Alexander v. Riga Reply Brief of Cross Appellants

    OFFICE OF THE CLERK

MARCIA M. WALDRON
ACTING CLERK

U n it e d  S t a t e s  C o u r t  of  A ppea ls

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
21400 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE

TELEPHONE

215-597-2995

601 MARKET STREET 
PHILADELPHIA 19106-1790

Date: April 10, 2000

West Publishing Company 
Editorial Department - D3 
610 Opperman Drive 
Eagan, MN 55123

Docket Nos.: 98-3597 & 98-3622 
Re: Alexander v. Riga

Dear Publisher:

Enclosed herewith are corrections to be made to the opinion filed on March 22. 2000. 
in the above-entitled case.

Please acknowledge receipt of same on the enclosed copy.

Thank you for your cooperation.

cc: Lexis
U.S. Law Week 
Commerce Clearing House 
Caroline Mitchell, Esq. 
Timothy P. O’Brien, Esq. 
(Thomas M. Hardiman, Esq. 
(Joseph P. McHugh, Esq. 
Rpbecca K. Troth, Esq. 

--/Charles S. Ralston, Esq.

Very truly yours,
MARCIA M. WALDRON, ACTING CLERK

Lynn M. Caswell
Case Manager
Direct Dial 267-299-4922



UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Nos. 98-3597 & 98-3622 

Alexander v. Riga

The following modifications have been made to the Court's 
O p i n i o n  issued on March 22, 2000, to the above-entitled appeal 
and will appear as part of the final version of the opinion:

Page 8, line 2 o f the cite after the indented quote: please change the year o f 
Simmons to 1991 rather than 1996

Page 8, line 3 o f  the last paragraph: delete the word “plain” after the word 
“committed” and “error”

Line 12 o f same paragraph: delete “Id., see also Bowley V. Stotler, 751 
F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1985)” and insert: Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1078.

Page 11, line 5 o f  the last paragraph: please change the year in the Tyus cite to 
read “ 1996" rather than “ 1997"

Page 13, line 4 o f  the first full paragraph: please insert 98" betw een “89" and 
“(1st Cir. 1999).”

Page 15, line 4 o f  the second lull paragraph: please delete “ , Bonjom o v. Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chern., 752 F.2d 802, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 477 U.S. 908 
(1986).

Page 16, first paragraph after indented cite, line 2: please add “ ----- ” between
“statute” and Bennett v. Spear.

Line 3, o f  same paragraph: please correct cite to read “ 154, 173" rather than
“54".

Line 4 o f  last paragraph: please delete “See” before the cite to Kolstad v. 
American Dental Association

Very truly yours,

7--
/s/ MARCIA M. WALDRON, 

Acting Clerk

Dated: April 10, 2000



Nos. 98-3597; 98-3622

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

RONALD ALEXANDER; FAYE ALEXANDER; FAIR HOUSING 
PARTNERSHIP OF GREATER PITTSBURGH, INC.

Appellants/Cross Appellees,

v.

JOSEPH RIGA; MARIA A. RIGA, 
a/k/a CARLA AGNOTTI,

Appellees/Cross Appellants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Civil Action No. 95-1239

REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANTS

THOMAS M. HARDIMAN 
JOSEPH P. MCHUGH 
Titus & McConomy LLP 
Twentieth Floor 
Four Gateway Center 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
(412) 642-2000
Counsel for Appellees/Cross Appellants



TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...............................................................................  ii

I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................  1

II. ARGUM ENT.............................................................................................. 2

A. The Rigas Did Not Waive Their
Argument That FHP Lacks S tan d in g ........................................... 2

B. This Court Should Not Overrule Its
Recent Decision In Montgomery New spapers............................. 5

C. Evidence Of The Alexanders’ Poor
Credit Was Improperly Excluded .............................................. 11

D. The Trial Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Excluding Evidence
Bearing On The Alexanders’ C redibility ..................................  13

III. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................  15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

i



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1980) .............................................  15

Chauhan v. M. Alfieri Co., Inc.,
897 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1989) .........................................................................  13

Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v.
Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d, 71
(3d Cir. 1998)................................................................................................  1,5-11

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) ................. ..  7

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ..................................... 9

MacDonald v. General Motors Corp.,
110 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1997) ............................................................................  4

Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.,
65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995) .........................................................................  12

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co.,
513 U.S. 352 (1995) ........................................................................................ 11

New York State Nat. Org. for Women v.
Terry, 159 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1998) .................................................................... 4

United States v. Atwell, 766 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) ...............................  14

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............................................................ 6, 7

Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) ........................................ 3-4

ii



CONSTITUTION: Page

Article 111........................................................................................................  1, 6, 13

RULES:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 .............................................................................................  i_4

Fed. R. Evid. 403 .............................................................................................  14-15

Fed. R. Evid. 4 0 4 (b ) ................................................................   13

Fed. R. Evid. 608 .................................................................................. ..  2, 13-15

MISCELLANEOUS:

Adv. Comm. Note to Rule 403 .......................................................................... 15

m



I, INTRODUCTION

Cross-Appellee Fair Housing Partnership of Greater Pittsburgh, Inc. 

("FHP") argues that Cross-Appellants Joseph and Maria Riga (the "Rigas") 

waived their right to challenge FHP’s standing because they failed to raise the 

issue in a motion under Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and because 

they judicially admitted that FHP had standing. Both contentions are incorrect. 

The Rigas raised the issue of standing in their Rule 50 motion. Moreover, 

whether they did so or not is irrelevant to their right to appeal the trial court’s 

earlier denial of summary judgment on that issue. FHP also misconstrues the 

concept of a judicial admission. Counsel for the Rigas made no explicit 

admission of a factual matter. Rather, he gave a qualified answer to a 

hypothetical question about a legal issue.

Without explicitly doing so, FHP asks this Court to overrule its recent 

decision, based on Article III of the Constitution, stating that fair housing 

organizations cannot manufacture standing for themselves by diverting their 

resources to litigation. This Court’s reasoning in Fair Housing Council of 

Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers. 141 F.3d 71 (3d Cir. 

1998), was correct in that case and applies with equal force in the instant case.

Finally, Cross-Appellees Ronald and Faye Alexander (the "Alexanders") 

argue that the Trial Court properly excluded evidence of their bad credit and



properly prohibited cross-examination on matters bearing on their truthfulness. 

The Alexanders mistakenly rely on the inapposite after-acquired evidence 

doctrine pertinent in employment discrimination cases where an employer’s 

motive is at issue. And they assert a concept of prejudice so broad as to 

eviscerate Rule 608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The probative value far 

outweighed any potential prejudice from questions which tended only to 

demonstrate that the Alexanders were untruthful, not that they were evil people.

IL ARGUMENT

A. The Rigas Did Not Waive Their
Argument That FHP Lacks Standing.

FHP argues that the Rigas waived their right to appeal the Trial Court’s 

denial of summary judgment against FHP for lack of standing. Reply Brief of 

Appellants ("Reply Brief") at 22-23. FHP claims first that the Rigas failed to 

raise the issue in their Rule 50 motion and second that the Rigas’ judicially 

admitted standing when their counsel responded to a hypothetical question 

posed by the trial court. IcL For the reasons that follow, both assertions are 

incorrect.

The Rigas raised the issue of FHP’s standing in their Rule 50 motion, 

both at the close of Plaintiffs’ case and at the close of all the evidence. The

2



Rigas’ counsel, Mr. Hardiman, explicitly stated as part of his Rule 50 argument 

at the close of Plaintiffs’ case: "I want the record to be clear, under the 

holdings of the Circuit, the Third Circuit, and not yet ruled on under the DC 

Circuit cases, a fair housing corporation, non-profit, such as the Fair Housing 

Partnership here, cannot confer standing upon itself by getting involved in a 

lawsuit." A1165. At the close of all the evidence, the Rigas renewed their 

motion: "Your Honor, the defendants filed a cross motion pursuant to Rule 

50." A1169. Rather than having another colloquy in which the same 

arguments were repeated, the trial court simply stated: "All right. For the 

reasons I’ve already articulated, both motions are denied." A1169. Thus, the 

arguments made at the close of the Plaintiffs case were renewed by the Rigas 

and again rejected at the close of all evidence.

Moreover, whether the Rigas raised the standing issue in their Rule 50 

motion is irrelevant to whether they may appeal the trial court s denial of their 

standing argument in their summary judgment motion. FHP argues that 

"[fjailure to raise sufficiency of FHP’s standing evidence by Rule 50 motion at 

close of evidence constitutes waiver of the issue." Reply Brief at 23. In

support of this assertion FHP cites Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 

1997). Williams is inapposite, however. It does not stand for the proposition

3



that failure to raise an issue in a Rule 50 motion waives the right to appeal an 

earlier denial of summary judgment on the same issue. This Court in Williams 

simply noted that failure to raise an issue in a Rule 50 motion for directed 

verdict (prior to submission of the case to the jury) waives the right to raise the 

issue in a renewed Rule 50 motion for judgment after the trial (Le^, judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict). Ich at 571-72. FHP has not cited any case or rule 

which prohibits appeal of a summary judgment ruling based on failure to raise 

an issue in a Rule 50 motion. Accordingly, the Rigas did not waive their right 

to appeal the trial court’s denial of their Motion for Summary Judgment due to 

FHP’s lack of standing.

Secondly, the Rigas did not judicially admit that FHP had standing. 

Whether FHP had standing is a legal matter, not a factual one. Judicial 

admissions "are statements of fact rather than legal arguments made to a court." 

New York State Nat. Org. for Women v. Terry. 159 F.3d 86, 97 n.7 (2d Cir. 

1998). Nor can a qualified answer to a hypothetical question constitute a 

judicial admission. To qualify as a judicial admission "an attorney’s statements 

must be deliberate, clear and unambiguous." MacDonald v. General Motors 

Corp.. 110 F.3d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1997). The court in MacDonald noted that 

counsel’s statements "dealt with opinions and legal conclusions, and we are thus

4



reluctant to treat them as binding judicial admissions." kL Likewise in this 

case, Mr. Hardiman was responding to a hypothetical question regarding a legal 

conclusion. And he explicitly rejected any suggestion that FHP had standing 

given the facts of this case. His response can in no way be deemed a binding 

judicial admission. Therefore, the Court should reject FHP’s tenuous 

argument.

B. This Court Should Not Overrule Its
Recent Decision In Montgomery Newspapers.

Just last year, this Court directly addressed the issue of a fair housing 

organization’s standing and held that "the pursuit of litigation alone cannot 

constitute an injury sufficient to establish standing under Article III." Fair 

Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 

F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 1998). FHP essentially asks this Court to reverse itself 

and overrule Montgomery Newspapers by adopting a broad rule that "agencies 

such as FHP have status to enforce Title VIII as ‘aggrieved persons.’" Reply 

Brief at 28. In other words, a fair housing organization which becomes 

involved in a housing discrimination lawsuit should automatically be deemed to 

have standing. Why? Because Congress has placed such importance on the 

private attorney general role of those organizations, particularly since " (tjhose

5



illegally denied housing are often ignorant and unsophisticated, and require 

agency assistance." See Reply Brief at 24-26 and 28-29. Putting aside the 

condescending paternalism of such an argument, the per se rule proposed by 

FHP would be unconstitutional.

In its zeal to satisfy the prudential aspects of standing, FHP ignores the 

constitutional requirements. As this Court discussed in Montgomery 

Newspapers. "[t]he standing inquiry in most cases is two-tiered, involving ‘both 

constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations 

on its exercise." IcL at 74, quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S, 490, 498 (1975). 

FHP is correct that this Court in Montgomery Newspapers noted that prudential 

standing requirements have been eliminated in cases arising under the Fair 

Housing Act. IcL at 75. But that does not mean that this Court can therefore 

adopt the per se rule proposed by FHP. Indeed, all it means is that FHP’s 

argument, based as it is on prudential considerations, is irrelevant.

The real issue here is whether FHP satisfies the constitutional 

requirements for standing. Article III of the Constitution requires at a 

minimum that there be a case or controversy, which means that "in every case, 

the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate: ‘[a]n "injury in fact" -  an invasion of 

a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)

6



actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical . . . . ’" IcL at 74, quoting 

Warth, 422 U.S. at 560-61 (emphasis in original). As this Court itself 

emphasized, there is no constitutional basis for standing unless in each 

particular case there is injury in fact.

Thus, there can be no per se rule by which all fair housing organizations 

automatically have the right to bring housing discrimination claims in federal 

court. There must be an individualized determination of injury in fact ~  that 

"‘as a result of the defendant’s action [plaintiff] has suffered a distinct and 

palpable injury.’" IcL. at 75, quoting Havens Realty Corp .,v. Coleman, 455 

U.S. 363, 372 (1982). In the specific context of fair housing organizations, 

whether there has been distinct and palpable injury turns on whether the 

organization’s ability to conduct its operations was perceptibly impaired, 

whether there was a consequent drain on its resources. at 75.

Like FHP, the fair housing organization in Montgomery Newspapers 

claimed that its resources had been diverted. The Fair Housing Council 

("FHC") claimed that it had to divert funds to an education campaign to repair 

damage caused by the advertisements. Id. at 76-77. This Court found that 

FHC in responding to Montgomery Newspapers’ summary judgment motion 

had offered no proof establishing any connection between the particular

7



advertisements and the need for implementation of the remedial education 

campaign. Id, at 77. This Court noted that the injury "must result from the 

particular discriminatory acts, not from the general conduct of multiple parties 

over the course of years." Id, at 77, n.3.

FHP made precisely the same type of unsupported assertion in 

responding to the Rigas’ summary judgment motion in this case, generically 

claiming that it would have to engage in outreach to counteract the effect of 

discrimination "such as" Mrs. Riga’s conduct. See Affidavit of Andrea Blinn 

attached to FHP’s Brief in Opposition to the Rigas’ Summary Judgment 

Motion. (A ll, Docket Entry 45). No evidence was offered of any steps 

actually taken by FHP and no evidence was offered to demonstrate that even if 

such steps had been taken, they would have been taken as a direct result of 

Mrs. Riga’s particular discriminatory acts as opposed to the general conduct of 

multiple parties in the Squirrel Hill area of Pittsburgh.

At trial, FHP offered some proof of outreach but never offered any proof 

that it was a direct result of Mrs. Riga’s conduct. (A669, A673). And the 

outreach described was quite general ("We went out and talked to persons in 

surrounding communities . . .  to educate them about the fair housing laws ) and 

was so unrelated to Mrs. Riga’s conduct that FHP did not even include the cost

8



of the staff time in calculating the damages it sought. (A673). In any event, 

evidence offered at trial has no bearing on whether FHP offered adequate 

evidence to survive summary judgment at the time that motion was filed and 

decided. Because the elements of standing are "an indispensable part of the 

plaintiffs case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other 

matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i. e. with the manner 

and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation."

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992), quoted in 

Montgomery Newspapers. 141 F.3d at 76. In order to defeat the Rigas’ 

summary judgment motion "based on the issue of standing, the FH[P] was 

required to submit ‘affidavits or other evidence showing through specific facts . 

. . that . . .  it [was] "directly" affected [by the alleged discrimination].’" 

Montgomery Newspapers. 141 F.3d at 76, quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 

(emphasis added by this Court). FHP failed to prove any such specific facts.

In Montgomery Newspapers. FHC also claimed its resources had been 

diverted to investigate the advertisements. Ich at 78. This Court rejected such 

a claim of injury, noting that the investigation was nothing more than a review 

of newspapers which occurred every day as part of FHC’s normal operations. 

Id. Likewise, in the instant case, FHP claims it was damaged because it

9



investigated the Rigas. This Court expressly held in Montgomery Newspapers 

that "the pursuit of litigation alone cannot constitute an injury sufficient to 

establish standing under Article III." Id  ̂ at 80.

FHP offered no evidence in response to the summary judgment motion 

indicating that the investigation was independent of the litigation or was 

something which was not part of its normal operations. To the contrary, FHP 

expressly stated that investigating complaints was one of a variety of methods 

by which it "typically" carried out its mission. See Affidavit of Andrea Blinn 

attached to FHP’s Brief in Opposition to the Rigas’ Summary Judgment 

Motion. (A ll, Docket Entry 45). That FHP spent some time investigating the 

Rigas rather than someone else is no different than the fact that FHC staff was 

diverted from reading other advertisements because it spent time reading the 

false advertisements.

It would be particularly inappropriate to find standing in this case where 

any diversion of resources was completely unnecessary and self-inflicted. The 

Alexanders had already established the availability of the apartment at issue 

before FHP even began its tests to ascertain whether it was available. Thus, 

FHP sought to manufacture standing for itself by investigating a question that 

the Alexanders had already answered. And the investigation was solely for the

10



purpose of litigation. This is precisely the type of damage which this Court has 

held does not confer standing. As with FHC in Montgomery Newspapers, 

FHP’s claim to standing in this case "shrinks the Article III standing 

requirement to a point where the requisite injury flows automatically from the 

burdens associated with filing a lawsuit. Resort to this extreme position simply 

is not necessary." JcL at 80. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied the 

Rigas’ Motion for Summary Judgment against FHP.1

C. Evidence Of The Alexanders’ Poor
Credit Was Improperly Excluded.

Relying on the inapposite after-acquired evidence doctrine, the 

Alexanders argue that the trial court properly excluded evidence that the 

Alexanders were not qualified for the apartment at issue. Reply Brief at 29.

As the Supreme Court case cited by the Alexanders demonstrates, the after- 

acquired evidence doctrine typically applies in employment discrimination cases 

where an employee has been terminated. See McKennon v, Nashville Banner 

Pub. Co.. 513 U.S. 352 (1995). The doctrine addresses the extent to which an 

employer can avoid liability for a discriminatory discharge by pointing to after-

1 It is important to note that this Court decided the Montgomery 
Newspapers case several weeks after the trial court had ruled on the Rigas’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment.

11



acquired evidence of misconduct which would have justified firing the employee 

had the employer known it. Such evidence does not bar an employee’s claim 

(although it may limit the recovery) because at issue is the employer’s motive 

for the discharge and information which the employer did not know can have 

no bearing on the employer’s motive. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins.

Co.. 65 F.3d 1072, 1073, n .l (3d Cir. 1995).

The after-acquired evidence doctrine has no bearing in this housing 

discrimination case, however. The bad credit evidence was not offered to 

justify any conduct by the Rigas. The Rigas did not offer the evidence to claim 

that the Alexanders were denied access to the apartment for a non- 

discriminatory reason. In such a case, the evidence might properly be barred 

as irrelevant, since the Rigas did not know of the Alexanders’ credit history at 

the time. Rather, the evidence was offered to rebut what the Rigas believe to 

be an essential element of the Alexanders’ case -  that the Alexanders were 

qualified to rent the apartment at issue. Put differently, the bad credit evidence 

was not offered to provide the Rigas with an affirmative defense (that what 

Mrs. Riga did was acceptable). It was offered to rebut any evidence which the 

Alexanders might have offered to meet their burden of proving that they were 

qualified. For reasons articulated in their initial brief, the Rigas believe that the

12



Alexanders had the burden of proving that they were qualified for the apartment 

and the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence proving the 

opposite.2

D. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Excluding
Evidence Bearing On The Alexanders’ Credibility.

Just as FHP ignored the troublesome issue of Article III standing 

requirements, mistakenly focusing on prudential considerations, the Alexanders 

ignore Rule 608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, mistakenly focusing on Rule 

404(b). The Rigas did not seek to offer evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or 

acts" under Rule 404(b) nor did they seek to "put character in issue" using 

"extrinsic documents" as the Alexanders assert. Reply Brief at 30. Rather, 

they sought to question Mr. and Mrs. Alexander on cross-examination about 

specific prior instances of dishonesty for the purpose of probing their character 

for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Rule 608(b) plainly permits such inquiry.

The Alexanders argue only that such evidence was "extremely prejudicial 

and not relevant." Reply Brief at 30. Evidence regarding credibility is always

2 The Alexanders argue that Chauhan v. Alfieri, 897 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 
1990) is inapposite. Reply Brief at 29. The Rigas do not cite Chauhan for any 
factual similarities. Instead, the Rigas cite Chauhan because in that case this 
Court noted that a plaintiff in a rental discrimination case must prove he is 
qualified to rent the property at issue.

13



relevant and was particularly critical here, where Mrs. Riga asserted that the 

Alexanders lied when they claimed to have visited the property at issue. The 

real issue is whether the inquiry’s prejudicial impact so outweighed its probative 

value as to require that it be excluded. But the Alexanders offer no analysis of 

this issue, presumably because the only "prejudice" the Alexanders would have 

suffered as a result of this inquiry would have been to expose their mendacious 

propensities. Although this certainly would have damaged the Alexanders’ 

case, it would hardly be unfair.

Rule 608 is subject to the balancing requirements of Rule 403 of the

Rules of Evidence. See U.S. v. Atwell. 766 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1985). Rule

403 permits relevant evidence to be excluded "if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of

time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. It

is important to bear in mind that Rule 403:

does not offer protection against evidence that is 
merely prejudicial, in the sense of being detrimental to 
a party’s case. Rather, the rule only protects against 
evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial only if it has ‘an undue tendency to

14



suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, 
though not necessarily, an emotional one.’

Carter v. Hewitt. 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original),

quoting Advisory Committee’s Note, Fed. R. Evid. 403.

The proposed questioning concerned lies to potential employers and 

providers of goods and services (see the Rigas’ opening brief at 45). It 

concerned matters which were legitimately probative of the Alexanders’ 

truthfulness, yet without characterizing them as evil people. In other words, 

there was no risk that a jury’s perception of the Alexanders would be unfairly 

skewed. There was no prejudice unless that concept is defined as meaning that 

a jury might conclude the Alexanders were lying. But such a definition would 

eviscerate Rule 608. Given the central importance of credibility in this case, 

the Rigas sought to question the Alexanders on matters whose probative value 

far outweighed any prejudice. For these reasons, the trial court abused its 

discretion when it excluded evidence that impugned the Alexanders’ credibility.

III. CONCLUSION

The District Court’s Order dated March 10, 1998 should be reversed and 

remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of the Rigas and 

against Plaintiffs, together with costs. Alternatively, the District Court’s

15



Judgment and Order dated October 9, 1998 should be affirmed in all respects 

with one exception: Plaintiffs should be required to pay the Rigas’ costs. If a 

new trial is ordered, the District Court’s decision excluding the Rigas’ proffered 

evidence regarding credit history and credibility should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Thbmas M. flardiman 
Pa. I.D. #65252

Joseph P. McHugh 
Pa. I.D. #77489

TITUS & MCCONOMY LLP 
Firm #662 
Twentieth Floor 
Four Gateway Center 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
(412) 642-2000

DATED: August 16, 1999 Counsel for Cross-Appellants

16



CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned certifies that this Reply Brief is in compliance with the 

type-volume limitations of Fed. R. App. P. 32. It is in non-proportional 14- 

point font and contains 3309 words.

Joseph P. McHugh



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, counsel for Appellees/Cross Appellants Joseph and 

Maria Riga, certifies that he served a copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of 

Cross Appellants this 16th day of August 1999 by First Class Mail, postage

prepaid, addressed to:

Counsel

Caroline Mitchell, Esquire 
3700 Gulf Tower 
707 Grant Street 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-1913

Timothy P. O’Brien, Esquire 
1705 Allegheny Building 
429 Forbes Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Charles Stephen Ralston, Esquire 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013

Rebecca K. Troth, Esquire 
Department of Justice 
P. O. Box 66078 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6078

Parties Represented 

Ronald and Faye Alexander

Fair Housing Partnership of 
Greater Pittsburgh

Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational 
Fund, Inc.

Amicus Curiae Department of 
Justice