tio n . And 
th ird ly , c o n tr a ry  to D efen d an ts ' a s s e r t i o n s ,  
th e re  is  no c o n flic t in  the  C ir c u i ts ;  in  fa c t a l l  
C irc u i ts  w hich have  a d d re s s e d  the p o in t have 
m ade e x p re s s  r u l  ings w hich  a r e  c o n s is te n t  w ith  
the ru lin g  of the  N inth C irc u i t  in  the in s ta n t  c a s e .

It a lso  is  the p o s itio n  of p la in tif fs  tha t even  
if  p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  is  r e q u i r e d  to p ro v e  
a v io la tio n  of §1981, su ch  a  ho ld ing  would not 
a ffec t the o u tcom e of the in s ta n t  c a s e .

A. THIS COURT ALREADY HAS 
H ELD  THAT PU R PO SE FU L  
DISCRIM INATION IS NOT 
REQUIRED UNDER 42 U. S. C. 
§1981

D efen d an ts ' r e l ia n c e  upon W ash ing ton  v. 
D avis fo r  the p ro p o s it io n  th a t p u rp o se fu l d i s ­
c r im in a tio n  m u st be p ro v ed  u n d e r 42 U. S. C. §1981 
is  m isp la c e d . T h is  re l ia n c e  is  m isp la c e d  to the 
ex ten t th a t the W ash ing ton  v. D av is d e c is io n

6. 45



c o n ta in s  a c o n tr a ry  ho ld ing . T h is  is  the  c a s e  
b e c a u se  a  c a re fu l  re a d in g  o f the op in ion  in  
W ash ing ton  v . D av is show s th a t:  (a) the d e c is io n  
in  W ash ing ton  v. D av is th a t p u rp o se fu l  d i s c r im in a ­
tio n  is  n e c e s s a ry  to m ake out a  v io la tio n , found 
in  P a r t  "II"  of the W ash ing ton  v. D av is op in io n , 
i s  s t r i c t ly  l im ite d  to c a s e s  b a se d  on the e q u a l 
p ro te c tio n  p ro v is io n s  of the F if th  and F o u r te e n th  
A m endm en ts  and  does not ex ten d  to c a s e s  g ro u n d ed  
on  s ta tu te s ;  and (b) in  P a r t  " i l l"  of the W ash ing ton  
v . D av is  o p in io n , in  w hich §1981 and a lo c a l  
D is t r ic t  of C o lum b ia  s ta tu te  a r e  c o n s tru e d , the 
C o u rt sp e c if ic a lly  in te r p r e ts  and c o n s tru e s  §1981 
and in  doing so p la c e s  the  b u rd e n  of p ro v in g  
" b u s in e s s  n e c e s s i ty "  upon e m p lo y e rs  sued  u n d e r 
§1981 upon a m e re  s ta t i s t i c a l  show ing o f a d v e rs e  
im p a c t w ithout a  show ing of p u rp o se fu l 
d is c r im in a t io n .

A re v ie w  of the  p r o c e d u ra l  c o n tex t in  w hich 
W ash ing ton  v. D av is  re a c h e d  the C o u rt is  h e lp fu l 
to  a  p ro p e r  u n d e rs ta n d in g  of the op in ion . In 
P a r t  " i"  of the  C o u r t 's  o p in io n , the p ro c e d u ra l  
se ttin g  g iv ing  r i s e  to the a p p e a l is  d e s c r ib e d  at 
426 U. S. 233-34  a s  fo llow s:

" T h e se  p r a c t ic e s  [inc lud ing  the 
w r itte n  te s t]  w ere  a s s e r te d  to v io la te  
r e s p o n d e n ts ' r ig h ts  'u n d e r  the due 
p r o c e s s  c la u s e  of the  F if th  A m end­
m en t to the U nited  S ta te s  C o n s titu tio n , 
u n d e r  42 U. S. C. §1981 and u n d e r
D. C. Code § 1 -3 2 0 . ' * * * R esp o n d en ts
then  f ile d  a  m o tion  fo r  su m m a ry  ju d g ­
m ent w ith  r e s p e c t  to the r e c u itin g  
p h a se  o f the c a s e ,  seek in g  a  d e c la ra t io n

46
7.



th a t the  te s t  a d m in is te re d  to those  
ap p ly ing  to  b eco m e  p o lic e  o f f ic e r s  
is  'u n law fu lly  d is c r im in a to ry  and 
th e re fo re  is  v io la tio n  of the  Due 
P r o c e s s  C lau se  o f the  F if th  A m end­
m en t. . . . ' No is s u e  u n d e r any s ta tu te  
o r  re g u la tio n  w as r a i s e d  by the m o tio n .
T he D is t r ic t  of C o lum bia  d e fe n d a n ts , 
p e t i t io n e r s  h e r e ,  and the f e d e ra l  p a r t i e s  
a lso  f ile d  m o tio n s fo r  s u m m a ry  ju d g m en t 
w ith  r e s p e c t  to the r e c r u i t in g  a s p e c ts  
o f the c a s e  a s s e r t in g  th a t re s p o n d e n ts  
w ere  e n ti t le d  to r e l i e f  on n e ith e r  c o n s t i ­
tu tio n a l n o r  s ta tu to ry  g ro u n d s . "
(E m p h a s is  added; fo o tn o te s  o m itte d . )

P a r t  II o f the  C o u r t 's  op in io n  is  l im ite d  to 
a d isc u s s io n  of the i s s u e s  invo lved  in  the  r e s p o n ­
d e n t's  m o tion  w hich  " r e s te d  on p u re ly  c o n s ti tu tio n a l  
g ro u n d s. . . . "  The C o u rt p r e m is e d  i ts  r e m a r k s  
in  P a r t  II by s ta t in g  th a t "We have n e v e r  h e ld  tha t 
the c o n s ti tu tio n a l  s ta n d a rd  fo r  ad ju d ic a tin g  c la im s  
of in v id io u s r a c i a l  d is c r im in a t io n  is  id e n tic a l  to 
the s ta n d a rd  a p p lic a b le  u n d e r T itle  VII, and  we 
dec line  to do so today . " A fte r  a long d is c u s s io n  
of eq u a l p ro te c tio n  c a s e s  b ro u g h t u n d e r  the F if th  
and F o u r te e n th  A m en d m en ts  and 42 U. S. C, §1983, 
the C ou rt he ld  th a t p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n , 
r a th e r  th an  so le ly  r a c ia l ly  d isa p ro p o rtio n a te  
e ffe c t, m u st be show n to e s ta b l is h  a c la im  u n d er 
the c o n s titu tio n a l eq u a l p ro te c tio n  p ro v is io n s .
The C o u rt, t h e r e f o r e ,  conc lu d ed  a s  fo llow s:

"B e c au se  the  C o u rt of A ppea ls  
e r ro n e o u s ly  ap p lied  the le g a l  s ta n d a rd  
ap p lic ab le  to T itle  VII c a s e s  in  r e s o lv in g

8.
47



the c o n s ti tu tio n a l  i s s u e s  b e fo re  i t ,  
we r e v e r s e  i ts  ju d g m en t in  r e s p o n ­
d e n ts ' fa v o r . " 426 U. S. a t  238.
(E m p h a s is  added . )

"[I]t w as e r r o r  [fo r the C o u rt 
of A ppeals] to d i r e c t  s u m m a ry  ju d g m en t 
fo r  re s p o n d e n ts  b a se d  on the F if th  
A m endm en t. " 426 U. S. a t 248.

In P a r t  " i l l"  of the W ash ing ton  v . D avis 
d e c is io n , th is  C o u rt th en  p ro c e e d e d  to 
d is c u s s  the i s s u e s  invo lved  in  the  p e t i t io n e r s ' 
s u m m a ry  ju d g m en t m o tion  th a t w e re  not d isp o se d  
o f by i ts  ho ld ing  in  P a r t  "II. " T h u s , P a r t  "III" 
d e a ls  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith the i s s u e s  c o n c e rn in g  the 
s ta tu to ry  c a u s e s  of a c tio n  u n d e r  §1981 and D. C. 
Code § 1 -3 2 0 , the c o n s ti tu tio n a l  i s s u e s  hav ing  
b een  d isp o se d  o f in  P a r t  "II. " A nd, m o st 
im p o r ta n t ly , in  th is  P a r t  "III"  the C o u rt a p p lie s  
hhe m o st b a s ic  p r in c ip le  of T itle  VII law , to w it: 
a  m e re  s ta t i s t ic a l  show ing th a t an  em p lo y m en t 
p r a c t ic e  h a s  an  a d v e rs e  im p a c t upon a  m in o rity  
g ro u p  sh if ts  the b u rd e n  to  the e m p lo y e r  to p ro v e  
jo b - r e la te d n e s s  r e g a r d le s s  of w h e th e r  p u rp o se fu l 
d is c r im in a t io n  h a s  b een  show n.

T h e re  ca n  be no r e a l  q u e s tio n  but th a t in  
P a r t  " i l l"  of the W ash ing ton  v , D avis o p in io n , 
the C o u rt w as c o n s tru in g  §1981 a long  w ith  a 
D is t r ic t  of C o lum b ia  lo c a l  code se c tio n . The 
seco n d  p a ra g ra p h  of P a r t  " i l l"  of the op in ion  
s p e c if ic a lly  n o te s  th a t the defendan t e m p lo y e r 's  
m o tion  fo r  s u m m a ry  judgm en t (w hich is  w hat w as 
be ing  d is c u s s e d  in  P a r t  " i l l" )  w as b a s e d  upon an

48
9.



a rg u m e n t th a t the  w r itte n  t e s t  a t  is s u e  "co m p lied  
w ith  a l l  a p p lic a b le  s ta tu to ry  . . . r e q u ir e m e n ts ;  
and they  a p p e a r  no t to have  d isp u te d  th a t u n d e r  the 
s ta tu te s  and  re g u la tio n s  g o v e rn in g  th e ir  conduct 
s ta n d a rd s  s im i la r  to those  o b ta in in g  u n d e r  T itle  VII 
had to  be s a tis f ie d . " (E m p h a s is  added . ) Since 
the C o u rt in  the f i r s t  p a ra g ra p h  of P a r t  "I"  o f the 
op in ion  s p e c if ic a lly  n o ted  th a t the c a s e  w as b ro u g h t 
u n d e r §1981, and  in d eed  in  foo tno te  two quo ted  
§1981 in  i ts  e n t i r e ty ,  and s in c e  the  C o u rt in 
P a r t  " i l l"  a s  quo ted  im m e d ia te ly  above s ta te d  th a t 
it w as c o n s tru in g  " a ll  a p p lic a b le  s ta tu te s "  (p lu ra l ,  
not s in g u la r ) ,  and s in ce  T itle  VII p r in c ip le s  w e re  
ap p lied  by the  C o u rt in  P a r t  " i l l"  of the W ash ing ton  
v. D av is  o p in io n , it  fo llow s th a t th is  C o u rt 
h a s  adop ted  and  a p p lie d  T itle  VII p r in c ip le s  w hile 
c o n s tru in g  §1981. It is  m o st n o tew o rth y  th a t the 
T itle  VII p r in c ip le  a p p lie d  u n d e r §1981 in  P a r t  
"III" of W ash ing ton  v. D av is w as the v e ry  p r in c ip le  
a t i s s u e  on th is  P e t it io n  - -  w h e th e r in  the a b se n c e  
of p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  the b u rd e n  to p ro v e  
jo b - r e la te d n e s s  sh if ts  to the e m p lo y e r  upon a 
show ing of s ta t i s t i c a l  a d v e rs e  im p a c t.

T he N inth C i r c u i t 's  ho ld ing  th a t T i tle  VII 
s ta n d a rd s  fo r  l ia b il i ty  app ly  in  §1981 em p lo y m en t 
d is c r im in a t io n  c a s e s  a ls o  is  in  a c c o rd  w ith th is  
th is  C o u r t 's  d e c is io n  in  Jo h n so n  v. R ailw ay  E x p re s s  
A gency , Inc. , 421 U. S. 454 (1975). H e re  th is  
C ourt ru le d  a t  421 US. 459 th a t:

"D esp ite  T itle  V II 's  ra n g e  and i ts  
d e s ig n  a s  a  c o m p re h e n s iv e  so lu tio n  
fo r the p ro b le m  of in v id io u s d is ­
c r im in a tio n  in  e m p lo y m e n t, the a g g riv e d  
in d iv id u a l c le a r ly  is  no t d e p riv e d  o f

10. 49



o th e r  r e m e d ie s  he p o s s e s s e s  and 
is  no t l im ite d  to T itle  VII in  h is  
s e a r c h  fo r  r e l ie f .  ' [T]he le g is la t iv e  
h is to ry  of T itle  VII m a n if e s ts  a 
c o n g re s s io n a l  in te n t to a llow  an  
in d iv id u a l to p u rs u e  in d ep en d en tly  
h is  r ig h ts  u n d e r  bo th  T itle  VII and 
o th e r  a p p lic a b le  s ta te  and fe d e ra l  
s ta tu te s .’ A le x a n d e r v. G a rd n e r-  
D enver Co. 415 U. S. a t 4 8 , 39 L . Ed.
2d 147, 94 S. C t. 1011. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  
C o n g re s s  n o te d 'th a t  the r e m e d ie s  
a v a ila b le  to the in d iv id u a l u n d e r 
T itle  VII a r e  c o -e x te n s iv e  w ith  the 
in d iv [ i]d u a l 's  r ig h t  to sue u n d e r  the 
p ro v is io n s  of the C iv il R igh ts  A ct of 
1866, 42 U. S. C. §1981 [42 U. S. C. S. 
§1981], and tha t the two p ro c e d u re s  
augm en t e a ch  o th e r  and a r e  not 
m u tu a lly  e x c lu s iv e . ' H. R. R ep. No. 
9 2 -2 3 8 , p . 19 (1971). See a lso  S.
R ep. No. 9 2 -4 1 5 , p. 24 (1 9 7 1 )."
(E m p h a s is  added . )

It is  su b m itte d  th a t s in c e  the  " re m e d ie s  
a v a ila b le "  u n d e r  S ection  1981 a re  " c o -e x te n s iv e "  
w ith th o se  u n d e r  T itle  VII, it  is  in co n ce iv ab le  
th a t the  m o st b a s ic  s ta n d a rd  fo r  e s ta b lis h in g  
l ia b il i ty  u n d e r the two s ta tu te s ,  i . e .  , w h e th e r 
p u rp o se fu l in te n t is  r e q u i r e d ,  w ould not be 
id e n tic a l  u n d e r  both  s ta tu te s .  It is  su b m itte d  
th a t w hen th is  C o u rt spoke of " re m e d ie s "  in  
Jo h n so n  v . R ailw ay  E x p re s s , the C o u rt w as not 
sp e ak in g  in  the n a rro w  s e n se  o f " r e l i e f , "  but 
r a th e r  in  the b ro a d  se n se  of a " re m e d y  fo r  a  
w rong . " W hen " re m e d y "  is  u se d  in  th is  l a t te r

50
11.



s e n s e ,  and w hen it is  s ta te d  th a t u n d e r  the  two 
s ta tu te s  the " re m e d ie s "  a r e  " c o -e x te n s iv e , " it 
fo llow s th a t the  s ta n d a rd s  fo r l ia b il i ty  u n d e r  the 
two s ta tu te s  m u st be id e n tic a l .

B. TH E NINTH C IR C U IT 'S
§1981 RULING IS CONSISTENT 
W ITH W E L L  ESTA BLISH ED  
PR IN C IPA L S O F  STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION AND W ITH 
42 U. S. C. §1988

A c e n tr a l  ho ld ing  of th is  C ou rt in  Jo h n so n  v. 
R ailw ay E x p re s s  A gency , In c . , 421 U. S. 454 , 
459-60  (1975) w as s ta te d  a s  fo llow s:

"A lthough th is  C o u rt h a s  not s p e c if ic a lly  
so h e ld , it  is  w ell s e tt le d  am ong  the 
F e d e ra l .  C o u rts  of A p p ea ls  -  and  we 
now jo in  th em  -  th a t §1981 a ffo rd s  a 
f e d e ra l  re m e d y  a g a in s t  d is c r im in a t io n  
in  p r iv a te  em p lo y m en t on the  b a s is  
o f r a c e . "

T h u s , th is  C o u rt in  Jo h n so n  a t  the le a s t  re c o g n iz e d  
th a t T itle  VII and §1981 p ro v id e  o v e rla p p in g  
s ta tu to ry  b a s e s  fo r  em p lo y m en t d is c r im in a t io n  
a c tio n s .

The ho ld ing  o f the N inth C irc u it  th a t th e se  
o v e rla p p in g  s ta tu te s  shou ld  be c o n s tru e d  con ­
s is te n tly  by in c o rp o ra tin g  T itle  VII s ta n d a rd s  
into §1981 is  c o m p e lle d  by lo n g -e s ta b l is h e d  
p r in c ip a ls  o f s ta tu to ry  c o n s tru c tio n . Indeed ,

12. 51



m o re  th an  a  c e n tu ry  ago th is  C o u rt s ta te d  in  
U nited  S ta te s  v. F r e e m a n , 3 How. 556, 564-65  
(1845) th a t:

"T he c o r r e c t  ru le  of in te r p re ta t io n  i s ,  
th a t if d iv e r s  s ta tu te s  r e l a te  to the  sa m e  
th in g , they  ought a l l  to be tak en  in to  
c o n s id e ra t io n  in  c o n s tru in g  any one of 
th e m , and i t  i s  an  e s ta b l is h e d  ru le  of 
law , tha t a l l  a c ts  in  p a r i  m a te r ia  a r e  
to be tak e n  to g e th e r ,  a s  if  th ey  w e re  
one law . (Doug. , 30; 2 T e rm . R ep. ,. 
387 ,586 ; 4 M aule & Selw. , 2 1 0 .)
If a  th ing  co n ta in ed  in  a  su b seq u en t 
s ta tu te ,  be w ith in  the r e a s o n  o f a f o rm e r  
s ta tu te ,  i t  s h a ll  be tak e n  to be w ith in  
the m ean ing  of th a t s ta tu te  (L o rd  R aym . , 
1028); and if  it  c a n  be  g a th e re d  fro m  
a  su b seq u e n t s ta tu te  in  p a r i  m a te r i a , 
w hat m ean ing  the L e g is la tu re  a tta c h e d  
to the  w o rd s  of a  f o rm e r  s ta tu te ,  they  
w ill am o u n t to a  le g is la t iv e  d e c la ra t io n  
of i t s  m ea n in g , and w ill g o v e rn  the 
c o n s tru c tio n  of the f i r s t  s ta tu te .
(M o rr is  v. M e llin , 6 B a rn . & C r e s s .  , 
454; 7 B a rn . & C r e s s . ,  9 9 .) "
(E m p h a s is  added . )

S im ila r ly , in  Cope v. C ope, 137 U. S. 682 , 688- 
89 (1891), th is  C o u rt p ro v id e d  th a t:

"T h e se  s e v e r a l  A c ts  of C o n g re s s , 
d ea lin g  a s  they  do w ith  the  sa m e  su b je c t 
m a t te r ,  shou ld  be c o n s tru e d  not only 
a s  e x p re s s in g  the in te n tio n  of C o n g re ss  
a t  the d a te s  the s e v e r a l  A c ts  w e re  p a s s e d ,

52 13.



bu t the l a t e r  A c ts  shou ld  a ls o  be 
re g a rd e d  a s  le g is la t iv e  in te r p re ta t io n s  
of the  p r io r  o n e s . "

See a lso  T ig e r  v . W e s te rn  In v e s tm e n t Co. ,
221 U. S. 286 (1910).

T he F o u r th  C irc u i t  v e ry  r e c e n tly  h as  
sp e c if ic a lly  a p p lie d  the  above re a s o n in g  w hile 
in c o rp o ra tin g  T itle  VII p r in c ip le s  in to  §1981.
Johnson  v. R y d e r T ru c k  L in e s ,  Inc. , ___  F . 2d
___ (4th C i r . ,  M ay 2 , 1978; No. 76-1293).
H ere  the p la in tif fs  w ere  con tend ing  th a t th is  
C o u r t 's  ho ld ing  in  In te rn a tio n a l B ro th e rh o o d  
of T e a m s te r s  v. U nited  S ta te s , 431 U. S. 324 
(1977) w as in a p p lic a b le  on  the th e o ry  th a t 
T e a m s te r s  a p p lie s  only to T itle  VII c a s e s .
The F o u r th  C irc u i t  ru le d  a s  fo llow s a t  page  e igh t 
of the  s lip  op in ion :

" O rd in a r i ly , §1988 e n a b le s  a  d i s t r ic t  
c o u r t  to u t i l iz e  G r ig g s 's in te rp re ta t io n  
of T itle  VII in  §1981 em p lo y m en t 
d isc r im in a t io n  s u i t s ,  bu t the  c o u rt  
canno t t r a n s g r e s s  the l im ita tio n  
p la c e d  on the G rig g s  r a t io n a le  in 
T e a m s te r s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to §703(h).
A ru lin g  th a t a  s e n io r i ty  sy s te m  
w hich is  law fu l u n d e r  T itle  VII is  
n e v e r th e le s s  un law fu l u n d e r  §1981 
w ould d is r e g a rd  the  p re c e p ts  of 
§1988. "

The F o u r th  C i r c u i t 's  r e f e re n c e  to 42 U. S. C. 
§1988 is  m o st n o tew o rth y . T ha t s e c t io n , w hich 
in  r e a l i ty  is  a s ta tu to ry  c o d if ic a tio n  of the

14. 53



a b o v e -d is c u s s e d  lo n g -e s ta b l is h e d  p r in c ip le  
th a t s ta tu te s  c o v e rin g  the sa m e  s u b je c t m a t te r  
a r e  to  be c o n s tru e d  c o n s is te n t ly ,  r e a d s  a s  fo llow s 
in  a p p lic a b le  p a r t :

"T h e  ju r is d ic t io n  in  c iv i l  . . . m a t te r s  
c o n fe r re d  on  the d i s t r ic t  c o u r ts  by 
the p ro v is io n s  of th is  c h a p te r  . . „ 
s h a ll  be e x e rc is e d  and e n fo rc e d  in  
c o n fo rm ity  w ith the  law s of the 
U nited  S ta te s , so  f a r  a s  such  law s 
a r e  su ita b le  to c a r r y  the sa m e  in to  
e ffe c t. . . . "

In v iew  o f the a b o v e -s ta te d  p r in c ip le s  of 
s ta tu to ry  c o n s tru c tio n , th e r e  is  no v a lid ity  to 
the a rg u m e n ts  found a t p a g e s  11-13  o f the P e t it io n  
to  the e ffec t th a t the N inth C irc u i t  d e c is io n  h e re in  
"h as  r a m if ic a t io n s  ex tend ing  f a r  beyond e m p lo y ­
m en t d is c r im in a t io n  c a s e s ."  (P e ti t io n  p . 1 1 . )
T h is  a rg u m e n t h a s  no v a lid ity  b e c a u se  u n d e r  the 
p r in c ip le s  o f s ta tu to ry  c o n s tru c tio n  o u tlin ed  
above and co d ified  in  42 U. S. C. §1988, only  tha t 
p a r t  o f §1981 w hich  a ls o  is  c o v e re d  by T itle  VII 
(i- e ‘  » em p lo y m en t c o n tr a c ts )  w ould be a ffe c te d  by 
T itle  VII p r in c ip le s .  T h u s , un lik e  the s itu a tio n  
in  W ash ing ton  v . D avis w h ere  b a s ic  and f a r -  
re a c h in g  C o n s titu tio n a l p r in c ip le s  w e re  b e ing  
c o n s tru e d , in  the in s ta n t  c a s e  the f e a r  d o es  not 
e x is t  th a t a  whole ra n g e  ta x , w e lfa r e ,  and  re g u la to ry  
law s  m igh t be in v a lid a te d  by the adop tion  of T itle  
VII p r in c ip le s  in to  §1981. In o th e r  w o rd s , to 
"c o n fo rm "  the two s ta tu te s  a s  is  r e q u i r e d  by 
§1988, a l l  th a t n eed  (o r shou ld) be done is  
in c o rp o ra te  the G rig g s  p r in c ip le  in to  §1981 
em p lo y m en t d is c r im in a t io n  c a s e s ,  no t in to

54 15.



o th e r  §1981 c a s e s  o u ts id e  the e m p lo y m en t s p h e re .

C. NO CIRCUIT HAS HELD  TH AT 
P U R P O S E F U L  DISCRIM INATION 
MUST BE PR O V ED  IN E M P L O Y ­
M ENT CASES BROUGHT UNDER 
SECTION 1981

None of the C irc u i t  C o u rt c a s e s  c ite d  by 
D efendan ts a t  S ec tio n  " i l l"  o f th e ir  P e t i t io n  s tan d  
fo r the p ro p o s i t io n , a s  c la im e d  by D efe n d an ts , 
tha t p u rp o se fu l and in te n tio n a l d is c r im in a t io n  m u st 
be p ro v ed  in  an  em p lo y m en t c a s e  b ro u g h t p u rsu a n t  
to 42 U. S. C. §1981. In the r e m a in d e r  of the 
in s ta n t s e c tio n  P la in t if fs  w ill a n a ly z e  e a ch  of the 
c a s e s  c ite d  by D e fe n d an ts , on  a  c a s e  by c a s e  
b a s is ,  and show th a t none o f the c a s e s  a r e  in  
co n flic t w ith the  N inth C irc u it  ho ld ing  h e re in .

The T en th  C irc u it  in  C hicano  P o lic e  O ffice r 
A ssn , y . S to v e r , 552 F . 2d 918 (10 th  C ir .  1977) 
re sp o n d e d  to the o r d e r  o f the U nited  S ta te s  S u p rem e  
C ourt in  S tover v. C hicano  P o lic e  O ff ic e rs  A ssn , , 
426 U. S. 944 (1976), th a t v a c a te d  and  re m a n d e d  
the c a s e ,  by r e c o n s id e r in g  i ts  p r io r  h o ld ings in 
ligh t of W ash ing ton  v. D a v is , 426 U. S. 229 (1976). 
T h is  law su it w as b ro u g h t p u rsu a n t  to  42 U. S. C, 
§§1981, 1983 and 1985. In i ts  o p in io n , h o w e v e r, 
the C irc u it  C o u rt d is c u s s e s  only the e ffec t of 
W ashington  v. D avis on the " c o n s titu tio n a l 
v io la tio n s  u n d e r §§1983 and  1985 and c o m p le te ly  
fa ils  to a d d re s s  the im p a c t on  the §1981 s ta tu to ry  
v io la tio n s . H en ce , th is  c a s e  canno t be c o n s id e re d  
a ru lin g  c o n tr a ry  to the in s ta n t c a se  on the §1981

16. 55



S im ila r ly , the d e c is io n  of the  S even th  C irc u it  
in  U nited  S ta te s  v. C ity  of C h ic a g o , 549 F . 2d 415
(7th C ir .  1977), c e r t ,  d e n ie d , ___ U. S. _____,
54 L . E d . 2d 155 (1978) did not in c lu d e  a ru lin g  
u n d e r  §1981. D esp ite  the  fa c t th a t the c a s e  w as 
b ro u g h t p u rsu a n t to T itle  VII, the F o u r te e n th  
A m endm en t and  §§1981, 1983 and  1985 by v a r io u s  
p la in t i f f s ,  the C irc u i t  C o u rt a t S ec tio n  "III"  o f i ts  
op in io n  c o n s id e r s  the m e r i t s  o f the c a s e  only  a s  
to the  v io la tio n s  of T itle  VII (S ection  " i l l .  B. ") 
and eq u a l p ro te c tio n  c la u se  (S ection  " il l .  C. ").
549 F . 2d 425. C o n tra ry  to the a s s e r t io n  of 
D efendan ts  h e re in  (P e ti t io n , page  19), the 
C irc u it  C o u rt r e v e r s e d  only  the  d i s t r ic t  c o u r t 's  
ho ld ing  c o n c e rn in g  v io la tio n s  o f the  e q u a l p ro te c tio n  
c la u s e  and fa ile d  to c o n s id e r  the l ia b il i ty  s ta n d a rd  
to be a p p lie d  to the  §1981 c a u s e s  of a c tio n .

T he o th e r  S eventh  C irc u i t  c a s e  c ite d  by 
D e fe n d an ts , C ity  of M ilw aukee v. S axbe , 546 F . 2d 
693 (7th C ir . 1976), a lso  is  no t on p o in t. A lthough 
the C irc u it  C o u rt did ru le  th a t the p la in t i f f 's  
§1981 c la im  r e q u i r e d  a  show ing of in te n tio n a l 
d is c r im in a t io n , the  la w su it  d id not invo lve  a  c la im  
o f em p lo y m en t d is c r im in a t io n . R a th e r , the c ity  
b ro u g h t th is  a c tio n  a g a in s t the U nited  S ta te s  
A tto rn e y  G e n e ra l  a lle g in g  d is c r im in a to ry  e n fo rc e ­
m en t of the  c iv i l  r ig h ts  la w s . H en ce , the Seventh 
C irc u it  h a s  not ru le d  on the  is s u e  h e re in  a s  to the 
s ta n d a rd  fo r l ia b il i ty  to be ap p lied  in  a §1981 
em p lo y m en t d is c r im in a t io n  c a s e .

The E ig h th  C irc u it  c a s e  Jo h n so n  v. A le x a n d e r , 
___ F . 2 d ____ , 16 F E P  C a s e s  894 (8th  C ir .  1978)

i s s u e  r a i s e d  b y  D e fe n d a n t s .

56 17.



s im ila r ly  is  no t in  c o n flic t w ith  the N inth C i r c u i t 's  
ru lin g  h e re in . T he ho ld ing  in  Jo h n so n  v. A le x a n d e r 
did not invo lve  an  em p lo y m en t c o n tr a c t .  In f a c t ,  
the E igh th  C irc u i t  c a te g o r ic a lly  s ta te d  th a t had  an  
em p loym en t c a s e  b een  b e fo re  i t ,  a c o n tr a ry  hold ing  
would have  r e s u l te d ,  s in c e  a t 16 F E P  C a s e s  897-98 
n. 3 is  found the  fo llow ing  s ta te m e n t:

"T he  c la im  of the  p la in tif fs  in  
W ash ing ton  v . D av is  w as b a s e d  so le ly  
on the fif th  a m en d m en t; they  d id  not 
invoke T itle  VII, and the  S u p rem e  C o u rt 
r e c o g n iz e d  th a t the  s ta n d a rd s  o f T itle  
VII m ay be b ro a d e r  th an  th o se  of the 
a m e n d m e n t, invoked  by p la in tif fs  
426 U. S. a t  246 -48 . A nd, in  a n u m b er 
o f c a s e  it  h a s  b e e n  h e ld  th a t T itle  VII 
s ta n d a rd s  a r e  a p p lic a b le  to s u its  b ro u g h t 
by b la c k s  u n d e r §1981. (C ita tio n s  
o m itte d ; e m p h a s is  add ed . )

P la in tif fs  f u r th e r  su b m it tha t a c a re fu l  
rea d in g  of the  E igh th  C irc u i t  op in ion  in  Jo h n so n  
v. A lex an d er show s not only  th a t th a t C o u rt i s  in  
a g re e m e n t w ith  the ho ld ing  of the N inth C irc u i t  
h e re in , bu t a ls o  th a t the  E igh th  C irc u it  d e c is io n  
is  p re m is e d  e n ti r e ly  upon a  find ing  that the c a se  
did not invo lve an  em p lo y m en t s itu a tio n .

C o n tra ry  to D efen d an ts ' c o n ten tio n  a t p a g e s  
17 and 18 of th e ir  P e t i t io n , the S ixth C irc u it  
h as  not y e t ru le d  on the §1981 is s u e .  In A rno ld  
v. B a l la rd , 16 F E P  C a se s  396, 12 E P D  p a ra .
11 ,224  (6th C ir . 1976) (not o ffic ia lly  p u b lish e d ), 
the C irc u it  C o u rt m e re ly  v a c a te d  i t s  p re v io u s  
d e c is io n  and re m a n d e d  the c a s e  to a llow  the  d i s t r ic t

18.
57



c o u r t  to  c o n s id e r  in it ia l ly  the im p a c t o f W ash ing ton  
v . D av is on  i t s  f in d in g s . The d i s t r ic t  c o u r t  h a s  
ru le d  on  th is  is s u e  bu t to d a te  i ts  d e c is io n  h a s  not 
b e e n  re v ie w e d  by the  Sixth C irc u i t .

T he F if th  C irc u it  in  H a rk le s s  v. Sw eeny 
Independen t School D i s t r i c t , 554 F . 2d 1353 
(5th  C ir .  1977) w as not p r e s e n te d  w ith  the is s u e  
o f w h e th e r  T itle  VII s ta n d a rd s  app ly  in  §1981 
a c tio n s . N or did th a t c o u r t  m ake any s ta te m e n ts  
w h a tso e v e r  c o n c e rn in g  th is  i s s u e .  T he fa c ts  of 
th is  c a s e  did not p r e s e n t  a  G rig g s  type v io la tio n  
re q u ir in g  the  ad o p tio n  of T itle  VII s ta n d a rd s  in  
o r d e r  to e s ta b l is h  l ia b il i ty  u n d e r §1981. R a th e r ,  
the  c a s e  invo lved  a s itu a tio n  of b la ta n t  p u rp o se fu l 
d is c r im in a t io n  a g a in s t  b lac k  e m p lo y e e s  a s  c o m p a red  
to  w hite e m p lo y e e s  and  the C irc u i t  C o u rt h e ld  tha t 
the im p a c t,  h i s to r ic a l  b ack g ro u n d  and  seq u en ce  of 
e v e n ts  of the e m p lo y e r 's  a c tio n s  e s ta b l is h e d  a 
c a s e  of in te n tio n a l d is c r im in a t io n . H e n c e , the  
F if th  C irc u it  he ld  only th a t a  show ing of p u r p o s e ­
fu l d is c r im in a t io n  w as su ff ic ie n t to  e s ta b l is h  a 
§1981 v io la tio n ; th e re  is  no ho ld ing  o r  im p lic a tio n  
th a t such  a show ing is  r e q u i r e d  to e s ta b l is h  a 
v io la tio n .

D efendan ts  a lso  c i te  the  F if th  C irc u i t  d e c is io n  
in  W ade v. M is s is s ip p i  C o o p e ra tiv e  E x ten tio n  
S e rv ic e , 528 F . 2d 508 (5th C ir . 1976) a s  e s ta b l i s h ­
ing the  r e q u ire m e n t  th a t p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  
m u st be show n in  §1981. T he r e a l i ty  is  th a t the 
ho ld ing  in  th is  c a se  is  p r e c is e ly  to  the c o n tr a ry .
T h is  c a s e  w as f ile d  in  1970 a g a in s t a  pub lic  em ployer 
ch a llen g in g  e m p lo y m e n t-p ra c tic e s  of the defendan t 
a s  b e ing  in  v io la tio n  o f the F if th  and F o u r te e n th  
A m e n d m e n ts , T i tle  VI of th e  C iv il R ig h ts  A c t,

58 19.



42 U .S .C . §§2000d, e t seq . and  42 U. S. C. §§1981, 
1983. D efendan ts  no doubt r e ly  on the C irc u i t  
C o u r t 's  s ta te m e n t th a t it  w ould not app ly  " T itle  
VII g u id e lin e s"  but r a th e r  th a t "pub lic  em p lo y m en t 
t e s t s  a r e  to be ju dged  u n d e r  a c o n s ti tu tio n a l  
s ta n d a rd  in  s u its  u n d e r  42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1983. "
528 F .  2d 518. In th is  s ta te m e n t,  h o w e v e r , the 
C ourt is  no t d isc u s s in g  the p r im a  fa c ie  c a s e  s ta n d a rd  
u n d er §1981, b u t r a th e r  the  b u rd e n  on the  defendan t 
em p lo y e r to  show the jo b - r e la te d n e s s  of an  e m p lo y ­
m ent p r a c t ic e  a lr e a d y  found to have an  a d v e rs e  
im p a c t. The C irc u i t  C o u rt h e ld  tha t the EEO C 
G uidelines w e re  not the  p ro p e r  s ta n d a rd  in  a 
§1981 c a s e .  D efendan ts  ig n o re  the r e le v a n t  
holding of the C irc u it  C o u rt a t 528 F .2 d  516-17 
w here  i t  i s  s ta te d :  " it i s ,  of c o u rse ., beyond 
d ispu te  th a t s ta t i s t i c a l  ev id en ce  a lone  m ay  
enab le  the p la in tif fs  to s a tis fy  th e i r  in it ia l  b u rd e n  
of show ing d is c r im in a t io n . "

D. A L L  CIRCUITS WHICH HAVE 
ADDRESSED TH E SECTION 
1981 ISSUE A R E IN ACCORD

A s p o in ted  out in  the im m e d ia te ly  p re c e e d in g  
s u b -s e c tio n , none of the C irc u it  c a s e s  c i te d  by 
D efendan ts s ta n d  fo r  the p ro p o s i t io n , a s  a s s e r te d ,  
tha t p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  m u st be p roved  
u nder §1981. T h e re  a r e ,  h o w e v e r , two C irc u it  
C o u rts  in  a d d itio n  to the N inth C irc u it  w hich  have 
a d d re s s e d  the  is s u e .  B oth e x p re s s ly  a g re e  w ith 
the N inth C irc u it  th a t p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  
need  not be p ro v e d  in  an  em p lo y m en t d i s c r im in a ­
tion  c a s e  b ro u g h t p u rsu a n t to §1981.

20. 59



The C irc u it  C ou rt fo r  th e  D is t r ic t  o f 
C o lum b ia  w as the f i r s t  C irc u it  to  r u le  d i re c t ly  on 
the  p o in t. In K in sey  v. F i r s t  R eg iona l S e c u r i t ie s , 
Inc. , 557 F . 2d 830 (D. C. C ir .  1977), it  i s  h e ld  a s  
fo llow s a t  557 F .  2d 838 n. 22:

"In W ash ing ton  v. D a v is , 426 U. S. 229,
96 S. C t. 2040, 48 L. E d . 2d 597 (1976), 
the  c o u r t  h e ld  th a t a  r a c ia l ly  d is p r o p o r ­
tio n a te  im p a c t is  a  v io la tio n  of e q u a l 
p ro te c tio n , h o w e v e r , only  w h e re  a 
d is c r im in a to ry  p u rp o se  is  show n.
Since p i a in tif f -a p p e lla n t  h e re  p ro c e e d s  
u n d e r T itle  VII of the  C iv il R ig h ts  A ct 
of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §§2000e, e t se q . 
and 42 U. S. C, §1981, he n eed  not m ee t 
th is  b u rd e n  of p ro o f. See L eague  v.
C ity  of S an ta  A na , 13 F E P  C a se s  1019 
(C .D . C alif . 1976) and T he  S u p rem e 
C o u r t , 1975 T e r m , 90 H a rv . L. R ev.
58 , 114-23  (1976) fo r  d is c u s s io n  o f the 
W ash ing ton  v . D av is  d e c is io n . "
(E m p h a s is  added . )

The F o u r th  C irc u it  a ls o  d ire c tly  a d d re s s e d  
the po in t in  Jo h n so n  v , R y d er T ru c k  L in e s ,  Inc. ,
___ F . 2 d ____  (4th C ir .  , May 2 , 1978; No.
76-1293). H e re  the  C o u rt e x p re s s ly  held th a t a ll  
of the  u su a l T i tle  VII s ta n d a rd s  app ly  in  c a s e s  
b ro u g h t p u rsu a n t  to  §1981.

60
21 .



E . ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
IN TEN TIO N A L DISCRIM INATION 
MUST BE PRO V ED  IN THIS 
C A SE, T H E R E  IS O V ER­
W HELMING EV ID E N C E , INCLUD­
ING ADMISSIONS O F RA CIALLY 
DISCRIM INATION PU R PO SE, IN 
TH E  RECORD BELOW .

At find ing  of fa c t  n u m b e r  s e v e n  the  C ourt 
below  found th a t "N e ith e r  D efen d an ts  n o r  th e ir  
o ff ic ia ls  engaged  in  e m p lo y m en t p r a c t ic e s  w ith 
a w ilfu l o r  c o n sc io u s  p u rp o se  of ex c lu d in g  b la c k s  
and M e x ic a n -A m e ric a n s  f ro m  em p lo y m en t a t the 
L os A n g e les  County F i r e  D e p a r tm e n t. " 8 F E P
C a se s  2 3 9 ,2 4 1 . It is  n o tew o rth y  th a t the  C o u rt 
below  m ade th is  find ing  in  the  b e lie f  th a t p u rp o s e ­
ful d is c r im in a t io n  w as i r r e le v a n t  to the p ro c e e d ­
ing; in d ee d , a t  c o n c lu s io n  o f law  n u m b e r  s ix ,  the 
C ourt below  n o ted  th a t the  only  in te n t show ing 
re q u ire d  w as th a t the d e fen d an ts  had  in te n tio n a lly  
u til iz e d  the  em p lo y m en t p r a c t ic e s  found to be 
il le g a l . 8 F E P  C a s e s  242.

A find ing  of fa c t m ade u n d e r  R ule 52 is  
'c le a r ly  e r ro n e o u s "  w hen , a lthough  th e re  is  

ev idence  to s u p p o rt i t ,  t h e  rev ie w in g  C o u rt on 
the e n tire  ev id en ce  is  le f t  w ith  the d e fin ite  and 
f irm  c o n v ic tio n  th a t a  m is ta k e  h a s  b e e n  c o m m itte d . 
U nited S ta te s  v . U nited  S ta te s  G ypsum  C o . ,
333 U .S . 364, 395 (1948).

B efo re  a n a ly z in g  the  fa c ts  b e lo w , it  shou ld  
be no ted  th a t in  W ash ing ton  v. D a v is , s u p r a , at 
242, th is  C o u rt s ta te d ;

22. 61



" N e c e s s a r i ly ,  an  in v id io u s  
d is c r im in a to ry  p u rp o se  m ay  o ften  
be  in f e r r e d  fro m  the  to ta li ty  o f the 
r e le v a n t  f a c t s ,  in c lu d in g  the  f a c t ,  if  it 
i s  t r u e ,  th a t the  law  b e a r s  m o re  h e a v ily  
on  one r a c e  th an  a n o th e r . It i s  a ls o  
no t in fre q u e n tly  t ru e  th a t the  d i s ­
c r im in a to ry  im p a c t - - i n  the  ju ry  
c a s e s  fo r  e x a m p le , the  to ta l  o r  s e r io u s ly  
d isp ro p o r tio n a te  e x c lu s io n  o f N e g ro e s  
f ro m  ju ry  v e n ir e s  - -  m ay  fo r  a l l  
p r a c t ic a l  p u rp o s e s  d e m o n s tra te  
u n c o n s titu tio n a lity  b e c a u se  in  v a r io u s  
c i r c u m s ta n c e s  the d is c r im in a t io n  is  
v e ry  d iff ic u lt to  e x p la in  on  n o n ra c ia l  
g ro u n d s . " (E m p h a s is  a d d e d .)

V ery  re c e n tly  th is  C o u rt e la b o ra te d  upon 
W ash ing ton  v , D avis and  p ro v id e d  f u r th e r  gu idance  
a s  to the c i r c u m s ta n c e s  in  w hich the r e q u is i te  
d is c r im in a to ry  p u rp o se  m ay  be in fe r re d .  V illage 
o f A rlin g to n  H e ig h ts  v . M e tro p o lita n  H ousing 
D evelopm en t C o rp o ra tio n , 429 U. S. 252 (1977). 
H ere  it  w as h e ld :

"D avis d o es  not r e q u i r e  a  p la in tif f  
to p ro v e  th a t  the  c h a llen g e d  a c tio n  r e s t e d  
so le ly  on r a c ia l ly  d is c r im in a to ry  
p u rp o s e s . R a re ly  c a n  it be sa id  th a t 
a le g is la t iv e  o r  a d m in is t ra t iv e  body . . . 
m ade a  d e c is io n  m o tiv a te d  so le ly  by a 
s in g le  c o n c e rn , o r  ev en  th a t a  p a r t ic u la r  
p u rp o se  w as the 'd o m in a n t ' o r  'p r im a r y ' 
one. . . . W hen th e re  is  p ro o f  th a t 
a  d is c r im in a to ry  p u rp o se  w as a 
m o tiv a tin g  fa c to r  in  the  d e c is io n  . . .

62 23.



ju d ic ia l  d e fe re n c e  i s  no lo n g e r  ju s t i f ie d .

"D e te rm in in g  w h e th e r in v id io u s 
d is c r im in a to ry  p u rp o se  w as a  m o tiv a t­
ing fa c to r  dem an d s a  s e n s i t iv e  in q u iry  
in to  such  c i r c u m s ta n t ia l  and d ire c t  
ev id en ce  of in te n t a s  m ay be a v a i la b le . " 
429 U. S. 265 -66 . (F o o tn o te s  
o m itte d ; e m p h a s is  a d d e d .)

In the in s ta n t  c a s e ,  the r e q u i r e d  a n a ly s is  
of the " to ta lity  of the r e le v a n t  f a c ts "  and the 
" c i r c u m s ta n t ia l  and d i r e c t  ev id en ce  of in te n t"  
b eg in s  w ith  the  fa c t th a t it  w as s tip u la te d  below  
th at: (a) a lth o u g h  a p p ro x im a te ly  10. 3% of the 
g e n e ra l  p o p u la tio n  of L os A n g e le s  C ounty is  
b la c k , a t the tim e  th is  la w su it  w as co m m e n ce d  
only n ine p e r s o n s  in  d e fe n d a n ts ' w o rk fo rc e  of 
1 ,7 6 2 , o r  0 .5 % , w e re  b la c k s  (R. 136); (b) 
a lthough 18. 3% of the g e n e ra l  p o p u la tio n  of 
Los A ngeles  C ounty  is  M e x ic a n -A m e ric a n , 
a t the tim e  th is  la w su it  w as co m m e n ce d  only 
50 p e rs o n s  in  d e fe n d a n ts ' w o rk fo rc e , o r  2 .8 % , 
w ere  M e x ic a n -A m e ric a n s  (R. 136); and (c) 
im m ed ia te ly  a f te r  th is  la w su it w as c o m m e n c e d , 
but only  b e c a u se  th is  la w su it  w as c o m m e n ce d , 
defendan ts  a l te r e d  th e ir  h ir in g  p r a c t ic e s  and 
e s ta b lish e d  an  e lig ib il i ty  l i s t  on w hich  no l e s s  
than  98 of the  top 315 p e rs o n s  on the l i s t  w e re  
b lack  and M ex ican - A m e ric a n  (R. 141; R, T. 
48-49). The d e a r th  of m in o rity  e m p lo y e es  
on the p a y ro l l  a t  the tim e  the la w su it  w as 
b ro u g h t, coup led  w ith the sudden  a b ility  to h ire  
s u b s ta n tia l n u m b e rs  o f m in o r it ie s  a f te r  be ing  
sued in  a c la s s  a c tio n , c r e a te s  an  " in f e re n c e ,"  
p la in tif fs  su b m it, th a t the su pposed ly  r a c ia l ly

24. 63



n e u tr a l  em p lo y m en t p r a c t ic e s  u ti l iz e d  b e fo re  
c o m m e n ce m e n t of th is  la w su it  w e re  not u til iz e d  
in  good fa ith  o r  w ith  a la c k  of r a c ia l  in ten t bu t 
r a th e r  th a t th o se  p r a c t ic e s  w ere  u se d  w ith  a 
r a c ia l ly  d is c r im in a to ry  p u rp o se fu l in te n t.

But th is  C o u rt n eed  not r e ly  on  s ta t i s t i c a l  
and lo g ic a l  in fe re n c e s  in  d e te rm in in g  w h e th e r 
the  D efen d an ts  engaged  in  p u rp o se fu l  o r  in te n tio n a l 
d is c r im in a t io n  p r io r  to c o m m e n ce m e n t of th is  
a c tio n . In d eed , the  ev id en ce  of p u rp o se fu l 
d is c r im in a t io n  below  w as so s tro n g  th a t " in te n ­
tio n a l"  d is c r im in a t io n  w as a d m itte d  by C hief 
B arlo w  h im s e lf ,  the C hief of the L os A ngeles  
F i r e  D e p a r tm e n t (R. T . 187-88).

S im ila r ly  c o n c lu s iv e  ev id en ce  o f  b la ta n t  in te n  
tio n a l o r  p u rp o se fu l d is c r im in a t io n  w as found in  
the te s tim o n y  of H aro ld  M cC ann, a  c a p ta in  in  the 
L os A n g e les  C ounty F i r e  D e p a r tm e n t. He 
te s t if ie d  a s  to  how p ro g ra m s  d e s ig n e d  to a s s i s t  
a p p lic a n ts  w e re  co n d u c ted  e x c lu s iv e ly  fo r  w h ites  
w hile s im i la r  p r o g ra m s  w ith m in o rity  p a r t ic ip a n ts  
w e re  p ro h ib ite d  by the F i r e  D e p a r tm e n t (R. T . 91- 
113).

P e rh a p s  the  m o st d e v a s ta tin g  ev id e n c e  in  
the  r e c o r d  below  of in te n tio n a l d is c r im in a t io n  
c o n c e rn s  the c o n ced ed  fa c t tha t h igh o f f ic ia ls  in 
D efendan ts ' p e rs o n n e l  d e p a r tm e n t a d m itte d ly  
knew th a t the  w r itte n  t e s t s  be ing  u ti l iz e d  a s  p a r t  
of the  s e le c tio n  s y s te m  fo r  new f i r e f ig h te r s  
o p e ra te d  to  ex c lu d e  b la c k s  and M e x ic a n -A m e ric a n s  
knew  th a t th e se  t e s t s  v io la te d  w e ll- e s ta b lis h e d  
T itle  VII le g a l p r in c ip le s ,  and  n e v e r th e le s s  th e se

64 25.



o ffic ia ls  a d m itte d ly  co n tin u ed  to u t il iz e  th e se  
te s ts  a s  p a r t  of the  s e le c tio n  p r o c e s s  u n til  
they  le a rn e d  th a t th is  c la s s  a c tio n  la w s u it  w as 
about to  be c o m m e n ce d . The ev id en ce  below  
show ing th e se  f a c ts  is  found a t P la in t i f f s ' E x h ib its  
se v e n , e ig h t and  n in e , and a t R. T . 4 8 -4 9 .

II

T H E  ISSUANCE O F TH E REM ED IA L 
HIRING ORDER H ER EIN  WAS 
W ITHIN T H E JURISD ICTION O F 
TH E DISTRICT COURT

The seco n d  q u e s tio n  p re s e n te d  by D efen ­
d a n ts ' P e t i t io n  is  w h e th e r the  D is tr ic t  C o u rt 
ex ceed ed  i ts  ju r i s d ic t io n  w hen it is s u e d  an  
a ff irm a tiv e  a c tio n  h ir in g  o r d e r  to  r e m a in  in  
e ffec t u n til  su ch  tim e  a s  the  p e rc e n ta g e  of 
m in o r it ie s  em p lo y ed  in  the L os A ngeles  County 
F i r e  D e p a r tm e n t a p p ro x im a te ly  e q u a ls  the 
p e rc e n ta g e  of m in o r it ie s  in  the g e n e ra l  p o p u la tio n  
of L os A ngeles C ounty. T he D is tr ic t  C ou rt 
held  th a t th is  p ro s p e c t iv e  h ir in g  o r d e r  w as 
" n e c e s s a ry  to  o v e rc o m e  the  p re s e n t ly  e x is tin g  
e ffe c ts  of p a s t  d is c r im in a t io n "  a s  ev id e n c e d  by 
the u n re b u tte d  p r im a  fac ie  c a s e  e s ta b l is h e d  by 
the s e v e re  u n d e r -u t i l iz a tio n  of m in o r it ie s  in 
D efendan ts ' w o rk fo rc e . See O pinion below  a t 
8 F E P  C a s e s  239 , 241-42 .

In In te rn a tio n a l B ro th e rh o o d  of T e a m s te r s  
v. U nited  S ta te s , 431 U, S. 324 (1977), th is  C o u rt 
h as  re c o g n iz e d  th a t a r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  o r d e r ,

26. 65



v ir tu a l ly  id e n tic a l  to the o r d e r  h e re in ,  i s  
a p p ro p r ia te  r e l i e f  w h ere  the p la in tif fs  have  show n 
the  e x is te n c e  o f a  p a t te rn  and p r a c t ic e  of 
d is c r im in a t io n . At S ection  "III. A. " of the 
T e a m s te r s  d e c is io n , 431 U. S. 361, th is  C o u rt 
d e s c r ib e d  the n a tu re  o f a p p ro p r ia te  " p ro s p e c tiv e  
r e l ie f "  in c lud ing  a t foo tno te  47 the in ju n c tiv e  r e l ie f  
a ffo rd ed  in  th a t c a s e ,  w hich a t 431 U. S. 330-31 n. 4 
w as d e s c r ib e d  a s  fo llow s:

"T he  d e c re e  fu r th e r  p ro v id e d  
tha t fu tu re  job  v a c a n c ie s  a t any 
T .I .  M .E .- D .C .  te rm in a l  w ould be 
f il le d  f i r s t  '[b]y  th o se  p e r s o n s  who 
m ay be found by  the  c o u r t ,  if  a n y , to 
be in d iv id u a l o r  c la s s  d is c r im in a te e s  
s u ffe r in g  the p r e s e n t  e ffe c ts  of p a s t  
d is c r im in a t io n  b e c a u se  o f r a c e  o r  
n a tio n a l o r ig in  p ro h ib ite d  by T itle  VII 
o f the  C iv il  R ig h ts  A ct of 1964. '
Any re m a in in g  v a c a n c ie s  co u ld  be 
f il le d  by 'an y  o th e r  p e r s o n s ,1 but 
th e  com pany  ob lig ed  i t s e l f  to h i r e  one 
N egro  o r  S p a n ish -su rn a m e d  p e r s o n  fo r 
e v e ry  w hite  p e r s o n  h ire d  a t any  te rm in a l  
u n til the p e rc e n ta g e  of m in o r ity  w o rk e rs  
a t th a t te rm in a l  eq u a lled  the  p e rc e n ta g e  
of m in o rity  g ro u p  m e m b e rs  in  the 
p o p u la tio n  o f the m e tro p o lita n  a r e a  
su rro u n d in g  the te rm in a l .  "

F u r th e r m o r e ,  a s  s ta te d  by the N inth C ircu it 
in  i ts  d e c is io n  on  r e h e a r in g  in  the in s ta n t  c a s e ,  
" [e ]ig h t C o u rts  of A p p ea l, includ ing  th is  o n e , 
have c o n s id e re d  and ap p ro v e d  the u se  of 
a c c e le r a te d  h ir in g  g o a ls  o r  q u o tas  to  e ra d ic a te

66
27.



the e ffe c ts  of p a s t  d is c r im in a t io n . " (C ita tio n s  
o m it te d .)  566 F .2 d  1342. H en ce , D e fen d an ts ' 
P e tit io n  r a i s e d  an  is s u e  th a t u n ifo rm ly  h a s  b een  
re s o lv e d  by th is  C o u rt and  the C o u rts  of A ppeal 
in  fa v o r  of the  a v a ila b il ity  of p ro s p e c t iv e  in ju n c tiv e  
h ir in g  r e l ie f .

T he sp e c if ic  g ro u n d s  fo r  re v ie w  se t fo rth  
by D efendan ts  do no t d is tin g u ish  the  in s ta n t  c a s e  
fro m  th o se  in  w hich  re m e d ia l  p ro s p e c t iv e  h ir in g  
o r d e r s  p re v io u s ly  have  been  upheld . D efendan ts  
l i s t  th re e  g ro u n d s  a s  l im itin g  the D is tr ic t  C o u r t 's  
ju r is d ic tio n  to o r d e r  p ro s p e c t iv e  r e l i e f  h e re in :
(1) the a b sen c e  of a find ing  of in te n tio n a l d is c r im in a ­
tion ; (2) the fa c t tha t the d is c r im in a to ry  a c ts  
cau sin g  the p r e s e n t  w o rk fo rc e /la b o r  poo l d is p a r i ty  
took p la c e  p r io r  to the  e ffe c tiv e  da te  o f T itle  VII 
and the a p p lic a b le  s ta tu te  o f l im ita tio n s  fo r  §1981; 
and (3) a la c k  of s ta n d in g  due to the fa c t th a t the 
p la in tif f  c la s s  d id not Include  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts  who 
w ere  a ffe c te d  by  the p a s t  un law fu l p r a c t ic e s .  
(P e titio n , p a g e s  2 -3 . )

A. A FINDING O F IN TEN TIONA L 
DISCRIM INATION IS NOT 
REQUIRED FO R A HIRING 
ORDER UNDER §1981 * 1

D e fe n d a n ts 'f i r s t  a rg u m e n t r a i s e s  in  a 
d iffe re n t co n tex t the p re v io u s ly -d is c u s s e d  is s u e  
as  to the  p ro p e r  s ta n d a rd  fo r  l ia b il i ty  fo r v io la ­
tions b a se d  upon §1981. D efendan ts  a rg u e :
(1) the a c ts  c a u s in g  the u n d e r u t il iz a tio n  of 
m in o r it ie s  o c c u r r e d  b e fo re  the da te  T itle  VII

28. 67



b e c a m e  a p p lic a b le  to pub lic  e m p lo y e rs ;  (2) h e n c e , 
the e n ti t le m e n t to r e l i e f  f ro m  the e ffe c ts  of th e se  
a c t m u s t be b a s e d  on v io la tio n s  o f §1981; (3) a  
v io la tio n  of §1981 r e q u i r e s  a show ing of in te n tio n a l 
d is c r im in a t io n ;  (4) the  D is t r ic t  C o u rt found no 
d is c r im in a to ry  in te n t; and  (5) th e r e f o r e ,  the  p r e -  
T itle  VII a c ts  w e re  not un law fu l and  P la in t if f s  a r e  
no t e n ti t le d  to r e l i e f  f ro m  th e i r  p r e s e n t  e ffe c ts .

P la in t if f s  a g re e  th a t the r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  
o r d e r  h e re in  w as b a se d  upon a p a t te rn  and  p r a c t ic e  
of d is c r im in a to ry  p r a c t ic e s  th a t w e re  un law fu l only 
u n d e r  §1981, no t T itle  VII. A s d is c u s s e d  p rev io u s ly  
in  th is  b r ie f ,  h o w e v e r , §1981 does  not r e q u i r e  a  
show ing o f in te n tio n a l d is c r im in a t io n  (S ec tio n  " i"  
above) and th a t  ev en  if  it  d o e s , the D is t r ic t  C o u r t 's  
g ra tu ito u s  find ing  of no d is c r im in a to ry  in te n t is 
c o n tr a ry  to the  f a c ts  in  the R e c o rd  and  shou ld  be 
re m a n d e d  (S ection  "I. E . ").

B. TH E  EX T E N T  O F A REM ED IA L 
HIRING ORDER IS NOT LIM ITED  
BY TH E STA TU TE OF 
LIM ITATIONS

D e fen d an ts ' seco n d  c o n te n tio n  is  th a t the 
r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  o r d e r  e x c e e d s  the D is tr ic t  C o u r t 's  
ju r i s d ic t io n  b e c a u se  i t  p ro v id e s  r e l i e f  fo r the 
p r e s e n t  e ffe c ts  of h ir in g  p r a c t ic e s  th a t o c c u r r e d  
p r io r  to  the  th re e  y e a r  s ta tu te  of l im ita tio n  p e r io d  
a p p lic ab le  to §1981 a c tio n s . D e fe n d an ts , h o w e v e r, 
do not com e fo rw a rd  w ith  any c a s e s  in  w hich a 
p ro s p e c t iv e  h ir in g  o r d e r  h a s  b e e n  so  l im ite d . 
In d eed , in  c a s e s  too n u m e ro u s  to c i te ,  the C o u rts

68
29.



have both  e x p lic itly  and im p lic i tly  h e ld  th a t the 
s ta tu te  o f l im ita tio n s  do es  no t a ffe c t the ex ten t 
of p ro s p e c t iv e  h ir in g  r e l i e f .  See e . g. , the 
c a s e s  c ite d  in  the op in ion  below  in  the  in s ta n t  
c a se  a t 566 F . 2d 1342-43 .

The b a s is  fo r  th re e  ru l in g s  is  the s e tt le d  
le g a l p r in c ip le  th a t w hen a  "pub lic  r ig h t"  is  b e in g  
e n fo rc e d , the  s ta tu te  o f l im ita tio n s  d o es  not 
r e s t r i c t  the  in ju n c tiv e , n o n -m o n e ta ry  r e l i e f  to be 
a ffo rd ed . T h e re  i s  no c o n flic t  am ong  the 
C irc u i ts  in  em p lo y m en t d is c r im in a t io n  c a s e s  
tha t have  ru le d  d ire c tly  on  th is  p o in t. EEO C  v. 
O cc id en ta l L ife  In su ra n c e  C o . , 535 F . 2d 533,
537-40 (9th C ir . 1976) a ff 'd  on o th e r  g ro u n d s ,
432 U .S . 355 (1977); EEO C  v. G riff in  W h ee l,
511 F . 2d 456 , 458-59  (5th C ir . 1975); EEO C v. 
K im b erly  C la rk  C o rp . , 511 F . 2d 1352, 1359-60 
(6th C ir .  1975). See a ls o ,  EEO C  v , C h r is t ia n s b u rg  
G arm en t Co. , In c . , 376 F . Supp. 1067, 1071-73 
(W. D. Va. 1974); EEO C  v . Duff B ro s , , In c . ,
364 F . Supp. 405 , 406-7  (E .D . T en n . 1973);
EEO C v. E a g le  Iro n  W o rk s , 367 F . Supp. 817, 
823-24 (S .D . Iowa 1973); EEO C v, L aack e  &
Joys C o. , 375 F . Supp. 852 , 853 (E .D . W is. 1974); 
EEOC v . B eE  H e lic o p te r  Co. , 426 F . Supp. 785,
790 (N. D. T ex . 1976). T h e se  c a s e s  e x p lic itly  
d is tin g u ish  b e tw een  the  "pub lic  r ig h ts "  em bod ied  
in  a p ro sp e c tiv e  h ir in g  o r d e r  and the  " p r iv a te  
o r  in d iv id u a l r ig h ts "  to backpay  and r e t r o a c t iv e  
s e n io r ity .

30.
69



C. P L A IN T IF F S  HAVE STAND­
ING TO SEEK A P R O S P E C T IV E  
HIRING ORDER R E L IE F

D efen d an ts ' f in a l g ro u n d  fo r  opp o sin g  the  
r e m e d ia l  h ir in g  o r d e r  is  th a t the P la in t if fs  la c k  
s ta n d in g  to  se e k  su ch  an  o r d e r ,  a rg u in g  th a t the 
in d iv id u a l n am ed  p la in ti f f s  do no t have  s tand ing  
to  c h a llen g e  the p a s t  h ir in g  p r a c t ic e s  w hich c a u se d  
the  s e v e re  u n d e r - r e p re s e n ta t io n  of m in o r it ie s  
in  the D efen d an ts ' w o rk fo rc e . D efen d an ts  b a se  
th e i r  a rg u m e n t on  the  C irc u i t  C o u r t 's  ru lin g  th a t 
P la in t if f  did not have s tan d in g  to  c h a llen g e  a  1969 
w r i t te n  te s t  b e c a u se  the 'p la in t if f s ' c la s s  did not 
in c lu d e  any p r io r  u n s u c c e s s fu l  a p p lic a n ts . "
566 F . 2d 1337-38 .

T he fa i lu re  to in c lu d e  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts  in  
the  p la in tif f  c la s s  i s  no t a  fa ta l  d e fe c t d e p riv in g  
the D is tr ic t  C o u rt ju r i s d ic t io n  to aw a rd in g  
p ro s p e c t iv e  h ir in g  r e l ie f .  In th is  r e g a r d ,  it 
is  to be n o ted  th a t:  (1) the p la in tif f  c la s s  w as 
defined  by the  C o u rt below  in t e r m s  of those  
p e r s o n s  e n title d  to in ju n c tiv e  r e l i e f  a s  a  r e s u l t  
of D efendan ts ' d is c r im in a to ry  h ir in g  p r a c t ic e s ;
(2) the  n am ed  p la in ti f f s ,  who in c lu d ed  c u r r e n t  
e m p lo y e es  of the  L os A ngeles C ounty F i r e  
D e p a r tm e n t, had  s ta n d in g  to se ek  a p ro sp e c tiv e  
h ir in g  o rd e r ;  and (3) ev en  if  P la in tif fs  do not 
c u r r e n t ly  have s ta n d in g , on re m a n d  P la in tif fs  
shou ld  be a llow ed  to re m e d y  the m u tu a l m is ta k e  
of the C o u rt and  the p a r t i e s  by seek in g  a 
re d e f in itio n  of the c la s s  to in c lude  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts .

70 31.



P la in t if f s ' f i r s t  p o in t is  th a t i t  i s  i r r e le v a n t  
th a t the  scope  o f the  r e p r e s e n te d  c la s s  a s  defined  
below  d id  no t in c lude  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts . In th is  
la w s u it , the  only  r e l i e f  sough t by the P la in t if fs  
h a s  b een  and  is  a  h ir in g  o r d e r  d es ig n e d  to e lim in a te  
the e ffe c ts  o f p a s t  d is c r im in a t io n . P la in t if fs  d id 
not se e k  in d iv id u a l b ack  pay  o r  s e n io r i ty  r e l i e f  
fo r id e n tif ia b le  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts . H ir in g  o r d e r  
r e l i e f ,  by i ts  v e ry  n a tu r e ,  only c a n  be p ro s p e c t iv e  
in  n a tu re .  It w as so le ly  b e c a u se  the P la in tif fs  
sought p ro s p e c t iv e  r e l i e f  o n ly , and  not b e c a u se  
the P la in tif fs  d id  not c h a llen g e  p a s t  p r a c t ic e s  
a ffec tin g  p r io r  a p p lic a n ts ,  th a t the c la s s  c e r t i f ie d  
below  did not in c lu d e  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts . In o th e r  
w o rd s , the  p a r t i e s  and the  c o u r t  b e lo w , w hen they 
defined  c la s s ,  w e re  fo cu s in g  on the  p ro sp e c tiv e  
r e l ie f  sought by  the  P la in t i f f s  and th e re fo re  
defined  the c la s s  in  t e r m s  o f th o se  e n ti t le d  to 
r e l i e f .  In th is  v e in , it  shou ld  be no ted  th a t the 
p a s t  a p p lic a n ts  ca n  and  w ill b e n e fit f ro m  the 
p ro sp e c tiv e  r e l i e f  a t  su ch  tim e  a s  they  r e - a p p ly  
and th e re b y  b e c o m e  fu tu re  a p p lic a n ts .

In the  a l te rn a t iv e ,  th re e  of the in d iv id u a l 
p la in tif fs  w e re  and  a r e  m in o r it ie s  em p loyed  a s  
f ir e f ig h te r s  by the  C ounty of L o s  A n g e le s.
T h re e  C irc u it  C o u rts  have h e ld  tha t c u r r e n t  
e m p lo y ees  of a  defendan t e m p lo y e r  have  stand ing  
as p e rs o n s  who a r e  h a rm e d  by the u n d e r ­
r e p r e s e n ta t io n  of m in o r it ie s  in  the  w o rk fo rc e .
W a te rs  v. H eu b le in , Inc. , 547 F . 2d 466 , 469- 
70 (9th C ir .  1976); C hicano  P o lic e  O ffic e r  A ssn , 
v. S to v e r , 526 F . 2d 431 , 435-37  (10th C ir .
1975); G ray  v. G reyhound  L in e s ,  E a s t ,  545 F .2 d  169, 
175-76 (D .C . C ir . 1976)). O bv iously , e ffe c tiv e  
r e l ie f  fo r the h a rm  s u ffe re d  by c u r r e n t  e m p lo y e es

32. 71



c a n  be p ro v id e d  only  by a  p ro s p e c t iv e  h ir in g  
o r d e r .

F in a lly ,  P la in t i f f s ’ conduct of th is  c a s e  h a s  
c o n s is te n t ly  fo cu sed  on D efen d an ts ' p a s t  h ir in g  
p r a c t ic e s .  The s ta te m e n t of the l ia b il i ty  is s u e  
b e fo re  the  c o u r t  below  s p e c if ic a lly  g o es  to a ll  
em p lo y m en t p r a c t ic e s ,  p a s t  and p r e s e n t .
(R. 134. ) T he ev id en ce  below  r e f le c te d  th is  
b ro a d ly  s ta te d  l ia b il i ty  i s s u e .  F o r  e x a m p le , in  
the  P r e - T r i a l  C o n fe re n c e  O r d e r ,  th e  o v e rw h e lm in g  
m a jo r ity  of s tip u la tio n s  of fa c t (R. 136-141) and 
" s ta te m e n ts  of m a te r ia l  fa c ts  and r e le v a n t  law "
(R. 142-148) r e la te d  to D efe n d an ts ' p a s t  p a t te rn  
and p r a c t ic e  of d is c r im in a t io n  in  th e ir  h ir in g  
p r a c t ic e s .  F u r th e r m o r e ,  the D is t r ic t  C o u r t 's  
F in d in g  of F a c ts  and C o n c lu s io n s  of Law d is c u s s e s  
and r u le s  on the  le g a lity  of D e fen d an ts ' p a s t  
h ir in g  p r a c t ic e s  and s p e c if ic a lly  f in d s  tha t the 
h ir in g  o r d e r  is  " n e c e s s a ry  to o v e rc o m e  the 
p r e s e n t ly  e x is tin g  e ffe c ts  of p a s t  d is c r im in a t io n . "
8 F E P  C a se s  2 3 9 ,2 4 1 -4 2 . H en ce , t h i s  is  not a 
c a s e  w h ere  the  P la in tif fs  have  fa ile d  to ch a llen g e  
p a s t  em p lo y m en t p r a c t ic e s .

P la in tif fs  su b m it tha t if  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts  m u st 
be in c lu d ed  in  the  p la in tif f  c la s s  in  o r d e r  fo r a 
p ro sp e c tiv e  h ir in g  o r d e r  to be g ra n te d , the m u tu a l 
m is ta k e  of the p a r t i e s  and the D is t r ic t  C ou rt tha t 
r e s u l te d  in  the f a i lu re  to in c lude  p a s t  a p p lic a n ts  
in  the  c la s s  shou ld  not be fa ta l  to  the h ir in g  o r d e r  
h e re in . R a th e r , th is  C o u rt shou ld  e i th e r  re m a n d  
th is  c a s e  to the D is t r ic t  C o u rt fo r  r e c o n s id e ra t io n

72
33.



of the c la s s  d e fin itio n  o r  re d e f in e  the c la s s  on i ts  
own m o tion  b a s e d  on the  f a c ts  in  the R e c o rd ,

III

CONCLUSION

F o r  the r e a s o n s  s ta te d  a b o v e , P la in tif fs  
re s p e c tfu lly  su b m it tha t D efe n d an ts ' P e t it io n  fo r  
W rit o f C e r t io r a r i  shou ld  be d en ied .

D ated: May 2 6 , 1978.

R e sp e c tfu lly  s u b m itte d ,

A. THOMAS HUNT 
TIM OTHY B. FLY N N  
C e n te r  fo r  Law  in  the P u b lic  
In te r e s t

W A LTER COCHRAN-BOND 

A tto rn e y s  fo r  R esp o n d en ts

34. 73





IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1978 

No. 77-1553

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERV­
ICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
vs.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, individu­
ally and on behalf of all others similarly situated, WILLIE C. 
BURSEY, ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. SMITH, WILLIAM 
CLADY, STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE ROY TUCKER, 
LEON AUBRY, RONALD CRAWFORD, JAMES HEARD, 
ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, OSBALDO A. AMPARAH, in­
dividually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Respondents.

Oh Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
tor the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FO R COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., 
PETITIONERS.

J ohn H. L arson,
County Counsel,

W illia m  F. Stew a rt ,
Chief, Labor Relations Division,
648 Hall of Administration,
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012, 
(213) 974-1829,

Attorneys for Petitioners.
75





SUBJECT INDEX
Page

Opinion and Judgment Below ....................................  1

Jurisdiction ............ ........ ........ ....................... ............. 2

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... 2

Questions Presented .......      2

Statement of the Case ..................................   3

Legal Proceedings ......................................................... 5

Hiring Practices .............................................................  8

Summary of Argument ....................................    10

Argument ............      14

I
C onstitu tional, N o t T itle  V II, S tandards of D is­

crim ination  G overn  C laim s U nder 42  U .S.C . 
Sec. 1981; P u rposefu l D iscrim ination  Is the 
C orrect C riterion  fo r A djudging  a V io lation
of Sec. 1981 ................................................................. 14

A. Section 1981 Is a S eparate and  D istinct 
E qual P ro tec tio n  S ta tu te  W hose S tandards 
of L iab ility  Should T rack  C onstitu tional 
P rincip les, N o t T hose of T itle  V II ..............  14

1. Section 1981 W as E nac ted  as an
E q u al P ro tec tion  S tatu te In tended  to 
E nforce C onstitu tional R ights ............ 18

2. C ongressional In ten t in the E n ac t­
m ent of Section 1981 W as to  Prohib-



11.

P age
it U nconstitu tiona l, P u rposefu l D is­
crim ination , N o t to  C rea te  L iab ility  
B ased  on  D isp roportionate  I m p a c t .... 23

B. E xtension  of G riggs D octrine to  Section
1981 Is Inconsisten t W ith  E stab lished  
S tandards of L iab ility  in  N on-em ploym ent 
Civil R ights A ctions .... ....... ...........................  25

C. T he F ed era l C ivil R ights A cts of 1866, 
1870, 1871 and  the C onstitu tion  Should 
Be H arm onized  by a C onsisten t S tandard  
fo r D eterm in ing  Illegal D iscrim ination  .... 30

II
T he D ecision Is C o n tra ry  to  the Suprem e C o u rt’s 

R ulings in  W ashington  v. D avis and  In te rn a ­
tional B ro therhood  of T eam sters v. U nited
S tates ................................................................................. 31

A. T he D ecision U njustifiab ly  Ignores the 
P u rposefu l In ten t H olding in W ashington  
v. D avis  ......... ......................................................  31

B. T he D ecision F ails to  P roperly  D istinguish  
B etw een Pre- and  P ost-T itle  V II H iring  
P ractices C o n tra ry  to  In te rn a tio n a l 
B ro therhood  of T eam sters v. U n ited  S tates III

I I I
T he C ircu it C o u rt’s R u ling  F ru s tra te s  the C om ­

prehensive C ongressional Schem e E m bodied  in 
T itle  V II  ........................................................ ................  39

A . Ju risd iction  F iling  P rerequisites E vaded  .. 40

78



111.

P age
B. L iab ility  S tandards E x tended  to  E m ploy­

ers C ongress D esired  E xcluded  ......    41

C. R em edies ..............................................................   42

D . C oncilia tion  and  A dm in istra tive R eview
P rocedures F ru s tra ted  ........   43

E. U niform ity  of E nfo rcem en t A ctions E n ­
dangered  ...........    44

F . T he D ecision R enders T itle  V II R e tro ac ­
tive as to  P ub lic  A gencies ......   46

IV
N o T itle  V II V io lation  P roven  ................................. . 48

V
T he A ffirm ed Q u o ta  H iring  O rd er C learly  E x ­

ceeds the C o u rt’s R em edial A u th o r i ty ................. 51

Conclusion ...................................................................... 57

79



IV.

T A B L E  O F  A U T H O R IT IE S  C IT E D

C ases P age

A lbem arle  v. M oody, 422  U.S. 405 .....................    56

A lexander v. G ardner-D enver C o., 415 U .S. 36
(1 9 7 4 )  ..........      41

A rnold  v. B allard , 390 F .Supp. 723 (N .D . O hio 
1 975) ................................................................... 28, 29, 32

B ell v. Southw ell, (5 th  C ir. 1 967) 376 F .2 d  659 .. 27

B ridgeport G uard ians v. B ridgeport Civil Service 
C om m ’n ,  482 F .2 d  1333 (C A 2  1 973) ____ 28, 36

C astro  v. Beecher, 459  F .2 d  725 (C A 1 1 972) -.28, 36

C hance v. B oard  of E xam iners, 458 F .2 d  1167 
(C A 2  1972) .............................................................. 28, 36

C hicano  Police O fficer’s A ssociation  v. Stover, 552
F .2 d  918 (1 0 th  C ir. 1977) ..................................32 , 33

C ity of M ilw aukee v. Saxbe, 546 F .2 d  693 (7 th  
C ir. 1 976) .........................................................................  32

C rocker v. B oeing C o., 437 F .Supp. 1138 (1 9 7 7 )  .. 32

C row  v. B row n, 332 F .Supp. 382 (N .D . G a. 1971) 
aff’d 457 F .2 d  788 (C A 5 1 972) ................. .......... 28

D avis v. C oun ty  of Los Angeles, 566  F .2 d  1334 ___  33

D avis v. C ounty  of Los Angeles, 13 F E P  C ases 
1217 ............................................. ................. ................ . 5

D ay ton  B oard  of E duca tion  v. B rinkm an, 433 U .S. 
406 , 97 S.Ct. 2766  (1 9 7 7 )  ........................................... 55

D ickerson  v. U .S. Steel C orp ., .... F .Supp. ...., 15 
F E P  Cases 753 (1 9 7 7 )  .......................................... 32, 44

D ouglas v. H am pton , 168 U .S .A pp.D .C . 62, 512 
F .2 d  976 (1 9 7 5 )  ............................................................... 28

80



E ast T exas F re igh t v. R odriguez, 431 U .S. 395
(1 9 7 7 )  ..... ...................................................................52, 53

E E O C  v. Sherw ood M edical Industries, .... F .Supp.
17 F E P  C ases 444  (1 9 7 8 )  ........................................  43

Fow ler v. Schw arzw alder, 351 F .Supp. 721 (D . 
M in n . 1 9 7 2 ), rev ’d on o ther grounds, 498 F .2 d  
143 (C A 8 1974) ........................................................   28

F ranks v. B ow m an T ran sp o rta tio n  C om pany, 424
U.S. 747  (1 9 7 6 )  ................................................46, 47 , 56

F riend  v. L eid inger, (D .C ., E .D . V a. 1 9 7 7 ), 17 
E P D  8392, 5978  ............................................................. 51

F urnco  C onstruction  C orp . v. W aters, .... U .S ........
(1 9 7 8 )  .................................................................................  57

G au treaux  v. R om ney, 448 F .2d  731 (C A 7  1 9 7 1 ).. 28 

G ilbert v. G enera l E lectric , 429  U.S. 125 (1 9 7 6 )  .. 24

G riffin v. B reckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 , 91 S .C t. 1790
(1 9 7 1 )  ............................................................................22, 30

H arkless v. Sweeny In dependen t School D istrict,
427  F .2 d  319, 14 E P D  f  7669 , 5295 (5 th  C ir. 
1977) ......        32

H arper v. K loster, 486 F .2 d  1134 (C A 4  1973) .... 28

H arper v. M ayor of B altim ore, 359 F .Supp. 1187 
(D .M d .) .............    28

H aw kins v. T ow n of Shaw, 437 F .2 d  1286 (C A 5 
1 9 7 1 ), aff’d on rehearing  en banc, 461 F .2 d  1171
(1 9 7 2 )  .................................................................   28

H azelw ood School D istric t v. U nited  States, .... U .S.
...., 97 S.Ct. 2736  (1 9 7 7 )  ......................37, 46, 49, 51

Hills v. G au treaux , (1 9 7 6 )  425 U.S. 284, 96 S.Ct. 
1538 .................................................................................26,

Page

55



VI.

In te rn a tio n a l B ro th erh o o d  of T eam sters v. U nited  
States, 431 U .S. 324 , 97 S .C t. 1843 (1 9 7 7 )  .... 

.................................................................... -3 1 ,  35, 37, 38 , 46

Jack so n  v. C on tinen ta l O il C o., .... F .S u p p .........
(1 9 7 5 )   ........................................  45

Jennings v. P aterson , (5 th  C ir. 1 974) 488 F .2 d  
436  ................................................................................... . 27

Johnson  v. A lexander, 572  F .2 d  1219, 16 F E P  
894  ( 8 th  C ir. 1 978) .................................................. 32, 42

Joh n so n  v. R ailw ay E xpress A gency, Inc ., 421 U.S.
454 , 95 S.C t. 1716 (1 9 7 5 )  ....14 , 15, 40 , 41 , 44, 45

Jones v. A lfred  H . M ayer C o., 392 U.S. 409 , 88 

S.C t. 2 1 8 6  (1 9 6 8 )  ................... 15, 16, 20, 22 , 25 , 30

K ennedy P a rk  H om es A ssn. v. C ity  of L ackaw anna,
436  F .2 d  108 (C A 2  1 9 7 0 ), cert, denied , 401 
U .S, 1010, 91 S.C t. 1256, 28 L .E d .2 d  546 
(1 9 7 1 )  ....................................................     28

Lew is v. B ethlehem  Steel C orp ., 440  F .Supp. 949 
(1 9 7 7 )  ........................................................................... 32, 33

M cD onnell D ouglas C orp . v. G reen, 411 U.S. 792
(1 9 7 3 )  ...............   41

M cD onnell v. S an ta  F e  T ra il T ran sp o rta tio n  C o.,
427  U.S. 327 , 96 S.Ct. 2574  (1 9 7 6 )  ..... .............  19

M etro p o litan  H . D . C orp . v. V illage of A rling ton  
H eights, 517 F .2 d  409  (C A 7 ) , cert, g ran ted ,
D ec. 15, 1975, 423 U.S. 1030, 96 S.C t. 560, 46 
1..1x1.2d 404  (1 9 7 5 )  ...................................................... 28

M illiken v. B radley, 418 U .S. 711 ...........................54, 55

N orw alk  C O R E  v. N orw alk  R edevelopm ent A gen­
cy, 395 F .2 d  920 (C A 2  1968)

Page

82
28



O ccidental L ife In su ran ce  Co. v. E E O C , 432  U.S.

vii.

Page

355 (1 9 7 7 )  ..........................................................43, 45 , 46

O lzm an v. L ak e  Hills Swim C lub, Inc ., (2 n d  C ir.
1 9 7 4 ) 4 9 5  F .2 d  1333 ..... ............................................... 27

P atterson  v. A m erican  T o bacco  C o., 535 F .2 d  257 
(4 th  C ir. 1 976) .................................... .....................37, 47

P lace v. W einberger, 497 F .2 d  412  ( 6 th  C ir. 1974)
.................. ............................................................ ..................  47

R ay v. Safew ay Stores, Inc ., .... F .S u p p .......  (1 9 7 6 )
........................ ............................................... ......................... 45

R egents of the U niversity  of C alifo rn ia  v. R akke,
.... U .S. ...., 17 F E P  C ases 1000 (1 9 7 8 )  ..54, 56, 57

R obinson v. L o rilla rd , 444  F .2 d  791 (4 th  Cir. 
1971) .............................................................................. 37, 47

R unyon v. M cC rary , 427  U.S. 160, 96  S.C t. 2586
(1 9 7 6 )  .................................................................. 19, 20, 26

Sabala v. W estern  G illette , Inc ., 516 F .2 d  1251 
(1 9 7 5 )  ..................................................................... ...........  40

Sabol v. Snyder, 524  F .2 d  1009 (1 0 th  C ir. 1975) .. 40

Scott v. C ity of A nniston , (N .D . A la. 1 9 7 7 ), 430  
F .Supp. 507 ............. ............................... ......................... 51

Smith v. T royan , 520 F .2 d  492  ( 6th  C ir. 1 975) .... 50

Southern A lam eda Spanish Speaking O rgan ization  
v. U nion  City, 424  F .2 d  291 (C A 9  1 970) .........  28

T illm an v. W heaton-H aven  R ecreation  A ssn., 410 
U.S. 431 , 93 S.Ct. 1090 (1973  ) ........................ 20, 22

T yler v. V ickery, 517 F .2 d  1089 (C A 5  1975) .... 28

U nited A ir L ines v. E vans, 431 U .S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 
1885 (1 9 7 7 )  ................................................................. 41 , 53

83



V lll.

U nited  States v. C ity  of C hicago, 385 F .Supp. 543 
(N .D . 111. 1 974) ...............................................................  28

U nited  S tates v. C ity  of C hicago, 549 F .2 d  415 
(7 th  C ir., 1 977) .......................... ........... .........................  32

U nited  S tates v. S tate of So. C aro lina , .... F .Supp.
15 F E P  C ases 1196 (1 9 7 7 )  ......... ............. ........  32

V an  D avis, et al. v. C oun ty  of L os A ngeles, et 
al., 566 F .2 d  1334 (9 th  C ir. 1 977) ......... 1, 2, 8 , 35

V elzaga v. N a tio n a l B oard  of R esp ira to ry  T herapy ,
13 E P C  % 11, 525, 8875 , 8881 (N .D . 111., J a n ­
uary  27, 1 977) ............................................ ..................... 32

W ade v. M ississippi C oopera tive E xtension  Serv.,
372  F .Supp. 126 (N .D . M iss. 1 974) ...................... 28

W ashington  v. D avis, 426  U.S. 229  (1 9 7 6 )  ..7, 11, 19 
.......20 , 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 , 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 57

M iscellaneous

H ouse R ep o rt N o. 92-238 (1 9 7 1 ) ,  p. 19 ...................  51

1972 S enate C ongressional R ecord , p . 3372  ......... . 17

S enate R ep o rt N o. 92-415 (1 9 7 1 ) ,  pp . 10-11 .........  51

U nited  S tates C ongressional and  A dm inistra tive
N ew s (1 9 7 2 ) ,  p. 2139  ..................................................  44

U nited  S tates C ongressional and  A dm inistra tive
N ew s (1 9 7 2 ) ,  p. 2 1 5 4 ................  .......................... 16, 50

U nited  S tates C ongressional & A dm inistrative
N ew s (1 9 7 2 ) ,  p. 2175  ............................ .................... 46

R egulations

C ode of F edera l R egulations, T itle  5, Sec. 300.101 
-----......................................................-....................................  34

Page

84



IX.

R ules Page

Rules of C ourt, R ule 1 9 ( 1 ) (b )  ......................_.............  2

S tatu tes

Civil R ights A ct of 1866, Sec. 1 ................................ . 21

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 1 (b )  .... 42

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 701 (b )  (2 )
............-.................................. -.................................... ............  42

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 703 ( j )  .......
................................................................................... 12, 52 , 54

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 (b )  .... 39

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 (c )  ..... . 39

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 (d )  .... 39

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 (e )  ....
..................................... ......... ................ ........... ................. 39, 40

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec, 7 0 6 ( f ) ( 1 )
.................................................................................................. 39

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 709  ............ 39

Public L aw  94-559, 90 S tat. 2641 ................................... 40

U nited S tates C ode, T itle  5, Sec. 3304  ..... ......... ........  34

U nited S tates C ode, T itle  28, Sec. 1 2 5 4 (1 )  ..............  2
.............................................2, 11, 18, 19, 30, 35, 38, 50

U nited S tates C ode, T itle  28, Sec. 1343 .................. 2

U nited States C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 1981 ..................
................ 2, 3, 5, 7, 8 , 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19
............20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34
........... 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48
.................................................... 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58

U nited States C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 1982 ....................
...........................11, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 30, 57

85



X.

Page
U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 1983 ....5 , 11,16, 18 

....................19, 20 , 25 , 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 50, 57

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 1985 ...................  11

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 1 9 8 5 (3 )  ............
..................................... -----............................... -2 0 , 22 , 30, 57

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 1988 ...................... 4 0

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 2000e .................... 2

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 2 0 0 0 e (b )    41

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 2 0 0 0 e (c )  ............  41

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 2 0 0 0 e -5 (e )  ........  40

U nited  States C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 2 0 0 0 e -5 (f)  ( 1 )  .. 40

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42, Sec. 2000e-16  .............  5

U n ited  S tates C onstitu tion , F ifth  A m e n d m e n t............ 2

U nited  States C onstitu tion , T h irteen th  A m endm ent
............. - .............................................................18, 19, 22, 30

U nited  S tates C onstitu tion , F o u rteen th  A m endm ent

T extbooks

Fiss, A  T heory  of F a ir E m ploym ent L aw s, 38 U n i­
versity of C hicago  L aw  Review , pp. 235 , 327, 
n. 7 5 .............................................................................. .........  24

Schei &  G rossm an, E m ploym ent D iscrim ination  
L aw , p. 639 ............................................. ............ ............... 40

Seelm an, E m ploym ent T esting  L aw ; 10 U rb an  L aw ­
yer, pp. 1, 49, 59, n. 206  .............................................  23

86



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1978 

No. 77-1553

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERV­
ICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
vs.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, individu­
ally and on behalf of all others similarly situated, WILLIE C. 
BURSEY, ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. SMITH, WILLIAM 
CLADY, STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE ROY TUCKER, 
LEON AUBRY, RONALD CRAWFORD, JAMES HEARD, 
ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, OSBALDO A. AMPARAH, in­
dividually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit,

BRIEF FO R COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et aL, 
PETITIONERS.

Opinion and Judgment Below.
The opin ion  on rehearing  (inc lud ing  d issen t) of 

the U nited  S tates C ircu it C o u rt of A ppeals fo r the 
N inth C ircu it is repo rted  as Van Davis, et al. v. County 
of Los Angeles, et al., 566 F 2d 1334 (9 th  C ir. 1 9 7 7 ). 
The orig inal op in ion  of the circu it cou rt is p rin ted  
as A ppendix  F  and  repo rted  as 13 F E P  C ases 1217 
(1 9 7 6 ) .

87



_ 2—

Jurisdiction.

T he opin ion  and  judgm ent w ere en tered  on D ecem ber 
14, 1977. A  tim ely petition  for rehearing  w as filed 
by the respondents, Van Davis, et al. ( p lain tiffs-appel- 
lan ts b e lo w ), and  was denied  on Jan u a ry  30, 1978.

Ju risd ic tion  of the d istric t cou rt was based  on  28 
U .S.C . Sec. 1343.

T his C o u rt’s ju risd iction  is invoked under 28 U .S.C . 
Sec. 1 2 5 4 (1 ) ,  and  R ule 1 9 ( 1 ) ( b ) ,  an d  the Petition  
fo r W rit of C ertio ra ri was g ran ted  on  Ju n e  19, 1978.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved.

1. T he 5 th  and  14th A m endm ents to  the U nited  
S tates C onstitu tion ; in  particu la r, the due process and 
equal p ro tec tion  clauses thereof;

2. T he follow ing provisions of the U n ited  S tates 
Code:

42  U .S.C . Sec. 1981. E q u a l rights under the law:

A ll persons w ith in  the ju risd iction  of the  U nited  
states shall have the sam e righ t in  every S tate 
and  T errito ry  to  m ake and  enforce con trac ts , to  
sue, be parties, give evidence, and  to  the full 
and  equal benefit of all law s and  proceedings 
fo r the security  of persons and  p roperty  as is 
enjoyed by w hite citizens, an d  shall be subject 
to  like punishm ent, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, 
and  ex tractions of every kind, and  to  no  o ther.

42 U .S.C . Sec. 2Q00e, et seq. T itle  V II of the 
Civil R ights A ct of 1964 as am ended  in  1972.

Questions Presented.

1. Is p ro o f of purposefu l racial d iscrim inato ry  in ten t 
requ ired  to establish a cause of ac tion  fo r em ploym ent

88



— 3-

discrim ination u n d er 42  U .S.C . Sec. 1981 o r can  an  
em ployer be held  liab le  fo r p re -T itie  V II  em ploym ent 
practices u n d er Sec. 1981 m erely  by a  show ing of 
d isproportionate  im pact?

2. Is the  im position  of a rac ia l q uo ta  h iring  o rder 
effective un til the en tire  fire departm en t achieves cu r­
rent racial p a rity  w ith  the general L os A ngeles C ounty  
population  beyond the ju risd iction  of the co u rt when:

a. T h e  d istric t cou rt expressly found  no  d iscrim ina­
tory in ten t w as presen t;

b. T he q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r a ttem pts to  rem edy h iring  
practices occurring  p rio r  to  the effective da te  of T itle  
V II and  tim e b a rred  by the  app licab le  3 -year S ta tu te  
of L im itations on  Sec. 1981 actions;

c. T h e  responden ts h ad  n o  s tand ing  to  rep resen t 
any p re -M arch  24 , 1972 app lican ts and  no  d iscrim ina­
tory hiring  has occu rred  subsequen t to  T itle  V IP s effec­
tive date;

d. T he q u o ta  rem edy exceeds the scope of the 
effects of any  p roven  d iscrim inato ry  h iring  practices?

Statement of the Case,

In  this p roceeding , the C oun ty  of Los A ngeles by 
judgm ent en tered  on Ju ly  20, 1973 was found  liable 
for em ploym ent d iscrim ination  under 42 U .S.C . Sec. 
1981 and  T itle  V II and  o rde red  to  engage in  quo ta  
hiring of b lacks and  M exican-A m ericans un til the en tire 
fire departm en t num bering  1750 firefighters achieved 
racial parity  w ith the C oun ty ’s general popu la tion . T he 
following p ivotal facts w ere established a t trial:

1- I t  was conceded by respondents th a t no  dis­
crim inatory h iring  occu rred  afte r the effective date 
of T itle V II (A . 5, 6 ).

89



4-

2. T he tria l cou rt found  th a t the C oun ty  h ad  not, 
a t any  tim e, engaged in purposefu l d iscrim ination . To 
the con trary , the cou rt expressly found  th a t the C oun ty  
h ad  engaged in  efforts designed to  increase m inority  
rep resen ta tio n  in  the fire departm en t (A . 4 1 ) .

3. N one of the  respondents except those already  
em ployed by the d epartm en t had  been app lican ts fo r 
any  firefigh ter position  p rio r to  1972. N one of the 
nam ed  p lain tiffs h ad  been  d isqualified  o r adversely af­
fected  in  the  selection process by any of p e titioners’ w rit­
ten  tests. T h e  N in th  C ircu it subsequently  held  th a t the 
p lain tiffs lacked  s tand ing  to  challenge the  C o un ty ’s 
use of qualifica tion  tests given a t any tim e p rio r to  
1972 (A . 8 3 ) .

4. A ll responden t app lican ts tak ing  the 1972 w rit­
ten  exam  passed, an d  all h iring  from  the  resu lting  
eligibility list was conceded by plain tiffs p rio r to  tria l 
to  have been  accom plished in a non-d iscrim inatory  
m anner.

T he respondents in th e ir com plain t filed on  Jan u a ry  
11, 1973 challenged two w ritten  em ploym ent tests of 
the C oun ty  of Los A ngeles— one given in  1969 and 
the  o ther in 1972. O nly these two w ritten  em ploym ent 
tests adm in istered  by the C oun ty  of L os A ngeles are 
re levan t o r w ere in issue in  this case. B oth tests were 
civil service ap titude  tests developed by L os A ngeles 
C o u n ty ’s D ep artm en t of P ersonnel and  adm inistered  
to  all app lican ts fo r en try  level firem en during  the 
tw o periods w hen applica tions fo r em ploym ent were 
being accep ted .1 W hile also claim ing the  5 '7 "  m inim um  *

!The appointment procedure also included a competitive oral 
interview, medical exam, physical strength and agility test and 
background check. None of these tests had a disproportionate 
impact on minorities and were not challenged as being dis­
criminatory by the respondents.

90



— 5 —

height s tan d ard  w as d iscrim inatory , the p lain tiffs ( r e ­
spondents h ere in ) expressly declined to  seek an  in ju n c­
tion against its use in  bo th  the D istric t and  C ircu it 
C ourt. N one of the p lain tiffs w as d isqualified  by the 
m inim um  height stan d ard . In  an  am ended  com plain t 
the p lain tiffs conceded  th a t the h iring  as a  re su lt of 
the 1972 test w as no t d iscrim inato ry  (A . 5, 6 ) . U lti­
m ately, the  N in th  C ircu it in  the decision u n d er review  
ruled  th a t the p lain tiffs had  n o  standing  to  challenge 
the 1969 w ritten  tests.

Legal Proceedings.

In  July , 1973, the tria l co u rt found  th a t pe titioner 
C ounty of L os A ngeles h ad  v io lated  42  U .S .C . Secs. 
1981, 1983, an d  Sec. 2000e-16  (T itle  V II)  by adm in is­
tering a  w ritten  em ploym ent qualifica tion  test fo r entry- 
level firefigh ter in  1969, and  Jan u ary , 1972, w hich 
had  “a d isp roportionate  im pact on  b lacks an d  M exican- 
A m ericans and  no t show n by a validation  study to  
be predictive of job  perfo rm ance sta tistica lly” (A . 3 9 ) .2 

The d istric t cou rt upheld  the d ep artm en t’s 51" m in i­
m um  height s tandard . T he co u rt fu rth e r found  th a t 
neither the  defendan ts n o r th e ir officials had  engaged 
in any em ploym ent p ractices w ith  a w ilful o r conscious 
purpose o f excluding b lacks and  M exican-A m ericans

2The only employment practices found by the district court 
to be discriminatory were, 1) the use of the two written 
tests having a disproportionate impact on blacks and Mexican- 
Americans and not shown by a validation study to be predictive 
of job performance statistically, and 2) the failure to cure 
a bad reputation in the minority community. The latter ground 
the circuit court did not consider sufficient to constitute a 
valid Title VII claim because it was extremely impressionistic 
and the district court did not rely on that theory. The only 
practices held by the circuit court as being discriminatory were 
the 1972 written test and the height requirement.

Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 13 FEP Cases 1217 
at 1219 n.6. 91



6 —

from  em ploym ent, b u t to  the con tra ry , h ad  engaged 
in  efforts designed to  increase m inority  rep resen ta tion  
in  the  F ire  D ep artm en t (A . 4 1 ) .  T h e  d istric t cou rt 
also  found  th a t the petitioners did  n o t in terfe re  w ith 
affirm ative ac tion  efforts o f ind iv idual persons designed 
to  increase b lack  and  M exican-A m erican  p artic ip a tio n  
ra tes in  the F ire  D ep artm en t (A . 3 9 ) .

A s a  rem edy, the co u rt o rdered  th a t the C oun ty  
h ire  all fu tu re  en try  level firem en in  acco rdance  w ith 
a  h iring  q u o ta  of 2 0 %  b lack  and  2 0 %  M exican- 
A m erican  un til such tim e as the percen tage rep resen ta ­
tion  of those m inorities in  the en tire  F ire  D epartm en t 
in  all ranks equaled  th e ir rep resen ta tion  in  the  C oun ty ’s 
general popu lation .

T h e  only nam ed  p lain tiffs in  this case w ere ind iv id ­
uals w ho w ere already  em ployed as firefighters or 
w ho h ad  app lied  fo r and  tak en  only the 1972 w ritten  
exam ination  an d  w ere subsequently  certified  on a h iring  
list conceded  by p lain tiffs to  have been adm inistered  
and  utilized  in a non-d iscrim inato ry  m anner. N o  ind i­
v idual w ho h ad  been unsuccessful o n  the  1969, o r 
any p rio r exam , was a p lain tiff, n o r did  the p laintiffs 
seek to  rep resen t such p rio r applican ts, the com plain t 
alleging th a t it was filed only on beha lf o f “b lacks 
o r M exican-A m ericans” w ho are  cu rren t o r  fu tu re  app li­
can ts fo r em ploym ent as L os A ngeles C oun ty  F irem en 
(A . 3 ) .

O n appeal, the U nited  S tates C o u rt of A ppeals fo r 
the  N in th  C ircu it, in  its orig inal decision, affirm ed 
the judgm ent finding the C oun ty  in v io lation  of Sec. 
1981. T he co u rt found  th a t the p lain tiffs failed to 
prove th a t specific d iscrim inatory  acts occurred  during 
the effective period  covered by T itle  V II  because the 
tests adm inistered  in  1972 h ad  no t been im plem ented;

92



— 7—

tha t is, no civil service list was p rom ulgated  o r hires 
m ade as a consequence of the test resu lts (A . 56, 
5 7 ). N evertheless, the co u rt ru led  th a t T itle  V II s tan d ­
ards w ere applicab le  to  Sec. 1981 claim s an d  th a t 
a v io lation  of Sec. 1981 could  be established m erely 
by show ing th a t a h iring  p rac tice  h ad  a d ispara te  
effect on m inorities and  the  em ployer w as unab le  to  
validate the test as job-re la ted . T he circu it co u rt re ­
versed the tria l co u rt’s judgm ent uphold ing  petitio n e rs’ 
5 '7 "  m inim um  height s tan d ard  and  rem anded  fo r recon ­
sideration  of the  quo ta .

Subsequent to  its o rig inal decision, the N in th  C ircuit, 
upon petitioners’ request, g ran ted  a  rehearing  to  d e te r­
mine, in  ligh t o f this C o u rt’s recen t decision in Washing­
ton v. Davis, 426  U .S. 229  (1 9 7 6 ) ,  w hether p roo f 
of purposefu l d iscrim inato ry  in ten t is requ ired  fo r a 
v iolation of Sec. 1981. O n  rehearing , the  N in th  C ir­
cuit (Ju d g e  W allace d issen ting) affirm ed its orig inal 
finding th a t there  was no o p era tional d istinction  b e ­
tween liability  based  upon  T itle  V II and  Sec. 1981 
and th a t the adverse im pact standards evolving from  
Title V II cases w ere sufficient to  establish  liability  
under Sec. 1981. I t  was held  th a t a  show ing of delib ­
erate in ten t to  d iscrim inate  w as no t a requirem ent 
under Sec. 1981 as it was u n d er the U nited  S tates 
C onstitution, as determ ined  by this C o u rt in Washing­
ton v. Davis (A . 89, 9 0 ) .3 T h e  N in th  C ircuit, how ever,

3The majority opinion expressed their ruling in these terms: 
“In our view, there remains no operational distinction in this 
context between liability based upon Title VII and Sec. 1981. 
• • . “In summary, we believe the district court properly found 
defendants use of the 1972 written examination as a selection 
device to be a violation of Sec. 1981. Plaintiffs produced 
overwhelming statistical data to establish the test’s dispropor­
tionate impact upon minority applicants, and the defendants 
were unable to validate the test in terms of job-relatedness” 
(A. 90, 91). 93



— 8

did  ru le  th a t respondents lacked  standing  to  rep resen t 
p rio r unsuccessful app lican ts including  those tak ing  the 
1969 test because the class did no t include any p rio r 
unsuccessful applican ts. Van Davis, et al. v. County 
of Los Angeles, et al., 566 F .2 d  1334 a t 1338 (A . 
8 3 ) .

Judge W allace dissented, being of the op in ion  th a t 
co n stitu tiona l s tandards w ere applicab le  to  p roving  dis­
c rim ination  u n d er Sec. 1981 and  noting  th a t, even 
if it w ere o therw ise, the q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r w as excessive 
as w ell as im proper in  view of the co u rt’s finding 
th a t respondents lacked  stand ing  to  rep resen t fo rm er 
applicants.

Hiring Practices,

T h e  w ritten  civil service test challenged in  this litiga­
tion  was adm in istered  to  applican ts fo r entry-level fire ­
figh ter positions tw ice, once in  1969 and  again  in 
Jan u ary , 1972. T h e  o ra l interview  and  physical agility 
portions of the exam ination  process w ere no t a ttacked  
because they h ad  no  d isp roportionate  im pact on  m inori­
ties. Im plem enta tion  of the 1972 adm inistered  test was 
delayed  pending  litigation  in  the s ta te  courts an d  w hen 
finally  utilized  fo r h iring  purposes in  1973, was used 
only  on  a pass-fail basis w ith  9 7 %  of all applican ts 
passing. A s to  these passing applican ts, their subsequent 
o ra l interview s and  physical exam inations h ad  no  ad ­
verse im pact.

T he C oun ty  of L os A ngeles h ired  no  firem en from  
w ell before M arch  24, 1972 (th e  effective d ate  of 
T itle  V II )  un til the Spring of 1973, w hen the first 
recru it class was com posed 50 %  of m inorities (1 0

94



9-

blacks and  20 M exican -A m ericans.) 4 A ll subsequent 
hiring has been p u rsu an t to  the tria l co u rt’s 4 0 %  
preferen tia l m inority  h iring  o rd e r of July , 1973. A t 
no tim e w as there  any claim  m ade th a t there  had  
been d iscrim inato ry  h iring  since M arch  24, 1972, o r 
as a consequence of the 1972 w ritten  test.

I t  was estab lished  a t tria l in June , 1973 th a t the 
1969 w ritten  exam  as u tilized in  the h iring  of new  
firefighters h ad  a  d isp roportionate  im pact on  b lacks 
and M exican-A m ericans. T h e  C ounty , how ever, in  the 
adm inistra tion  of the subsequent 1972 exam , set the 
cut off score extrem ely low so th a t 9 7 %  of the app li­
cants passed, and  then  in tended  to  process th rough  
the o ra l in terview  an d  physical agility phases of the 
selection process approxim ately  500  of those applican ts. 
These 500  w ould  be chosen to tally  by ran d o m  selection 
so th a t the m inority  app lican t percen tage w hich app rox i­
m ated th e ir  com m unity  rep resen ta tion  w ould  be m ain ­
tained th ro u g h o u t the subsequent stages of the selection 
process w hich h ad  show n no h istory  of d isp roportionate  
racial im pact (A . 23, 2 4 ) .

A  s ta te  law suit alleging th a t the p roposed  random  
selection m ethod  vio lated  the civil service law  resulted  
in its use being enjoined. A fte r a y ea r’s delay, the 
C ounty, because of the urgen t need fo r new firem en, 
initially con tem pla ted  interview ing the top  544  app li­
cants on the 1972 w ritten  test. N o such selection 
or interview s were ever com m enced. Instead , all passing 
applicants w ere in terview ed and  hires w ere m ade in 
an o n -d isc rim in a to ry  m an n er (A . 5, 6, 2 5 ) .

4The respondents, in their first and second amended com­
plaints, alleged that the hiring of this recruit class was done 
in a non-discriminatory manner (A. 5, 6).

95



— 10—

D uring  the five-year pendency of the  appeal, the 
petitioners observed, and  in m ost cases exceeded the 
term s of the  q u o ta  h iring  o rder, and  as of Ju ly , 1978, 
h ad  h ired  as firem en recru its  373 persons of w hich 
207  ( 5 5 .5 % )  w ere b lacks o r M exican-A m ericans. P u r­
suan t to  the term s of the  judgm ent the d istric t cou rt 
receives annua l reports and  re ta in s ju risd ic tion  over 
the  case un til the en tire  departm en t reaches com m unity  
rac ia l parity .

Summary of Argument.

T he judgm ent herein  ho ld ing  the petitio n e r liable 
fo r  p re-T itle  V II  (M arch  24, 1 972) em ploym ent p ra c ­
tices is challenged on two p rim ary  grounds:

1 ) P u rposefu l d iscrim inato ry  in ten t is requ ired  to  
estab lish  a v io lation  of 42  U .S .C . Sec. 1981. This 
the respondents fa iled  to  do as the tria l co u rt expressly 
found  no  in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  in  regard  to  any 
of pe titioners’ em ploym ent p ractices.

2 )  T h e  q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r w as beyond  the  D istric t 
C o u rt’s ju risd iction  as it clearly  exceeds the scope of 
the vio lations and  illegally strives to  achieve rac ia l 
balance ra th e r th an  rem edy the  effects of p roven  dis­
crim ination  occurring  w ith in  the ac tionab le  3 -year S ta t­
ute o f L im ita tions period. M oreover, the  respondents 
(n o n e  of w hom  had  been d iscrim inatorily  denied  em ­
p loym ent) lacked  standing  to  rep resen t p rio r applican ts 
w ho w ere objects of the rem edial o rder.

T h e  petitioners m ade no hires in  a d iscrim inatory  
m anner o r w ith any d isp roportionate  effect subsequent 
to  the effective date  of T itle  V II , n o r in any way 
engaged in  a p a tte rn  o r  p rac tice  of d iscrim ination .

96



— 11'

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, enacted originally as part of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and reenacted as part 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, is a statute separate 
and distinct from Title VII and is neither co-extensive 
in coverage or in the standards for measuring an action­
able claim. Section 1981 is an equal protection statute 
similar to Sec. 1983, enacted to protect constitutional 
rights in accordance with the congressional intent to 
prohibit deliberate discrimination. The more stringent 
presumptions, standards, and burdens of proof unique 
to Title VII are not applicable to claims under Sec. 
1981 as the Supreme Court has held them not to be 
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment and Sec. 1983 
in W ashington  v. D avis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

A decision that constitutional standards (purposeful 
intent) govern the proof of a cause of action under 
Sec. 1981 will comport with its legislative history, 
its application in related discrimination cases, and will 
harmonize that statute with parallel interpretations of 
Secs. 1982, 1983, 1985, and the U.S. Constitution. 
Moreover, such an interpretation is necessary to avoid 
the harm attendant to Title VII enforcement procedures 
if Sec. 1981 discrimination standards are held to be 
operationally the same as Title VII’s.

Extending Title VII standards to Sec. 1981 causes 
of action will necessarily create conceptual confusion 
in all forms of non-employment discrimination actions 
under Sec. 1981. To a great extent the effect of the 
Court’s ruling in W ashington  v. D avis will be negated 
by the simple expedient of alleging a cause of action 
under Sec. 1981. Moreover, the circuit court’s decision 
will permit circumvention of the Title VII’s administra­
tive, conciliatory, and procedural prerequisites. The

97



— 12—

la tte r  consequence, because of d iffering  sta tu tes of lim i­
ta tio n  am ong the  ju risd ictions, w ould destroy the en ­
fo rcem ent uniform ity  of T itle  V II and  expose the  federa l 
cou rts  to  a flood of litigation  on  claim s th a t C ongress 
in tended  shou ld  be first w innow ed th rough  the E E O C  
conc ilia tion  m achinery. T he circu it co u rt’s decision  ef­
fectively v itiates the clear d istinc tion  this C o u rt has 
m ade betw een proof and  liability  fo r pre- and  post- 
T itle  V II  em ploym ent p ractices an d  m akes T itle  V II 
re troactive  to  governm ent agencies.

A lthough liability  and  the q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r have 
been  p red ica ted  upon  a v io la tion  of Sec. 1981, it 
is likew ise c lea r th a t there  has been no v io lation  of 
T itle  V II. A ll h ires by the petitioners subsequen t to 
the  effective d ate  of T itle  V II have been  non-discrim ina- 
tory , w ithou t d isp roportionate  effect, and  in  com pliance 
w ith the C o u rt’s quo ta  h iring  order. U nder the  facts 
of the case, there  is absolutely  no basis fo r a finding 
of T itle  V II v io lation  and  certa in ly  there  is no  fac tual 
justification  fo r the w ide-ranging quo ta  h iring  o rder 
im posed.

A lthough the focus of the argum ent has been directed  
to  the Sec. 1981 issue, the n a tu re  of the rem edy im posed 
has far-reach ing  consequences and  is subject to  serious 
challenge. T h e  tria l co u rt’s h iring  o rd e r requ iring  40 %  
m inority  h iring  p er annum  un til the  en tire  fire  d ep a rt­
m en t achieves rac ia l parity  w ith the general county 
popu lation  is in  excess of the co u rt’s ju risd iction  and 
violates Sec. 7 0 3 ( j )  of T itle  V II. T he respondents 
have concurred  th a t the rem edial h iring  o rder herein 
w as based  upon  a p a tte rn  and  p rac tice  of d iscrim inatory  
p ractices th a t w ere unlaw ful only un d er Sec. 1981, 
n o t T itle  V II (O pposition  2 9 ) . A s such, of course,

98



— 13—

the quota order is totally unrelated to the extent of 
any proven violation, seeks to provide a remedy to 
a class the court of appeals has held the respondents 
have no standing to represent, and attempts to remedy 
speculative unproven discrimination that could have 
only taken place, if at all, more than three years 
preceding the filing of the action and thus time barred 
under the applicable statute of limitations.

99



ARGUMENT.

I
CONSTITUTIONAL, NOT TITLE VII, STANDARDS OF 

DISCRIMINATION GOVERN CLAIMS UNDER 42 
U.S.C. SEC. 1981; PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION IS 
THE CORRECT CRITERION FOR ADJUDGING A 
VIOLATION OF SEC. 1981.

A. Section 1981 Is a Separate and Distinct Equal 
Protection Statute Whose Standards of Liability 
Should Track Constitutional Principles, Not Those 
of Title VII.

T h e  circu it co u rt’s holding th a t there  rem ains no  
o p era tional d istinction  betw een liab ility  based  upon 
T itle  V II  and  Sec. 1981 ignores Sec. 1981’s constitu ­
tional heritage and  em barks the federa l courts  on  a 
journey th a t is com pletely d ivergent from  the  h isto rical 
foundations of the C ivil R ights A cts of 1866 and  
1870.

O ne begins w ith  the observation  th a t Sec. 1981 
and  T itle  V II are separate , d istinct and  independen t 
s ta tu tes afford ing  different, albeit to  som e ex ten t re ­
lated , rights and  rem edies. T he independen t n a tu re  
of the two statu tes, enacted  m ore th an  n inety  years 
ap a rt, w as firm ly established by the C o u rt in  Johnson 
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U .S. 454  (1 9 7 5 ) .

In  Johnson, the C o u rt h ad  occasion  to  decide w hether 
the filing of an  E E O C  charge p u rsu a n t to  T itle  V II 
to lled the sta tu te  of lim itations applicab le to  an  action  
o n  the sam e facts u n d er Sec. 1981. T he C o u rt, in 
concluding  th a t it d id  no t and  th a t the  p la in tiff was 
b a rred  from  pursu ing  his claim  under Sec. 1981 stated  
that,

___14—

100



— 15.

“Sec. 1981 is no t coextensive in its coverage w ith  
T itle  V II” ,

and com m ented  fu rther,

. . th a t the rem edies availab le u n d er T itle  
V II  and  Sec. 1981, a lthough  re la ted  and  although 
direc ted  to  m ost of the sam e ends, are separate , 
d istinct, and  in d e p e n d e n t. . .”

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra 
a t 4 60 , 461 .

In  an  earlie r case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
392 U .S. 409 , 88 S .C t. 21 8 6  (1 9 6 8 ) ,  the  Suprem e 
C ourt n o ted  the independen t n a tu re  of the R eco n stru c­
tion E ra  C ivil R igh ts S ta tu tes an d  the recen tly  enacted  
Civil R ights A c t of 1968. T itle  V III  of the Civil 
R ights A c t of 1968, sim ilar to  T itle  V II  of the Civil 
R ights A c t of 1964, p roh ib ited  d iscrim ination  in  a 
defined a rea  of congressional concern  and  p rovided  
com prehensive adm in istra tive m achinery  fo r the en fo rce­
m ent of open  an d  non-d iscrim inato ry  housing. T he 
Suprem e C o u rt found  th a t s ta tu te  to  be qu ite d ifferen t 
from  its 100-year-old p redecessor in  42  U .S .C . Sec. 
1982 stating ,

“L a te r  the sam e day, the H ouse passed  the Civil 
R ights A c t of 1968. Its enactm ent h ad  no  effect 
up o n  Sec. 1982 an d  no effect upon  this litigation , 
bu t it underscored  the vast differences betw een, 
on  the one han d , a general s ta tu te  applicab le 
only to  rac ia l d iscrim ination  in the ren ta l and  
sale of p roperty  and  enfo rceab le  only by p rivate  
parties acting  on their ow n initiative, and , on 
the o ther hand , a detailed  housing law , applicable 
to  a  b ro ad  range of d iscrim inato ry  p ractices and

101



— 16—

en forceab le  by a com plete arsenal of federa l au ­
th o rity .”

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra a t 2191 .

A lthough  Jones involved Sec. 1982, a com pan ion  
to  Sec. 1981 in  the C ivil R ights A ct of 1870, the 
C o u rt’s analysis o f th a t s ta tu te  in  the con tex t o f the 
recently  enacted  T itle  V III  of the C ivil R ights A c t of 
1968 is extrem ely  illum inating . In  addition  to  recog­
nizing the independen t n a tu re  of the tw o sta tu tes, the 
C o u rt fo u n d  th a t the passage of the m odern  law  h ad  
no effect upon  Sec. 1982— a view  sim ilar to  the  one 
urged  by the  petitioners herein— th a t T itle  V II of the 
1964 C ivil R ights A c t w as n o t in tended  to , and , in  
fact, d id  n o t have any effect on Sec. 1981.

E vidence in  the Congressional Record could  n o t 
m ake it m ore clear th a t C ongress in enacting  T itle  
V II in  1964 and  am ending it in  1972, in tended  T itle  
V II  to  p rovide an  additional, independen t cause of 
ac tion  an d  in  no  w ay to  affect Secs. 1981, 1983:

“In  establish ing the app licab ility  of T itle  V II  to  
s ta te  an d  local em ployees, the C om m ittee wishes 
to  em phasize th a t the ind iv idual’s righ t to  file 
a  civil ac tion  in  his ow n behalf, p u rsu a n t to  the 
C ivil R ights A ct of 1870  and  1871, 42  U .S .C . 
Secs. 1981 an d  1983, is in no  w ay affec ted” . . . . 

“T itle  V II  w as envisioned as an  independent s ta tu ­
to ry  au tho rity  m ean t to  provide an  aggrieved ind i­
v idual w ith an  add itional rem edy to  redress em ­
p loym ent d iscrim ination  . . . .”

U.S. Cong. & Adm. News ’72 , p. 2154 .

In  debating  w hether to  repeal Sec. 1981 an d  to  
m ake T itle  V II the exclusive d iscrim ination  rem edy

102



- 1 7 -

in 1972, it w as sta ted  by S enato r W illiam s in  support 
of re ta in ing  Sec. 1981 that:

“T his is especially tru e  w here the legal issues 
un d er o th er law s m ay n o t fa ll w ith in  the scope 
of T itle  V II or w here the em ployee, em ployer, 
o r  lab o r o rgan iza tion  does no t fa ll w ithin the 
ju risd ic tiona l confines of T itle  V II. T hese s itu a­
tions do exist, and  I am  sure th a t it is unnecessary  
to  spell them  ou t a t this p o in t.”

1972 S enate Congressional Record, p. 3372 .

W hile bo th  the Suprem e C o u rt and  C ongress have 
observed th a t Sec. 1981 and  T itle  V II are separa te  
and d istinc t s ta tu tes prov id ing  independen t avenues fo r 
relief, it has been rem arked  th a t the rem edies are, 
to a ce rta in  ex ten t, coextensive an d  th a t the tw o sta tu tes 
augm ent each  o th er an d  are  no t m utually  exclusive.
This is co rrec t, of course, to  th e  sam e ex ten t as can  
be said  ab o u t any num ber of law s th a t deal in  general 
with the  sam e sub ject m atter. T h is does n o t m ean  
that the sam e s tan d ard  of liability  perta ins to  each 
statu te an d  th a t purposefu l in ten t is n o t a  necessary  
elem ent to  a Sec. 1981 claim .

T he rem edies availab le  u n d er Sec. 1981 an d  T itle  
V II are  very sim ilar and  bo th  sta tu tes provide a cause 
of action  fo r d iscrim ination  in  em ploym ent, includ ing  
that of a deliberate ch arac te r. T his overlap  of rem edies 
and jurisd iction  in  the instance of deliberate  d iscrim ina­
tion canno t be taken  as a basis fo r concluding  th a t 
the p roo f of d iscrim ination  is the sam e in  all cases 
under the tw o independen t s ta tu tes and  th a t Sec. 1981 
prohibits u n in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  upon  p roo f th a t 
a neutral h iring prac tice  had  a d isp roportionate  im pact.

Since T itle  V II and  Sec. 1981 are clearly  independent 
statutes, and  the petitioners’ liability  was pred icated  103



18—

o n  the la tte r, the in q u iry  m ust focus on  w hat is the 
s tan d ard  of liab ility  u n d er Sec. 1981 as in tended  by 
C ongress in  the post-C ivil W ar period .

1. Section 1981 Was Enacted as an Equal Protection Statute 
Intended to Enforce Constitutional Rights.

Section 1981 is a post-C ivil W a r R econstru c tio n  
E ra  s ta tu te  orig inally  enacted  in  1866 to  enforce the 
13 th  A m endm ent to  the U n ited  S tates C onstitu tion  
w hich p roh ib its  invo lun tary  servitude, an d  extends to 
o thers the sam e righ t to  m ake and  enforce con trac ts  
enjoyed by  w hite citizens— th a t is, equal rights un d er 
the  law s. Section 1981 w as subsequently  reen ac ted  as 
p a r t of th e  C ivil R ights A c t of 1870, w hich w as 
designed to  im plem ent the 14th  A m endm ent. C learly , 
Sec. 1981, enacted  as p a r t of the C ivil R ights A ct 
of 1866, rested  only on  the  13th A m endm en t as the 
14th A m endm ent h ad  no t been form ally  p roposed  at 
the tim e. T h e  C ivil R igh ts A c t of 1870, how ever, 
is based  up o n  the 14th A m endm ent and  it reenacted , 
w ith  m ino r changes, ce rta in  language of Sec. 1981, 
as it appeared  in  the 1866 A ct.

In  determ ining  w hether Sec. 1981 is based  solely 
on  the  13th o r  14th A m endm ent, the p roblem  is com ­
p o unded  by  the reenac tm ent of Secs. 1981 an d  1983 
together in  th e  recod ification  in 1874. T h e  m ost recent 
Suprem e C o u rt view appears to  be th a t Sec. 1981 
finds its roots in both the 13th and  14th A m endm ents.

W hile the tru e  co n stitu tiona l an tecedents of Secs. 
1981 and  1983 m ay m ake fo r an  in teresting  excursion 
in to  the realm  of legislative genealogy, its reso lu tion  
is n o t determ inative of the p redom inan t issue of this 
case; i.e., w hether T itle  V II  o r  co nstitu tiona l standards 
of liability  perta in . I t  is c lear th a t Sec. 1981 is based

104



— 19.

upon a  constitu tiona l righ t w hich the  C o u rt has found  
is traceab le , in  substan tia l p a r t, to  the 14 th  A m endm ent. 
Even assum ing Sec. 1981 to  be p red ica ted  solely on 
the 13th A m endm ent, the s tan d ard  of liab ility  is still 
purposeful rac ia l d iscrim ination .

T he b ro a d e r equal p ro tec tio n  p rincip les applicab le  
to all races from  Sec. 1981 has been recently  em p h a­
sized %y this C o u rt despite  its p a rtia l heritage  from  
the 13th A m endm ent. McDonnell v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co., 427  U.S. 327 , 96  S.C t. 2574  
(1 9 7 6 ) ; Runyon v. McCrary, 427  U .S. 160, 96 S.Ct. 
2586 (1 9 7 6 ) .  In  this contex t, an  argum ent th a t consti­
tu tional d istinctions in  the origins of Secs. 1983 and 
1981, in and  of them selves, req u ire  re jection  of the 
Washington v. Davis ru le  w hen  applied  to  local govern­
m ent ac tion  challenged  u n d er Sec. 1981, lacks p e rsu a ­
sion. S tandards fo r ac tionab le  d iscrim ination  under the 
two sta tu tes should  be harm onized , ra th e r th an  d istin ­
guished, a  concep t n o ted  by this C o u rt in  Runyon 
v. McCrary, supra. Section 1981 proh ib its rac ia l d istinc­
tions in  the term s of, o r in  the  righ t to  m ake, a con tract. 
I t  does no t in co rp o ra te  the subtleties and  rigorous s tan d ­
ards re la ting  to  adverse im pact and  test validation  
that have evolved w ith the passage of T itle  V II and  
its subsequent in te rp re ta tio n  by the courts and  adm inis­
trative agencies. If the em ployer deliberately  d iscrim i­
nates in  m aking  an  em ploym ent co n trac t based on 
race, o r specifies d ifferen t term s and  conditions thereof 
based solely on race, then  those s ta tu tes as well as 
the U nited  S tates C onstitu tion  have been violated.

“O ne of the ‘rights enum erated ’ in Sec. 1 is 
‘the sam e right . . .  to  m ake and  enforce con tracts  
. . .  as is enjoyed by w hite citizens . . . .’ 14 Stat. 
27. Ju st as in Jones a N egro ’s Sec. 1 righ t to

105



■20—

p u rchase  p ro p erty  on equal term s w ith  w hites was 
v io lated  w hen a  p riva te  person  refused to  sell to 
the  p rospective pu rchaser solely because h e  w as 
a N egro , so also a N egro ’s Sec. 1 righ t to  ‘m ake 
and  enforce co n trac ts’ is v io lated  if a p riva te  o ffer­
er refuses to  ex tend  a N egro , solely because he 
is a N egro , the sam e opportun ity  to  en te r in to  
co n trac ts  as he extends to  w hite offerees.”

Runyon v. McCrary, supra a t 2594 .

T h is exclusion based on race alone is clearly  no t 
w hat occurred  in  the in stan t case o r in  Washington 
v. Davis. In  b o th  instances, the  sam e civil service 
developed test was adm inistered  to  all races an d  the 
sam e g rad ing  and  scoring standards fo r d e term ina tion  
of eligibility fo r  appo in tm en t w ere applied  equally  and  
consistently  to  all races. T h e  respondents have p red i­
ca ted  th e ir en tire case solely upon  a show ing of d isp ro ­
p o rtio n a te  im pact and  a claim  th a t the defendan ts can ­
n o t prove by a  valida tion  study th a t their tests are  re­
la ted  to, o r  predictive of, job  perfo rm ance statistica lly—  
evidentiary  princip les th a t have evolved solely from  
T itle  V II decisions.

T he Suprem e C o u rt has previously  held  th a t d iscrim i­
na to ry  in ten t is requ ired  under 4 2  U .S .C . Secs. 1982, 
1983 and  1 9 8 5 (3 ) .  Section 1981 should  be construed  
accordingly. In  Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation 
Assn., 410  U .S. 431 , 93 S .C t. 1090 (1 9 7 3 ) ,  supra, 
the C o u rt s ta ted  th a t Secs. 1981 and  1982 should  
be construed  together in  light of their h istorical re la tio n ­
ship. N oting  the independence of T itle  V III  from  Sec. 
1982, the C o u rt in Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., w ent 
on  to  in terp re t Sec. 1982, itself, to  determ ine if it 
p roh ib ited  private  as well as public  d iscrim ination . T he

106



• 2 1 -

present language of Sec. 1982 is rem arkab ly  sim ilar 
in  its b ro a d  scope to  th a t of Sec. 1981 since bo th  
find th e ir  genesis in Sec. 1 of the 1866 C ivil R ights 
A ct. A s the C o u rt described the sta tu te  in  Jones, supra 
at 2193,

“ . . . [ i ]n  p la in  and  unam biguous term s Sec. 
1982 g ran ts to  all citizens, w ithou t reg a rd  to  race 
o r color, the sam e righ t to  pu rch ase  o r  lease 
p ro p erty  as is enjoyed by w hite citizens.”

T he p resen t language of Sec. 1981 w as orig inally  p a r t 
of Sec. 1 of the 1866 C ivil R ights A c t w hich provided: 

“ • . . citizens, o f every race  and  color, w ithou t 
reg ard  to  any prev ious cond ition  of slavery o r 
invo lun ta ry  servitude, * * * shall have the sam e 
right, in  every S ta te  and  T errito ry  in  the  U nited  
S tates, to make and enforce contracts, to  sue, 
be  parties, and  give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and  to  full and  equal benefit o f all 
law s and  proceedings fo r the security  of person  
and  p roperty , as is enjoyed by w hite citizens, 
an d  shall be sub ject to  like punishm ent, pains, 
and  penalties, and  to  none o ther, any  law , sta tu te , 
o rd inance, regu la tion , o r  custom , to  the con tra ry  
no tw ith stand ing .” (E m phasis  a d d e d ).

In  la ter codifications, the language perta in ing  to  the 
right to  m ake and  enforce con trac ts  was re ta in ed  
in Sec. 1981, and  the language re lating  to  the right 
to purchase, lease and  convey rea l o r personal p roperty  
was transposed  to  a  new  section  enum erated  as Sec. 
1982. In  in terp re ting  w hat the presen t language of 
Sec. 1982 was in tended  to  proh ib it, the C o u rt stated: 

“H ence the s tructu re  of the 1866 A ct, as well 
as its language, po in ts to  the conclusion  urged

107



— 22—

by  the  petitioners in  this case— th a t Sec. 1 was 
m ean t to  p roh ib it all racially  motivated dep riva­
tions of the rights enum erated  in  the  s ta tu te . . . 
(E m phasis  ad d e d ).

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra a t 2196 .

T w o statu tes enacted  at the sam e tim e, sharing  the 
sam e congressional goals and  the sam e C ivil R ights 
A ct, and  utilizing essentially the sam e language, p a rtic u ­
larly  the operative phrases u n d er w hich certa in  form s 
o f  d iscrim ination  are  ac tionable ; to  w it, “to  m ake and  
enforce co n trac ts ,” and  “to  . . . pu rchase, lease, sell 
. . . and  convey rea l an d  personal p ro p erty ” m ust 
be considered in pari materia and  construed  accord ing­
ly. T he p arity  of construction  betw een Secs. 1981 and  
1982 is fu rth e r supported  by the Suprem e C o u rt’s find­
ing  in  Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 
410  U .S. 431 , 93 S.Ct. 1090  (a  case involving an  
express rac ia l exclusionary  p o licy ), tha t:

“In  light of the h isto rica l in terre la tionsh ip  betw een 
Sec. 1981 and  Sec. 1982, there  is no  reason  to  
construe these sections differently  w hen applied 
on  these facts to  the claim  of Wheaton-Haven 
th a t it is a p riva te  c lub .”

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Assn., 
supra a t 172.

A dditional sup p o rt fo r the conclusion th a t Sec. 1981 
is an  equal p ro tec tion  constitu tionally  based  s ta tu te  
requ iring  p roo f of d iscrim inato ry  in ten t is p rov ided  by 
this C o u rt’s decision in terp re ting  Sec. 1 9 8 5 (3 ) ,  enacted  
as p a r t o f the 1871 A ct, in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790 (1 9 7 1 ) .  In  Griffin, the 
C o u rt held th a t Sec. 1 9 8 5 (3 )  w as prem ised on  the 
13 th  A m endm ent and  th a t a requ ired  elem ent of a

108



cause of ac tion  u n d er th a t s ta tu te  w as invidious d iscrim ­
inatory  intent:

“T h e  co nstitu tiona l shoals th a t w ould  be in  the 
p a th  of in terp re ting  Sec. 1 9 8 5 (3 )  as a general 
federa l to rt law  can  be avoided by  giving full 
effect to  the  congres'sional purpose— by requiring , 
as an  elem ent of the cause of action , the  k ind  
of invidiously d iscrim inato ry  m otiva tion  stressed 
by the sponsors of the  lim iting  am endm ent. See 
the rem arks of R epresentatives W illard  and  Shella- 
barger, qu o ted  supra, a t 1797. T h e  language re ­
quiring  in ten t to  deprive of equal p ro tec tion , o r 
equal privileges an d  im m unities, m eans th a t there 
m ust be som e rac ia l, o r  perhaps otherw ise class- 
based, invidiously d iscrim inato ry  anim us behind  
the  co n sp ira to rs’ action . T h e  conspiracy, in  o ther 
w ords, m ust aim  a t a deprivation  of the equal en­
joym ent of rights secured by the law  to  all.” 2

2, Congressional Intent in the Enactment of Section 1981 
Was to Prohibit Unconstitutional, Purposeful Discrimina­
tion, Not to Create Liability Based on Disproportionate 
Impact.

T h e discrim ination  addressed  by C ongress a t tim e 
of enactm ent of Sec. 1981 was in ten tiona l, no t conse­
quential. T he adverse im pact theory  d id  no t evolve 
until the E E O C  G uidelines of 1970 and  the in terpretive 
Griggs decision of 1971. A lthough serious do u b t exists 
as to  w hether C ongress even in tended  adverse im pact 
standards w ithou t considerations of in ten t to  apply to  
Title V II, p articu la rly  in regard  to  public em ployers 
(see Seelm an, Employment Testing Law; 10 U rb an  
Law yer 1, 49 , 59, n 2 0 6 ) ;  it is c lea r the Griggs 
doctrine evolved solely in conjunction  w ith T itle  V II.

- 23-

109



— 24—

O ne can n o t avoid no ting  the inequ ity  of holding the 
C oun ty  of Los A ngeles liable for pre-1971 h iring  p ra c ­

tices u n d er a s tan d ard  th a t d id  no t em erge until 
1971. T h e  d isp roportionate  im pact crite rion  is a  c rea­
tu re  of con tem porary  developm ent, n o t m en tioned  by 
C ongress in 1964, o r expressly p rovided  fo r in  T itle  

V II. In  fact, p rio r to  the issuance of the 1970 E E O C  
G uidelines, th a t agency h ad  n o t adop ted  adverse im pact 

as an  indicium  of p roh ib ited  rac ia l d iscrim ination .

I t  is difficult to  envision how  an  agency w ithout 
the pow er to  issue regu la tions having  the fo rce and  

effect of law  in reg ard  to  the sta tu te  w hich created  
it (Gilbert v. General Electric, 429  U .S. 125 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) ,  
can  change the standards of liab ility  under a  s ta tu te  
p redating  it by 100 years and  w ith reg ard  to  w hich 

they have no regu la to ry  relationsh ip . C hanges in  a 
federa l agency position  on testing  p rincip les indicate 

the  u ncerta in  n a tu re  of em ploym ent d iscrim ination  con­
cepts even in  the context of T itle  V II. T h e  civil service 
p rocedures developed in the la te  19th and  early  20th 
centuries to  p rom ote  m erit h iring  in  public em ploym ent, 

such as the F ederal Service E n tran ce  E xam in a tio n  at 
issue in Washington v. Davis and  those developed 

nationally  by s ta te  and  local entities, w ere considered 
m odels of public adm in istra tion . It is inconceivable 

th a t C ongress in 1866 could  have in tended  these to 

constitu te  a v io lation  of Sec. 1981 absent racial m otiva­

tion  in their use. W hat constitu tes a p ro p er testing 

technique rem ains a m a tte r of in tense controversy  (see

110



- 2 5 -

Brief of A P A , D ivision 14, in  Washington v. Davis). 
W hether an  em ployer has v io lated  an  1866 civil rights 
statu te should  no t tu rn  upon  psychological testing  s tan d ­
ards in  con tem porary  vogue.

B. Extension of Griggs Doctrine to Section 1981 Is 
Inconsistent With Established Standards of Liability 
in Non-employment Civil Rights Actions,

In  add ition  to  disagreeing w ith the app lica tion  of 
the Griggs s tan d ard  in  previous em ploym ent d iscrim ina­
tion cases u n d er Secs. 1981 and  1983, this C o u rt 
in Washington v. Davis, supra a t 240 , 2047 , expressly 
ruled it inapp licab le  to  constitu tiona l d iscrim ination  
claims in  o th er contexts. T he C o u rt in Washington 
stated, supra a t 2051,

“A  ru le  th a t a s ta tu te  designed to  serve n eu tra l 
ends is nevertheless invalid , absen t com pelling ju s­
tification , if in  prac tice  it benefits o r burdens 
one race m ore th an  an o th er w ould be far-reach ing  
and  w ould  raise serious questions abou t, and  p e r­
haps invalidate, a w hole range of tax , w elfare, 
public service, regu la to ry , and  licensing statu tes 
th a t m ay be m ore burdensom e to the p o o r and 
to  the average b lack  th an  to  the m ore affluent 
w hite.”

T he concern  no ted  above will becom e a reality  if 
the con trac t clause in Sec. 1981 is in terp re ted  and  
applied in con junction  with the Griggs doctrine. F o r 
example, the C o u rt in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 
supra, construed  Sec. 1982 w hich proh ib its d iscrim ina­
tion in the sale and  purchase  of real p roperty  as 
being d irected  against racially  m otivated  practices. H ow ­
ever, the righ t to  p u rchase  o r sell rea l p roperty  is

111



•26-

exercised con tractually . If  d isp roportionate  im pact is in ­
sufficient fo r liability  under Sec. 1982, then  a  c la im an t 
in  a non-em ploym ent con tex t need sim ply p lead  his 
case under Sec. 1981 and  thus invalidate  the challenged  
p rop erty  re la ted  p rac tice  sim ply on the g round  it is 
m ore burdensom e to  m inorities.

R acia l d iscrim ination  claim s n o t involving em ploy­
m ent have been and  will continue to  be  b ro u g h t under 
Sec. 1981 as well as Sec. 1983 an d  the  C onstitu tion . 
T h ere  is no th ing  in  the legislative history  of Sec. 1981 
w hich suggests th a t liability  th ereunder is to  be prem ised 
m erely upon  a show ing of d isp roportionate  im pact o r 
th a t em ploym ent cases are  to  be accorded  special tre a t­
m en t and  be subject to  d ifferen t s tandards of p roof 
th an  o th er civil rights claim s encom passed by  th a t 
s ta tu te . T h e  C ircu it C o u rt’s holding herein , necessarily  
underm ines the th ru s t of the Washington decision and  
invites confusion and  e rro r as to  the co rrec t s tan d ard  
fo r p roving d iscrim ination  in  fu tu re  nonem ploym ent 
cases un d er Sec. 1981.

Sec. 1981, as no ted  earlier, b road ly  p ro tec ts  the 
rig h t o f all persons in  the U n ited  S tates to  m ake 
and  enforce con trac ts  and  to  have the fu ll and  equal 
benefit o f all laws. D iscrim ination  ac tions alleging a 
v io lation  of th a t s ta tu te  have been prosecuted  against 
a wide varie ty  of public and  p rivate  actions in  w hich 
the courts have uniform ly applied  the constitu tional 
deliberate in ten t s tandard , a fac t em phasized by this 
C o u rt in W ashington. R ecen t exam ples are:

Runyon v. McCrary, supra, ( denial o f adm ission 
to  publicly  advertised  p rivate  schools solely be­
cause of ra c e ) ;  Hills v. Gautreaux, (1 9 7 6 )  425 
U.S. 284  [96  S.C t. 1538] (d iscrim inato ry  housing

112



- 2 7 -

practices th a t selected sites to  in ten tiona lly  avoid 
p lacing  b lacks in  w hite n e ig h b o rh o o d s); Jennings 
v. Paterson, (5 th  C ir. 1 974) 488  F .2 d  436  (c o n ­
struction  of ro ad  b arricad e  to  deliberately  b a r  ac ­
cess to  b la c k s ) ; Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, 
Inc., (2 n d  C ir. 1974) 495 F .2 d  1333 (rac ia lly  
m otivated  swim  club exclusory p o licy ); Bell v. 
Southwell, (5 th  C ir. 1 967) 376 F .2 d  659 (seg re­
gated  voting  lists and  b o o th s).

In each case w here liab ility  w as estab lished  it was 
predicated  upon  evidence of deliberate  in ten t, n o t a 
neutral p rac tice  th a t in  o p era tion  h ad  a  racially  d ispro­
portionate im pact. T h e  suggestion th a t rac ia l im pact 
standing alone should  now  be the stan d ard  fo r liability  
appears re jected  by the m ajo rity  in  Washington w hen 
the C o u rt stated:

“B oth  before an d  afte r Palmer v. Thompson, how ­
ever, various C ourts of A ppeals have held  in  sever­
al contexts, including public employment, th a t the 
substan tially  d isp roportionate  rac ia l im pact of a 
s ta tu te  o r  official p rac tice  standing  alone and  w ith­
ou t regard  to  d iscrim inatory  purpose, suffices to  
prove rac ia l d iscrim ination  v io lating  the E q u a l 
P ro tec tion  C lause absent som e justification  going 
substan tia lly  beyond w hat w ould be necessary  to  
validate m ost o ther legislative classifications. T he 
cases im pressively dem onstrate  th a t there  is an ­
o ther side to  the issue; bu t, w ith all due respect, 
to the extent that those cases rested on or expressed 
the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose 
is unnecessary in making out an equal protection 
violation, we are in disagreement.” (E m phasis 
ad d e d ).

Washington v. Davis, supra a t 246, 2050.
113



— 28—

In  foo tno te  12, Washington v. Davis, supra a t 2050 , 
the C o u rt listed  the num erous cases w ith w hich they 
d isagreed  including a substan tia l num ber dealing  w ith 
public  em ploym ent.5 M any  of these cases in b o th  the 
em ploym ent and  non-em ploym ent contex ts w ere b rough t 
u n d er Sec. 1981 as well as Sec. 1983. N o tab le  exam ples 
are:

Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F .2 d  1167, 
1176-1177 (C A 2  1 9 7 2 ); Bridgeport Guardians 
v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm’n., 4 8 2  F .2 d  
1333, 1337 (C A 2  1 9 7 3 ); Castro v. Beecher, 
459  F .2 d  725 , 732-733  (C A 1  1 9 7 2 ); Arnold

5Cases dealing with public employment include Chance v. 
Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-1177 (CA2 1972); 
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-733 (CA1 1972); Bridge­
port Guardian v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm’n, 482 F.2d 
1333, 1337 (CA2 1973); Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 
F.Supp. 1187, 1200 (D.Md.), aff’d in pertient part sub nom.; 
Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (CA4 1973); Douglas v. 
Hampton, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 62, 67, 512 F.2d 976, 981 
(1975); but cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096-1097 
(CAS 1975), cert, pending, No. 75-1026. There are also 
District Court cases: Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension 
Serv., 372 F.Supp. 126, 143 (ND Miss. 1974); Arnold  v. 
Ballard, 390 F.Supp. 723, 736, 737 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United 
States v. City of Chicago, 385 F.Supp. 543, 553 (N.D. 111. 
1974); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F.Supp. 721, 724 (D. 
Minn. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 498 F.2d 143 (CA8 
1974).

In other contexts there are Norwalk C O RE  v. Norwalk Re­
development Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (CA2 1968) (urban re­
newal); Kennedy Park Homes Assn. v. City of Lackawanna, 
436 F.2d 108, 114 (CA2 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 1010, 
91 S.Ct. 1256, 28 L.Ed.2d 546 (1971) (zoning); Southern 
Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City, 424 
F.2d 291 (CA9 1970) (dictum) (zoning); Metropolitan H. 
D. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (CA7), 
cert, granted, December 15, 1975, 423 U.S. 1030, 96 S.Ct. 
560, 46 L.Ed.2d 404 (1975) (zoning); Gautreaux v. Romney, 
448 F.2d 731, 738 (CA7 1971) (dictum) (public housing); 
Crow v. Brown, 332 F.Supp. 382, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1971), 
aff’d, 457 F.2d 788 (CA5 1972) (public housing); Hawkins 
v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (CA5 1971), aff’d on 
rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972) (municipal services).

114



— 29—

v. Ballard, 390 F .S upp. 723 , 7 36 , 737  (N .D .
O hio  1 9 7 5 ).

Of p a rticu la r in terest is the fac t th a t the  d is tric t cou rt 
in Arnold v. Ballard up o n  rem and  subsequent to  Wash­
ington v. Davis held  th a t d iscrim inato ry  in ten t is re ­
quired un d er §1981 and  expressly d isagreed  w ith  the 
m ajority  op in ion  in  the  in stan t case. (U .S .D .C . N .D . 
Ohio, € 7 3 -4 7 8 , M arch  14, 1 9 7 8 ).

T he responden ts’ O pposition  to  the P etitio n  fo r C er­
tio rari reveals th a t they do n o t con tend  th a t the Griggs 
standards should  be transposed  to  nonem ploym ent Sec. 
1981 actions. In stead , they posit the theory  th a t em ploy­
m ent cases are a special class w ith in  Sec. 1981 to  
which a d ifferen t s tan d ard  fo r ad jud ica ting  illegal dis­
crim ination  is applicable. T h ere  is, how ever, no  ju stifica ­
tion in  either the legislative h istory  o r jud icial in te rp re ­
tations of th a t section fo r such an  expansive b ro ad  
contention. I t  is inconceivable th a t in  1866 th e  M em bers 
of C ongress had  in  m ind  the Griggs doctrine , o r th a t 
they possessed a un ique concern  fo r em ploym ent p ra c ­
tices ou t o f the m any o thers th a t w ould  affect the 
recently em ancipated  b lacks. A pplying Griggs s tandards 
only to  em ploym ent cases u n d er Sec. 1981 is a  fo rm  
of s ta tu to ry  surgery co n tra ry  to  the will of C ongress.

I t  is c lear th a t Sec. 1981 does no t speak  separately  
as to em ploym ent p ractices, bu t refers to  the m aking  
of all con trac ts  and  the fu ll and  equal benefit of 
all laws. R ecognizing th a t Sec. 1981 on its face does 
not provide fo r d ifferen t considerations in  em ploym ent 
cases, the argum ent is advanced  th a t C ongress in en­
acting T itle  V II in tended  to  m odify Sec. 1981 only 
as to employment discrimination claims, and, thereby, 
borrow  the Griggs s tandard .

115



■30—

T his effo rt a t s ta tu to ry  reconstruction , while novel, 
sim ply does no t com port w ith  the facts, the legislative 
h isto ry  o r any ju d ic ia l in te rp re ta tio n . T h ere  is, indeed, 
a  g rea t deal o f evidence th a t C ongress in  enacting  T itle  
V II  did  no t in tend  to elim inate purposefu l in ten t as 
an  elem ent of p roof. N evertheless, it is c lea r th a t T itle  
V II  did  no t affect previously enacted  civil rights laws 
any  m ore th an  T itle  V III  of the 1968 C ivil R ights 
A c t affected  Sec. 1982, (see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 
supra).

C. The Federal Civil Sights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871 
and the Constitution Should Be Harmonized by a 
Consistent Standard for Determining Illegal Dis­
crimination.

T h e various sta tu tes com prising  the C R A  of 1866 
an d  1871 should  be construed  consistently  in  regard  
to  the  stan d ard  of liability . A s this and  o ther re la ted  
cases dem onstrate , there  is a need  to  harm onize Sec. 
1981 w ith  the  liability  standards u n d e r Secs. 1982, 
1983 and  1 9 8 5 (3 ) ,  as well as the U nited  S tates C onsti­
tu tion . A ll of these sta tu tes as w ell as the  13 th  and  
14th A m endm ents w ere enacted  during  the sam e h is to ri­
ca l period  in  the form  of equal p ro tec tio n  legislation. 
D iscrim inato ry  in ten t is the estab lished  s tan d ard  u n d er 
the C onstitu tion  an d  in  em ploym ent d iscrim ination  cases 
u n d er Sec. 1983; likewise, it is a requ ired  elem ent 
o f p ro o f u n d er Sec. 1982 (Jones v. Mayer) and  1985 
( 3 )  (Griffin v. Breckenridge). T h e  sam e princip le 
perta ins to  Sec. 1981.

N either legislative n o r jud icial p receden t justifies a 
different trea tm en t of Sec. 1981 in  general, and  cer­
tain ly  no t in the lim ited a rea  of em ploym ent. I t  is 
the C onstitu tion  and  the R econstruc tion  E ra  Civil

116



Rights A cts th a t requ ire  harm oniz ing— n o t those s ta t­
utes and  T itle  V II.

Besides being off the po in t, any th eo ry  th a t suggests 
that T itle  V II and  Sec. 1981 should  be harm onized  
by transposing  T itle  V II  s tandards of liab ility  suffers 
from  ignorance of the legislative h istory , antecedents, 
and purpose of each  sta tu te , as well as this C o u rt’s 
determ ination  th a t the sta tu tes are d istinc t and  inde­
pendent. I t  is sim ply w rong to  believe th a t the sta tu tes 
can be tru ly  “h arm on ized” a t all in  th is  fashion. 
R ather th an  harm onize, a ho ld ing  th a t the standards 
of p roo f an d  liab ility  un d er Sec. 1981 are operationally  
the sam e, inevitably  does violence to  the procedures, 
goals, righ ts an d  liabilities th a t C ongress in tended  to  
establish th rough  the enactm ent of T itle  V II.

T he Suprem e C o u rt in  Washington v. Davis observed 
the differences betw een the m o d em  T itle  V II  and  the 
14th A m endm ent. T h is d istinc tion  should  continue to 
be m ain ta ined  by determ ining  th a t ou tside of T itle  
V II, or som e o th er sta tu te  th a t m ay specifically im pose 
a Griggs s tan d ard , the un iform  liability  s tan d ard  for 
em ploym ent d iscrim ination  is one of rac ia l m otivation  
and d iscrim inato ry  in ten t.

— 3 1 -

n
THE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO THE SUPREME 

COURT’S RULINGS IN WASHINGTON V. DAVIS AND 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 
V. UNITED STATES.

A. The Decision Unjustifiably Ignores the Purposeful 
Intent Holding in Washington v. Davis.

In  Washington v. Davis, supra, this C o u rt ru led  
that the standard  fo r ad jud ica ting  claim s of rac ia l dis­
crim ination under T itle  V II was no t the sam e stan d ard

117



— 32-

fo r ad jud ica ting  such  claim s un d er the C onstitu tion . 
A lthough  the com plain t in  Washington alleged a cause 
of ac tion  un d er Sec. 1981 as well as the C onstitu tion , 
the C o u rt d id  no t specifically  re fer to  Sec. 1981 in 
its opinion. T h e  ra tio n a le  beh ind  the  C o u rt’s decision, 
how ever, w ould  app ear equally  applicab le  to  actions 
under Sec. 1981 because the sta tu te , like Sec. 1983, 
was in tended  to  prov ide s ta tu to ry  p ro tec tio n  to  consti­
tu tio n a l rights an d  while o rig inating  in  the Civil R ights 
A c t of 1866, w as reenac ted  w ith  Sec. 1983 as p a rt 
of the Civil R ights A c t of 1874.

T h e  m ajo rity  of the C ircu it and  D istric t C o u rts6 
have read  the Washington v. Davis in ten t ru le  as encom ­
passing bo th  Secs. 1981 and  1983 claim s, constru ing  
b o th  of the sta tu tes to  be  governed by  constitu tiona l 
princip les. In  light of the legislative h istory  of these 
tw o s ta tu tes and  the th ru s t o f this C o u rt’s decision 
in  Washington, the co rrec t view  appears to  be tha t 
expressed after rem and  by the T en th  C ircu it in  Chicano 
Police Officer’s Association v. Stover, 552  F .2 d  918
(1 9 7 7 ) ,  echoed by num erous federa l courts:

6Chicago Police Officers Assn. v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 
(10th Cir., 1977); Arnold  v. Ballard, 12 EPD f  11, 224 
(1976); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th 
Cir., 1977); City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705
(7th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Alexander, .......  F.2d .......  16
FEP Cases 894 (8th Cir. 1978); Harkless v. Sweeny Inde­
pendent School District, ....... F.2d ....... , 14 EPD f  7669,
5295 (5th Cir. 1977); Arnold  v. Ballard, (C73-478, USDC 
N.D. Ohio), Memorandum Opinion and Order dated Mar. 
14, 1978; Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F.Supp. 949,
963 (1977); United States v. State of So. Carolina, ........
F.Supp.......... , 15 FEP Cases 1196 (1977), (3-judge panel
that included two circuit judges); Crocker v. Boeing Co., 437
F.Supp. 1138 (1977); Dickerson v. U. S. Steel Corp., ........
F.Supp........... 15 FEP Cases 753 (1977); Veizaga v. National
Board of Respiratory Therapy, 13 EPD f 11, 525, 8875, 
8881 (N.D. 111., January 27, 1977).

118



—33—

“ [T ]h e  e rro r in  ou r holding and  the views ex­
pressed by us is clear. W e s ta ted  th a t we agreed 
. . . w ith  the  view th a t the m easure of a  claim  
under the C ivil R ights A c t is in  essence th a t 
applied  to  a  su it u n d er T itle  V II  of the  C ivil 
R ights A ct of 1964. 526  F .2 d  a t 438 , 11 F E P  
C ases a t 1061. T his w as co n tra ry  to  the p rincip le 
holding th a t cam e in  Washington v. Davis, supra, 
a t 238 , 12 F E P  Cases a t 1418. A ll of o u r reaso n ­
ing and  trea tm en t of the case w hich proceeded  
from  the erroneous s tan d ard  m ust be co rrec ted .” 

Supra a t 920 .

W e believe th a t Judge W allace of the 9 th  C ircu it 
in his dissenting  opin ion  in  the case a t b a r  correctly  
stated the law  w hen he said,

“B ecause Sec. 1981 is peculiarly  linked to  the 
F o u rteen th  A m endm ent, the standards perta in ing  
to  th a t A m endm en t should  also con tro l Sec. 1981 
. . . .  [S ject'ion  1981 enjoys a un ique h isto rical 
an d  concep tual re la tionsh ip  to  the F o u rteen th  
A m endm ent w hich is no t shared  by T itle  V II. 
C onsequently , it is quite  p ro p e r to  assum e absent 
a co n tra ry  ho ld ing  by  the  Suprem e C ourt, th a t 
the s tandards fo r establishing a prima facie case 
of d iscrim ination  u n d er Sec. 1981 and  the E qual 
P ro tec tio n  C lause of the F o u rteen th  A m endm ent 
should be the sam e: T h ere  m ust be p ro o f of 
d iscrim inatory  in ten t.”

Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566  F .2 d  
1334 a t 1348, 1349, (A . 1 1 1 ).

T he Washington rule has been held  applicab le to  
Sec. 1983 causes of ac tion ,7 a fact recognized by

'‘Washington v. Davis, supra; Chicano Police Officer’s Ass’n, 
v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918; Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel, 440 F. n g  
Supp. 949, 963-64.



- 34-

responden ts (O p p . 8 ) . Y et, there  is no  rea l basis 
to  d istinguish  Secs. 1981 and  1983 in  reg ard  to  the 
standards of liability  governing em ploym ent d iscrim ina­
tion  as bo th  are equal p ro tec tio n  s ta tu tes (Sec. 1981 
is expressly so denom inated  in  the s ta tu te  heading  
in  42 U .S .C .) and  derived from  the C onstitu tion . The 
in ten t of C ongress during  the perio d  1866-74 as to 
the n a tu re  of the d iscrim ination  each p roh ib ited  could 
n o t have been different.

A ny detailed  analysis as to  w hich sta tu tes this C ourt 
was referring  to  in  Washington serves no m eaningful 
purpose , a lthough it appears th a t the s ta tu tes were 
5 U .S.C . Sec. 3304  and  5 C .F .R . Sec. 300 .101  relating 
to  the  D istric t of C o lum bia’s civil service procedures, 
w hich, during  the litigation , the D istric t asserted  includ­
ed the Griggs job-relatedness standards. C asting  the 
question  in  the con tex t of a “s ta tu te” o r the C onstitu tion  
is no t conclusive.

Sec. 1981 as well as Sec. 1983 are clearly  statutes, 
b u t the issue is w hat standards of liability  did  C ongress 
in ten d  to  be applicab le  w hen they  w ere enacted  over 
n inety  years ago. T his C ourt, w hile no ting  in  Washing­
ton, supra a t 2051 , th a t u n d er T itle  V II C ongress 
p rescribed  the job  relatedness rule, expressly declined 
to  expand  its am bit to  include the C o n stitu tio n  or 
any o ther sta tu te  except, perhaps, the D istric t of C olum ­
b ia  codes as allow ed by the defendants in Washington. 
T o  the con trary , the C o u rt concluded  th a t the “exten­
sions of the job-relatedness rule beyond areas where 
it is a lready  applicab le  by sta tu te , such as the  field 
of public employment (referring , P etitioners believe, 
to  the D istric t of C o lum bia code provisions because 
Sec. 1981 contains no lim itation  to  public  em ploym ent)

120



— 35—

should aw ait legislative p rescrip tion” , Washington v. 
Davis, supra a t 2 0 5 1 , 2052 .

F inally , a lthough  too  obvious to  m erit ex tended  dis­
cussion, the circu it c o u rt’s Van Davis decision effectively 
renders m eaningless in  g rea t p a r t the ru ling  in  Washing­
ton v. Davis. Since there  are a g rea t varie ty  of cases 
where T itle  V II does n o t apply, b u t Sec. 1981 and  
the 14th A m endm en t do, the in ten t requ irem en t of 
the A m endm ent could  be easily avoided by the sim ple 
expedient of p lead ing  u n d er Sec. 1981. If  the stan d ard  
for liability  under Sec. 1981 w as the sam e as th a t 
under T itle  V II, th ere  w as little  reason  fo r C ongress 
to extend T itle  V II  to  public  em ployers in  1972.

B, The Decision Fails to Properly Distinguish Between 
Pre- and Post-Title VII Hiring Practices Contrary 
to International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States.

T he circu it co u rt’s ru ling  herein  acts to  m ake T itle  
VII re troactive  as to  public  agencies and  to  destroy 
any d istinction  betw een  pre- and  post-A ct h iring  p rac ­
tices. T his conclusion  is sym ptom atic of the  low er fed­
eral courts erroneously  ignoring, since Griggs, the d is­
tinction betw een  the C ivil R ights A c t of 1866 and 
1870 and  the C ivil R ights A c t of 1964. Since m ost dis­
crim ination suits a re  filed  under several statu tes, the 
tendency has been  to  b lu r the sta tu to ry  distinctions 
which, in  m any cases involving private  em ployers, m ay 
have been of no  m om ent since T itle  V II also applied  
fully.

I t  is instructive to  no te  th a t the low er co u rt Sec. 
1981 cases w hich borrow ed  the lesser s tan d ard  of lia ­
bility from  T itle  V II w ere decided in the year im m edi­
ately follow ing the Griggs decision, a t a period  w hen

121



— 36-

T itle  V II a lready  h ad  been applicab le to  p riva te  em ­
ployers fo r a t least seven years. In  re trospect, it can 
be seen, beginning w ith  Chance v. Board of Examiners, 
supra, th a t in  the  field  of pub lic  em ploym ent the low er 
courts have failed to  m ain ta in  the sharp  focus d istin ­
guishing Secs. 1 9 8 1 /1 9 8 3  and  la te r the enacted  T itle  
V II— although the  C ircu it C ourts in  Chance, Castro 
v. Beecher, 459  F .2 d  725 (1 s t C ir. 1972) and  Bridge­
port Guardians v. Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 
482  F .2 d  1333 (2 n d  C ir. 1 9 7 3 ), trea ted  Secs. 1981 
and  1983 together as co n stitu tiona l equa l p ro tec tion  
statu tes.

T h e  e rro r in this in te rp re ta tio n a l leap  can  be m ade 
evident by considering its effect in  the con tex t of a 
p riva te  em ployer. If  the Griggs decision  h ad  been 
decided  in  1966 instead  of 1971, then  the c ircu it co u rt’s 
conclusion in  the  in stan t case th a t in  term s of liability 
there  is n o  o p era tional d istinc tion  betw een  T itle  V II 
an d  Sec. 1981, w ould have necessarily  m ade Title 
V II standards th rough  the m ode o f Sec. 1981 applicable 
to  p riva te  em ployers p rio r to  its effective d ate  of July, 
1965. T h e  fac t is, how ever, th a t the low er co u rt deci­
sions like the Davis case herein , w ere no t decided 
until long afte r any applicab le  sta tu te  of lim itations 
h ad  run  on a Sec. 1981 claim  against a p riva te  em ploy­
er. A s the in stan t case vividly illustra tes, the circum ­
stance is the opposite  w ith  public  em ployers. By the 
theory  th a t the Griggs s tan d ard  is now  app licab le  to 
Sec. 1981 claim s, the effective da te  of T itle  V II as 
to  public em ployers has been  in  p rac tica l term s, ad­
vanced  from  three to  six years p receding  M arch  24, 
1972, depending on the p artic u la r ju risd ic tion ’s statute 
of lim itations. T his is the p rac tica l effect despite the

122



continual adm onition  by the federa l courts th a t T itle  
V II is n o t re tro ac tiv e .8

T he c ircu it co u rt op in ion  in  the case a t b a r  ignores 
the d istinction  recognized by this C o u rt in  Hazelwood
School District v. United States, .... U .S ........, 97 S.Ct.
2736 (1 9 7 7 ) ,  and  International Brotherhood of Team­
sters v. United States, 431 U .S. 324 , 97 S.C t. 1843 
(1 9 7 7 ) , betw een  liability  p red ica ted  upon  pre- and  
post-Title V II  h iring  practices. In  Hazelwood, the  Su­
preme C o u rt reversed the decision of the circu it court 
because:

“ [T ]h e  C o u rt of A ppeals to ta lly  d isregarded  the 
possibility  th a t this prima facie s ta tis tica l p ro o f 
in the reco rd  m ight a t the tria l cou rt level be 
rebu tted  by statistics dealing  w ith Hazelwood’s h ir­
ing afte r it becam e subject to  T itle  V II. R acia l 
d iscrim ination  by pub lic  em ployers was no t m ade 
illegal under T itle  V II un til M arch  24, 1972. 
A  public  em ployer w ho from  th a t da te  fo rw ard  
m ade all its em ploym ent decisions in a  w holly 
nond iscrim inato ry  w ay w ould no t v io late T itle  V II 
even if it h ad  form erly  m ain tained  an  all-w hite 
w ork force by purposefu lly  excluding N egroes.” 

Hazelwood School District v. United States,
U .S ......., 97 S .C t. 2736  a t 2742 .

The C o u rt fu rth e r n o ted  in  foo tno te  15 of the O p in ­
ion th a t a public em ployer even before the extension 
of T itle  V II  in  1972 w as subject to  the com m and

•— 3 7 —

8Hazelwood School District v. United States, .......  U.S.
-... , 97 S.Ct. 2736 (1977); International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843 
(1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 251, 
(4th Cir. 1976); Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791 (4th 
Cir. 1971).

123



■38-

of the 14th A m endm ent n o t to  engage in  purposeful 
d iscrim ination , the ind ication  being th a t constitu tional 
s tandards governed liability  fo r p re -T itle  V II  hiring  
practices.

In  International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, supra, the C o u rt again  adm onished  th a t the 
em ployer was governed by differen t s tandards of p roof 
depending on w hen T itle  V II becam e applicab le  and 
m ust be afforded  the opportun ity  to  show,

. . th a t the claim ed d iscrim inato ry  p a tte rn  is 
a p roduc t o f p re-A ct h iring  ra th e r  th an  unlaw ful 
post-A ct d iscrim ination , o r th a t during  the period 
it is alleged to  have pursued  a d iscrim inatory  
policy  it m ade too  few em ploym ent decisions to 
justify  the inference th a t it h ad  engaged in  a 
reg u la r p ractice  of d iscrim ination .”

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, supra a t 1867.

T h e  C o u rt’s recognition  of a d istinction  in  trea tm ent 
as well as effect of pre- an d  post-T itle  V II  hiring 
practices is m eaningful only if the s tandards o f liability 
are different. If an  em ployer could  be held  liab le under 
Sec. 1981 fo r p ractices th a t an ted a ted  T itle  V II  m erely 
because they h ad  a d isp roportionate  im pact and  had 
no t been show n statistically  to  be p red ictive of job 
perform ance, little w ould be gained by p erm itting  an 
em ployer in  a T itle  V II ac tion  to  d istinguish  those 
em ploym ent practices occurring  before the A c t was 
effective.

124



— 39—

I I I
THE CIRCUIT COURT’S RULING FRUSTRATES THE 

COMPREHENSIVE CONGRESSIONAL SCHEME EM­
BODIED IN TITLE VH.

A  decision th a t there  is no  opera tio n a l d istinc tion  
betw een Sec. 1981 and  T itle  V II in reg ard  to  s tandards 
of liability  w ill resu lt in  serious unsettling  an d  co u n te r­
productive effects on T itle  V II’s com prehensive ap ­
p roach  to  the en fo rcem ent of equal em ploym ent rights.

C ongress, w hile enacting  T itle  V II  in  1964 and  
again before extending  it to  public  entities by the 
1972 am endm ents, engaged in  considerab le deba te  con ­
cerning the term s of the  A ct. C onsidera tion  w as given 
as to  w hat em ployers should  be excluded from  cover­
age of the  A ct an d  w hat p rocedura l safeguards should 
be prov ided  in  the adm in istra tive enforcem ent p roceed ­
ings. D e ta iled  provisions governing the exhaustion  of 
adm inistrative rem edies (Sec. 7 0 6 ( b ) ( c ) ( d )  an d  ( e ) ) ,  
conciliation  efforts (Sec. 7 0 6 ( b ) ) ,  record-keeping  and 
access (Sec. 7 0 9 ) ,  and  prerequisites to  litigation  (Sec. 
7 0 6 ( f ) ( 1 ) ) ,  w ere deba ted  and  ultim ately  enacted . T itle  
V II as finally  enacted  in co rp o ra ted  the  concerns of 
interested parties and  C ongress as to  safeguard ing  and 
accom m odating the  rights of the em ployer and  the 
individual. H ow ever, it is precisely these rights, rep re­
senting the collective will of C ongress, ham m ered  ou t 
after long debate , and  having becom e defined  and 
settled afte r years of experience, u tiliza tion  and  judicial 
in terp re ta tion  th a t are th rea tened  by the circu it co u rt’s 
decision in  th is case.

A side from  the s tan d ard  of liability , the m ajo r d istinc­
tion betw een T itle  V II and  the o lder Civil R ights 
Acts is in  the area of coverage and  adm inistrative 
enforcem ent procedures. A ll of the form s of rem edies

125



— 40—

available under T itle  V II are likewise availab le u n d er 
Sec. 1981® including a tto rneys’ fees since the enact­
m en t of the C ivil R ights A tto rneys F ees A w ards A ct 
of 1976 (P L  94-559 , 90 S tat 2 6 4 1 ) ,  am ending  42 
U .S.C . Sec. 1988. E xtending  the Griggs doctrine  to  
Sec. 1981 suits reduces the d ifference betw een  the 
two sta tu tes to  prim arily  the adm inistra tive enforcem ent 
p rocedures and  this, w hen coupled  w ith  the m ore gen­
erous rem edies under Sec. 1981, m ust inevitably  ac t 
to  fru stra te  the com prehensive adm in istra tive stru c tu re  
th a t C ongress w ished im plem ented w ith the  passage 
of T itle  V II. T he p rim ary  areas of the congressional 
p lan  adversely affected are: 1) Ju risd ic tional filing 
prerequisites, 2 )  em ployers included; 3 )  lim itations on 
rem edies, 4 )  conciliation  and  adm inistra tive review  p ro ­
cedures, 5 )  uniform ity  of enforcem ent p rocedures, and  
6 )  re troactiv ity .

A. Jurisdiction Filing Prerequisites Evaded.

U nder T itle  V II, a d iscrim ination  charge w ith the 
E E O C  m ust be filed w ith in  180 days afte r alleged 
unlaw ful em ploym ent prac tice  occurred . Section 706 , 
( e ) ,  42  U .S.C . Sec. 2 0 0 0 e -5 (e )  as am ended , 1972. 
T h erea fte r, a civil com plain t m ust be  filed in  federal 
co u rt w ithin ninety days of receip t of the no tice  o f the 
righ t to sue, 42 U .S.C . Sec. 2 0 0 0 e -5 (f)  ( 1 ) .  T h e  Su­
prem e C o u rt has held  th a t these prerequisites to  a fed- 9

9In fact, in many instances the Sec. 1981 remedy is 
more expansive, and punitive damages are available under Sec. 
1981 but not Title VII (Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 
Inc., supra at 460). The similar remedies available under Sec. 
1981 are back pay (Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 
F.2d 1251 (1975)), declaratory relief, including reinstatement, 
promotions and quotas for the class (Sabol v. Snyder, 524 
F.2d 100a (10th Cir. 1975), Schei & Grossman, Employment 
Discrimination Law, p. 639).

126



— 41—

eral civil ac tion  are ju risd ictional. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U .S. 792  (1 9 7 3 ) ;  Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., 415  U.S. 36 (1 9 7 4 ) .

T he C o u rt n o ted  in  United Air Lines v. Evans, 
431 U .S. 553 , 97 S .C t. 1885, 1889 (1 9 7 7 ) ,  tha t 
a claim  based on a d iscrim inato ry  act th a t w as no t 
m ade the basis fo r a tim ely E E O C  charge w as b a rred  
and m erely constitu ted  an  u n fo rtu n a te  p ast event th a t 
had  no  p resen t legal consequences. H ow ever, the  fa ilu re  
to com ply w ith any of im p o rtan t T itle  V II ju risd ictiona l 
prerequisites will be of little  consequence if the p lain tiff 
can take  advan tage o f T itle  V II’s Griggs doctrine  m erely 
by filing a com plain t under Sec. 1981, w hich is gov­
erned only  by a less restric tive and  non-un ifo rm  sta tu te  
of lim itations. O bservance of T itle  V II’s adm inistrative 
requirem ents is of no  significance as the  filing o f a 
Title V II  charge  and  reso rt to  the adm in istra tive m a ­
chinery are  no t prerequisites for in stitu tion  of a Sec. 
1981 action . Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 
supra a t 460 , 95 S.C t. 1716, 1720 (1 9 7 5 ) .

B. Liability Standards Extended to Employers Con­
gress Desired Excluded.

T ransposing  T itle  V II s tandards to  Sec. 1981 actions 
would, con tra ry  to  the clear legislative in ten t, effectively 
bring certa in  agencies and  individuals w ith in  T itle  V II’s 
m ore restric tive em brace. C ongress, w hen it orig inally  
enacted T itle  V II in 1964, expressly m ade the A ct 
inapplicable to  certa in  em ployers, m ost no tab ly  federal, 
state and  local public  entities. 42 U .S.C . Sec. 2 0 0 0 e (b )  
(c ) , eff. Ju ly  2, 1965 .10 A s the in stan t case so

10Until March 24, 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) read “but 
such item does not include the United States, . . .  or a 
State or political subdivision of a State. . .

127



—4 2 —

clearly  dem onstrates, if the  C ircu it C o u rt’s decision 
is upheld  these p re -1972  exclusions will be  eroded  
by jud icial fiat.

W hile public  agencies have now  been b ro u g h t w ithin 
the am bit o f T itle  V II by the 1972 am endm ents, there  
still rem ain  several categories of em ployers th a t C o n ­
gress in tends to  exclude from  its coverage. E m ployers 
covered by the A c t m ust be  persons engaged in  an 
industry  affecting  com m erce w ho have fifteen  o r  m ore 
em ployees fo r each  w orking day  in  each  of tw enty 
o r m ore ca len d ar weeks in  the cu rren t o r  p receding  
ca len d ar year (Sec. 7 0 1 (b )  of T itle  V I I ) ) .  Bona fide 
private  m em bership clubs (Sec. 7 0 1 ( b ) ( 2 ) ) ,  In d ian  
tribes (Sec. 7 0 1 ( b ) ), and  the U n ited  S tates G overn­
m ent ( 7 0 1 ( b ) )  are also excluded.

P erhaps, m ost no tew orthy  of the  exem ptions is the 
A rm ed F orces w hich the federal courts have consistently  
held  n o t to  be covered by  T itle  V II  as it  is not 
an  “em ployer” as defined by the A ct. (Johnson v. 
Alexander, 572  F .2 d  1219, 16 F E P  894 ( 8th  C ir. 
1 9 7 8 ) ) .  A s the A rm ed Forces can  b e  sued under 
Sec. 1981, it takes little  im ag ination  to  perceive the 
effect on the m ilitary  if the circu it cou rt op in ion  herein 
becom es the settled  law.

C. Remedies.

T he effect of the circu it co u rt’s ru ling  is to  encourage 
p lain tiffs to  seek relief under Sec. 1981 ra th e r  than  
T itle  V II , because of the m ore  generous rem edies ob­
ta inab le  under Sec. 1981 while still hav ing  th e  advan ­
tage of T itle  V II’s liberal s tandards of p roof. U nlike 
T itle  V II, actions un d er Sec. 1981 perm it com pensatory  
as well as punitive dam ages and  there  is no  two- 
yea r lim itation  on back  pay  aw ards.

128



D. Conciliation and Administrative Review Procedures 
Frustrated.

T he g reatest dam age flow ing from  the c ircu it co u rt’s 
decision is th a t done to  the concilia tion  and  adm inis­
tra tive review  procedures w hich C ongress designed to  
encourage settlem ent of cases sho rt o f litigation  and, 
thus, avoid  the  jud icial overload  b o u n d  to  ensue as 
a p ro d u c t of increased  enfo rcem ent activity. Indeed, 
conciliation  plays such a  cen tra l role in  the schem e 
of T itle  V II  th a t the E E O C  is requ ired  by law  to 
refrain  from  com m encing a civil ac tion  un til it has 
discharged its adm inistra tive duties. Occidental Life 
Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432  U .S. 355 (1 9 7 7 ) .

In  re jecting  a con ten tion  th a t the E E O C  w as requ ired  
to conciliate only  the precise charges m ade by the 
com plainant, the d istric t cou rt in EEOC  v. Sherwood
Medical Industries, .........  F .S u p p ............ , 17 F E P  Cases
444  (1 9 7 8 ) ,  rem arked:

“T his con ten tion , if accepted , w ould  ru n  con ­
tra ry  to  congressional in ten t and  could  well have 
the effect of rendering  the concilia tion  requ irem ent 
o f an  em pty  form ality . T he m an d ate  th a t con ­
ciliation  be a ttem pted  is un ique  to  T itle  V II and  
it clearly  reflects a strong  congressional desire 
fo r ou t-of-court settlem ent of T itle  V II v iolations. 
See Culpepper v. Reynolds Metal Co., 421 F .2 d  
888 , 2 F E P  C ases 377 (5 th  C ir. 1 9 7 0 ); Oatis 
v. Crown Zellerhach, 398 F .2 d  496 , 1 F E P  C ases 
328 L R R M  2782 . T he legislative h istory  of the 
1972 am endm ents confirm s th a t C ongress viewed 
jud icial relief as a recourse of last reso rt, sought 
only afte r a settlem ent has been a ttem pted  and  
failed. C oncilia tion  is clearly  the hea rt of the 
T itle  V II adm in istra tive p rocess.”

-— 43—

129



T o  extend to  civil rights claim ants th e  m ajo r advan ­
tage of T itle  V II, the standards of d iscrim ination  and 
burdens of p roof, to  claim s u n d er Sec. 1981 w ithout 
T itle  V IF s concom itan t lim itations w ould  ru n  d irectly  
con tra ry  to  the C ongressional in ten t to  settle  o u t of 
cou rt as m any d iscrim ination  claim s as possib le .11

T he heavy em phasis in  T itle  V II  o n  conciliation  
efforts before litigation  canno t be  view ed lightly. T he 
adm inistrative p rocedures set fo rth  in T itle  V II  reflect 
the congressional in ten t to provide victim s of d iscrim ina­
tion w ith  app rop ria te  redress, while, a t the sam e time, 
no t im posing unreasonab le  burdens u p o n  em ployers.

E. Uniformity of Enforcement Actions Endangered.
T he confusion resu lting  from  the circu it co u rt holding 

is illustra ted  by a consideration  of the d iffering  statu tes 
of lim itation  applicab le to  Sec. 1981 actions. This 
C o u rt and  the circu it courts have uniform ly  held 
th a t the sta tu te  of lim itation  fo r Sec. 1981 actions 
is the m ost analogous s ta te  s ta tu te  of lim itations. John­
son v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra. Thus, 
the tim e lim it on such actions ranges from  one year 
to  six years depending  on the ju risd ic tion  in  which 
the action  is filed .11 12 In  som e instances the  statu te

11In urging the adoption of amendments to Title VII in 
1972, the Congressional Committee noted that during the first 
five years of the EEOC’s existence it received more than 52,000 
charges. During the first IVi months of the 1971-72 fiscal 
year the Commission received 14,644 charges—U.S. Cong, and 
Admin. News ’72, p. 2139.

126-year Statute of Limitation, Penn., Dickerson v. U.S.
Steel Corp., ....... F.Supp. ....... , 15 FEP Cases 752 (1977).
1-year Statute of Limitation, Tenn., Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc., supra at 463.

130



— 45-

of lim itations varies w ith in  the sam e s ta te .13 A n  add i­
tional lack  of un iform ity  is c rea ted  by the fac t th a t 
provisions reg ard in g  to lling , revival an d  app lica tion  are 
in terp re ted  u n d er s ta te  law. Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency, Inc., supra.

U nlike the situa tion  un d er T itle  V II, em ployers, m any 
of w hom  have offices in  several ju risd ictions, w ould 
no t be governed by  uniform  filing and  lim ita tion  req u ire ­
m ents u n d er Sec. 1981; yet, if the c ircu it co u rt’s conc lu ­
sion in  the in s tan t case is accepted , these em ployers 
w ould be sub jec t to  T itle  V II ’s m ore rigorous and  
dem anding  s tandards o f p roof. A s this C o u rt observed 
in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 4 3 2  U .S.
355, .........  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  in  no ting  a d istinc tion  betw een
T itle V II  an d  o th er actions, the “T itle  V II  defendan t 
is a lerted  to  the possib ility  of an  enforcem ent suit 
w ithin ten  days afte r a charge has been  filed. This 
p rom pt no tice serves, as C ongress in tended , to  give 
him  an o p p o rtu n ity  to  g a th er an d  preserve evidence 
in an tic ipation  of a co u rt ac tio n ” .

T he need to  prov ide p ro ced u ra l safeguards fo r the 
rights of em ployers was clearly  em phasized by C ongress 
when the 1972 T itle  V II am endm ents w ere being con­
sidered. T he congressional com m ittee, no ting  th a t em ­
ployers could  be subject to  enorm ous m an d ato ry  p en a l­
ties in  the absence of a defin ite  lim ita tion  an d  th a t 
due process requ ired  p ro m p t no tice of a  charge, stated  
in the C om m ittee  R eport, “ to  avoid the litigation  of 
state charges and  to  preclude responden ts from  being 
subject to  indefin ite  liabilities, it is c lea r th a t a precise

13In Colorado a 2-year (Ray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., .......
F.Supp. .......  (1976))), and a 6-year Statute of Limitation
{Jackson v. Continental Oil Co., ....... F.Supp.......... (1975))
have been held to apply.

131



- 46-

sta tu te  of lim itations is needed. . . .  I t  seems p a ten t 
th a t fa ilu re  to  requ ire  tim ely no tice  violates all concepts 
of due process. In  view of the  specific abuses regard ing  
service o f charges u n d er T itle  V II, a  specific req u ire ­
m ent fo r service on the responden t w ith in  a  specified 
tim e period  (5 -7  d ays) is a p rerequ isite  to  m ain ta in ing  
m inim um  standards of process” . U.S. Cong. & Adm. 
News ’72 , p. 2175 .

A  hold ing  th a t the m easure of d iscrim ination  is 
opera tionally  the sam e under Sec. 1981 and  T itle  V II 
w ould, thus, in  p rac tice  o p era te  to  deprive the  defendan t 
of essential p rocedura l safeguards no ted  in  Occidental.

F. The Decision Renders Title VII Retroactive as to 
Public Agencies.

T h e extension of T itle  V II  liab ility  s tan d ard s to 
Sec. 1981 actions challenging public  agency h iring  p rac ­
tices th a t occurred  before the effective d a te  of T itle  
V II  unden iab ly  renders T itle  V II re troactive, con tra ry  
to  the decisions of this C ourt.

In  International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United 
States, supra a t 1867, an d  Hazelwood School District
v. United States, .........  U .S .............. , 97 S .C t. 2736 ,
2742 , the Suprem e C o u rt expressly n o ted  the  d ifference 
in  trea tm en t betw een pre- and  p ost-T itle  V II  h iring  
practices and  stated  th a t d iscrim ination  by  public em ­
ployers under T itle  V II w as n o t m ade illegal un til 
M arch  24, 1972. E arlie r in Franks v. Bowman Trans­
portation Company, 424  U .S. 747 , 759  n .12 , the  C ourt 
in  affirm ing the  princip le th a t the  effect of the  A ct 
was prospective, n o t re trospective, quo ted  an  in te rp re ­
tive m em orandum  from  the Congressional Record. This 
m em orandum  states in  pertin en t part:

132



— 41-

“T itle  V II  w ould  have no  effect on  establish ing 
sen iority  rights. Its  effect is p rospective and  no t 
re trospective. T hus, fo r  exam ple, if a  business 
has been  d iscrim inating  in  the  p as t an d  as a 
re su lt has an  all w hite w ork ing  force w hen the 
T itle  V II  com es in to  effect the em ployers’ ob liga­
tion  w ould  be to  sim ply fill fu tu re  vacancies on 
a  non-d iscrim inato ry  basis .”

Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424  
U .S. 747 , n ,1 2 a t  759 .

T h e  circu it courts have uniform ly  held  th a t T itle  
V II is n o t re tro ac tiv e  an d  provides n e ith er liability  
no r a  rem edy fo r d iscrim inato ry  acts occu rring  before 
its effective date . Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 
535 F .2 d  257  (4 th  C ir. 1 9 7 6 ); Robinson v. Loril- 
lard, 4 4 4  F .2 d  791 (4 th  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ); Place v. Wein­
berger, 497  F .2 d  4 1 2  ( 6th  C ir. 1 9 7 4 ).

In  view of the  settled  law , it m akes little  sense 
to a ttem pt to  distinguish  the  p resen t case sim ply because 
liability w as fo u n d  u n d er Sec. 1981 w hen th a t liab ility  
was p red ica ted  en tire ly  upon  a s tan d ard  th a t evolved 
solely from  an  in te rp re ta tio n  of T itle  V II  ( Griggs v. 
Duke Power).

A lthough  this C o u rt has recognized th a t T itle  V II 
and Sec. 1981 a re  separa te  and  d istinct s ta tu tes upon  
which a c la im an t can  base a claim  of rac ia l d iscrim ina­
tion, it is com pletely ap p ro p ria te  in  determ ining  the 
liability s tan d ard  u n d er Sec. 1981, to  consider C on­
gress’s understand ing  of the  scope of Sec. 1981 at 
the tim e they enacted  T itle  V II. In  view of the legisla­
tive h istory  (see pp. 16-17, infra) of T itle  V II, the 
conclusion is inescapable th a t C ongress in tended  th a t 
statute to  create  add itional rights and  rem edies in the

133



— 48— •

field of em ploym ent d iscrim ination  n o t availab le  under 
the then  existing law-— for otherw ise the A c t’s p ro ce­
d u ra l and  ju risd ictiona l lim itations w ould  have no  m ean ­
ing. In  this lim ited  b u t sign ifican t sense then, Sec. 
1981 should  be construed  to  fu rth e r, n o t fru stra te , 
the in ten t of C ongress. If  C ongress h ad  believed at 
the tim e it enacted  T itle  V II th a t they  w ere m erely 
re sta ting  the liability  standards u n d er the venerable 
Sec. 1981 o r w ere changing them , then  it ac ted  at 
cross-purposes to  their desire to  expand  rem edies w hen 
it  im posed p ro ced u ra l lim itations.

IV
NO TITLE Vn VIOLATION PROVEN.

T h e first rec ru it class h ired  by the petitioners after 
the effective da te  of T itle  V II  was com posed  o f 50 %  
blacks an d  M exican-A m ericans. T he ind iv iduals in  this 
class took  the 1972 w ritten  ap titu d e  test of w hich 
9 7 %  received passing scores, and  advanced  to  the 
o ra l in terview  and  subsequen t phases of the  exam ination  
process. T he subsequent elem ents in  the process did 
no t have an  adverse im pact on  m inorities an d  the 
respondents in  th e ir first and  second am ended  com ­
plain ts alleged th a t the u ltim ate  hires w ere nondiscrim - 
inato ry  (A . 5, 6 ) . A ll subsequen t hires, o f course, 
w ere in  accordance w ith the  C o u rt’s judgm ent o f July 
20, 1973 requiring  th a t 4 0 %  of all new  hires annually  
be b lack  an d  M exican-A m erican.

A s the respondents have agreed, the q u o ta  hiring 
o rd e r was necessarily  affirm ed on  the  basis of hiring 
th a t occurred  p rio r to  the effective d ate  of T itle  V II 
(O pposition  p. 2 9 ) .  T o  assert th a t the petitioners “uti­
lized” the 1972 test afte r T itle  V II’s extension to 
public agencies is m isleading in  the con tex t o f the

134



■— 49—

facts an d  form s no  legally  cognizable basis fo r a finding 
th a t T itle  V II  has been  v io lated . W ritten  tests have 
no im pact un til ac tually  used as a basis fo r h iring 
or re jec tion  of applican ts. I t  is conceded  th a t the 1972 
w ritten  test was no t used in any  adverse sense tow ard  
m inorities in  accepting  o r  re jecting  them  fo r em ploy­
m ent. N inety-seven p e rcen t of all app lican ts passed  
the test an d  all advanced  to  fu rther, adm itted ly  non- 
d iscrim inatory , stages in  the selection  process. O nly 
in  this w ay w as the  1972 test ac tua lly  used  an d  is 
the only fac tu a l basis upon  w hich a co u rt can  ad jud ica te  
w hether T itle  V II has been vio lated . T he petitioners’ 
uneffec tuated  p ro p o sa l in  the  face of an  extrem ely 
serious shortfa ll in  firem en to  interview  on  a p re lim inary  
basis the to p  544  app lican ts tak ing  the 1972 w ritten  
test does n o t constitu te  a v io lation  of T itle  V II any 
m ore th an  it can  su p p o rt the  q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r w hich 
the responden ts concede w as p red ica ted  upon  claim ed 
earlier Sec. 1981 vio lations. T h e  interview s w hen finally  
com m enced w ere n o t lim ited  to  the to p  544  candidates, 
and  the uneffec tua ted  p roposa l obviously p layed  no 
role in  the ethn ic com position  of the p e titioners’ fire 
departm en t.

N o t only has no  effective d iscrim inato ry  ac t occurred  
since M arch  24, 1972, the  th resho ld  conditions fo r 
asserting a T itle  V II v io lation  w ere never reached. 
A  v io lation  of T itle  V II requ ires p roo f of a p a tte rn  
and p rac tice  of d iscrim ination . Iso la ted  incidents, even 
with som e d iscrim inato ry  effect, are insufficien t to  e s tab ­
lish liability  un d er th a t s ta tu te . Hazelwood School Dis­
trict v. United States, ....... U .S. ___  (1 9 7 7 ) ,  97 S.Ct.
2736. T h ere  is sim ply no evidence in  the  record  to 
sustain any finding of a p a tte rn  and  p rac tice  of d iscrim i­
nation  by petitioners afte r T itle  V II becam e effective.

135



— 50—

T h e  responden ts’ m inim um  height s tan d ard  can n o t 
independently  constitu te  a  v io lation  of Sec. 1981, Sec. 
1983 o r T itle  V II sim ply because there  w as n o  d is­
crim inato ry  in ten t beh ind  its app lica tion  and  the  h iring  
afte r the effective date  of T itle  V II w as accom plished 
p u rsu an t to  the C o u rt’s q uo ta  order. T h e  respondents 
expressly declined before the d istric t and  c ircu it cou rt 
to  seek elim ination  of the height s tan d ard 14 and  the 
h iring  results since 1972 (5 5 %  blacks an d  M exican- 
A m ericans) belie any adverse effect in  o p era tio n  of 
such a standard . M inim um  height s tandards have been 
upheld  as having a ra tio n a l basis in  non-T itle  V II 
cases (Smith v. Troyan, 5 2 0  F .2 d  492  ( 6 th  C ir. 1 9 7 5 ), 
cert. den. U.S. Suprem e C o u rt) .  F inally , the re sp o n d ­
ents lacked  standing  to  challenge the height requ irem ent 
as none of the nam ed plain tiffs (w h e th er app lican ts 
o r incum ben ts) had  suffered any  in jury  in  fac t as 
a  consequence of its app lica tion  since each  m et the 
m inim um  standard .

A n  independent question exists as to  w hether a public 
agency can be found guilty of v io lating  T itle  V II 
in  the face of an express find ing  of no  d iscrim inatory  
in ten t. T h e  congressional debates on T itle  V II and  
a t the tim e of its extension to  public em ployers clearly  
ind icate  th a t C ongress did so un d er the  au tho rity  and  
scope of the F o u rteen th  A m endm ent (see Legislative 
H istory , U.S. C ong. & A dm . N ew s ’72 , p. 2154 ;

14The respondents stated the basis for their circuit court 
appeal thus, “The only modification of the Judgment sought 
on this appeal is an increase in the Mexican-American hiring 
ratio, such increase to be ordered if there is a reversal by 
this court of appeal of the district court’s conclusion of law 
that the height standard is job-related and legal. Plaintiffs- 
appellants did not seek below and do not seek on this appeal, 
an order enjoining the use of 57" height standard”. (Brief 
of Appellants, 9th Cir., p. 3, lines 21-27.)

136



51—

H .R . R ep. N o. 92-238, p . 19 (1 9 7 1 ) ;  S. R ep. N o. 
92-415 , pp . 10-11 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ) .  T he s tan d ard s of liability  
fo r em ploym ent d iscrim ination  u n d er T itle  V II as to  
public em ployers can  be no  g rea ter th an  th a t p rescribed  
by the C onstitu tion . T w o federa l courts thus fa r  have 
held  th a t purposefu l in te rest is a requ irem en t fo r estab­
lishing a T itle  V II v io lation  against s ta te  agencies or 
its po litica l subdivisions.

Scott v. City of Anniston, (N .D . A la . 1 9 7 7 ), 
4 3 0  F .Supp. 507;

Friend v. Leidinger, (D .C ., E . D . V a. 1 9 7 7 ), 
17 E P D  If 8392 , 5978 .

T he U .S. Suprem e C o u rt has tw ice declined to  pass 
on  the issue on  the basis th a t it was n o t p roperly  
before the C ourt. See Dothard v. Rawlinson,
U .S. ......... , 97 S .C t. 2920  a t 2724  n . l ,  and  Hazelwood
School District v. United States, .........  U .S ............. , 97

S.Ct. 2736  a t 2731 n . l .

V
t h e  a f f ir m e d  q u o ta  h ir in g  o r d e r  c l e a r l y

EXCEEDS THE COURT’S REMEDIAL AUTHORITY.
T he d istric t c o u rt’s q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r w as illegal 

and exceeded its ju risd ic tion  fo r the follow ing reasons: 
1) T h e  absence of a  find ing  of in ten tiona l d iscrim ina­
tion; 2 ) the  fact th a t the d iscrim inato ry  acts, if any, 
causing the p resen t w ork fo rc e /la b o r  pool d isparity  
that is the ob ject of the C o u rt’s o rd e r took  place 
p rio r to  the effective date  of T itle  V II and  the app li­
cable sta tu te  of lim itations fo r Sec. 1981; 3 )  the lack 
of standing  as found  by the c ircu it co u rt because the 
plain tiff class d id  no t include p ast app lican ts w ho were 
affected by  any past practices; and  4 )  the q uo ta  o rder 
is to tally  un re la ted  to  any p roven  effects o f discrim ina-

137



— -52-

tion  and  attem pts to  m andate  e thn ic b alance  in  the 
w ork  force con tra ry  to  Sec. 703 ( j )  of T itle  V II.

N one of the  nam ed  plain tiffs no t a lready  em ployed 
by the fire d epartm en t h ad  been app lican ts fo r the 
1969 o r any o th er p rio r exam ination . T h e  responden ts’ 
com plain t specifically alleged th a t the  su it was b rou g h t 
on behalf of a class com posed of all persons who 
are  either b lack  o r M exican-A m erican  an d  w ho are 
current o r future app lican ts fo r em ploym ent as Los 
A ngeles C ounty  firem en (A . 3 ) .  T h e  first an d  only 
exam ination  fo r C oun ty  firefigh ter they h a d  tak en  was 
the 1972 exam ination  w hich in  app lica tion  h ad  no  ad ­
verse effect. T h e  p lain tiffs th a t w ere cu rren t firem en 
on  the force, had , of course, passed  som e previous 
exam  and  w ere th ereafter em ployed. T h e  c ircu it court 
co rrec tly  concluded the p lain tiffs lacked  stand ing  to 
challenge defendan ts’ p rio r use of a w ritten  qualifica tion  
test in  1969 .15 In  light of the c lea r facts an d  this 
C o u rt’s ru ling  in  East Texas Freight v. Rodriguez, 
431 U .S. 395 (1 9 7 7 ) ,  such a find ing  w as inescap­
able.

I t  thus follows th a t if the d istric t co u rt h ad  no 
ju risd iction  to  declare the use of the 1969 test illegal 
(even  absent a deliberate in ten t re q u irem en t), the court 
h ad  no  ju risd iction  to  im pose a q u o ta  h iring  order 
th a t could  only be fo r the  purpose of p rovid ing  a

15The Court’s ruling on lack of standing would necessarily 
encompass any previous employment practice not applied to 
plaintiffs as they could perforce have suffered no injury if 
they had not been candidates. Footnote 6 (A. 83) to the circuit 
court’s majority opinion indicates that this was their under­
standing.

138



- 5 3 -

rem edy fo r  the  consequences o f  a test th e  p lain tiffs 
had  no  stand ing  to  challenge.

C o n tra ry  to  responden ts’ assertions in  th e ir O p p o ­
sition to  th e  P e titio n  herein , m erely  being  of the sam e 
race as the alleged discrim inatees is n o t sufficient to  
confer s tand ing  in  the absence of an  ind iv idual claim  
of in jury . R esp o n d en ts’ position  is co n tra ry  to  this 
C o u rt’s decision  in  East Texas Freight v. Rodriguez 
and if adop ted , m ust necessarily  destroy the established 
concepts of standing. In  this regard , it is of p artic u la r 
significance th a t no t only w ere there  no  p as t re jected  
applicants nam ed  as p lain tiffs, the su it w as expressly 
brought only on behalf of cu rren t and  fu tu re  appli­
cants (A . 5, 6 ).

A ssum ing arguendo th a t de libera te  in ten t to  discrim i­
nate is n o t necessary  fo r liab ility  u n d er Sec. 1981 and  
that som ehow  the p lain tiffs have standing  to  ob tain  
a q uo ta  o rd e r as a rem edy fo r a  test they have no 
standing to  challenge, the q u o ta  o rd e r requ iring  the 
entire fire d ep artm en t to  achieve rac ia l b a lan ce  w ith 
the C oun ty ’s general p o p u la tio n  exceeds the C o u rt’s 
rem edial au tho rity  fo r the follow ing reasons: 1) It 
attem pts to  rem edy p u rp o rted  d iscrim ination  (n o t  sup­
ported  by any  find ing  of a d iscrim inatory  ac t)  th a t 
could only have occu rred  p rio r to  the th ree-year sta tu te  
of lim itations cut-off period  governing Sec. 1981 claim s 
(Jan u ary  11, 1 9 7 0 ) ;16 2 )  T h e  o rd e r is co n tra ry  
to the ho ld ing  in  United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 
U.S. 553 (1 9 7 7 )  th a t tim e b a rred  claim s have no

16The petitioners, pursuant to the quota hiring order, have 
to date hired more blacks and Mexican-Americans (207) than 
the number of persons of all races (187) hired as a result 
of the 1969 written test.

139



- 54-

p resen t legal consequences. T he o rd e r is clearly  in tended  
to  rem edy p ast d iscrim inatory  p ractices u nconstra ined  
by any tim e lim itations. In  fact, the p lain tiffs adm it 
th a t p ast app lican ts w ho are tim e b a rred  from  suing 
will benefit from  the  q u o ta  o rd e r w hen they  reapply , 
(O pp . 3 2 .)  A t page 29 in  responden ts’ O pposition  
they state: “P lain tiffs agree th a t the rem edial h iring  
o rd e r herein  w as based  on a  p a tte rn  and  p rac tice  
of d iscrim inatory  p ractices th a t w ere un law ful only 
un d er § 1981, n o t T itle  V II .” In  this con tex t, any 
sta tu te  of lim itations, w hether u n d er Sec. 1981 o r T itle  
V II, is rendered  m eaningless; 3 )  C o n tra ry  to  the 
p rincip le th a t q uo ta  orders are lim ited  to  the  extent 
of the v io lation  proven  an d  issued only in  extrem e 
circum stances, the d istric t co u rt’s sw eeping o rd e r herein  
sim ply seeks to  achieve racial b a lan ce  betw een  the 
w ork force and  the general com m unity. T h is is directly  
con tra ry  to  the in ten t of C ongress as expressed in  
Sec. 703 ( j )  of T itle  V II, as well as several p ro n o u n ce­
m ents of this C ourt.

R ecently , including the decision in  Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, .........  U .S. ......... ,
17 F E P  Cases 1000 (1 9 7 8 ) ,  the Suprem e C o u rt has 
expressed concern  th a t the rem edies fo r d iscrim ination  
n o t exceed the effects of the estab lished  v io lation . In  
Milliken v. Bradley, 418  U .S. 717 , the Suprem e 
C o u rt found  the school desegregation  o rd e r re ­
quiring  the crossing of d istric t boundaries w as no t 
p ro p er because there  w as no p red ica te  of a constitu ­
tio n a l v io lation  o r the iden tification  of any significant 
segregative effects resu lting  from  u nconstitu tiona l con­
duct. T h e  o rd e r was held  im perm issib le because it 
was no t com m ensura te  w ith  the co nstitu tiona l v iolation

140



•55—

to  be redressed . T his princip le  w as resta ted  in  Hills 
v. Gautreaux, 96 S .C t. 1538 (1 9 7 6 ) .

L im ita tions on  a tria l cou rt’s rem edial au tho rity  in 
race d iscrim ination  cases was again  undersco red  in  
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U .S. 
406, 97 S.C t. 2766  (1 9 7 7 ) ,  w herein  the D istric t C o u rt 
after find ing  con stitu tio n a l v io lations o rdered  d istric t­
w ide rac ia l s tuden t red istribu tion  un til each  school was 
b rough t w ith in  15%  of the b la c k /w h ite  popu la tion  
ra tio  of D ay ton . T h e  Suprem e C o u rt v acated  and  re ­
m anded  on  g round  th a t the federa l cou rt h ad  exceeded 
its rem edial au th o rity  to  ta ilo r the rem edy to  the extent 
of the constitu tiona l v io lation . T h e  C o u rt held th a t 
there w as no  ju stifica tion  fo r the  d isparity  betw een 
the evidence of the effects of the constitu tiona l v io lation  
and the sw eeping red istribu tion  order.

A lthough  Milliken, Hills, and  Dayton involved illegal 
school segregation , the princip le  th a t the rem edy m ust 
no t exceed the ex ten t of the  v io lation  proven  is equally  
applicable to  em ploym ent d iscrim ination  cases, p a rtic u ­
larly  w hen the effect of such a rem edial o rd e r is 
to d iscrim inate in  a very rea l sense against o th er races 
not sharing  any cu lpab ility  fo r p ast d iscrim inatory  p ra c ­
tices. T he q u o ta  o rd e r in this case is very sim ilar 
in scope to  those found  defective in  Milliken and 
Dayton. P rem ised  on  the m ost tenuous of grounds 
and u n supported  by any evidence, it assum es th a t p e r­
fect rac ia l p arity  w ould  have been achieved in the 
absence of d iscrim ination— and therefore o rdered  q uo ta  
hiring un til the en tire  d epartm en t achieved cu rren t 
racial p a r ity .17 A s em phasized herein , this w as under-

17The current composition of the entire department has 
evolved during at least a 30-year period. Indeed, unless one 

(This footnote is continued on next page)
141



— 56—

taken  in  com plete d isregard  of s tand ing  considerations, 
the sta tu te  of lim itations, and  any co rre la tio n  betw een 
the effects o f the only act found  illegal (th e  1972 
w ritten  te s t)  and  the q u o ta  order. T his is particu la rly  
u n fo rtu n a te  because of the com plete lack  of any id en ti­
fiab le  victim s and  the responden ts’ express allegation  
th a t they rep resen ted  only p resen t and  fu tu re  applican ts.

L im ita tions on the scope of q u o ta  o rders in  em ploy­
m en t d iscrim ination  cases should  be consisten t w ith 
those applicab le to  o th e r rem edies, such as re in sta te ­
m ent, b ack  pay  and  re troactive seniority , all of w hich 
this C o u rt has construed  to  be lim ited  by the s ta tu te  
of lim itations, the dam age ac tually  proven , o r  by  the 
scope of the applicab le s ta tu te  un d er w hich the v io lation  
w as fo u n d .18 Franks v. Bowman Transportation 
Company, 424  U .S. 747 (1 9 7 6 ) .  Indeed , the lim itations 
on rac ia l h iring  quotas should  be even m ore stringent 
because, unlike the o ther rem edies such as b ack  pay  
and  re troactive seniority , they im pact no t so m uch 
upon- the em ployer, bu t upon  innocen t individuals who 
did  n o t share in  the d iscrim inatory  p ractices o r  p ro fit 
therefrom .

T he m ajority  in  Bakke observed this inheren t u n fa ir­
ness in  rem ark ing  th a t w hile rac ia l classifications have 
been designed as rem edies fo r the v ind ication  of consti­
tu tio n a l entitlem ents, “the scope of the rem edies was

assumes that all of the 1760 firefighters on the force had 
been hired in the eight years immediately preceding the lawsuit, 
the quota order seeks to remedy unproven discrimination occur­
ring even before the original enactment of the Title VII in 
1964.

18In Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 421 at 423, the 
Supreme Court stated that there should be no drastic distinction 
between injunctive and back pay relief, a concept at odds 
with the quota order herein.

142



no t perm itted  to  exceed the ex ten t o f the v io lations 
. . and  fu r th e r  th a t . . the  rem edial ac tion  
usually  rem ains subject to  con tinu ing  oversight to  assure 
th a t it will w ork  the least h arm  possible to  o th er in n o ­
cent persons com peting fo r the  benefit” . Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, slip op. pp . 31, 
38, supra a t 1014-17. A gain  in Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, .........  U .S. .........  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  the C o u rt
adm onished th a t “ [i] t  is c lea r beyond cavil th a t the 
ob ligation  im posed by T itle  V II is to  p rovide an  equal 
opportun ity  fo r each app lican t regardless of race w ith ­
ou t reg ard  to  w hether m em bers of the app lican ts’ race 
are a lready  p roportio n ate ly  rep resen ted  in  the  w ork  
fo rce” . (E m phasis  in  o rig in a l).

T he sw eeping q u o ta  o rd e r in  the in stan t case paten tly  
violates the above princip les and  furnishes independen t 
grounds fo r reversal.

—57—

Conclusion.

T he facts of the in stan t case reveal th a t it is the 
classic one to  m easure the liability  d istinctions betw een 
T itle  V II and  Sec. 1981 and  to  harm onize Secs. 1981, 
1982, 1983 and  1 9 8 5 (3 )  by recognizing a uniform  
standard  of liab ility  fo r non-T itle  V II em ploym ent d is­
crim ination  claim s. T here  w ere no claim s of d iscrim ina­
tory h iring  afte r T itle  V II becam e effective, no d is­
crim inatory  in ten t in  the use of any h iring  practices, 
and no standing  by p lain tiffs to challenge the pre- 
1972 h iring  practices. T his case is the app ro p ria te  
one fo r the C o u rt to  m ake its Washington v. Davis 
intent rule com plete and  consistent in app lica tion  to 
sim ilar equal p ro tec tion  and  constitu tionally  derived 
statutes of the sam e era,

143



— 58 -

Bo th  C ongress and  this C o u rt have recognized the 

un ique n a tu re  of T itle  V II resu lting  in  its being  con­
strued  d ifferently  th an  predecessor an ti-d iscrim ination  

sta tu tes. I t  is only w ith in  the  contex t o f T itle  V II, 
a  s ta tu te  th a t was p rio r to  1972, expressly inapplicab le 
to  public agencies such as the P etitioner, th a t the 
Griggs doctrine has evolved. Incalcu lab le  h arm  will 

resu lt if legislative history  an d  jud icial p receden t are 
ignored  and  unique T itle  V II derived s tan d ard s are 

transposed  to  independen t Sec. 1981. T hese  include 
as a m in im a its re troactive effect on  public  agencies, 
the thw arting  of the congressional lim itations form ing 

an  in teg ra l p a r t of T itle  V II w hich w ill inevitably  
encourage a flood of litigation  and, perhaps m ost signifi­

cantly , the expansion  of the Griggs doctrine  beyond 
the  em ploym ent context.

L iab ility  was found  upon  a show ing of po ten tia l 
b u t unrealized  d isp roportionate  im pact of the 1972 
test, the circu it cou rt holding th a t the respondents 

lacked  standing  to  challenge the 1969 test. T h e  quo ta  
h iring  o rd e r w as, therefore , p red ica ted  solely upon 
the cu rren t racial com position  of the  F ire  D epartm en t, 
w ithou t d istinction  betw een pre- an d  p ost-T itle  V II 
h iring  and  w ithout p roo f of any illegal p re -T itle  V II 
practices.

T he excessive q u o ta  order, in com plete d isregard 

of standing, the  S ta tu te  of L im ita tions, and  totally  

d ivorced from  the effects of any proven  v io lation  is 
clearly  beyond the d istrict co u rt’s au tho rity  and , by 

itself, constitu tes com pelling grounds fo r reversal.

144



— 59-

Judgm en t of the N in th  C ircu it should  be reversed 
with d irec tion  th a t the o rd e r of the d istric t cou rt be 
vacated  an d  the C om pla in t dism issed.

R espectfu lly  subm itted ,

J ohn  H. L arson,
County Counsel,

W illia m  F . Stew a rt ,
Chief, Labor Relations Division,

Attorneys for Petitioners.
Septem ber, 1978.

145





IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
O cto b er T erm , 1978 

N o. 77-1553

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERV­
ICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, in­
dividually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 
WILLIE C. BURSEY, ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. 
SMITH, WILLIAM CLADY, STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE 
ROY TUCKER, LEON AUBRY, RONALD CRAWFORD, 
JAMES HEARD, ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, OSBALDO A. 
AMPARAH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.

B R IE F  F O R  R E S P O N D E N T S

A . Thomas Hunt,
T imothy B. Flynn,
C en ter fo r L aw  in the P ub lic  In terest, 
Walter Cochran-Bond,
Edward B. Reitkopp,

10203 S an ta  M onica B oulevard , 
Los A ngeles, C alif. 90067, 
(2 1 3 )  879-5588,

Attorneys for Respondents.

147





S U B JE C T  IN D E X

Q uestions P resen ted  ................................... -...................P reface

Statem ent of the C ase —......................................................  1

A. B ackground  ............................................................... 1

B. L iab ility  ......................................................................  3
1. R ecru itm en t ..... -....................-..........-.......... 4
2. W ritten  T ests ................................................  5
3. H eigh t R equ irem en t ...........—-...................  7

C. R elief - .......................................................................... 8

D . C essation  of D iscrim ination  ................................. 11

E . C o u rt of A ppeals .....................................................  12

F . Issues B efore Suprem e C o u rt .........   13

Sum m ary of A rgum en t - .......-............................................  14

A rgum ent ........................................ -.......................................  15

I
W ilful D iscrim inato ry  In ten t N eed  N o t Be Shown 

U n d er Section 1981 ............. - ..............-.....................  15

A . In tro d u c tio n  ..........................................................  15

B. Jo h n so n  v. R ailw ay E x p re s s .......... -...............  17

C. In  P a ri M ate ria  ..................................................  23

D . W ashington  v. D avis ........................................  30

E . L egislative H istory  ............................................  35

F . R eliance ........................ -....................................... 36

II
T he R eco rd  H ere Shows In ten tio n a l D iscrim ina­

tion  ............................................. -..................................... 37

Page

149



11.

H I Page
T h e  D efendan ts’ S tanding  A rgum ent Is N o t P ro p ­

erly B efore the C o u r t ..................................................  41

IV
T he H iring  O rder Issued Below W as A p p ro p ria te

........................................................ -............. .....................  44

C onclusion .............    49

A ppendix  A . P la in tiffs’ E xh ib it 8— M em o from  
the H ead  of L os A ngeles C oun ty  P ersonne l D e­
p artm en t to the L os A ngeles C oun ty  C ivil Serv­
ice C om m ission ..... ..................... ....................A pp. p. 1

P a c t Sheet on the F irem an  E x a m in a t io n ........... .......... 3

A ppend ix  B. P e rtin en t P o rtio n  of T ran sc rip t In ­
volved ................................................................................  5

150



T A B L E  O F  A U T H O R IT IE S  C IT E D

C ases P age

A lbem arle  P ap e r Co. v. M oody, 4 2 2  U .S. 405 
(1 9 7 5 )  ..................     27

A llen  v. A m algam ated  T ran sit U nion , L o ca l 788 ,
544 F .2 d  876 ( 8th  C ir. 1 977) ................................  48

B arne tt v. W .T . G ra n t C o., 518 F .2 d  543 (4 th  C ir. 
1 9 7 5 ) ............ .................................................................43 , 44

C arte r v. G allagher, 452  F .2 d  315 ( 8th  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ), 
cert, denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1 9 7 2 )  ................. .......  36

C asteneda v. P a rtid a , 4 3 0  U .S. 482  (1 9 7 7 )  .......38, 39

C ope v. C ope, 137 U.S. 682 (1 8 9 0 )  .........................  24

D avis v. C oun ty  of Los A ngeles, 566  F .2 d  1334 
(9 th  C ir. 1 977) ................. ................ ...7 , 13, 15, 41 , 49

E ast T exas M o to r F re igh t v. R odriguez, 431 U .S.
395 (1 9 7 7 )  ...............................................      43

E rlenbaugh  v. U nited  States, 409  U .S. 239  (1 9 7 2 )
....................      25

G ard n er v. P an am a R . C o., 342  U .S. 29 (1 9 5 1 )  .... 48

G ibson v. L ocal 40 , S upercargoes and  C heckers,
543 F .2 d  1259 (9 th  C ir. 1 976) ..... ..........................  43

G ray  v. G reyhound  L ines, E ast, 545 F .2 d  169 
(D .C . C ir. 1 976) ...............................................    44

Griggs v. D uke P ow er C o., 401 U .S. 424  (1 9 7 1 )  
.......................................... 14, 15, 19, 20, 23, 27, 35, 36

H ackett v. M cG uire  B ro thers, Inc., 445 F .2 d  442  
(3 rd  C ir. 1 971) ...............................................................  44

iii.

151



IV.

H azelw ood School D istric t v. U n ited  States, 431 U.S.
324 (1 9 7 7 )  ............. ...........................................................  29

H olm berg  v. A rm brech t, 327 U.S. 392  (1 9 4 6 )  ..47 , 48 

H u n ter v. E rickson , 393 U.S. 385 (1 9 6 9 )  ......... 25 , 29

In te rn a tio n a l B ro therhood  of T eam sters v. U n ited  
States, 431 U .S. 324 (1 9 7 7 )  ......... ....28 , 29 , 46, 47

Johnson  v. G eorg ia  H ighw ay E xpress, Inc ., 417 
F .2 d  1122 (5 th  C ir. 1 969) ........................................  43

Jo h n so n  v. R ailw ay E xpress A gency, Inc ., 421 U .S.
454  (1 9 7 5 )  ................... 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 , 23 , 25

Johnson  v. R yder T ru ck  L ines, Inc., 575 F .2 d  471 
(4 th  C ir. 1 978) ..........................................................28 , 35

Jones v. M ayer, 392 U.S. 409  (1 9 6 8 )  ......................... 29

K atzenbach  v. M organ , 384  U .S. 641 (1 9 6 6 )  ..... . 34

K ing v. L aborers In te rn a tio n a l U nion , L o ca l N o. 
818, 443 F .2 d  273 ( 6 th  C ir. 1 971) ......................... 36

Kinsey v. F irs t R egional Securities, Inc ., 557 F .2 d  
830 (D .C . C ir. 1 977) ........................................ .........  35

L ou isian a  v. U nited  States, 380 U .S. 145 (1 9 6 5 )
...........................................................................................45 , 48

N L R B  v. A llis-C halm ers M fg. C o., 388 U .S. 175 
(1 9 6 7 )     ....................................................................  24

N L R B  v. D river’s L oca l U nion , 362  U .S. 274  
(1 9 6 0 )  .......... ........................................................... .........  24

Pettw ay v. A m erican  C ast Iro n  P ipe C o., 576 F .2 d  
1157 (5 th  C ir. 1 978) ...............................................28, 35

R egents of the U niversity  of C alifo rn ia  v. B akke,
57 L .E d .2 d  750  (S .C t. 1 978) .................................. . 45

Page

152



V.

R ich v. M artin  M arie tta  C orpo ra tion , 522  F .2 d  331 
(1 0 th  C ir. 1975) .................. .......................................... 43

Shield C lub  v. C ity  of C leveland, 538 F .2 d  329 
(6 th  C ir. 1 9 7 6 ) ........................... ...................................  36

Sullivan v. L ittle  H un ting  P ark , 396 U .S. 229 
(1 9 6 9 )  .............. ................................................................  36

Swann v. C harlo tte-M eck lenberg  B o ard  of E du ca­
tion , 402  U .S. 1 (1 9 7 1 )  ................................... 46 , 48 , 49

U nited  S tates v. F reem an , 3 How . 556  (1 8 4 5 )  .... 24

W ashington  v. D avis, 426  U .S. 229 (1 9 7 6 )  ..............
_____ _____12, 13, 16, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 , 38, 40

W aters v. H eublein , Inc ., 547 F .2 d  466  (9 th  C ir. 
1 9 7 6 ), cert, denied , 433 U.S. 915 (1 9 7 7 )  ..... . 44

Y oung v. I .T .T ., 438  F .2 d  757  (3 rd  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ) .. 36 

C onstitu tions

U nited S tates C onstitu tion , F ifth  A m endm ent .........
......... .................. ............. .........................16, 32, 33, 34, 40

U nited S tates C onstitu tion , T h irteen th  A m endm ent
..................................... ................................................. ........... 34

U nited S tates C onstitu tion , F o u rteen th  A m endm ent 
.................... ......................................... 2, 16, 32, 33, 34, 40

S tatu tes

D.C. C ode Sec. 1-320 ..........................................................  32

42 U .S.C .:
Sec. 1981 ................... 1, 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
................... 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28 , 29, 30
....................................................32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40

Sec. 1982 .......................................................................25, 29

Page

153



Sec. 1983 

Sec. 3601

vi.

P age 

1, 26, 32 

............  25

Secs. 2000e, et seq., T itle  V II of the C ivil R ights
A c t of 1964, as am ended _____ _____2, 4, 1,9,  10

.............................12 , 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

.............. ....................27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 40

Civil R ights A ct of 1866, Sec. 1 .....................................  36

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 3 (h )  .... 28

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 (c )  .... 22

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 (e )  .... 21

Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 6 ( f ) ( 1 )
......................................................... ............................... 2

Legislative M ateria ls  

C ongressional G lobe,
39th  C ongress, 1st Session 474  (1 8 6 6 )  .................  35

C ongressional R ecord ,
3371 (1 9 7 2 )  ..... .........................................................26, 27

H .R . R ep. N o. 92-238 (1 9 7 1 )  ........................................  19

M iscellaneous

35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (A u g u st 1, 1 970) ......................... 5

C ooper & Sobel, “F a ir E m ploym ent C rite ria”, 82 
H arv ard  L aw  Review, pp. 1598, 1599 (1 9 6 9 )  .... 20

L o p atk a , “F ederal R egulation  of E m ploym ent D is­
crim ination ,” 1977, U niversity  of Illinois L aw  
F orum , pp. 69, 71 ............................................................  20

R ules

F edera l R ules of C ivil P rocedure, R u le  23 ..............  43

154





1. W hether o r n o t purposeful d iscrim ination  is a p re­
requisite  to liability  un d er 4 2  U .S.C . §1981.

2. I f  the answ er to  the first question  is in  the  affirm a­
tive, w hether o r no t there  w as a show ing of p u r­
poseful d iscrim ination  in  the in stan t case.

3. W hether o r no t D efendants m ay ra ise  the standing 
issue before this C ourt.

4. W hether o r no t the hiring  o rd e r w hich issued below 
is app rop ria te  and  is constitu tiona l as “m irro ring” 
the illegal d iscrim ination  proven.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

156



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
O cto b er T erm , 1978 

N o. 77-1553

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERV­
ICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
vs.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, in­
dividually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 
WILLIE C. BURSEY, ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. 
SMITH, WILLIAM CLADY, STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE 
ROY TUCKER, LEON AUBRY, RONALD CRAWFORD, 
JAMES HEARD, ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, OSBALDO A. 
AMPARAH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background
T he P la in tiffs /R esp o n d en ts  in this case are  b lacks and 

M exican-A m ericans ( “P la in tiffs” ) . T h e  D e fe n d a n ts / 
Petitioners are  the C oun ty  of L os A ngeles and  two 
constituent agencies of th a t C oun ty  ( “D efendan ts” ).

T his ac tion  w as com m enced on  Jan u a ry  11, 1973. 
The orig inal com plain t alleged vio lations of 42  U .S.C . 
§1981 ( “Section 1981” ) an d  42 U .S .C . §1983, as

157



•2 -

well as the  F o u rteen th  A m endm ent (R . 1-9) .x By 
w ay of a Second A m ended  C om pla in t filed o n  M ay 
3, 1973, allegations w ere added  th a t T itle  V II  of the 
C ivil R ights A c t of 1964, as am ended, 42  U.S.C. 
§§200Ge et seq. ( “T itle  V II” ) had  been an d  was being 
v io lated  (R . 6 0 -6 8 ). A ttached  as copies to  th a t Second 
A m ended  C om pla in t w ere copies of the  P la in tiffs’ 
charges filed w ith the E q u al E m ploym ent O pportun ity  
C om m ission ( “E E O C ” ) and  the “righ t to  sue” letters 
w hich h ad  been issued to  the P la in tiffs p u rsu a n t to  
Section 7 0 6 ( f ) ( 1 )  of T itle  V II (R . 6 9 -7 3 ).

T he case proceeded  to  tria l on  Ju n e  5, 1973 and 
Ju n e  6, 1973 (T r . 1 -2 6 2 ).1 2 In  add ition  to  the oral 
testim ony and  th irteen  exhibits w hich w ere adm itted  
in to  evidence a t trial, the evidence before the D istrict 
C o u rt included  extensive and  extrem ely  im p o rtan t stipu­
lations of fac t betw een the parties. T hese stipulations 
are found  in  a P re-T ria l O rd er filed  an d  signed by 
the C o u rt a t the com m encm ent of tria l (R . 132ff; 
stipulations a t 1 3 6 -1 4 1 ).

T h e  D istric t C o u rt found  th a t D efendan ts h ad  en­
gaged in  d iscrim inatory  em ploym ent p ractices violative 
of T itle  V II and  Section 1981 (R . 1 6 3 -1 6 4 ).

T h e  Judgm en t en tered  by the D istric t C o u rt estab­
lished a fo rty  percen t m inority  annua l h iring  goal (R . 
1 6 7 ). T h e  Judgm ent, w hich has been in effect since 
Ju ly , 1978 (R . 1 6 6 ), specifically provides a t p arag raph  
seven th a t the h iring  o rd e r shall no t be deem ed “to 
requ ire  o r encourage” defendants to  h ire unqualified  
firefighters o r “to  low er o r re fra in  from  increasing 
job-re la ted  s tan d ard s” (R . 1 6 8 ). T h e  Judgm en t pro­

1“R.” refers to a reference to the record in the Court of 
Appeals, which has been forwarded to the Supreme Court.

2“Tr.” refers to the Trial Transcript which is part of the 
record on appeal and which has been forwarded to the Supreme 
Court.

158



— 3—

vides th a t the  decree is “sub ject to  m od ifica tion” in 
the event the h iring  o rd e r is in  conflic t w ith  the above- 
stated  term s of p a rag ra p h  seven (R . 1 6 8 ) . N o  m odifi­
cation  of the decree has been sough t by  D efendan ts 
during the five years of its o pera tion ; indeed, the resu lt 
of the Judgm en t has been tha t, despite the fac t there 
were v irtually  n o  m inorities em ployed as of the  d ate  
this law suit w as com m enced (R . 1 3 6 ), 207 m inority  
firem en have been h ired  since the Judgm en t w as en tered  
(D efendan ts’ B rief, p. 1 0 ).

B. Liability

T h e p rim ary  basis fo r the D istric t C o u rt’s find ing  
of liability  is found  a t find ing  o f fac t n u m b er two 
(R . 160) and  a t conclusion of law  n u m b er fo u r 
(R . 163) w hich read  as follows:

“2. T he w orkforce a t the tim e the com plain t 
here in  w as filed, a t the L os A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  
D ep artm en t, consisted  of 1 ,762 firem en, of w hom  
n ine ( 0 .5 % )  are b lack  and  fifty ( 2 .8 % )  are 
M exican-A m erican . In  L os A ngeles C ounty , 10 .8%  
of the  inhab itan ts  a re  b lack  and  18 .3%  are M exi- 
can-A m erican . D efendan ts did  no t justify , a t the 
tria l o r  o th er proceedings herein , the pauc ity  of 
b lack  an d  M exican-A m erican  firem en em ployees at 
the L os A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D epartm en t, as com ­
p ared  to  the general pop u la tio n  statistics fo r those 
m inority  groups.

“4. In  cases involving d iscrim ination  based on 
race  and  n a tio n a l origin, ‘statistics often  tell m uch, 
and  C ourts  listen .’ Alabama v. United States, 304 
F .2 d  583 , 586  (5 th  C ir. 1 9 6 2 ), aff’d per curiam, 
371 U .S. 37 (1 9 6 2 ) .  In  em ploym ent d iscrim ina­
tion  cases it consistently  has been held  th a t w here 
em ploym ent statistics, such as those before the

159



C o u rt, reveal a severe d isp roportion  betw een the 
percen tage  of m inority  em ployees and  the percen t­
age o f m inorities resid ing w ith in  the re levan t geo­
graph ical area in w hich the em ployer is located , 
a  prima facie case of d iscrim ination  is established. 
See e,g., United States v. Local 86, Ironworkers, 
315 F . Supp. 1202, 1236 (W .D . W ash ., 1 9 7 0 ), 
aff’d 443 F .2 d  544, 551 (9 th  C ir. 1 971) cert, 
denied 404  U.S. 984  (1 9 7 1 ) ;  United States v. 
Hayes International Corp., 456  F .2 d  112, 120 
(5 th  C ir. 1 9 7 2 ); Parham v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 433 F .2 d  421 , 426  ( 8th  Cir. 
1 9 7 0 ). D efendants in  this case did  n o t reb u t the 
prima facie case fo r P lain tiffs estab lished  by the 
statistics, cited in F indings of F a c t N u m b er Two 
( 2 ) . ”

T he evidence as found  in the P re-T ria l O rd e r stipu la­
tions and  as adduced  a t tria l show ed th a t D efendants 
h ad  engaged in  num erous em ploym ent prac tices which 
opera ted  to  the detrim en t of m inorities and  w hich were 
n o t job-re la ted  o r  justified  by business necessity. The 
evidence as to  these p ractices, m ost of w hich were 
carried  ou t bo th  before and  afte r M arch , 1972, when 
T itle  V II becam e applicab le to public em ployers, can 
be sum m arily  described as follows:

1. Recruitment

T h e head  of the C oun ty  P ersonne l D ep artm en t testi­
fied a t tria l th a t p rio r to  1969 D efendan ts did  little 
o r  no  recru iting  in  b lack and  M exican-A m erican  com ­
m unities, b u t instead  relied on  “w ord  of m o u th ” recru it­
m en t by their all w hite w orkforce (T r . 3 0 -3 2 ).

I t  also was adm itted  a t tria l by the head  of the 
C oun ty  P ersonnel D epartm en t th a t the L os Angeles 
C ounty  F ire  D epartm en t had  a rep u ta tio n  as a discrim i­
nato ry  em ployer in the m inority  com m unities of Los



—5—

Angeles C oun ty  due to  the fac t few  m inorities are 
em ployed (T r . 5 2 ) .  In  ap p a ren t reference to  the fa ilu re  
to recru it despite the bad  rep u ta tio n , the D istric t C o u rt 
specifically found  th a t D efendan ts h ad  engaged in the 
illegal em ploym ent p rac tice  o f “failing  and  refusing 
to take  necessary  affirm ative steps to  overcom e the 
existence in the b lack  an d  M exican-A m erican  com m uni­
ties o f L os A ngeles C oun ty  of a  rep u ta tio n  th a t the 
Los A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D ep artm en t d iscrim inates 
against b lacks and  M exican-A m ericans.”

2. Written Tests
Stipulations found  in  the P re-T ria l O rd er (R . 138- 

139) show  th a t “fo r several yea rs” D efendan ts had  
adm inistered w ritten  tests to  app lican ts fo r h ire  as 
firefighters w hich had  an  extrem ely  severe adverse im ­
pact upon  b lack  and  M exican-A m erican  applican ts; in ­
deed, fo r  exam ple, in  1969 approx im ate ly  2 5 %  of 
the app lican ts w ere b lack  an d  M exican-A m erican  (R . 
137), bu t, as a  resu lt of the w ritten  test, only five 
blacks an d  seven M exican-A m ericans w ere h ired  as 
com pared to  175 w hites (R . 13 8 ).

It w as stipu la ted  in  the P re-T ria l O rder (R . 139) 
that “ [n ]o  studies establish ing the valid ity  o f the w ritten  
entrance tests have been conducted  accord ing  to  the 
procedures set fo rth  in  the E q u al E m ploym ent O p­
portunity  C om m ission G uidelines, 29  C F R  §1607 , 35 
Fed. Reg. 12333 (A u g u st 1 , 1 9 7 0 ) .”

D efendants realized  as early  as M ay, 1971 th a t 
their w ritten  tests v io lated  applicab le federa l law. 
P laintiffs’ E xh ib it 8 , received in to  evidence a t tr ia l ,3 

is a m em o from  the head  of the L os A ngeles C ounty  
Personnel D ep artm en t to  the Los A ngeles C ounty  Civil

3Fo_r the Court’s convenience, a complete copy of Plaintiffs’ 
Exhibit 8 is attached hereto as Appendix “A”.

161



6

Service C om m ission. P age th ree  of this m em o is en­
titled  a  “F ac t Sheet on the F irem an  E x am ” and  reads 
as follow s in  re levant part:

“3. T he cu rren t test fo r F irem an  does dis­
crim inate against m inorities. (A lth o u g h  we had 
over 407  B lacks applying fo r F irem an  the last 
tim e this test was given, only fo u r w ere within 
appo in tm ent range on the list and  h ired . O f 126 
C hicanes, only 5 w ere w ithin reach  on  the list 
and  subsequently  h ire d .)

“4. A  recen t F ed era l Suprem e C o u rt decision 
on testing, G riggs et al v D uke P ow er C om pany, 
holds th a t this type of test is in  v io lation  of 
the Civil R ights A ct of 1964.

“ 6 . W e are no t staffed to  in terview  all of 
the 5000  plus candidates w hom  we estim ate will 
apply  fo r F irem an  on an open-com petitive exam ­
ination , and  the alternative of using our existing 
written examination as an administrative device 
for selecting a group of applicants whom we 
can interview for the Fireman positions (approxi­
mately 600 applicants to be interviewed for 80 
jobs) places us in the position of knowingly dis­
criminating.” (second  em phasis a d d e d ).

D espite the above-quoted m em orandum  w hich stated 
th a t use of the w ritten  test “places us in  the position 
of know ingly d iscrim inating” , on D ecem ber 1, 1972, 
the head  of the C oun ty  P ersonnel D ep artm en t form ally 
recom m ended by w ay of a m em orandum  that the w rit­
ten  test be used to elim inate all cand ida tes except 
the top  500  (P la in tiffs’ E xh ib it 7 ) .  T his m em orandum  
of D ecem ber 1, 1972, itself recognized “there  is some 
possibility  th a t this ac tion  will be challenged in  the 
C o u rts” . This practice  of in terview ing the top  500 
candidates (5 4 4  actually  w ere in terv iew ed) h ad  the

162



7-

effect o f con tinu ing  the severe adverse im pact of the 
w ritten test because of those to  be interview ed, only 
1.8%  w ere b lack  and  6 .0 %  w ere M exican-A m ericans 
(R . 140 -41 ).

As was an tic ipated  in the D ecem ber 1, 1972 m em o, 
the D efendan ts’ p rac tice  of utilizing  the w ritten  test 
was “challenged” , nam ely  by the in stan t law suit. In  
response to  this law suit, and  only because of this law ­
suit, D efendan ts d iscontinued  the utilization  of the w rit­
ten test (R . 140-41; T r. 4 8 -4 9 ) .

D espite the fac t the tests h ad  been u tilized  in  earlie r 
years to  decide w hich app lican ts w ould be p laced  at 
the top  of the list of persons to  be h ired  (R . 1 3 8 ), 
the head  of the L os A ngeles C oun ty  P ersonnel D e p a rt­
ment testified  th a t in his op in ion  it is no t possible 
to devise a w ritten  test fo r a job  such as firefigh ter 
which valid ly  ranks app lican ts (T r . 5 5 ) .

3. Height Requirement

It was stipu la ted  by the parties th a t p rio r to  1971 
D efendants requ ired  all app lican ts to  be 5 ' 8"  in  height, 
that in  1971 the requ irem en t w as low ered to  5 7 " ,  
and th a t “no studies have been conducted  establish ing 
the validity  of the height s tan d a rd s” (R . 1 4 0 ). It 
also was stipu la ted  at tria l th a t 4 5 %  of the M exican- 
A m ericans in  Los A ngeles C ounty , as com pared  to  
approxim ately 14%  of the w hites, are elim inated  by 
a 5 7 "  height requ irem en t (T r . 2 0 0 ) .

T he D istric t C o u rt concluded  th a t the height req u ire ­
ment was legal, bu t the N in th  C ircu it C o u rt o f A ppeals 
reversed (R . 163; 566  F .2 d  a t 134 1 -4 2 ). D efen d an ts’ 
petition fo r ce rtio ra ri did no t challenge the C o u rt of 
Appeals holding th a t the height requ irem ent is violative 
of T itle V II.

163



— 8

C . R elief

T h e  D istric t C o u rt en tered  a Judgm ent w hich, am ong 
o ther things, established a goal fo r D efendan ts of hiring 
tw enty percen t b lacks and  tw enty percen t M exican- 
A m ericans as new  firefighters (R . 1 6 7 ). T he D istrict 
C o u rt m ade it clear th a t the goals estab lished  by  the 
Judgm en t w ere no t im perm issible “q u o tas” since p ara ­
graph  seven of the Judgm ent (R . 168) reads as follows: 

“7. N oth ing  in this O rd er shall in  any way 
be deem ed to  requ ire  o r encourage D efendants:
( a )  to  em ploy any person  no t qualified  fo r a 
firem an position  w ith the L os A ngeles C o un ty  Fire 
D epartm en t; o r  (b )  to  in  any w ay low er o r refrain 
from  increasing the standards fo r em ploym ent as 
firem en at the Los A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D epart­
m ent, p rovided  such standards are reasonab ly  re­
la ted  to  the qualifications of p o ten tia l firemen; 
all o ther provisions in this o rd e r are  subordinate 
to  the provisions of this parag rap h  num bered  seven 
(7 )  and  shall be subject to  m odification  in  the 
event of any conflict herew ith .”

In  F ind ing  of F ac t num ber six (R . 1 6 1 ), the Dis­
tric t C o u rt explained the need fo r the establishm ent 
of the goals, stating  as follows:

“6 . T he accelerated  h iring  to  be o rdered  by the 
C o u rt is based  on all F indings, including the fol­
low ing considerations:

(a )  it seems evident, as officials o f D efendants 
testified  a t the tria l, th a t D efendan ts will have 
no difficulty finding sufficient num bers of qualified 
b lack  and  qualified  M exican-A m erican  potential 
firem en to  fill the requ ired  ra tios;

(b )  it is in the public in terest to  accelerate 
the elim ination  of the racial im balance at the 
Los A ngeles C ounty  F ire  D ep artm en t caused by 
the p ast d iscrim ination  of D efendan ts;

164



9

( c )  it appears th a t unless the  C o u rt orders 
accelerated  h irin g  a t the L os A ngeles C ounty  
F ire  D epartm en t, there  w ill no t be suffic ient h iring  
of b lacks and  M exican-A m ericans as is necessary  
to  overcom e the presently  existing effects of past 
d iscrim ination  w ith in  a reasonab le  period  of tim e;

(d )  it appears th a t a C o u rt o rd e r requ iring  
accelerated  h iring  of m inorities will aid  those offi­
cials of D efendan ts w ho desire the  elim ination  
of the effects of past d iscrim ination , in  th a t such 
an  o rd e r in  all likelihood  will m ake m inority  re ­
c ru iting  efforts m ore effective.”

T he grounds fo r F ind ing  of F a c t 6 ( c ) ,  quo ted  im m e­
diately above, to  the effect th a t absent the h iring  o rd e r 
the effects of the  past d iscrim ination  w ould  no t be 
elim inated, are obvious. A s described and  discussed 
above in  Section “B .2 .” of the S ta tem ent of th e  C ase, 
in D ecem ber of 1972 and  Jan u a ry  of 1973, several 
m onths afte r T itle  V II becam e applicab le  to  public 
em ployers, D efendan ts w ere in  the process of u tilizing 
a w ritten  test w hich D efendan ts knew w as illegal. T h e  
p rac tica l need of C ourt-im posed  goals fo r such an  
em ployer need no t be elucidated .

C hief B arlow  of the L os A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D e p a rt­
m ent was called as a w itness by the Plaintiffs a t the 
trial. D uring  his testim ony the follow ing exchange oc­
curred  betw een the C o u rt and  C hief B arlow :

“T H E  C O U R T : A ll right. N ow , I a lready  felt
th a t I  m ay have asked you the questions th a t 
m ay have been  u n fa ir to  you in  your position  
and  p u t you on the spot. I  have no desire so 
to  do. B u t I am  anxious to get w hatever po in t 
of view I can  from  you as a responsible rep resen ta ­
tive of the fire departm en t.

If  I  w ere to  m ake an o rder requ iring  th a t any 
h iring  of fire  d epartm en t personnel be of a p a rtic u ­

165



10—

la r  rac ia l p roportion , as you sit th ere  now , do 
you see any w ay in w hich th a t w ould pose an 
u n fo rtuna te  p roblem  to the fire  d epartm en t?

T H E  W IT N E SS: Only th a t it w ould reflect
th a t we did  no t have the  ability  to  m eet ou r 
ob ligation  and  o u r com m itm ent, I  th ink  th a t in 
term s of the personnel of the departm en t, their 
reflection  w ould be th a t— or an  in ference th a t 
som e lack  of s tan d ard  w as— or a s tan d ard  was 
n o t follow ed th a t w ould be som ew hat less than  
w hat they’ve h ad  in the past. I  th ink  the answ er 
is sim ple. I  feel th a t m y m ain  concern  w ould 
be the  fac t th a t we have no t perfo rm ed  in  term s 
of w hat o u r responsibility  was.

T H E  C O U R T : W ell, in  ac tua lity  you  haven ’t,
have you?

T H E  W ITN ESS: That’s right.” (em phasis
ad d ed ) (T r . 1 9 3 ).

C hief B arlow  also testified  as follows (T r . 150- 
5 1 )  concerning the advisability  of a C ourt-im posed  
h iring  order:

“Q  Is it fa ir  to  say, C hief B arlow , th a t in 
yo u r opinion if the C o u rt issued a  h iring  ra tio  
in  this case w hich requ ired  the h iring  o f one 
b lack  and  one M exican  A m erican  fo r each w hite 
hired, th a t there w ould be no  p roblem  in  the 
fire departm en t?

A  I  w ould no t an tic ipate  this.
T H E  C O U R T : Y ou  w ould no t an tic ipate  any

problem ?
T H E  W IT N E SS: A ny prob lem s.”

A t tria l there  also was u n con trad ic ted  expert testi­
m ony from  an  industria l psychologist th a t a hiring 
o rd e r w ould p roduce applican ts “as well qualified  as 
those selected in the p as t” (T r . 2 1 2 -2 1 3 ) . Sim ilarly,

166



— l i ­

the head  of the L os A ngeles C oun ty  P ersonnel D e p a rt­
m ent testified  th a t in  his op in ion  a C ourt-im posed  
hiring  o rd e r w ould n o t affect the  quality  of firefighters 
h ired  (T r . 6 0 -6 1 ).

T h e  D istric t C o u rt d id  n o t explain  the  reason  forty  
percen t w as chosen as the an n u a l h iring  goal, o ther 
th an  to  sta te  th a t the goal w ould  have been h igher 
fo r M exican-A m ericans b u t fo r the D istric t C o u rt’s 
determ ination  th a t the  height requ irem en t w as legal 
(R . 1 6 1 -1 6 2 ). I t  is no tew orthy , how ever, th a t  in  July, 
1972, the h ead  of the L os A ngeles C oun ty  P ersonnel 
D epartm en t h ad  sta ted  in  a m em orandum  to the C oun ty  
Civil Service C om m ission th a t “a goal of 5 0 %  m inori­
ties fo r all new  firem en hires seems reasonable. . . 
(P la in tiffs’ E xh ib it 9, a t p. 2 ) .  Sim ilarly, the  head  
of the  P ersonne l D ep artm en t testified  at tria l th a t he 
had  recom m ended  a  p ro cedure  w hereby only C oun ty  
em ployees could  apply  to  be firefighters, in the  belief 
tha t such a p rocedure  w ould  cause an  “increase” in 
m inority  rep resen ta tio n  in  the fire departm en t “in  g rea t­
er num bers th an  the  p o p u la tio n  and  the general public” 
(T r . 52-54 , 6 9 -7 0 ) .

D. Cessation of Discrimination

In  their m em orandum , D efendan ts repeated ly  refer 
to  the  fac t th a t no  “d iscrim inato ry  h iring” took  place 
a t the  L os A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D ep artm en t afte r the 
effective date  o f T itle  V II. T h e  C o u rt should  be aw are 
th a t this version of the facts is only technically  true. 
T he m ore basic p o in t and  a m ore accu ra te  descrip tion  
of the tru e  facts is that: ( a )  long afte r the effective 
date o f T itle  V II , D efendan ts w ere in  the  process 
of carry ing  ou t a h iring  p rog ram  based on  a testing 
system w hich D efendan ts knew v io lated  T itle  V II  (See 
Section “B ” of S ta tem ent of F ac ts  a b o v e ) ; and  (b )  
D efendants ceased these illegal p ractices solely in re-

167



sponse to  the  in stan t law suit (See Section “B ” o f S ta te­
m ent o f F ac ts  ab o v e).

P lain tiffs subm it th a t u n d er these circum stances the 
fac tu a l situation  before the D istric t C o u rt can  m ost 
accura te ly  be described as being one w here p rio r to  
the  effective d a te  of T itle  V II , D efendan ts engaged 
in  various em ploym ent p ractices w hich h ad  th e  effect 
o f v irtually  excluding m inorities from  em ploym ent as  
firefighters and  afte r T itle  V II becam e applicable , D e­
fendan ts con tinued  these p ractices un til learn ing  th a t 
this law suit was to  be brought. D ue to  the fact, how ever, 
th a t no  h iring  was ac tually  consum m ated  betw een 
M arch , 1972 and  the date  of the com m encem ent of 
th e  in stan t law suit, no illegal h iring  w as ac tually  com ­
p leted  afte r the effective date  of T itle  V II. T h is p o in t 
is o f no  p artic u la r im portance , how ever, since the  in ­
s tan t law suit also was p rosecuted  u n d er Section 1981, 
assum ing of course th a t T itle  V II princip les and  s tan d ­
ards of liability  are applicable in Section 1981 cases.

E . C o u rt of A ppeals

O n appeal to  the N in th  C ircu it C o u rt of A ppeals, 
by w ay of an  opinion dated  O c to b er 20 , 1976, the 
N in th  C ircu it at first upheld  the  D istric t C o u rt in  all 
respects o th er th an  a ru ling  th a t the D is tric t C o u rt 
h ad  erred  in holding D efendan ts’ height requ irem en t 
to  be job-re la ted . T he N in th  C ircu it in structed  the 
D istric t C o u rt to  reconsider upon  rem and  its lim itation  
on the h iring  o rder due to  the C o u rt of A ppeals reversal 
on the height issue (See A ppendix  “B ” to  P etition  
fo r C ertio ra ri) .

D efendan t then  filed a pe tition  fo r rehearing , arguing 
th a t this C o u rt’s ru ling  in  Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229  (1 9 7 6 )  requ ired  a ho ld ing  th a t w ilful or 
purposeful d iscrim ination  m ust be p roven  before liability  
can  be estab lished  under Section 1981. T he N in th

— 12—

168



— 13

C ircu it reh eard  the case and  issued a new  opin ion  
on D ecem ber 14, 1977. 566 F .2 d  1334.

In  this D ecem ber, 1977 opin ion  the N in th  C ircu it 
ru led  th a t this C o u rt’s op in ion  in  Washington v. Davis 
is lim ited  to  “co nstitu tiona l issues” an d  therefo re  is 
inapp licab le  to  Section 1981 cases. 566  F .2 d  a t 1339- 
41. A lso in  this new  opinion, a lthough  the issue was 
no t befo re  the C o u rt on the petition  fo r  rehearing , 
the N in th  C ircu it no ted  th a t due to  the fac t the scope 
of the rep resen ted  class d id  n o t include p as t applican ts, 
P lain tiffs lacked  stan d in g  to  challenge a 1969 w ritten  
test adm in istered  by D efendan ts. 566  F .2 d  a t 1337- 
38. T he N in th  C ircu it o rdered  a rem and  and  instructed  
the D istric t C o u rt to  reconsider the h iring  o rd e r no t 
only in  ligh t of the reversal o n  the height requ irem ent, 
bu t also in ligh t of the ho ld ing  th a t due to  the narrow  
scope of the  class the P lain tiffs lacked s tand ing  to 
challenge the 1969 w ritten  test. 566  F .2 d  a t 1337- 
38.

F. Issues Before Supreme Court

T h e P e titio n  fo r  C ertio ra ri by D efendan ts herein  
raises two issues, w hich can  be sta ted  as follows: 
( 1 ) w hether o r no t purposefu l o r  w ilful d iscrim inatory  
in ten t is a p re requ isite  to  liability  u n d er Section 1981; 
and  ( 2 ) w hether the scope of the h iring  o rd e r and  
the re lief afforded  by the D istric t C o u rt is app rop ria te  
in view  of the scope of the class rep resen ted  by P la in ­
tiffs and  in  view of sta tu te  of lim itations considerations.

I t  appears to  P la in tiffs th a t the second issue is no t 
p roperly  before the Suprem e C ourt. T h is is the case 
because the N in th  C ircu it C o u rt of A ppeals a lready  
has ru led  th a t the case should  be rem anded  to  the 
D istrict C o u rt fo r a re-evaluation  of the h iring  order. 
566 F .2 d  a t 1343.

169



SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
P la in tiffs’ position  before the C o u rt is th a t the  relief 

a ffo rded  below  was entirely  ap p ro p ria te  as “m irro rin g ” 
the w rongs com m itted  because in ten tio n a l d iscrim ina­
tion  need no t be proven  to establish liability  under 
Section 1981. T h e  first reason  th a t in tended  o r  w ilful 
d iscrim ination  is no t a p rerequ isite  to  liab ility  under 
Section 1981 is th a t in  Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 , 461 (1 9 7 5 )  this C o u rt held 
th a t T itle  V II and  Section 1981 are  “d irec ted  to  m ost 
o f the sam e ends” and  in  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U .S. 424 , 430-31 (1 9 7 1 ) ,  this C o u rt ru led  th a t 
un in ten tiona l “artific ia l b arrie rs” to m inority  em ploy­
m en t are v iolative of T itle  V II. T he second reason  
th a t in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  is n o t a p rerequisite  
to  liability  u n d er Section 1981 is tha t, as th is C ourt 
recognized in Griggs, Id. a t 430-31 , as of 1964 C o n ­
gress h ad  declared  th a t un in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  
w as proh ib ited  in the em ploym ent field and, therefore , 
as of 1964 un d er the in pari materia canon  of s ta tu to ry  
construction , the non-in ten t s tan d ard  becam e applicable 
to  Section 1981. (See P o in t “I ” of A rgum ent, infra.)

A t P o in t “I I ” , infra, of the A rgum ent, P lain tiffs 
also show th a t the record  below is replete w ith evidence 
of in ten tional d iscrim ination .

I t  also is P la in tiffs’ position  th a t the goals and  tim e­
tables established in the D istric t C o u rt’s h iring  o rder 
are com pletely app rop ria te  because: ( a )  o th er than  
due to  an  oversight w hich can  and  shou ld  be readily  
correc ted  on rem and , P la in tiffs h ad  stand ing  to  chal­
lenge D efendan ts’ past d iscrim inatory  p ractices; (b )  
D efendan ts’ sta tu te  of lim itations argum ents are inapp li­
cable to  this suit in  equity; and  ( c )  the goals and 
tim etables found  in the D istric t C o u rt’s Judgm en t are 
app rop ria te  fo r the purpose of elim inating  the effects 
of past d iscrim ination . (See P oin ts “H I” and  “IV ” of 
A rgum ent, infra.)

-— 14—

170



— 15—  

A R G U M E N T

I
WILFUL DISCRIMINATORY INTENT NEED NOT BE 

SHOWN UNDER SECTION 1981

A . In tro d u c tio n

T h e  p rin c ip a l th ru st o f D efendan ts’ pe tition  to  
the Suprem e C o u rt is th a t because the  D istric t C o u rt 
found  th a t D efendan ts h ad  no w ilful o r  conscious dis­
crim inato ry  in ten t (R . 1 6 2 ), and  because no  d iscrim ina­
tion  was effectuated (a s  opposed  to  “th rea ten ed ” ) by 
D efendan ts a fte r M arch , 1972 (w hen  T itle  V II first 
becam e app licab le  to  pub lic  e n titie s ) , an d  because the 
relief a ffo rded  by the D istric t C o u rt w as designed “to 
erase the  effects o f p ast d iscrim ination” (5 6 6  F .2 d  
a t 1343; R . 1 6 4 ), no h iring  o rd e r w hatsoever can p os­
sibly be  ap p ro p ria te  in  this case assum ing th a t w ilful o r 
purposefu l d iscrim ination  is requ ired  to  m ake ou t a 
v io lation  of Section 1981.

In  response, P la in tiffs’ basic position  is th a t w ilful 
o r purposefu l d iscrim ination  is n o t requ ired  fo r a show ­
ing of liab ility  in employment discrimination cases 
brough t u n d er Section  1981. In  short, it is P la in tiffs’ 
position  th a t in law suits b ro u g h t to  enforce the right 
to m ake employment co n trac ts  guaran teed  by Section 
1981, T itle  V II s tandards as enunc ia ted  by this C o u rt 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424  (1 9 7 1 )  
are applicable.

T h e  argum ents in  sup p o rt o f P la in tiffs’ position  th a t 
no w ilful o r  purposefu l d iscrim ination  need be proven  
u n d er Section 1981 can  be ou tlined  as follows:

1. T h e  Suprem e C o u rt has ru led  unequivocally  
in  Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 
454 , 461 (1 9 7 5 )  th a t T itle  V II  and  Section 1981 
are “re la ted , and  . . . d irec ted  to  m ost o f the 
sam e ends” . Since the two sta tu tes are d irected  
to  “m ost of the sam e ends”, it follow s th a t the

171



m ost basic standards of liability  in  the tw o sta tu tes 
m ust be identical.

2. Since T itle  V II and  Section 1981 overlap  
in  th e ir  coverage of em ploym ent d iscrim ination , 
accord ing  to  the long-established in pari materia 
canon  of s ta tu to ry  construction , the s tandards of 
liability  un d er the tw o sta tu tes should  be construed  
consistently . T he re levan t policy considerations 
m ilita te  in favor of applying consisten t s tandards 
of liability  to  T itle  V II  an d  Section 1981.

3. A  carefu l read ing  of this C o u rt’s decision 
in  Washington v. Davis, 426  U .S. 229  (1 9 7 6 )  
shows th a t in  th a t decision  a  non -in ten t s tan d ard  
was applied  by the C o u rt to  a Section 1981 em ­
p loym ent d iscrim ination  case. F u rth e r , the  policy 
considerations re levant to  the  Washington v. Davis 
hold ing  th a t purposefu l in ten t m ust be show n to 
m ake ou t a  v io lation  of the F if th  an d  F o u rteen th  
A m endm ents are no t applicab le to  Section  1981.

4. T h e  legislative h isto ry  of Section 1981 
shows th a t C ongress in tended  the  enactm en t to  
afford  “practica l freedom .” In  m odern  tim es, an 
in ten t s tan d ard  w ould  be inconsisten t w ith  this 
C ongressional desire; indeed this C o u rt has recog­
nized th a t an  in ten t s tan d ard  in  the  em ploym ent 
field  w ould resu lt in legislation  w ith  no  p rac tica l 
value.

5. N o  prejud ice due to  surprise o r  re liance 
will resu lt to  D efendants and  o th er em ployers if 
a non -in ten t s tan d ard  is applied  to  Section 1981. 
T his is the case because of the fac t the C ourts 
o f A ppeals fo r alm ost a decade have continuously  
applied  T itle  V II princip les in  Section 1981 cases; 
fu rtherm ore  D efendants in the in stan t case believed 
T itle  V II to  apply to  their em ploym ent practices 
long before T itle  V II becam e applicab le  to  public 
em ployers. By con trast severe p re jud ice due to

— 16—

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re liance will resu lt to  em ploym ent d iscrim ination  
grievan ts if an  in ten t s tan d ard  is applied  to  Section 
1981.

6 . A pp lica tion  o f a non -in ten t s tan d ard  in Sec­
tion  1981 cases w ould  no t constitu te  a re troactive 
app lica tion  of T itle  V II.

B . Jo h n so n  v. R ailw ay E xpress

T h e  hold ing  in the in stan t case by the N in th  C ircu it 
C ourt o f A ppeals th a t T itle  V II s tandards fo r liability  
apply in Section  1981 em ploym ent d iscrim ination  cases 
is in acco rd  w ith the Suprem e C o u rt’s decision in 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U .S. 
454 (1 9 7 5 ) .  H ere M r. Justice  B lackm an, speaking 
for the C ourt, ru led  as follow s a t 421 U .S. 459  and  
461:

“D esp ite  T itle  V II’s ran g e  an d  its design as 
a  com prehensive so lu tion  fo r the problem  of in ­
vidious d iscrim ination  in  em ploym ent, the ag­
grieved ind iv idual clearly  is no t deprived of o ther 
rem edies he possesses and  is no t lim ited to  T itle  
V II in  his search  fo r relief. ‘[T ]h e  legislative 
h istory  of T itle  V II m anifests a congressional in ten t 
to  allow  an  ind iv idua l to  pu rsue  independently  
his righ ts u n d er b o th  T itle  V II and  o ther app li­
cable s ta te  an d  federa l s ta tu tes .’ A lexander 
v. G ardner-D enver Co. 415 U.S. a t 48 , 39 L . 
E d. 2d  147, 94 S. C t. 1011. In  particu la r, C ongress 
n o ted  ‘th a t the remedies available to the individual 
under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv\i]- 
dual’s right to sue under the provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981; and 
th a t the tw o p rocedures augm ent each o ther and  
are n o t m utually  exclusive.’ H .R . R ep . N o. 92- 
238 , p. 19 (1 9 7 1 ) .  See also S. R ep. N o. 92- 
415 , p. 24 (1 9 7 1 ) .

* * *
173



— 18—

“W e generally  conclude, therefore , th a t the  rem ­
edies available u n d er T itle  V II  and  u n d er §1981, 
although related, and although directed to most 
of the same ends, are separa te , distinct, an d  inde­
penden t.” (em phasis a d d e d ).

P lain tiffs subm it th a t since the “rem edies availab le” 
under T itle  V II and  th a t p a r t o f Section 1981 which 
covers em ploym ent d iscrim ination  are “co-extensive,” 
“re la ted , and  . . . d irec ted  to  m ost of the sam e ends,” 
it follows th a t the basic s tan d ard  of liab ility , i.e., 
w hether purposefu l in ten t to  d iscrim inate is required, 
m ust be the  sam e o r a t least s im ilar u n d er b o th  statutes. 
In  o ther w ords, P lain tiffs subm it th a t th is C o u rt already 
has ru led  th a t a lthough som e m in o r differences between 
the two sta tu tes w ere contem plated  by C ongress (e.g., 
differen t lim itations periods and  the availab ility  of pun i­
tive d am ag es), the tw o s ta tu tes are basically  the same. 
A  holding th a t a  rad ically  d ifferen t s tan d ard  of liability 
is applicable to  the tw o sta tu tes w ould  be com pletely 
inconsistent w ith the ho ld ing  in  Johnson v. Railway 
Express.

I t  canno t be contended  th a t the above-quo ted  holding 
in  Johnson is m erely a  ho ld ing  th a t the “re lief” p rin­
ciples under the two s ta tu tes are the sam e. W hen Mr. 
Justice  B lackm an spoke of the “rem edies available” 
under the tw o sta tu tes being “d irec ted  to  m ost of the 
sam e ends” , he was doing so in  the con tex t of a 
general discussion of the im port and  m ean ing  of the 
tw o statu tes. T herefo re , the holding th a t the “remedies 
availab le” under the two sta tu tes are “co-extensive” and 
“d irec ted  to  m ost of the sam e ends” , is a ho ld ing  that 
bo th  sta tu tes are d irec ted  a t rem edying “m ost o f” the

174



19-

sam e w rongs. P erhaps an o th e r w ay of s ta ting  the sam e 
poin t is to  p o in t ou t th a t the only w ay the “rem edies 
availab le” u n d er the tw o sta tu tes can  be “co-extensive” 
is to  have the sam e basic  s tan d ard s of liab ility  under 
both sta tu tes; otherw ise the “rem edies availab le” are 
not “co-extensive” since m any w rongs w ould  no t be 
rem edied u n d er Section  1981 if an  in ten t s tan d ard  
of liability  w ere to  be  im posed w hile a non -in ten t 
s tandard  is applicab le  to  T itle  V II.

P lain tiffs believe it to  be m ost no tew orthy  th a t at 
the tim e C ongress sta ted  th a t the “rem edies availab le” 
under T itle  V II an d  Section 1981 a re  “co-extensive” , 
C ongress w as aw are th a t in  Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U .S. 4 2 4  (1 9 7 1 ) ,  the C o u rt had  ru led  th a t 
purposeful o r  w ilful d iscrim ination  need no t be proven  
under T itle  V II. In d eed  Griggs w as c ited  and  the 
non-in ten t s tan d ard  w as discussed a t pages 2 1  and  
22 of H .R . R ep. N o. 92-238 (1 9 7 1 ) ,  w hich is only 
two pages subsequent to  the H ouse R ep o rt expression 
of the C ongressional will th a t the tw o s ta tu tes are 
“co-extensive.”

P ub lic  policy considerations m ilitate in  favor of fo l­
lowing the th ru s t o f Johnson v. Railway Express Agency 
and m aking  the rem edies availab le u n d er T itle  V II 
and Section 1981 tru ly  “co-extensive” by applying the 
Title V II non -in ten t s tan d ard  to  Section 1981. In  fact, 
it appears to  P lain tiffs th a t if the in ten t s tan d ard  p ro ­
posed by D efendan ts is in co rp o ra ted  in to  Section  1981, 
in reality  the ho ld ing  w ould  constitu te  the “d ea th  knell” 
of m ost im p o rtan t em ploym ent d iscrim ination  litigation  
under Section 1981. T his is the  case because as this 
C ourt recognized in  the reference to  the fox and  sto rk

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•20—

p arab le  in  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U .S. at 
431-32, legislation p roh ib iting  em ploym ent d iscrim ina­
tion  w ould  be of no rea l value to  m inorities if the 
only em ploym ent d iscrim ination  p roh ib ited  is in ten tional 
d iscrim ination  and  if “ ‘bu ilt-in  headw inds’ fo r  m inority  
groups [w hich] are u n re la ted  to  m easuring  job  capab il­
ity” are to  be allow ed to  con tinue to  ex ist.4 P lain tiffs 
subm it th a t to  m ake Section 1981 a v irtually  valueless 
sta tu te  w ould hard ly  be consisten t w ith the C o u rt’s 
ru ling  in  Johnson v. Railway Express Agency tha t 
it is in  the public  in terest to  affo rd  “rem edies” in 
the two sta tu tes w hich are “d irec ted  to  m ost of the 
sam e ends” . Id. a t 461 .

Since T itle  V II is in  full fo rce and  effect and  cu rren t­
ly availab le to  all em ploym ent d iscrim ination  grievants, 
it m ight “a t first b lu sh” seem  th a t there  is no practical 
need to  follow  Johnson v. Railway Express an d  m ake 
the  rem edies available u n d er Section 1981 tru ly  co­
extensive w ith T itle  V II.

T here  are a  g rea t m any p rac tica l considerations m ili­
ta tin g  in  favo r of re ta in ing  Section  1981 as a m eaningful 
alternative to  T itle  V II, including:

( a )  A s this C o u rt recognized in  Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, 421 U .S. 454 , 461 
(1 9 7 5 ) ,  the “choice” to  em ploym ent discrim ina­
tion  grievants of w hether to  p roceed  u n d er the 
T itle  V II  adm inistrative ro u te  o r to  p roceed  d irect­
ly to  F edera l C o u rt under Section 1981 “is a 
valuable one” . T he in stan t case is an  exam ple of

4As early as 1969 the commentators recognized that uninten­
tional discrimination is “a critical factor in minority unemploy­
ment and underemployment.” Cooper & Sobol, “Fair Employ­
ment Criteria”, 82 Harvard Law Review 1598, 1599 (1969). 
Another more recent commentator, perhaps overstating the case, 
has said that overt discrimination is now “virtually extinct.” 
Lopatka, “Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination”, 
1977 University of Illinois Law Forum 69, 71.

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w here the u sual adm in istra tive delays un d er T itle  
V II  w ould  have been severely p re jud ic ia l to  the 
P la in tiffs and  the rep resen ted  class h ad  they no t 
been able to  p roceed  d irectly  to  F ed era l C o u rt 
u n d er Section 1981.® T h e  availability  of re lief by 
w ay of p re lim inary  in junction  is m uch m ore likely 
to  be availab le  u n d er Section 1981 th an  under 
T itle  V II.

( b )  T h e  extrem ely  sho rt s ta tu te  of lim itations 
found  a t Section 7 0 6 (e )  of T itle  V II fo r filing 
charges w ith  the E E O C  often  m eans th a t the 
only cause of ac tion  a grievan t m ay have preserved 
is u n d er Section 1981. T h e  availability  of a longer 
sta tu te  of lim itations in  the n o n -in ten tional discrim ­
ination  situa tion  is im p o rtan t because the victim  
of such d iscrim ination  m ay no t be im m ediately 
aw are  of the w rongs com m itted .

( c )  F o r  public em ployers such as D efendants, 
w ho w ere n o t covered by T itle  V II un til M arch , 
1972, unless a  non -in ten t s tan d ard  is applied  to  
Section 1981, m eaningful relief w ould  n o t be avail­
ab le fo r d iscrim inato ry  p ractices ca rried  o u t subse­
quen t to  1964 w hen the non-in ten t s tan d ard  w as 
first recognized by C ongress, bu t p rio r to  M arch , 
1972, despite the fac t those p ractices m ay have 
o pera ted  to  exclude m inorities to tally  as in  the 
in stan t case.

( d )  T itle  V II requires c laim ants to  nego tia te  
a  com plex adm inistra tive schem e before proceeding  
in  F ed era l C o u rt and  claim ants norm ally  are no t 5

5In the instant case the first complaint filed on January 11, 
1973 was not based on Title VII (R. 1). It was not until 
May, 1973 that Title VII allegations were made by way of 
a Second Amended Complaint (R. 60), after the requisite 
Title VII administrative procedures had been exhausted. As 
noted above, it was the First Complaint which triggered Defend­
ants’ alteration of their discriminatory hiring program.

177



•22—

rep resen ted  by counsel in  these adm in istra tive p ro ­
ceedings. F o r exam ple, u n d er Section 7 0 6 (c )  of 
T itle  V II if a c la im an t fails to  file his grievance 
w ith  an  app ro p ria te  S tate agency an d  the  E E O C  
fails to  “defer” his charge to  such  an  agency, 
the  F edera l C ourts do n o t have ju risd ic tion  in 
a  subsequent ac tion  un d er T itle  V II. If  Section 
1981 is preserved, w ith a non -in ten t standard , 
under such circum stances Section 1981 can  serve 
as a  “fall back” w hen defects arise in the T itle  V II 
procedures.

T he consequences of a ho ld ing  th a t purposefu l dis­
c rim ination  is necessary to  m ake ou t a  Section 1981 
v io la tion  can  be graphically  illu stra ted  in  the  instan t 
case. In  the in stan t case if an  in ten t s tan d ard  is ap ­
plied  to  Section 1981, there  m ight be no significant 
rem edial re lief despite the follow ing facts: ( a )  until 
this law suit was b rough t the L os A ngeles C oun ty  F ire 
D epartm en t em ployed v irtually  no b lacks (one-half of 
one p e rcen t) and  very few  M exican-A m ericans (2 .8 % )  
despite the fac t there is a large b lack  and  M exican- 
A m erican  popu lation  in L os A ngeles C oun ty  (R . 1 6 3 ); 
(b )  the D istric t C o u rt found  th a t “ [d e fe n d a n ts  did 
no t justify , a t the tria l o r  o ther proceedings herein, 
the paucity  of b lack  and  M exican-A m erican  firem en 
em ployees at the Los A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D epartm en t 
. . .” (R . 1 6 3 ); ( c )  the D istric t C o u rt recognized 
th a t even afte r the effective date  of T itle  V II and 
“un til learn ing  th a t this law suit was abou t to  be com ­
m enced” D efendants w ere continu ing  to  u tilize w ritten  
tests w hich were artific ia l barriers  and  w hich operated  
to  exclude m inorities from  em ploym ent (R . 1 6 3 ); (d )  
as discussed above in the “S tatem ent of the C ase”, 
Section “B ” , D efendants w ere acutely  aw are th a t their 
em ploym ent practices opera ted  to  exclude m inorities 
and  w ere artific ia l barriers  (See a ttached  A ppendix

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“A ” , p. 3 ) ,  b u t nevertheless con tinued  to  utilize the 
artific ia l b arrie rs ; an d  (e )  the D istric t C o u rt found  
it to  be in  the “public  in terest” to  en ter a h iring  
o rder w hich w ould “accelerate  the elim ination  of the 
rac ia l im balance . . . caused  by the p ast d iscrim ination  
of D efen d an ts” (R . 1 6 1 ).

D efen d an ts’ argum ents regard ing  pub lic  policy  found  
in  th e ir m em orandum  a t Section “I I I ” , to  the effect 
th a t P la in tiffs’ position  w ould  encourage  a bypassing 
of the T itle  V II adm in istra tive p rocedures, m isses a 
basic po in t. T h a t p o in t is th a t this C o u rt a lready  has 
recognized th a t it is consisten t w ith  pub lic  policy and  
the in ten t of C ongress to  p rovide P la in tiffs in  em ploy­
m ent d iscrim ination  cases w ith “a lte rn a tiv e  m eans” fo r 
redressing em ploym ent d iscrim ination  grievances. John­
son v. Railway Express Agency, supra, a t 459 , 461.

C. In Pari Materia

C oncern ing  P la in tiffs’ con ten tion  th a t the canon  of 
s ta tu to ry  construc tion  know n as in pari materia should 
be applied  to  T itle  V II and  Section 1981, tw o pre lim ­
inary  po in ts m ust be m ade. T h e  first is th a t w hen 
this C o u rt held  in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424  (1 9 7 1 )  th a t lack  of in ten t to  d iscrim inate 
is irre levan t to  liability  in a T itle  V II case, it w as 
m ade clear th a t the C o u rt was applying a term  or 
provision of T itle  V II “p la in  from  the language of 
the s ta tu te” . Id., a t 429-30 . T he second p o in t is th a t 
this C o u rt’s holding in  Johnson v. Railway Express 
Agency th a t d iscrim ination  in em ploym ent is p roh ib ited  
by Section 1981 m eans, of course, th a t T itle  V II and  
Section 1981 are overlapping in their coverage and 
deal w ith  the sam e subject m atter, nam ely em ploym ent 
d iscrim ination .

W ith  these tw o poin ts in  m ind, it is m ost im portan t 
to  no te th a t it is a  long-established canon  of sta tu to ry

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construc tion  th a t w hen “several A cts of C ongress [deal] 
w ith the sam e subject m atter, [they] should  be con ­
strued  no t only as expressing the  in ten tion  of C ongress 
a t  the  dates the several acts w ere passed, b u t the 
la te r A cts should also be regarded  as legislative in te r­
p re ta tions of the p rio r ones.” Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 
682 , 688-89  (1 8 9 0 ) .

Sim ilarly m ore th an  a cen tury  ago the  Suprem e 
C o u rt held  as follows in United States v. Freeman, 
3 How . 556 , 564-65  (1 8 4 5 ) :

“T h e  correc t ru le  of in te rp re ta tio n  is, th a t if 
divers sta tu tes re la te  to  the sam e thing, they 
ough t all to be tak en  in to  consideration  in  con stru ­
ing any  one  of them , an d  it is an  established 
ru le of law, th a t all acts in  pari m ateria  are 
to  be taken  together, as if they w ere one law. 
(D oug ., 30; 2  T erm . R ep ., 387 , 586 ; 4 M au le  & 
Selw., 2 1 0 .)  If  a  th ing con ta ined  in  a subsequent 
sta tu te , be w ith in  the reason of a fo rm er sta tu te , it 
shall be  taken  to  be w ith in  the m ean ing  of th a t 
s ta tu te  (L o rd  R aym ., 1 0 2 8 ); and  if it can be gath­
ered from a subsequent statute in pari materia, 
what meaning the Legislature attached to the words 
of a former statute, they will amount to a legislative 
declaration of its meaning, and will govern the 
construction of the first statute. (M o rris  v. M ellin , 
6 B arn . & C ress., 454; 7 B arn . & C ress., 9 9 .) ” 
(E m phasis  ad d e d ).

O th er m ore recent cases follow ing the in pari materia 
canon  of sta tu to ry  construction  include NLRB v. Allis- 
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1 9 6 7 )  
and  NLRB v. Driver’s Local Union, 362 U.S. 274, 
291 -92  (1 9 6 0 )  ( “C ourts m ay p roperly  tak e  in to  ac­
coun t the la te r A ct when asked to  extend the reach  
of the earlier A c t’s vague language to  the lim its w hich, 
read  literally , the w ords m ight perm it.” ). Sim ilarly in

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Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409  U .S. 239 , 243 (1 9 7 2 )  
the princip le  w as applied  in a crim inal law  context. 
H ere M r. Justice  M arshall, w riting  fo r the  C o u rt, ind i­
cated th a t it is no t ap p ro p ria te  to  apply the p rincip le 
when the  tw o s ta tu tes w ere no t “in tended  to  serve 
the sam e fu n c tio n ” . 409  U.S. a t 245 . In  the situa tion  
now before this C o u rt it has, of course, a lready  been 
recognized by this C o u rt th a t the tw o sta tu tes “are 
d irected  to  m ost of the sam e ends” . Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, supra a t 461.

T his C o u rt has applied  the in pari materia p rincip le 
in a  case strik ing ly  sim ilar to  the in stan t case. In  
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U .S. 385 , 388 (1 9 6 9 ) ,  the 
in pari materia canon  w as app lied  in  such a  way 
tha t a s ta tu to ry  provision  found  in the C ivil R ights 
A ct of 1968, T itle  V III , 42  U .S .C . §§3601 et 
seq. ( “T itle  V I I I” ) w as in co rp o ra ted  in to  42 U .S.C . 
§1982 ( “Section 1982” ). T his situa tion  is, of course, 
v irtually  iden tica l to  the  in s tan t case because the  ju x ta ­
position of T itle  V III and  Section 1982 in  Hunter 
v. Erickson is iden tical to  the  jux taposition  of T itle  
V II and  Section 1981 in  the in stan t case. Indeed  both  
Section 1981 and  Section 1982 are p a r t of the Civil 
R ights A c t of 1866.

M r. Justice W hite w ro te  the op in ion  fo r the C o u rt 
in Hunter v. Erickson. C iting  tw o cases fo r the  in 
pari materia p rincip le, he held th a t a p rovision in 
Title V III  m ust be applied  to  Section 1982 because 
the tw o sta tu tes “should  be read  together” . T he legisla­
tive h istory  of T itle  V II shows a C ongressional desire 
for a sim ilar “read ing  together”of T itle  V II  and  Section 
1981 in  such a  way th a t the no-in ten t T itle  V II  s tandard  
is p a r t o f Section 1981. S enato r H arrison  W illiam s, 
Senate F lo o r M an ag er fo r the bill w hich am ended 
Title V II in  1972, and  one of its orig inal sponsors, 
specifically s ta ted  as follows during  floor debate;

181



— 2 6 —

“T h e  p a ram o u n t n a tio n a l in terest em bodied  in 
the elim ination  of em ploym ent d iscrim ination  is 
bo th  an  expression of congressional in ten t and 
ju d ic ia l in terp re ta tion . W hile we have generally 
denounced  em ploym ent d iscrim ination , the courts, 
w hich have been in  a b e tte r position  to  view 
the devasta tion  w hich this type of discrim ination  
w reaks upon  o u r social fram ew ork , have been 
even m ore adam ant. O ne need  only read  the 
recen t decision by M r. C hief Justice  B urger in 
G riggs against D uke P ow er C o., to  see the concern 
th a t the courts have. In  describ ing  the scope o f the 
ac t the C o u rt stated:

‘T h e  A c t proscribes no t only overt d iscrim ina­
tion  b u t also p ractices th a t are fa ir  in form  but 
d iscrim inatory  in  o p era tio n .’

“A ccordingly, the courts have repeated ly  p ro ­
posed  a  m ultifaceted  app roach  to  em ploym ent dis­
crim ination , to  b ring  to  b ea r the  fu ll fo rce of 
the law  on this problem .

“T he law  against em ploym ent d iscrim ination  did 
no t begin w ith T itle  V II  and  the E E O C , nor 
is it in tended  to  end  w ith  it. T he  righ t of in­
dividuals to  b ring  suits in  F ederal courts to  redress 
ind iv idual acts of d iscrim ination , including em ploy­
m ent d iscrim ination  was first p rov ided  by the Civil 
R ights A cts of 1866 and  1871, 42  U .S.C . sections 
1981, 1983. I t  was recently  s ta ted  by the Suprem e 
C o u rt in  the case of Jones v. Mayer, th a t these 
ac ts  p rovide fundam ental constitu tiona l guaran ­
tees. In any case, the courts have specifically held 
that Title VII and the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 
and 1871 are not mutually exclusive, and must 
be read together to provide alternative means to 
redress individual grievances.” C ong. R ec. 3371 
(1 9 7 2 )  (em phasis ad d ed ).

182



■— 27

I t  should be no ted  th a t in  the above quote, S enato r 
W illiam s evidenced a C ongressional desire th a t Section 
1981 and  T itle  V II “prov ide alternative  m eans” to  
redress em ploym ent d iscrim ination  grievances. P la in tiffs 
would p o in t ou t th a t unless T itle  V II an d  Section 
1981 b o th  have a non -in ten t s tan d ard  of liab ility , the 
only cases w here “alternative  m eans” of re lief w ould 
be p rovided  w ould be in  the in ten tio n a l d iscrim ination  
situation . In  view of the fac t th a t in  the deba te  quo ted  
above, S enato r W illiam s specifically  endorsed  the  idea 
of “alternative  m eans” to  redress grievances, a t exactly 
the sam e tim e he endorsed  the  Griggs non -in ten t T itle  
V II s tan d ard , it can n o t be seriously contended  th a t 
the desire fo r “a lternative  m eans” to  redress grievances 
was lim ited to  cases of in ten tiona l o r w ilful d iscrim ina­
tion.

P la in tiffs believe th a t the analysis set fo r th  in  the 
above-quoted sta tem en t by S enato r W illiam s reflects 
the co rrec t public policy considerations in the in stan t 
case. A  read ing  of Section 1981 u n d er w hich in ten t 
would be requ ired  fo r  liability  w ould  no t be consistent 
with the desired  policy of afford ing  “a lternative  m eans” 
to achieve w hat S enato r W illiam s re ferred  to  as “the 
param o u n t n a tio n a l in terest . . .  in  the elim ination  
of em ploym ent d iscrim ination .” C ong. R ec. 3371 
(1 9 7 2 ) . N o r w ould  an  in ten t s tan d ard  fo r Section 
1981 be consisten t w ith  this C o u rt’s recogn ition  in 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 4 2 2  U .S. 405 , 416 
(1 9 7 5 ) , th a t em ploym ent d iscrim ination  is “an  h istoric 
evil of na tio n a l p ro p o rtio n s.”

A no ther very im p o rtan t public policy  consideration  
m ilitating in  favor of applying the in pari materia 
canon to  T itle  V II and  Section 1981 is th a t to  do 
otherw ise undoub ted ly  will cause inconsistency, confu­
sion and  uncerta in ty  in the law . T h is will be the case 
because if the two sta tu tes are no t to  be “read  together” ,

183



— 28—

the resu lt will be th a t w hat is legal u n d er one statu te 
m ay b e  illegal u n d er the  o th er an d  vice versa. F or 
exam ple in  International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324 , 353 -354  (1 9 7 7 ) ,  this 
C o u rt recently  ru led  th a t d u e  to  the  “bo n a fide seniority 
system ” provision found  a t Section 7 0 3 ( h )  of Title 
V II, an  otherw ise legitim ate sen iority  system  is not 
illegal despite  the fa c t th e  system  m ay p e rp e tu a te  dis­
crim ination  carried  ou t p rio r to  the  effective d ate  of 
T itle  V II. If the in pari materia p rincip le is to  be 
applied  to  T itle  V II an d  Section 1981, the  holding 
in  Teamsters w ould be in co rp o ra ted  in to  Section 1981. 
B y con trast, how ever, if D efendan ts’ position  is accepted 
an d  if the  tw o sta tu tes are to  h ave  d ifferen t standards, 
it w ould follow  th a t the seniority  system  found  legal 
u n d er T itle  V II in  Teamsters w ould  be  illegal under 
Section 1981; this is the case because the  pre-1965 
segregated  seniority  system s constitu ted  purposefu l dis­
crim ination  and  due to  the fac t Section 1981 does 
no t con ta in  T itle  V II’s Section 7 0 3 (h )  “b o n a  fide 
seniority  system ” exception.

Tw o C ircu it C ourts of A ppeal a lready  have dealt 
w ith th e  above-described s itua tion  and , w ithou t using 
the  phrase “in pari materia”, have in co rp o ra ted  Section 
7 0 3 (h )  of T itle  V II in to  Section 1981. Johnson v. 
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F .2 d  471 (4 th  Cir. 
1 9 7 8 ); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 
F .2 d  1157, 1191-92, n. 37 (5 th  C ir. 1 9 7 8 ). If  the 
in pari materia canon  is no t to  be applied  to  Title 
V II and  Section 1981, the  valid ity  of these tw o C ircuit 
C o u rt holdings is at best doubtfu l, thereby  causing 
confusion and  u n certa in ty  in  the law  despite a clear 
and  specific ru ling  by this C o u rt on the Section 7 0 3 (h )  
p o in t in Teamsters.

D efendan ts argue in th e ir m em orandum  a t Section 
“L A .” th a t Section 1981 should  be read  in congruence 
w ith  Section 1982 and  the o ther sections w hich original-

184



— 29—

ly w ere p a r t of the C ivil R ights A ct of 1866. D efendants 
then p o in t o u t th a t in  Jones v. Mayer, 392  U .S. 409  
(1 9 6 8 )  this C o u rt ru led  that: ( a )  T itle  V III  o f the 
Civil R ights A ct of 1968 d id  no t “affec t” Section 
1982; and  (b )  th a t racially  “m o tiva ted” housing  dis­
crim ination  is p roh ib ited  by Section 1982.

A s to  the fac t th a t in  Jones the  C o u rt held  th a t 
the enactm en t of T itle  V III  “had  no  effect” upon  
Section 1982, P lain tiffs w ould no te  th a t this ho ld ing  
w ent only  to  the p o in t th a t T itle  V III  did  no t repeal 
Section 1982. I t  can n o t possibly be, as D efendan ts 
contend, th a t this C o u rt m ean t in  Jones th a t the in 
pari materia p rincip le  is no t applicab le  to  T itle  V III  
and Section 1982 because in  1969, only one y ea r 
after Jones, as discussed above this C o u rt in  Hunter 
v. Erickson applied  the  in pari materia p rincip le  to  
T itle  V III  and  Section 1982.

A s to  the p o in t th a t Section 1982 should  be read  
consistently  w ith  Section 1981, by this argum ent D e­
fendants m isapply  the in pari materia p rincip le. T his 
canon of s ta tu to ry  construc tion  is no t th a t different 
parts of a s ta tu te  covering d ifferen t subject m a tte r 
areas are to  have the sam e s tandards of liability ; ra th e r, 
as discussed fully above, the in pari materia canon  
requires consisten t in terp re ta tio n s of d ifferen t sta tu tes 
covering the sam e subject m a tte r in  o rd e r to  have 
consistency in  the law.

D efendan ts vigorously  con tend  a t P a r t  “II .B .” of 
their B rief before the C o u rt th a t if the T itle  V II n o n ­
intent s tan d ard  is to  be applied  to  Section 1981, it 
would constitu te  a re troactive app lica tion  of T itle  V II. 
D efendants fu rth e r argue th a t such a re troactive app lica­
tion of T itle  V II  w ould  be in  v io lation  of the C o u rt’s 
holdings in  International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U .S. 324 (1 9 7 7 )  and  in  Hazelwood 
School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299  (1 9 7 7 ) .

185



- 30-

P la in tiffs’ response to  this argum en t is th a t in  the 
in stan t case P lain tiffs are no t asking fo r a re troactive 
app lica tion  of T itle  V II. P lain tiffs are asking only for 
a  recognition , by w ay of app lica tion  of the in pari 
materia princip le, th a t by 1964 w hen C ongress first 
enacted  T itle  V II, p roh ib ited  d iscrim ination  in  em ploy­
m ent h ad  com e to include, am ong o ther things, the 
non-in ten tional erection  of artific ia l barriers  to  m inority  
em ploym ent. A t least as of th a t da te , the discrim ina­
tion  p roh ib ited  by Section 1981 should  include non- 
in ten tiona l artific ia l barriers. T here is thus no  “re tro ­
active” app lica tion  o f T itle  V II im plicit in  P lain tiffs’ 
position , b u t only an  app lica tion  of the in pari materia 
princip le  as of 1964 w hen C ongress defined  prohib ited  
em ploym ent d iscrim ination  to  include non-w ilful artifi­
cial barriers  to  m inority  em ploym ent.

D . W ashington  v. D avis

T h e  p rincipa l th ru s t o f D efendan ts’ argum ent in  their 
M em orandum  to  this C o u rt is th a t Washington v. Davis, 
426  U.S. 229  (1 9 7 6 )  requires a ho ld ing  th a t wilful 
o r  purposefu l d iscrim inatory  in ten t m ust be show n to 
estab lish  liability  u n d er Section 1981. I t  appears to 
P lain tiffs th a t this re liance upon  Washington v. Davis 
is m isp laced  to  the ex ten t th a t in  Washington v. Davis 
it was held, o r at least assum ed, th a t a non-in tent 
s tan d ard  applies to  Section 1981. T h is is the case 
because a carefu l read ing  of the op in ion  in Washington 
v. Davis shows th a t:

( a )  the decision in  Washington v. Davis that 
purposefu l d iscrim ination  is necessary  to  m ake out 
a  v io lation , found  in  P a r t  “I I ” of the Washington 
v. Davis opinion, is strictly  lim ited to  cases based 
on  the equal p ro tec tio n  provisions of the Fifth 
and  F o u rteen th  A m endm ents and  does no t extend 
to  cases g rounded  on sta tu tes; and  ( b )  in  P art

186



■ 3 1

“I I I” of the Washington v. Davis opinion, in  w hich 
Section 1981 and  a local D istric t of C o lum bia  
s ta tu te  are  construed , this C o u rt specifically in te r­
p re ted  an d  construed  Section 1981 and  in  doing 
so p laced  the b u rd en  of p roving  “business neces­
sity” up o n  em ployers sued u n d er Section 1981 
upon  a  m ere s ta tis tica l show ing of adverse im pact 
w ithou t a  show ing of purposefu l d iscrim ination .

A  review  of the p ro ced u ra l con tex t in w hich Wash­
ington v. Davis reached  the C o u rt is helpful. In  P a rt 
“I ” of the  C o u rt’s op inion, the p ro ced u ra l setting  giving 
rise to  th e  appeal is described  a t 426  U.S. 233-34  
as follows:

“T hese prac tices [including  the  w ritten  test] 
w ere asserted  to  v io late responden ts’ rights ‘under 
the  due process clause of the  F ifth  A m endm ent 
to  the U nited  S tates C onstitu tion , under 42  U .S.C . 
§1981 and  under D .C . C ode §1 -320 .’ * * * 
R esponden ts then  filed  a m o tion  fo r partia l sum ­
m ary  judgm ent w ith  respect to  the recru iting  phase 
of the  case, seeking a d ec la ra tion  th a t the test 
adm inistered  to  those applying to  becom e police 
officers is ‘unlaw fully  d iscrim inatory  and  thereby  
is in v io lation  of the due process clause of the  F ifth  
A m endm ent. . . .’ No issue under any statute 
or regulation was raised by the motion. T h e  D is­
tric t of C o lum bia defendants, petitioners here, and  
the  federa l parties also filed m otions fo r sum m ary 
judgm ent w ith  respect to  the recru iting  aspects 
of the  case asserting  th a t respondents w ere en titled  
to  relief on neither constitutional nor statutory 
grounds.” (E m phasis  added; foo tno tes om itted .)

P a rt I I  o f the C o u rt’s opinion is lim ited to  a d iscus­
sion of the issues involved in  the responden t’s m otion 
which “rested  on purely  constitu tiona l g rounds. . . . ” 
The C o u rt prem ised its rem arks in P a r t  II  by stating

187



— 32-

th a t “W e have never held  th a t the constitutional stand­
ard fo r ad jud ica ting  claim s of invidious rac ia l d iscrim ­
ination  is iden tical to  the s tan d ard  applicab le  under 
T itle  V II , an d  we decline to  do  so to d ay .” (em phasis 
a d d e d ). A fte r a long discussion of equal p ro tec tion  
cases b ro u g h t u n d er the F ifth  and  F o u rteen th  A m end­
m ents and  42  U .S.C . §1983 , this C o u rt held  that 
purposefu l d iscrim ination  m ust be show n to  establish 
a claim  u n d er the constitutional equa l p ro tec tio n  provi­
sions. T h e  C ourt, therefore , concluded  as follows:

“B ecause the C o u rt of A ppeals erroneously  ap­
plied  the legal s tan d ard  applicab le  to  T itle  V II 
cases in  resolving the constitutional issues before 
it, we reverse its judgm ent in  responden ts’ favor.” 
426  U .S. a t 238 . (E m phasis  ad d ed .)

* * *

“ [ I ] t  was e rro r [fo r the C o u rt o f A ppeals] 
to  d irec t sum m ary judgm ent fo r respondents based 
on  th e  F ifth  A m endm ent.” 426  U .S. a t 248 .

In  P a rt  “I I I” of the Washington v. Davis decision, 
th is C o u rt then  p roceeded  to  discuss the issues involved 
in  the  petitioners’ sum m ary judgm ent m otion  th a t were 
no t d isposed of by  its holding in P a r t  “I I .” T hus, P art 
“I I I” deals exclusively w ith the issues concern ing  the 
s ta tu to ry  causes of ac tion  u n d er Section 1981 and
D .C . C ode §1-320, the co nstitu tiona l issues having 
been disposed of in  P a rt “I I .” A nd, m ost im portantly , 
in this P a r t  “I I I” the C o u rt applies the  non-in tent 
s tan d ard  of T itle  V II, to  wit: a  m ere statistical 
show ing th a t an  em ploym ent p rac tice  has an  adverse 
im pact upon  a m inority  g roup  shifts the b u rden  to 
the em ployer to  prove job-re la tedness regardless 
of w hether purposefu l o r w ilful d iscrim ination  has 

been shown.

188

T here can be no real question  b u t th a t in Part 
“I I I” of the Washington v. Davis op inion, the C ourt



■33-

w as constru ing  Section 1981 along  w ith a D istric t 
o f C o lum bia local code section. T h e  second p a rag ra p h  
of P a r t  “I I I ” o f the op in ion  specifically  no tes th a t 
the D efendan t em ployer’s m otion  fo r sum m ary  judgm ent 
(w hich  is w hat was being discussed in  P a r t  “I I I ” ) 
w as based  up o n  an  argum ent th a t the w ritten  test 
a t issue “com plied w ith all app licab le  s ta tu to ry  . . . 
requ irem ents; and  they  ap p ear n o t to  have d isputed  
th a t u n d er the sta tu tes and  regula tions governing their 
conduc t s tandards sim ilar to  those ob tain ing  un d er T itle  
V II  h ad  to  be satisfied .” (E m phasis  a d d e d .) Since 
the  C o u rt in  the first p a rag ra p h  of P a r t  “I ” o f the 
op in ion  specifically n o ted  th a t th e  case was b rou g h t 
u n d er Section 1981, and  indeed in  foo tno te  two quoted  
Section 1981 in its entirely , and  since the  C o u rt in 
P a r t  “I I I” as quo ted  im m ediately  above sta ted  th a t 
it w as constru ing  “all applicab le s ta tu tes” (p lu ra l, not 
s in g u la r) , and since T itle  V II principles w ere applied  
by the  C o u rt in  P a r t  “I I I ” of the Washington v. Davis 
opinion, it follows th a t this C o u rt has adop ted  and  
applied  T itle  V II princip les w hile constru ing  Section 
1981. I t  is m ost no tew orthy  th a t the T itle  V II princip le 
applied  u n d er Section 1981 in  P a r t  “I I I” of Washington 
v. Davis was the very p rincip le  a t issue in  this case 
— w hether in  the  absence of purposefu l d iscrim ination  
the burden  to  prove job-relatedness shifts to  the em ­
ployer upon  a show ing of sta tistica l adverse im pact.

T h e  in s tan t case also  is d istinguishable from  Wash­
ington v. Davis because the  public policy considerations 
in  th a t case w hich underlie  the holding th a t purposeful 
d iscrim ination  m ust be show n to m ake ou t a constitu ­
tional v io lation , are no t applicab le to  Section 1981. 
T h e  policy  considerations in  Washington v. Davis w ere 
stated  a t 426  U .S. 248 to  be th a t if the non-in ten t 
s tan d ard  w ere applied  to  the F ifth  and  F ourteen th  
A m endm ents, it “w ould ra ise  serious doubts about,

189



■34-

an d  perhaps invalidate, a  w hole range of tax , w elfare, 
p ub lic  service, regulatory , and  licensing sta tu tes. . .
B y con trast, if the in pari materia p rincip le  is applied 
to  T itle  V II an d  Section 1981 no such resu lt w ould 
occur because the T itle  V II non -in ten t s tan d ard  w ould 
be applied  only to  th a t p a r t of Section 1981 also 
covered by T itle  V II, nam ely  em ploym ent con tracts.

In  Washington v. Davis, this C o u rt w as, of course, 
no t in  a position  to  apply  the in pari materia principle, 
and  thereby  lim it the app lica tion  of the non-in ten t 
s tan d ard  to  em ploym ent cases arising under the F ifth  
and  F o u rteen th  A m endm ents, because in  Washington 
v. Davis C onstitu tional provisions w ere being construed  
an d  it w ould  n o t have been ap p ro p ria te  to  ru le  tha t 
C onstitu tional s tandards are to be “read  to g e th er” with 
s ta tu to ry  standards o r th a t C onstitu tional s tandards are 
to  be altered  by legislation.

T h roughou t D efendan ts’ brief, and  particu la rly  at 
P a r t  “I .A .” , it is a rgued  th a t since u n d er Washington 
v. Davis, C onstitu tional s tandards requ ire  in ten tional 
d iscrim ination , to  im pute a  non -in ten t s tan d ard  to  Sec­
tion  1981 is no t app ro p ria te  because Section 1981 
has its h isto rical foundations in  the  T h irtee n th  and 
F o u rteen th  A m endm ents. In  response p lain tiffs w ould 
p o in t ou t th a t it is settled  law  th a t C ongress m ay enact 
legislation  p u rsu an t to  th e  en forcem ent au tho rity  p ro ­
vided by the T h irteen th  and  F o u rteen th  A m endm ents, 
w hich m ay afford  civil rights p ro tec tions n o t precisely 
afforded  by the C onstitu tional provisions them selves. 
See e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , 650-51 
(1 9 6 6 ) .  It is, of course, th rough opera tion  of the in pari 
materia princip le th a t C ongress, in  effect, has p rom ul­
gated  the non-in ten t s tandard  fo r Section 1981.

A t page 32 of D efendan ts’ brief, w ith  accom panying 
foo tno te  six, it is s tated  th a t since this C o u rt’s decision 
in  Washington v. Davis, “the m ajo rity” of the C ircuit

190



— 35—-

an d  D istric t C ourts have im puted  an  in ten t s tan d ard  
in to  Section 1981. In  the ir opposition  to the petition  
fo r  ce rtio ra ri P la in tiffs  a lready  have analyzed  in  detail 
all o f the C o u rt of A ppeals cases cited  by  D efendan ts 
in  foo tno te  six. T h a t analysis does no t b ea r repetition  
here, save to  say th a t the analysis show ed th a t in 
none of the  C o u rt of A ppeals cases c ited  w as it held  
th a t an  in ten t s tan d ard  is applicab le  to  Section 1981 
cases.

A s against this to ta l lack  of au tho rity  a t the C o u rt 
of A ppeals level in  support o f D efendan ts’ position, 
it is no tew orthy  th a t in  add ition  to  the  N in th  C ircu it 
in  the in s tan t case, since Washington v. Davis was 
decided th ree  C ircu its have held  th a t T itle  V II princip les 
are applicab le  in  cases b ro u g h t p u rsu an t to  Section 
1981. Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 
F .2 d  830, 838 , n. 22  (D .C . C ir. 1 9 7 7 ); Johnson v. 
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F .2 d  471 (4 th  C ir. 
1 9 7 8 ); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576  
F .2 d  1157, 1191-92, n. 37 (5 th  C ir. 1 9 7 8 ).

E . L egislative H istory

D efendan ts con tend  in  their m em orandum  before 
this C ourt, w ithou t citing any  re levan t C ongressional 
debates o r  com m ittee reports, th a t in  1866 w hen C o n ­
gress enacted  Section 1981, C ongress could  no t possibly 
have h ad  a non -in ten t s tan d ard  in  m ind.

P la in tiffs w ould  n o te  th a t the legislative h isto ry  of 
Section 1981 evidences a C ongressional in ten tion  th a t 
Section 1981 should  “secure to  all persons w ith in  the 
U nited  S tates practical freedom .” (em phasis ad d ed ) 
Congressional Globe, 39 th  C ongress, 1st Session 474  
(1 8 6 6 )  (R em ark s of S enato r T rum bull, au th o r of Sec­
tion  1981 an d  cha irm an  of the S enate Jud ic ia ry  C om ­
m ittee ). T he p o in t is, o f course, th a t as this C ourt 
no ted  in  Griggs, as fully d iscussed above, the only

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w ay to  affo rd  “p rac tica l freedom ” in m odern  times 
in  the field  of em ploym ent d iscrim ination  is to  apply 
a  non -in ten t s tan d ard  to  artific ia l barriers  to  m inority  
em ploym ent. Griggs, supra, 401 U .S. a t 4 31 . Indeed 
n o t to  afford  “p ractica l freedom ” by a non -in ten t s tan d ­
a rd  in  the em ploym ent field  h ard ly  w ould  be consonan t 
w ith  this C o u rt’s recognition , while constru ing  Section 
1982 in  Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396  U .S. 
229 , 237 (1 9 6 9 )  th a t the p ro tec tio n  “m ean t to  be 
a ffo rded” by Section 1 of the C ivil R igh ts A c t of 
1866 w as “b ro a d  and  sw eeping [in ] n a tu re .”

F. Reliance

If this C o u rt accepts P la in tiffs’ position  and  rules 
th a t the Griggs non -in ten t s tan d ard  is applicab le  to 
em ploym ent cases b rough t under Section 1981, no  em ­
ployer will be pre jud iced  due to  surprise. T h is is true 
because, sim ply enough, fo r alm ost a decade the F ederal 
C ourts  consistently  have held  th a t T itle  V II principles 
generally  are applicab le in  Section 1981 em ploym ent 
d iscrim ination  cases. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 
4 5 2  F .2 d  315 (8 th  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ), cert, denied, 406  U.S. 
9 5 0  (1 9 7 2 ) ;  King v. Laborers International Union, 
Local No. 818, 443 F .2 d  273 (6 th  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ); Young 
v. I.T.T., 438  F .2 d  757 (3 rd  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ); Shield Club 
v. City of Cleveland, 538 F .2 d  329 (6 th  C ir. 1 9 7 6 ).

O ne of the ironies in  the in stan t case is th a t the 
very D efendan ts involved long have assum ed th a t a 
non-in ten t s tan d ard  applied  to  Section 1981. This 
is the case because in 1971, well before T itle  V II 
app lied  to  public entities, the h ead  of the  C ounty  
of L os A ngeles P ersonnel D ep artm en t w rote the m em o­
randum  w hich w as P la in tiffs’ E xh ib it 8 below  and 
w hich is a ttached  hereto  as A ppendix  “A ” . T his m em o 
a t page 3 shows beyond any  real do u b t th a t D efendants 
assum ed th a t the Griggs non -in ten t s tan d ard  was ap ­

192



— 37—

plicab le  to  them  despite the fac t T itle  V II  w as not 
yet so applicable.

I t  also is no tew orthy  th a t a ru ling  fo r the D efend­
an ts in  the in stan t case will resu lt in  p re jud ice to  
those em ploym ent d iscrim ination  p lain tiffs w ho, upon  
re liance of cases such as those cited  above, have consid­
ered  it to  be long-settled  law  th a t non -in ten t s tandards 
apply  in  Section 1981 cases. T here  undoubted ly  are 
m any such cases based  on  Section 1981 curren tly  p en d ­
ing in  the F ed era l C o u rt system .

II
THE RECORD HERE SHOWS INTENTIONAL 

DISCRIMINATION

Should the C o u rt d isagree w ith the P la in tiffs’ position  
im m ediately  above in  Section “I” of the A rgum ent, 
P la in tiffs nevertheless are en titled  to  an  affirm ance. 
T his is the  case because there  is no  rea l doub t b u t 
th a t the reco rd  below  shows D efendan ts had  engaged 
in in ten tiona l and  purposefu l d iscrim ination .

A  p ro p e r analysis o f the  situa tion  begins w ith  the 
fac t th a t a t the  tim e the  D istric t C o u rt fo u n d  as a 
fac t th a t D efendan ts h ad  no t engaged in  “w ilful o r 
conscious” d iscrim ination  (R . 1 6 2 ), the D istric t C o u rt 
believed the ho ld ing  to  be of no  im portance. T his 
is c lear because at C onclusion  of L aw  N o. 7 , the 
D istric t C o u rt held th a t the only in ten t requ ired  in 
the  case w as an in ten t to  use the non-job-related  em ploy­
m ent p ractices w hich h ad  the “effect” of d iscrim inating  
(R . 1 6 3 -6 4 ). Indeed  a colloquy during tria l betw een 
P la in tiffs’ counsel and  the D istric t C o u rt Judge shows 
th a t, co n tra ry  to  the find ing  th a t no “w ilful o r  con­
scious” d iscrim ination  h ad  been engaged in, the D istric t 
C o u rt assum ed th a t such wilful d iscrim inatory  in ten t 
existed bu t believed th a t the existence of such in ten t

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w as of no  significance. T he colloquy, found  a t pages 
112-13 of the tria l transcrip t, reads as follow s in  re levant 
part:

“T H E  C O U R T : M r. H un t, I w an t to  consider
everything th a t m ight be re levan t to  the issue 
here concerned. B ut I  can  assure you I am  no t 
going to  be im pressed w ith p roo f th a t the fact 
th a t the  fire departm en t has a b a tta lio n  chief, 
o r  w hatever it is, th a t is m yopic as fa r  as reasons 
fo r giving a person  a  low ra tin g  are concerned, 
and  w hether or no t [you] can re la te  th a t to 
the activities of this w itness in  try ing  to  p rom ote 
rac ia l in teg ra tion  in the fire departm en t.

“/  am perfectly willing to assume that there 
are officials in the fire department who would 
take offense at such doings. But that has nothing 
to do with what this Court feels called upon 
to consider.

^ ^

“T H E  C O U R T : You don’t have to present
testimony to establish to this Court that there are 
people in the fire department who would not like 
to have a minority increase in the roll. There 
is no doubt about that.” (em phasis a d d e d ).

U nder these circum stances P laintiffs subm it th a t the 
D istric t C o u rt’s finding of no in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  
by D efendan ts is of little m eaning or value. T h is is 
particu la rly  true since the reco rd  in the in stan t case 
is replete w ith evidence of in ten tional d iscrim ination  
and  as this C o u rt recognized in Washington v. Davis, 
426 U .S. 229 , 242  (1 9 7 6 ) ,  “ [n jecessarily , an invidious 
d iscrim inato ry  purpose m ay often  be in ferred  from  the 
to ta lity  of the relevant fac ts” . F irstly , the statistics 
show ing v irtually  no m inority  firefighters, despite a 
large m inority  popu lation  in L os A ngeles C ounty , raises 
an in ference of purposeful d iscrim ination . See Cas­

194



39—

taneda v. Partida, 430  U.S. 482 , 494-95  (1 9 7 7 ) .  D e­
fendan ts did  no th ing  to  reb u t th a t inference of in ten ­
tional d iscrim ination .

N o t only d id  D efendan ts no t reb u t the inference 
of in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  ra ised  by the em ploym ent 
statistics, bu t indeed  C hief B arlow  of the  C o u n ty  F ire  
D ep artm en t adm itted  th a t he h ad  his “personal susp i­
cions” abou t “in ten tio n a l foo t-d ragg ing” . H is testim ony 
concerned  the loss of a large num ber of app lica tion  
slips from  m inority  app lican ts; C hief B arlow  testified  
th a t his “personal suspicions” w ere th a t the slips had  
been lost “because of som e intentional foot-dragging  
on  the p a r t o f som e fire departm en t personnel, [due 
to ] the though t of m inorities being added  to  the  fire 
d ep a rtm en t” (em phasis ad d ed ) (T r . 187-88).°

O th er evidence of in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  in  the 
reco rd  below  concerns the fac t th a t D efendan ts p e r­
m itted  w hite firefigh ters to  b ring  the ir w hite friends 
and  relatives in to  C oun ty  fire sta tions in o rder to  
p rep are  and  assist those friends and  relatives in  the 
C oun ty ’s app lica tion  and  testing  process fo r the  fire ­
figh ter job. W hen, how ever, a C ap ta in  in  the F ire  
D ep artm en t began  doing the sam e fo r m inorities, he 
w as o rdered  to  cease his activities. D espite this o ccu r­
rence, the prac tice  of perm itting  w hite app lican ts on 
C oun ty  prem ises to  “p rac tice” fo r the tests and  in te r­
views was allow ed to  continue afte r it h ad  been  o rdered  
h alted  fo r m inorities (T r . 9 8 -1 1 0 ) .

I t  also is m ost no tew orthy , as to  w hether there 
was in ten tiona l d iscrim ination  on the p a r t of D efend­
ants, th a t as is fully described in  Section “B ” of the 
“S ta tem ent of the C ase” above. D efendan ts con tinued  
to  use d iscrim inatory  non-job-related  w ritten  tests de- 6

6Chief Barlow’s complete testimony on this point is attached 
hereto as Appendix “B”.

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40-

spite  th e ir express knowledge th a t such tests w ere illegal 
un d er T itle  V II and  indeed their assum ption  th a t such 
tests w ere illegal under Section 1981 (See attached  
A ppend ix  “A ” ). I t  also is m ost no tew orthy  th a t this 
use of d iscrim inatory  w ritten  tests con tinued  un til 1973 
and  ceased only due to  the in stan t law suit, despite 
the know ledge of the head  of the personnel departm en t 
as early  as p rio r to  1969 th a t D efendan ts’ w ritten 
tests excluded m inorities d isp roportionate ly  (T r . 42- 
4 3 )  and  despite the know ledge of th a t departm en t 
head  th a t the tests w ere no t job-re la ted  as rank ing  
devices (T r . 5 5 -5 6 ). In  this vein it is m ost no tew orthy  
th a t this C o u rt held  in Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229 , 241 th a t evidence of d isp roportionate  im pact 
is re levant un d er the in ten t s tan d ard  of liab ility  of 
the F ifth  and  F o urteen th  A m endm ents. P la in tiffs  sub­
m it th a t knowing use of non-job-related  tests while 
know ing  th a t they opera te  to  exclude m inorities, is 
tan tam o u n t to  a purposefu l “in ten t” to  exclude m inor­
ities,

T h is C o u rt should  be  aw are th a t before the N in th  
C ircu it C ourt of A ppeals, P lain tiffs con tended  th a t 
if an  in ten t s tan d ard  is to  be im puted  to  Section 
1981, P lain tiffs have satisfied th a t s tan d ard  and  th a t 
the  find ing  by the D istric t C o u rt of no  in ten tiona l 
d iscrim ination  was “clearly  e rroneous.” (See P la in tiffs / 
A ppellees’ B rief In  O pposition  T o  P etitio n  F o r  R e­
h ea rin g ). T he N in th  C ircuit, of course, did n o t reach  
the p o in t since it applied  a non -in ten t s tan d ard  to 
Section 1981.

196



— 41

I I I
THE DEFENDANTS’ STANDING ARGUMENT IS 

NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.

A t p o in t “V ” of D efen d an ts’ b rief before th is C ourt, 
it is a rgued  th a t because the N in th  C ircu it C o u rt of 
A ppeals has ru led  th a t the P lain tiffs lacked  standing  
to  rep resen t p ast applican ts, the h iring  o rd e r below  
can n o t possibly be ap p ro p ria te  since the h iring  o rder 
in  this case is one designed to  “elim inate the effects 
of p as t d iscrim ination . . . (R . 1 6 4 ). D efendan ts’
logic seems to  be th a t since past app lican ts w ere no t 
rep resen ted  in  this law suit, re lief to  rem edy the  effects 
of past d iscrim ination  is no t app rop ria te .

P la in tiffs have no  rea l a rgum en t w ith the basic logic 
of D efen d an ts’ position . D efendants, how ever, in  their 
a rgum ent have m issta ted  the N in th  C ircu it’s ruling. 
T he N in th  C ircu it ru led  only th a t because the class 
did  no t include past applican ts, the P lain tiffs lacked 
s tand ing  to  challenge a w ritten  test adm in istered  in 
1969. T he exact ho ld ing  of the N in th  C ircu it, found  
a t 566 F .2 d  1337, is as follows: “In light of the 
fact that p la in tiffs’ class did  no t include any p rio r 
unsuccessful applican ts, it follows th a t p lain tiffs ne ither 
suffered  no r w ere th rea ten ed  w ith any in ju ry  in  fact 
from  the use of the 1969 exam ina tion .” T he C o u rt 
of A ppeals then  ordered  the case rem anded  fo r  recon­
sidera tion  by the D istric t C o u rt of the h iring  o rd e r 
it h ad  en tered , in view of the various holdings it 
h ad  m ade including, in  particu la r, the holding as to 
standing. 566 F .2 d  1343.

P la in tiffs subm it th a t at this stage of the proceedings 
D efendan ts canno t com plain  abo u t the D istric t C o u rt’s

197



- 42-

h irin g  o rd e r on  s tand ing  grounds. T h e  p o in t is, sim ply 
enough, th a t the C o u rt of A ppeals a lready  has ordered  
the D istric t C o u rt to  reconsider the h iring  o rd e r it 
issued in  view of the C o u rt of A ppeals ho ld ing  on 
stand ing ; therefore , in  effect, D efendan ts are appealing  
o n  a p o in t on  w hich they have prevailed .

P lain tiffs d id  no t appeal from  the C o u rt o f A ppeals 
ho ld ing  because, upon  rem and , it w ill be  show n by 
P lain tiffs th a t the D istric t C o u rt’s defin ition  o f the 
scope of the class to  exclude p ast app lican ts w as a 
m ere oversight on the p a r t of the D istric t C o u rt and 
the  counsel involved. T his is the s itua tion  because 
the evidence a t tria l w as fully  developed on  beha lf 
o f p ast app lican ts (See, e.g., the stipu la tions of fac t 
in  the  P re-T ria l O rder, R . 136ff and  the testim ony 
a t T r. 3 0 -6 1 ) . Indeed , the D istric t C o u rt’s basic liability  
holdings and  the relief afforded  all w ere based  on  
“p as t” d iscrim ination  (R . 160, 1 6 4 ). U n d e r these c ir­
cum stances, it is the in ten t o f P lain tiffs, up o n  the 
rem and , to  co rrec t the oversight in  w hich p ast applican ts 
w ere excluded from  the represen ted  class by w ay of 
a m otion  fo r reconsidera tion  d irec ted  to  the  scope 
of the represen ted  class. O nce the oversight is corrected , 
the N in th  C ircu it ho ld ing  th a t the  P la in tiffs  have no 
standing  no  longer will be applicable.

I t  canno t be seriously questioned b u t th a t the  failu re 
to  include past applican ts in  the rep resen ted  class was 
a m ere oversight. T h e  orig inal com plain t w as pled 
on behalf o f a class including  p ast app lican ts (R . 
4, lines 2 1 -2 4 ) . T he evidence w ent to  p ast applican ts 
(See, e.g., R . 137 ff). Indeed , in  its first op in ion  dated  
O ctober 20, 1976, the N in th  C ircu it C o u rt of A ppeals, 
in  the very first sentence of the opinion, m istakenly  
sta ted  th a t past applican ts w ere included  in the rep re­
sented class (See A ppendix  “B ” , p. 1 to  P etition  for 
C e rtio ra ri) . F u rtherm ore , at no p o in t in  this entire

198



-43-

case, p rio r  to  the petition  fo r  ce rtio ra ri to  th is C ourt, 
did D efendan ts ever m ake the argum ent th a t P lain tiffs 
lacked  standing  due to  the fac t th e ir class d id  no t 
include p as t applican ts.

P la in tiffs  also w ould  note in  passing th a t once the 
rem an d  is ca rried  ou t to  the D istric t C ourt, it  will 
be app ro p ria te  fo r the nam ed  P la in tiffs  to  represen t 
p ast app lican ts as well as p resen t an d  fu tu re  applican ts. 
T his is the case because the w ritten  tests to  w hich 
the  nam ed  P la in tiffs w ere sub jected  are v irtually  iden ti­
ca l to  the ea rlie r w ritten  tests (See P la in tiffs’ E xhib its 
4 and  5, the tests co n cern ed ), thus satisfying the  com ­
m onality  and  typ icality  requ irem ents of R u le  23 of 
the  F ed era l R ules of C ivil P rocedure. Indeed , as this 
C o u rt s ta ted  in  East Texas Motor Freight v. Rod­
riguez, 431 U .S. 395 , 406  (1 9 7 7 ) :  “W e are  no t u n ­
aw are th a t suits alleging rac ia l or e thn ic d iscrim ination  
are  often  by the ir very n a tu re  class suits, involving 
classw ide w rongs. C om m on questions of law  o r  fac t 
a re  typically  p resen t.”

T h e  cases w hich show  th a t P lain tiffs as m inority  
cu rren t app lican ts an d  m inority  cu rren t em ployees can  
rep resen t p ast applican ts, p articu la rly  w here th e  cha l­
lenged em ploym ent p ractices affecting  the class are 
the sam e o r sim ilar to  those affecting  the nam ed  P la in ­
tiffs, are too  legion to  cite b u t include: Gibson v. 
Local 40, Supercargoes and Checkers, 543 F .2 d  1259, 
1264 (9 th  C ir. 1 9 7 6 ); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corpo­
ration, 522  F .2 d  333, 341 (1 0 th  C ir. 1 975) (P la in tiffs  
allow ed to  m ake claim s on beha lf of a class including 
persons n o t engaged in  w ork  “iden tica l” to  th a t of 
the nam ed  P la in tiffs ); Johnson v. Georgia Highway 
Express, Inc., 417  F .2 d  1122, 1124-25 (5 th  C ir. 1969) 
(d ischarged  em ployee a p ro p e r class P la in tiff fo r a 
class to  include app lican ts and  em ployees); Barnett 
v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F .2 d  543 , 547-48  (4 th  C ir.

199



— 4 4

1 9 7 5 ); Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F .2 d  
4 4 2  (3 rd  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 
F .2 d  466  (9 th  C ir. 1 9 7 6 ), cert, denied, 433 U .S. 
915 (1 9 7 7 )  (em ployee P la in tiff has s tand ing  to  re p re ­
sent app lican t c la ss); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 
545 F .2 d  169 (D .C . C ir. 1 9 7 6 ).

IV
THE HIRING ORDER ISSUED BELOW 

WAS APPROPRIATE
A ssum ing th a t p a s t applican ts w ere included  in  the 

P la in tiff class, the  h iring  o rd e r en tered  by the D istric t 
C o u rt w as p roperly  w ith in  the C o u rt’s equ itab le  rem e­
d ia l discretion . T he h iring  o rd e r is set fo rth  in  the 
Judgm en t and  provides th a t D efendan ts shall h ire  4 0 %  
m inority  firefighters (R . 1 6 7 ). T his h iring  o rd e r was 
m ade strictly  subject to  the proviso  th a t D efendan ts’ 
h iring  s tandards shall no t be low ered (R . 1 6 8 ).

T h e  h iring  relief w as considered  by  the  D istric t C o u rt 
to  be “necessary  to  overcom e the p resen tly  existing 
effects of p ast d iscrim ination  w ith in  a reasonab le  period  
of tim e” (R . 1 6 1 ). T he D istric t C o u rt based  this 
h iring  o rd e r upon  its findings that: ( 1 )  D efendan ts 
failed to  reb u t the prima facie case of d iscrim ination  
c rea ted  by the severe d isparity  betw een the percen tage 
of b lacks ( 0 .5 % )  and  M exican-A m ericans ( 2 .8 % )  
in  the  w orkforce of the L os A ngeles C o u n ty  F ire  
D epartm en t and  the percen tage of b lacks ( 1 0 .8 % )  
and  M exican-A m ericans (1 8 .3 % )  in the general po p u ­
la tion  of Los A ngeles C oun ty  (R . 1 6 0 ); and  (2 )  
D efendants h ad  engaged in illegal em ploym ent practices 
by their use of unvalidated  w ritten  tests th a t adversely 
affected  b lack  and  M exican-A m erican  app lican ts and 
by D efendan ts’ fa ilu re  adequately  to  recru it blacks 
and  M exican-A m ericans (R . 1 6 0 ).

T his C o u rt repeated ly  has recognized th a t once a 
p ast constitu tional o r sta tu to ry  v io lation  has been estab-

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45-

lished, the D istric t C ourts  have b ro ad  equ itab le  d iscre­
tion  in  fash ioning  relief. In  Louisiana v. United States,
380 U .S. 145 (1 9 6 5 ) ,  it w as sta ted  that:

“W e bear in m ind  th a t the C o u rt has no t m erely 
the  pow er b u t the duty  to  ren d er a decree w hich 
will so fa r  as possib le elim inate the  d iscrim inatory  
effects of the p ast as well as b a r  like d iscrim ination  
in  the fu tu re .” Id. a t 154.

T he h iring  relief o rdered  by the D istric t C o u rt is 
consisten t w ith the judgm ent of this C o u rt ann ounced 
by  M r. Ju stice  Pow ell in  Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, .... U .S ......... , 57 L .E d .2 d
7 5 0  (1 9 7 8 ) .  Justice  Pow ell s ta ted  a t 57 L .E d .2 d  778- 
79  that:

“T he courts of appeals have fashioned various 
types of rac ia l preferences as rem edies fo r constitu ­
tio n a l o r  s ta tu to ry  v io lations resu lting  in  identified, 
race-based  in juries to  ind iv iduals held  en titled  to 
the  preference. E.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. 
v. Civil Service Commission, 482  F . 2 d  1333 
(C A 2  1 9 7 3 ); Carter v. Gallagher, 452  F. 2d 
315 , m odified  on  rehearing  en banc, 4 5 2  F . 2d 
327 (C A 8  1 9 7 2 ). Such preferences also have 
been upheld  w here a legislative o r  adm inistrative 
body  charged  w ith the responsibility  m ade d e te r­
m inations of p ast d iscrim ination  by the industries 
affected , and  fash ioned  rem edies deem ed ap p ro ­
p ria te  to  rectify  the d iscrim ination . E.g., Contrac­
tors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secre­
tary of Labor, 442  F .2 d  159 (C A 3 ) , cert, denied,
404  U .S. 954 (1 9 7 1 ) ;  Associated General Con­
tractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 
F . 2d  9 (C A 1 1 9 7 3 ), cert, denied, 416  U.S.
957 (1 9 7 4 ) ;  cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S,
641 (1 9 6 6 ) .” (foo tno tes om itted .)

T h e  scope of the h iring  relief also was well w ithin 
the D istric t C o u rt’s equ itab le discretion . T he basic re- 201



46-

stra in t on  a  D istric t C o u rt’s d iscre tion  is th a t “the 
n a tu re  of the v io lation  determ ines the scope of the 
rem edy .” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of 
Education, 402  U .S. 1, 16 (1 9 7 1 ) .  In  the in stan t 
case, the  h iring  relief “m irro rs” the  p ast v io lations 
(i.e., fo r prima facie case find ing ) fo r it w as designed 
to  cause the rep resen ta tion  of b lacks an d  M exican- 
A m ericans in  D efendan ts’ w orkforce to  a tta in  the level 
it w ould  have reached  b u t fo r the p as t d iscrim ination .

V irtually  iden tical h iring  relief was endorsed  by this 
C o u rt in  International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1 9 7 7 ) .  In  Teamsters, 
the  consent decree p rovided  fo r prospective relief th a t 
w as described  as follows a t 431 U .S. 330-331 , n.4:

“T he decree fu rth e r p rovided  th a t fu tu re  job 
vacancies a t any com pany term inal w ould be filled 
first ‘[b ]y  those persons w ho m ay b e  found  by 
the court, if any, to  be individual o r  class dis- 
crim inatees suffering the p resen t effects o f past 
d iscrim ination  because of race or n a tio n a l origin 
p ro h ib ited  by T itle  V II  of the  Civil R igh ts A ct 
of 1964 .’ A ny rem ain ing  vacancies could  be filled 
by ‘any o th er persons,’ b u t the company obligated 
itself to hire one Negro or Spanish-surnamed per­
son for every white person hired at any terminal 
until the percentage of minority workers at that 
terminal equalled the percentage of minority group 
members in the population of the metropolitan area 
surrounding the terminal.” (E m phasis  a d d e d ).

T his C o u rt then  approved  this h iring  o rder in  the 
consent decree as p ro p e r in junctive relief w hen it s ta ted  
a t 431 U .S. 361 , n. 47 that:

“T he federal courts have freely exercised  their 
b ro ad  equ itab le  d iscretion  to  devise prospective 
relief designed to  assure th a t em ployers found  
to  be in v io lation  of § 7 0 7 ( a )  [o f T itle  V II]

202



elim inate  th e ir d iscrim inato ry  p ractices and  the 
effect therefrom . * * * In  this case prospective 
relief w as in co rp o ra ted  in  the p a rtie s’ consent de­
cree. See supra, a t 330-1 , n .4 .”

I t  is also sign ifican t to  no te th a t the h iring  relief 
in  the Teamsters consent decree was based  upon  fin d ­
ings analogous to  those m ade by the D istric t C o u rt 
in  the in stan t case. T his C o u rt in Teamsters held  th a t 
a prima facie case of d iscrim ination  h ad  been  shown 
by the  d isparity  betw een the rep resen ta tion  of m inorities 
in the com pany’s w orkforce and  th a t in the general 
popu la tion . 431 U .S. a t 337, n .17 . I t  also was concluded  
a t 431 U .S. a t 339 , n. 20  that:

“ [A Jb se n t exp lana tion , it is o rd inarily  to  be 
expected  th a t non  d iscrim ination  w ill in  tim e resu lt 
in  a  w ork  force m ore o r less rep resen ta tive of 
the racial an d  e thn ic  com position  of the popu la tion  
in  the com m unity  from  w hich em ployees are 
h ired .”

F inally , the prospective h iring  relief is equ itab le  in 
n a tu re  and  hence, the scope of the relief shou ld  no t 
be  lim ited, as D efendan ts suggest, to  rem edying only 
the effects of p ast d iscrim inato ry  acts w ith in  the s ta tu te  
of lim itations period . A s s ta ted  in Holmberg v. Arm- 
brecht, 327 U .S. 392 , 396 (1 9 4 6 ) ,

“T rad itio n a lly  and  fo r good reasons, sta tu tes 
of lim itation  are no t contro lling  m easures of equi­
tab le  relief. Such sta tu tes have been d raw n upon 
by equity  solely fo r the light they m ay shed in 
determ in ing  th a t w hich is decisive fo r the chancel­
lo r’s in terven tion , nam ely, w hether the p lain tiff 
has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to  m ake 
a decree against the defendan t unfa ir. See R ussell 
v. T odd , sup ra  (3 0 9  US at 289 , 84 L  ed 761, 
60 S C t  5 2 7 ) .

H*

— 47—

203



— 48-

“E quity  eschews m echanical ru les; it depends 
on  flexibility. E qu ity  has ac ted  on  the p rincip le 
th a t ‘laches is no t like lim itation , a m ere m atte r 
of tim e; bu t p rincipa lly  a question  of the inequity  
of perm itting  the claim  to be enforced— an inequity  
founded  upon  som e change in  the condition  or 
re la tions of the p rop erty  o r  the p artie s.’ G alliher 
v. C adw ell, 145 US 368 , 373 , 36 L  ed 738 , 
740 , 12 S C t 873. See S ou thern  P. Co. v. 
B ogert, 250  US 483 , 4 88 , 489 , 63 L  ed 1099, 
1106, 1107, 39 S C t 533 . A n d  so, a suit in 
equity  m ay lie though  a com parab le  cause of 
ac tion  a t law  w ould  be b a rre d .”

See also Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342  U .S. 29, 
30-31 (1 9 5 1 ) ;  Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Local 788, 544  F .2 d  876 (8 th  C ir. 1 9 7 7 ).

D efendan ts are  in  no  w ay p re jud iced  by a prospective 
h iring  o rd e r th a t rem edies the effects of p ast illegal 
d iscrim ination  th a t took  place p rio r to  the th ree  year 
s ta tu te  of lim itations period. F u rth erm o re , the D istric t 
C o u rt’s decree specifically subord inates the num erical 
h iring  goals to  the availab ility  of qualified  applican ts 
and , in  fact, allows D efendan ts to  increase th e ir qualifi­
ca tion  s tandards fo r em ploym ent of firefighters so long 
as such standards are job-re la ted  (R . 1 6 8 ). It, th ere ­
fore, w as p ro p er fo r the D istric t C o u rt “to  render 
a  decree w hich will so fa r as possible elim inate the 
d iscrim inatory  effects of the past. . . .” Louisiana 
v. United States, 380 U .S. 145, 154 (1 9 6 5 ) .

T h e  relief found  by this C o u rt to  be app rop ria te  
in  school desegregation  cases illustra tes th a t sta tu tes 
of lim itations have no t been used to  lim it the D istric t 
C o u rt’s d iscretion , aw ard ing  b ro ad  and  effective equi­
tab le  relief in d iscrim ination  cases. F o r exam ple, in 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 
402  U .S. 1 (1 9 7 1 ) ,  the constitu tiona l v io lation  found

204



— 49-

by  the D istric t C o u rt was “locating  schools in  N egro  
residen tia l areas and  fixing the size of the schools to 
accom m odate  the needs of im m edia te  neighborhoods,” 
402  U .S. 7. T he re lief g ran ted  by the D istric t C ourt, 
an d  approved  by this C o u rt, involved a com prehensive 
p lan  to  desegregate the en tire  school system . C learly , 
the desegregation  p lan  was in tended  to  elim inate  en ­
tire ly  the d u a l school system  th a t h ad  been crea ted  
by  d iscrim inato ry  siting and  assignm ent decisions over 
an  ex tended  period  of tim e. I t  w as n o t lim ited  to  
elim inating  the effect of d iscrim inato ry  sitings and  as­
signm ents w ith in  the s ta tu te  of lim itations period.

Conclusion

F o r the  reasons s ta ted  above, P lain tiffs respectfu lly  
subm it th a t the decision  of the N in th  C ircu it C o u rt 
of A ppeals in  Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 
F .2 d  1334 (9 th  C ir. 1 977) should  be affirm ed.

D ated : N ovem ber 1, 1978

R espectfu lly  subm itted ,

A. T homas H u n t ,
T im othy  B. F ly n n ,
C en ter fo r L aw  in the P ub lic  In terest, 
W a lter  Cochran-Bond ,
E dward B. R e it k o pp ,

Attorneys for Respondents.

205





A P P E N D IX  “A ” .

T O : Civil Service C om m ission 
F R O M : G o rd o n  T . N esvig

S U B JE C T : P O L IC Y  O N  T H E  U SE  O F  P R O M O ­
T IO N A L  E X A M IN A T IO N S  O N  T U E S ­
D A Y , A P R IL  6, 1971

O n T uesday , A p ril 6, 1971, the B oard  of Supervisors 
passed  a m otion  u rg ing  th a t the  Civil Service C om m is­
sion resc ind  the  p rom otional exam ination  fo r  F irem an  
an d  give an  open  com petitive exam ina tion  instead . O n 
W edneday , A pril 7, 1971, the  C ivil Service C om m ission 
o rde red  the p rom otional exam ination  fo r F irem an  re ­
scinded  and  ind icated  th a t the exam ination  should  be 
o rde red  on  an  open  com petitive basis.

A fte r review ing all of the  evidence p rep ared  by 
m y staff, I  still believe th a t the decision to  give a 
p rom otional exam ination  w as app rop ria te . I  w ould  like 
to  p resen t the  follow ing in fo rm ation  as a basis fo r 
influencing fu tu re  policy decisions of the C om m ission 
regard ing  the C oun ty ’s A ffirm ative A ction  P rogram .

Section 19101 w hich w as added  to  the A dm in istra tive 
C ode on  O cto b er 11, 1969, as a resu lt of the B o ard ’s 
desire to  p rovide equal em ploym ent opportun ity  p ro ­
vides no t only fo r m ore intensive recru itm en t of m ino r­
ities fo r C oun ty  jobs, bu t also provides fo r  upgrad ing  
the large n u m b er of m inority  em ployees w ho are dead- 
ended  in  first an d  second level jobs. T his far-reach ing  
personnel policy applies to  all C ounty  em ployees. I t  
shou ld  be m ade c lear th a t in  the im plem entation  of 
the C o u n ty ’s A ffirm ative A ction  P rog ram  we will in 
no  w ay know ingly  d iscrim inate  against any group . O ur

M ay  19, 1971

207



■2—

p ro g ram  is designed to  prov ide expanded  opportun ities 
fo r all C oun ty  em ployees, w ith an  em phasis on  elim inat­
ing  barriers  to  the  p rom otion  of m inorities.

I t  has been a consisten t C oun ty  policy to  give p ro ­
m o tiona l exam inations w hen adequate  com petition  ex­
ists w ith in  the  C oun ty  service. T his policy  is based  
on  a C oun ty  C h arte r requ irem ent and  is fully detailed  
in  Civil Service C om m ission R u le  8.05.

A s p a r t o f o u r effort to  im plem ent the B oard’s 
A ffirm ative A ction  policies we have been review ing 
all exam inations to  insure th a t w e p rov ide  C oun ty  
em ployees th e ir p rom otional rights in  those cases w here 
adequate  com petition  exists w ith in  C oun ty  service. A  
recen t exam ple of the app lica tion  of this policy w as 
the  in terd ep artm en ta l p rom otional exam ina tion  fo r A p ­
pren tice  positions. A lthough  these exam inations h ad  
previously  been given on  an  open  com petitive basis, 
we felt th a t we w ere denying opportun ities to  existing 
em ployees w ith  re la ted  experience w ith in  C o un ty  serv­
ice.

T h e  F irem an  exam ination  is an o th e r exam ple in  
w hich Civil Service C om m ission R ule 8.05 appears 
applicable . A lthough  we m ay exhaust the com petition  
fo r this class w ith in  C oun ty  service afte r one o r two 
p rom otional adm inistrations of the exam ination , we b e ­
lieve th a t adequate  com petition  now  exists w ith in  C o u n ­
ty service to  justify  a p rom otional exam ination .

T h e  large filing (5 ,0 0 0 -1 0 ,0 0 0 ) an tic ipated  on  an 
open  com petitive F irem an  exam ination  w ould require 
the use of a w ritten  test o r an  alternative  un tested  
p rocedure to  select ou t 600 of the applican ts fo r the 
interview  portion  of this exam ination . A  p rom otional 
exam ination  w ould resu lt in  a filing of approxim ate ly

208



— 3—

600  app lican ts and  w ould  p rec lude  the need to  use 
a testing  device w hich m ay discrim inate.

I  request the C om m ission’s con tinued  app roval to  
prov ide p rom otional exam inations in all cases w here 
C ivil Service C om m ission R ule 8.05 is determ ined  to  
be applicab le , w ith a heavy em phasis on those classes 
w hich are  cu rren tly  underrep resen ted  by m inorities.

rb

F A C T  S H E E T  O N  T H E  F IR E M A N  
E X A M IN A T IO N

1. O f 1795 F irem en  in  L os A ngeles C oun ty  only 
10 are B lack, 40  B row n, an d  1 O rien ta l.

2. A  g rea t deal o f the alienation  betw een m inority  
residents and  the  F ire  D ep artm en t results from  the 
lack  of adequate  rep resen ta tion  of m inorities in  the 
fire  service. T h e  b rick -th row ing  we have experienced 
a t several fires no t only presen ts a  h azard  to  C ounty  
F irem en  bu t results in g rea te r fire losses th an  w ould  
otherw ise occur.

3. T h e  cu rren t test for F irem an  does d iscrim inate 
against m inorities. (A lth o u g h  we had  over 407 
B lacks applying fo r F irem an  the last tim e this 
test was given, only fo u r w ere w ith in  appo in tm ent 
range on the list and  hired. O f 126 C hicanos, 
only 5 w ere w ithin reach  on the list and  subsequently  
h ire d .)

4. A  recen t F ed era l Suprem e C o u rt decision on test­
ing, G riggs et al v D uke P ow er C om pany, holds 
th a t this type of test is in  v io lation  of the Civil 
R ights A c t of 1964.

5. T he only alternative w hich we have thus fa r found  
to  be a cu ltu ra lly  fa ir way of selecting applican ts 
fo r the interview  p o rtio n  of the F irem an  exam

209



4-

has been info rm ally  determ ined  to  be illegal by 
o u r C oun ty  C ounsel rep resen ta tive  (R an d o m  Selec­
tio n ) .

6. W e are no t staffed  to  in terview  all of the 5000  
plus cand ida tes w hom  we estim ate w ill apply  fo r 
F irem an  on an  open-com petitive exam ination , and  
the alternative  of using o u r existing w ritten  exam ina­
tion  as an  adm inistrative device fo r selecting a group  
o f app lican ts w hom  w e can in terview  fo r the F ire ­
m an  positions (app rox im ate ly  600  app lican ts to  
be in terview ed fo r  80 jo b s) p laces us in  the position  
of know ingly d iscrim inating .

7. W e have good reason  to  believe th a t adequate  
com petition  exists w ith in  the  C oun ty  Service fo r 
this class. A  p rom otional exam ination  w ould  resu lt 
in  a filing of approx im ate ly  600  app lican ts all 
of w hom  could  be interview ed.

8. Since 30  to  4 0 %  of the  C o un ty  app lican ts for 
this class w ould  be m inorities, we estim ate  th a t 
a  p ro m o tio n a l exam ination  w ould  resu lt in  app rox i­
m ately  25 m inority  hires ou t o f a to ta l o f 80 
new  hires.

210



APPENDIX “B”.

— 5—

T H E  C O U R T : Y ou  h ea rd  M r. C lady testify
yesterday  abou t his H ercu lean  effort to  get slips 
from  various people saying “P lease let m e know  
w hen you’re  going to  announce an o th e r tes t.” He 
th inks he collected som e 300.

W as this p a r t of the p rog ram  th a t you  helped  
to  develop?

T H E  W IT N E SS: P a rt. Yes, this w as p a r t of
the p ro g ram  to accum ulate.

T H E  C O U R T : H e said  he developed som e
300 of those, tu rn ed  them  in, and  found  out 
th a t no  slip, no  notices w ere sent ou t un til ju st 
ab o u t the eve of the cut-off tim e, an d  then  as 
fa r as he knew , only ha lf w ere sent out.

C an  you  evaluate  th a t?  D o you  know  w hether 
o r n o t th a t occurred?

T H E  W ITN ESS: W hen I w as called and  to ld
this list of nam es was no t utilized, I  requested  
dow n th rough  the people responsible w ith in  o u r 
h iera rchy  of w ork ing  w ith this group , w hat h a p ­
pened  to  these nam es, because o u r position  w as 
th a t these nam es w ould be subm itted  to  the  p e r­
sonnel d epartm en t and  they w ould be utilized  in 
the  recru iting  effort.

T H E  C O U R T : D o you know  w hether o r  no t
it  w as done?

T H E  W IT N E SS: T o  my know ledge there  was
a  com m unication  problem  at this p a rtic u la r tim e, 
and  th a t I was no t satisfied w ith the fac t th a t 
these lists of nam es w ere no t hand led  properly  
in  m y estim ation .

211



— 6 —

T H E  C O U R T : D id  you  know  w hy they w ere
n o t hand led  properly?

T H E  W ITN ESS: N o, I  d o n ’t.

T H E  C O U R T : D o  you have any suspicion
o r in ference th a t it m ight no t have been  hand led  
p roperly  because of som e in ten tio n a l foo t-dragging  
on the  p a r t of som e fire  d ep artm en t personnel, 
the though t of m inorities being added  to  the fire 
departm en t?

T H E  W ITN ESS: I have m y personal sus­
picions, yes, your H onor.

212



IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
O cto b er T erm , 1978 

N o . 77-1553

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERV­
ICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
Vi'.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, individu­
ally and on behalf of all others similarly situated, WILLIE C. 
BURSEY, ELIJAH HARRIS, JAMES W. SMITH, WILLIAM 
CLADY, STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE ROY TUCKER, 
LEON AUBRY, RONALD CRAWFORD, JAMES HEARD, 
ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, OSBALDO A. AMPARAH, in­
dividually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.

R E P L Y  B R IE F  F O R  C O U N T Y  O F  
LO S A N G E L E S , et a l., P E T IT IO N E R S .

John H. Larson,
County Counsel,

William F . Stewart,
Chief, Labor Relations Division,
648 H all of A dm in istra tion ,
L os A ngeles, C alif. 90012 . 
(2 1 3 )  974-1829,

Attorneys for Petitioners.
213





S U B JE C T  IN D E X
P age

In tro d u c tio n  ..............................................................................  1

I
C ongress D id  N o t In ten d  R acia lly  D isp roportionate  

Im p ac t A lo n e  to  C onstitu te  a  V io lation  of Sec. 
1981, E ith e r a t the T im e o f O rig inal E n ac tm en t 
o r  W ith  the Passage of T itle  V II in  1964 ............ 3

A . In ten t of the 39 th  C ongress .............................. 4

B. E ffect of the 1964 E n ac tm en t of T itle  V II .. 8

C. E ffect o n  D ecisions in  T eam sters and  H azel­
w ood ............................................................................ 11

II
Q uo ta  O rd er ............................................................................ 12

II I
T h e  P etitio n  fo r C ertio ra ri W as N o t Im providently  

G ran ted ; T he C ase Should  Be R eta ined  fo r R eso­
lu tion  of Im p o rtan t F ed era l Issues ...........................  16

IV
T h e  E vidence Sustains the D istric t C o u rt’s F ind ing  

of N o  In ten tio n a l D iscrim ination ; the Issues of 
L aw  M ust Be R esolved in  A ccordance  W ith  the 
E stab lished  F indings in  the R eco rd  ................   23

C onclusion  ................................................................................. 25

215



11.

T A B L E  O F  A U T H O R IT IE S  C IT E D

C ases P age

A rling ton  H eights v. M etropo litan  H ousing  C orp .,
4 2 9  U.S. 252  (1 9 7 7 )  .................................................  5

B uchanan  v. W arley, 245  U.S. 60 (1 9 1 7 )  ............... 7

E ast T exas M o to r F re igh t v. R odriguez, 431 U.S.
395 (1 9 7 5 )  ....................................................................... 3

F ran k s  v. B ow m an, 424  U .S. 747  (1 9 7 6 )  ..............  13

G uard ian s A ssoc, v. C ivil Service C om m ission, 
U .S .D .C ., SD N Y  (1 9 7 7 )  recently  repo rted  in  18 
F E P  C ases 63 .........................    22

H urd  v. H odge, 68 S.C t. 847 (1 9 4 8 )  .........................  7

In te rn a tio n a l B ro therhood  of T eam sters v. U .S.,
431 U.S. 324  (1 9 7 7 )  ........................... 11, 12, 15, 26

Johnson  v. R ailw ay E xpress A gency, 421 U.S. 454  
(1 9 7 5 )  .................................................................................  9

Joh n so n  v. R yder T ru ck  L ines, Inc ., 575 F .2 d  471 .. 12

R egents of the U niversity  of C alifo rn ia  v. B akke,
157 L .E d .2 d  ....... (1 9 7 8 )  .............................................  15

T ak ah ash i v. F ish  & G am e C om m ission, 334  U.S.
410  (1 9 4 8 )  .........................................................................  7

U n ited  A ir L ines v. Evans, 431 U .S. 553 (1 9 7 7 )  .... 19

W ashington  v. D avis, 426  U.S. 229  .............. 4, 6, 7 , 8

W illiam s v. D eK alb  C ounty , et al., (5 th  C .A . Oct.
10, 1978) 18 E P D  Cases 1J8646 ............................  22

216



111.

Statu tes P age

C ivil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 3 (h )  ..
..................................................................................................11, 12

Civil R ights A c t of 1964, T itle  V II, Sec. 7 0 3 ( j )  .... 
..............................................................................................13, 14

U n ited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Secs. 1981-1988 ....... 10

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 1981 ............-........
.................. ................1, 2, 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12
______13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26

U n ited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 1982 ...................  26

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 1988 ......................  10

U nited  S tates C ode, T itle  42 , Sec. 2 0 0 0 e (b )  .........  10

U nited  S tates C onstitu tion , T h irteen th  A m endm ent 4

U n ited  S tates C onstitu tion , F o u rteen th  A m endm ent
..... ................................................ ............................... 7, 10, 26

217





IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
O cto b er T erm , 1978 

N o . 77-1553

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; and CIVIL SERV­
ICE COMMISSION OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Petitioners,
vs.

VAN DAVIS, HERSHEL CLADY and FRED VEGA, individu­
ally and on behalf of all others similarly situated, WILLIE C. 
BURSEY, ELIJAH HARRIS. JAMES W. SMITH, WILLIAM 
CLADY, STEPHEN HAYNES, JIMMIE ROY TUCKER, 
LEON AUBRY, RONALD CRAWFORD, JAMES HEARD, 
ALFRED R. BALTAZAR, OSBALDO A. AMPARAH, in­
dividually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.

REPLY BRIEF FOR COUNTY OF 
LOS ANGELES, et aL, PETITIONERS.

Introduction.
In  this reply  brief, the petitioners will respond to  the 

follow ing con ten tions th a t p redom ina te  in  the briefs 
of the respondents and  th e ir  amici.

1) T h e  congressional in ten t, either in  1866 o r w ith 
the  passage of T itle  V II in  1964, w as to  establish  lia­
b ility  u n d er Sec. 1981 by a show ing of rac ia lly  dis­
p ro p o rtio n a te  im pact alone w ithou t p ro o f of d iscrim ­
in a to ry  purpose; 219



— 2—

2 )  T h e  q u o ta  o rd e r requ iring  4 0 %  m inority  h iring  
un til ra c ia l p arity  is achieved is ap p ro p ria te  an d  w ith in  
the C o u rt’s ju risd ic tion  under the estab lished  facts;

3 )  T h e  petition  fo r ce rtio ra ri w as im providently  
g ran ted ;

4 )  T h e  find ing  of the  tria l co u rt th a t the petition ­
ers did  no t purposefu lly  d iscrim inate was clearly  e r­
roneous an d  shou ld  be overtu rned  by the  Suprem e 
C ourt.

B ecause there  appears to  be som e confusion  am ong 
the amici in  support o f the  respondents on  the  facts 
in  a m otion  in  opposition  to  certification  of the class 
as they b ea r on the issues of the case, a b rief sum m ary  
is necessary  to  p lace the  issues in  perspective. T his 
case involves the valid ity  of the petitio n e rs’ h iring  p ra c ­
tices p rio r to  the effective da te  of T itle  V II , th a t 
is, un d er p lain tiffs’ Sec. 1981 cause of action , and  
the  valid ity  of the  q u o ta  h iring  order. I t  is recognized 
by all th a t no  d iscrim inatory  h iring  occu rred  subsequen t 
to  the effective da te  of T itle  V II. T he only ob jectionab le  
prac tice  alleged as occurring  afte r T itle  V II w as the p ro ­
posed, b u t to ta lly  uneffec tuated  p lan  to  fill critica l 
vacancies by in itially  interview ing the  top  544  ap p li­
can ts tak ing  the w ritten  test, w hich, if ca rried  out, 
m ay have h ad  a d isp roportionate  effect o n  m inorities.

T he tria l co u rt found  th a t the petitioners h ad  no t 
in ten tiona lly  d iscrim inated  against m inorities; how ever, 
it  im posed a  q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r because of pe titioners’ 
use of an  unvalida ted  w ritten  exam  having  a d ispara te  
im pact on  m inorities. T h e  h iring  o rd e r was in tended  
to  rem edy p resum ed p ast d iscrim inato ry  h iring  ( th a t 
is, p rio r to  T itle  V II )  and  no t assist the  p resen t ap p li­
can ts and  plain tiffs, w ho, p lain tiffs concede, w ere all 
h ired  and  ran k ed  in  a nond iscrim inato ry  m anner.

220



•3—

A dditionally , the responden ts claim  th a t their fa ilu re  
to  seek re lief on beha lf of p a s t app lican ts was th rough  
in ad v erten t clerical e rro r and  th a t the stand ing  issue 
w as n o t ra ised  un til the  recen t rehearing  before circu it 
court. In  p o in t of fact, n o t only  d id  respondents fa il to  
sue on  behalf of p ast app lican ts— th e ir com plain ts alleg­
ing  they w ere rep resen ting  only  p resen t an d  fu tu re  
app lican ts— b u t m ost significantly , no  p ast app lican t 
w as a  nam ed  p lain tiff. T h e  ru ling  of this C o u rt on 
s tand ing  in  East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez,
431 U .S. 395 (1 9 7 5 ) ,  is applicab le  to  the in stan t case.

T he responden ts’ sta tem ent th a t a  stand ing  issue 
w as n o t ra ised  un til the rehearing  befo re  the circu it 
co u rt is sim ply n o t co rrec t. T he p lain tiffs in itially  ra ised  
the s tand ing  issue in  th e ir answ er (A . 15) and  again  
in  a m otion  in  opposition  to  certification  of the class 
(C .T . 4 9 ) .  In  petitio n e rs’ appeal to  the circu it court, 
one of the p rim ary  g rounds w as the p la in tiffs’ lack  
of stand ing  because no p ast app lican t w as a  nam ed  
p la in tiff (B rie f of D efendan ts, A ppellees-A ppellan ts, pp. 
18 -2 1 ). T he responden ts have represen ted  they will 
seek in  the tria l co u rt expansion of the class to  in ­
clude p ast app lican ts (R esp ’s. Br. 4 2 ) .  Petitioners, 
of course, assert th a t even if past applican ts had  been 
included, a v io lation  of Sec. 1981 canno t be ad judged  
w ithou t a show ing of d iscrim inato ry  purpose.

I
Congress Did Not Intend Racially Disproportionate Im­

pact Alone to Constitute a Violation of Sec. 1981,
Either at the Time of Original Enactment or With 
the Passage of Title VII in 1964.

R espondents and  their amici, in  contending  th a t the 
C oun ty  of L os A ngeles can be found  in v io lation  
of Sec. 1981 m erely by a show ing of d isp roportionate  221



4

im pact, ad o p t tw o approaches to  the constru c tio n  of 
Sec. 1981. In itially , it is con tended  th a t the  39 th  
C ongress in tended  a t the tim e of enactm en t of Sec. 
1981 th a t d iscrim inato ry  in ten t w as n o t necessary  to  
estab lish  a  v io la tion  of the sta tu te , n o r did  the 13th 
A m endm ent so requ ire . I t  is fu rth e r argued  th a t even 
if the  3 9 th  C ongress d id  n o t con tem plate  the d ispara te  
im pact standards th a t have now  derived from  T itle  
V II, C ongress in  enacting  T itle  V II in  1964 in tended  
to  am end  Sec. 1981 by im plica tion  to  eng raft such 
s tandards b u t only as to  em ploym ent practices.

T h e  first position  contends too b road ly . I t  is unsup­
p o rted  by  the legislative h istory, and  because it canno t 
be lim ited  to  em ploym ent practices, is con tra ry  to  the 
view  of the Suprem e C o u rt in  Washington v. Davis 
expressed thusly:

“A  ru le  th a t a  sta tu te  designed to  serve n eu tra l 
ends is nevertheless invalid , absen t com pelling  jus­
tification , if in  prac tice  it  benefits o r  burdens one 
race  m ore th an  an o th e r w ould  be far-reach ing  
an d  w ould raise serious questions abou t, an d  p e r­
haps invalidate, a w hole range of tax , w elfare, 
public service, regula tory , an d  licensing sta tu tes 
th a t m ay be m ore burdensom e to the p o o r and  
to  the average b lack  th an  to  the affluen t w hite .” 
Washington v. Davis, 426  U .S. 229 , 240 .

T he second position  is flatly  co n tra ry  to  the expressed 
in ten t of C ongress w hen they enacted  T itle  V II.

A, Intent of the 39th Congress.

C onsiderab le  research  and  analysis has been  provided 
the C o u rt on  the considerations befo re  the  39 th  C on­
gress a t the tim e they enacted  Sec. 1981. T here  is 
nothing, how ever, in  the deliberations of C ongress th a t

222



— 5-

w ould  com pel the conclusion  th a t the Griggs d ispara te  
im pact crite ria  w ere w ith in the con tem pla tion  of C on­
gress w hen  they enacted  Sec. 1981, an d  th a t they 
in tended  the s ta tu te  to  invalidate  official actions solely 
because they  resu lt in  a racially  d isp roportionate  im­
pac t. Indeed , as the research  o f the amici has dem on­
stra ted , a substan tia l n um ber o f sta te  laws enacted  afte r 
the C ivil W ar expressly d iscrim inated  against blacks 
solely because of the ir race.

W hile it is tru e  th a t som e of the “B lack  C odes” 
enacted  in  the early  R econstruc tion  E ra  appeared  
n eu tra l on  th e ir face, it  w as obvious to  C ongress 
as w ell as the  m ilita ry  occupational governm ent 
th a t these sta tu tes w ere enacted  w ith a purposefu l 
d iscrim inato ry  in ten t and  w ere designed to  place the 
new ly freed  b lacks in  a position  subserv ien t to  their 
fo rm er m asters. A  sta tu te  o r  p ractice , n eu tra l on  its 
face, is nevertheless vio lative of Sec. 1981 and  the 
C o nstitu tion  if it is enacted  w ith a racially  d iscrim ina­
to ry  purpose , as this C o u rt recen tly  em phasized in 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429  
U .S. 252  (1 9 7 7 ) .  T h a t c ircum stance, how ever, is no t 
befo re  the C o u rt in  the in stan t case as the tria l court 
a fte r review ing and  w eighing the evidence expressly 
concluded  th a t no d iscrim inatory  in ten t existed.

T h e  fac t th a t C ongress could  no t have in tended  
a  Griggs s tan d ard  at the tim e they enacted  Sec. 1981 
is ap p a ren t from  the actions of the federa l governm ent 
in  subsequent years w hen, w ith the evolution  of the 
civil service system  in the la te  19th C en tu ry , various 
em ploym ent c rite ria  w ere u tilized by s ta te  and  federal 
agencies w hich clearly  w ould n o t pass m uster under 
T itle  V II  requirem ents.

223



6-

In  seeking to  prov ide “p rac tica l freedom ” to  blacks, 
C ongress in  passing  Sec. 1981 recognized th a t em an­
cipation  w as m eaningless w ithou t the legal righ t to  
con trac t, and  to  buy, sell and  ow n rea l an d  personal 
p roperty . I t  does n o t follow, how ever, th a t C ongress 
h ad  in m ind  concepts th a t evolved 100 years la ter 
un d er a un iquely  designed em ploym ent d iscrim ination  
sta tu te . U nder responden ts’ expanded  view of Sec. 1981, 
n eu tra lly  ph rased  crim inal s ta tu tes o r  vagrancy  law s 
enacted  w ithou t any  in ten t to  d iscrim inate w ould  today  
vio late the s ta tu te  if in  o pera tion  they had  a  d ispara te  
im pact on m inorities.

T he argum ent th a t C ongress in tended  in  the  en ac t­
m ent of Sec. 1981 to  p rovide “p rac tica l freedom ” fo r 
b lacks by app lica tion  of a d ispara te  im pact s tan d ard  
of liability  appears to  be reso lved  by  this C o u rt in 
Washington v. Davis w hen it declined to  ex tend  the 
s tan d ard  to  non-em ploym ent contexts o r unless expressly 
prov ided  fo r by law . T h e  argum ent th a t C ongress in ­
tended  to  im pose a d ispara te  im pact s tan d ard  in  1866, 
if true , canno t be lim ited  to  em ploym ent cases as 
Sec. 1981 by its term s is fa r m ore sw eeping in  its 
com pass. T o  adop t th a t a rgum ent w ould  necessarily  
u n dercu t the th ru st of this C o u rt’s decision in  Washing­
ton v. Davis and  com pel the conclusion th a t a b ro a d  
range of public  and  p rivate  activity  fa lling  w ith in  the 
scope o f Sec. 1981 is invalid  sim ply because such activ­
ity  m ay resu lt in  a d ispara te  im pact on m inorities.

I t  is fu rth e r urged th a t C ongress in tended  in enacting  
Sec. 1981 to  elim inate the “badges and  incidents” 
o f slavery, and  th a t the m inorities’ fa ilu re  to  do well 
on certa in  tests is an u n fo rtu n a te  byp roduc t of th e ir 
prev ious condition  of slavery and  subsequent d iscrim ina­
tory  trea tm en t. Such an argum ent suffers, how ever,

224



•7

from  the  fac t th a t it is lim ited  to  b lacks w ho w ere 
the only m inority  held  in  slavery, w hereas Sec. 1981 
has been relied  upon  by o th er m inorities (a s  is the 
case h e re in ) , as w ell as w hites fo r re lief from  purposefu l 
d iscrim ination .

T h e  1866 A ct w as d irec ted  tow ard  p rovid ing  equal 
civil rights and  u n d er the  law  and  insuring  a  n eu tra l 
process, devoid of d iscrim inato ry  in ten t. I t  w as no t in ­
ten d ed  to  invalidate  a n eu tra l p rac tice  sim ply because it 
h ad  a  d isp roportionate  im pact.1 Takahashi v. Fish & 
Game Commission, 334  U .S. 410  (1 9 4 8 )  is n o t incon­
sisten t w ith  Washington v. Davis and  canno t, in  any 
w ay, be  in te rp re ted  to  su p p o rt responden ts’ position . In  
fact, the  decision  confirm s the close re la tionsh ip  betw een 
Sec. 1981 and  the  14th A m endm ent as equal p ro tec tion  
sta tu tes. T h e  s ta tu te  th a t was s truck  dow n in Takahashi 
w as n o t a t all n eu tra l on its face as it specifically 
b a rred  aliens from  obtain ing  a C alifo rn ia  com m ercial 
fish ing  license. In  add ition  to  holding th a t the  sta tu te  
conflic ted  w ith  federa l suprem acy in  regu la ting  im m igra­
tion , the  Suprem e C o u rt found  th a t aliens w ere “p e r­
sons” w ith in  the p ro tec tio n  of Sec. 1981 and  the 14th 
A m endm en t an d  th a t the sta te  could  no t b a r  aliens from  
pursu ing  a certa in  occupation  while perm itting  citizens 
to  do so. In  d iscussing the app lica tion  of Sec. 1981 *

JThe Supreme Court recognized the close affinity between 
Sec. 1981 and the 14th Amendment in Buchanan v. Warley, 
245 U.S. 60 (1917), and Hurd v. Hodge, 68 S.Ct. 847 (1948). 
The Court in noting in Hurd that Sec. 1981 and the 14th 
Amendment were expressions of the same general congressional 
policy, quoted from the remarks of Representative Thayer that 
the 14th Amendment was intended to incorporate “the principles 
of the civil rights bill (Act of 1866) which has recently become 
the law.” Hurd v. Hodge, supra at 852, N.13. It is clear 
that Congress was contemplating the same standard of liability 
for both enactments.

225



— 8—

an d  the  14th A m endm ent to  the case, the  m ajo rity
stated:

“T h e  p ro tec tio n  of this section has been held  
to ex tend  to  aliens as well as to  citizens. C onse­
quently  the section and  the F o u rteen th  A m endm ent 
on w hich it rests in  p a r t p ro tec t ‘all persons’ 
against s ta te  legislation  b earing  unequally  upon  
them  e ither because o f alienage o r color. See Hurd 
v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 68 S.C t. Sec. 847. T he 
F o u rteen th  A m endm ent an d  the law s adop ted  
u n d er its au tho rity  thus em body a  general policy 
th a t all persons law fully  in this coun try  shall abide 
‘in any state’ on an equality of legal, privileges 
with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws.” 
Id., a t 419-420 .

B, Effect of the 1964 Enactment of Title VIL 
U nlike m any of th e ir amici, the respondents do no t 

lean  heavily  upon  the theory  th a t C ongress in enacting  
Sec. 1981 in tended  to  im pose a d ispara te  im pact stand- 
d a rd  devoid of any  in ten t requ irem en t on all public 
and  p rivate  actions cognizable u n d er th a t section. A p ­
paren tly  recognizing th a t such a b ro ad  in te rp re ta tio n  
is unsupported  by legislative h isto ry  and  w ould  ru n  
co u n te r to  the concern  expressed by  the C o u rt in 
Washington v. Davis, the respondents advance a m ore 
lim ited  construction-— to  wit, th a t Sec. 1981 should  
be construed  as to  transpose T itle  V II’s d ispara te  
im pact standards only as to  em ploym ent cases.

T h e ir argum ent m ay be sum m arized  as follows: Since 
T itle  V II  and  Sec. 1981 are bo th  in tended  to  proscribe 
d iscrim ination , the sta tu tes should  be construed  to ­
gether. T hus, it is urged, th a t by applying the doctrine 
of in pari materia the C o u rt should  find  th a t C ongress 
in  enacting  T itle  V II in  1964 thereby  ex tended  T itle

226



— 9—

V II standards to  the century-old  p redecessor Sec. 1981, 
b u t only in the employment context. T herefo re , since 
the  effective date  of the  1964 C ivil R ights A c t (Ju ly  
2 , 1 9 6 5 ), d isp ara te  im pact is also the s tan d ard  u n d er 
Sec. 1981, an d  since the coun ty ’s d isp roportionate  h ir­
ing  took  p lace a fte r 1965 b u t befo re  M arch  24, 1972, 
liab ility  can  be sustained  u n d er Sec. 1981 despite the 
fac t th a t the tria l co u rt found  no  d iscrim inatory  in ten t 
p resen t.

T h ere  are  substan tia l flaw s in  this line of reasoning. 
F o r  one, there  is sim ply no  ind ica tion  in  the congres­
sional debates a tten d an t to  the enactm en t of T itle  V II 
th a t C ongress in tended  in  any w ay to  change the s tan d ­
a rd  of liab ility  u n d er Sec. 1981. In  fact, C ongress 
recognized th a t Sec. 1981 w as a separa te  and  d istinct 
s ta tu te  th a t w as n o t to  be affected  by T itle  V II  (John­
son v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U .S. 454  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ) .  
C ongress could  n o t have in tended  the conciliation  and  
ju risd ic tiona l adm inistra tive and  p rocedura l req u ire ­
m ents of T itle  V II , so laboriously  and  com prehensively 
debated , to  be, a t the sam e tim e, rendered  circum ven- 
tab le  by ex tending  T itle  V II  s tandards to  Sec. 1981. 
E xpansion  of T itle  V II standards to  Sec. 1981 should 
n o t be accom plished w ithou t th e  express ac tion  of 
C ongress th rough  the legislative process, w here the 
represen ta tives will have the fu ll opportun ity  to  debate  
and  consider the  im pact and  consequence of such ac tion  
on  T itle  V II  procedures.

T h e  term s of Sec. 1981 do no t p rovide fo r separate 
or special trea tm en t of em ploym ent cases, n o r is there 
any language in the 1964 C ivil R ights A ct th a t w ould 
am end  Sec. 1981 to  selectively apply  T itle  V II em ploy­
m ent standards. T he fac t th a t the tw o statu tes m ay 
be d irected  tow ard  the sam e ends and  thus, to  a certain  
ex ten t overlap  in  coverage, as is the case also w ith 227



■10—

the C onstitu tion , does no t p rovide the basis fo r  a b ro ad  
hold ing  th a t in  1964 C ongress in tended  to m ake sub­
stan tive changes to  liability  s tandards under Sec. 1981.

T h e  m ost fun d am en ta l e rro r in responden ts’ hypo th ­
esis, how ever, is th a t it overlooks the fac t th a t C o n ­
gress in  1964 m anifestly  in tended  no t to  ex tend  T itle  
V II to  public  em ployers such as the  petitioners, as 
the A c t expressly excluded such em ployers from  its 
coverage.2 B ecause C ongress did  no t in tend  to  apply 
T itle  V II  to  public  em ployers un til 1972, it m ust 
follow  th a t it  d id  n o t desire do so ind irectly  th rough  
Sec. 1981. C ongress’s express exclusion of public agen­
cies from  T itle  V II  coverage disposes of the argum ents 
u rg ing  the  harm oniz ing  of Sec. 1981 w ith T itle  V II 
ra th e r  th an  the C onstitu tio n  and  the 14th A m endm ent 
th rough  the in pari materia doctrine , applying T itle  
V II  s tandards to  Sec. 1981 th rough  Sec. 1988, o r  
th a t C ongress in  enacting  T itle  V II determ ined  w hat 
prac tices constitu ted  a “badge or inc iden t” of slavery. 
A t least, as fa r  as public em ployers are  concerned, 
th e ir express exclusion from  T itle  V II coverage in  
1964 rebuts the con ten tion  th a t C ongress, a t th a t tim e, 
in tended  to  am end Sec. 1981 so as to  keep pace 
w ith con tem porary  T itle  V II developm ents.

E xpansion  of the d ispara te  im pact s tan d ard  beyond 
areas w here it is a lready  specifically m ade applicable 
by s ta tu te  should  no t be done w ithou t legislative action . 
Sec. 1988 does no t p rovide support fo r responden ts’ 
con ten tion . Sec. 1988 provides th a t ju risd iction  “shall 
be exercised  and  enforced  in  conform ity  w ith  the laws 
of the U nited  S tates . . .  so fa r as the sam e is no t con-

2As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII (42 U.S.C. §2000e 
(b ) ) provided “but such item does not include . . .  a state 
or political subdivision of a state. .. .”

228



_ 1  I n ­

sistent w ith the C onstitu tion  and  the  laws of the  U nited  
S tates . , Since p rio r to  1972, T itle  V II provided 
th a t it was inapp licab le  to  public em ployers, the tran sp o ­
sition  of the d ispara te  im pact standards of T itle  V II to 
a Sec. 1981 su it against a public  entity  fo r acts oc­
curring  p rio r  to  1972 w ould  be inconsisten t w ith  the 
law s of the U nited  States.

C. Effect on Decisions in Teamsters and Hazelwood.
T he responden ts suggest th a t the C o u rt’s ru ling  in 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 
U .S. 324  (1 9 7 7 ) ,  uphold ing  a b o n a  fide seniority  sys­
tem  u n d er T itle  V II w ould be jeopard ized  by recogniz­
ing  an  in ten t s tan d ard  un d er Sec. 1981. In  fac t, only 
a  ru ling  th a t d isp ara te  im pact T itle  V II standards do 
n o t apply  to  Sec. 1981, will p reserve the d istinction  
in  the Teamsters and  Hazelwood cases betw een pre- 
and  p ost-T itle  V II h iring  p ractices and  the scope of 
rem edies a tten d an t to  a T itle  V II v io lation .

R esponden ts e rr in claim ing  th a t unless T itle  V II 
standards are  read  in to  Sec. 1981, the B F O Q  re tirem ent 
exem ption un d er Sec. 7 0 3 (h )  of T itle  V II w ill no t 
be p reserved  as it can  be challenged u n d er Sec. 1981 
because they were in ten tiona lly  d iscrim inatory . T he 
responden ts argue from  a false prem ise; th a t is, th a t 
the C o u rt in tended  u n d er Sec. 7 0 3 (h )  to  approve all 
sen iority  system s, even those th a t w ere purposely  d is­
crim inatory . N oth ing  could  be fu rth e r from  the tru th .

T h e  seniority  system  approved  in  Teamsters was 
n o t in ten tiona lly  d iscrim inatory— it w as the h iring  p ra c ­
tices th a t w ere found  to  be  in ten tionally  d iscrim inatory . 
In  fact, the seniority  system  upheld  w as racially  neutral, 
n o t c rea ted  fo r d iscrim inatory  purposes bu t w ith a 
p resen t d iscrim inatory  im pact only because of previous 
h iring  d iscrim ination .

229



— 1 2 -

R esponden ts’ e rro r is m ade ap p a ren t by the p la in  
language of the Sec. 7 0 3 ( h )  exem ption w hich by its 
term s is applicab le only to  b o n a  fide seniority  system s 
th a t “are  no t the resu lt of an  in ten tion  to  d iscrim inate 
because of race  o r  na tio n a l o rig in .” International Broth­
erhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 97 S.C t. 1843. T h e  C o u rt 
n o ted  in Teamsters th a t “the sen iority  system  in this 
case is entirely  b o n a  fide. I t  applies equally  to  all 
races and  ethnic groups. . . .  I t  is conceded th a t the 
sen iority  system  d id  n o t have its genesis in  rac ia l dis­
crim ination , an d  th a t it w as nego tia ted  and  has been 
m ain ta in ed  free from  any illegal p u rp o se .” Id. a t 1865.

T here is sim ply no  reason  to  ex tend  T itle  V II  s tan d ­
ards to  Sec. 1981 in  o rd e r to  preserve the  legality 
of a bo n a fide sen iority  system .3 T h e  recogn ition  of 
an  in ten t requ irem ent u n d er Sec. 1981 w ould  suffice. 
If  the system  was c rea ted  o r adm inistered  w ith  a d is­
crim inato ry  purpose, it should  be struck  dow n as it 
deserves, and  this can  be done u n d er Sec. 1981 as 
well as T itle  V II.

I I
Quota Order.

I t  has been contended  by a few of the amici, b u t 
n o t respondents, th a t the judgm ent and  the q u o ta  h iring  
o rd e r are  independently  sustainab le  un d er T itle  V II. 8

8The 4th Circuit in Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 
575 F.2d 471, while reaching the correct result, failed to 
note the factual distinction observed by this Court in Teamsters 
between previous discriminatory hiring and a neutral seniority 
system that had a disproportionate impact in application; that 
is, the distinction between deliberate discriminatory intent and 
mere disproportionate consequences. The circuit court was cor­
rect in finding that employment practices legal under Title 
VII could not be illegal under Sec. 1981, not because the 
Sec. 703(h) exemption has to be read into Sec. 1981, but 
because there was no discriminatory intent in the administra­
tion of the system.

230



13—

These con ten tions are based on various theories such 
as b ad  repu ta tio n , existing rac ia l im balance, an d  the 
uneffec tuated  p roposa l to  in itially  in terview  the to p  544 
cand ida tes tak ing  the 1971 exam ination . T he con ten tion  
is com pletely  w ithou t m erit.

Sim ply sta ted , the uneffec tuated  in ten t to  interview  
the to p  544  cand idates did  n o t rise to  the level of a 
T itle  V II v io lation . M ore significantly, how ever, the 
un im plem ented  p ro p o sa l and  the p resum ed th rea t can  
affo rd  no bases w hatsoever fo r the sw eeping q uo ta  
o rd e r en tered  in  this case as it bears no  re la tionsh ip  
to  the w rong. A s Judge W allace in  dissent no ted , 
it  n e ither aggravated  n o r p erp e tu a ted  d iscrim ination  and  
p lain tiffs conceded th a t it h ad  no  effects (A . 1 1 8 ).

T he q u o ta  o rd e r requ iring  h iring  in  accordance w ith 
set num erica l ra tios un til the en tire  departm en t achieved 
rac ia l p arity  w as solely designed as a rem edy fo r p re ­
sum ed p ast d iscrim inato ry  p ractices occurring  p rio r  to 
the effective d ate  in  1972 of T itle  V II, un restric ted  in 
any w ay by  the  rem oteness of the em ploym ent practices. 
T herefo re , a  finding of a v io lation  of Sec. 1981 was 
an  indispensable p red ica te  to  the quo te  rem edy. A  
T itle  V II v io lation , as respondents concur, w ould no t 
sustain  the sw eeping q uo ta  o rd e r im posed upon the 
petitioners. E ven  in  the presence of a v io lation  of 
Sec. 1981, the p a rticu la r o rder en tered  in this case 
exceeded the ex ten t of the v io lations proven, an d  was 
n o t in any  w ay ta ilo red  to  the w rong established.

T he lim itations of Section 7 0 3 ( j )  are no t restric ted  
to  rac ia l im balance caused  only by nond iscrim inato ry  
p ractices occuring  p rio r to  T itle  V II (Franks v. Bow­
man, 424  U.S. 747 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) .  O therw ise, an  em ployer 
w ho d iscrim inated  p rio r to  the effective date  of T itle  V II

231



14—

b u t w ho h ad  no t d iscrim inated  subsequently , w ould  be 
subject to  a  q u o ta  o rd e r sim ply as a consequence of the 
rac ia l im balance  in  his w ork  force. E ven  assum ing a 
token  T itle  V II v io lation  because of pe titioners’ uneffec­
tu a ted  in ten t to  initially  in terview  the top  544 app lican ts 
tak ing  the 1971 w ritten  exam , Section 703 ( j )  w ould  
p rec lude  the issuance of a  q u o ta  o rd e r m erely to  cure 
the existing rac ia l im balance of the  departm en t.

T h e  C oun ty  challenged the  responden ts’ attem pts 
to  o b ta in  a  sw eeping q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r from  the incep­
tion  of the  law suit (see D efen d an ts’ A nsw er to  Second 
A m ended  C om pla in t [C .T . 4 2 ] ,  an d  D efendan ts’ T ria l 
B rief [C .T . 1 1 9 ] ) .  I t  w as one of the p rin c ip a l g rounds 
up o n  w hich petitioners appealed  the judgm en t to  the 
c ircu it court. M oreover, represen tatives from  the C ounty  
F ire  D epartm en t, as well as the C oun ty ’s D irec to r 
o f P ersonnel, testified  th a t they opposed  a q u o ta  h iring  
o rd e r because it w ould  be in im ical to  the  operations 
of the departm en t.

T h e  amici e rroneously  assum e th a t the q u o ta  o rd e r 
im posed is sustainable  solely u n d er T itle  V II. T he 
n a tu re  o f an  em ployer’s rep u ta tio n  is no t sufficient to  
constitu te  a v io lation  of T itle  V II  o r  justify  a q u o ta  
o rder. U n d er this theory  o f som e amici, an  em ployer 
w ho d iscrim inated  p rio r to  the effective d ate  of T itle  
V II w ould  apparen tly  be subject to a  q u o ta  o rd e r soon 
a f te r th a t da te  sim ply because of a “b ad  rep u ta tio n ,” 
even if he h ad  n o t engaged in  any subsequent d iscrim ­
in a to ry  hiring.

I t  is im proper to  justify  a q u o ta  o rd e r to  co rrec t 
rac ia l im balance by sim ply characteriz ing  such im bal­
ance as the “effect of past d iscrim ination” o r the result 
o f a “bad  rep u ta tio n ” . R ac ia l im balance can  exist quite

232



— IS

independently of any actions tak en  by  an  em ployer 
subsequent to  the effective date  of T itle  V II. M oreover, 
such a theory  oblite rates stand ing  requirem ents o r  s ta t­
u te of lim ita tions’ considera tions,4 * as a p lain tiff could  
m erely p o in t to  an  existing rac ia l im balance  and  trace 
it back  to  som e p ast d iscrim inato ry  p rac tice  no  m atte r 
how  rem ote in  tim e, o r  ineffective as fa r  as the  
ind iv idual p la in tiff is concerned.

T h e  q uo ta  h iring  decree in Teamsters does n o t lend 
support to  responden ts’ efforts to  sustain  the q u o ta  
o rd e r in  this case, as the o rd e r in Teamsters w as p a r t 
o f a  consen t decree th a t w as n o t challenged on  appeal. 
In  addition , it w as p red ica ted  upon  the find ing  of ac­
tionab le  d iscrim ination  w hich petitioners assert does 
n o t exist in  the case a t bar.

T he responden ts’ argum ents in  support o f the q u o ta  
o rd e r overlook  the fac t th a t it is n o t m erely  the d ep a rt­
m en t th a t has been affected  by such an  order, b u t all 
p resen t and  fu tu re  applican ts w ho are n o t m em bers 
o f the ethnic g roup  th a t are the beneficiaries o f the 
num erical quotas. A pp lican ts w ho are  w hite o r  o f o ther 
m ino rity  groups, have h ad  the ir em ploym ent o p p o rtu n i­
ties severely restric ted  solely because of th e ir  race, 
a  circum stance w hich this C o u rt m ost recently  ad ­
dressed. Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 157 L .E d .2 d  ....... (1 9 7 8 ) .

4The fact that a quota is considered an equitable remedy
does not justify ignoring statute of limitations and standing 
requirements, particularly when, as this case illustrates, the hiring 
preference benefits future black and Mexican-American appli­
cants who have not been the victims of discrimination to the 
detriment of innocent non-minority applicants.



— 16

I I I
The Petition for Certiorari Was Not Improvidently 

Granted; The Case Should Be Retained for Resolu­
tion of Important Federal Issues.

A  few amici an d  the G overnm ent have argued  th a t 
the C o u rt im prov iden tly  g ran ted  ce rtio ra ri o n  e ither 
the Sec. 1981 o r the q u o ta  issue, o r  bo th . A t the 
sam e tim e, how ever, they stress the im portance  of 
the issues before the C o u rt on  ce rtio ra ri.5 I t  is signifi­
can t th a t the respondents have n o t ra ised  these co n ­
ten tions as they  recognize fo r the reasons set fo rth  
below , th a t the  issues are rip e  fo r consideration , the 
reso lu tion  of w hich affects n o t only the v ita l in terests 
of the parties, b u t involve federa l issues of extrem e 
im portance  and  ones of first im pression. T he argum ent 
th a t ce rtio ra ri w as im providently  g ran ted  m isconstrues 
th e  facts, the  ho ld ing  of the circu it court, an d  m ore 
im portan tly , acts to  com pound  confusion  in  the law  
by  counselling  unnecessary  delay in  the jud icial reso lu ­
tion  of a critica l and  p a ram o u n t federa l issue.

T h e  c ircu it cou rt em phatica lly  held  th a t T itle  V II 
standards are applicab le to  Sec. 1981 (A . 8 9 ) , and  
th a t the defendan ts v io lated  Sec. 1981 by utilizing  an  
unvalida ted  test th a t had  a d ispara te  im pact on m inori­
ties even though  there  was no  purposefu l in ten t to 
d iscrim inate (A . 8 9 -9 0 ). T he opin ion  sta ted  concisely, 

“In  sum m ary, we believe the  d istric t co u rt p roperly  
found  the defendan ts’ use of the  1972 w ritten  
exam ina tion  as a selective device, a v io lation  of 
Sec. 1981 .” 6

6Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (“This 
case presents a narrow, but exceedingly important issue”. A.C. 
Br. 6.)

234



17—

M oreover, despite this lack  of discrim inator} ' in ten t, 
the C o u rt also held  th a t the p re -1 9 7 2  use of the 51" 
height s tan d ard  also v io lated  Sec. 1981.

T he C o u rt’s app roval o f the q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r neces­
sarily  h ad  to  be p red ica ted  solely u p o n  a Sec. 1981 
v io la tion  theory  because there  w as no  d iscrim inatory  
h iring  afte r T itle  V II becam e effective to  the  C ounty  
of L os A ngeles. T h e  G overnm ent co rrec tly  observed 
in  th e ir brief th a t the C oun ty  of L os A ngeles h ad  
n o t h ired  anyone on th e  basis o f the  d iscrim inatory  
exam ination  afte r the effective date  of T itle  V II  (B r. 
9 ) ,  stating ,

“N o one (inc lud ing  the p la in tiffs) had  ac tually  
suffered  d iscrim inato ry  trea tm en t since the p la in ­
tiffs becam e app lican ts in  O ctober, 1971 ” (B r 
1 8 ).

U nlike m any of the amici w hose know ledge of the 
facts is lim ited  by their lack  of in tim acy  w ith the 
case, the respondents recognize the Sec. 1981 issue 
as being app rop ria te ly  before the C o u rt and  pressing 
fo r reso lu tion  in o rd e r to  determ ine bo th  the validity  
of the q u o ta  o rd e r and  the finding of liability. M o re ­
over, the respondents agree th a t the q u o ta  o rd e r af­
firm ed by the appella te  co u rt necessarily  h ad  to  rely  
upon  a find ing  th a t Sec. 1981 h ad  been violated.

“P lain tiffs agree th a t the rem edial h iring  o rder 
herein  was based  upon a p a tte rn  and  p rac tice  
of d iscrim inato ry  p ractices th a t w ere unlaw ful 
only un d er Sec. 1981, no t T itle  V II .” (B r in 
O pp. 2 9 ) .

T h e  q uo ta  o rd e r approved  by the circu it cou rt was 
en tered  clearly  fo r the sole purpose of e rad ica ting  effects

235



18—

of p resum ed  p as t d iscrim ination .6 * 8 Such discrim ination , 
if any, could  only have occu rred  w hen Sec. 1981, 
n o t T itle  V II, was app licab le  to  petitioners. T h e  C o u rt 
fu rth e r n o ted  th a t re lief under T itle  V II  is d irectly  
app licab le  to  Sec. 1981 and  saw no  reason  to  lim it 
Sec. 1981 relief. T hus a  justic iab le  controversy  exists 
as to  Sec. 1981 as well as the quo ta .

T h e  circu it co u rt’s affirm ance of the q u o ta  o rd e r 
(consisten tly  challenged  by the petitioners in  all p ro ­
ceedings below ) necessarily  requires a  determ ina tion  
of the valid ity  of the  find ing  of liab ility  fo r  p re-T itle  
V II  conduc t u n d er Sec. 1981. If pu rposefu l in ten t 
is the s tan d ard  u n d er Sec. 1981, then  un d er the fin d ­
ings of the tria l co u rt the petitioners have n o t vio­
la ted  th a t sta tu te , an d  the  c ircu it could  h ad  no  a lte r­
native except to  vacate  the q u o ta  order, because i t  has 
been recognized  by all th a t no  d iscrim inato ry  h iring  has 
occu rred  afte r T itle  V II becam e effective. D espite p e ti­
tioners’ u rg ing  th a t the q u o ta  o rd e r exceeded the tria l 
co u rt’s ju risd iction , the  circu it cou rt upheld  the validity  
o f the  o rd e r m erely rem and ing  the case fo r  reconsidera­
tion  o f precise num erical ra tios (b u t no t the u ltim ate  
goal of rac ia l p a r ity )  in  ligh t of the  co u rt’s rulings 
on  height and  standing, the  c lea r im plication  being 
th a t n o t only  w as a q u o ta  o rd e r valid, bu t th a t the 
tria l co u rt could  even increase the q u o ta  because of 
the  ru ling  on  height. T he petitioners urged befo re  the 
c ircu it co u rt as well as the  Suprem e C o u rt th a t any 
q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r w ould be illegal in the absence of 
a  v io lation  of Sec. 1981. I t  is qu ite  apparen t, how ever,

6In their brief, the respondents state,
“Indeed, the district court’s basic liability holdings and
relief afforded all were based on ‘past’ discrimination.” 
(R. Br. 42).

236



th a t the  circu it co u rt expressly approved  the existing 
q u o ta  o rder, stating,

“W e do n o t necessarily  believe th a t a  1-1-3 ra tio  
was in co rrec t.” (A . 9 6 ) ,

an d  fu rther,
“W e believe the d istric t co u rt was w holly justified  
in  decid ing  to  im pose affirm ative h iring  o rders 
upon  the defendan ts.” (A . 9 7 ) .

In  F o o tn o te  20 the c ircu it co u rt s ta ted  th a t they 
did  n o t read  United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 
553 (1 9 7 7 ) ,  as in  any  w ay restric ting  the affirm ative 
q u o ta  o rder. In  United Air Lines th is C o u rt ru led  
th a t p a s t d iscrim inato ry  practices, no t the subject 
of a tim ely com plain t, w ere n o t independently  ac tion­
able. T h is foo tno te  to  the m ajo rity  op in ion  below  in d i­
ca tes th a t the  circu it co u rt believed th a t a quo ta  o rd e r 
could  be  issued to  p rovide a rem edy to  past discrim ina- 
tees, even those th a t h ad  n o t tim ely filed  claim s o r in ­
stitu ted  a law suit, w hich on  the  facts o f this case could 
only have occurred  before T itle  V II becam e applicable 
to  the  petitioners.

T he argum ent th a t consideration  of the valid ity  of 
the  q uo ta  o rd e r u n d er Sec. 1981 is n o t necessary  be­
cause the  o rd e r can  be sustained  u n d er T itle  V II is 
sim ply no t co rrec t in  light o f the  facts ind icating  no  
d iscrim inato ry  h iring  afte r the effective date  of T itle  
V II. M oreover, as the respondents agree, the circu it 
co u rt approved  the q uo ta  o rder based on a presum ed 
v io lation  of Sec. 1981. T hus, reso lu tion  of the app ro p ri­
a te  s tan d ard  of liability  under Sec. 1981 is ripe fo r 
consideration  and  p roperly  before the C ourt.

R em anding  the case w ithou t review  w ould  delay 
reso lu tion  of a federal issue of g rea t im portance  affect­

— 19—

237



•20-

ing  m any  pend ing  cases involving public  em ployers and  
deprive the parties of m eaningfu l ju d ic ia l review , p a r tic ­
u larly  since the  q u o ta  o rd e r continues to  be  oper­
able. A ny fu rth e r delay  in  reso lu tion  of the legal issue 
only increases the  period  of tim e th a t hires are m ade 
p u rsu an t to  w hat petitioners con tend  is an  illegal q u o ta  
o rd e r in  excess of the d istric t co u rt’s ju risd iction , n o t 
only adversely affecting  the C oun ty  of L os A ngeles as a 
public em ployer, bu t perhaps m ore  significantly , those 
app lican ts no t the beneficiaries of the  q u o ta  o rd e r 
w ho are refused em ploym ent solely because of their 
race. If  Sec. 1981 requires a show ing of deliberate 
in ten t, the q u o ta  o rd e r has been utilized over the past 
five years to  im properly  exclude w hites and  o thers 
from  em ploym ent.7

A n o th e r com pelling  reason  fo r im m edia te  reso lu tion  
of the issues is b ro ach ed  by  the rep resen ta tion  in  re ­
sponden ts’ b rief (p . 4 2 )  th a t they  in tend  to  seek leave 
o f co u rt to  expand  the class to  include p rio r applican ts; 
i.e., those th a t applied  only w hen Sec. 1981 was 
applicable , and  upon  th a t basis p reserve the quo ta  
h iring  o rd e r (a  suggestion also m ade by the L aw yers’ 
C om m ittee fo r Civil R ights as amicus curiae. [B r. 
10, N .4 j ) .  T his clearly indicates the ripeness of the 
Sec. 1981 issue fo r consideration .

The NAACP in reliance on statements of fact that appear 
absolutely nowhere in the record, gratuitously advance the novel 
theory that the petitioners have not been hiring under compulsion 
of the quota order since it was entered in 1973. This contention 
is not only irrelevant to the issue of the validity of the quota 
order, but is simply not correct. The amicus’ factual representa­
tion itself describes a quota when it states that all applicants 
are reduced down to three groups of whites, blacks and Mexican- 
Americans in exact proportion to the 1-1-3 hiring order (Br. 
6 ).

238



—21

O ne can n o t leave th is issue w ithou t com m ent upon  
the position  of the G overnm ent. In  the ir b rief, the 
G overnm ent clearly  recognized the lack  of any  dis­
crim inato ry  h iring  subsequen t to  the  effective d a te  of 
T itle  V II  an d  quite  candid ly  observed th a t as of this 
m om ent the  q u o ta  h iring  o rd e r has becom e excessive, 
no tin g  th a t the  C o u n ty ’s h iring  reco rd  in  the  last 5Vz 
years has been  exem plary. N one of the  nam ed  plain tiffs 
had  suffered  d iscrim inato ry  trea tm en t since they becam e 
app lican ts in  O ctober, 1971, p rio r to  the effective date  
of T itle  V II, and  the G overnm ent ind icates th a t the 
need  fo r the q u o ta  o rd e r has now  evaporated .

N ow here does the  G overnm en t suggest th a t they 
d isagree w ith the petitioners’ con ten tion  th a t Sec. 1981 
requires a show ing of d iscrim inato ry  in ten t. W hile p e ti­
tioners app recia te  their recogn ition  th a t the q u o ta  o rder 
is excessive, the G o vernm en t’s reason  fo r vacating  the 
o rd e r g ran ting  ce rtio ra ri on  the speculative basis th a t 
the C o u rt below  m ay term inate  the o rd e r entirely , is 
an  unrealistic  as it is insubstan tia l. T he tria l co u rt’s 
o rd e r w as to  engage in  p re feren tia l h iring  of b lacks 
an d  M exican-A m ericans un til ra c ia l p arity  w as achieved 
w ith  the general com m unity. T he circu it court approved 
this o rder, ind icating  only a desire fo r the tria l court 
to  reconsider the precise ra tio  of hiring, no t the final 
m an d ate  of rac ia l parity  fo r bo th  groups. T he G overn ­
m en t position , how ever, does highlight the unfairness 
of such an  o rd e r if petitioners are correc t in their 
con ten tion  th a t T itle  V II s tandards are no t applicable 
to  actions under Sec. 1981.

V arious amici have ind icated  the im portance of the 
issues before the C o u rt and  the G overnm ent has p ro ­
fessed a desire to  see the law  in this a rea  clarified 
and  to  have the C o u rt arrive a t a co rrec t construction

239



- 2 2 -

of Sec. 1981. T hus, the position  of the G overnm ent in  
seeking to  delay  resolution  of this issue is inexplicab le .8 
R ecently , in  o th er em ploym ent d iscrim ination  cases, the 
G overnm en t’s co n trib u tio n  has been lim ited to  suggest­
ing  th a t the C o u rt delay reso lu tion  of the  issues by 
declin ing o r lim iting  review. R a th e r th an  tak e  a position  
on  the  m erits, the G overnm en t’s efforts have been d i­
rec ted  tow ard  seeking delay  p rem ised  on tchnical, and  
in  the in s tan t case, ill-conceived grounds. W hile they do 
n o t ind ica te  w hich case w ould  be ap p ro p ria te  to  decide 
the  Sec. 1981 issue, they in tim ate  th a t tw o pending 
circu it co u rt cases are n o t the ones (see  Br. 20, N .1 2 ) . 
I t  is subm itted  th a t such a position  is un justified  in  
view of:

1) T h e  need to  resolve a pressing  federa l issue 
of g rea t n a tio n a l im portance , an  issue up o n  w hich 
m ore an d  m ore low er courts are tak ing  a position  
co n tra ry  to  th a t o f the N in th  C ircu it,8 and

8This is particularly so because if disparate impact is the 
standard under Sec. 1981, then the federal government, as 
well as certain agencies exempt under Title VII, would have 
engaged in illegal employment practices by utilizing civil service 
exams having a disparate impact prior to 1972.

Subsequent to the grant of certiorari, herein, the Fifth 
Circuit specifically held that a claimant under Sec. 1981 must 
show purposeful discrimination and that Title VII standards 
did not apply.

“PER CURIAM: Upon motion for rehearing a majority
of the court agrees with Judge Clark’s special concurring 
opinion. The opinion is accordingly modified to hold that 
under the teaching of Washington v. Davis, 426 US. 
229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the named 
plaintiff and the class must make a showing of purposeful 
discrimination before casting the burden on the defendant 
to rebut the charge; that a claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, dealt with by the court in Washington, rather 
than under Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportu­
nity Act.” Williams v. DeKalb County, et al„ (5th C.A. 
Oct. 10, 1978) 18 EPD Cases 518646. Accord: Guardians 
Assoc, v. Civil Service Commission, U.S.D.C., SDNY 
(1977) recently reported in 18 FEP Cases 63.240



— 23—

2 )  T he obvious p re jud ice no t only to  the  parties, 
b u t to  p o ten tia l app lican ts resu lting  from  refusal to  
ad jud ica te  a pressing legal issue w hile a  q u o ta  o rder 
rem ains in  effect.

T he G overnm en t’s analysis of the  sta tus of the  q u o ta  
o rd e r is as faulty , as is their assum ption th a t the 
judgm ent and  q u o ta  o rd e r are  independently  sus­
ta inab le  un d er T itle  V II. A s discussed earlie r the 
q u o ta  o rd e r w as im posed as a rem edy fo r  presum ed 
p ast d iscrim ination  th a t could  only have tak en  p lace 
w hen Sec. 1981, no t T itle  V II, w as applicab le to  p e ti­
tioners. T he G overnm ent adm its th a t re liance on  Sec. 
1981 w as necessary  in the  first decision of the circu it 
co u rt (B r. 13) bu t, som ehow , w ithou t a change in  the 
facts they con tend  it is no t necessary  in  the second 
decision. T he conten tions ra ised  in  the  petition  fo r 
ce rtio ra ri involved the  app ropriateness of the rem edy 
(q u o ta  o rd e r) , as w ell as the  s tan d ard  fo r liability . 
T h e  c ircu it cou rt specifically  approved  the  valid ity  of 
a q uo ta  o rder in  general in  this case, as well as the 
specific one im posed by the d istric t court.

IV
The Evidence Sustains the District Court’s Finding of 

No Intentional Discrimination; the Issues of Law 
Must Be Resolved in Accordance With the Estab­
lished Findings in the Record.

R espondents a ttem pt to  evade the findings below  
up o n  w hich certio ra ri was gran ted , and  m ost in ap p ro ­
p ria te ly  urge the C o u rt to  find  th a t petitioners engaged 
in  purposefu l d iscrim ination  co n tra ry  to  the findings 
of the tria l court. N o t only is there  no justification  
in  the reco rd  fo r such action , the  a ttem pt m isconstrues 
the ro le  of the n a tio n ’s highest jud icial tribunal: T h e

241



— 2 4 —

C o u rt shou ld  resolve the issues re la ting  to  liab ility  
u n d er §1981 and  the  valid ity  of the q uo ta  o rd e r on  
the basis of the factual reco rd  estab lished  below  w hich 
form s the  p red ica te  fo r reso lu tion  o f the im p o rtan t fed­
era l issues before the  C ourt.

T he p rincip le  th a t the tria l co u rt is in  the best 
position  to  w eigh all evidence, an d  its  findings should  
n o t be reversed unless clearly  erroneous needs no e lab ­
ora tion . I t  is sufficient to  p o in t ou t th a t the finding 
of co u rt w en t beyond m erely  ho ld ing  th a t no  d iscrim ina­
to ry  in ten t existed; bu t affirm atively  fo u n d  th a t “neither 
D efendan ts n o r th e ir officials engaged  in  em ploym ent 
p ractices w ith a  w illful o r  conscious purpose  of exclud­
ing  b lacks and  M exican-A m ericans from  em ploym ent 
a t the  L os A ngeles C oun ty  F ire  D ep artm en t (A . 4 1 ) .  
In  addition , the d istric t co u rt found , to  the  con tra ry , 
th a t pe titio n e r h ad  engaged in  efforts to  increase m ino r­
ity  rep resen ta tion .

T h e  responden ts’ references to  the evidence below  
are  highly selective, ou t of contex t, and  m isleading. 
T h e  reco rd  is replete w ith  evidence th a t com m encing 
befo re  the 1969 exam ination , the C oun ty  m ade sub ­
stan tia l and  in  m any instances creative efforts to hire 
m ore m inorities in to  the fire departm en t. U sing the 
w ritten  exam  to  elim inate only  the low est scoring 3% 
an d  choosing the interview ees by  random  selection w as 
designed to  m axim ize m inority  p artic ip a tio n  in  the em ­
ploym ent process. U n fo rtunate ly  this effort resu lted  in 
a  law suit w hich delayed h iring  un til the C oun ty  was 
p laced  in desperate  need fo r new  firem en w hich p ro m p t­
ed  the p roposa l to  in itially  interview  the top  544  app li­
can ts (R .T . 7 0 ) .

T h e  respondents are incorrec t in  s ta ting  th a t the 
proposal was in tended  to  elim inate from  em ploym ent

242



- 2 5 -
consideration  cand ida tes fa lling  below  544 . T h ere  w as 
no  such in ten tion  as Judge W allace no ted  in  his d is­
sen ting  o p in ion .10 T h e  top  544  w ere to  be initially  
in terview ed only fo r the  lim ited  purpose  o f ob tain ing  
a  n u m b er of recru its  to  alleviate the p resen t personnel 
crises (R .T . 7 2 ) .  A s events transp ired , of course, every 
cand ida te  w as in terview ed an d  n o  p erson  w as h ired  
n o r  a n  eligibility list c rea ted  as a consequence of the 
w ritten  exam ination . M r. N esvig’s rem arks re ferred  to  
the p roposa l to  in terview  the top  544  applican ts, w hich 
never occu rred  an d  w ere m erely a  recogn ition  th a t the 
w ritten  test so u tilized  w ould  have a  d isp roportionate  
im pact upon  m inorities. T h e  petitioners’ affirm ative ac­
tion  efforts, m any of w hich p receded  the  1969 exam ina­
tions, included  h iring  a m inority  recru itm en t firm  (R .T . 
6 2 ) ,  ta rge ted  m ino rity  advertising , including  d istribu tion  
of a b ro ch u re  p rin ted  in  Spanish  (R .T . 63, 8 9 ) ,  in ten ­
sive recru iting  lim ited  to  m ino rity  areas (R .T . 6 3 ) ,  
changes to  the  w ritten  exam ina tion  to  reduce d ispara te  
effect (R .T . 8 2 ) ,  an d  contem plation  of an  exam ination  
lim ited  to  C oun ty  em ployees w here the m inority  rep re­
sen ta tion  w as h igher th an  th a t in  the general popu lation .

C onclusion.

T h e  adverse consequences of transposing  the un ique 
T itle  V II  d ispara te  im pact standards to  §1981 app ear 
overw helm ing. I t  w ould  contravene legislative in ten t, 
invite circum vention  of the T itle  V II conciliation , ju ris­
d ictional and  p roced u ra l requirem ents, and  ex tend  T itle

10“Tbese applicants were not to be ranked on the basis 
of the test results, however, and the interviews were not intended 
to eliminate the remaining applicants from consideration. The 
purpose was solely to expedite the rehiring of sufficient firemen 
to meet the immediate, urgent requirements of the fire depart­
ment.” (Dissent, Wallace J. A. 103).

243



— 26—

V II s tandards to  persons o r  agencies C ongress in tended  
to  exem pt. M oreover, it w ould  app ly  T itle  V II  re tro ac ­
tively to  public agencies co n tra ry  to  the s ta ted  s ta tu to ry  
exclusion in  the  A c t an d  u n d ercu t th is C o u rt’s decisions 
in  Teamsters an d  Hazelwood w hich recognized th e  clear 
d istinc tion  in  trea tm en t betw een pre- and  post-T itle  V II 
h iring  practices. F inally , unless the d ispara te  im pact 
s tan d ard  is lim ited  to  em ploym ent cases u n d er §1981 
( a  lim itation  th a t finds no  sup p o rt o r  justification  
in  the legislative h isto ry  o r  p rio r  jud icial construc tion  
of the  s ta tu te )  the  s ta tu te  could  be applied  to  invalidate  
neu tra lly  designed and  free of rac ia l m otivation , tax , 
w elfare reg u la to ry  an d  licensing sta tu tes, sim ply because 
in  o p era tio n  they  m ay be m ore burdensom e to  som e 
m inorities.

T he recognition  of a  d iscrim inato ry  in ten t s tan d ard  
fo r §1981 is in  h arm ony  w ith  the s tan d ard  app lied  u n d er 
the  C onstitu tion , the  14 th  A m endm en t and  §1982, and  
w ill com port w ith  C ongressional in ten t, p rov ide a un i­
fying ru le  consisten t w ith  jud icial and  s ta tu to ry  p rece­
dent, an d  preserve the in teg rity  of T itle  V II procedures.

R espectfu lly  subm itted ,

J ohn  H. L arson ,
County Counsel,

W illia m  F . Stew a rt ,
Chief, Labor Relations Division,

Attorneys for Petitioners.

N ovem ber, 1978

244



L aw R eprin ts
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