Salone v USA Petitioners Reply to Respondents Brief in Opposition

    No. 90-

In The

Supreme Court of Cfjc Uniteb states;
OCTOBER TERM, 1990 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al,

Petitioners,
v.

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,

__________________ ________________ Respondents.

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

John E. McDermott 
660 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2300 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Telephone: (213) 955-4600

Counsel of Record for Petitioners

John E. McDermott 
Richard C. Field 
Evan M. Eisland 
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft 

660 S. Figueroa Street, Suite 2300 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Telephone: (213) 955-4600

Glen D. Nager 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue 

1450 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-2088 
Telephone: (202) 879-3939 

Counsel for Petitioners 
County of Los Angeles, et al.

November 30, 1990

De Witt W. Clinton 
COUNTY COUNSEL OF 

LOS ANGELES 
Mary Wawro 
SENIOR ASSISTANT 

COUNTY COUNSEL 
648 Hall of Administration 
500 W. Temple Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
Telephone: (213) 974-1811

Richard K. Simon 
Lee L. Blackman 
Erich R. Luschei 
McDermott, Will & Emery 
2029 Century Park East,

Suite 3800
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2917 
Telephone: (213) 277-4110



1

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ORDERS AND FINDINGS (and related items)
1. 9th Circuit Opinion on Merits 1 1 /2 /9 0 ......... A-l
2. 9th Circuit Order Denying Motion to Recall

Mandate 1 1 /7 /9 0 .......................................... A-49
3. District Court Findings of Fact on Liability

6/4/90 ................................................................... A-50
4. District Court Findings of Fact on Remedial Plan 

8/6/90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  A-152
5. 9th Circuit Order Granting Stay 8 /1 6 /9 0 ........... A-164
6. District Court Order on Election Schedule After

Remand 11/13/90.  ........................................... A-165
7. 9th Circuit—First Request for Judicial Notice by

Los Angeles C ounty..................... .........................  A-171
8. 9th Circuit Order Denying Request for Judicial

Notice 10/18/90 ........................ .. A-194
9. RT 8/3/90, p. 1158 (Weissburd testimony).......... A-195

10. District Court Findings of Fact on Rejection of
County Plan 8 /3 /9 0 .............................................. A-197

11. District Court Order and Amended Order on
Remedial Plan Adopted (8/3/90) . ...................... . A-216

12. District Court Denial of Stay Pending Appeal
8 /6 /9 0 ........................................ ..................... . A-219

13. 9th Circuit Order Granting Temporary Stay and
Setting Expedited Briefing Schedule 8/9/90......... A-220

14. Declaration of W. A.V. Clark (filed with Reply
Brief in Support of First Request for Judicial 
Notice)................................................................... A-223

15. District Court—Request by Los Angeles County
for Judicial Notice of June 5, 1990 Primary 
Election Results.................................................... . A-226

16. District Court Order Denying Motions for
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss 10 /31/89 .... A-230



2

Page

TRIAL TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS
17. Trial Ex. 2303, p. 3 ......................... ......................  A-245
18. Trial Ex. 313, pp. 26, 43, 57, 58 ............................ A-248
19. Trial Ex. 2363, p. 5 3 .............................................. A-251
20. RT 1/11/90, pp. 56-57 ............................................ A-253
21. RT 1/12/90, pp. 27-29, 32-33, 56 ............   A-256
22. RT 1/23/90, pp. 36-37 ...........................................  A-263
23. RT 1/18/90, p. 96...................................   A-266
24. RT 1/3/90, pp. 22-23, 67-73 .................................. A-268
25. RT 1/10/90, pp. 147-48 ............................. ..........  A-278
26. RT 1/4/90, pp. 193-94  ............................. .. A-281
27. RT 1/8/90, pp. 124-32 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  A-284
28. RT 2/20/90, pp. 83-84 (Grofman testimony) . . . .  A-294
29. RT 1/17/90, pp. 114-118 .. ...............................   A-297
30. RT 2/22/90, pp. 119-122 ...... ................................. A-303
31. RT 3/1/90, pp. 97-105 . . . . . . . .  ................  A-308
32. RT 3/15/90, pp. 4-20.........     A-318
33. Trial Ex. 1520 .............       A-336
34. Trial Ex. 5540 .....................        A-337
35. Trial Ex. 4151A. . . . . .  .........................................   A-338
SLIP OPINION
36. Badillo v. Stockton, CIV No. S-87-1726 EJG,

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Slip op.
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1990).......................... .. A-348

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
STATUTES INVOLVED
37. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 .......................... A-358
38. U.S. Const, amend. XV, § 1 ............................ A-358
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965), as amended by Act of

June 29, 1982, Pub. L. 97-205 § 3, 96 Stat. 134 .. . A-358
40. California Election Code § 35000 (West 1989) . .. A-359
41. California Election Code § 35001 (West 1989) .. . A-359
42. California Government Code § 25005 (West 1988). A-359
43. Los Angeles County Charter, Article II, § 7 . A-3 60



A-l

FILED PASADENA OFFICE 
NOV 02 1990

CATHY A CATTERSON, CLERK 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR PUBLICATION 
3fn tljc Huiteii states Court of appeals; 

for tlje iTintf) Cirtuit 
YOLANDA GARZA; SALVADOR 
LEDEZMA; RAYMOND PALACIOS;
MONICA TOVAR; GUADALUPE DE 
LA GARZA,

Plain tiffs-Appellees,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY; DEAN DANA; PETER F. 
SCHABARUM; KENNETH F. HAHN, 

Defendants-Appellants/
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
and

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN;
SARAH FLORES,

Intervenors-Appellees,

No. 90-55944

D.C. #CV-88-5135-KN

OPINION

Nos. 90-55945/ 
90-56024

D.C. #CV-88-5435-KN

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY; DEANE DANA; PETER F.
SCHABARUM; KENNETH F. HAHN, 
et al.,

Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of California 
David V. Kenyon, District Judge, Presiding 

Argued and submitted October 10, 1990 
San Francisco, California

Filed:



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Before: SCHROEDER, D. W. NELSON, and KOZINSKI, Cir­
cuit Judges. SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

INTRODUCTION

Hispanics in Los Angeles County, joined by the United States 
of America, filed this voting rights action in 1988 seeking a 
redrawing of the districts for the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors. They alleged that the existing boundaries, which had 
been drawn after the 1980 census, were gerrymandered bounda­
ries that diluted Hispanic voting strength. They sought redistrict­
ing in order to create a district with a Hispanic majority for the 
1990 Board of Supervisors election in which two board members 
were to be elected.

The Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, forbids the imposi­
tion or application of any practice that would deny or abridge, 
on grounds of race or color, the right of any citizen to vote. In 
1980, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that this provision 
prohibited only intentional discrimination, and would not allow 
minorities to challenge practices that, although not instituted 
with invidious intent, diluted minority votes in practice. City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980). In response 
to this decision, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982 
to add language indicating that the Act forbids not only inten­
tional discrimination, but also any practice shown to have a dis­
parate impact on minority voting strength. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(b). Thus, after the 1982 amendment, the Voting Rights 
Act can be violated by both intentional discrimination in the 
drawing of district lines and facially neutral apportionment 
schemes that have the effect of diluting minority votes.

To the extent that a redistricting plan deliberately minimizes 
minority political power, it may violate both the Voting Rights 
Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth amend­
ment. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66-67, 100 S. Ct. at 1499. The



A-3

plaintiffs in this cast claimed that because the County had en­
gaged in intentional discrimination in the drawing of district lines 
in 1981, the resulting boundaries violated both the Voting Rights 
Act and the Equal Protection Clause. They further claimed that, 
whether or not the vote dilution was intentional, the effect of the 
County’s districting plan was the reduction of Hispanic electoral 
power in violation of the newly amended Voting Rights Act.

The district court held a three-month bench trial. At its con­
clusion the district court found that the County had engaged in 
intentional discrimination in the 1981 reapportionment, as it had 
in prior reapportionments, deliberately diluting the strength of 
the Hispanic vote. It also found that, regardless of intentional 
discrimination, the County’s reapportionment plan violated the 
Voting Rights Act because it had the effect of diluting Hispanic 
voting strength. Finally, it found that, based on post-census data, 
it was possible to grant the remedy that the plaintiffs sought, 
which was a redistricting in which one of the five districts would 
have a Hispanic voting majority. It ordered the County to pro­
pose such a redistricting.

In its findings, the district court detailed the recent history of 
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and the voting 
procedures by which it has been elected. At least since the begin­
ning of this century, the Board has always consisted of five mem­
bers, elected in even-numbered years to serve four-year terms. 
These elections are staggered so that two supervisors are elected 
one year, and three are elected two years later. Supervisors are 
elected in non-partisan elections, and a candidate must receive a 
majority of the votes cast in order to win. If no candidate receives 
such a majority, the two candidates who receive the highest num­
ber of votes must engage in a runoff contest.

The district court found persuasive the evidence showing that 
the Board had engaged in intentional discrimination in 
redistrictings that it undertook in 1959, 1965 and 1971. The dis-



A-4

trict court further found that the 1981 redistricting was calcu­
lated at least in part to keep the effects of those prior discrimina­
tory reapportionments in place as well as to prevent Hispanics 
from attaining the majority in any district in the future. The 
findings of the district court on the question of intentional dis­
crimination are set forth in the margin.1 After entering these

‘The relevant findings with regard to the 1959 Redistricting are as 
follows:

64. Prior to 1959, District 3 included Western Rosemead and did 
not include any portion of the San Fernando Valley, Beverly Hills, 
West Hollywood, West Los Angeles, or Eagle Rock.
65. The 1959 redistricting occurred less than six months after the 
November 1958 general election for the open position of District 3 
Supervisor. Ernest Debs, a non-Hispanic, defeated Hispanic candi­
date Edward Roybal, by a margin of 52.2 percent to 47.8 percent.
66. Debs received 141,011 votes. Roybal received 128,974 votes. 
There were four recounts before Debs was finally determined to be 
the winner.
67. In 1959, Debs reported in a Supervisorial hearing that he and 
District 4 Supervisor Burton Chace agreed to shift Beverly Hills, 
West Hollywood, and West Los Angeles from District 4 to District
3.
68. The Board’s action transferred between 50,000 to 100,000 vot­
ers from District 4 into District 3 and had the effect of substantially 
decreasing the proportion of Hispanic voters in District 3.
69. Dr. Kousser testified it was his opinion that Debs and Chace 
agreed to the transfer for two reasons. First, Chace was receptive 
to the agreement because it enabled him to eliminate Los Angeles 
City Councilwoman Rosaline Wyman as a possible opponent in his 
upcoming 1960 bid for reelection. Debs welcomed the change be­
cause the move west allowed him to make District 3 more easily 
winnable against Roybal or another candidate who might appear 
to Hispanic voters in the next election.

The findings with regard to the 1985 Redistricting are as follows:
88. The Boundary Committee rejected a proposal to move 
Alhambra and San Gabriel, areas adjacent to growing Hispanic 
population, from District 1 to District 3. Instead, the committee 
recommended a complicated two-stage change which moved

(Footnote continued on following page)



A-5

findings and conclusions of law, the district court gave the 
County the opportunity to propose a new plan, as required by 
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S. Ct. 2493, 2497 (1978). 

(Footnote continued from previous page)
Alhambra and San Gabriel from Supervisor Bonnelli’s District 1 
to Supervisor Dorn’s District 5, moved a section of the San Fer­
nando Valley from District 5 to Supervisor Debs’ District 3, and 
moved Monterey Park and unincorporated South San Gabriel from 
District 1 to District 3.
89. Dr. Kousser testified that, in his opinion, the Board avoided 
transferring Alhambra and San Gabriel directly to District 3 be­
cause those areas were adjacent to areas of Hispanic population 
concentration and were becoming more Hispanic. The more com­
plicated two-stage adjustments permitted the addition of heavily 
Anglo areas from the San Fernando Valley and offset the much 
more limited addition of Hispanic population gained by moving 
Monterey Park and the unincorporated area of South San Gabriel 
to District 3.

The Court’s findings with regard to the 1971 Redistricting are as 
follows:

109. In 1971, District 3 lost some areas with substantial Hispanic 
population on its eastern border. Western Rosemead was trans­
ferred from District 3 to District 1. A census tract in the City of 
San Gabriel was also transferred from District 3 to District 5.
110. George Marr, head of the Population Research Section of the 
Department of Regional Planning testified that he was surprised by 
the proposal to move a substantial portion of the San Fernando 
Valley from District 5 to District 3. Marr described the portion of 
the San Fernando Valley ultimately added to District 3 from Dis­
trict 5 as looking like “one of those Easter Island heads.” Marr 
developed the general feeling that Debs’ representative on the 
Boundary Committee had requested the additional area in the San 
Fernando Valley because the residents of the area were regarded as 
“our kind of people.”

The court’s findings on the Overall Intent of Past Redistrictings are 
as follows:

112. The Court finds that the Board had redrawn the supervisorial 
boundaries over the period 1959-1971, at least in part, to avoid 
enhancing Hispanic voting strength in District 3, the district that

(Footnote continued on following page)



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Under the Los Angeles County Charter, any redistricting must 
be approved by four of the five members of the Board. In response 

(Footnote continued from previous page)
has historically had the highest proportion ofHispanics and to make 
it less likely that a viable, well financed Hispanic opponent would 
seek office in that district. This finding is based on both direct and 
circumstantial evidence, including the finding that, since the defeat 
of Edward Roybal in 1959, no well-financed Hispanic or Spanish- 
surname candidate has run for election in District 3.
113. While Hispanic population was added to District 3 during the 
1959-1971 redistrictings, the Court finds that the proportion of 
Spanish-surname persons added to District has been lower than the 
Hispanic population proportion in the County as a whole. No indi­
vidual area added was greater than 15.1 percent Spanish-surname.
114. Dating from the adoption of the County’s Charter in 1912 
through the 1971 redistricting process, no Los Angeles County 
redistricting plan has created a supervisorial district in which His­
panic persons constituted a majority or a plurality of the total 
population.

The Court’s findings with regard to the 1981 Redistricting are as 
follows:

125. The individuals involved in the 1981 redistricting had demo­
graphic information available of population changes and trends in 
Los Angeles County from 1950 to 1980. It was readily apparent in 
1980 that the Hispanic population was on the rise and growing 
rapidly and that the white non-Hispanic population was declining.

127. From a political perspective, since Hispanic population 
growth was most significant in Districts 1 and 3, if the 1971 bound­
aries were changed in any measurable way to eliminate the existing 
fragmentation, the incumbancy of either Supervisor Schabarum or 
Supervisor Edelman would be most affected by a potential Hispanic 
candidate.

136. An analysis of the 1978 Supervisor election in District 3 was 
conducted after the Boundary Committee recommended a plan 
with an Hispanic population majority in District 3. The actual 
results of the analysis were never produced. Mr. Seymour did not 
rule out the possibility that he requested such an analysis and Su­
pervisor Edelman testified that he “most probably” discussed the 
results of the 1978 election analysis with Mr. Seymour.

(Footnote continued on following page)



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to the court’s order directing the County to propose a plan, three 
Board members submitted a proposal. The district court rejected

(Footnote continued from previous page)
137. Peter Bonardi, a programmer with the Urban Research Sec­
tion of the Data Processing Department in 1981 and a participant 
in the data analysis requested by Supervisor Edelman, stated that 
he was directed not to talk about the analysis of voting patterns and 
that an “atmosphere of ‘keep it quiet’ ” pervaded.
138. Supervisors Hahn and Edelman sought to maintain the exist­
ing lines. To this end, the Democratic minority agreed to a transfer 
of population from District 3 to District 2. Supervisor Edelman 
acknowledged that he and Supervisor Hahn had worked out a 
transfer of population from the heavily Hispanic Pico-Union area 
on the southern border of District 3 to the northern end of Dis­
trict 2.
139. Supervisor Edelman knew that if the 1971 boundary lines were 
kept intact, the Hispanic community was going to remain essen­
tially the same in terms of its division among the districts.
140. The Board departed from its past redistricting practice in 1981 
and approved a contract with The Rose Institute for State and 
Local Government, a private entity, to perform specialized services 
and produce redistricting data at a cost of $30,000.

157. [Boundary Committee Members] Smith and Hoffenblum op­
posed the CFR [Chicanos [sic] for Fair Representation] plan be­
cause the plan proposed increasing the Hispanic proportion in Dis­
trict 1 from 36 to 42 percent. Both Boundary Committee members 
perceived the CFR effort as intended to jeopardize the status of 
Supervisor Scharbarum as well as that of the conservative majority.
158. Hoffenblum testified that one of the objectives of the Republi­
can majority was to create an Hispanic seat without altering the 
ideological makeup of the Board. According to Hoffenblum, it was 
“self-evident” that if an Hispanic district was created in Supervisor 
Schabarum’s district it would impact on the Republican majority.
159. The proponents of the Smith and Hoffenblum plans sought to 
gain areas of Republican strength such as La Mirada, Arcadia, 
Bradbury in Districts 4 and 5, while losing increasing Hispanic 
areas such as Alhambra or the predominantly black Compton and 
other liberal areas of Santa Monica and Venice.

162. Supervisor Edelman would not rule out the possibility that 
ethnic considerations played at least some part in the rejection by 

(Footnote continued on following page)



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that proposal with findings to support its conclusion that the 
proposal was less than a good faith effort to remedy the violations

(Footnote continued from previous page)
the Board majority of the CFR Plan. Moreover, the fact that CFR 
proposed a plan in which District 1 had a 42 percent Hispanic 
population was a possible basis for the rejection of the plan by the 
majority. Supervisor Schabarum would not accept a 45 or 50 per­
cent Hispanic proportion in his district in 1981.

165. On September 24, 1981, prior to the Board’s adoption of the 
challenged plan, Board members met, two at a time in a series of 
private meetings in the anteroom adjacent to the board room, 
where they tried to reach agreement on a plan.

175. The plan adopted in 1981 retained the boundary between the 
First and the Third Supervisorial Districts, the districts that con­
tain the largest proportions of Hispanics. In doing so, the 1981 Plan 
continued to split the Hispanic Core almost in half.
176. The Board appeared to ignore the three proposed plans which 
provided for a bare Hispanic population majority.
177. The Court finds that the Board of Supervisors, in adopting the 
1981 redistricting plan, acted primarily with the objective of pro­
tecting and preserving the incumbencies of the five Supervisors or 
their political allies.
178. The Court finds that in 1981 the five members of the Board of 
Supervisors were aware that the plan which they eventually 
adopted would continue to fragment the Hispanic population and 
further impair the ability of Hispanics to gain representation on the 
Board.
179. The continued fragmentation of the Hispanic vote was a rea­
sonably foreseeable consequence of the adoption of the 1981 Plan.
180. The Court finds that during the 1981 redistricting process, the 
Supervisors knew that the protection of their five Anglo incumben­
cies was inextricably linked to the continued fragmentation of the 
Hispanic Core.
181. The Supervisors appear to have acted primarily on the politi­
cal instinct of self-preservation. The Court finds, however, that the 
Supervisors also intended what they knew to be the likely result of 
their actions and a prerequisite to self-preservation—the continued 
fragmentation of the Hispanic Core and the dilution of Hispanic 
voting strength.



A-9

found in the existing districting. The court considered other pro­
posals. On August 6 it accepted and imposed a plan which creates 
a district in which the majority of the voting age citizen popula­
tion is Hispanic. The County then appealed and this court or­
dered the matter handled on an expedited basis.

There is a second appeal before us. It is from the district court’s 
denial of a motion to intervene in the main case. During the 
course of the proceedings, there was a primary election under the 
existing districting plan. The incumbent supervisor, Edmund 
Edelman, received a majority of the votes in District 3, and 
thereby won that seat. In the District 1 contest, the incumbent 
did not seek reelection. No candidate received the required ma­
jority of the votes; therefore, the two front runners, Sarah Flores 
and Gregory O’Brien, were scheduled to compete in a runoff 
election on November 6, 1990.

During the remedial phase of these proceedings, one of those 
candidates, Sarah Flores, sought to intervene in this action in 
order to oppose any redistricting plan which would result in the 
need for a new primary election in which additional candidates 
could run for the seat she was seeking in District 1. The district 
court denied her petition to intervene and she appeals from that 
denial. We have jurisdiction of her appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 776 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(denial of motion to intervene is an appealable order).

I. The County Appeal—Liability

Plaintiffs filed this action in order to require the imposition of 
new district lines for the 1990 election of supervisors. The record 
shows without serious dispute that at the time of the decennial 
redistricting in 1981, it was not possible to draw a district map, 
with roughly equal population in each district, that contained a 
district with a majority of Hispanic voters. The district court 
found, however, that the County in 1981, as part of a course of



A-10

conduct that began decades earlier, intentionally fragmented the 
Hispanic population among the various districts in order to dilute 
the effect of the Hispanic vote in future elections and preserve 
incumbencies of the Anglo members of the Board of Supervisors. 
The evidence in the record also shows that at the time that this 
action was filed it was possible to draw lines for five districts of 
roughly equal population size, as required by state law, with one 
single-member district having a majority of Hispanic voters.

The district court found the County liable for vote dilution on 
two separate theories. It found that the County had adopted and 
applied a redistricting plan that resulted in dilution of Hispanic 
voting power in violation of Section 2. It also found that the 
County, by establishing and maintaining the plan, had intention­
ally discriminated against Hispanics in violation of Section 2 and 
the Equal Protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

In this appeal, the County’s threshold argument is that districts 
drawn in 1981 are lawful, regardless of any intentional or unin­
tentional dilution of minority voting strength, because at the time 
they were drawn there could be no single-member district with a 
majority of minority voters. The County asks us to extract from 
the Supreme Court’s leading decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 
478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986), and subsequent cases in this 
and other circuits, the principle that there can be no successful 
challenge to a districting system unless the minority challenging 
that system can show that it could, at the time of districting, 
constitute a voter majority in a single-member district.

In response to this position, the appellees argue that no major­
ity requirement should be imposed where, as here, there has been 
intentional dilution of minority voting strength. The County thus 
also challenges the sufficiency of the district court’s findings with 
regard to intent.

We hold that, to the extent that Gingles does require a majority 
showing, it does so only in a case where there has been no proof



A-11

of intentional dilution of minority voting strength. We affirm the 
district court on the basis of its holding that the County engaged 
in intentional discrimination at the time the challenged districts 
were drawn.

A. The Background and Effect o f Gingles

In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 1973, to provide minority groups a remedy for vote 
dilution without requiring a showing that the majority engaged 
in intentional discrimination. Congress set forth a non-exhaustive 
list of factors to guide courts in determining whether there had 
been a Section 2 violation. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 
pt. 1 at 28-29. Congress indicated that in applying these factors, 
courts should engage in a “searching practical evaluation of the 
‘past and present reality’ ” of the political system in question. Id. 
at 30. Creation of this “results” test for discrimination under 
Section 2 did not affect the remedies under Section 2 for inten­
tional discrimination. Id. at 27.

In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986), 
the Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the new amend­
ment. While noting the factors the Senate had set out as indica­
tors of impermissible vote dilution, it stated that a court must 
look to the totality of the circumstances in considering a vote 
dilution claim. It also established three preconditions for liability 
under the amendment to Section 2 for claims based only on dis­
criminatory effects: (1) geographical compactness of the minority 
group; (2) minority political cohesion; and (3) majority block 
voting. 478 U.S. at 50-51, 106 S. Ct. at 2766-67.

The Gingles requirements were articulated in a much different 
context than this case presents. Although the Gingles Court was 
aware of the history of discrimination against blacks, which was 
the minority there in question, the Court did not consider any 
claim that the disputed districting plan had been enacted deliber­



A-12

ately to dilute the black vote. See 478 U.S. at 80, 106 S. Ct. at 
2760-61. The claim at issue was that the multi-member districts 
that were being used, regardless of the intent with which they 
were created, had the effect of diluting the black vote. 478 U.S. 
at 39-41, 106 S. Ct. at 2781-82. Thus, the court instituted the 
“possibility of majority” requirement in a case in which it was 
asked to invalidate a political entity’s choice of a multi-member 
district system, and impose a system of single-member districts, 
and was not asked to find that the multi-member scheme had 
been set up with a discriminatory purpose in mind.2 An emphasis 
on showing a statistically significant disparate impact is typical 
of claims based on discriminatory effect as opposed to discrimi­
natory intent.

In contrast, the district court in this case found that the County 
had adopted its current reapportionment plan at least in part with

2Gingles has spawned confusion in the lower courts. The opinion 
explicitly reserved the question of whether the standards it set forth 
would apply to a claim in which minority plaintiffs alleged that an 
electoral practice impaired their ability to influence elections, as op­
posed to their ability to elect representatives. 478 U.S. at 46 n.12, 106 S. 
Ct. at 276 n. 12. Nevertheless, it has been applied to preclude such 
“ability to influence” claims, based upon plaintiffs’ failure to demon­
strate such an ability to elect representatives under the Gingles criteria. 
See, e.g., McNeil v. Springfield Park, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), cert, 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989). See generally Abrams, “Raising Politics 
Up”: Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 449 (1988). On the other hand, some courts have 
dealt differently with the criteria articulated in Gingles when facing 
“ability to influence” claims. They have done so in opinions that “range 
from virtually ignoring the electoral standard or ignoring it entirely, to 
considering it a prerequisite to the application of the totality of the 
circumstances test [specified in the statute itself], to treating it as a, if 
not the, central element of the test.” Abrams, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 465 
(citing United Latin Am. Citizens v. Midland Indep. School Dist., 812 
F.2d 1494, 1496-98 (5th Cir. 1987); Buckanga v. Sisseton Indep. School 
Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 471-72 (8th Cir. 1986); Martin v. Allain, 658 F. 
Supp. 1183, 1199-1204 (S.D. Miss. 1987)) (footnotes omitted). “[T]he 
language from Gingles that creates the ‘ability to elect’ standard may 
prove to be Gingles’ more enduring and problematic legacy.” Abrams, 
63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 468.



A-13

the intent to fragment the Hispanic population. See Findings 
[App. A-67] No. 81. The court noted that continued fragmenta­
tion of the Hispanic population had been at least one goal of each 
redistricting since 1959. Thus, the plaintiffs’ claim is not, as in 
Gingles, merely one alleging disparate impact of a seemingly neu­
tral electoral scheme. Rather, it is one in which the plaintiffs have 
made out a claim of intentional dilution of their voting strength.

The County cites a number of cases in support of its argument 
that Gingles requires these plaintiffs to demonstrate that they 
could have constituted a majority in a single-member district as 
of 1981. None dealt with evidence of intentional discrimination. 
See, e.g., Romero v. City o f Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir. 
1989); McNeil v. Springfield Park, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), 
cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989); Skorepa v. City o f Chula 
Vista, 723 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Cal. 1989).

To impose the requirement the County urges would prevent 
any redress for districting which was deliberately designed to 
prevent minorities from electing representatives in future elec­
tions governed by that districting. This appears to us to be a result 
wholly contrary to Congress’ intent in enacting Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act and contrary to the equal protection principles 
embodied in the fourteenth amendment.

B. The Findings o f Intent
We therefore turn to the appellants’ challenge to the district 

court’s rulings with respect to the intent of the supervisors in 
1981. The County contends that the district court did not make 
sufficient findings on intentional discrimination. Focusing on lan­
guage in Finding 177, quoted supra in note 1, the County claims 
that the district court found only that the supervisors in 1981 
intended to perpetuate their own incumbencies. This is a mis­
taken reading of what the district court found. Although the 
court noted that “the Supervisors appear to have acted primarily 
on the political instinct of self-preservation,” the court also found



A-14

that they chose fragmentation of the Hispanic voting population 
as the avenue by which to achieve this self-preservation. Finding 
No. 181. The supervisors intended to create the very discrimina­
tory result that occurred. That intent was coupled with the intent 
to preserve incumbencies, but the discrimination need not be the 
sole goal in order to be unlawful. See Arlington Heights v. Metro­
politan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). 
Accordingly, the findings of the district court are adequate to 
support its conclusion of intentional discrimination, and the de­
tailed factual findings are more than amply supported by evidence 
in the record.

Even where there has been a showing of intentional discrimi­
nation, plaintiffs must show that they have been injured as a 
result. Although the showing of injury in cases involving discrim­
inatory intent need not be as rigorous as in effects cases, some 
showing of injury must be made to assure that the district court 
can impose a meaningful remedy.

That intent must result, according to the Voting Rights Act, 
in the

political processes leading to nomination or election . . . [not 
being] equally open to participation by members of a [pro­
tected] class . . .  in that its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the 
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). This language is echoed in the intentional 
discrimination case of White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S. Ct. 
2332 (1973). There, in addition to intent, the Supreme Court 
required proof that “the political processes leading to nomination 
and election were not equally open to participation by the group 
in question—that its members had less opportunity than did 
other residents in the district to participate in the political 
processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” Id. at 766, 93 
S. Ct. at 2339. See also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 
91 S. Ct. 1858, 1872 (1971).



A-15

Applying that standard to this case of intentional discrimina­
tion, we agree with the district court that the supervisors’ inten­
tional splitting of the Hispanic core resulted in a situation in 
which Hispanics had less opportunity than did other county resi­
dents to participate in the political process and to elect legislators 
of their choice. We conclude, therefore, that this intentional dis­
crimination violated both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal 
Protection Clause.

C. Laches

The County claims that, because four rounds of elections have 
occurred since the 1981 reapportionment plan was instituted, and 
because a regular reapportionment is scheduled to occur in 1991, 
the plaintiffs’ claim for redistricting relief is barred on the ground 
of laches. It argues that substantial hardship will result from a 
redistricting now, when another regularly scheduled one is set to 
occur so closely on its heels. Furthermore, the County contends 
that the plaintiffs had no excuse for their delay in bringing suit. 
Therefore, it concludes, the suit should have been dismissed.

Although plaintiffs could have filed an action as early as 1981 
in order to enhance their ability to influence the result in a district 
in which they were then still a minority, their failure to do so does 
not constitute laches. The record here shows that the injury they 
suffered at that time has been getting progressively worse, because 
each election has deprived Hispanics of more and more of the 
power accumulated through increased population. Because of the 
ongoing nature of the violation, plaintiffs’ present claims ought 
not be barred by laches.

II. The County Appeal—Remedy

A. Redistricting Between Decennial Redistrictings

The County contends that the district court erred in requiring 
it to redistrict now, at a point between regularly scheduled de­



A-16

cennial reapportionments. Citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
84 S. Ct. 1362, reh’g denied, 379 U.S. 270, 85 S. Ct. 12 (1964), 
the County claims that decennial redistricting based upon census 
data is a “rule,” and that the case “was intended to avoid” the 
confusion that might be associated with more frequent 
reapportionments.

The County misreads Reynolds. The Court in Reynolds insti­
tuted a requirement of periodic reapportionment based upon cur­
rent population data. It stated that decennial reapportionment 
“would clearly meet the minimal requirements,” and less fre­
quent reapportionment would “assuredly be constitutionally sus­
pect.” 377 U.S. at 583-84, 84 S. Ct. at 1393. The Court further 
noted, however, that while more frequent apportionment was not 
constitutionally required, it would be “constitutionally permissi­
ble,” and even “practicably desirable.” Id. Thus, Reynolds did not 
institute a constitutional maximum frequency for reapportion­
ment; rather, it set a floor below which such frequency may not 
constitutionally fall.

B. Use o f Post-1980 Population Data

The County further claims that the district court erred in con­
sidering any data other than data from the 1980 census. Since the 
1980 census data does not suggest the possibility of creating a 
Hispanic majority district, the County claims that the plaintiffs 
must lose in their 1988 claim to redistrict to provide for such a 
district. This claim, too, misinterprets the case law on which it 
purports to rest.

Since Reynolds would permit redistricting between censuses, it 
appears to assume that post-census data may be used as a basis 
for such redistricting. Furthermore, in a subsequent opinion the 
Court noted with approval the possibility of using predictive data 
in addition to census data in designing decennial reapportionment 
plans. The court stated that “[situations may arise where sub­
stantial population shifts over such a period [the ten years be­



A-17

tween redistricting] can be anticipated. Where these shifts can be 
predicted with a high degree of accuracy, States that are redis­
tricting may properly consider them.” Kirpatrick v. Preisler, 394 
U.S. 526, 535, 89 S. Ct. 1225, 1231, rehg denied, 395 U.S. 917, 
89 S. Ct. 1737 (1969). See also Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 
91, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 1296 (1966) (“the Equal Protection Clause 
does not require the States to use total population figures derived 
from the federal census as the standard by which . . . substantial 
population equivalency is to be measured.”). The Court has never 
hinted that plaintiffs claiming present Voting Rights Act viola­
tions should be required to wait until the next census before they 
can receive any remedy.

The Fifth Circuit has held that non-census data may be con­
sidered in reapportionments between censuses if the relevant in­
formation cannot be obtained through census data. Westwego Cit­
izens for Better Government v. Westwego, 906 F.2d 1042, 1045-46 
(5th Cir. 1990). Such a practice makes sense not only where, as 
in Westwego itself, census data on the population in question was 
unavailable because of the limited nature of the compilations and 
manipulations performed by the census; it is also logical where, 
as here, the census data is almost a decade old and therefore no 
longer accurate.3

The County contests the validity of the population statistics 
that the court employed. The district court’s findings, however, 
present an extensive review of the data itself and of the method­
ology that produced it, coupled with an inquiry into its validity. 
The County has not offered any reason why the district court

3In McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937, 946 (7th Cir. 
1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989), the Seventh Circuit found 
that in order to prove an effects violation from postcensus data, the data 
used must be of a clear and convincing nature, and that “estimates based 
on past trends are generally not sufficient to override ‘hard’ decennial 
census data.” We see no reason to impose this high standard in a case 
where intentional discrimination has been proved, and the data is 
merely to be used in fashioning a remedy.



A -18

should have rejected this data, other than the fact that it does not 
come from the census. Since it was permissible for the district 
court to rely on non-census data, we find that the district court 
did not err in its assessment of the size and geographic distribu­
tion of the Hispanic population in Los Angeles.

The district court’s findings concerning vote dilution may be 
set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 
79, 106 S. Ct. at 2781. The findings at issue here were amply 
supported by the evidence that was before the district court.

C. Apportionment Based on Population Rather than Voting Age
Citizen Data

The County contends that because the district court’s reappor­
tionment plan employs statistics based upon the total population 
of the County, rather than the voting population, it is erroneous 
as a matter of law. The County points out that many Hispanics 
in the County are noncitizens, and suggests that therefore a re­
districting plan based upon population alone, in which Hispanics 
are concentrated in one district, unconstitutionally weights the 
votes of citizens in that district more heavily than those of citizens 
in other districts.

The district court adopted a plan with nearly equal numbers of 
persons in each district.4 The districts deviated in population by 
sixty-eight hundredths of one percent. (Findings and Order Re­
garding Remedial Redistricting Plan and Election Schedule, 
[App. A-154]).

District Total Pop. White Black Hispanic Other

1 1 ,7 7 9 ,8 3 5 1 2 .4 2 .1 7 1 .2 14 .3
2 1 ,7 7 5 ,6 6 5 1 5 .0 3 8 .6 3 5 .3 11.1
3 1 ,7 6 8 ,1 2 4 6 0 .9 3 .9 2 5 .5 9 .7
4 1 ,7 7 6 ,2 4 0 5 3 .9 4 .3 2 6 .6 1 5 .2
5 1 ,7 8 0 ,2 2 4 57 .1 5 .9 2 4 .3 1 2 .6

Total 8 ,8 8 0 ,1 0 9 3 9 .8 1 1 .0 3 6 .6 12 .6



A-19

The variance is larger when the number of voting age citizens in 
each district is considered.5

The County is correct in pointing out that Burns v. Richardson, 
384 U.S. 73, 91-91, 86 S. Ct. 1286, 1296-97 (1966), seems to 
permit states to consider the distribution of the voting population 
as well as that of the total population in constructing electoral 
districts. It does not, however, require states to do so. In fact, the 
Richardson Court expressly stated that “[t]he decision to include 
or exclude [aliens or other nonvoters from the apportionment 
base] involves choices about the nature of representation with 
which we have been shown no constitutionally founded reason to 
interfere.” 384 U.S. at 92, 86 S. Ct. at 1296-97. Richardson does 
not overrule the portion of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 
84 S. Ct. 1362, 1385 (1964), that held that apportionment for 
state legislatures must be made upon the basis of population.

In Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61, 84 S. Ct. at 1381, the Supreme 
Court applied to the apportionment of state legislative seats the 
standard enunciated in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 
526 (1964), that “the fundamental principle of representative gov­
ernment is one of equal representation for equal number of peo­
ple, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of 
residence within a state.” This standard derives from the consti­
tutional requirement that members of the House of Representa­
tives are elected “by the people,” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560, 84 
S. Ct. at 1381, from districts “founded on the aggregate number 
of inhabitants of each state” (James Madison, The Federalist, No. 
54 at 369 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)); U.S. Const, art. I, § 2. The framers

3 District Total Pop. White Black Hispanic Other

1 707,651 25.4 3.5 59.4 11.6
2 922,180 23.8 50.8 17.1 8.3
3 1,098,663 77.0 4.3 13.9 4.7
4 1,081,089 67.5 4.4 19.7 8.4
5 1,088,388 69.8 6.2 18.1 5.9

Total 4,897,971 55.8 13.4 23.3 7.5



A-20

were aware that this apportionment and representation base 
would include categories of persons who were ineligible to vote— 
women, children, bound servants, convicts, the insane, and at a 
later time, aliens. Fair v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 576 
(D.D.C. 1980). Nevertheless, they declared that government 
should represent all the people. In applying this principle, the 
Reynolds Court recognized that the people, including those who 
are ineligible to vote, form the basis for representative govern­
ment. Thus population is an appropriate basis for state legislative 
apportionment.

Furthermore, California state law requires districting to be ac­
complished on the basis of total population. California Elections 
Code § 35000. No part of the holding in Richardson, or in any 
other case cited by the appellants, suggests that the requirements 
imposed by such state laws may be unconstitutional. In fact, in 
Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 747, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 
(1973), the Court approved a redistricting based on total popula­
tion, but with some deviations based upon consideration of polit­
ical factors. In approving that plan, the Court expressly noted 
that districting based upon total population would lead to some 
disparities in the size of the eligible voting population among 
districts. These differences arise from the number of people ineli­
gible to vote because of age, alienage, or non-residence, and be­
cause many people choose not to register or vote. Id. at 746-47, 
93 S. Ct. at 2328. The Court made no intimation that such dis­
parities would render those apportionment schemes constitution­
ally infirm.

Even the limited latitude Gaffney affords state and local gov­
ernments to depart from strict total population equality is un­
available here. The Supreme Court has held that unless a court 
ordering a redistricting plan can show that population variances 
are required by “significant state policies,’’ that court must devise 
a plan that provides for districts of equal population. Chapman v. 
Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24, 95 S. Ct. 751, 764 (1975). Since California



A-21

law requires equality of total population across districts, there are 
no locally relevant contrary policies.

There is an even more important consideration. Basing districts 
on voters rather than total population results in serious popula­
tion inequalities across districts. Residents of the more populous 
districts thus have less access to their elected representative. 
Those adversely affected are those who live in the districts with a 
greater percentage of non-voting populations, including aliens 
and children. Because there are more young people in the pre­
dominantly Hispanic District 1 (34.5% of the L.A. County His­
panic population (Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law re: 
County’s Remedial Plan, [App. A-200 to A-201])), citizens of 
voting age, minors and others residing in the district will suffer 
diminishing access to government in a voter-based apportionment 
scheme.

The purpose of redistricting is not only to protect the voting 
power of citizens; a coequal goal is to ensure “equal representa­
tion for equal numbers of people.” Kirpatrick, 394 U.S. at 531, 
89 S. Ct. at 1229. Interference with individuals’ free access to 
elected representatives impermissibly burdens their right to peti­
tion the government. Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137, 81 S. Ct. 523, 539, 
reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 875, 81 S. Ct. 899 (1961). Since “the whole 
concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people 
to make their wishes known to their representatives,” this right 
to petition is an important corollary to the right to be represented. 
Id. Non-citizens are entitled to various federal and local benefits, 
such as emergency medical care and pregnancy-related care pro­
vided by Los Angeles County. California Welfare and Institutions 
Code §§ 14007.5; 17000. As such, they have a right to petition 
their government for services and to influence how their tax dol­
lars are spent.

In this case, basing districts on voting population rather than 
total population would disproportionately affect these rights for



A-22

people living in the Hispanic district. Such a plan would dilute 
the access of voting age citizens in that district to their represen­
tative, and would similarly abridge the right of aliens and minors 
to petition that representative. For over a century, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that aliens are “persons” within the mean­
ing of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, entitled to 
equal protection. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368, 6 S. 
Ct. 1064, 1070 (1886). This equal protection right serves to allow 
political participation short of voting or holding a sensitive public 
office. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984) 
(law that would have denied alien the right to become a notary 
public and thereby assist in litigation for the benefit of migrant 
workers struck down under strict scrutiny equal protection anal­
ysis); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2120 (1977) (state’s 
interest in educating its electorate does not justify excluding 
aliens from state scholarship program, since aliens may partici­
pate in their communities in ways short of voting). Minors, too, 
have the right to political expression. Tinker v. Des Moines Com­
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-13, 89 S. Ct. 733, 739-40 
(1969). To refuse to count people in constructing a districting 
plan ignores these rights in addition to burdening the political 
rights of voting age citizens in affected districts.

The principles were well expressed by the California Supreme 
Court in its opinion in Calderon v. City o f Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 3d 
253, 258-59, 93 Cal.Rptr. 361, 365-66 (1971), in holding that the 
United States Constitution requires apportionment by total pop­
ulation, not by voting population.

Although we are, of course, constrained by the supremacy 
clause (U.S. Const, art VI, cl.2) to follow decisions of the 
Supreme Court on matters of constitutional interpretation, 
we emphasize that we do so here not only from constitu­
tional compulsion but also as a matter of conviction. Adher­
ence to a population standard, rather than one based on 
registered voters, is more likely to guarantee that those who 
cannot or do not cast a ballot may still have some voice in 
government.



A-23

Thus, a 17-year-old, who by state law is prohibited from 
voting, may still have strong views on the Vietnam War 
which he wishes to communicate to the elected representa­
tive from his area. Furthermore, much of a legislator’s time 
is devoted to providing services and information to his con­
stituents, both voters and nonvoters. A district which, al­
though large in population, has a low percentage of regis­
tered voters would, under a voter-based apportionment, have 
fewer representatives to provide such assistance and to listen 
to concerned citizens, (footnote omitted).

Judge Kozinski’s dissent would require districting on the basis 
of voting capability. Adoption of Judge Kozinski’s position would 
constitute a denial of equal protection to these Hispanic plaintiffs 
and rejection of a valued heritage.

D. Rejection o f the Supervisors’ Proposal
After it found that the County’s districting plan was statutorily 

and constitutionally invalid, the district court gave the County 20 
days to develop and propose a remedial plan of its own. The 
County submitted a plan, but the district court rejected it be­
cause, although it did create a district that had a Hispanic major­
ity, it unnecessarily fragmented other Hispanic populations in the 
County. The district court found that such fragmentation posed 
an impediment to Hispanic political cohesiveness. Furthermore, 
the district court objected to the placement of the Hispanic ma­
jority district in a section controlled by a powerful incumbent, 
rather than in the one section that had a naturally occurring open 
seat, an open seat that was “in the heart of the Hispanic core.” 
For these reasons, the district court found that the County’s plan 
did not represent a good faith effort to remedy the violation. The 
County objects to the district court’s rejection of its proposal. It 
argues that the district court may not substitute “even what it 
considers to be an objectively superior plan for an otherwise con­
stitutionally and legally valid plan,” citing Wright v. City o f Hous­
ton, 806 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1986); Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 
143, 151 (5th Cir. 1985).



A-24

However, there appear to be at least two fundamental reasons 
why the district court was not required to defer to the plan put 
forward by the supervisors in this case. First, as two of the super­
visors themselves point out in their separate brief on the issue, the 
plan that the Board submitted to the district court could not, 
under the County’s charter, have been considered a Board Redis­
tricting plan, because only three members voted in favor of it, not 
the four required for such matters. Los Angeles County Charter, 
Art. II, Sec. 7 (1985). Thus, the proposal was not an act of legis­
lation; rather, it was a suggestion by some members of the Board, 
entitled to consideration along with the other suggestions that 
have been received. Second, the district court found that it did 
not constitute a good faith attempt to remedy the violation be­
cause, inter alia, it used unnatural configurations in order to place 
an Anglo incumbent in the new Hispanic district, and it frag­
mented some Hispanic communities in other districts in the same 
manner in which the Board had deliberately diluted Hispanic 
influence in the past.

E. The County’s Claim o f Reverse Discrimination

The County argues that, by deliberately creating a district with 
a Hispanic majority, the district court engaged in discrimination 
in favor of a minority group of the type forbidden by City o f 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 4769, 109 S. Ct. 706 
(1989). It claims to have had a valid defense based upon the 
district court’s “creation of an equal protection violation in order 
to establish a Section 2 claim.” The district court erred, it con­
tends, in refusing to address this constitutional defense.

The County makes no suggestion, however, that the redistrict­
ing plan somehow dilutes the voting strength of the Anglo com­
munity. The deliberate construction of minority controlled voting 
districts is exactly what the Voting Rights Act authorizes. Such 
districting, whether worked by a court or by a political entity in 
the first instances, does not violate the constitution. United Jewish



A-25

Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S. Ct. 996 (1977). For 
that reason, the district court properly refused to consider the 
appellants’ constitutional defense.

III. The Flores Appeal

Sarah Flores appeals from the District Court’s denial of her 
petition to intervene. Her petition was based upon her interest in 
the outcome of the suit as a candidate in the election that stood 
to be invalidated. Under the plan adopted by the district court, 
she would be eligible to run for election in the new Hispanic 
district. Under the status quo, she was scheduled to participate 
in a runoff election against one other candidate. The district court 
dismissed her petition to intervene because it was untimely and 
because, in any event, the interests that she claimed to advocate 
either were already represented in the case or had not been 
proven to exist.

A party is entitled to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. 
Pro. 24(a)(2) if that party moves to do so in a timely fashion and 
asserts an interest in the subject of the litigation, shows that the 
asserted interest stands to be impeded or impaired if the litigation 
goes forth without intervention, and demonstrates that the inter­
est is not adequately represented by the parties to the litigation. 
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 
1983). In determining whether a motion to intervene is timely, a 
court must consider whether intervention will cause delay that 
will prejudice the existing parties. United States v. Oregon, 745
F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984).

Where a would-be intervenor does not demonstrate interests 
sufficiently weighty to warrant intervention as of right, the court 
may nevertheless consider eligibility for permissive intervention 
under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(b)(2). Courts will allow such inter­
vention where the intervenor raises a claim that has questions of 
law or fact in common with the main case, shows independent



A-26

grounds for jurisdiction, and moves to intervene in a timely fash­
ion. Venegas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989), ajfd, 
110 S. Ct. 1678 (1990). The decision to grant or deny this type of 
intervention is discretionary, subject to considerations of equity 
and judicial economy. Id. at 530-31. Sarah Flores sought both 
intervention as of right and, in the alternative, permissive inter­
vention in the proceedings below. The district court denied inter­
vention on either ground.

This ruling was correct. Flores knew that this lawsuit was 
pending at the time when she decided to run in the election, and 
knew that part of the relief sought was a redistricting plan that 
could affect the outcome of that election. She did not petition to 
intervene until four months after she declared her candidacy, 
which was almost two years after the proceedings had been insti­
tuted. While Flores points out that the entry of a trial into a “new 
stage” may be the appropriate point for intervention, such is only 
the case where the new phase develops as a result of a change in 
the law or the factual circumstances. See United States v. Oregon, 
745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984). Here, the new phase came about in 
the general progression of the case to a close. It was a foreseeable 
part of a chain of events. Therefore, Flores’ delay cannot be ex­
cused on this ground. Introduction of a new party at that late 
stage could have resulted in irreversible prejudicial delay in a case 
where time was of the essence.

IV. The Election
A motions panel of this court entered an order which had the 

effect of staying the county’s election procedures pending our 
decision. Because the time schedule originally contemplated by 
the district court’s order can no longer be followed, we RE­
MAND for the district court to impose a new schedule pursuant 
to which the primary, and if necessary, a general election can be 
conducted. Because it is imperative that such election procedures 
go forward as soon as practicable the opinion of this panel shall 
constitute the mandate.



A-27

The judgment of the district court on liability and its decision 
as to remedy are AFFIRMED. The scheduling provisions of the 
district court’s order of August 6, 1989 are VACATED and the 
matter is REMANDED for the purpose of determining the 
schedule for elections under the district court’s redistricting plan. 
We issue the mandate now because 42 U.S.C. § 1971(g) requires 
that voting rights cases “be in every way expedited.”

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND RE­
MANDED. THE MANDATE SHALL ISSUE FORTHWITH.

Counsel

John E. McDermott, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants- 
Appellants County of Los Angeles

Thomas K. Bourke, Los Angeles, California, for Appellant 
Flores

Mark D. Rosenbaum, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs- 
Appellees Garza

Irv Gornstein and Jessica Dunsay Silver, Department of Jus­
tice, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee United States of 
America

Theodore Shaw, Los Angeles, California, for Intervenor- 
Appellee

Garza v. County o f Los Angeles, et al.

No. 90-55944

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting in part:
I. Liability
A determination by a federal court that elected officials have 

intentionally discriminated against some of their constituents is a 
matter of no little moment. While I join the liability portion of 
Judge Schroeder’s opinion without reservation, I write briefly to



A-28

explain, for the benefit of those not conversant with the esoterica 
of federal discrimination law, what today’s ruling means—and 
what it does not.

First the good news. Nothing in the majority opinion, or in the 
district court’s findings which we review and approve today, sug­
gests that the County supervisors who adopted the 1981 reappor­
tionment—all of whom are still in office—harbored any ethnic or 
racial animus toward the Los Angeles Hispanic community. In 
other words, there is no indication that what the district court 
found to be intentional discrimination was based on any dislike, 
mistrust, hatred or bigotry against Hispanics or any other minor­
ity group. Indeed, the district court seems to have found to the 
contrary. See Garza v. County o f Los Angeles, Nos. 88-5143 & 88- 
5435, [App. A-54 to A-55] (C.D. Cal. June 4, 1990) (“The Court 
believes that had the Board found it possible to protect their 
incumbencies while increasing Hispanic voting strength, they 
would have acted to satisfy both objectives.”)6

Which brings us to what this case does stand for. When the 
dust has settled and local passions have cooled, this case will be 
remembered for its lucid demonstration that elected officials en­
gaged in the single-minded pursuit of incumbency can run rough­
shod over the rights of protected minorities. The careful find in gs 
of the district court graphically document the pattern—a contin­
uing practice of splitting the Hispanic core into two or more

6The lay reader might wonder if there can be intentional discrimina­
tion without an invidious motive. Indeed there can. A simple example 
may help illustrate the point. Assume you are an Anglo homeowner 
who lives in an all-white neighborhood. Suppose, also, that you harbor 
no ill feelings toward minorities. Suppose further, however, that some 
of your neighbors persuade you that having an integrated neighborhood 
would lower property values and that you stand to lose a lot of money 
on your home. On the basis of that belief, you join a pact not to sell 
your house to minorities. Have you engaged in intentional racial and 
ethnic discrimination? Of course you have. Your personal feelings to­
ward minorities don’t matter; what matters is that you intentionally 
took actions calculated to keep them out of your neighborhood.



A-29

districts to prevent the emergence of a strong Hispanic challenger 
who might provide meaningful competition to the incumbent su­
pervisors. The record is littered with telltale signs that 
reapportionments going back at least as far as 1959 were moti­
vated, to no small degree, by the desire to assure that no supervi­
sorial district would include too much of the burgeoning Hispanic 
population.

But the record here illustrates a more general proposition: Pro­
tecting incumbency and safeguarding the voting rights of minori­
ties are purposes often at war with each other. Ethnic and racial 
communities are natural breeding grounds for political challeng­
ers; incumbents greet the emergence of such power bases in their 
districts with all the hospitality corporate managers show hostile 
takeover bids. What happened here—the systematic splitting of 
the ethnic community into different districts—is the obvious, 
time-honored and most effective way of averting a potential chal­
lenge. Incumbency carries with it many other subtle and not-so- 
subtle advantages, see Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic 
Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses o f Incumbency, 49 
Ohio St. LJ. 773-81 (1988), and incumbents who take advantage 
of their status so as to assure themselves a secure seat at the 
expense of emerging minority candidates may well be violating 
the Voting Rights Act. Today’s case barely opens the door to our 
understanding of the potential relationship between the preserva­
tion of incumbency and invidious discrimination, but it surely 
gives weight to the Seventh Circuit’s observation that “many de­
vices employed to preserve incumbencies are necessarily racially 
discriminatory.” Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1408 (7th Cir. 
1984) cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985).

The Supreme Court in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), 
left open whether and under what circumstances political gerry­
mandering may amount to a violation of the Voting Rights Act. 
Id. at 118 n. 8. The record before us strongly suggests that politi-



A-30

cal gerrymandering tends to strengthen the grip of incumbents at 
the expense of emerging minority communities. Where, as here, 
the record shows that ethnic or racial communities were split to 
assure a safe seat for an incumbent, there is a strong inference— 
indeed a presumption—that this was a result of intentional dis­
crimination, even absent the type of smoking gun evidence un­
covered by these plaintiffs. State and local officials nationwide 
might well take this lesson to heart as they go about the task of 
decennial redistricting.

II. The Remedy

While I enthusiastically join the majority as to liability, I have 
two points of disagreement as to the remedy. The first is really 
just a quibble: I agree with the majority that the County’s pro­
posed plan was not entitled to any deference. The Los Angeles 
County Charter requires at least four supervisors to pass a reap­
portionment plan. Los Angeles County Charter Art. 2, § 7. Since 
two of the five supervisors opposed the plan proposed by the 
County, see maj. op. [App. A-24], it is obvious that the “proposal 
was not an act of legislation; rather, it was a suggestion by some 
members of the Board,” id., not entitled to the special deference 
afforded apportionment plans that are the legislative act of the 
apportioning body.

The majority’s alternative reason for upholding the district 
court’s rejection of the plan, contained in the last sentence of part 
II. D of the opinion, is therefore dicta, and dicta about which I 
harbor some doubt. It is not at all clear to me that, had the Board 
of Supervisors adopted the apportionment plan proposed by the 
County, the reasons relied on by the district court for rejecting 
the plan would be sufficient. Certainly the issue is far more diffi­
cult than the majority’s casual reference acknowledges. I would 
prefer to see a more detailed discussion of the issue before adopt­
ing the majority’s conclusion as the law of the circuit, but a more 
extensive discussion is inappropriate, as it’s all dicta anyhow. The



A-31

more prudent course would be to reserve the issue for a day when 
it is squarely presented to us.

My second disagreement is more substantive; I cannot agree 
with the majority’s conclusion, contained in part II.C of the opin­
ion, that the district court’s reapportionment plan complies with 
the one person one vote principle announced by the Supreme 
Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). While the ma­
jority may ultimately be vindicated, its conclusion is hard to 
square with what the Supreme Court has said on this issue up to 
now.

A. Before plumbing the doctrinal waters in this murky area of 
constitutional law, it is worth stating exactly what the County is 
complaining about. In drawing the remedial plan in this case, the 
district court adhered closely to state law which calls for supervi­
sorial districts that are equal in population. In doing so, the court 
wound up with two districts where the numbers of voting age 
citizens are markedly lower than those in the three other dis­
tricts.7 The disparity is particularly great between Districts 1 and 
3. District 1 has 707,651 eligible voters while District 3 has 
1,098,663, a difference of 391,012, about 55% of the eligible vot­
ers in District 1. Since it takes a majority in each district to elect 
a supervisor, this means that the supervisor from District 1 can 
be elected on the basis of 353,826 votes (less than the difference

7The district court’s remedy finding No. 5 sets forth the relevant 
figures for the districting plan it adopted:

District Total White Black Hispanic Other

1 707,651 25.4 3.5 59.4 11.6
2 922,180 23.8 50.8 17.1 8.3
3 1,098,663 77.0 4.3 13.9 4.7
4 1,081,089 67.5 4.4 19.7 8.4
5 1,088,388 69.8 6.2 18.1 5.9
TOTAL 4,897,971 55.8 13.4 23.3 7.5
Findings and Order Regarding Remedial Redistricting Plan and Elec­
tion Schedule [App. A-154] (filed Aug. 6, 1990).



A-32

between the two districts), while the supervisor from District 3 
requires at least 549,332 votes. Put another way, a vote cast in 
District 1 counts for almost twice as much as a vote cast in 
District 3.

B. Does a districting plan that gives different voting power to 
voters in different parts of the county impair the one person one 
vote principle even though raw population figures are roughly 
equal? It certainly seems to conflict with what the Supreme Court 
has said repeatedly. For example, in Reynolds, the Court stated: 
“Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or 
means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly 
seems justifiable.” 377 U.S. at 563. The Court also stated: “With 
respect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, 
as citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of 
where they live,” id. at 565; and “Simply stated, an individual’s 
right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired 
when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared 
with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State,” id. at 
568;8 and “the basic principle of representative government re­
mains, and must remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen’s 
vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives,” id. at 567.

Almost identical language appears in numerous cases both be­
fore Reynolds, see, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) 
(“To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another 
would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of demo­
cratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of 
Representatives elected ‘by the People.’ ”); Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. 368, 379 (1963) (“Once the geographical unit for which a 
representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in 
the election are to have an equal vote—whatever their race, what­
ever their sex, whatever their occupation, whatever their income,

8This language is also quoted in G a ffn e y  v. C u m m in g s , 412 U.S. 735,
744 (1973).



A-33

and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit.”9); 
and after, see, e.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 56 
(1970) (“[W]hen members of an elected body are chosen from 
separate districts, each district must be established on a basis that 
will insure, as far as is practicable, that equal numbers of voters 
can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.”); Chap­
man v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24 (1975) (“All citizens are affected 
when an apportionment plan provides disproportionate voting 
strength, and citizens in districts that are underrepresented lose 
something even if they do not belong to a specific minority 
group.”); Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 
259, 265 (1977) (“[I]n voting for their legislators, all citizens have 
an equal interest in representative democracy, and . . . the con­
cept of equal protection therefore requires that their votes be 
given equal weight.”).

The Court adhered to the same formulation as recently as two 
Terms ago: “In calculating the deviation among districts, the 
relevant inquiry is whether ‘the vote of any citizen is approxi­
mately equal in weight to that of any other citizen.’ ” Board of 
Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433, 1441 (1989) (quoting Rey­
nolds, 377 U.S. at 579).

Despite these seemingly clear and repeated pronouncements by 
the Supreme Court, the majority’s position is not without sup­
port, as the Court has also said things suggesting that equality of 
population is the guiding principle. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. 
at 568 (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of 
a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population 
basis.”); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321 (1973) (“[T]he basic 
constitutional principle [is] equality of population among the dis­
tricts.”); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969) 
(“ ‘[E]qual representation for equal numbers of people [is] the

9This language is also quoted in M o o r e  v. O g ilv ie , 394 U.S. 814, 817
(1969), and R e y n o ld s , 377 U.S. at 557-58.



A-34

fundamental goal for the House of Representatives.’ ” (quoting 
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18)).

In most cases, of course, the distinction between the two for­
mulations makes no substantive difference: Absent significant de­
mographic variations in the proportion of voting age citizens to 
total population, apportionment by population will assure equal­
ity of voting strength and vice versa. Here, however, we do have 
a demographic abnormality, and the selection of an apportion­
ment base does make a material difference: Apportionment by 
population can result in unequally weighted votes, while assuring 
equality in voting power might well call for districts of unequal 
population.

How does one choose between these two apparently conflicting 
principles? It seems to me that reliance on verbal formulations is 
not enough; we must try to distill the theory underlying the prin­
ciple of one person one vote and, on the basis of that theory, select 
the philosophy embodied in the fourteenth amendment. Coming 
up with the correct theory is made no easier by the fact that the 
Court has been less than consistent in its choice of language and 
that, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his Reynolds dissent, “both 
the language and history of the controlling provisions of the Con­
stitution [have been] wholly ignored” by the Court, 377 U.S. at 
591 (Harlan, J., dissenting), making it impossible to rely on the 
Constitution for any meaningful guidance. Still we must try.

C. While apportionment by population and apportionment by 
number of eligible electors normally yield precisely the same re­
sult, they are based on radically different premises and serve ma­
terially different purposes. Apportionment by raw population em­
bodies the principle of equal representation; it assures that all 
persons living within a district—whether eligible to vote or not— 
have roughly equal representation in the governing body.10 A

10It is established, of course, that an elected official represents all 
persons residing within his district, whether or not they are eligible to 
vote and whether or not they voted for the official in the preceding 
election. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality).



A-35

principle of equal representation serves important purposes: It 
assures that constituents have more or less equal access to their 
elected officials, by assuring that no official has a disproportion­
ately large number of constituents to satisfy. Also, assuming that 
elected officials are able to obtain benefits for their districts in 
proportion to their share of the total membership of the gov­
erning body, it assures that constituents are not afforded unequal 
government services depending on the size of the population in 
their districts.

Apportionment by proportion of eligible voters serves the prin­
ciple of electoral equality. This principle recognizes that electors 
—persons eligible to vote—are the ones who hold the ultimate 
political power in our democracy. This is an important power 
reserved only to certain members of society; states are not re­
quired to bestow it upon aliens, transients, short-term residents, 
persons convicted of crime, or those considered too young. See J. 
Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.N. Young, Constitutional Law § 14.31, 
at 722-23 (3d ed. 1986).

The principle of electoral equality assures that, regardless of 
the size of the whole body of constituents, political power, as 
defined by the number of those eligible to vote, is equalized as 
between districts holding the same number of representatives. It 
also assures that those eligible to vote do not suffer dilution of 
that important right by having their vote given less weight than 
that of electors in another location. Under this paradigm, the 
fourteenth amendment protects a right belonging to the individ­
ual elector and the key question is whether the votes of some 
electors are materially undercounted because of the manner in 
which districts are apportioned.

It is very difficult, in my view, to read the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements in this area without concluding that what lies at 
the core of one person one vote is the principle of electoral equal­
ity, not that of equality of representation. To begin with, the name



A-36

by which the court has consistently identified this constitutional 
right—one person one vote—is an important clue that the Court’s 
primary concern is with equalizing the voter power of electors, 
making sure that each voter gets one vote—not two, five or ten, 
Reynolds, 377 U. S. at 562; or one-half.

But we need not rely on inferences from what is essentially an 
aphorism, for the Court has told us exactly and repeatedly what 
interest this principle serves. In its most recent pronouncement 
in the area, the Court stated: “ The personal right to vote is a value 
in itself, and a citizen is, without more and without mathemati­
cally calculating his power to determine the outcome of an elec­
tion, shortchanged i f  he may vote for only one representative when 
citizens in a neighboring district, o f equal population, vote for two; 
or to put it another way, if he may vote for one representative 
and the voters in another district half the size also elect one 
representative.” Morris, 109 S. Ct. at 1440 (emphasis added).

References to the personal nature of the right to vote as the 
bedrock on which the one person one vote principle is founded 
appear in the case law with monotonous regularity. Thus, in Had­
ley v. Junior College District, the Court stated: “[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that the trustees of this junior college dis­
trict be apportioned in a manner that does not deprive any voter 
of his right to have his own vote given as much weight, as far as 
is practicable, as that of any other voter in the junior college 
district.” 397 U.S. at 52. The Court further explained: “[A] qual­
ified voter has a constitutional right to vote in elections without 
having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or diluted,” id. (foot­
note omitted); and “This Court has consistently held in a long 
series of cases, that in situations involving elections, the States are 
required to insure that each person’s vote counts as much, insofar 
as it is practicable, as any other person’s,” id. at 54 (footnote 
omitted); and “once a State has decided to use the process of 
popular election and ‘once the class of voters is chosen and their 
qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by which



A-37

equality of voting power may be evaded,’ ” id. at 59 (quoting 
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. at 381).

Reynolds itself brims over with concern about the rights of 
citizens to cast equally weighted votes: “[T]he judicial focus must 
be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any 
discrimination against certain of the State’s citizens which con­
stitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally 
protected right to vote.” 377 U.S. at 561. Again: “Full and effec­
tive participation by all citizens in state government requires, 
therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the 
election of members of his state legislature.” Id. at 565.11 And yet 
again: “And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement 
or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as 
by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Id. at 
555. Reynolds went so far as to suggest that “[t]o the extent that 
a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.” 
Id. at 567.

While the Court has repeatedly expressed its concern with 
equalizing the voting power of citizens as an ultimate constitu­
tional imperative—akin to protecting freedom of speech or free­
dom of religion—its various statements in support of the principle 
of equal representation have been far more conditional. Indeed, a 
careful reading of the Court’s opinions suggests that equalizing 
total population is viewed not as an end in itself, but as a means 
of achieving electoral equality. Thus, the Court stated in Rey­
nolds: “[T]he overriding objective must be substantial equality of 
population among the various districts, so that the vote of any 
citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other 
citizen in the State.” Id. at 579 (emphasis added). This language 
has been quoted in numerous subsequent cases. See Gaffney, 412 
U.S. at 744; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973); Burns,

nThis language is also quoted in W h itc o m b  v. C h a v is , 403 U.S. 124,
141 (1971).



A-38

384 U.S. at 91 n.20. In Connor v. Finch, 432 U.S. 407, 416 (1977), 
the Court stated the proposition as follows: “The Equal Protec­
tion Clause requires that legislative districts be of nearly equal 
population, so that each person’s vote may be given equal weight 
in the election of representatives.” (emphasis added).12

Particularly indicative of the subservience of the representa­
tional principle to the principle of electoral equality is Gaffney v. 
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), on which the majority mistak­
enly relies. Gaffney deals with the question of how much variation 
in population is permissible in effectuating the one person one 
vote principle of Reynolds. The Supreme Court held that absolute 
mathematical precision is not necessary. Total population, the 
Court pointed out, is only a proxy for equalizing the voting 
strength of eligible voters. But, the Court noted, it is not a perfect 
proxy; voters might not be distributed homogeneously through­
out the population, for example. Therefore, “it makes little sense 
to conclude from relatively minor ‘census population’ variations 
among legislative districts that any person’s vote is being substan­
tially diluted.” Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745-46. The Court continued:

What is more, it must be recognized that total population, 
even if absolutely accurate as to each district when counted, 
is nevertheless not a talismanic measure o f the weight o f a 
person’s vote under a later adopted reapportionment plan. The 
United States census is more of an event than a process. It 
measures population at only a single instant in time. District 
populations are constantly changing, often at different rates 
in either direction, up or down. Substantial differentials in 
population growth rates are striking and well-known phe­
nomena. So, too, i f  it is the weight o f a person’s vote that 
matters, total population—even if stable and accurately

12The Court has continued to justify the requirement of equality of 
populations as a means of assuring that “each citizen’s portion [is] 
equal.” Morris, 109 S. Ct. at 1438; see also Lockport v. Citizens for 
Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 264 (1977) (“[I]t has been established 
that the Equal Protection Clause cannot tolerate the disparity in indi­
vidual voting strength that results when elected officials represent dis­
tricts of unequal population . . . .”).



A-39

taken—may not actually reflect that body of voters whose 
votes must be counted and weighed for the purposes of re­
apportionment, because “census persons” are not voters.

Id. at 746 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

Finally, there is the teaching of Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 
73 (1966), which the majority dismisses far too lightly. Because 
it is the only Supreme Court case applying the one person one 
vote principle in a situation where there were large numbers of 
residents not eligible to vote—it being the only case where there 
was a divergence between the representational principle and the 
principle of electoral equality—the case deserves a more careful 
examination. While Burns does not, by its terms, purport to re­
quire that apportionments equalize the number of qualified elec­
tors in each district, the logic of the case strongly suggests that 
this must be so. As noted earlier, in a situation such as ours—as 
that in Burns—one or the other of the principles must give way. 
If the ultimate objective were to serve the representational prin­
ciple, that is to equalize populations, Burns would be inexplicable, 
as it approved deviations from strict population equality that 
were wildly in excess of what a strict application of that principle 
would permit.13

Burns can only be explained as an application of the principle 
of electoral equality; the Court approved the departure from strict 
population figures because raw population did not provide an 
accurate measure of whether the voting strength of each citizen

13In Burns, the ninth and tenth districts contained 28% of Oahu’s 
total population, yet were entitled to only 6 representatives. The fif­
teenth and sixteenth districts, on the other hand, contained only 21% 
of the population, but were entitled to 10 representatives. Burns, 384 
U.S. at 90-91 & n.18. Thus, in districts 9 and 10, there was one repre­
sentative for every 4.67% of Oahu’s total population, whereas in dis­
tricts 15 and 16, there was one representative for every 2.1% of the 
population. This deviation of well over 100%—122%, in fact—far ex­
ceeds the population deviations held permissible by the Supreme Court 
in the line of cases discussed below. See App. A-42 to A-43 infra.



A-40

was equal. Thus, while Burns spoke in permissive terms, its logic 
is far more categorical.

The only other way to explain the result in Bums is to assume 
that there is no principle at all at play here, that one person one 
vote is really nothing more than a judicial squinting of the eye, a 
rough-and-ready determination whether the apportionment 
scheme complies with some standard of proportionality the re­
viewing court happens to find acceptable. I am reluctant to as­
cribe such fluidity to a constitutional principle that the Supreme 
Court has told us embodies “fundamental ideas of democratic 
government,” Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 8.14

When considered against the Supreme Court’s repeated pro­
nouncements that the right being protected by the one person one 
vote principle is personal and limited to citizens, the various ar­
guments raised by the majority do not carry the day. Thus, the 
Court’s passing reference in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 
531 (1969), to “preventing] debasement of voting power and 
diminution of access to elected representatives” suggests only that 
the Court did not consider the possibility that the twin goals 
might diverge in some cases. As Kirkpatrick contains no discus­
sion of the issue, it provides no clue as to which principle has 
primacy where there is a conflict between the two.

Similarly unpersuasive is the majority’s citation of cases that 
hold that aliens and the young enjoy many constitutional rights 
on the same basis as citizens. Maj. op. [App. A-21 to A-22], One 
right aliens and children do not enjoy is the right to vote. Insofar 
as the Court views its one person one vote jurisprudence as pro­
tecting the right to vote enjoyed only by citizens, see [App. A-32 
to A-34] supra, it’s entirely beside the point what other rights 
noncitizens may enjoy. If, as I suggest, one person one vote pro­

14One’s resolve in this regard is put to the test by Brown v. Thomson, 
462 U.S. 835 (1983). See id. at 850 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note [16] 
infra.



A-41

tects a right uniquely held by citizens, it would be a dilution of 
that right to allow noncitizens to share therein.15

Finally, I understand my colleagues to be suggesting that, as a 
matter of policy, the principle of equal representation is far wiser 
than the principle of electoral equality. Were I free to disregard 
the explicit and repeated statements of the Supreme Court, I 
might well find this argument persuasive. But I am not free to 
ignore what I regard as binding direction from the Supreme 
Court, so my own policy views on this matter make no difference.

All that having been said, I must acknowledge that my col­
leagues may ultimately have the better of the argument. We are 
each attempting to divine from language used by the Supreme 
Court in the past what the Court would say about an issue it has 
not explicitly addressed. While much of the language and some 
of the rationale of the Supreme Court’s decisions clearly support 
my view, other language, as well as tradition, supports my col­
leagues. Were the Supreme Court to take up the issue, I would 
not be surprised to see it limit or abandon the principle of elec­
toral-equality in favor of a principle of representational equality. 
But the implications of that decision must be considered by those 
who have the power to make such choices, not by us. My col­
leagues may well be looking into the future, but controlling guid­
ance comes from the past.

15My colleagues also rely on the fact that apportionment for the 
House of Representatives is based on whole population figures. But for 
reasons explained by the Supreme Court in Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 571- 
77, arguments based on the “federal analogy” are “inapposite and irrel­
evant to state legislative redistricting schemes,” id. at 573, and therefore 
are not particularly persuasive in the context of state and local appor­
tionment cases. Congressional apportionments are governed by section 
2 of the fourteenth amendment, which makes total population the ap­
portionment base; it says nothing about state apportionments. If this 
provision were meant to govern state legislative apportionments, the 
principle of one person one vote, based on a separate part of the four­
teenth amendment, would be superfluous.



A-42

D, Having concluded that it is the principle of electoral equal­
ity that lies at the heart of one person one vote, we must address 
whether the district court’s plan nevertheless falls within accept­
able limits. While the Supreme Court has not been completely 
consistent in its methodology, usually it creates hypothetical ideal 
districts (i.e., districts that contain precisely the same number of 
people) and then determines, in percentage terms, the degree of 
deviation between each of the actual districts and the ideal one. 
The maximum deviation is calculated by adding the percentage 
points that the largest district is above the ideal, to the percentage 
points the smallest is below. See, e.g., Brown v Thomson, 462 U.S. 
at 839, Mahan, 410 U.S. at 319. While the Court has always used 
raw population figures, not electors, there seems to be no reason 
to apply a different methodology when comparing numbers of 
electors.

Here, a hypothetical ideal district would contain 979,594 elec­
tors. See note [7] supra. Compared to this ideal district, the dis­
tricts under the plan adopted below deviate as set forth in the 
following table:
District #  Electors Raw Deviation % Deviation

1 707,651 -271,943 -28%
2 922,180 -57,414 -6 %
3 1,098,663 +  119,069 +  12%
4 1,081,089 +  101,495 +  10%
5 1,088,388 +108,794 +  11%

As this table demonstrates, the districts in the court-ordered 
plan contain very significant deviations from the ideal district. As 
expected, the greatest spread is between Districts 1 and 3, and it 
amounts to 40%. Equally significant are the individual devia­
tions. Only one district, number 2, has a number of electors close 
to the norm, i.e., a deviation within single digits. Three of the 
districts have deviations between 10% and 20% and one district 
has a deviation nearly three times that amount—28%.



A-43

If I am right that it is qualified electors, not raw population 
figures, that count, these deviations fall far outside the acceptable 
range. The Supreme Court’s cases in this area have defined three 
ranges of deviation that bear on the constitutionality of the plan. 
A maximum deviation of less than 10% is considered de minimis 
and will be acceptable without further inquiry. White v. Register, 
412 U.S. 755, 763 (1973). Deviations somewhat above 10% may 
be acceptable if justified by compelling and legitimate interests. 
See, e.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 184-85 (1971). And, the 
Court has stated quite clearly that deviations above this buffer 
range will not be acceptable at all, even if justified by the most 
compelling and legitimate interests. The Court has not precisely 
identified the upper range for this buffer category, but does not 
appear to have approved any plans having a maximum deviation 
over 20%.16

It should be noted that, in discussing the range of possible 
deviations, the Court in all of these cases was comparing total 
population figures. Gaffney, however, tells us that deviation in 
total population figures is permissible, to some extent at least, 
because raw population is only an approximation of the number 
of electors. 412 U.S. at 746. It may well be that where, as here, 
the comparison is between the number of electors, the permissible 
range of deviation is much narrower.

16The only contrary authority seems to be Brown v Thomson, as to 
which it is not clear at all what the relevant deviation was. The only 
deviation mentioned by the majority and concurring opinions is 89%, 
which was the degree of deviation of one particularly small county. But 
the majority and concurrence go to great lengths to assure us that that 
is not the relevant figure; the two concurring Justices expressed “the 
gravest doubts that a statewide legislative plan with an 89% maximum 
deviation could survive constitutional scrutiny . . . .” 462 U.S. at 850 
(O’Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring). Because of the peculiar 
procedural posture of the case, it is hard to tell just what the court 
viewed as the relevant deviation; it might have been 23%, see id. at 860 
n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting), although, for the reasons explained by the 
dissent, this figure, like the theory of the majority, seems to make little 
sense.



A-44

Even if we apply to this case the ranges established by the 
Court in cases involving raw population figures, it is clear that 
the district court’s plan falls far outside the permissible range. As 
far as I am aware, no plan has ever been approved with a maxi­
mum deviation of as much as 40%. If I read the Court’s cases 
correctly, deviation that large could not be justified even by the 
most compelling reasons. Nor, do I believe, has the district court 
even advanced reasons that would permit it to go beyond the 10% 
de minimis range. Such reasons may exist, but they are not artic­
ulated in the record. Four out of the five districts therefore fall 
outside the acceptable range for purposes of one person one vote.

E. Having concluded that the district court’s plan runs a-foul 
of the one person one vote principle, we arrive at the single most 
difficult issue in this case: To what extent, if any, this principle 
may have to give way when it collides with a remedial plan de­
signed to cure the effects of discrimination.

There is, as far as I am aware, little or no guidance on this 
issue. All prior cases alleging violations of one person one vote 
involved a conflict between that constitutional principle and vari­
ous interests advanced under state law. See, e.g., [App. A-42 to 
A-43] supra. Under such circumstances, even if the state is found 
to have a rational and compelling interest in deviating from sub­
stantial district equality, this interest may not justify more than a 
small range of deviations; beyond that, the state’s interest gives 
way to the constitutional imperative.

The balance may well be different where, as here, the compet­
ing interest is itself grounded in the fourteenth amendment or its 
derivative, the Voting Rights Act. What seems absolutely clear 
to me, however, is that the district court cannot simply ignore one 
person one vote in seeking to create a remedy. The Supreme 
Court has cautioned that district courts have “considerably nar­
rower” discretion than state legislatures to depart from the ideal 
of one person one vote, and that “the burden of articulating spe­



A-45

cial reasons for following [policies that would result in a depar­
ture are] correspondingly higher.” Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 
419-20 (1977). Moreover, “it is the reapportioning court’s respon­
sibility to articulate precisely why a plan of single-member dis­
tricts with minimal population variance cannot be adopted.” 
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975).

At the very least, it seems to me, the district court must make 
a determined effort to eliminate or minimize the electoral dispar­
ities within the districts, consistent with achieving the remedial 
purposes of the plan. In so doing, I should think the district court 
would have latitude of up to 20% maximum deviation from the 
ideal district, providing, of course, that it supplies an adequate 
explanation of why its purposes cannot be achieved within a nar­
rower range.

What if the district court determines that it cannot construct 
an adequate remedial plan without going beyond the 20% maxi­
mum deviation range? Under one view of the matter, one person 
one vote would not provide an absolute constraint on the court’s 
remedial powers, as the competing interest here is not state law— 
which necessarily takes a back seat to a constitutional imperative 
—but an interest of equivalent dignity, itself growing out of the 
same constitutional roots as one person one vote. Under this 
paradigm, the district court would be allowed, under certain cir­
cumstances, to go beyond the 20% buffer allowed by the earlier 
cases. The district court would have to make very specific findings 
on how it has sought to achieve substantial equality among the 
districts and why it has been unable to do so without sacrificing 
the remedial purpose of the plan. If supported by the record (i.e., 
if no one comes forward with a plan that can do what the district 
court says can’t be done), I should think that a much greater 
deviation from the ideal plan would be permissible, quite possibly 
as much as the 40% maximum deviation here.

There is, however, another paradigm: A plausible case could 
be made that the district court gets no greater latitude when it



A-46

acts pursuant to the Voting Rights Act because its remedial pow­
ers are absolutely constrained by the principle of one person one 
vote. The argument in support of this position grows not out of 
some hierarchy of values, but out of the nature of the remedial 
process. A reapportionment plan designed to remedy unlawful 
discrimination can have one purpose and one purpose only: To 
put the victims of discrimination in the position they would have 
enjoyed had there been no discrimination. Here, for example, the 
object would be to create the type of district that would have 
existed had the supervisors not continually split the Hispanic 
core.

Even if we make the most favorable assumptions about what 
might have been, we cannot conclude that the supervisors would 
have come up with a district that violated the constitutional con­
straint of one person one vote. Since we know that, in the normal 
course of events and in the absence of discrimination, no such 
district could have been created, no legitimate remedial purpose 
would be served by creating such a district now. Under this view 
of the matter, there would be no tension between the court’s 
remedial power and the principle of one person one vote, and 
therefore no justification for going beyond the 20% buffer. Even 
departures beyond the 10% de minimis buffer could, under this 
paradigm, be justified only upon a showing that compelling cir­
cumstances in the county would, in the absence of discrimination, 
have resulted in districts of greater than de minimis disparity.17

In is unnecessary to explore this conundrum, however, as it 
seems absolutely clear that we must remand to the district court 
on this issue. To begin with, the district court constructed the 
remedial plan under the mistaken impression that it w’as con­
strained by the state law requirement that supervisorial districts

17The Court has been somewhat vague as to what interests justify 
departure beyond the 10% de minimis buffer, but the only one clearly 
identified has been a long-standing and genuine desire to maintain the 
integrity of political subdivisions. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-81; Abate, 
403 U.S. at 183, 187.



A-47

be equal in population. It is clear, however, that where state law 
runs up against a constitutional constraint such as one person one 
vote, state law must yield. It is most emphatically not the case, as 
the majority suggests, that a district court, in drafting a remedial 
plan, is constrained by state apportionment law where that law 
would violate the Constitution.

Remand is also appropriate because the district court was ap­
parently not aware that it was, required to try—if at all possible— 
to construct a remedial plan that avoided the conflict between the 
two interests. Since the district court did not try, we do not know 
whether it is possible to reconcile both interests. A remand is 
necessary in order to find out. Only if it turns out that an effective 
remedial plan that also satisfies one person one vote cannot be 
constructed would I venture an opinion on the difficult question 
whether, to what extent and under what circumstances the prin­
ciple of one person one vote must yield when the district court 
exercises its equitable powers to remedy the effects of past dis­
crimination.

III. Expedited Issuance o f the Mandate
Reluctantly, I must also part company with my colleagues in 

their decision to issue the mandate forthwith. As it is clear from 
this action that this panel will not grant a stay, we place an 
unnecessary burden upon the parties, the district judge, our own 
colleagues and the Justices above us.

I well understand the reason for haste; delaying an election any 
longer than absolutely necessary should not be done lightly. Con­
sistent with that imperative, we have issued a significant opinion 
in an important and difficult case about three weeks after submis­
sion. No one can justly accuse us of sitting on our thumbs. Were 
the opinion unanimous, or were I convinced that our differences 
are relatively trivial, I would go along with expediting the man­
date.

But we do not all agree. Moreover, our disagreement goes to 
the heart of the district court’s remedial plan. Should there be



A-48-

further review, any steps taken by the district court and the par­
ties in implementing the majority opinion would be wasted. The 
more prudent course, is seems to me, would be to let the parties 
consider their options in a sober, unhurried fashion, as contem­
plated by the Federal Rules Appellate Procedure.

My able colleagues have advanced very compelling arguments 
as to why the one person one vote rule should be construed as 
embodying the principle of equal representation. I have suggested 
that much of the Court’s language and rationale supports the 
opposite view, that it is the principle of electoral equality that lies 
at the heart of one person one vote. We are not in a position to 
resolve this issue, which grows out of a lack of meaningful guid­
ance in a long series of Supreme Court opinions. Yet this issue 
will have immediate and growing significance as large popula­
tions of aliens are taking up residence in several of our largest 
states.18 The Supreme Court may deem it prudent to take up the 
issue before large-scale redistricting gets underway in 1991.

Given these considerations, I would preserve the opportunity 
to have the matter considered in a deliberative fashion, unhurried 
by the pendency of an election. For better or worse, the election 
was stayed, which allowed us to consider the case without the 
sword of Damocles hanging over our heads. I would offer the 
same opportunity for unhurried deliberation to our colleagues 
and to any of the Justices who might wish to consider the matter.

IV. Conclusion
This is a fascinating case. It poses many new questions which 

required the district court to sail into uncharted waters. For the 
most part, the district court—and the majority—got it right. But 
close is not close enough when important constitutional rights are 
at stake. I would order a limited remand for the district court to 
apply the teachings of Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny.

lsSee, e.g., Suro, Behind the Census Numbers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 
1990, § 4, at 4 col. 1.



A-49

FILED Nov. 7 1990 
CATHY A CATTERSON, CLERK 

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YOLANDA GARZA; SALVADOR 
LEDEZMA; RAYMOND PALACIOS;
MONICA TOVAR; GUADALUPE DE 
LA GARZA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY; DEANE DANA; PETER F. 
SCHABARUM; KENNETH F. HAHN,

Defendants-Appellants/

No. 90-55944

D.C. #CV-88-5135-KN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

and
LAWRENCE K. IRVIN;
SARAH FLORES,

In tervenors-Appellees,

O R D E R

Nos. 90-55945/ 
90-56024

D.C. #CV-88-5435-KN

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY; DEANE DANA; PETER F.
SCHABARUM; KENNETH F. HAHN,

Defendan ts-Appellan ts.
Before: SCHROEDER, NELSON AND KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges.

Judges Schroeder and Nelson have voted to deny appellants’ emer­
gency motion for recall of mandate and stay of further issuance pending 
determination of petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en 
banc and petition for writ of certiorari. Judge Kozinski would grant the 
motion.

The emergency motion is denied.



A-50

FILED 4 1990 
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
BY DEPUTY
®nitel> States Court 

Central Sistrirt of California
YOLANDA GARZA, et al„

Plaintiffs,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al„

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al„
Plaintiffs-Intervenors.

No. CV 88-5143 KN(Ex)

No. CV 88-5435 KN(Ex)

FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW



A-51

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

I. SUMMARY OF FIN D IN G S............... ................  [A-53]
II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. THE PARTIES................................. ..............  [A-56]
B. THE CLAIMS..................................................  [A-58]
C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. History o f Governing Body .......................  [A-58]
2. Demographics o f Los Angeles County. . . . .  [A-60]
3. Campaign Financing................................  [A-63]
4. Prior Redistrictings...................................  [A-64]

(a) 1959 Redistricting...........................  [A-65]
(b) 1963 Redistricting...........................  [A-66]
(c) 1965 Redistricting..........................  [A-67]
(d) 1971 Redistricting...........................  [A-69]

(1) Intent of Past Redistrictings . . . .  [A-72]
(e) 1972 City Council Redistricting . . . .  [A-73]
(f) 1981 Redistricting.............................  [A-74]

(1) Intent of 1981 Redistricting . . . .  [A-83]
D. SIZE AND GEOGRAPHIC COMPACT­

NESS OF HISPANIC COMMUNITY
1. 1980 Census Data ................. ................  [A-84]
2. Growth in Hispanic Population Since 1980 . [A-86]
3. Accuracy o f Post-Census Data................ [A-88]

(a) Reliability of PEPS Data...............  [A-88]
A. Citizen Voting Age Population .............  [A-91]
5. Voter Registration and Turnout . ............ [A-93]
6. Misreporting o f Citizenship............. [A-93]
7. Undercount o f Hispanics.....................   [A-97]
8. Spanish-Surname/Spanish-Origin .. . . . .  [A-97]
9. Deadwood...............     [A-100]

10. Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plans............... .. [A-102]
E. POLITICAL COHESIVENESS

1. Hispanic Candidacies in County 1978-1989
(a) Contests for County Supervisor . . . .  [A-104]
(b) Other Nonpartisan County Contests. [A-106]
(c) Non-County wide Elections............. [A-107]
(d) County wide Partisan Elections........ [A-109]



A-52

Page
2. Analysis o f Ethnically Polarized Voting

(a) Methodology ...................................  [A-111]
(b) Results of Analysis................... [A-l 14]

3. Cohesiveness o f Hispanic Voters ................  [A-l 17]
F. NON-HISPANIC BLOC VOTING___. . . . .  [A-122]
G. OTHER SENATE FACTORS

1. History o f Official Discrimination . . . . . . . .  [A-127]
(a) Repatriation ................ .....................  [A-127]
(b) Education.........................................  [A-127]
(c) Public Facilities...............................  [A-128]
(d) Right to V ote...................................  [A-128]

2. Racial Appeals...........................................  [A-130]
3. Size o f Election Districts  ......... [A-130]

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. JURISDICTION ........................... ................  [A-132]
B. THE VOTING RIGHTS AC T .........................  [A-132]

1. The Senate Factors.....................................  [A-133]
(a) Geographical Compactness. . . . . . . .  [A-137]

(1) Voting Age Population......... . [A-13 7]
(2) Current Population Data . . . . .  [A-13 8]
(3) Estimates and Projections........ [A-139]

(b) Political Cohesiveness.....................  [A-139]
(1) Ecological Regression Analysis . [A-140]

(c) Racial Bloc Voting...........................  [A-141 ]
(d) History of Discrimination . . . . . . . . .  [A-142]
(e) Other Discriminatory Practices . . . .  [A-144]
(f) Size of Election Districts.................. [A-144]
(g) Candidate Slating Process............... [A-144]
(h) Lingering Effect of Past Discrimina­

tion .............................................. . . [A-144]
(i) Election of Minorities ......................  [A-144]

C. DISCRIMINA TOR YRESUL TS V. INTENT . [A-145]
D. INTER-DECENNIAL REDISTRICTING . .. [A-148]
E. TOTAL POPULATION AS APPORTION­

MENT BASE ...................................................  [A-148]
F. ONE PERSON ONE VOTE R U L E ................ [A-149]
G. REAPPORTIONMENT.................................  [A-150]



A-53

I. SUMMAR Y OF FINDINGS

The Court has spent the past several weeks since the conclusion 
of this trial on April 18, 1990, immersed in what the Supreme 
Court in Thornburg v. Gingles referred to as a “searching evalua­
tion of ‘past and present reality’ ” and on a “ ‘functional’ view of 
the political process.” 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986) citing S.Rep. at 30, 
n.120, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 208. The con­
clusion this Court reaches is that, on a fundamental level, the 
Hispanic community has sadly been denied an equal opportunity 
to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of 
their choice to the Board of Supervisors for this burgeoning 
County.

As the findings below set forth, plaintiffs have adequately dem­
onstrated, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the 
1981 redistricting plan adopted by the Board of Supervisors vio­
lated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Specifically, the Court finds that the Hispanic community is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact such that a five 
district plan can be drawn in which Hispanics comprise a major­
ity of the citizen voting age population in one of the five districts. 
The post-1980 estimates of citizen voting age population, based 
upon PEPS data and the special tabulation of voting age citizens 
by the Census Bureau, are reliable as an alternative means of 
proof that under current conditions it is possible to create a su­
pervisorial district with an Hispanic citizen voting age population 
majority.

Further, even if the Court were to use 1980 Census data, plain­
tiffs have established through illustrative plans that Hispanic vot­
ing age citizens had the potential to elect the candidate of their 
choice absent a clear citizen voting age majority. It would be 
myopic, on these facts and circumstances, for the Court to apply 
the bright line 50 percent requirement set forth by the Ninth



A-54

Circuit in Romero v. City o f Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426 (9th 
Cir. 1989), as an absolute measure of undiluted minority voting 
strength. While this Court can imagine a number of circum­
stances in which the 50 percent figure is dispositive, as Justice 
O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Gingles:

“[T]here is no indication that Congress intended to mandate 
a single, universally applicable standard for measuring undi­
luted minority voting strength, regardless of local conditions 
and regardless of the extent of past discrimination against 
minority voters in a particular State or political subdivision.”

478 U.S. at 94-95 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

In this case, the explosive and continuous growth of the Los 
Angeles County Hispanic community was evident at the time of 
the adoption of the 1981 redistricting plan as was the steady 
decline of the County’s non-Hispanic white population. These 
facts, coupled with a long and painful history of discrimination 
against Hispanics in this County weighs heavily in favor of the 
conclusion that even relying solely on the 1980 Census data, 
plaintiffs have met their burden under Gingles.

The Court also finds that Hispanics are politically cohesive and 
that voting behavior is polarized between Hispanics and non-His- 
panics. In particular, the Court concludes that Hispanic voters 
regularly provide overwhelming support for Hispanic candidates 
while the degree of non-Hispanic cross-over voting is minimal 
Given the estimated levels of polarization, including the effects of 
non-Hispanic bloc voting, an Hispanic candidate is unable to be 
elected to the Board under the current configuration of supervi­
sorial districts.

During the 1981 redistricting process, the Supervisors’ primary 
objective was to protect their incumbencies and that of their al­
lies. This objective, however, was inescapably linked to the con­
tinued fragmentation of the Hispanic population core. The Court 
believes that had the Board found it possible to protect their



A-55

incumbencies while increasing Hispanic voting strength, they 
would have acted to satisfy both objectives. As defendants’ coun­
sel argued in opening statement:

“It was not, . . . the case of a Republican protecting [his] 
incumbency against the Hispanic Republican. It was the Re­
publican protecting himself or protecting his philosophical 
concerns and those of the ones who elected him from a 
change to a Democratic seat. . . . Now looking again to the 
motive of minority members on the Board of Supervisors. 
Again what you find is that it was not an effort by the Anglos 
to preclude Hispanics from getting elected. . . .  It was not 
because of a desire on anyone’s part to dilute or diffuse or to 
keep the Hispanic community powerless; it was because they 
could not find the way to do what everyone wanted to do. 
And that sometimes happens in politics.”

It is undeniable, however, that the Los Angeles County Board 
of Supervisors knew that by adopting the 1981 redistricting plan, 
they were further impairing the ability of Hispanics to gain rep­
resentation on the Board. The Court finds no legal justification 
for this form of discrimination based on the protection of super­
visorial incumbencies.

As the court stated in Rybicki v. State Board o f Elections, 574
F. Supp. 1082, 1109 (N.D. 111. 1982), where the requirements of 
incumbency “are so closely intertwined with the need for racial 
dilution . . .  an intent to maintain a safe, primarily white, district 
. . . is virtually coterminous with a purpose to practice racial 
discrimination.” The Court finds, on the evidence presented, that 
the Supervisors acted with the intent to maintain the fragmenta­
tion of the Hispanic vote.

Throughout this trial, the Court heard extensive testimony re­
garding the size of the supervisorial districts. The Court strongly 
believes, as one Supervisor testified, that the districts are now too 
large for any one person to adequately represent. The Court be­
lieves that expansion may well be in the best interest of all con­



A-56

cerned. However, the Court finds that while the size of the dis­
tricts contributes significantly to the inability of Hispanics to elect 
a candidate of their choice, plaintiffs have failed to establish a 
valid legal claim based solely on the size of the supervisorial 
districts.

Since the task of reapportionment is properly a legislative func­
tion, it is appropriate, in this case, to allow the Board of Supervi­
sors a reasonable opportunity to meet constitutional requirements 
by adopting a substitute measure. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 
540 (1978). It is the sincere hope of this Court that in fashioning 
a suitable remedy, defendants will carefully reconsider the issue 
of expansion.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. THE PARTIES

1. The United States of America is the plaintiff in the consoli­
dated case, No. CV 88-5435 KN, United States o f America v. 
County o f Los Angeles, et al. The United States was represented 
by Steven H. Rosenbaum, of the Voting Section, Civil Rights 
Division of the Justice Department.

2. Hispanic1 registered voters in Los Angeles County are the 
plaintiffs in this consolidated class action, No. CV 88-5143 KN, 
Yolanda Garza, et al. v. County o f Los Angeles, et al. The class 
representatives include: plaintiff Yolanda Garza, a resident of 
Supervisorial District One; plaintiff Salvador H. Ledezma, a resi­
dent of Supervisorial District Two; plaintiff Raymond Palacios, a 
resident of Supervisorial District Three; plaintiff Guadalupe De 
La Garza, a resident of Supervisorial District Four; and plaintiff 
Monica Tovar, a resident of Supervisorial District Five. All are 
United States citizens of Spanish heritage and registered voters 
in Los Angeles County, California (hereinafter the “Garza plain­

•The term “Hispanic” refers to persons of Spanish heritage and per­
sons of Spanish origin.



A-57

tiffs”). Richard P. Fajardo, of the Mexican American Legal De­
fense and Educational Fund (MALDEF), and Mark D. Rosen­
baum of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) represented 
the Garza plaintiffs.

3. Defendant Los Angeles County is a political subdivision of 
the State of California established under the laws of the State and 
the Charter of the County of Los Angeles. Los Angeles County 
is subject to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
as amended, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982), codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, et seq.

4. Defendants Edmund D. Edelman, Board Chairman; Peter
F. Schabarum, Kenneth Hahn, Deane Dana, and Michael D. 
Antonovich, are duly elected members of the Board of Supervi­
sors of the County. All are white non-Hispanic persons.

5. Defendant Charles Weissburd is the Registrar-Recorder of 
Los Angeles County responsible for the conduct of elections in 
the County, including elections for positions on the Board of 
Supervisors. Mr. Weissburd is a white non-Hispanic person 
sued in his official capacity.

6. Defendant Richard B. Dixon is the administrative officer of 
Los Angeles County and has primary responsibility for the con­
duct of day-to-day County affairs including oversight and imple­
mentation of County and State election laws. Mr. Dixon is a 
white non-Hispanic person sued in his official capacity.

7. Defendant Frank F. Zolin, named as a defendant by the 
Garza plaintiffs, is the Clerk/Executive Officer for the County 
responsible for conducting County elections.

8. Defendants were represented by John McDermott, Lee 
Blackman, and Richard Simon, of McDermott, Will & Emery.



A-58

B. THE CLAIMS

9. Both the United States and the Garza plaintiffs challenge the 
1981 redistricting plan (hereinafter “the 1981 Plan”) under the 
authority of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 
(hereinafter “the Act”).

10. The Garza plaintiffs bring this class action pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) on their own behalf and 
on behalf of all Hispanic citizens whose right to vote has been or 
will be abridged by the adoption and maintenance of the 1981 
Plan.

11. The Garza plaintiffs also challenge the 1981 Plan on the 
grounds that it was adopted and/or maintained for the purpose 
of discriminating against Hispanic citizens in violation of Section 
2 of the Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.

12. The Garza plaintiffs allege that the presence of only five 
supervisorial districts results in the dilution of Hispanic voting 
rights in violation of Section 2 of the Act and the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.

C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. History o f the Governing Body

13. Los Angeles County was one of the original 27 counties 
formed in 1850 by the California Legislature.

14. The first Board of Supervisors was elected in 1852.

15. Los Angeles County has been governed by a five-member 
Board of Supervisors at all times except for a two-year period 
between 1883 and 1885, when the Board consisted of seven mem­
bers.



A-59

16. Under the provisions of a charter adopted in 1912, Los 
Angeles County was granted home rule power and was divided 
into five supervisorial districts. The charter became effective in 
1913.

17. Since at least 1914, the Supervisors have been elected dur­
ing even-numbered years in nonpartisan elections. If no candidate 
receives a majority of the votes cast in a June primary, the two 
candidates who receive the highest number of votes oppose each 
other in a general election in November of that year.

18. Supervisors are elected for four-year, staggered terms.

19. Elections for Supervisor in Districts 2, 4 and 5 were held in 
1988. Elections for Supervisor in Districts 1 and 3 are scheduled 
to be conducted in 1990.

20. The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors has legisla­
tive, executive and quasi-judicial powers.

21. The Board of Supervisors has authority pursuant to state 
law to alter, with voter approval, the size of the governing body.

22. Pursuant to the charter of the County of Los Angeles, the 
Board of Supervisors has authority, within one year after a gen­
eral election, to redraw the boundaries of the supervisorial dis­
tricts. Charter of the County of Los Angeles, Art. II, Sec. 7 
(1985).

23. Los Angeles County is responsible for providing certain 
classes of governmental services to all County residents including 
health services, courts, elections and welfare.

24. Los Angeles County is also responsible for providing full 
municipal services to residents of the unincorporated areas of the 
County, including fire protection, law enforcement, planning, 
zoning and building inspection.



A-60

25. Supervisor Edelman agreed with the finding in “To Serve 
Seven Million,” a 1976 report of the Public Commission on Los 
Angeles County Government, that “[n]o other local official in the 
United States is assigned responsibilities of the breadth and scale 
of those afforded a Los Angeles County Supervisor.”

26. Los Angeles County has a contracting program to provide 
certain services to cities requesting these services. As a result of 
the contracting program, the County provides a significant por­
tion of local governmental service to all County residents.

27. The Board of Supervisors has the authority to adopt the 
County’s budget, appropriate funds pursuant to the budget and 
conduct elections in the County.

28. Los Angeles County had a budget of $9,111,147,132 for the 
fiscal year ending June 30, 1989.

2. Demographics o f Los Angeles County
29. The demographic picture of Los Angeles County has 

changed dramatically since 1950.

30. The 1950 Census of Population, (hereinafter “Census”), 
reported that the total population of Los Angeles County was 
4,015,687, of whom 287,614 (7.2%) were persons with Spanish 
surnames.

31. The 1960 Census reported that the total population of Los 
Angeles County was 6,038,771, of whom 576,716 (9.6%) were 
persons with Spanish surnames.

32. The total population of Los Angeles County increased by 
2,023,084 persons (50.4%) between 1950 and 1960 while the 
County’s Spanish-surnamed population increased by 289,102 per­
sons (100.5%) between 1950 and 1960.

33. The 1960 Census data revealed a population concentration 
of Spanish surnamed persons in the area south and east of down­
town Los Angeles.



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34. The 1970 Census reported that the total population of Los 
Angeles County was 7,032,075 persons, of whom 1,289,311 
(18.3%) were persons with Spanish surnames.

35. The total population of Los Angeles County increased by 
993,304 persons (16.4%) between 1960 and 1970, while the 
County’s Spanish-surnamed population increased by 712,595 per­
sons (60.24%).

36. The 1970 Census revealed several discrete concentrations 
of Spanish surnamed persons in the center of the County.

37. The 1980 Census reported that the total population of the 
County of Los Angeles was 7,477,503 persons, of whom 
2,066,103 (27.6%) were persons of Spanish origin, 926,361 
(12.4%) were black persons and 434,850 (5.8%) were Asians and 
Pacific Islanders.

38. The total population of Los Angeles County increased by 
445,428 persons (6.3%) between 1970 and 1980 while the number 
of persons of Spanish origin in the County increased by 776,792 
persons (60.2%).

39. According to the 1980 Census, the population of Los An­
geles County can be summarized as follows:

Los Angeles County—1980 Census2
Total Hispanic White Black Asian Others

POP 7,477,503 27.6% 52.9% 12.4% 5.8% 1.3%
VAP 5,446,115 23.3% 58.3% 11.4% 5.8% 1.2%
CVAP 4,515,239 14.6% 67.4% 13.5% 3.7% 0.8%

40. The data from the previous three decennial censuses dem­
onstrate that as Los Angeles County’s total population has grown 
over the past few decades, the County’s racial and ethnic compo­
sition has also changed. The group that has grown the fastest in 
recent years is comprised of persons of Spanish origin, as reported 
by the Census in 1980.

2POP refers to the 1980 Census total population. VAP refers to the 
1980 Census voting age population. CVAP refers to the 1980 Census 
citizen voting age population.



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41. The number of persons reported as having Spanish sur­
names in the 1970 Census of Los Angeles County was 1,051,409.

42. By the time of the 1980 Census, more than 2 million people 
in Los Angeles County reported that they were of Spanish origin.

43. The County’s Hispanic population is concentrated, to a 
significant extent, in a compact and contiguous area beginning in 
the eastern part of the City of Los Angeles and extending east­
ward into the San Gabriel Valley, (hereinafter “Hispanic Core”)

44. This Hispanic Core includes Boyle Heights, Lincoln 
Heights and El Sereno in the City of Los Angeles, the unincor­
porated East Los Angeles community, and the cities of 
Rosemead, Pico Rivera, Montebello, La Puente, El Monte, 
Maywood, Vernon, Bell, Bell Gardens and other cities and unin­
corporated communities.

45. The Hispanic Core is contained within a set of 229 census 
tracts. These tracts are contiguous and persons of Spanish origin 
were the majority of the population in all but three of the tracts 
according to the full-count data from the 1980 Census.

46. According to the 1980 Census, the Hispanic Core had a 
total population of 1,204,279, of whom 877,478 (72.8%) were 
Hispanic and a voting age population that was 67.4 percent His­
panic.

47. Approximately 40 percent of the County’s entire Hispanic 
population lived in one of the 229 core census tracts in 1980, and 
these tracts comprise 81 percent of all census tracts with Hispanic 
population majorities in 1980.

48. Data from the Los Angeles County Department of Health 
Services and Data Processing have been presented to the Court 
in the form of a series of small-area population estimates and 
projections known as the Population Estimates and Projections 
System (hereinafter “PEPS”).



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49. PEPS data contains estimates of 1985 and 1987 total popu­
lation and population by race and ethnicity by various age levels 
for each populated census tract in Los Angeles County.

50. PEPS also generated projections of 1989 and 1990 total 
population and population by race and ethnicity by various age 
levels for each populated census tract in the County.

51. The County’s population as a whole grew by 12.3 percent 
between 1980 and 1987. The County’s Hispanic population grew 
by 42.7 percent between 1980 and 1987. By 1990, Hispanics are 
expected to constitute 35.8 percent of the total population of the 
County.

52. According to PEPS data, the number of non-Hispanic 
whites fell by 378,000 between 1980 and 1987. In 1980, non-His- 
panic whites made up 53.2 percent of the County’s total popula­
tion. By 1987, non-Hispanics made up only 42.8 percent of the 
County’s total population.

53. In 1990, non-Hispanic whites are projected to constitute
39.8 percent of the population.

54. In the Hispanic Core, the total population was estimated 
by PEPS to have grown from 1,204,279 persons to 1,519,630 
persons between 1980 and 1987.

3. Campaign Financing

55. Since 1960, only three incumbents running for a seat on the 
Board of Supervisors were defeated in their reelection bids. Su­
pervisor Hahn has served since 1952; Supervisor Schabarum since 
1972; Supervisor Edelman since 1974; and Supervisors Dana and 
Antonovich since 1980.

56. Incumbent Supervisors enjoy a strong campaign fund-rais­
ing advantage over their challengers for reelection.



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57. In 1987, the combined campaign funds of the five incum­
bent Supervisors totaled $3 million. Forty-nine percent of this 
amount belonged to Supervisors Schabarum and Edelman, who 
would not run for reelection until 1990. The largest amount, 
$800,000 belonged to Supervisor Dana, the smallest, $210,000, to 
Supervisor Hahn.

58. Incumbent Supervisors received 91 percent, $8.2 million of 
$9.1 million, of all campaign money raised from 1981 to 1986 and 
raised 74 percent of their contribution in non-election years.

59. During the 1982, 1984, 1986, and 1988 elections, each in­
cumbent Supervisor had more campaign funds expended on his 
behalf that were expended on behalf of his combined opposition.

60. Potential candidates recognize that to be considered a seri­
ous candidate for the Board, a person must spend between one 
and two million dollars on a campaign.

61. Mr. George Pla, who has managed political campaigns for 
elections in Los Angeles County, testified that it would be difficult 
for any candidate to raise $1-2 million, but that it would be even 
more difficult for an Hispanic candidate because of lack of a 
financial base. Pla also noted the adverse effect the inability to 
raise funds had on public perception of an Hispanic candidate’s 
likelihood of success.

4. Prior Redistrictings

62. The 1981 Plan cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. As illus­
trated by the testimony of J. Morgan Kousser, a professor of 
History at the California Institute of Technology, if the Court 
examines the changes in District 3 in the context of the demo­
graphic changes in the County as a whole, as well as the place 
where Hispanics lived and moved to during that period of time, 
the pattern is persuasive evidence that the lines were drawn and 
maintained with a racially discriminatory design.



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63. Dr. Kousser, in particular, concluded that there was ample 
evidence to be gleaned from the history of prior redistrictings to 
indicate that the Board kept the Hispanic Core split in order to 
secure their positions against challengers who would appeal to 
Hispanic voters.

(a) The 1959 Redistricting
64. Prior to 1959, District 3 included Western Rosemead and 

did not include any portion of the San Fernando Valley, Beverly 
Hills, West Hollywood, West Los Angeles, or Eagle Rock.

65. The 1959 redistricting occurred less than six months after 
the November 1958 general election for the open position of Dis­
trict 3 Supervisor. Ernest Debs, a non-Hispanic, defeated His­
panic candidate Edward Roybal, by a margin of 52.2 percent to
47.8 percent.

66. Debs received 141,011 votes. Roybal received 128,974 
votes. There were four recounts before Debs was finally deter­
mined to be the winner.

67. In 1959, Debs reported in a Supervisorial hearing that he 
and District 4 Supervisor Burton Chace agreed to shift Beverly 
Hills, West Hollywood, and West Los Angeles from District 4 to 
District 3.

68. The Board’s action transferred between 50,000 to 100,000 
voters from District 4 into District 3 and had the effect of sub­
stantially decreasing the proportion of Hispanic voters in District
3.

69. Dr. Kousser testified it was his opinion that Debs and 
Chace agreed to the transfer for two reasons. First, Chace was 
receptive to the agreement because it enabled him to eliminate 
Los Angeles City Councilwoman Rosalind Wyman as a possible 
opponent in his upcoming 1960 bid for reelection. Debs wel­
comed the change because the move west allowed him to make 
District 3 more easily winnable against Roybal or another candi­
date who might appeal to Hispanic voters in the next election.



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70. Debs was a Democrat and Chace a Republican. The two 
were not allies on other issues.

71. At the time of this transfer, District 1, which borders on 
the east of District 3, was much larger than the other four dis­
tricts.

72. If Debs had taken communities from District 1, the five 
districts would have been equipopulous. The lack of effective 
equal population requirements at the time made it possible for the 
District 3 to be moved deliberately west instead of east which 
avoided adding communities from the Roybal stronghold in East 
Los Angeles.

(b) The 1963 Redistricting

73. On December 19, 1961, the Board of Supervisors, acting in 
accordance with Section 25009 of the California Government 
Code enacted in 1961, adopted an order establishing the Supervi­
sorial District Boundary Committee (hereinafter “Boundary 
Committee”), to study and make recommendations concerning 
the need for changing Supervisorial district boundaries in Los 
Angeles County. Each Supervisor appointed one member to the 
committee.

74. In 1962, voters defeated a referendum to expand the Board 
of Supervisors from five to seven members.

75. Evidence suggests Debs wanted the referendum issue on the 
ballot in 1962 because he sought to move his district out of East 
Los Angeles and concentrate his district in the western area of 
the district, Beverly Hills, West Los Angeles and West Holly­
wood, communities with larger proportions of Non-Hispanic 
whites.

76. The Board of Supervisors adopted ordinance 8407 on May 
14, 1963 which enacted the recommendations of the Boundary 
Committee and established new district boundaries.



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77. The boundary changes involved a shift in the boundary 
between Districts 3 and 5, in which District 3 was extended north 
across the Santa Monica Mountains, for the first time, to the 
Ventura Freeway and into the San Fernando Valley. Eagle Rock 
was also added to District 3.

78. At the time of the 1963 boundary changes, a growing His­
panic population was beginning to emerge in the San Gabriel 
Valley, directly adjacent to the eastern boundary of District 3. 
Eagle Rock, in contrast, was about 4 percent Spanish surname 
and the portion of the San Fernando Valley annexed to District 2 
was about 1 percent Spanish surname.

79. Since District 3 was underpopulated in 1963 and District 1 
was overpopulated, population equality among the supervisorial 
districts could have been fostered by moving District l ’s growing 
Hispanic areas in the San Gabriel Valley directly to District 3. 
This was not done.

(c) The 1965 Redistricting

80. In 1965, the California Supreme Court ruled that no super­
visorial district in California should have more than 23 percent 
or less than 17 percent of a County’s total population. Miller v. 
Board of Supervisors o f Santa Clara County, 63 Cal. 2d 343 
(1965).

81. In response to Miller, the Los Angeles County Board of 
Supervisors reactivated the Supervisorial District Boundary 
Committee on October 5, 1965.

82. The 1965 Boundary Committee considered a proposal by 
Russell Quisenberry, the appointee of District 5 Supervisor War­
ren Dorn, to move 90,000 people in Alhambra and San Gabriel, 
areas close to the Hispanic Core, from District 1 to Debs’ District 
3. Dorn proposed that these changes be implemented after the 
1966 election, when Debs faced reelection.



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83. The Boundary Committee did not follow the Dorn propos­
al. Instead, Alhambra and San Gabriel were assigned to Dorn’s 
Fifth District and 87,000 predominantly Anglo residents of San 
Fernando Valley were moved to Debs’ District 3 from Dorn’s 
District 5.

84. The Boundary Committee reported that, based on estimates 
of population, the Supervisorial Districts if revised according to 
the committee’s recommendations, would have the following 
populations:

District 1 1,492,000
District 2 1,258,000
District 3 1,398,000
District 4 1,253,000
District 5 1,484,000

85. The Boundary Committee plan provided for an average 
deviation from population equality of 7.06 percent and a maxi­
mum deviation of 17.35 percent.

86. On November 30, 1965, the Board of Supervisors, by a 4-1 
vote with Supervisor Hahn dissenting, adopted Ordinance 8998, 
which enacted the plan proposed by the 1965 Boundary Commit­
tee.

87. The adoption of the 1965 plan involved such changes as: 
(1) The inclusion of the City of Long Beach, which previously 
was split between two districts, wholly in District 4; (2) The 
boundary between District 3 and District 5 was shifted from the 
Ventura Freeway to Oxnard Boulevard; (3) Monterey Park and 
unincorporated South San Gabriel were transferred from District 
1 to District 3; and (4) District 5, as previously discussed, was 
allocated a portion of the eastern part of the County in the San 
Gabriel Valley which previously had been represented by Super­
visor Bonelli from District 1.



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88. The Boundary Committee rejected a proposal to move 
Alhambra and San Gabriel, areas adjacent to growing Hispanic 
population, from District 1 to District 3. Instead, the committee 
recommended a complicated two-stage change which moved 
Alhambra and San Gabriel from Supervisor Bonelli’s District 1 
to Supervisor Dorn’s District 5, moved a section of the San Fer­
nando Valley from District 5 to Supervisor Debs’ District 3, and 
moved Monterey Park and unincorporated South San Gabriel 
from District 1 to District 3.

89. Dr. Kousser testified that, in his opinion, the Board avoided 
transferring Alhambra and San Gabriel directly to District 3 be­
cause those areas were adjacent to areas of Hispanic population 
concentration and were becoming more Hispanic. The more com­
plicated two-stage adjustments permitted the addition of heavily 
Anglo areas from the San Fernando Valley and offset the much 
more limited addition of Hispanic population gained by moving 
Monterey Park and the unincorporated area of South San Gabriel 
to District 3.

90. None of the persons who served on the 1965 Boundary 
Committee were individuals with Spanish surnames.

(d) The 1971 Redistricting

91. A comparison of the 1960 Census data with 1970 Census 
data demonstrates the extent to which areas bordering on District 
3 were gaining Hispanic population. Spanish surname population 
increased during that decade in Alhambra from 6 percent to 19 
percent and in Monterey Park from 13 percent to 33 percent.

92. The Hispanic population in the County doubled from 1970 
to 1980 and, in 1970, the Hispanic Core showed marked and 
continuous expansion outward and contiguously into the San Ga­
briel Valley.

93. Efforts were made during this time to expand the Board of 
Supervisors. Esteban Torres, who was president of the Congress



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of Mexican American Unity, testified before the Los Angeles 
County Economy and Efficiency Committee in April 1970, to 
urge that the Committee recommend expansion of the Board.

94. Concurrent efforts were also made to expand the Los An­
geles City Council.

95. The Board failed to obtain the three votes necessary to 
place the issue on the ballot. The City Council expansion effort 
failed to pass at the polls.

96. The Board of Supervisors established the Los Angeles 
County Supervisorial District Boundary Committee on April 20,
1970 (hereinafter “Boundary Committee”).

97. The members of the committee and the Supervisors who 
appointed them were as follows: John D. Lusk by Supervisor 
Bonelli; Dan Patacchia by Supervisor Hahn; Leslie G. Cramer by 
Supervisor Debs; LeRoy Center by Supervisor Chace; and Alfred 
E. Paonessa by Supervisor Dorn.

98. None of the individuals who served on the 1963, 1965 and
1971 Boundary Committees had a Spanish surname.

99. Richard Schoeni, a County employee, served as the secre­
tary to the 1971 Boundary Committee. In this capacity, Mr. 
Schoeni provided staff support, gathered information, made sug­
gestions, maintained the committee’s records, and drafted the 
report and recommendations that the Committee submitted to 
the Board of Supervisors.

100. Pursuant to Section 25001 of the California Government 
Code, the Board, in redistricting, may consider such factors as: 
topography, geography, cohesiveness, contiguity, integrity, com­
pactness of territory, and community of interests of the districts.

101. The Boundary Committee adopted the following guide­
lines in addition to the factors delineated in the California Gov­



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ernment Code; (1) to preserve historical representation of certain 
areas closely identified with a particular district; (2) to avoid the 
division of cities by supervisorial boundaries whenever possible; 
and (3) to avoid the separation of cities or communities sharing 
common interests and problems peculiar to a section of the Coun­
ty.

102. Population statistics generated from the 1970 Census dem­
onstrated that the 1965 supervisorial districts had the following 
populations:
District Population Percentage of Total

1 1,547,407 22.0
2 1,238,454 17.6
3 1,364,312 19.4
4 1,271,186 18.1
5 1,610,716 22.9
103. Among the proposals discussed during the meetings of the

Boundary Committee was one presented by Leslie Cramer, rep­
resentative of Ernest Debs, to extend District 3 further into the 
San Fernando Valley north of Oxnard Boulevard.

104. The 1971 Boundary Committee never gave any consider­
ation to moving District 3 east to include more of the San Gabriel 
Valley or moving Pico Rivera from District 1, which was over- 
populated, to District 3. Nor did the committee consider adding 
such areas as San Gabriel, Rosemead or El Monte to District 3.

105. According to the testimony of Dr. Schoeni, moving Dis­
trict 3 east was not considered to avoid splitting the San Gabriel 
Valley. However, San Gabriel Valley was already split among 
District 5 which contains Alhambra, San Gabriel, and East San 
Gabriel, and District 3 which contains South San Gabriel and 
part of Rosemead.

106. The Los Angeles County Supervisorial District Boundary 
Committee Report and Recommendations, which included a de­
tailed description of the supervisorial boundaries prepared by the



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County Engineer, was submitted to the Board of Supervisors on 
July 22, 1971. The Board adopted the plan proposed by the 
Boundary Committee.

107. The Boundary Committee recommended the following 
changes to the existing plan: (1) Artesia, Bellflower, Cerritos and 
Lakewood were transferred from District 1 to District 4; (2) 
Rosemead was transferred from District 3 to District 1; and (3) 
Van Nuys, Sepulveda, Panorama City and Sun Valley were trans­
ferred to District 3 from District 5.

108. As a result of the 1971 redistricting, District 3 gained over 
205,000 people from other districts and lost more than 163,000 
people to other districts.

109. In 1971, District 3 lost some areas with substantial His­
panic population on its eastern border. Western Rosemead was 
transferred from District 3 to District 1. A census tract in the 
City of San Gabriel was also transferred from District 3 to Dis­
trict 5.

110. George Marr, head of the Population Research Section of 
the Department of Regional Planning testified that he was sur­
prised by the proposal to move a substantial portion of the San 
Fernando Valley from District 5 to District 3. Marr described the 
portion of the San Fernando Valley ultimately added to District 
3 from District 5 as looking like “one of those Easter Island 
heads.” Marr developed the general feeling that Debs’ represen­
tative on the Boundary Committee had requested the additional 
area in the San Fernando Valley because the residents of the area 
were regarded as “our kind of people.”

111. None of the persons who served on the 1971 Boundary 
Commission were individuals with Spanish surnames.

(1) Intent o f Past Redistrictings

112. The Court finds that the Board has redrawn the supervi­
sorial boundaries over the period 1959-1971, at least in part, to



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avoid enhancing Hispanic voting strength in District 3, the dis­
trict that has historically had the highest proportion of Hispanics 
and to make it less likely that a viable, well-financed Hispanic 
opponent would seek office in that district. This finding is based 
on both direct and circumstantial evidence, including the finding 
that, since the defeat of Edward Roybal in 1959, no well-financed 
Hispanic or Spanish-surname candidate has run for election in 
District 3.

113. While Hispanic population was added to District 3 during 
the 1959-1971 redistrictings, the Court finds that the proportion 
of Spanish-surname persons added to District 3 has been lower 
than the Hispanic population proportion in the County as a 
whole. No individual area added was greater than 15.1 percent 
Spanish-surname.

114. Dating from the adoption of the County’s Charter in 1912 
through the 1971 redistricting process, no Los Angeles County 
redistricting plan has created a supervisorial district in which 
Hispanic persons constituted a majority or a plurality of the total 
population.

(e) 1972 Los Angeles City Council Redistricting

115. In 1971, the California Supreme Court ruled that the 1968 
voter-based reapportionment plan for the Los Angeles City 
Council was unconstitutional. Calderon v. City o f Los Angeles, 4 
Cal. 3d 251, 266 (1971).

116. In 1972, the Charter and Code Committee set out to de­
vise a new redistricting plan.

117. As then Committee Chair Edmund Edelman stated in a 
1971 press release: “It is my intention to urge my colleagues on 
the committee and on the council to create a district where it 
would be possible for a Mexican-American to be elected.”



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118. Edelman proposed a plan which increased the Spanish- 
surname proportion in District 14, held by Councilman Art Sny­
der, from approximately 40 percent to 68 percent Hispanic by 
unifying Hispanic communities previously split by Districts 13 
and 14.

119. Citizenship and voting age data were not used for pur­
poses of devising the city’s 1972 redistricting plan.

120. In devising the 1972 plan, Edelman was assisted by Alma 
Fitch and Jeff Seymour, both of whom played a role in the 1981 
supervisorial redistricting.

121. Chicanos for Fair Representation criticized Edelman’s 
plan and questioned the accuracy of the 68 percent estimate of 
Spanish-surname population, believing it to be 57 percent.

122. The City Council adopted the Edelman Plan and overrode 
the veto of Mayor Sam Yorty.

123. Despite the substantial increase in the Hispanic popula­
tion in District 14, Councilman Snyder was able to defeat several 
Hispanic opponents.

124. In 1985, after Snyder’s retirement, Richard Alatorre was 
elected to represent District 14 and became the first Hispanic to 
serve on the Los Angeles City Council since Edward Roybal.

(f) The 1981 Redistricting

125. The individuals involved in the 1981 redistricting had 
demographic information available of population changes and 
trends in Los Angeles County from 1950 to 1980. It was readily 
apparent in 1980 that the Hispanic population was on the rise and 
growing rapidly and that the white non-Hispanic population was 
declining.



A-75

126. According to the report of the 1981 Boundary Advisory 
Committee, the 1980 Census data showed that the districts under 
the 1971 boundaries had the following population characteristics:
District Population % Black % Hispanic %

1 1,522,347 20.4 47,772 3.1 550,819 36.2
2 1,423,015 19.0 635,751 44.7 354,314 24.9
3 1,577,877 21.1 44,868 2.8 669,246 42.4
4 1,445,286 19.3 140,585 9.7 236,518 16.4
5 1,509,132 20.2 75,003 5.0 254,830 16.9
127. From a political perspective, since Hispanic population 

growth was most significant in Districts 1 and 3, if the 1971 
boundaries were changed in any measurable way to eliminate the 
existing fragmentation, the incumbency of either Supervisor 
Schabarum or Supervisor Edelman would be most affected by a 
potential Hispanic candidate.

128. All of the plans considered by the participants in the 
redistricting were based on 1980 Census population data.

129. In 1981, citizenship or voting age data was not considered 
or requested by County staff, Boundary Committee members or 
the Supervisors and their aides.

130. No suggestion was made in 1981 that citizenship data or 
voter registration data be used as the apportionment base.

131. On February 27, 1981, Deane Dana sent a lettergram to 
Supervisors Schabarum and Antonovich recommending that both 
a public and a private redistricting committee be established. 
Dana suggested obtaining the services of Joseph Shumate to assist 
in the redistricting effort noting the experience Shumate had with 
the Republican reapportionment efforts in 1970, 1971 and 1972.

132. Mr. Shumate was hired to work in a private capacity on 
behalf of Supervisors Dana, Schabarum and Antonovich. The 
objective, according to Mr. Shumate’s testimony, was “to assist 
in determining whether a plan would help or hurt the three Su­
pervisors.”



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133. Allan HofFenblum, a political advisor to Supervisor 
Antonovich, testified that the following statement attributed to 
him was what he believed at the time:

“We would be remiss is [sic] we did not have a [sic] least 
one district that was at least 50 percent Hispanic, otherwise 
it looks like we’re sitting here trying to save five white Su­
pervisors.”

134. Supervisor Edelman and others involved in the 1981 re­
districting effort were not aware of Mr. Shumate or the role he 
played on behalf of Supervisors Schabarum, Antonovich and 
Dana.

135. While these three Supervisors were pursuing their redis­
tricting efforts, Supervisor Edelman asked Jeffrey Seymour to as­
sist him in the redistricting process by examining maps produced 
and by preparing a political analysis of Supervisor Edelman’s 
district.

136. An analysis of the 1978 Supervisor election in District 3 
was conducted after the Boundary Committee recommended a 
plan with a Hispanic population majority in District 3. The actual 
results of the analysis were never produced. Mr. Seymour did not 
rule out the possibility that he requested such an analysis and 
Supervisor Edelman testified that he “most probably” discussed 
the results of the 1978 election analysis with Mr. Seymour.

137. Peter Bonardi, a programmer with the Urban Research 
Section of the Data Processing Department in 1981 and a partic­
ipant in the data analysis requested by Supervisor Edelman, 
stated that he was directed not to talk about the analysis of voting 
patterns and that an “atmosphere of ‘keep it quiet’ ” pervaded.

138. Supervisors Hahn and Edelman sought to maintain the 
existing lines. To this end, the Democratic minority agreed to a 
transfer of population from District 3 to District 2. Supervisor



A-77

Edelman acknowledged that he and Supervisor Hahn had worked 
out a transfer of population from the heavily Hispanic Pico- 
Union area on the southern border of District 3 to the northern 
end of District 2.

139. Supervisor Edelman knew that if the 1971 boundary lines 
were kept intact, the Hispanic community was going to remain 
essentially the same in terms of its division among the districts.

140. The Board departed from its past redistricting practice in 
1981 and approved a contract with The Rose Institute for State 
and Local Government, a private entity, to perform specialized 
services and produce redistricting data at a cost of $30,000.

141. The facilities at The Rose Institute were used primarily 
by persons working privately on behalf of Supervisor Dana, 
Schabarum, and Antonovich, including Joseph Shumate, con­
ducting private redistricting research and analysis.

142. The Board reactivated the Supervisorial District Bound­
ary Committee and charged the Committee with the responsibil­
ity for recommending a redistricting plan in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 35000-35006 of the Elections Code and one 
which would ensure that ethnic minorities are equitably repre­
sented, and that city boundaries were respected as much as possi­
ble.

143. The five initial appointees to the Boundary Committee, 
Blake Sanborn, Robert Bush, Ron Smith, Alma Fitch, and Allan 
Hoffenblum, were persons who had close political ties to the ap­
pointing Supervisors or were persons who had been trusted em­
ployees and advisors to the Supervisors. All five individuals were 
non-Hispanic.

144. On July 8, 1981, representatives of Californios for Fair 
Representation (hereinafter “Californios” or “CFR”), a coalition 
of Hispanic organizations active in the redistricting process, crit­



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icized the all-Anglo composition of the Committee and requested 
that it be expanded to include minority representatives, including 
at least one Hispanic and one black.

145. On July 14, 1981, the Board of Supervisors appointed five 
additional members to the Boundary Committee, Lauro Neri and 
Jesus Melendez, both Hispanic; Davis Lear and Robert Perkins, 
both black; and Dr. Frederico Quevedo, a Filipino. These addi­
tional appointees played a minor role in the redistricting process. 
None of the minority representatives or persons appointed to the 
Boundary Committee on July 14, 1981 had any previous experi­
ence in demography or the redistricting of elective bodies.

146. The Los Angeles County Coalition of CFR worked on 
redistricting plans for state, county and local jurisdictions within 
Los Angeles County and was permitted to use the facilities of the 
Rose Institute for the purpose of preparing their proposals.

147. Leticia Quezada was the chair of the Los Angeles County 
CFR chapter.

148. In considering different redistricting strategies, CFR de­
clined to create a plan which included one district with a substan­
tial Hispanic majority because they did not think that four Su­
pervisors would vote for such a plan. CFR viewed a plan which 
included an Hispanic district as very threatening to incumbents 
since it would involve drastic shifts in population.

149. CFR instead opted to propose a plan that reduced the 
splintering of the Hispanic community and provided for two His­
panic “influence” districts: one with a bare Hispanic population 
majority in District 3 and an Hispanic growth district in District 
1 with 42 percent Hispanic population.

150. Through various conversations with the Supervisors or 
their representatives, members of CFR developed an understand­



A-79

ing of the objectives of the Supervisors for the redistricting pro­
cess. Supervisor Edelman indicated that he wanted the San Diego 
Freeway to be the western boundary of District 3 and the Santa 
Monica Freeway to be the district’s southern boundary. Alma 
Fitch informed CFR that Supervisor Edelman was happy to rep­
resent the Hispanic community but that he did not believe that 
all the Hispanics should be in his district. Mike Lewis indicated 
in meetings with CFR that Supervisor Schabarum was willing to 
transfer Hispanic population from District 1 to District 3 to cre­
ate an Hispanic district. Specifically, the Supervisor was w illing 
to lose Pico Rivera and South Gate, two majority Hispanic cities.

151. Boundary Committee members Hoffenblum and Smith 
each introduced plans with identical 50.2 percent Hispanic popu­
lations in Supervisorial District 3. The plans differed with respect 
to District 1. While the Californios plan increased the District 1 
Hispanic population from 32 percent Hispanic to 42 percent, both 
the Hoffenblum and Smith plans reduce the Hispanic population 
in District 1 to 31.3 percent and 31.7 percent Hispanic respec­
tively.

152. By a 5-4 vote, the Committee recommended that the 
Board adopt the Hoffenblum Plan. The Final Report of the 
Boundary Committee stated as to the Hoffenblum Plan:

This Plan increases the opportunity of Hispanics and Blacks 
by recognizing that a special community of interests exists 
for Hispanics and Blacks. Boundaries were developed to in­
crease the electoral effectiveness of these two groups in the 
Second and Third Supervisorial districts.

153. Representatives of Supervisors Hahn and Edelman offered 
no proposals for plans during the course of the Committee’s meet­
ings, and opposed all plans enlarging the Hispanic population in 
District 3 beyond the then-current district lines.

154. Besides increasing the Hispanic population in District 3, 
the Hoffenblum Plan reduced the Hispanic population in the dis­



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tricts of Supervisors Dana, Schabarum and Antonovich, particu­
larly in Schabarum’s Supervisorial District 1, and the black pop­
ulations in the districts of Dana and Antonovich. Black and His­
panic populations were added to Districts 3 and 2. The following 
tables show the changes in population statistics as illustrated by 
the Hoffenblum Plan from the then-existing boundaries.

Current (1981) Boundaries—Pre-Redistricting
Dist Population % Black % Hispanic %

1 1,522,347 20.4 47,772 3.1 550,819 36.2
2 1,423,015 19.0 635,751 44.7 354,314 24.9
3 1,577,877 21.1 44,868 2.8 669,246 42.4
4 1,445,286 19.3 140,585 9.7 236,518 16.4
5 1,509,132 20.2 75,033 5.0 254,830 16.9

Hoffenblum Plan
Dist Population % Black % Hispanic %

1 1,496,560 20.0 48,708 3.3 468,661 31.3
2 1,495,727 20.0 691,655 46.2 384,721 25.7
3 1,495,085 20.0 50,863 3.4 750,266 50.2
4 1,495,738 20.0 81,082 5.4 231,268 15.5
5 1,495,547 20.0 71,701 4.8 230,811 15.4

155. The Smith and Hoffenblum plans, while increasing Dis­
trict 3 to a bare majority, proposed a substantial decrease in the 
Hispanic population percentage in District 1.

156. The CFR plan, the Smith plan and the Hoffenblum plan 
all proposed shifting the City of Compton from District 4, the 
“coastal district,” to District 2, where most of the County’s black 
population was concentrated.

157. Smith and Hoffenblum opposed the CFR plan because the 
plan proposed increasing the Hispanic proportion in District 1 
from 36 to 42 percent. Both Boundary Committee members per­
ceived the CFR effort as intended to jeopardize the status of 
Supervisor Schabarum as well as that of the conservative majori­
ty.



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158. Holfenblum testified that one of the objectives of the Re­
publican majority was to create an Hispanic seat without altering 
the ideological makeup of the Board. According to Hoffenbium, 
it was “self-evident” that if an Hispanic district was created in 
Supervisor Schabarum’s district it would impact on the Republi­
can majority.

159. The proponents of the Smith and Hoffenbium plans 
sought to gain areas of Republican strength such as La Mirada, 
Arcadia, Bradbury in Districts 4 and 5, while losing increasing 
Hispanic areas such as Alhambra and the predominantly black 
Compton and other liberal areas of Santa Monica and Venice.

160. The Boundary Committee met officially on eight occasions 
between July 8 and August 12, 1981.

161. No Board member ever publicly advocated any of the 
plans introduced by members of the Boundary Commission, in­
cluding the recommended Hoffenbium Plan or the CFR Plan.

162. Supervisor Edelman would not rule out the possibility that 
ethnic considerations played at least some part in the rejection by 
the Board majority of the CFR Plan. Moreover, the fact that 
CFR proposed a plan in which District 1 had a 42 percent His­
panic population was a possible basis for the rejection of the plan 
by the majority. Supervisor Schabarum would not accept a 45 or 
50 percent Hispanic proportion in his district in 1981.

163. The Supervisors proposed no plans raising Hispanic pop­
ulation in any district beyond where it already remained by virtue 
of the 1971 boundary lines. Although the feasibility of establish­
ing even a 50 percent Hispanic district was never disputed, no 
Supervisor ever publicly discussed or endorsed the idea.

164. The Court finds that in 1981 a district could have been 
devised which more fairly and adequately recognized Hispanic 
voting strength while complying with the standard redistricting 
criteria.



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165. On September 24, 1981, prior to the Board’s adoption of 
the challenged plan, Board members met, two at a time in a series 
of private meetings in the anteroom adjacent to the board room, 
where they tried to reach agreement on a plan.

166. On at least ten separate occasions, pairs of Supervisors 
entered the room and negotiated the final redistricting plan.

167. The Board rejected the Boundary Committee’s report.

168. According to the deposition of Mr. Schoeni:
“The Boundary Committee report was received; the 

Board heard testimony; the Board set aside the Boundary 
Committee report and proceeded from a clean slate, if you 
will, with Supervisor Edelman mediating and trying to gain 
as much in terms of population equity as was possible.”

169. Using the map which was in the anteroom, Supervisor 
Schabarum and Antonovich discussed changes in the boundary 
between Districts 1 and 5, including the transfer of Sierra Madre. 
Schabarum and Antonovich did not discuss the Hoffenblum, 
Smith or CFR plans.

170. Mr. Schoeni drew proposed district boundaries on the 
map in the anteroom, and once a map was developed which pur­
ported to reflect a consensus of the Board, an immediate tabula­
tion of the changes was performed and given to Board Chair, 
Supervisor Edelman.

171. On September 24, 1981, after Board members had reached 
an agreement on a plan, the Board met publicly and unanimously 
adopted this recent creation which had never been presented to 
the public.

172. Supervisor Schabarum testified that he had described the 
1981 plan as “ho-hum” because it “just juggled the boundaries 
around a little bit to get the job done within the law.”



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173. Supervisor Schabarum also testified that he thinks it “fun­
damentally un-American and unsound” to fashion district lines 
with the intent of permitting ethnic groups to be represented.

174. The Court finds that the Supervisors and their aids under­
stood the potential for increasing Hispanic voting strength and 
sought to avoid the consequences of a redistricting plan designed 
to eliminate the fragmentation of the Hispanic population.

(1) Intent o f 1981 Redistricting

175. The plan adopted in 1981 retained the boundary between 
the First and the Third Supervisorial Districts, the districts that 
contain the largest proportions of Hispanics. In doing so, the 
1981 Plan continued to split the Hispanic Core almost in half.

176. The Board appeared to ignore the three proposed plans 
which provided for a bare Hispanic population majority.

177. The Court finds that the Board of Supervisors, in adopting 
the 1981 redistricting plan, acted primarily with the objective of 
protecting and preserving the incumbencies of the five Supervi­
sors or their political allies.

178. The Court finds that in 1981 the five members of the 
Board of Supervisors were aware that the plans which they even­
tually adopted would continue to fragment the Hispanic popula­
tion and further impair the ability of Hispanics to gain represen­
tation on the Board.

179. The continued fragmentation of the Hispanic vote was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the adoption of the 1981 
Plan.

180. The Court finds that during the 1981 redistricting process, 
the Supervisors knew that the protection of their five Anglo in­
cumbencies was inextricably linked to the continued fragmenta­
tion of the Hispanic Core.



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181. The Supervisors appear to have acted primarily on the 
political instinct of self-preservation. The Court finds, however, 
that the Supervisors also intended what they knew to be the likely 
result of their actions and a prerequisite to self-preservation—the 
continued fragmentation of the Hispanic Core and the dilution of 
Hispanic voting strength.

D. SIZE AND GEOGRAPHIC COMPACTNESS OF 
HISPANIC COMMUNITY

1. 1980 Census Data

182. As stated supra, in Part C, 2, the 1980 Census reported 
that the total population of the County of Los Angeles was 
7,477,503 persons of whom 2,066,103 or 27.6 percent were per­
sons of Spanish origin.

183. According to full-count data from the 1980 Census, per­
sons of Spanish origin were the majority of the population in all 
but three of the 229 contiguous census tracts comprising the His­
panic Core.

184. Dr. William P. O’Hare, a sociologist and demographer 
who is director of policy studies for the Population Reference 
Bureau, a non-profit research and educational organization in 
Washington, D.C., compiled a demographic profile of the 229 
Hispanic Core census tracts using full-count tract-level reports of 
total population and voting age, plus a special tabulation of voting 
age citizens provided by the Census Bureau. These core census 
tracts had the following aggregate characteristics:

Hispanic Population Core— 1980
Total Hispanic White Black Asian

POP3 1,204,279 73% 18% 4% 5%
VAP 783,677 67% 22% 4% 6%
CVAP 458,306 52% 36% 6% 4%

3POP=Total Population. VAP =  Voting Age Population. 
CVAP =  Citizen Voting Age Population.



A-85

185. The Court finds that based on 1980 Census data, a super­
visorial district can be drawn encompassing the Hispanic Core 
community so that the percentage of citizen voting age Hispanics 
in the districts would be such that Hispanics would have the 
potential to elect a candidate of their choice. While the Court 
agrees with defendants that plaintiffs’ experts, Dr. Grofman and 
Dr. Estrada, could not devise a plan with a voting age citizen 
majority on the basis of 1980 Census data that comports with the 
one man one vote rule, the Court does find it persuasive that the 
illustrative districts were just shy of the 50 percent mark, in the 
44 to 46 percent range.

186. Further, this case presents precisely the situation antici­
pated by Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion in Gingles, 
478 U.S. at 94-95, in which the unique demographic changes Los 
Angeles County has undergone and continues to undergo coupled 
with the lingering effects and history of discrimination in the 
County against Hispanics, preclude the application of “a single, 
universally applicable standard for measuring undiluted minority 
voting strength.” Id. The application of the bright line 50 percent 
requirement set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Romero v. City of 
Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1427 (9th Cir. 1989), would be inappro­
priate under these facts and circumstances.

187. Therefore, even if this Court were to agree with defen­
dants’ contention that current population data is less reliable than 
the 1980 Census, the Court would still find that the 1981 Plan 
violated Section 2 of the Act based on the totality of the circum­
stances delineated in these findings.

188. The evidence shows that the Board of Supervisors know­
ingly chose to draw and adopt a plan that minimized the voting 
potential of the County’s Hispanic population. This minimization 
of Hispanic voting strength was achieved by fragmenting the His­
panic Core.



A-86

189. The distribution of tracts among current supervisorial dis­
tricts reflects this conscious minimization:
Districts Tracts TPOP H PO P % VAP HVAP4 5 %
1 77 433,173 299,648 69% 277,169 174,664 63%
2 50 226,318 155,332 69% 153,645 97,516 63%
3 104 538,093 418,750 78% 348,257 253,564 73%
5 2 6,694 3,749 56% 4,606 2,278 49%
Total 233 1,204,279 877,478 73% 783,677 528,021 67.4
Districts Tracts TCVAP HACAP %
1 77 190,705 95,950 50%
2 50 68,954 22,925 33%
3 104 195,445 117,077 60%
5 2 3,202 1,374 43%
Total 233 458,306 237,326 52%

190. No citizenship data by the Census Bureau with respect to 
the 1980 decennial census was available in time for the 1981 
redistricting process.

2. Growth in Hispanic Population Since 1980

191. The demographics of Los Angeles County have changed 
dramatically since 1980.

192. The population data for Los Angeles County can be sum­
marized as follows:

1980 Census
Total Hispanic White Black Asian/Other

County POP 7,477,503 27.6% 52.9% 12.4% 7.1%
Hispanic 1,359,907 74.4% 13.4% 4% 6%
Core POP5

4TPOP=total population. HPOP =  Hispanic population. TVAP =  
total voting age population. HVAP =  Hispanic voting age population. 
TCVAP =  total citizen voting age population. HCVAP =  Hispanic 
citizen voting age population.

5Hispanic population core is a geographic area represented by 229 
census tracts, 226 of which had a total population that was 50 percent 
more Hispanic in 1980.



A-87

1985 PEPS Population Estimates
Total Hispanic White Black Asian/Other

County
Core

8,018,210 30.4% 47.2% 12.0% 
1,359,907 74.4% 13.4% 3.5%

10.3%
8.8%

County
Core

1987 PEPS Population Estimates
8,418,817 34.4% 42.8% 11.5% 
1,519,630 77.2% 11.0% 3.0%

11.3%
8.7%

County
Core

1989 PEPS Population Projections
8,718,710 35.8% 40.8% 11.2% 
1,602,484 78.2% 9.7% 2.9%

12.2%
9.3%

County
Core

1990 PEPS Population Projections
8,880,109 36.6% 39.8% 11.0% 
1,648,827 78.7% 9.0% 2.9%

12.6%
9.5%

193. According to PEPS data, the number of Hispanic persons 
in Los Angeles County increased by more than 850,000 between 
1980 and 1987 and that the number of Hispanics in Los Angeles 
County is projected to increase by almost 350,000 more between 
1987 and 1990.

194. The population of Los Angeles County grew by 12.3 per­
cent between 1980 and 1987. The Hispanic population grew by 
42.7 percent during this period.

195. By 1990, Hispanics are expected to constitute 35.8 percent 
of the County’s total population.

196. Between 1980 and 1987, the number of non-Hispanic 
whites decreased by 378,000. In 1980, whites comprised 53.2 per­
cent of the total population. In 1987, whites made up 42.8 percent 
of the population.

197. According to PEPS projections, non-Hispanic whites will 
constitute 39.8 percent of the County’s population by 1990.

198. The Hispanic population growth in Los Angeles County 
during the 1980’s has occurred primarily in areas where there was



A-8S

already a significant Hispanic presence in 1980. Almost two- 
thirds of the Hispanic population growth between 1980 and 1987 
has occurred in census tracts where Hispanics made up more than 
25 percent of total population in 1980.

199. As the Court stated in is [sic] findings on the 1981 Redis­
tricting supra, the post-1980 growth in Los Angeles County’s 
Hispanic population was foreseeable at the time of the 1981 re- 
districting because it reflects a series of long-term demographic 
trends that were evident by 1981. The County’s Hispanic popula­
tion had increased significantly in each of the last three decennial 
censuses and the County’s white non-Hispanic population 
showed a sharp decline between 1970 and 1980.

200. Spanish-surnamed persons made up 55.6 percent of the 
registered voters in the Hispanic Core in November 1988.

3. Accuracy o f Post-Census Data

201. The Court finds that post-census data is a more accurate 
indicator than the 1980 Census of current demographic condi­
tions in Los Angeles County. Specifically, the Court considers the 
PEPS estimates and projections to be a unique and reliable source 
of information for this purpose.

(a) Reliability o f PEPS Data

202. PEPS had its genesis in a population research project 
begun at the University of California at Los Angeles and later 
transferred to the Los Angeles County government.

203. The process of producing a set of PEPS estimates and 
projections is referred to as an iteration. There have been two 
iterations of the PEPS process. The first iteration produced esti­
mates for 1985 and projections for 1990. The second iteration 
produced estimates for 1987 and projections for 1989 and 1990.

204. The PEPS population estimates are based upon a combi­
nation of information from the 1980 Census, the California De­



A-89

partment of Finance, the United States Bureau of the Census 
Current Population Survey, and administrative and vital records.

205. Estimates are based on observations of what occurred in 
the past according to administrative records. Projections study 
past and present trends and estimate future situations.

206. The racial and ethnic groups reported by PEPS include 
total population, Latino6 population, white non-Latino popula­
tion, black population, and Asian/Other. The PEPS Latino cate­
gory is designed to include persons whose origins are from Mexi­
co, Central or South America. The PEPS black and Asian cate­
gories include persons who identify themselves as black and Span­
ish origin or Asian and Spanish origin.

207. PEPS made no attempt to estimate or project the number 
of citizens in Los Angeles County.

208. PEPS data has been relied on for planning purposes by the 
Los Angeles County government, including the Department of 
Health Services, the Department of Mental Health, the Sheriffs 
Department, the Superior Court system, the Municipal Court 
system and the Public Library system.

209. Population figures for Hispanics from PEPS data are con­
sistent with data from the Census Bureau estimating that by 1985, 
the number of Hispanics in Los Angeles County had climbed to 
2,742,700, an increase of nearly 700,000 from 1980.

210. Dr. Nancy Minter, who supervised most of the work on 
the first and second iterations, testified that in her opinion, the 
1985 PEPS estimates are a more accurate reflection of current 
population in Los Angeles County than the 1980 Census at the 
countywide level and when the tract data is aggregated, to the 
supervisorial district level.

6PEPS uses the term “Latino.” The Census uses the term “Hispanic.” 
Latinos are a subgroup of Hispanics. In Los Angeles County, the over­
whelming majority of Hispanics are Latinos.



A-90

211. The Court concludes that the “glitch” in the 1987 PEPS 
estimates and the 1989 projections which consisted of the omis­
sion of certain death records for the cities of Long Beach and 
Pasadena from the calculations for the second PEPS iteration did 
not affect the 1985 population estimates generated by the first 
iteration.

212. Dr. Minter testified that in the second PEPS iteration, the 
white non-Hispanic population Countywide may have been un­
derestimated by approximately 100,000 persons, and that the 
Asian/Other population may have been overestimated by approx­
imately 100,000 persons.

213. Mr. Jerry Lubin, the director of the PEPS project, testified 
that after having discovered this “glitch,” he never told PEPS 
users to use the 1985 rather than the 1987 estimates or to ignore 
the 1987 estimates.

214. Dr. O’Hare performed additional analyses of the 1985 
estimates, the 1987 estimates and the 1989 projections after dis­
closure of the “glitch.”

215. The comparison of PEPS estimates and projections with 
the Department of Finance and Census Bureau city estimates 
revealed an extremely strong level of consistency among the three 
sets of data. While the PEPS estimates and projections for Long 
Beach and Pasadena did show a greater degree of difference from 
the other two data sets than did the other five cities for 1987 and 
1989, the degree of difference was relatively small.

216. The Court concludes that the missing data referred to by 
Dr. Minter and Mr. Lubin does not appear to have had any 
significant impact on the reliability of the second PEPS iteration 
as to total population data or as to the reliability of those esti­
mates for the Hispanic population.

217. The Court concurs with the conclusion reached by Dr. 
O’Hare, that the 1985, 1987 and 1989 PEPS data are reliable



A-91

population estimates and projections, and that, even with the 
“glitch,” each set of data provides a more accurate reflection of 
Los Angeles County’s current population than does the 1980 
Census.

218. The Court is unwilling, therefore, to reject Dr. Estrada’s 
estimate of Hispanic citizenship proportions in Hispanic Oppor­
tunity Districts I and II in 1989 which utilize PEPS projections 
and the 1987 PEPS estimates. (See discussion of Estrada Plans 
infra).

219. As defendants’ expert, Dr. W.A.V. Clark, testified, “the 
1985, 1987, 1989 and 1990 [PEPS data] are all part of one project, 
to the extent that you can use the data and make comments about 
it. . . . So it is all part of one project, and I don’t differentiate in 
my mind particularly between any one of those estimates or pro­
jections. I think of them all as having about the same reliability, 
recognizing that there [sic] all keyed back to a base line census 
point.”

220. Dr. Clark testified that the reliability of PEPS data in­
creases as it is aggregated, and agreed that when PEPS tract data 
is aggregated to the level of a Supervisorial district, “you would 
be on quite safe ground.”

221. It is this Court’s finding that the Los Angeles County’s 
1985 and 1987 PEPS tract-level estimates of total population and 
population by race and ethnicity; and the 1989 PEPS tract-level 
projections of total population and population by race and eth­
nicity are an acceptable and reliable basis under California law 
for the intercensal redistricting of Los Angeles County Supervi­
sorial districts.

4. Citizen Voting Age Population
222. In measuring the citizen voting age population, the Court 

has considered 1980 Census sample data on citizenship, Hispanic 
voter registration from 1982 to 1988, and post-1980 estimates of 
citizen voting age population.



A-92

223. The Court finds that sample data from the 1980 Census 
on citizenship by age and ethnicity is the most reliable measure 
of the Hispanic citizen voting age population as it existed in 1980.

224. The Court, however, agrees with the contention of the 
United States and finds that, for practical reasons, decennial cen­
sus counts of voting age citizen population cannot be an exclusive 
measure of geographic compactness. Total population data and 
voting age population data are available for redistricting purposes 
promptly after the decennial census is taken, while citizenship 
data is not released until several years later. For example, follow­
ing the 1980 Census, the Bureau of the Census did not release 
citizenship data until 1983 and does not anticipate being prepared 
to do so after the 1990 Census until 1992-3.

225. No figures were published by the Census for the number 
of voting age citizens in major race/ethnicity groups in each cen­
sus tract in Los Angeles County based upon the 1980 Census.

226. The Census Bureau prepared two special tabulations at 
the request of the Justice Department providing a breakdown of 
sample data concerning the number of voting age United States 
citizens, according to race and ethnicity and a cross-tabulation 
between self-identified Spanish-origin status and Spanish-sur- 
name status, among voting age citizens, by 1980 Census tract.

227. This special tract-level tabulation prepared by the Census 
found a total of 4,515,232 citizens of voting age in the County 
and a total of 659,368 Hispanic citizens of voting age in the 
County. With the sampling error, the number of Hispanic citizens 
of voting age in 1980 was between 649,172 and 669,564.

228. Many jurisdictions, including Los Angeles County, will be 
legally required to complete their redistrictings before citizenship 
data becomes available after the 1990 Census.



A-93

5. Voter Registration and Turnout
229. Between 1982 and 1988, Spanish-surname voter registra­

tion increased from 10.5 percent to 13.4 percent, and the esti­
mated Hispanic voter registration from 12.3 percent to 14.6 per­
cent in Los Angeles County.

230. Dr. Grofman reviewed data concerning voter registration 
and turnout and concluded that as a result of differential rates of 
voter registration and turnout between Hispanics and non-His- 
panics in Los Angeles County, the proportion of Hispanic voting 
age citizens who are registered and who turnout to vote is con­
siderably lower than non-Hispanics. Consequently, when Span- 
ish-surnamed registered voters or Spanish-origin registered voters 
comprise more than 50 percent of the registered voters in a dis­
trict, that translates into a situation in which the Hispanic citizen 
voting age population in the district will in fact be 50 percent or 
greater.

231. Statistics for Spanish-surnamed and estimated Spanish-or­
igin registered voters were not available for Los Angeles County 
for any election prior to November 1982.

232. According to the Field Institute’s California Opinion In­
dex for January, 1988, among adult citizens eligible to vote in 
California, Hispanics were registered at lower rates than non-His- 
panics in 1987. The official state registration figures were adjusted 
by the Field Institute to account for estimated “deadwood” and 
duplication in the voting rolls. The Field Institute also reported 
lower Hispanic turnout for the 1986 general election.

233. Dr. Minter, testified that voter registration is not used in 
PEPS because it is too volatile. The Court, however, finds the 
examination of Spanish-surname and estimated Spanish-origin 
registered voter data useful in determining a minimum rate for 
measuring Hispanic citizen voting age population.

6. Misreporting of Citizenship
234. There are no official Census Bureau adjustments to the 

1980 data for misreporting of citizenship.



A-94

235. Dr. Jeffrey Passel asserts that, two million non-citizens 
nationwide falsely reported themselves as citizens in the 1980 
Census. Passel’s method for determining this misreporting was to 
compare the numbers of alien population based on the census 
count, which includes legal and undocumented aliens, with INS 
numbers of the legal resident population derived directly from the 
alien address registration system, or the 1-53 data.

236. Dr. Passel’s analysis concluded that census counts of nat­
uralized citizens were higher than the estimate of naturalized 
citizens based on INS data.

237. Dr. Passel’s studies are not considered corrections to the 
decennial census data as they were performed for research pur­
poses. This research is based on national estimates with an un­
known range of error. For example, Dr. Passel’s national esti­
mates of naturalization misreporting do not fully account for 
derived citizenship, that is, the acquisition of citizenship by a 
foreign-born child upon the naturalization of one or both parents. 
The greater the number of derived citizens, the more inaccurate 
are Dr. Passel’s citizen corrections.

238. Defendants’ experts, Dr. Clark and Professor Siegel testi­
fied that, in their opinions, the special tabulation of voting age 
citizen data from the 1980 Census is not accurate because a sig­
nificant number of persons in Los Angeles County erroneously 
reported that they were United States citizens.

239. Dr. Clark did not rely upon the Census Bureau’s special 
tabulation of voting age citizens for his analysis but instead de­
veloped a procedure to estimate citizen voting age population 
independently of the special tabulation. Dr. Clark testified that 
the adjustment factor was derived from the Warren/Passel meth­
odology and applied to the Hispanic population in the County as 
a whole.

240. It is inappropriate, in the Court’s mind, to substitute the 
estimates of Dr. Clark in place of the official Census data special



A-95

tabulation. The procedure utilized by Dr. Clark does not take 
advantage of census tract-level information for voting age popu­
lation or other variables more detailed than total population.

241. Dr. Clark applied his citizenship misreporting estimates 
to 1980 Census Hispanic total population data; to post-1980 esti­
mates of citizen voting age population; and to modify the proce­
dure of Dr. O’Hare for estimating Hispanic voter registration.

242. The difficulty the Court has with the Clark application of 
the Passel methodology is that the estimates of misreporting of 
citizenship employed by Dr. Passel relied upon national correc­
tion factors applied to local data. These are referred to as syn­
thetic assumptions. Because such a synthetic correction proce­
dure applies a constant factor to all subareas, local variations in 
the underlying error will necessarily produce inaccurate results. 
The greater the local variation, the greater the inaccuracy.

243. Professor Siegel testified that he reviewed and approved 
of Dr. Clark’s estimates of voting age citizens, yet he did not 
know basic facts about how those estimates were performed, the 
number of self-reported Hispanic voting age citizens in Los An­
geles County in 1980, the adjusted number used by Dr. Clark, nor 
the number of voting age Hispanics who supposedly misreported 
their citizenship.

244. Professor Siegel, while working for the Bureau of the Cen­
sus, testified in Fair v. Klutznick, that “we . . . [the Bureau of 
Census] do not believe that an estimate of unlawful residents can 
be made which is of a quality sufficient for apportionment pur­
poses.” In a later case, Ridge v. Verity, Professor Siegel submitted 
a declaration stating that there existed an entirely feasible method 
by which undocumented aliens from the 1990 census could be 
excluded for purposes of congressional apportionment.

245. As an employee of the Census Bureau, Professor Siegel 
testified that synthetic adjustments for population undercount of­



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ten produced “garbage” at the local level. In this litigation, Pro­
fessor Siegel has used synthetic adjustments to estimate 
undercount of the Hispanic population in Los Angeles County, 
and has endorsed Dr. Clark’s use of synthetic adjustments for 
citizenship misreporting in Los Angeles County.

246. In addition, the Court finds the Passel methodology prob­
lematic in its estimate of Hispanic citizen voting age population. 
The adjusted alien population used by Passel was for persons 
born in “Spanish” countries, regardless of whether the aliens 
identified themselves as Hispanics. To subtract non-Hispanic 
aliens born in these countries from the Spanish-origin population 
erroneously reduces the Spanish-origin citizen population.

247. The Court finds it noteworthy that the Heer/Passel study 
and Dr. Passel’s data reported in the national-level study, dem­
onstrate that even with a control for period of entry, the Mexican- 
born population in Los Angeles County was on average only half 
as likely to report being naturalized than was the Mexican-born 
population in the balance of the United States. As the table below 
illustrates:

Data Entered Before 1970

Total Population 
Born in Mexico

Total
Naturalized

Self-Reported
Citizenship

Nationwide 988,000 385,000 39.0%
LA County 241,500 67,200 27.8%
Outside LA County 
Entered 1970-74

746,500 317,800 42.6%

Nationwide 569,000 103,000 18.1%
LA County 201,400 23,300 11.6%
Outside LA County 
Entered 1975-80

367,600 79,700 21.7%

Nationwide 769,000 92,000 12.0%
LA County 254,900 17,000 6.7%
Outside LA County 
All Periods o f Entry

514,100 75,000 14.6%

Nationwide 2,326,000 580,000 24.9%
LA County 697,800 107,500 15.4%
Outside LA County 1,628,200 472,500 29.0%



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248. Having considered the estimates of Dr. Clark and Profes­
sor Siegel as well as the methodology utilized to derive these 
citizen voting age population estimates, the Court is not con­
vinced that these estimates will produce a more accurate measure 
of voting age citizens than will the special tabulation of the Cen­
sus. Moreover, the Court is unable to determine the magnitude 
of citizenship misreporting in the 1980 Census special tabulation 
data for the County and finds that substituting Dr. Clark’s and 
Professor Siegel’s estimates of citizen voting age population for 
the official Census data would be inappropriate.

7. Undercount o f Hispanics

249. There are no official Census Bureau adjustments to the 
1980 data for the undercount of the minority population.

250. According to Census publications, Hispanics were 
undercounted in the 1980 Census by 2.2 percent to 7.6 percent, 
Blacks by 5.5 percent and Whites by .7 percent. The Court agrees 
with the Garza plaintiff's that to arrive at the most realistic figures 
for the population of Los Angeles County if adjustments are 
made for overreporting of citizenship then such adjustments must 
likewise be made for undercount.

8. Spanish-Surname/Spanish-Origin

251. The Census has published a list of Spanish surnames used 
to identify persons of Spanish surname during the 1980 Census. 
This Spanish-surname identifier was included in the Los Angeles 
County Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) file as well as the 
sample detail file for Los Angeles County from which the Census 
Bureau prepared special tabulations.

252. Individuals with Spanish-surnames are sometimes not of 
Spanish-origin, while some persons without Spanish-surnames are 
of Spanish-origin. According to the 1980 Census, in Los Angeles 
County there were 574,120 voting age citizens with a Spanish



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surname and 659,375 voting age citizens who identified them­
selves as being of Spanish origin. Of the voting age citizens with 
a Spanish-surname, 88.7 percent were of Spanish origin. Of the 
voting age citizens without a Spanish surname, 3.6 percent were 
of Spanish origin.

253. The four-step procedure followed by United States’ ex­
perts is outlined as follows:

(1) The number of Spanish-surnamed registered voters 
were totalled within voter registration precincts and census 
tracts, by matching lists of registered voters from the Los 
Angeles County Registrar-Recorder and the 1980 Census 
List of Spanish Surnames.

(2) Within the voting age citizen population for each cen­
sus tract, the proportion of persons who were both Spanish 
surnamed and of Spanish origin among all persons with 
Spanish surnames was applied to the number of Spanish-sur­
named registered voters whose residences lay within that 
tract. This produced an estimate of the number of Spanish- 
surnamed registered voters who were also of Spanish origin.

(3) Within the voting age citizen population for each cen­
sus tract, the proportion of persons who did not have a Span­
ish surname but were of Spanish origin among all persons 
without a Spanish surname was applied to the number of 
registered voters without Spanish surnames. This produced 
an estimate of the number of registered voters who did not 
have Spanish surnames but were of Spanish origin.

(4) The two estimates of Spanish origin voters resulting 
from steps (2) and (3) were added together to derive the total 
number of registered voters of Spanish origin.

254. The estimates of Spanish-origin population derived by Dr. 
O’Hare are considered by this Court to be valid estimates of the 
number of registered voters of Spanish origin.

255. Dr. Clark modified Dr. O’Hare’s methodology by reduc­
ing the number of voting age citizens in each census tract that 
were used to compute the estimation ratios in order to correct for 
misreporting of citizenship.



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256. Since Dr. Clark’s voter registration adjustments for mis- 
reporting of citizenship were predicated upon the proposed ad­
justments which the Court declined to adopt supra, the Court 
declines to adopt the adjustments to voter registration data pro­
posed by Dr. Clark.

(a) Adjustments for “European Spanish”

257. The Court has great difficulty with the adjustments made 
for “European Spanish.” The Court is not convinced that a clear 
determination can be made that Filipino, Cuban and “European” 
voters of Spanish origin in Los Angeles County vote differently 
from other voters of Spanish origin.

258. Moreover, in the 1980 Census, Spanish-origin status was 
determined from a separate question which asked “Is this person 
of Hispanic/Spanish Origin?” and then provided five choices: No 
(not Spanish Origin), Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban or Other 
Spanish Origin. For the ancestry question in the 1980 Census, 
respondents were required to fill in a blank in response to the 
question “What is this person’s ancestry?” Ancestry Codes 1-99 
reflected persons who reported Western European ancestry such 
as French or German. Codes 200-204 are identifiable with Spain 
(e.g. Spaniard, Catalonian). Codes 205 and 206 are “Spanish” and 
“Spanish American.”

259. Under Dr. Clark’s definition of “European” Spanish pop­
ulation, anyone with a Spanish surname who was assigned an 
ancestry code from 1-99, or 200-206, was removed from the Span­
ish surname population, regardless of whether those persons had 
identified themselves as Spanish origin or not.

260. For purposes of this analysis, Dr. Clark reasoned that 
persons who identify themselves directly with Spain do not iden­
tify with the larger Hispanic community of persons of Mexican, 
Central or South American origin. The assumption is that per­
sons who identified themselves as “Spanish” or of “Spanish- 
American” ancestry traced their decent directly to Spain and



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would not identify with the larger Hispanic community, which 
in Los Angeles County is predominantly of Mexican origin.

261. However, as the Census Bureau warns in its instructions 
regarding use of the Codes, ancestry is not a substitute for eth­
nicity.

262. An additional problem with Dr. Clark’s analysis is that 
he factored out Spanish-surnamed persons with ancestry codes 1- 
99 and 200-206 regardless of whether they had identified them­
selves as Mexican Spanish-Origin, Puerto Rican Spanish-Origin, 
Cuban Spanish-Origin (whom he also removed separately), other 
Spanish-Origin, or not Spanish-Origin at all. A sizeable number 
of voting age citizens with ancestry codes 205 and 206 were of 
Mexican Spanish-Origin ethnicity (14,240). Dr. Clark factored 
out these individuals because they had Spanish surnames and 
wrote in the word “Spanish” or had designated “Spanish-Ameri- 
can” ancestry.

263. The Court adopts the counts of Spanish surname and 
estimated Spanish-origin voters presented by the United States, 
as reasonably and accurately reflecting Hispanic voter registra­
tion and turnout in Los Angeles County between 1982 and 1988.

9. Deadwood

264. Defendants contend that the registered voter statistics 
provided are flawed since they contain the names of many persons 
who no longer reside within their listed precinct or those who are 
deceased. Defendants further contend that this “deadwood” is 
exceedingly Democratic, containing a disproportionate number 
of Hispanics.

265. Pursuant to the laws of the State of California, the Los 
Angeles County Registrar-Recorder is responsible for conducting 
the Registration Confirmation and Outreach Program (“RCOP”) 
designed to identify and remove “deadwood.”



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266. RCOP is conducted in January of every year and consists 
of sending a registration confirmation postcard to voters at the 
residence shown on the voting rolls.

267. In even-numbered years, the confirmation postcard is sent 
to all registered voters in the County while in odd-numbered 
years it is sent only to those persons who failed to vote in the 
general election in the preceding November.

268. The postcard requests that it not be forwarded to another 
address even if the voter has moved and left a forwarding address. 
Thus, if the United States Postal Service is unable to deliver the 
card at the address listed, the card is returned to the Registrar- 
Recorder’s office with a notation as to why that card is undeliv­
erable.

269. If the postcard indicates the voter has moved and left no 
forwarding address or if their forwarding address reflects that 
they moved out of the County, the Registrar-Recorder’s office 
cancels the voter registration. If the postcard indicated the person 
has moved within the County, the voting rolls are changed to 
reflect the new address.

270. Defendants are correct in their assertion that the presence 
of “deadwood” on the voting rolls is a problem and the Court is 
not completely persuaded that RCOP is effective as the sole pro­
cedure for removing such “deadwood.” However, defendants 
have not demonstrated that the “deadwood,” even if improperly 
remaining on the voting rolls, is disproportionately Hispanic.

271. The proportion of persons identified as Democratic who 
were cancelled under the provisions of the RCOP for the years 
1984 to 1990 did not constitute a disproportionate share of the 
total cancellations in those years.

272. In addition, voters’ surnames, party identifications, regis­
tration precinct numbers and census tract numbers can be re­



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trieved from the computerized lists of cancellations provided by 
the Registrar-Recorder. These computerized lists can be matched 
with the Census Bureau’s 1980 list of Spanish surnames, to yield 
accurate counts of Spanish-surnamed voter cancellations.

Analysis by Spanish-Surnamed Voters o f 
Residency Confirmation and Outreach Program (RCOP)

Total Spanish Surname

November 1988 Registration . . . .  3,765,368
January 1989 RCOP Cancella­

tions   .....................................  132,424
January 1990 RCOP Cancella­

tions ......................................... 245,138

502,885 (13.4%) 

14,522(11.0%) 

27,102 (11.1%)

273. The Court does not find that Hispanic persons constitute 
a differentially greater proportion of “deadwood.”

274. In addition to the registered voter data, plaintiffs expert 
Dr. Estrada and defendants’ experts, Drs. Freeman, Minter and 
Clark, used differing methodologies to estimate post-1980 citizen 
voting age population in Los Angeles County based principally 
on special Census Bureau tabulations of the 1980 citizen voting 
age population and PEPS estimates and projections.

10. Plaintijfs, Illustrative Plans

1. The Grofman Plans

275. Dr. Bernard Grofman, United States’ expert, presented 
five illustrative supervisorial redistricting plans each containing 
five districts. Plan 1 used 1980 Census data and the 1985 and 
1987 PEPS estimates. Plan 2 used 1987 PEPS estimates and 1989 
and 1990 PEPS projections. Plan 3 used 1989 and 1990 PEPS 
projections. Plans 4 and 5 used 1985, 1987, 1989 and 1990 PEPS 
data.

276. In devising these plans, Dr. Grofman considered such 
standard criteria for redistricting as compliance with the one-per­
son, one-vote rule and avoiding minority vote dilution.



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277. In each of Dr. Grofman’s five plans, the total population 
deviation is less than 10 percent, using a valid total population 
base.

278. In the Grofman Plans, the Hispanic total population per­
centage in the most heavily Hispanic district increased during the 
1980’s while the white population decreased. Likewise, in each of 
the Grofman plans, one district as of November 1988 had an 
estimated Spanish-origin registered voter proportion in excess of 
50 percent.

279. In Grofman Plans 3, 4 and 5, one district as of November 
1988 had an estimated Spanish-origin voter turnout proportion in 
excess of 50 percent.

2. The Estrada Plans

280. Dr. Estrada proposed two illustrative supervisorial dis­
tricts, Hispanic Opportunity Districts I and II (HOD I and HOD 
II). Neither HOD I nor HOD II had an Hispanic voting age 
citizenship population majority in 1980. In HOD I, there were 
260,243 Hispanic citizens of voting age, which is 46.9 percent of 
the total citizen voting age population of HOD I. In HOD II, 
Hispanic voting age citizens comprise 282,676, or 46.9 percent of 
the total HOD II population. Dr. Estrada concluded that an 
Hispanic citizen voting age majority district could have been cre­
ated in 1985.

281. In arriving at his conclusions and in devising his illustra­
tive plans, Dr. Estrada considered such demographic factors as: 
Hispanic children ages 10-17 who would turn 18 over the course 
of the 1980’s and the higher citizenship rate associated with this 
group; the possible effects of mortality, out-migration and in-mi- 
gration of citizens upon the 1980 base citizen voting age popula­
tions; and, the likelihood that both Asian and Hispanic citizen­
ship rates have diminished from the 1980 rates.



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282. Based on 1985 PEPS data, Dr. Estrada’s HOD I and 
HOD II, illustrated that an Hispanic majority citizen voting age 
district can be created in HOD I. Assuming that citizen voting 
age population rates remain equal to the 1980 rates for all 
race/ethnic groups, by 1985 51 percent of the citizen voting age 
population of the HOD I district was Hispanic. Assuming that 
55 percent rather than 46 percent of the Asian/Other population 
were voting age citizens, an Hispanic citizen voting age majority 
could still be created in HOD I in 1985.

283. The Garza plaintiffs demonstrated that an Hispanic ma­
jority citizen voting age district could be created in HOD I and 
HOD II using 1987 and 1989 PEPS data as well.

284. The Court finds that under a variety of reasonable demo­
graphic techniques, demonstrated by both plaintiffs’ and defen­
dants’ experts, the demographic changes that have occurred since 
1980 make it possible to draw a Supervisorial district in which 
Hispanics constitute a majority of the citizen voting age popula­
tion.

E. POLITICAL COHESIVENESS

1. Hispanic Candidacies in Los Angeles County 1978-1989

(a) Contests for Los Angeles County Supervisor

285. Direct evidence of the voting patterns of Hispanics is un­
available for supervisorial or other countywide elections in Los 
Angeles County, because the ballot is secret and no exit polls exist 
for County elections.

286. Since 1978, Hispanic candidates have run in five supervi­
sorial election contests: District 1 (1978 and 1982); District 3 
(1978 and 1982); and District 5 (1988).

287. In the 1978 primary election in District 1, one Hispanic 
candidate, Alfonso Lavin, ran against three non-Hispanics, in­



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eluding incumbent Peter Schabarum. Lavin is not a recognizable 
Spanish surname. Lavin received 7.3 percent of the vote and 
Schabarum received 55.7 percent of the vote.

288. In the 1978 primary election in District 3, two Hispanic 
candidates, Rosalio Munoz and Gonzalo Molina, ran against the 
incumbent, Edmund Edelman. Munoz received 11.5 percent of 
the vote, Molina received 14.0 percent of the vote and Edelman 
received 74.5 percent of the vote.

289. In the 1982 primary election in District 1, Lavin ran 
against incumbent Schabarum, as well as another non-Hispanic 
candidate. Schabarum received 64.5 percent and Lavin received 
10.5 percent of the vote.

290. In the 1982 primary in District 3 Rosalio Munoz ran 
against incumbent, Edelman, and two other non-Hispanic candi­
dates. Munoz received 11.8 percent of the vote and came in sec­
ond behind Edelman who received 72.1 percent of the vote.

291. In the 1988 primary election for Supervisor in District 5, 
two Hispanic candidates, M. Enriquez-Marquez and Jose Gal­
van, ran against incumbent Antonovich, and seven other non- 
Hispanic candidates. At the time of the election, Spanish-sur- 
named voters comprised approximately 8 percent of the regis­
tered voters in District 5. Enriquez-Marquez placed fourth with 
2.3 percent of the vote; Galvan placed last with 0.5 percent of the 
vote. Antonovich, who received 44.8 percent of the vote, was 
forced into a run-off with Baxter Ward, who received 22.4 percent 
of the vote in the primary.

292. All the Hispanic candidates in these supervisorial contests 
were minor candidates with relatively little campaign financing 
who had no realistic chance of mounting a serious challenge to 
the incumbent Supervisor.



A-106

293. Dr. Grofman analyzed three of the elections for Supervi­
sor since 1978 which involved Hispanic candidates with Spanish 
surnames and one election in 1982 involving an Hispanic candi­
date without a Spanish surname. Dr. Grofman found that even 
with respect to these very minor candidates, there were substan­
tial differences between the levels of support received from His- 
panics and that received from non-Hispanics.

294. The Court further finds that analyses of Supervisorial elec­
tions are not dispositive of political cohesiveness. Rather, plain­
tiffs were entitled to attempt to establish political cohesion 
through the study and analysis of other elections within the 
County of Los Angeles.

295. No specific number of elections need be studied in order 
to determine whether voting is polarized in Los Angeles County 
along ethnic lines.

(b) Other Nonpartisan County Contests

296. Since 1978 there have been two election contests for Los 
Angeles County offices other than Supervisor in which Hispanic 
candidates have run: County Sheriff (1982) and County Assessor 
(1986).

297. In the 1982 primary election for County Sheriff, two His­
panic candidates, Alex Jacinto and Robert Feliciano, received 6 
percent and approximately 20 percent of the total vote, respec­
tively, against candidates Sherman Block, Charles Greene, and 
three other non-Hispanic candidates. The winner, incumbent 
Block, received 63 percent of the total vote.

298. In the 1986 primary election for County Assessor, the 
Hispanic candidate, Sid Delgado, received roughly 12 percent of 
the total vote against a field of eleven non-Hispanic candidates for 
an open seat. Delgado’s share of the votes cast placed him in 
fourth place in the race, with the leading candidate, John Lynch, 
receiving 21 percent of the vote.



A-107

299. Based upon the relative vote shares and campaign expen­
ditures of the Hispanic candidates in the 1982 Sheriffs race and 
the 1986 Assessor’s race, the Court agrees with Dr. Grofman’s 
conclusion that these were relatively minor candidates.

300. Dr. Grofman conducted analyses of the 1982 primary race 
for Sheriff and the 1986 primary race for Assessor. Based upon 
his analysis, Dr. Grofman found a dramatic divergence between 
the support levels from Hispanics versus those from non-Hispan- 
ics for the two Hispanic candidates in the 1982 Sheriff primary. 
The Hispanic support level, based on Spanish-origin data, for 
Jacinto and Feliciano combined was estimated at 80 percent, 
while the support of non-Hispanic voters for these two candidates 
was estimated at only 20 percent. According to the estimates of 
Dr. Grofman, Feliciano was the plurality choice of the Hispanic 
voters. Similarly in the 1986 Assessor race, the Hispanic candi­
date, Delgado, was estimated to have been the plurality choice of 
Hispanic voters in a very crowded field of candidates with 35 
percent support among Hispanics compared to only 10 percent 
support from non-Hispanics.

(c) Non-Countywide Elections

301. Since 1983 there have been seven elections for Los Angeles 
City Council in which Hispanics have run for office: District 1 
(1987 and 1989); District 4 (1983); District 7 (1989); and District 
14 (1983, 1985, and 1987).

302. In the 1983 primary election for District 14, two Hispanic 
candidates, David Sanchez and Steve Rodriguez, received 2.2 per­
cent and 42.6 percent of the vote respectively in a field of six 
candidates, which included the Anglo incumbent, Art Snyder, 
and three other non-Hispanic candidates. Snyder won the elec­
tion with 50.1 percent of the vote.

303. In a subsequent special election in District 14 in December 
1985, six Hispanic candidates and one non-Hispanic candidate



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ran for an open seat created by the resignation of Councilman 
Snyder. One of the Hispanic candidates, Richard Alatorre, won 
the election with 59.58 percent of the vote and became only the 
second Hispanic elected to the Los Angeles City Council since at 
least 1900. Dorothy Andromidas, the sole non-Hispanic candi­
date, received about one percent of the votes cast.

304. As a result of the 1985 lawsuit filed against the City of 
Los Angeles to remedy the fragmentation of the Hispanic popu­
lation concentrations in the eastern part of the city, United States, 
et al. v. City o f Los Angeles, No. CV 85-7739 JMI (JRx) (C.D. 
Cal. 1985), the City of Los Angeles chose to redraw the council 
districts so as to create a second Hispanic majority city council 
district, Council District 1.

305. As of the 1988 general election, persons of Spanish origin 
constituted approximately 46 percent of the registered voters in 
Council District 1.

306. In the special election in Council District 1 on February 
3, 1987, two Hispanic candidates ran against two non-Hispanic 
candidates for the vacant seat. The two Hispanic candidates re­
ceived 82.5 percent of the vote. One of the Hispanic candidates, 
Gloria Molina, was elected with 57.0 percent of the vote.

307. The special elections for Los Angeles City Council Dis­
trict 14 in 1985 and Los Angeles City Council District 1 in 1987 
both occurred in districts which contained a clear majority His­
panic population.

308. In April 1989, eight candidates, including two Hispanic 
candidates, Irene Tovar and Richard Yanez, ran in the primary 
election for Los Angeles City Council District 7. Tovar received 
9.5 percent of the total vote; Yanez received 1.3 percent; and the 
incumbent, Ernai Bernardi, received 41.9 percent.

309. Dr. Grofman analyzed the 1983 primary contest in City 
Council District 14 and the 1989 primary in City Council Dis­



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trict 7. The population of District 14, which is located essentially 
within the Hispanic Core, is greater than 60 percent Hispanic. In 
1983, Spanish-surnamed persons constituted 49.9 percent of the 
registered voters in District 14. In contrast, District 7, which is 
located in the San Fernando Valley area, has a much smaller 
proportion of Hispanics among its population. As of the 1988 
general election, only 25.49 percent of the registered voters in 
Council District 7 were of Spanish origin. Dr. Grofman’s analysis 
found high levels of Hispanic political cohesion in both of these 
contests.

(d) Contests for Partisan Offices in Los Angeles County

310. According to the 1980 Census, three of the congressional 
districts in the County had Hispanic citizen voting age popula­
tions of at least 35 percent: Congressional District 25 (42.1 per­
cent), Congressional District 30 (37.3 percent), and Congres­
sional District 34 (35.2 percent).

311. As of the 1982 general election, Congressional Districts 
25, 30 and 34 also contained the greatest proportions of Hispanic 
registered voters of all the congressional districts in the County.

312. In the 1982 Democratic primary elections, an Hispanic 
candidate prevailed in each of these three congressional districts: 
Edward Roybal in Congress District 25, Matthew Martinez in 
Congressional District 30, and Esteban Torres in Congressional 
District 34. The three nominees went on to victory in the general 
elections of 1982. Moreover, these Hispanic candidates continued 
to prevail in these three congressional districts for all subsequent 
Democratic primary and general elections.

313. These three congressional districts are located within the 
Hispanic Core area of Los Angeles County.

314. No Hispanic has been elected in any other congressional 
district wholly within Los Angeles County since at least 1982.



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315. As of the 1982 general election, State Senate Districts 24 
and 26 also contained the greatest proportions of Hispanic regis­
tered voters of all the state senate districts in Los Angeles County.

316. In the 1982 Democratic primary elections, an Hispanic 
candidate prevailed in both of these state senate districts: Art 
Torres in Senate District 24 and Joseph Montoya in Senate Dis­
trict 26. In turn these nominees went on to victory in the general 
elections of 1982. Moreover, these Hispanic candidates have pre­
vailed in these state senate districts for all subsequent Democratic 
primary and general elections.

317. Both of these senate districts are included within the His­
panic Core area of Los Angeles County.

318. No Hispanic has been elected to any other state senate 
district wholly within Los Angeles County since at least 1982.

319. According to the 1980 Census, four of the state assembly 
districts in Los Angeles County had Hispanic citizen voting age 
populations of at least 35 percent. Assembly District 55 (41.4 
percent), Assembly District 56 (57.6 percent), Assembly District 
59 (43.5 percent) and Assembly District 60 (37.4 percent).

320. As of the 1982 general election, Assembly Districts 55, 56, 
59 and 60 also contained the greatest proportions of Hispanic 
registered voters of all the state assembly districts in Los Angeles 
County.

321. In three of these four state assembly districts (Assembly 
District 55, Assembly District 56, and Assembly District 59), 
Hispanic candidates prevailed in both the Democratic primary 
and general elections of 1982. In turn, Hispanic candidates pre­
vailed in these three districts in all subsequent Democratic pri­
mary and general elections through 1988. In only one of these 
assembly districts, District 60, did a non-Hispanic candidate pre­



A-111

vail in the Democratic primary and general election contests of 
1982 and subsequent years. No Hispanic candidate has run in the 
Democratic primary for Assembly District 60 since 1982.

322. Each of the three assembly districts in which Hispanic 
candidates have prevailed is located within the Hispanic Core 
area of Los Angeles County.

2. Analysis o f Ethnically Polarized Voting 

(a) Methodology

323. Dr. Allan Lichtman has been recognized as an expert 
witness in bloc voting, political systems, and quantitative and 
socioeconomic analysis, among other matters, in more than 15 
federal court cases.

324. Dr. Grofman has been recognized as an expert witness in 
racial or ethnic vote dilution in numerous federal court cases. His 
testimony concerning racially polarized voting was adopted by 
both the District Court and the United States Supreme Court in 
Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984), af f d  in 
part, rev'd in part, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In 
addition, Dr. Grofman was the sole expert witness for the plain­
tiffs in Cruz Gomez v. City o f Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 
1988), cert, denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1534 (1989), in which 
his opinions were adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

325. Drs. Lichtman and Grofman used standard methods in 
the analysis of electoral data to determine whether voting is eth­
nically polarized in Los Angeles County elections, considering 
Hispanics versus non-Hispanics, and whether the existing system 
of supervisorial districts impedes the ability of Hispanic citizens 
to elect representatives of their choice and fully participate in the 
political process. Their analyses of ethnically polarized voting 
follow procedures that are consistent with the standards pre­
scribed by the Supreme Court in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 52-59.



A-112

326. Plaintiffs’ experts determined the voting behavior of His- 
panics and non-Hispanics in Los Angeles County by comparing 
the ethnic composition of precincts to the division of the vote 
among competing candidates at each precinct. Ecological regres­
sion, the standard method for inferring the behavior of popula­
tion groups from data collected for aggregate units, was used to 
estimate the voting behavior of non-Hispanics and Hispanics. The 
regression methodology generates prediction equations that indi­
cate how voting responds to variations in the proportions of His­
panics and non-Hispanics in each precinct. These equations can 
provide the information needed to estimate the average voting of 
non-Hispanics and Hispanics, respectively, in the election district 
under analysis.

327. Ecological regression, therefore, provides estimates of the 
average voting behavior of the groups in question. It does not 
purport to determine the voting behavior of individuals. Nor does 
it purport to estimate exactly the voting behavior of non-Hispan­
ics and Hispanics in each precinct.

328. Drs. Lichtman and Grofman also utilized a technique 
termed “extreme case analysis.” This technique examines the ac­
tual choices of voters in the most heavily non-Hispanic and the 
most heavily Hispanic precincts in a jurisdiction. If voting is 
polarized along ethnic lines, there should be differences in the 
percentages of votes going to the non-Hispanic and Hispanic can­
didates in the most heavily non-Hispanic and most heavily His­
panic precincts.

329. Ecological regression and extreme case analysis were also 
supplemented by the examination of squared correlation coeffi­
cients, an indicator of the reliability of a finding of polarized 
voting. The possible value of the squared correlation coefficient 
(R2) varies from 0 to 1.0, with values close to 1.0 indicating that 
the percentage of the vote case for the Hispanic candidates can 
be nearly perfectly predicted from the Hispanic versus non-His­



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panic composition of political units. Although no particular value 
of R2 arbitrarily defines the distinction between “high” and 
“low”, social scientists often find values in excess of .25 to be 
indicative of a substantial relationship between variables and gen­
erally consider values of .5 or greater as indicative of a very strong 
relationship.

330. As indicated by the Gingles decision, plaintiffs’ experts 
divided the analysis of polarized voting into two components: the 
degree to which the Hispanic electorate cohesively supports His­
panic candidates for public office and the degree to which the 
non-Hispanic electorate bloc votes for non-Hispanic candidates.

331. The analysis of Hispanic cohesion and non-Hispanic bloc 
voting provides an indication of whether Hispanic voters have an 
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in the existing 
supervisorial districts. In particular, the issue is whether bloc 
voting by non-Hispanics will normally be sufficient to defeat His­
panic candidates in the existing Supervisorial districts with the 
greatest Hispanic concentration.

332. Dr. Grofman analyzed eight nonpartisan elections involv­
ing non-Hispanic versus Hispanic candidates in Los Angeles 
County from 1978 to 1989; four were for County Supervisor, one 
for sheriff, one for assessor and two for Los Angeles City Council. 
Of the eight contests analyzed, only the assessor’s contest was an 
election for an open seat.

333. In addition, Dr. Lichtman analyzed 12 open-seat partisan 
elections involving Hispanic versus non-Hispanic candidates for 
U.S. Congress, state senate, and state assembly from 1982 to 
1988. Of the 12 contests analyzed, five were primaries, four Dem­
ocratic and one Republican, and several were general elections, 
including one special run-off election.



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334. Dr. Lichtman focused on open-seat elections because gen­
erally they are the most hotly contested of all races and provide 
the clearest indication of whether or not Hispanics and non-His- 
panics systematically differ in their choices of candidates.

335. There are no substantive differences in results of the eco­
logical regression and extreme case analyses between the analyses 
based upon Spanish surname and the analyses based upon Span­
ish origin data.

336. There is no dispute that plaintiffs’ experts accurately com­
puted and reported the results of the application of the ecological 
regression methodology. Dr. Jerome Sacks, a statistician and one 
of the defendants’ experts, replicated plaintiffs’ analysis and pro­
duced results that were not substantively different.

(b) Results o f Analysis

337. The analysis of polarized voting in this case centered on 
the exposition and critique of ecological regression as a technique 
for analyzing group voting behavior.

338. Defendants presented the testimony of three statisticians, 
Dr. Stephen Klein, Dr. Jerome Sacks, and Dr. David Freedman, 
who individually and collectively criticized the use of the ecolog­
ical regression methodology to analyze group voting behavior.

339. Defendants’ experts do not dispute that as a general mat­
ter in the elections analyzed by plaintiffs’ experts the proportion 
of the vote for the Hispanic candidates increases as the proportion 
of Hispanics in the precinct increases.

340. The ecological regression methodology can produce phys­
ically impossible results.

341. In the 20 elections analyzed by Drs. Grofman and Licht­
man, physically impossible results were produced for only four



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of the 40 estimates of Hispanic and non-Hispanic voting. All 
involved estimates of Hispanic support for the Hispanic candidate 
that exceeded 100 percent.

342. All four physically impossible estimates were for general 
elections and three of four were just a few percentage points over 
the 100 percent mark,

343. Voting analysts often encounter estimates over 100 per­
cent when voting is highly polarized and the slope of the ecologi­
cal regression line is steeply pitched. Dr. Lichtman testified that 
in numerous jurisdictions where he encountered such estimates, 
he was able to verify the accuracy of the method of bounds 
through examination of nearly homogeneous precincts that in­
cluded a majority of the population group in question.

344. Extreme case analysis also shows the accuracy of using the 
method of bounds for the one instance in which an estimate de­
parts substantially from 100 percent, the estimate of the percent 
of Hispanics voting for the Hispanic candidate in the 1982 gen­
eral election is Assembly District 52. Although there are no heav­
ily Hispanic precincts in Assembly District 52, examination of 
Dr. Sacks’ scattergram for this election shows that there are a 
large number of precincts in which the percentage of registrants 
with a Spanish origin is 10 percent or less. Dr. Lichtman’s ex­
treme case analysis shows that in precincts where Spanish-origin 
registrants are 10 percent or less, 25 percent of the vote was 
actually cast for the Hispanic candidate. This percentage con­
forms almost exactly to the 24 percent non-Hispanic crossover 
vote derived by the methods of bounds employed by Dr. Licht­
man.

345. Defendants’ experts also content that ecological regression 
is unreliable because it depends on the unreasonable assumption 
that voting behavior is constant across precincts except for ran­
dom variation. The regression equation assumes that Hispanics



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give the same level of support to Hispanic candidates in every 
precinct.

346. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the so-called con­
stancy assumption does not significantly undermine the reliability 
of the estimates gained through the ecological regression meth­
odology in this case.

347. The ecological regression technique is designed to provide 
accurate estimates only of average group voting behavior in a 
particular jurisdiction. As a result, the technique can yield accu­
rate estimates even in the presence of substantial random varia­
tions in voting behavior within the studied jurisdiction. The tech­
nique can also produce accurate estimates in the presence [of] 
non-random variations, so long as such variations are not related 
to the percentage of Hispanics within a jurisdiction.

348. Defendants’ experts testified that an omitted variable or a 
variable related both to voting behavior and to the percentage of 
Hispanic registrants in a precinct may be distorting the ecological 
regression analysis. The degree of bias will depend on the strength 
of the omitted variable’s independent influence on voting behav­
ior and on the strength of its relationship to the percentage of 
Hispanics in a precinct.

349. Defendants’ experts advance the theory that such varia­
bles as Democratic affiliation and low socioeconomic status im­
pact on voting behavior by overriding ethnic affiliation.

350. While in theory there exists a possibility that ecological 
regression could overestimate the results of ecological regression, 
experts for defendants have failed to demonstrate that there is in 
fact any substantial bias resulting from the omitted variable prob­
lem in Los Angeles County.

351. In a further attempt to discredit the reliability of the eco­
logical regression technique, defendants’ experts developed the 
“neighborhood model” to provide an alternative method of mea­



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suring ethnically polarized voting. The neighborhood model 
posits that all voters within a precinct vote alike irrespective of 
ethnic diversity within such a precinct.

352. At its logical boundaries, the omitted or contextual vari­
able theory blends into the neighborhood model: both theories 
posit that non-ethnic factors impact on voting behavior to the 
extent of overriding ethnic affiliation. Thus, the greater the num­
ber of asserted contextual variables related to the ecological com­
position of the precinct, the more the omitted variable theory 
begins to resemble the neighborhood model.

353. The Court concludes that the neighborhood model’s em­
phasis on the ecological structure of a precinct as a determinant 
of voting behavior impedes it from detecting the presence of po­
larized voting. As such, it is not a reliable method of inferring 
group voting behavior.

354. Defendants’ critique of plaintiffs’ squared correlation co­
efficient (R2) and extreme case analyses reiterates their constancy 
assumption objection to the ecological regression methodology.

355. The Court finds that the ecological regression and extreme 
case analysis performed by plaintiffs’ experts, as supplemented by 
the analysis of correlation coefficients are sufficiently reliable to 
make the requisite determinations about polarized voting between 
Hispanics and non-Hispanics.

356. The results of ecological regression and extreme case anal­
ysis reveal that Hispanic and non-Hispanic voters in Los Angeles 
County are polarized along ethnic lines in their choices of candi­
dates.

3. Cohesiveness o f Hispanic Voters

357. The results of the ecological regression analyses demon­
strated that for all elections analyzed, Hispanic voters generally



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preferred Hispanic candidates over non-Hispanic candidates.7 In 
15 of the 19 elections studied,8 a majority of voters with Spanish 
surnames voted for Hispanic candidates. In 14 of these 15 con­
tests, the Hispanic vote for the Hispanic candidates was much 
higher, equal to or greater than 32 percentage points, than the 
non-Hispanic vote for the Hispanic candidates. In 14 of the 19 
elections, voters with Spanish surnames voted for Hispanic can­
didates at a level equal to or greater than the 60 percent that is 
generally considered to be a landslide victory in American politi­
cal history.

358. Among the 19 contests studied, Dr. Lichtman properly 
isolated for analysis the eight nonpartisan contests and the four 
partisan primary contests. The Supervisorial elections are non­
partisan contests in which candidates compete without explicit 
party identification. Similarly, in partisan primary contests can­
didates compete under the same label so that the influence of 
party identification is eliminated. Since a better that [sic] two- 
thirds majority of Hispanics in the County are Democrats, their 
behavior in general elections might be influenced by party affilia­
tion in the sense that they may be more likely to vote for the 
Democratic nominee. Thus, as compared to general election con­
tests, nonpartisan and primary races provide the most stringent 
test of Hispanic cohesion.

7The ecological regression analysis showed that voting was ethnically 
polarized in the 1988 Republican primary contest with 60 percent of 
voters with a Spanish surname and 59 percent of voters with Spanish 
origin opting for the Hispanic candidate compared to 45 percent of 
voters without a Spanish surname and 44 percent of voters without a 
Spanish origin. But Dr. Lichtman testified that he did not rely on the 
results of the analysis because squared correlation coefficients were very 
low indicating a lack of reliability of the analysis. In addition, he noted 
that at least since 1982 all Hispanics elected to public office in Los 
Angeles County have run as Democrats.

8Hereafter, the reports of the analyses exclude the 1988 Republican 
primary for the reasons noted in the preceding footnote.



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359. In eight of the 12 nonpartisan and partisan primary elec­
tions, a majority of voters with Spanish surnames voted for His­
panic candidates. In seven of the 12 contests, a 70 percent or 
greater majority of voters with Spanish surnames united behind 
Hispanic candidates. On average, about 64 percent of the Span- 
ish-surnamed voters supported Hispanic candidates in these con­
tests.

360. There were special circumstances involved in the five non­
partisan contests in which the cohesion levels were lower than 60 
percent. The five contests include the 1986 contest for assessor 
and the four Supervisorial contests.

361. In the assessor’s contest, although the lone Hispanic can­
didate, Delgado, failed to gain majority support from Hispanic 
voters, he still finished in first place among Hispanic voters de­
spite a crowded field that included 12 candidates. Delgado gar­
nered the support of 38 percent of voters with a Spanish surname 
and 35 percent of voters with a Spanish origin. The second-place 
finisher among Hispanic voters garnered the support of 20 per­
cent of the voters with either a Spanish surname or a Spanish 
origin. Overall, as a result of Delgado’s support among Hispanics, 
he finished in fourth place among the 12 candidates. Similarly, in 
the 1988 Supervisorial race in District 5, Enriquez-Marquez, al­
though a much weaker candidate overall than Delgado, finished 
first among Hispanic voters in a likewise crowded field of ten 
candidates. Enriquez-Marquez garnered the support of 36 per­
cent of voters with a Spanish surname and 33 percent of voters 
with a Spanish origin. The second-place finisher among Hispanic 
voters garnered the support of 21 percent of voters with a Spanish 
surname.

362. In only one of four Supervisorial contests analyzed by Dr. 
Grofman did a majority of Spanish-surname or Spanish-origin 
voters support the Hispanic candidates. The remaining three Su­
pervisorial contests, however, involved relatively marginal His­



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panic candidates. In the 1982 primary contests in Supervisorial 
Districts 1 and 3, and in the 1988 primary contest in Supervisorial 
District 5, the Hispanic vote for the Hispanic candidates was 
much higher than their overall percentages. For these three Su­
pervisorial contests, the Hispanic candidates received a mean vote 
of 37 percent from Spanish-sumamed voters and a mean vote of 
34 percent from Spanish-origin voters compared to an overall 
mean vote of but 8 percent.

363. The 1982 primary contests provide a useful means of ana­
lyzing Hispanic cohesion since six of the 19 elections analyzed 
were held on primary election day in 1982. In contests for U.S. 
Congress in the 1982 primary in Congressional District 30 and 
Congressional District 34, the Hispanic candidates received 78 
and 90 percent, respectively, of the vote of Spanish-surnamed 
voters and 78 and 88 percent, respectively, of the vote of Spanish- 
origin voters. In the contest for state assembly in the 1982 pri­
mary for Assembly District 59, the Hispanic candidates received 
83 percent of the vote of Spanish-origin voters. In the 1982 pri­
mary contest for sheriff, the Hispanic candidates received 85 per­
cent of the vote of Spanish-surnamed voters and 80 percent of the 
vote of Spanish-origin voters. Only the relatively marginal candi­
dates for Supervisor in Districts 1 and 3 in the 1982 primary 
received less than majority support from Hispanics. In District 1, 
the Hispanic candidate received 21 percent of the vote of Spanish- 
surnamed voters and 19 percent of the vote of Spanish-origin 
voters. In District 3, the Hispanic candidate received 44 percent 
of the vote of Spanish-surnamed voters and 41 percent of the vote 
of Spanish-origin voters. For all six contests, Hispanic candidates 
garnered a mean vote of 67 percent from Spanish-origin voters.

364. Dr. Lichtman’s analysis of partisan elections in Los An­
geles County demonstrates strong political cohesion among His­
panics. In the four Democratic Party primary elections he ana­
lyzed, Spanish origin voters are estimated to have provided, on 
average, 85 percent of their vote for Hispanic candidates. His­



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panic candidates received an average of 94 percent of the vote of 
Spanish-origin voters in the eight general elections Dr. Lichtman 
analyzed.

365. The Court finds that Hispanic political cohesiveness is 
strong when Hispanic candidates have a realistic chance of win­
ning.

366. For all 19 elections analyzed, the reliability of the findings 
of polarized voting is corroborated by extremely high values of 
the squared correlation coefficient (R2). Whether Spanish-sur- 
name or Spanish-origin data are used, in all but five contests, the 
value of the squared correlation coefficient is at least equal to 
0.65. For all 19 elections, moreover, the finding of racial polari­
zation attains a level of statistical significance equal to or greater 
than the conventional standards used in social science. Research­
ers generally accept as reliable results for which statistical signifi­
cance equals or exceeds the conventional standards of either .05 
(corresponding to a five in one-hundred probability of obtaining 
results from chance or random factors) or .01 (corresponding to 
a one in one-hundred probability). For all 19 elections studied, 
the statistical significance is better than .00001 (corresponding to 
one in one-hundred thousand probability of obtaining the results 
from chance or random factors). The likelihood of obtaining any 
of these given results under the random factors hypothesis is low 
and the likelihood of obtaining the consistent pattern of these 
results is virtually zero.

367. The results of ecological regression analysis are corrobo­
rated by the findings of extreme case analysis, a technique that 
examines the actual vote cast in precincts that are heavily His­
panic or heavily non-Hispanic in their ethnic composition. The 
results of the extreme case analyses in this case were consistent 
with, and bolstered the reliability of the results of ecological re­
gression.

368. For all 11 partisan contests studied, the Hispanic candi­
dates received a greater than landslide majority, 60 percent or



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more, of the votes actually cast in more than 80 percent Hispanic 
precincts, whether Spanish-surname or Spanish-origin data are 
used. In contrast, only in the 1982 general election for state as­
sembly in Assembly District 56 and in the 1986 special run-off 
and general elections for state assembly in Assembly District 55, 
did the Hispanic candidate receive more than 50 percent of the 
votes actually cast in the more than 90 percent non-Hispanic 
precincts. For the eight nonpartisan elections studied, the His­
panic candidates received a majority of the vote cast in more than 
80 percent or more than 90 percent Hispanic precincts in three 
elections.9 In all eleven partisan elections, the Hispanic candi­
dates received a much higher vote in the heavily Hispanic pre­
cincts that in the more than 90 percent non-Hispanic precincts.

F. NON-HISPANIC BLOC VOTING
369. Plaintiffs did not present evidence of white bloc voting. 

For most of their analyses, they combined Anglos, Blacks and 
Asians into a non-Hispanic bloc. The potential distorting effect 
of this construct is lessened by the fact that for most of the elec­
tions analyzed, the Black and Asian percentage of the electorate 
was not significant. Moreover, given the demographic reality of 
the Hispanic Core in Los Angeles County, if 40 percent of the 
registered voters in a given precinct are Hispanic, the precinct 
will likely be predominantly Hispanic in its overall population.

370. Where a racial or ethnic group is only a small component 
of the electorate, its voting behavior would not have a significant 
effect on the two-group ecological regression estimates of voting 
behavior.

371. Of the elections analyzed by plaintiffs’ experts non-His­
panic voters provided majority support for the Hispanic candi­
dates in only three elections, all partisan general election contests

9For some nonpartisan contests, it was possible to use more than 90 
percent Hispanic precincts; for others it was possible only to use more 
than 80 percent Hispanic precincts.



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in which party affiliation often influences the behavior of voters 
(the 1982 general election contests in Senate District 24 and As­
sembly District 56 and the 1986 general election contest in As­
sembly District 55). Overall, for all 19 contests studied, the mean 
crossover vote for Hispanic candidates among non-Spanish-sur- 
named voters was 27 percent, compared to a bloc vote of 76 
percent for non-Hispanic candidates.

372. In the 12 non-partisan or partisan primary elections non- 
Hispanic voters did not provide a crossover vote of greater than 
34 percent for the Hispanic candidates, whether Spanish-surname 
or Spanish-origin data are used. Overall, for these 12 elections, 
the mean crossover vote for Hispanic candidates by non-Spanish- 
surnamed voters is 17 percent.

373. The results of extreme case analysis corroborate the find­
ings of strong bloc voting by non-Hispanics. Of all 19 contests 
studied, only in the 1982 general election contest for state assem­
bly in Assembly District 56 and in the 1986 special runoff and 
general election contests for state assembly in Assembly District 
55, did Hispanic candidates receive a majority of the vote actually 
cast in the more than 90 percent non-Hispanic precincts, whether 
Spanish-surname or Spanish-origin data are used. Considering 
only the 12 nonpartisan and partisan primary contests, in no 
instance did Hispanic candidates receive more than 42 percent of 
the vote cast in the more than 90 percent non-Hispanic precincts. 
Overall, for these 12 elections, the mean vote for Hispanic candi­
dates in the more than 90 percent non-Hispanic precincts, using 
Spanish-surname data, is 19 percent.

374. For several of the elections analyzed through ecological 
regression, extreme case analysis provides especially strong con­
firmation of the bloc voting results, because a majority or near­
majority of non-Hispanic registrants reside in the more than 90 
percent non-Hispanic precincts. Dr. Jerome Sacks, an expert for 
the defendants, testified that if about 35 to 40 percent of a group



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reside within “homogeneous” precincts, which he defines as pre­
cincts in which the group comprises 90 percent or more of the 
defined population, then the ecological regression analysis will 
produce reliable results for that group because the homogeneous 
precincts anchor the regression line.

375. Specifically, Dr. Sacks testified that in Los Angeles 
County there are sufficient homogeneous precincts Countywide 
and in Supervisorial Districts 3 and 5 to have confidence that the 
regression estimates for non-Hispanics voting behavior are reli­
able.

376. Dr. Sacks’ analysis provided five test cases of the reliability 
of the regression analysis for non-Hispanics: the 1978 and 1982 
primaries for Supervisor in District 3; the 1982 Countywide pri­
mary for sheriff, the 1986 County wide primary for assessor; and 
the 1988 primary for Supervisor in District 5. For these contests, 
the following table compares ecological regression and extreme 
case results for non-Hispanics using Spanish-surname data.

Comparison o f Ecological Regression and Extreme Case 
Analyses Non-Hispanic Registrants, Spanish-Surname Data 
Nonpartisan Elections Meeting Dr. Sacks Reliability Criteria 
Percentage o f Non-Hispanics Voting for Hispanic Candidates

Election Ecological Regression
90% -f- Non-Hispanic 

Precincts

1978 Primary SD10 3 20 19
1982 Primary Sheriff 21 23
1982 Primary SD 3 5 6
1986 Primary Assessor 10 11
1988 Primary SD 5 1 2

377. These results show an extremely close correspondence 
between the estimates of non-Hispanic voting for the Hispanic 
candidate derived by ecological regression and the actual vote for

10SD =  Supervisorial District.



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the Hispanic candidate in precincts that are 90 percent or more 
non-Hispanic. This correspondence holds both for Spanish-sur- 
name and Spanish-origin data. In no instance is there a difference 
of more than two percentage points between the ecological regres­
sion results and the results from extreme case analysis. As would 
be expected from the fact that there are some Hispanics in the 
more than 90 percent non-Hispanic precincts, the support for the 
Hispanic candidate in these precincts is generally a point or two 
higher than the estimate drawn from ecological regression.

378. These results have implications for the estimates of His­
panic as well as non-Hispanic voting. The vote for the Hispanic 
candidate(s) is simply the sum of the votes cast for that candidate 
or candidates by non-Hispanic and by Hispanic voters. Thus, if 
non-Hispanics are not voting for the Hispanic candidate, then the 
votes for the Hispanic candidate must be coming from Hispanic 
voters. Therefore, the reliable ecological regression estimates of 
low non-Hispanic support for Hispanic candidates for each of the 
five elections studied also provides strong confirmation of the 
reliability of the ecological regression estimates for the Hispanic 
support for these candidates.

379. The analysis of both partisan and non-partisan elections 
also suggests that the degree of crossover voting by non-Hispanics 
for Hispanic candidates may decrease as the Hispanic component 
of a district decreases. Seven of the eight non-partisan elections 
were held in districts, or Countywide, with an Hispanic compo­
nent among their registered voters equal to or less than that of 
the most heavily Hispanic of existing Supervisorial districts, Dis­
trict 1. For these seven elections, a mean of only 9 percent of 
voters without a Spanish surname crossed over to support an 
Hispanic candidate. Of the nonpartisan primary elections, only 
the election for City Council in District 14 was held in a district 
with a greater Hispanic component than that of existing Supervi­
sorial District 1. According to 1983 data, 49.9 percent of the 
registrants in Council District 14 has a Spanish surname. In the



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1983 primary in this district, 23 percent of voters without a Span­
ish surname crossed over to opt for the Hispanic candidates, a 
percentage that is 2.5 times greater than the mean crossover vote 
of 9 percent for the remaining seven non-partisan contests.

380. Given the current configuration of the supervisorial dis­
tricts and the existence of non-Hispanic bloc voting, the Hispanic 
electorate, though politically cohesive, would not normally have 
an opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice in even the 
most Hispanic districts, District 1 and District 3.

381. If the estimated polarization levels are applied to plaintiffs’ 
proposed District 3 of Grofman Plan 1, the election prospects of 
Hispanics improve substantially.

382. This fact is illustrated by the table below which applies 
the cohesion and crossover estimates from the three 1982 p r im ary 
elections in Congressional Districts 30 and 34 and Assembly Dis­
trict 59 to a 50.2 percent Spanish-origin district.

Projected Vote for Hispanic Candidate 
in 50.2 Percent Spanish-Origin District 

Based on 1982 Spanish-Origin Primary Results 
(Assuming Equal Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Turnout)

I. CD11 30 (78% Hispanic Cohesion, 33% Non-Hispanic Crossover)
1. Hisp. Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  .78 X 50.2% =  39.2%
2. Non-Hisp. Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  .33 X 49.8% =  16.4%
3. Total Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  39.2% +  16.4% =  55.6%

II. CD 34 (88% Hispanic Cohesion, 26% Non-Hispanic Crossover)
1. Hisp. Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  .88 X 48.3% =  42.5%
2. Non-Hisp. Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  .26 X 51.7% =  13.4%
3. Total Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  42.5% +  13.4% =  55.9%

III. AD 59 (83% Hispanic Cohesion, 29% Non-Hispanic Crossover)
1. Hisp. Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  .83 X 48.3% =40.1%
2. Non-Hisp. Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  .29 X 51.7% =  15.0%
3. Total Vote for Hisp. Candidate =  40.1% +  15.0% =  55.1%

11 CD =  Congressional District. AD =  Assembly District.



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383. A similar analysis results in a projected vote of over 50 
percent for an Hispanic-preferred candidate in District 3 of 
Grofman Plan 1 based on available 1982 Spanish-origin statistics 
(44.0 percent Spanish origin).

384. Under similar analyses, an Hispanic-preferred candidate 
would be the projected winner in a 44.0 percent Spanish-origin 
district under either the assumption of equal turnout rate or that 
of turnout differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics.

G. OTHER SENATE FACTORS

1. History o f Official Discrimination

385. The Hispanic community in Los Angeles County has 
borne the effects of a history of discrimination in the areas of 
education, housing, employment, and other socioeconomic areas.

386. In Southern California, restrictive real estate covenants 
have created limited housing opportunities for the Mexican-ori- 
gin population. Dr. Camarillo testified that the current Hispanic 
population concentrations correspond to the historical process in 
which people were not allowed to live, or were restricted to par­
ticular areas of the County.

(a) Repatriation

387. From 1929 to 1939, in the aftermath of the Depression, 
some 200,000 to 300,000 Mexican-Americans returned to their 
“country of origin” as part of a program instituted by the Justice 
Department. While the program was theoretically voluntary, 
many legal resident aliens and American citizens of Mexican de­
scent were forced or coerced out of the country.

(b) Education

388. In eight of the largest counties in California, in 1923, there 
were 64 schools with 90-100 percent Mexican-origin children.



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School officials required Mexican children to have separate grad­
uation ceremonies from Anglos attending the same school. In one 
Los Angeles County school where officials were unable to provide 
separate buildings for the Mexican children, they were assigned 
to separate classrooms.

389. California maintained segregated schools for Hispanics in 
Los Angeles until 1947 when the California Supreme Court 
struck down such segregation. Westminster School District o f Or­
ange County v. Mendez, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Cal. 1946), affd, 
161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). However, as the United States 
points out, school desegregation litigation involving districts con­
tained within Los Angeles County continued until 1989.

390. The mean years of school completed by Hispanic voting 
age citizens in 1980 was only 10.9 years, compared to 13.1 years 
for white non-Hispanics. The Hispanic mean was lower than that 
of any other minority group.

391. According to the Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey, only 5 percent of Hispanics had completed 16 or more 
years of school, compared to 29 percent of Anglos.

(c) Public Facilities

392. As examples of discrimination against Hispanics in the use 
of public facilities, Dr. Camarillo testified that it was common 
during the first decade of this century, for access to public swim- 
ming pools to be restricted for Mexican-Americans and blacks, 
usually to the day before the pool was to be cleaned. In movie 
theaters, Mexican-Americans could not sit in the center sections.

(d) Right to Vote

393. In 1962, California was one of only 19 states which made 
English language literacy a prerequisite for voting.



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394. In 1970, the California Supreme Court held that Article 
II, Section 1 of the Constitution of California violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by conditioning 
the right of persons otherwise qualified to vote upon the ability 
to read the English language. The court found no compelling 
state interest in “denying the vote to a group of . . . citizens who 
already face similar problems of discrimination and exclusion in 
other areas and need a political voice if they are to have any 
realistic hope of ameliorating the conditions in which they live.” 
Castro v. State o f California, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 240 (1970). The court 
noted that “fear and hatred played a significant role in the pas­
sage of the literacy requirement.” Id. at 25.

395. Pursuant to the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act, the Census Bureau determined that Los Angeles County was 
covered by the bilingual ballot election requirements of Section 
203, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la, because more than five percent of 
the County’s citizens of voting age were persons of Spanish heri­
tage, a protected language minority group under the Voting 
Rights Act, and that the illiteracy rate of such persons was higher 
than the national rate.

396. As initially enacted, the provisions of Section 203 were 
due to expire on August 6, 1985.

397. In 1982, Congress extended the protections of Section 203 
until August 6, 1992, but devised a new formula for coverage. 
This extension applied only to those jurisdictions in which the 
Census Bureau determined that members of a single language 
minority do not speak or understand English adequately enough 
to participate in the electoral process.

398. In 1984, the [sic] pursuant to the 1982 amendments, the 
Census determined that Los Angeles County was no longer cov­
ered by Section 203 of the Act. Although 14.6 percent of the 
County’s voting age citizens were “persons of Spanish heritage”



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according to the 1980 Census, the Bureau concluded that fewer 
than five percent could not speak or understand English ade­
quately enough to participate in the electoral process.

399. On August 7, 1984, the Board of Supervisors voted to 
discontinue providing election materials in Spanish.

2. Racial Appeals

400. The Garza plaintiffs provided the Court with substantial 
evidence of racial appeals in elections at all levels within the 
County.

401. For example, Steven Rodriguez, an Hispanic, ran for 
Councilman in District 14 of the Los Angeles City Council. 
When Mr. Rodriguez campaigned in Eagle Rock in 1983, he had 
doors slammed in his face and had his campaign literature de­
stroyed. During his campaign, Mr. Rodriguez encountered such 
reaction in excess of 100 times.

402. During his campaigns for United States Congress, Esteban 
Torres encountered racial appeals by his opponents in the form 
of statements that Mr. Torres catered only to Hispanics and in 
the use of his photograph in opponents’ campaign literature.

403. In the 1971 runoff for the 49th Assembly District, Richard 
Alatorre ran against William Brophy. Mr. Brophy distributed 
mailers which included Mr. Alatorre’s photograph and alluded 
that Alatorre was sympathetic to undocumented aliens.

404. The Court finds that Hispanic residents in Los Angeles 
County have suffered and continue to suffer from the lingering 
effects of discrimination.

3. Size o f Supervisorial Districts

405. While the population equality statistics for statewide elec­
toral districts in California under the 1980 Census population 
figures range from 295,849 persons for state assembly districts to 
525,953 persons for congressional districts, to 591,698 for state



A-131

senate districts, population equality for a Los Angeles County 
Supervisorial district is 1,495,501 persons or approximately one 
sixteenth of the 1980 population of the State of California.

406. A Los Angeles County Supervisorial district equal to one- 
fifth of the County’s population is over 2.5 times larger in popu­
lation than either a congressional or state senatorial district 
which meet population equality standards and over 5 times as 
large as a California assembly district which satisfies the equal 
population standard.

407. The Los Angeles County Supervisorial districts have the 
largest population of any single-member district for electing a 
county governing body in the United States.

408. The 1980 population of each Los Angeles County Super­
visorial district was larger than the population of 16 states.

409. Los Angeles County encompasses 4,083 square miles. In 
land area, the County is four times as large as the State of Rhode 
Island and twice as large as Delaware.

410. The five district structure clearly provides an advantage 
to incumbents and requires significant financial expenditures to 
run a successful campaign.

411. Between 1981 and 1986 incumbent Supervisors secured 
contributions of $8.2 million.

412. Candidates for the Board of Supervisors must raise more 
money than candidates for Governor in many states to be a seri­
ous challenger.

413. In 1962 and in 1976, the Board submitted the issue of 
revising the structure of County government to the voters. On 
both occasions, the voters rejected the proposed change.

414. The Garza plaintiffs contend that the size of the Board of 
Supervisors has a discriminatory impact upon Hispanic partici­



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pation in the political process and that the size of the districts 
constitute a disfavored voting procedure that denies Hispanics 
equal access to the electoral process,

415. Supervisor Hahn testified that it was difficult for one Su­
pervisor to represent more than a million people.

416. The Court finds that the enormous size and population of 
each supervisorial district and the fragmentation of the Hispanic 
population core under the 1981 redistricting plan have impeded 
the ability of Hispanic persons to participate in the political pro­
cess, deterred viable Hispanic candidates from running for the 
Board, and impaired the ability of Hispanics to elect Supervisors 
of their choice.

To the extent that the preceding Findings of Fact may be 
deemed to be Conclusions of Law, they are hereby incorporated 
by reference into the Conclusions of Law.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LA W

A. JURISDICTION

1. The Court has jurisdiction over this voting rights litigation 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) &
(4). Venue is proper in the Central District of California pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

B. THE VOTING RIGHTS A CT

2. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, as 
amended, 96 Stat. 134, provides that:

(a) No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied 
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which re­
sults in a denial or abridgement of the right . . .  to vote on 
account of race or color, or in contravention of the guaran­
tees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).



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(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or 
political subdivision are not equally open to participation by 
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in 
that its members have less opportunity than other political 
members of the electorate to participate in the political pro­
cess and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent 
to which members of a protected class have been elected to 
office in the state or political subdivision is [but] one circum­
stance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in 
this section establishes a right to have members of a pro­
tected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in 
the population.

3. Section 4(f)(2) of the Act provides

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, 
practice or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision . . .  to deny or abridge the right of any citi­
zen of the United States to vote because he is a member of a 
language minority group.12 (emphasis added)

1. The Senate Factors

4. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority report accompa­
nying the bill that amended § 2, elaborates on the circumstances 
that might be probative of a § 2 violation, noting the following 
“typical factors” (hereinafter “Senate Factors”):

1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the 
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the 
members of the minority group to register, to vote, or other­
wise to participate in the democratic process;

2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state 
or political subdivision is racially polarized;

12The term language minorities or language minority group means 
persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives 
or of Spanish heritage. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3).



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3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision 
has used unusually large election districts, majority vote re­
quirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting prac­
tices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for 
discrimination against the minority group;

4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether the mem­
bers of the minority group have been denied access to that 
process;

5. The extent to which members of the minority group in 
the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimi­
nation in such areas as education, employment and health, 
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process;

6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized 
by overt or subtle racial appeals.

7. The extent to which members of the minority group 
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

5. Additional factors considered probative of a violation in­
cluded:

Whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the 
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the 
members of the minority group.

Whether the policy underlying the state or political subdi­
vision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to vot­
ing, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

S.Rep.No. 97-417, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 28, 29 (1982), U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 1982, pp. 206-207 (hereinafter S. Rep.).

6. The impact of the contested structure or practice on minor­
ity electoral opportunities must be assessed based on “objective” 
factors which include but are not limited to the Senate Factors 
enumerated above. The Senate Committee noted in its report that 
there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be 
proved, or that a majority of them point one way or another. 
S.Rep. at 29, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 207.



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7. The Senate Committee set forth a flexible, fact-intensive test 
for determining § 2 violations. “The question whether the politi­
cal processes are ‘equally open’ depends upon a searching practi­
cal evaluation of the ‘past and present reality’ ” and on a “func­
tional” view of the political process. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 citing 
S.Rep. at 30, n.120, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, 
p. 208. As Gingles explained, “the essence of a § 2 claim is that a 
certain electoral law, practice or structure interacts with social or 
historical conditions to cause an inequality in opportunities en­
joyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred represent­
atives.” Id. at 47. Rights afforded under Section 2 apply equally 
to Hispanics. Gomez v. City o f Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th 
Cir. 1988), cert, denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1534 (1989). The 
conclusion as to whether Hispanics have an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their 
choice is “peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case.” Id. 
at 79.

8. The circumstances under which § 2 violations may be 
proved is limited in three ways:

First, electoral devices, such as at large elections, may not 
be considered per se violative of Section 2. Plaintiffs have the 
burden of demonstrating that, under the totality of the cir­
cumstances, the devices result in unequal access to the elec­
toral process.

Second, the conjunction of an allegedly dilutive electoral 
mechanism and the lack of proportional representation does 
not establish a violation.

Third, the results test does not assume the existence of 
racial bloc voting; plaintiffs must prove it.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46, quoting S.Rep. at 33.

9. The Supreme Court in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46, addressed a 
claim that multimember districts diluted black voting strength. 
Plaintiffs alleged and attempted to prove that their ability to elect



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the representatives of their choice was impaired by the selection 
of a multimember electoral structure. Id. at 46 n. 12. The Supreme 
Court stated that it had no occasion to consider what standards 
should pertain to a claim brought by a minority group that is not 
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single­
member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district 
impairs its ability to influence elections. Id. (emphasis in the origi­
nal).

10. The Court also stated that it had no occasion to consider 
whether the standards applied in Gingles are fully pertinent to 
other sorts of vote dilution claims, such as claims alleging that 
the splitting of a large and geographically cohesive minority be­
tween two or more multimember or single-member districts re­
sulted in the dilution of the minority vote. Id. at n. 12.

11. While many or all of the Senate Factors may be relevant to 
a plaintiffs § 2 claim, “unless there is a conjunction of the fol­
lowing circumstances, the use of multimember districts generally 
will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representa­
tives of their choice.” Id. at 48. Specifically, the Court outlines 
three preconditions for multimember districts to operate to im­
pair minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their 
choice:

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that 
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to consti­
tute a majority in a single member district, (hereinafter “ge­
ographical compactness”)

Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is 
politically cohesive, (hereinafter “political cohesiveness”)

Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the 
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it, in the 
absence of special circumstances such as the minority candi­
date running unopposed, usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate, (hereinafter “racial bloc voting”)



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Id. at 51. “[T]he bloc voting majority must usually be able to 
defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographi­
cally insular minority group.” Id. at 49 (emphasis in original)

(a) Geographic Compactness

12. Unless minority voters possess the potential to elect repre­
sentatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, 
they cannot claim to have been injured by the structure or prac­
tice. Id. at 50 n.17 (emphasis in original). For this reason, the 
Supreme Court determined that a showing of geographic com­
pactness is a threshold matter. Id.

13. Justice O’Connor, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist, preferred 
to leave open the broader question of whether § 2 requires a show­
ing of maximum feasible minority voting strength:

In my view, we should refrain from deciding in this case 
whether a court must invariably posit as its measure of “un­
diluted” minority voting strength single-member districts in 
which minority group members constitute a majority. There 
is substantial doubt that Congress intended “undiluted mi­
nority voting strength” to mean “maximum feasible minor­
ity voting strength.” Even if that is the appropriate definition 
in some circumstances, there is no indication that Congress 
intended to mandate a single, universally applicable standard 
for measuring undiluted minority voting strength, regardless 
of local conditions and regardless of the extent of past dis­
crimination against minority voters in a particular State or 
political subdivision.

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 94-95 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

(1) Voting Age Population

14. The eligible minority voter population, rather than the total 
population is the appropriate measure of geographical compact­
ness. Romero, 883 F.2d at 1426; Gomez, 863 F.2d at 1414; 
Skorepa v. City o f Chula Vista, 723 F. Supp. 1384, 1386 (S.D. Cal. 
1989).



A-138

(2) Current Population Data

15. Current voting age population data are probative because 
they indicate the electoral potential of the minority community. 
City o f Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 186 n.22 (1980). See, 
e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80 (results of elections for years 1978, 
1980 and 1982 examined to determine if racially polarized voting 
existed); Gomez, 863 F.2d at 1409-10 & n. 1 (election results from 
1971 through 1987 considered); Smith v. Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 
1310, 1315-16 (E.D. Ark.) (three-judge court), affd, U.S.

, 109 S. Ct. 548 (1988) (election results analyzed include 1982, 
1985, 1986 and 1988 contests).

16. The census is presumed to be accurate unless proven other­
wise. Latino Political Action Committee v. City o f Boston, 568 F. 
Supp. 1012, 1018 (D. Mass. 1983), affd, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 
1986). The evidence disproving the census must be clear, cogent 
and convincing. Dixon v. Hassler, 412 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1976) (three judge panel), affd  sub nom. Republican Party 
v. Dixon, 429 U.S. 934 (1976) (applying standard that decennial 
census will be controlling unless there is ‘clear, cogent and con­
vincing evidence’ that such figures are no longer valid and that 
other figures are valid).

17. In order to overcome the presumption in favor of the 1980 
census data, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that the census was 
inaccurate.

18. It is sufficient to conclude that there has been significant 
demographic changes since the decennial census and that there 
exists post-decennial population data that more accurately re­
flects evidence of the current demographic conditions. Kirkpat­
rick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969); cf Gaffney v. 
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 746 (1973) (describing federal census 
as “more of an event than a process” measuring population “at 
only a single instant in time”).



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(3) Estimates and Projections

19. Where shifts in population can be predicted with a high 
degree of accuracy, such “predictions” may be considered by 
states that are redistricting. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 534. These 
findings as to population trends must be thoroughly documented 
and applied throughout the state in a systematic manner. Id. but 
Cfi McNeil, 851 F.2d 937, 947 (7th Cir. 1988), cert, denied,
U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989) (refusing to override presump­
tion in favor of census based on meager evidence and noting that 
estimates based on past trends are generally not sufficient to over­
ride “hard” decennial census data); Graves v. Barnes, 446 F. 
Supp. 560, 568 (W.D. Texas 1977), affd sub nom. Briscoe v. 
Escalante, 435 U.S. 901 (1978) (study’s projections did not offer 
high degree of accuracy required to supplant population figures 
of prior decennial census).

(b) Political Cohesiveness

20. The inquiry whether a minority group is politically cohe­
sive is not to be made prior to and apart from a study of polarized 
voting because the central focus is upon voting patterns. Campos 
v. City o f Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988), cert, 
denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 3213 (1989). If a minority group 
votes together it can be deemed politically cohesive. Id.

21. In determining political cohesiveness, the inquiry is essen­
tially whether the minority group has expressed clear political 
preferences that are distinct from those of the majority. Gomez, 
863 F.2d at 1415. Therefore, as the Court noted in Gingles, one 
way to demonstrate cohesiveness is by showing that a significant 
number of minority group members usually vote for the same 
candidates. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56.

22. In Gomez, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court for 
applying an incorrect legal standard. The district court had de­
termined that, “with respect to those Hispanics who have actually



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voted, the evidence favored a finding of political cohesiveness.” 
Id. at 1416 (emphasis in original). The court concluded, however, 
that because “no significant number of eligible Hispanics have 
voted in the elections under consideration,” the Hispanic commu­
nity as a whole was too apathetic to be politically cohesive. Id.

23. Political cohesiveness is to be judged primarily on the basis 
of the voting preferences expressed in actual elections. Gomez, 
863 F.2d at 1416. “The district court erred by focusing on low 
minority voter registration and turnout as evidence that the mi­
nority community was not politically cohesive. The court should 
have looked only to actual voting patterns rather than speculating 
as to the reasons why many Hispanics were apathetic.” Id.

24. Socioeconomic disparities and differences of political opin­
ion within the Hispanic community are “only relevant to the 
extent that they reflect differences in voting behavior among His­
panics.” Id.

25. Statistical analysis of voting data is highly relevant to the 
issue of political cohesion. Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1493 
(10th Cir. 1989).

(1) Ecological Regression Analysis

26. Political cohesion may be established through ecological 
regression analysis and lay witness testimony. Carrollton Branch 
o f NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987), cert, 
denied, U.S. , 485 U.S. 936 (1988). As the Ninth Circuit 
stated in Romero, 883 F.2d at 1423, “Both before and after 
Thornburg, plaintiffs, including plaintiffs in this case, utilized exit 
polls, ecological regression and homogeneous precinct analysis to 
show the existence of polarized voting.”

27. Bivariate ecological regression analysis has been frequently 
employed in Section 2 cases after Gingles. See, e.g., Campos, 840 
F.2d at 1246-48; Citizens for a Better Gretna v. Gretna, 834 F.2d 
496, 500-02 (5th Cir. 1987).



A-141

28. Crucial to the validity of regression analysis are the values 
for “R” and “R2”, which measure the strength of the correlation 
and linear relationship of the variables being examined. Overton 
v. Austin, 871 F.2d 529, 539 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that “R2” 
value expresses the percentage of variance in the vote that is 
explained by the race of the voters).

(c) Racial Bloc Voting
29. “The number of elections that must be studied in order to 

determine whether voting is polarized will vary according to per­
tinent circumstances. One important circumstance is the number 
of elections in which the minority group has sponsored candi­
dates.” Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 (finding district court war­
ranted in its focus on those races that had a minority member as 
a candidate).

30. If a small number of minority candidacies prevents the 
compilation of statistical evidence, a court should not deny relief, 
but should rely on other totality of circumstances factors to de­
termine if the electoral system had a discriminatory effect. See 
Solomon v. Liberty County, 865 F.2d 1566, 1577-78 (11th Cir. 
1988) (holding that plaintiffs should be able to buttress their 
claims of white bloc voting by pointing to racial voting patterns 
in elections for offices they do not challenge in their section 2 suit 
and that district court erred in ignoring regression analyses con­
sidered probative of black political cohesiveness).

31. In a plurality portion of the Gingles opinion, the Court 
stated that “[ujnder § 2, it is the status of the candidate as the 
chosen representative o f a particular racial group, not the race of 
the candidate, that is important.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 68. The 
race of the voter, not of the candidate is relevant to vote dilution 
analysis. Id. However, the Court also recognized that since both 
minority and majority voters often select members of their own 
race as their preferred representatives, “it will frequently be the 
case that a black candidate is the choice of blacks, while a white 
candidate is the choice of whites.” Id.



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32. The Fifth Circuit interpreted Gingles to hold that the race 
of the candidate is in general of less significance than the race of 
the voter—but only within the context o f an election that offers 
voters the choice o f supporting a viable minority candidate. Better 
Gretna, 834 F.2d at 503 (emphasis added).

33. The legal concept of racially polarized voting, as it relates 
to claims of vote dilution, refers only to the existence of a corre­
lation between the race of the voters and the selection of certain 
candidates. Id. at 74.

34. In order to prove a prima facie case of racial bloc voting, 
plaintiffs need not prove causation or intent. Id.

35. A definition or [sic] racially polarized voting which holds 
that racial bloc voting does not exist when voters of a certain 
race’s choice of a certain candidate is most strongly influenced by 
the fact that the voters have low income and menial jobs—“when 
the reason most of those voters have menial jobs and low incomes 
is attributable to past or present racial discrimination—runs 
counter to the Senate Report’s instruction to conduct a searching 
and practical evaluation of past and present reality.” Id. at 65 
citing S.Rep at 30. Such an approach, according to the Supreme 
Court, would interfere with the purpose of the Voting Rights Act 
to eliminate the negative effects of past discrimination on the 
electoral opportunities of minorities. Id.

36. The fact that racially polarized voting is not present in one 
or a few individual elections does not necessarily negate the con­
clusion that the district experiences legally significant bloc voting. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.

(d) History o f Discrimination

37. Congress intended that the Voting Rights Act eradicate 
inequalities in political opportunities that exist due to the vestigial 
effects of past purposeful discrimination. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 69.



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In Solomon, 865 F.2d at 1579, the Eleventh Circuit found that 
the trial court erred by failing to consider past and present reality 
as required by Gingles and by refusing to give any weight to the 
legislature’s reason—to discriminate against blacks—for prescrib­
ing the at-large system as the method of electing school board 
members in Florida.

38. Courts have historically recognized that political participa­
tion by minorities tends to be depressed where minority groups 
suffer effects of prior discrimination such as inferior education, 
poor employment opportunities and low incomes. Gingles, 478 
U.S. at 69; see, e.g., White v. Register, 412 U.S. at 768-69 (holding 
that district court’s order requiring disestablishment of 
multimembers districts in certain Texas counties was warranted 
in light of history of political discrimination against blacks and 
Mexican-Americans residing in those counties and the residual 
effects of such discrimination on those groups); Kirksey v. Board 
o f Supervisors o f Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139, 145-46 (5th Cir.) 
(en banc) cert, denied 434 U.S. 968 (1977) (finding that Supervi­
sors’ reapportionment plan, though racially neutral, would per­
petuate the denial of black minority access to the democratic 
process).

39. In Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 151, the Fifth Circuit, in reversing 
the district court’s reapportionment plan, concluded that plain­
tiffs had proved a long history of denial of access to the demo­
cratic process and that the structure and residual effects of the 
past had not been removed and replaced by current access. “By 
fragmenting a geographically concentrated but substantial black 
minority in a community where bloc voting has been a way of 
political life the plan [though racially neutral] will cancel or min­
imize the voting strength of the back minority and will tend to 
submerge the interests of the black community.” Id. The court 
concluded that the plan denies rights protected by the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments.



A-144

(e) Other Discriminatory Voting Practices

40. A section 2 claim is enhanced by a showing of the existence 
of large districts, majority voting requirements, anti-single shot 
voting provisions and the lack of provision for at-large candidates 
running from particular geographic subdistricts. Zimmer v. 
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), ajfd  
sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 
636 (1976).

(f) Size o f Supervisorial Districts

41. Unusually large election districts is a factor typically rele­
vant to a Section 2 claim. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45.

(g) Candidate Slating Process

42. A slating process is a procedure by which a political group 
determines what candidate they will sponsor for particular offices. 
The resulting candidacies comprise that group’s “slate.” Solo­
mon, 865 F.2d at 1581 n.31 (finding that on remand district court 
should consider whether white slating process is open to black 
candidates who seek to represent black interests). Slating could 
thus operate to control effective access of minorities to the ballot. 
Overton, 871 F.2d at 534.

(h) Lingering Effects o f Past Discrimination

43. The lingering effects of past discrimination are relevant 
only if they continue to “hinder [the minority group’s] ability to 
participate effectively in the political process.” S. Rep. at 29, U.S. 
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 206.

(i) Election o f Minorities

44. Minority electoral failure is one of the two most probative 
indications of vote dilution. Solomon, 865, F.2d at 1583 citing 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n. 15.



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C. DISCRIMINATORY RESULTS V INTENT

45. In Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980), the Supreme 
Court determined that minority voters, to establish that their 
votes have been diluted in violation of section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (hereinafter “the Act”), as well as violation of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, must 
prove that the contested electoral practice was adopted or main­
tained by the governmental officials for a discriminatory purpose.

46. In 1982, section 2 of the Act was amended to add a “re­
sults” test to the intent test. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43, the intent test was repudiated because it 
asked the wrong question. The “right” question is whether “as a 
result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have 
an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and 
to elect candidates of their choice.” S.Rep. at 28, U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News 1982, p.206. The Report of the Senate Commit­
tee states in pertinent part:

The subsection [new subsection 2(a)] expresses the intent 
of Congress in amending Section 2 that plaintiffs do not need 
to prove discriminatory purpose or motive, by either direct 
or indirect evidence, in order to establish a violation. With 
this clarification, Section 2 explicitly codifies a standard dif­
ferent from the interpretation of the former language of Sec­
tion 2 contained in the Supreme Court’s Mobile plurality 
opinion, i.e. the interpretation that the former language of 
Section 2 prohibits only purposeful discrimination.

Under Section 2, as amended plaintiffs would continue to 
have the option of establishing a Section 2 violation by 
proving a discriminatory purpose behind the challenged 
practice or method. However, if plaintiff chose to establish a 
violation under the alternative basis now codified in the stat­
ute as the “results standard, then proof of the purpose be­
hind the challenged practice is neither required or relevant.
. . . The courts are to look at the totality of the circum­
stances in order to determine whether the result of the chal­
lenged practice is that the political processes are equally



A-146

open; that is, whether, members of a protected class have the 
same opportunity as others to participate in the electoral 
process and to elect candidates of their choice. The courts 
are to conduct this analysis on the basis of a variety of ob­
jective factors concerning the impact of the challenged prac­
tice and the social and political context in which it occurs.

The motivation behind the challenged practice or method 
is not relevant to the determination. The [Senate] Committee 
expressly disavows any characterization of the results test 
codified in this statute as including an intent requirement, 
whether or not such a requirement might be met in a partic­
ular case by inferences drawn from the same objective fac­
tors offered to establish a discriminatory result.

Nor is there any need to establish a purposeful design 
through inferences from the foreseeable consequences of 
adopting or maintaining the challenged practice.

S.Rep. at 4, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1965, p. 245-46. 
The Court finds that the claims that a challenged electoral system 
or practice violates Section 2 due to a discriminatory purpose 
may be determined independently of any analysis of the precon­
ditions set forth in Gingles. See Brown v. Board o f Commissioners 
o f City o f Chattanooga, 722 F. Supp. 380, 383 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) 
(stating that in adding the “results” test to Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, Congress left the “intent” test intact); c f Overton, 
871 F.2d at 540-41 (explaining that the factors pertinent to a 
determination of discriminatory intent of a regulation that con­
tinues to have disparate racial impact include the historical back­
ground of the regulation, specific sequence of events leading up 
to the regulation, departures from the normal procedural se­
quence, substantive departures, and legislative history, especially 
where there are contemporary statements by members of the de­
cision-making body).

47. The standard of proof required for determining intent or 
discriminatory purpose is the same as that used in resolving cases 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.



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Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982); Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).

48. Discriminatory purpose may be inferred from the totality 
of the relevant facts, including the fact that the law bears more 
heavily on one race than another. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 240 (1976).

49. Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was 
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circum­
stantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. Id. at 
242.

50. Courts traditionally refrain from reviewing the merits of 
the decisions of legislators and administrators on the grounds that 
these officials are properly concerned with balancing numerous 
competing considerations. However, racial discrimination is not 
just another competing consideration. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 
at 265. When there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has 
been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is 
no longer justified. Id.

51. Historical evidence is relevant to a determination of dis­
criminatory purpose. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625. See Brown, 722 
F. Supp. at 385 (finding history of Chattanooga’s city government 
and the black franchise “particularly revealing”).

52. Factors that may be probative of a discriminatory purpose 
include: (1) impact of the official action; (2) historical background 
of the decision, “particularly if it reveals a series of official actions 
taken for invidious purposes”; (3) specific sequence of events lead­
ing up to the challenged decision; (4) departures from normal 
procedural sequences; (5) substantive departures . . . “particularly 
if the factors usually considered important by the decision maker 
strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.” Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67.



A-148

53. In Rybicki v. State Board o f Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 
1109 (N.D. 111. 1982), the court found that where the require­
ments of incumbency “were so closely intertwined with the need 
for racial dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarily 
white, district for Senator Joyce is virtually coterminous with a 
purpose to practice racial discrimination,” is indicative of an in­
tent to discriminate.

D. INTER-DECENNIAL REDISTRICTING

54. The California Election Code states in pertinent part:
At any time between the decennial adjustments of district 

boundaries, the board may cause a census of the County to 
be taken as provided in Section 26203 of the Government 
Code, and may adjust the boundaries of the Supervisorial 
districts on the basis of that census, or on the basis of popu­
lation estimates prepared by the State Department of Fi­
nance or the County planning department or planning com­
mission, pursuant to section 35000.

Cal. Elec. Code § 35003, added by Stats. 1979, c. 546, p. 1747, 
§ 1. Pursuant to California Election Code § 35003 (West 1989), 
the County is authorized to conduct inter-decennial apportion­
ments.

E. TOTAL POPULATION AS APPORTIONMENT BASE
55. The law of the State of California requires that the Board 

of Supervisors redistrict using total population figures validated 
by the California Department of Finance. California Election 
Code § 35000 states in pertinent part:

Following each decennial federal census, and using popu­
lation figures as validated by the Population Research Unit 
of the Department of Finance as a basis, the board shall 
adjust the boundaries of any or all of the Supervisorial dis­
tricts of the County so that the districts shall be as nearly 
equal in population as may be.

Cal. Elec. Code § 35000.



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56. Neither the Constitution of the State of California nor the 
United States Constitution requires the use of citizens or citizens 
of voting age as the apportionment base. Burns v. Richardson, 384 
U.S. 73, 92 (1966). Nor are states required to include “aliens, 
transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied 
the vote for conviction of crime, in the apportionment base by 
which their legislators are distributed and against which compli­
ance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured.” Id. at 
92. As the Supreme Court explained, this decision on which 
groups to include or exclude “involves choices about the nature 
of representation with which we have been shown no constitu­
tionally founded reason to interfere.” Id.

57. In Burns, the Supreme Court found fault with the use of a 
registered voter or actual voter base since such a basis depends 
upon the extent of political activity of those eligible to register 
and vote as well as upon criteria governing state citizenship. Id. 
“Each is susceptible to improper influences by which those in 
political power might be able to perpetuate underrepresentation 
of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral 
process, or perpetuate a “ghost of prior malapportionment.” Id. 
at 92-93 quoting Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873 876 (D.C. Vt. 
1965).

F. ONE PERSON ONE VOTE R ULE

58. The overriding objective of a legislative apportionment 
scheme must be “substantial equality of population among the 
various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is approximately 
equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State.” Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).

59. The right of American citizens to participate fully and 
effectively in the political processes of state legislative bodies ap­
plies equally to County bodies. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 
U.S. 474, 480 (1968) (finding that city, town, or County may no



A-150

more deny equal protection than it may abridge freedom of 
speech, establish an official religion, arrest without probable 
cause, or deny due process of law).

60. While an alternative election system must comport with the 
one person one vote standard, it need not achieve absolute equal­
ity. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578. The Supreme Court has acknowl­
edged that some leeway in the equal protection requirement 
should be afforded states in devising their legislative apportion­
ment plans. A maximum deviation from population equality of 
less than ten percent is permissible under the equal protection 
clause for purposes of apportioning state and local governing 
bodies. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 852 (1983) 
(stating that deviations below ten percent are ordinarily consid­
ered de minimis)-, Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418 (1977) 
(noting that under-10 percent deviations are considered to be of 
prima facie constitutional validity in context of legislatively en­
acted apportionments); see also White, 412 U.S. at 765 (permit­
ting variance of 9.9 percent); Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 745 (permitting 
deviation of 7.83 percent with no showing of invidious discrimi­
nation).

61. The burden is on the district court to “elucidate the reasons 
necessitating any departure from the goal of population equality, 
and to articulate clearly the relationship between the variance and 
the state policy furthered.” Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 24 
(finding that 20 percent variance in plan formulated by federal 
court is constitutionally impermissible absent significant state 
policies or other acceptable considerations that require adoption 
of a plan with so great a variance).

G. REAPPORTIONMENT

62. The task of reapportionment is properly a legislative func­
tion. Whenever practicable, the legislature should be afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to meet constitutional requirements by



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adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to 
devise and order into effect its own plan. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 
U.S. 535, 540 (1978). The County may also provide to this Court 
an appropriate schedule for the prompt implementation of the 
plan following the Court’s review.

63. Should the County be unable or unwilling to devise and 
present a fair election plan to this Court, the Court will undertake 
the “unwelcome obligation” of ordering into effect a plan of its 
own design. Connor, 431 U.S. at 415.

To the extent that the preceding Conclusions of Law may be 
deemed to be Findings of Fact, they are hereby incorporated by 
reference into the Findings of Fact.

It is so o rd ered .

DATED:

David V. Kenyon 
United States District Judge



A-152

DICK THORNBURGH
Attorney General
JOHN R. DUNNE 
Assistant Attorney General
GERALD W. JONES 
STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM 
SHEILA K. DELANEY 
ROBERT S. BERMAN 
ROBERT A. KENGLE 
GAYE L. HUME 
ANTHONY E. CHAVEZ 
Attorneys, Voting Section 
Civil Rights Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 66128 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6128 
Telephone: (202) 307-3143
LOURDES G. BAIRD 
United States Attorney
RONALD K. SILVER
Assistant United States Attorney 
1100 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Telephone: (213) 894-6168 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

LODGED 
AUG 6 1990

FILED
AUG 6 1990
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT O F CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA GARZA, et al., 
Plaintiffs, No. CV 88-5143 KN (Ex)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al., 
Plain tiff-In tervenors.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV 88-5435 KN (Ex)

PROPOSED FINDINGS 
AND ORDER 
REGARDING 
REMEDIAL
REDISTRICTING PLAN 
AND ELECTION 
SCHEDULE



A-153

On June 4, 1990, this Court issued Findings of Fact and Con­
clusions of Law holding that the 1981 redistricting plan for the 
Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors violates Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1973 (“Sec­
tion 2”), and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 
After affording defendants a reasonable opportunity to propose a 
remedial redistricting plan and holding an evidentiary hearing on 
the validity of the proposed remedial plan, this Court found that 
the plan failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 2. Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Proposed Remedial Plan 
Submitted by County of Los Angeles, filed August 3, 1990.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing concerning the device 
of a court-ordered redistricting plan, at which Dr. Bernard 
Grofman and Dr. Leobardo Estrada, expert witnesses retained by 
the United States and Garza plaintiffs, respectively, testified about 
alternative plans. Following that hearing, the Court heard testi­
mony concerning the feasibility of implementing an alternative 
plan at the November 6, 1990 election.

On August 3, 1990, after considering the entire record and the 
arguments of the parties regarding possible alternative plans and 
the implementation of such a plan, the Court directed the plain­
tiffs to prepare and lodge a proposed order that among other 
things, adopts Garza Plan 1 as the court-ordered plan and calls 
for a special primary election in District 1 on November 6, 1990.

The Court makes the following findings regarding the choice 
of a remedial plan and the schedule for implementing the reme­
dial plan:

I. GARZA PLAN 1 MODIFIED

1. Pursuant to this Court’s order of August 3, 1990, Dr. Es­
trada has filed a declaration submitting, for acceptance by this 
Court, a description of Garza Plan 1, which includes the “minor



A -154

revisions required to include all parts of particular cities,” except 
the City of Los Angeles, entirely within one supervisorial district. 
Having reviewed the plan as modified, the Court finds that the 
plan satisfies the requirements of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, and the Fourteenth Amendment and hereby 
adopts Garza Plan 1 as modified as the court-ordered plan.

2. Garza Plan 1 Modified is based upon an illustrative plan 
developed by Dr. Bernard Grofman, an expert called by the 
United States, and initially presented during the liability phase of 
this litigation. Dr. Grofman testified at the remedial stage that 
Garza Plan 1, along with two alternatives that he had construct­
ed, would provide Hispanics with an opportunity equal to other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process 
and to elect supervisors of their choice without diluting the voting 
strength of the County’s black citizens.

3. The 1990 total population characteristics for Garza Plan 1 
Modified, according to 1990 PEPS data, are as follows:
District Total White Black Hispanic Other

1 1,779,835 12.4 2.1 71.2 14.3
2 1,775,665 15.0 38.6 35.3 11.1
3 1,768,124 60.9 3.9 25.5 9.7
4 1,776,240 53.9 4.3 26.6 15.2
5 1,780,244 57.1 5.9 24.3 12.6

TOTAL 8,880,109 39.8 11.0 36.6 12.6

4. Garza Plan 1 Modified has an overall total population devi­
ation of sixty-eight hundredths of one percent (0.68%) as mea­
sured by 1990 PEPS data.

5. Using the estimates of voting age citizen population for 1990 
developed by Dr. Leobardo Estrada, Garza Plan 1 Modified has 
the following characteristics:
District Total White Black Hispanic Other

1 707,651 25.4 3.5 59.4 11.6
2 922,180 23.8 50.8 17.1 8.3
3 1,098,663 77.0 4.3 13.9 4.7
4 1,081,089 67.5 4.4 19.7 8.4
5 1,088,388 69.8 6.2 18.1 5.9

TOTAL 4,897,971 55.8 13.4 23.3 7.5



A-155

6. Using 1990 voter registration, Garza Plan 1 Modified has the 
following characteristics:
District Total

1 366,145
2 611,293
3 784,773
4 800,893
5 835,408

TOTAL 3,398,512

Spanish Spanish
Surname Origin

50.6 52.8
7.9 9.1
7.3 8.3

12.0 12.9
10.5 11.5
14.0 15.1

7. Garza Plan 1 Modified unites the Hispanic Core into Super­
visorial District 1 and remedies the fragmentation of the Hispanic 
Core occasioned by the 1981 redistricting plan and prior redis­
tricting plans.

8. Garza Plan 1 Modified preserves the integrity of the growing 
Hispanic community in the San Fernando Valley.

9. Garza Plan 1 Modified creates a single-member district (Dis­
trict 1) in which Hispanic voting age citizens make up a majority 
of the voting age citizen population and in which Hispanic regis­
tered voters make up a majority of the registered voters.

10. Garza Plan 1 Modified maintains the naturally-occurring 
open seat that falls within the majority-Hispanic District 1. The 
incumbent supervisors, other than Supervisor Schabarum who 
did not file for reelection, are retained in their existing districts. 
The plan is consistent with the provisions of the Los Angeles 
County Charter as interpreted by defendants to require that “the 
four incumbents’ residences are located in the district that they 
represent.” Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
In Support of the County’s Remedial Redistricting Plan, at 14 
(emphasis added).

11. Garza Plan 1 Modified does not split any cities other than 
the City of Los Angeles, which must be split because of its size.



A-156

12. Garza Plan 1 Modified creates a district in which Hispanic 
citizens will have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of 
choice to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors. The plan 
fully remedies the violations found by this Court and provides 
Hispanic citizens an equal opportunity to participate in the polit­
ical process and to elect a supervisor of their choice.

13. In addition, Garza Plan 1 Modified does not diminish the 
voting strength of the County’s black citizens. Using 1990 data, 
blacks are estimated to comprise 50.8 percent of the voting age 
citizens in District 2 of the plan compared to 46.7 percent in 
District 2 of the 1981 plan. That result is achieved, in part, by 
transferring the entire City of Compton from District 4 to Dis­
trict 2 and by providing that the cities of Beverly Hills and West 
Hollywood remain in District 5.

II. SPECIAL ELECTION IN  DISTRICT 1

14. The United States and the Garza plaintiffs seek to have the 
Court order a special primary election on November 6, 1990 in 
the Hispanic majority district of the court-ordered plan. Defen­
dant Supervisors Edelman and Hahn also joined in the request 
that a remedial election be held promptly. The other defendants 
urge the court to allow the general election in District 1 of the 
1981 plan to proceed as scheduled.

15. The Court finds that special election relief is appropriate 
under the circumstances of this case. The Court has found that 
there has been a serious, substantial and longstanding violation 
of the voting rights of Hispanic citizens in Los Angeles County; 
that the violation has affected the outcome of elections to the 
board of supervisors; and that the plaintiffs have exercised due 
diligence in seeking relief in advance of the 1990 elections.

16. The Court also finds that it is feasible to conduct a special 
primary election for Supervisor in District 1 on November 6,



A -157

1990, and that doing so would not jeopardize the integrity of the 
general election to be held throughout Los Angeles County on 
November 6, 1990.

17. The Court finds it is unnecessary to alter the result of the 
June 5, 1990 election of Supervisor Edelman in District 3 in order 
to provide an effective remedy.

18. Defendant Charles Weissburd is the Registrar-Recorder of 
the County of Los Angeles. He testified that for administrative 
reasons his office has set August 15, 1990 as the target date for 
having the computer files reflect the boundaries of all election 
districts, including supervisorial districts. Specifically, the com­
puter file would show the election districts for each of the 
county’s over 11,000 established precincts.

19. Mr. Weissburd testified that to have a new supervisorial 
redistricting plan based upon census tract data in place by August 
15 he would have had to receive the new plan by July 20 to 
provide four weekends—eight working days—to input in the sys­
tem the new supervisorial redistricting plan. A substantial com­
ponent of that work would involve translating the census tract 
data into the established precinct data and making the necessary 
assignments of voters.

20. Mr. Weissburd, however, also testified that if the new su­
pervisorial election districts were drawn based upon existing pre­
cinct lines, they would be easier to implement. New precincts 
would not need to be created and voters would not have to be 
transferred from one precinct to another. In addition, the Regis­
trar-Recorder has the computer capability of directly implement­
ing a new redistricting plan based upon established precinct as­
signments.

21. David Ely, a research analyst with Pactech Data and Re­
search, Inc., was retained by the plaintiff United States to help



A-158

create certain computer databases for this litigation. These data­
bases made extensive use of election and registered voter files 
from the Registrar-Recorder’s office, and were relied upon by 
both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts during the liability phase 
of this litigation. In addition, Mr. Ely utilized the files of the 
Registrar-Recorder in his work on verifying and finalizing the 
redistricting plans passed by the Los Angeles City Council in 
1986 to resolve similar voting rights litigation.

22. Mr. Ely testified that he has developed a methodology for 
describing a supervisorial redistricting plan by using established 
precincts rather than census tracts, as well as a system for verify­
ing the accuracy of the established precinct assignments. Mr. Ely 
has applied the methodology and the verification system to Garza 
Plan 1 Modified and produced a description of the plan based 
upon the established precincts existing at the time of the June 5, 
1990 primary election.

23. The Court finds that Mr. Ely’s methodology yields an ac­
curate and reliable description of Garza Plan 1 Modified and will 
order the plan into effect based upon his established precinct 
assignments. As a result, the task of the Registrar-Recorder is 
greatly reduced and simplified because there will be no need to 
start with census tract data and convert that data to established 
precinct data. Nor is there a need to modify established precincts 
or to reassign voters from one established precinct to another. 
Any established precincts that have been changed since the June 
primary can be assigned to the new plan based upon the Regis­
trar-Recorder’s records of established precinct changes.

24. As a practical matter, the assignment of established pre­
cincts is needed first and foremost for District 1 for an election to 
be held on November 6, 1990. Mr. Weissburd did not identify any 
reason why the assignment of precincts in the remaining supervi­
sorial districts would have any bearing on the conduct of the 
November 6th election.



A-159

25. The Court finds that the Registrar-Recorder can make the 
necessary assignments for the boundaries of the court-ordered 
plan in the computer files by the August 15th target date.

26. The Court further notes that defendants have failed to dem­
onstrate that the Registrar-Recorder must invariably satisfy the 
August 15th target date in order to meet the statutory deadlines 
for the mailing of sample ballots, the processing of absentee bal­
lots, and the delivery of ballots and supplies to polling places, the 
three tasks identified by Mr. Weissburd as being tied to the Au­
gust 15th target date.

27. Mr. Weissburd testified that his office has the computer 
technology simultaneously to maintain established precinct as­
signments for two different supervisorial redistricting plans. If the 
defendants so desire, they may maintain the established precinct 
assignments for the 1981 redistricting plan in one file, while they 
enter the established precinct assignments for Garza Plan 1 Mod­
ified in another file.

28. A special primary election in District 1 conducted simulta­
neously with the November 1990 general election is the most 
economical, least disruptive date on which this Court can sched­
ule a special election.

29. The County would be spared the cost of a special primary 
election, which Mr. Weissburd testified would be about $2.00 per 
voter (about $735,000 in the case of District 1).

30. Conducting a special primary election simultaneously with 
the November 6, 1990 general election is likely to result in a 
higher level of voter participation for the special primary election 
than would result on other potential special election dates.

31. There remains sufficient time before November 6, 1990 to 
have a reasonable candidate filing period and campaign period. 
This Court takes notice of the fact that this case has generated



A-160

extensive publicity and put potential candidates on notice that an 
election could be called promptly to remedy the existing discrim­
inatory electoral system. As a consequence, voters in District 1 
should have ample notice of the November 6, 1990 special elec­
tion and candidates should have sufficient time to garner financial 
support and to mount an effective campaign in the district.

32. Mindful of the effect that an order for a special election has 
upon the candidates who ran for Supervisor in District 1 and 
District 3 on June 5, 1990, the Court finds that the equities favor 
a waiver of the statutory filing fee for all such persons. Likewise, 
the Court is aware that the new boundaries of District 1 do not 
include the residences of Sarah Flores and Gregory O’Brien. The 
equities favor giving them and others who reside in District 1 of 
the 1981 plan but who do not currently reside in District 1 as 
redrawn an opportunity to run in the special election by waiving 
the pre-filing residency requirement.

33. If a candidate is elected at the special election on November 
6, 1990, the candidate will be able to assume office on December 
3, 1990, the regularly scheduled transition date under the Los 
Angeles County Charter.

34. If a special general election in District 1 is required because 
no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast at the special 
primary election, the special general election should be held on 
December 4, 1990, in order to reduce to the minimum the amount 
of time the incumbent supervisor in District 1 will holdover in 
office pursuant to the Los Angeles County Charter.

Accordingly, It  Is H ereby  Or d er ed , A djudged  and  D e­
creed  that:

1. The 1981 redistricting plan used to elect the Los Ange­
les County Board of Supervisors violates Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.



A-161

2. The defendants, their agents and successors in office, 
and all persons acting in concert with them, are permanently 
enjoined from conducting any election pursuant to the 1981 
redistricting plan, including but not limited to the general 
election for Supervisor in District 1 scheduled for November 
6, 1990.

3. The June 5, 1990 primary election for Supervisor in 
District 1, in which no candidate received a majority of the 
votes cast, shall have no force or effect.

4. The June 5, 1990 primary election for Supervisor in 
District 3 on June 5, 1990, in which Supervisor Edelman 
received a majority of the votes cast, shall not be affected by 
this order.

5. Defendants, their agents and successors in office and all 
persons acting in concert with them, shall immediately begin 
to take all steps necessary to implement the remedial redis­
tricting plan described in Appendix A as the plan for electing 
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

6. A special primary election shall be held on November 
6, 1990 in District 1 of the plan described in Appendix A. If 
no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast at the 
primary, a special general election shall be held on December 
4, 1990.

7. The election(s) required by this order shall be held in 
accordance with the schedule established in Appendix B.

8. The Defendant Registrar-Recorder immediately shall 
begin to make the changes necessary to established precinct 
and voter assignment records for purposes of holding the 
special primary election in District 1 on November 6, 1990.

9. Nothing in this order shall preclude the Registrar- 
Recorder from maintaining the computer files for the estab­
lished precinct and voter assignments based upon the 1981 
plan.

10. Defendants shall utilize, and Plaintiff United States 
shall make available, the services of David Ely, of Pactech 
Data and Research, Inc., for consultation and technical as­
sistance regarding the assignment of the established pre-*



A -162

cincts for Garza Plan 1 Modified contained in Appendix A. 
Arrangements for such consultation and technical assistance 
shall be made through counsel.

11. Candidate filing fees shall be waived for all persons 
who paid fees to run for Supervisor in District 1 or District 
3 on June 5, 1990, and who otherwise qualify as candidates 
for the special primary election to be held on November 6,
1990.

12. Any candidate who was nominated for election in the 
June 5, 1990 primary for an office other than Supervisor shall 
not for that reason be barred from becoming a candidate for 
Supervisor in District 1 in the special election.

13. All persons residing within the boundaries of District 
1 under the 1981 plan or District 1 of the plan described in 
Appendix A shall be deemed to satisfy the residency require­
ment for purposes of qualifying as a candidate for Supervisor 
in the special election in District 1. To hold office as the 
Supervisor for District 1 a person must become a resident 
and elector of the District within 30 days of taking office.

14. The fact that Supervisor Schabarum, the incumbent in 
District 1, does not reside in District 1 of the plan described 
in Appendix A shall not preclude him from serving as Su­
pervisor for District 1 for the remainder of his term.

15. If a Supervisor is elected in the special primary election 
on November 6, 1990, the term of office shall begin at noon 
on December 3, 1990 in accordance with Article II, Section 
6 of the Charter of the County of Los Angeles. If no candi­
date receives a majority of the votes cast in the special pri­
mary election and a special general election is required to be 
held on December 4, 1990, the term of office shall begin at 
noon on December 19, 1990, and the term of the incumbent 
in District 1 shall be extended until that time.

16. All provisions of state law and the county charter not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Order shall govern 
the special election.



A -163

17. The Court retains jurisdiction of this action to consider 
the request of the plaintiffs for relief under Section 3(c) of 
the Voting Rights Act and to enter such further relief as may 
be appropriate.

It  Is So Or d er ed .

DATED: August 6, 1990

Honorable David V. Kenyon 
United States District Judge

Presented by:
Steven H. Rosenbaum 
Attorney, Voting Section 
Civil Rights Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 66128 
Washington, D.C. 20035-6128 
(202) 307-3143 
(213) 894-6035



A-164

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE N INTH CIRCUIT

YOLANDA GARZA, et al.,
Plain tiffs-Appellees,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al, 
Defendants-Appellants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,

and

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al,
In tervenors-Appellees

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants.

FILED

AUG 16 1990

CLERK, U.S. COURT 
OF APPEALS

No. 90-55944

D C # CV 88-5143 KN 
Central California

No. 90-55945

D C # CV-88 -5435 KN 
Central California

ORDER

Before: NELSON, BEEZER and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges

These appeals raise difficult and close legal questions and nei­
ther side has demonstrated that the equities strongly favor going 
forward with their chosen election on November 6. Rather the 
equities favor maintaining the status quo pending consideration 
of this matter by the merits panel. Accordingly, the county shall 
hold no election for Supervisor District 1 pending further order 
of this court. All portions of the district court’s order that require 
the County to prepare for a remedial primary are stayed. The 
parties may seek a modification of this order or other interlocu­
tory relief in their briefs on the merits. All pending and subse­
quent motions in this case are referred to the merits panel.

JUDGE NELSON strongly dissents from this order and would 
deny the stay in its entirety.



A-165

RICHARD P. FAJARDO 
VIBIANA ANDRADE 
ANTONIA HERNANDEZ 
Mexican American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund 
634 South Spring Street, 11th 

Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90014 
(213) 629-2512

JOSE GARZA 
JUDITH A. SANDERS- 

CASTRO
Mexican American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund 
140 East Houston Street 
Suite 300
San Antonio, TX 78205 
(512) 224-5476

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Continued on next page

FILED

NOV 9 1990

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA

ENTERED

NOV 13 1990

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA

Plaintiffs,
LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al, 

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA; LOS ANGELES 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS;
et al.,

No. CV 88-5143 KN (Ex)

No. CV 88-5435 KN (Ex)

Kn ORDER RE:
SPECIAL ELECTION 

SCHEDULE

THIS CONSTITUTES NOTICE 
OF ENTRY

AS REQUIRED BY FRCP, 
RULE 77(d).

Defendants.



A-166

Attorneys for Garza Plaintiffs 
continued from previous page

MARK D. ROSENBAUM
PAUL L. HOFFMAN
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
633 South Shatto Place
Los Angeles, CA 90005
(213) 487-1720

DOUGLAS E. MIRELL
RICHARD S. AMADOR
LOEB AND LOEB
1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1800
Los Angeles, CA 90017
(213) 688-3400

JOAQUIN G. AVILA
One Warm Springs Professional Ctr.
200 Brown Road, Suite 114 
Fremont, CA 94539 
(415) 651-7724

Of Counsel

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals having affirmed the deci­
sion of this Court, and having remanded this case to this Court 
to set a new special election schedule,

Accordingly, It  Is H ereby  Or d er ed , A djud ged  and  D e ­
creed  that:

1. The 1981 redistricting plan used to elect the Los Ange­
les County Board of Supervisors violates Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution.

2. The defendants, their agents and successors in office, 
and all persons acting in concert with them, are permanently



A-167

enjoined from conducting any election pursuant to the 1981 
redistricting plan.

3. The June 5, 1990 primary election for Supervisor in 
District 1, in which no candidate received a majority of the 
votes cast, shall have no force or effect.

4. The June 5, 1990 primary election for Supervisor in 
District 3 on June 5, 1990, in which Supervisor Edelman 
received a majority of the votes cast, shall not be affected by 
this order.

5. Defendants, their agents and successors in office and all 
persons acting in concert with them, shall immediately begin 
to take all steps necessary to implement the remedial redis­
tricting plan described in Appendix A as the plan for electing 
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

6. A special primary election shall be held on January 22, 
1991 in District 1 of the plan described in Appendix A of 
the August 6, 1990 order. If no candidate receives a majority 
of the votes cast at the primary, a special general election 
shall be held on February 19, 1991.

7. The election(s) required by this order shall be held in 
accordance with the schedule established in Amended Ap­
pendix B.

8. The Defendant Registrar-Recorder immediately shall 
begin to make the changes necessary to established precinct 
and voter assignment records for purposes of holding the 
special primary election in District 1 on January 22, 1991.

9. Nothing in this order shall preclude the Registrar-Re­
corder from maintaining the computer rules for the estab­
lished precinct and voter assignments based upon the 1981 
plan.

10. Defendants shall utilize, and Plaintiff United States 
shall make available, the services of David Ely, of Pactech 
Data and Research, Inc., for consultation and technical as­
sistance regarding the assignment of the established pre-



A-168

cincts for Garza Plan 1 Modified contained in Appendix A 
of the August 6, 1990 order. Arrangements for such consul­
tation and technical assistance shall be make [sic] through 
counsel.

11. Candidate filing fees shall be waived for all persons 
who paid fees to run for Supervisor in District 1 or District 
3 on June 5, 1990, and who otherwise qualify as candidates 
for the special primary election to be held on January 22,
1991.

12. All persons residing within the boundaries of District 
1 under the 1981 plan or District 1 of the plan described in 
Appendix A shall be deemed to satisfy the residency require­
ment for purposes of qualifying as a candidate for Supervisor 
in the special election in District 1. To hold office as the 
Supervisor for District 1 a person must become a resident 
and elector of the District within 30 days of taking office.

13. If a Supervisor is elected in the special primary election 
on January 22, 1991, the term of office shall begin at noon 
on February 8, 1991. If no candidate receives a majority of 
the votes cast on the special primary election and a special 
general election is required to be held on February 19, 1991, 
the term of office shall begin at noon on March 8, 1991.

14. The term of the incumbent in District 1 shall be ex­
tended until such time as a supervisor is elected in either the 
special primary or general election. The fact that Supervisor 
Schabarum, the incumbent in District 1, may not reside in 
District 1 of the plan described in Appendix A shall not 
preclude him from serving as Supervisor for District 1 for 
the remainder of his term.

15. All provisions of state law and the county charter not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Order shall govern 
the special election.

16. The Court retains jurisdiction of this action to consider 
the request of the plaintiffs for relief under Section 3(c) of 
the Voting Rights Act and to enter such further relief as may 
be appropriate.



A-169

It  Is So Or d er ed . 

DATED: November 9, 1990

Honorable David V. Kenyon 
United States District Judge

Presented by:

RICHARD P. FAJARDO 
VIBIANA ANDRADE 
ANTONIA HERNANDEZ 
JOSE GARZA
JUDITH CASTRO-SANDERS
Mexican American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund 
634 South Spring Street, 11th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90014

MARK D. ROSENBAUM
PAUL L. HOFFMAN
ACLU Foundation of Southern California
633 South Shatto Place
Los Angeles, CA 90005

DOUGLAS E. MIRELL 
RICHARD S. AMADOR 
LOEB AND LOEB 
1000 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1800 
Los Angeles, CA 90017

JOAQUIN G. AVILA
One Warm Springs Professional Ctr.
200 Brown Road, Suite 114 
Fremont, CA 94539

by Richard P. Fajardo



A-170

Nov 9-27, 1990 

Nov 12-30, 1990

Nov. 30, 1990 

Dec. 3, 1990

Dec 17, 1990 to 
Jan 11, 1991
Dec 24, 1990 to 
Jan 15, 1991
Jan 22, 1991

Feb 5, 1991

Feb 19, 1991 
Mar 5, 1991

Amended Appendix B

ELECTION SCHED ULE

Period for filing-in-lieu-fee petitions 
pursuant to Cal. Elec. Code § 6494.

Period for filing declarations of candidacy 
and nomination papers pursuant to Cal. 
Elec. Code § 6490.

Filing of Candidate statements pursuant to 
Cal. Elec. Code § 10012.

Drawing of randomized alphabet for 
purposes of determining the order of names 
of the candidates on the ballot pursuant to 
Cal. Elec. Code § 10216-10217.5.

Sample ballots distributed pursuant to Cal. 
Elec. Code § 10010.

Absentee ballots applications received 
pursuant to Cal. Elec. Code § 1002.
Special Primary Election

Certification of primary election results 
pursuant to Cal. Elec. Code § 17088.
General Election.

Certification of general election results 
pursuant to Cal. Elec. Code § 17088.



A-171

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiff-Appellees,
vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
et al.,

Defendant-Appellees,

UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
and

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al., 
Interv enors-Appellees, 

vs.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 

et al,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No. 90-55944

D C # CV-88-05143 Kn (Ex) 
Central California

No. 90-55945

D C # CV-88-05435 Kn (Ex) 
Central California

FIRST REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
BY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 

RE: 1990 CENSUS DATA
DeWitt W. Clinton 
County Counsel of 

Los Angeles 
Mary Wawro 
Senior Assistant 

County Counsel 
648 Hall of Administration 
500 W. Temple Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 
Telephone: (213) 974-1811

John E. McDermott 
Richard C. Field 
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft 
300 South Grand Avenue,
Suite 1100
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
Telephone: (213) 687-2400 
Richard K. Simon 
Lee L. Blackman 
Erich R. Luschei 
McDermott, Will & Emery 
2029 Century Park East,
Suite 3800
Los Angeles, CA 90067-2917 
Telephone: (213) 277-4110 
Attorneys for the 
County of Los Angeles



A -172

As disclosed in its opening (Op. Br. at 10 and fn. 8 and reply 
(Reply Br. at 1-4) briefs, the County of Los Angeles (“County”) 
is in receipt of preliminary 1990 census data from the United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. This new 
data calls into serious question the Population Estimation and 
Projection System (“PEPS”) estimates and projections used by 
the district court to find a violation of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1973) and the 14th Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, and to order a remedial plan. It also 
bears on the issue of laches. The County hereby requests under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 that judicial notice be taken of the 
currently available 1990 population numbers prepared by the 
United States Department of Commerce—Bureau of the Census:1

A. Population and Housing Unit list for the State of Cali­
fornia (and cities therein) prepared by the Bureau of the 
Census for the Postcensus Local Review Program.

B. Memorandum from the Bureau of the Census to All 
Governors and State Legislative Leaders regarding Delivery 
of Redistricting Data to States.

C. Declaration of Dr. William A.V. Clark.

As described in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities, the new Census data directly is relevant to the issues 
raised in this appeal.

'The County will provide this Court with any further Census data it 
receives from the Census Bureau. Therefore, this request is titled “First 
Request For Judicial Notice.”



A-173

Therefore, the County respectfully requests that this Court 
take Judicial Notice of the 1990 Census data and interpretive 
material presented herein.

Dated: September 21, 1990

Attorneys for Defendant- 
Appellant

By:------ .--------------------- ------
John E. McDermott

DeWitt W. Clinton 
COUNTY COUNSEL OF LOS 
ANGELES 
Mary Wawro 
SENIOR ASSISTANT 
COUNTY COUNSEL

CADWALADER, 
WICKERSHAM & TAFT 
John E. McDermott 
Richard C. Field

McDe r m o t t , w il l  & 
EMERY
Richard K. Simon 
Lee L. Blackman 
Erich R. Luschei



A-174

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
There can be no doubt that the population data used in the 

district court by the parties in this matter is inextricably inter­
twined with the district court’s finding of liability against the 
County, the district court’s rejection of the County’s proposed 
remedial plan, and the district court’s (now stayed) implementa­
tion of the Garza Plan 1 (modified) remedial plan. These district 
court findings and orders are the essence of these appeals. There­
fore, the issue of accurate population data is crucial to this 
Court’s assessment of the matters raised by these appeals.

The 1990 preliminary census counts for cities and counties has 
just become available to states, counties, and cities across the 
United States. The material of which judicial notice is sought 
reflects that the PEPS estimates are over 300,000 persons to high 
in one district (District 1, the district court’s Hispanic majority 
district) and nearly 250,000 people too low in another district 
(District 5). The total variance of the district court’s plan, using 
the new census data, is over 33%.

1. The County's Request Meets The Standards For Judicial
Notice
The County seeks judicial notice of two categories of materials. 

The first category is material directly from the Census Bureau— 
its list of California population and housing units (Exhibit A, 
hereto) and an explanatory letter setting forth the deadlines the 
Census Bureau hopes to meet for final state population numbers. 
(Exhibit B, hereto). The second category is a Declaration of 
County demographer Dr. Clark setting forth straightforward 
mathematical calculations not reasonably subject to dispute.

Case law is clear that courts may take judicial notice of the 
latest Census figures. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 132 
n. 2 (6th Cir. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 443 U.S. 545, 99 S.Ct. 
2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979); Goins v. Allgood, 391 F.2d 692, 697 
(5th Cir. 1968); Traweek v. San Francisco, 659 F.Supp. 1012, 
1015 n. la (N.D. Cal. 1984); Baker v. Kissimmee, 645 F.Supp. 
571, 578 n. 7 (M.D. Fla. 1968); Aleut League v. Atomic Energy



A-175

Commission, 337 F.Supp. 534, 538 (D.Alaska 1971). Indeed, in 
Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987 (D.D.C. 1981), 
ajfd, 459 U.S. 159, 103 S.Ct. 530, 74 L.Ed.2d 334 (1982), a 
Voting Rights Act case, the court took judicial notice of census 
data published after trial. See, Port Arthur, 517 F.Supp. at 993 
n.5.

2. Conclusion

As case law shows, the items for which judicial notice is sought 
meet the requirements for judicial notice. For these reasons, this 
Court should grant the County’s request for judicial notice of the 
new 1990 Census Bureau population data.

Dated: September 21, 1990

Attorneys for Defendant- 
Appellant County of Los 
Angeles

By:_______________________
John E. McDermott

DeWitt W. Clinton 
COUNTY COUNSEL OF LOS 
ANGELES 
Mary Wawro 
SENIOR ASSISTANT 
COUNTY COUNSEL
CADWALADER, 
WICKERSHAM & TAFT 
John E. McDermott 
Richard C. Field
McDe r m o t t , w il l  &
EMERY
Richard K. Simon 
Lee L. Blackman 
Erich R. Luschei



A-176

Seal of Bureau of the Census Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE 
DIRECTOR

RECEIPT AND USE OF POSTCENSUS 
LOCAL REVIEW DATA

Per your request, we are providing your data generated for the 
Postcensus Local Review Program. You have previously accepted 
receipt of these data under the following conditions.

1. You understand that the Census Bureau generated these 
data solely for use in the coverage improvement operation 
called the Postcensus Local Review Program.

2. You understand that data from the Postcensus Local 
Review Program represent partial and preliminary results 
from the 1990 decennial census and are likely to change 
pending completion of the Postcensus Local Review Pro­
gram and other census enumeration and coverage improve­
ment activities.

3. You understand that these partial and preliminary data 
from the Postcensus Local Review Program may differ by an 
unpredictable amount from the final and official 1990 decen­
nial census data and apportionment counts issued to the 
President by December 31, 1990, and the P.L. 94-171 redis­
tricting data to be issued by April 1, 1991.

4. You understand that the Census Bureau is releasing 
these partial and preliminary data from the Postcensus Local 
Review Program for information purposes only. The Census 
Bureau neither encourages nor sanctions use for official pur­
poses, such as budgeting or redistricting activities.

5. You understand that since the Postcensus Local Review 
data are preliminary in nature, that it is premature to raise 
questions about the content of the data. Therefore, it is in- 
appropriate to request the Census Bureau to respond to such 
inquiries or to speculate on the final census results.



A-177

1990 DECENNIAL CENSUS
PRELIMINARY HOUSING AND POPULATION COUNTS
STATE: CALIFORNIA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
PAGE: 2 DATE: 08-16-90 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

GOVERNMENTAL UNIT

Code Name
All

Housing Units All Persons
Persons in 

Group Qtrs

CO 06 101 Sutter County 24131 64007 830
CO 06 103 Tehama County 20367 49355 904
CO 06 105 Trinity County 7530 13030 232
CO 06 107 Tulare County 104787 303622 5200
CO 06 109 Tuolumma County 25090 40153 4247
CO 06 111 Ventura County 228362 650880 12502
CO 06 113 Yolo County 52627 138554 6760
CO 06 115 Yubo County 21141 57726 1911
PL 06 0003 Adelanto city 2647 9499 0
PL 06 0007 Agoura Hills city 6849 20190 10
PL 06 0010 Alameda city 30356 72950 5782
PL 06 0020 Albany city 7307 15803 10
PL 06 0025 Alhambra city 29632 80740 1284
PL 06 0050 Alturas city 1248 2843 40
PL 06 0065 Amador City city 92 166 0
PL 06 0070 Anaheim city 93252 264959 3670
PL 06 0075 Anderson city 3235 8251 91
PL 06 0080 Angels city 1226 2571 22
PL 06 0085 Antioch city 22624 81379 327
PL 06 0090 Apple Valley town 16638 45851 120
PL 06 0105 Arcadia city 19424 48007 830
PL 06 0110 Areata city 6300 15119 1249
PL 06 0130 Arroyo Grande city 6052 14274 153
PL 06 0135 Artesia city 4538 15384 498
PL 06 0139 Arvin city 2454 9209 79
PL 06 0145 Atascadero city 8025 22581 270
PL 06 0150 Atherton town 2508 6700 95
PL 06 0155 Atwater city 7351 21816 118
PL 06 0160 Auburn city 4784 10815 205
PL 06 0165 Avalon city 0 12 12
PL 06 0170 Avenal city 1758 9652 4192
PL 06 0175 Azusa city 12995 39844 1147
PL 06 0180 Bakersfield city 65572 171601 2774
PL 06 0185 Baldwin Park city 17157 68481 895
PL 06 0190 Banning city 9259 20035 384
PL 06 0195 Barstow city 8472 21205 155
PL 06 0205 Beaumont city 3709 9587 199
PL 06 0210 Bell city 9395 23812 79
PL 06 0215 Bellflower city 24101 61495 672



69
1
0

100
0

158
0

214
96
49
42

201
814
487

93
0
0

103
852
148
190
819
32

157
324

50
246
106

:990
1439

96
720
■392

0
62

8
109

0
98
0

13
111

A-178

Name
All

Housing Units All Persons
Bell Gardens city 9545 41990
Belmont city 10293 23659
Belvedere city 1020 2103
Benicia city 9481 23954
Berkeley city 45301 89111
Beverly Hills city 15707 31783
Big Bear Lake city 8538 5187
Biggs city 548 1587
Bishop city 1763 8422
Blue Lake city 518 1182
Blythe city 2640 7804
Bradbury city 279 816
Brawley city 6122 18865
Brea city 12624 32076
Brentwood city 2618 7515
Brisbane city 1385 2937
Buena Park city 23124 68028
Burbank city 40940 92654
Burlingame city 12970 26727
Calexico city 4681 17908
California City city 2367 5765
Calipatria city 767 2686
Calistoga city 2339 4409
Camarillo city 18540 49768
Campbell city 15737 35309
Capitola city 5121 9846
Carlsbad city 27348 62711
Carmel-by-the-Sea city 2980 3775
Carpenteria city 5441 13505
Carson city 243874 83209
Cathedral City city 14737 28959
Ceres city 8988 25945
Cerritos city 15315 53089
Chico city 15413 38466
Chino city 15985 58933
Chowchilla city 2270 5863
Chula Vista city 49614 134158
Claremont city 10943 22699
Clayton city 2333 7219
Clearlake city 7266 11643
Cloverdale city 2015 4709
Clovis city 18828 49936
Coachella city 3787 16534
Coalinga city 3205 6071
Colfax city 478 949
Colima town 388 1074
Colton city 14483 39206



A-179

All Persons in
Code Name Housing Units All Persons Group Qtrs

PL 06 0585 Colusa city 1894 4910 73
PL 06 0587 Commerce city 3331 11985 99
PL 06 0590 Compton city 22905 86999 581
PL 06 0595 Concord city 43659 110840 1102
PL 06 0600 Corcoran city 2700 13291 5058
PL 06 0605 Coming city 2445 5887 19
PL 06 0610 Corona city 25414 74204 831
PL 06 0615 Coronado city 9081 18014 1750
PL 06 0620 Corte Madera town 3546 7873 0
PL 06 0625 Costa Mesa city 39675 96025 2225
PL 06 0828 Cotati city 2432 5657 0
PL 06 0635 Covina city 16009 42453 594
PL 06 0640 Crescent City city 1438 3440 95
PL 06 0658 Cudahy city 5442 22698 0
PL 06 0665 Culver City city 16889 38528 947
PL 06 0670 Cupertino city 15944 39886 312
PL 06 0685 Cypress city 14733 42582 116
PL 06 0700 Daly City city 30134 91209 631
PL 06 0705 Dana Point city 14426 31528 338
PL 06 0706 Danville city 10562 28675 134
PL 06 0715 Davis city 18161 45597 1987
PL 06 0725 Delano city 6525 22846 58
PL 06 0735 Del Mar city 2487 4784 26
PL 06 0755 Del Rey Oaks city 728 1649 0
PL 06 0765 Desert Hot Springs city 5474 11462 85
PL 06 0775 Dinuba city 3637 12661 192
PL 06 0780 Dixon city 3451 10129 42
PL 06 0785 Dorris city 361 634 0
PL 06 0790 Dos Palos city 1414 4141 6
PL 06 0795 Downey city 34212 91020 1946
PL 06 0800 Duarte city 6739 20536 682
PL 06 0802 Dublin city 6901 22951 3750
PL 06 0805 Dunsmuir city 1060 1995 9
PL 06 0827 East Palo Alto city 6897 21608 304
PL 06 0850 El Cajon city 34537 88168 1947
PL 06 0855 El Centro city 10108 21154 500
PL 06 0860 El Cerrito city 10274 22684 126
PL 06 0880 El Monte city 26991 104189 1550
PL 06 0885 El Paso de Robles

(Paso Robles) city 7350 18055 54
PL 06 0895 El Segundo city 7173 15145 2
PL 06 0910 Emeryville city 3601 6693 0
PL 06 0920 Encintias city 21909 54474 1584
PL 06 0930 Escalon city 1597 4291 0
PL 06 0935 Escondido city 41767 108069 1340
PL 06 0940 Etna city 344 821 0
PL 06 0945 Eureka city 11067 25179 836



1
0

250
0

6714
462
109

0
177
102
510
48

1131
7383
1739

165
171

1833
272

2333
760

55
101
273

12
140
28
23

. 0
62

496
9

432
1320

79
816

15
15
52
0

150
6
0

80

A -180

Name
All

Housing Units All Persons
Exeter city 2512 6415
Fairfax town 3180 6805
Fairfield city 25724 74109
Farmersville city 1631 5818
Femdale city 574 1282
Fillmore city 3553 11616
Firebaugh city 1221 4267
Folsom city 9299 29484
Fontana city 28115 85281
Fort Bragg city 2475 5712
Fort Jones town 300 637
Fortuna city 9698 8703
Foster City city 11761 28121
Fountain Valley City 17919 53405
Fowler city 1074 8113
Fremont city 82253 172071
Fresno city 128592 258592
Fullerton city 42265 112476
Gall city 2973 8610
Gardena city 16821 49220
Garden Grove city 45715 141133
Gilroy city 9606 30362
Glendale city 71915 176116
Glendora city 16748 47257
Gonzales city 1157 4472
Grand Terrace city 4018 10796
Grass Valley city 4357 8976
Greenfield 1733 6624
Gridley city 1796 4707
Grover city 4933 11571
Guadalupe city 1374 5405
Gustline city 1578 3885
Half Moon Bay city 3318 6409
Hanford city 11617 30750
Hawaiian Garden city 3520 13473
Hawthorne city 29128 89986
Hayward city 41716 100295
Healdsburg city 3758 9387
Hemet city 17890 33252
Hercules city 5540 16554
Hermosa Beach 9613 16020
Hesperia city 17207 49906
Hidden Hills city 526 1715
Highland city 11645 32844
Hillsborough Town 3785 10609
Hollister city 6176 18550
Holtville city 1477 4807



A-181

All Persons in
Code Name Housing Units All Persons Group Qtrs

PL 06 1295 Hughson city 1064 3232 0
PL 06 1300 Huntington Beach 72673 180746 ■ 558
PL 06 1305 Huntington Park city 14394 54969 248
PL 06 1310 Huron city 954 4651 673
PL 06 1317 Imperial city 1334 4023 26
PL 06 1320 Imperial Beach 9418 26004 624
PL 06 1327 Indian Wells city 2857 2595 0
PL 06 1330 Indio city 11927 34537 506
PL 06 1335 Industry city 169 812 261
PL 06 1340 Inglewood city 38613 106673 1499
PL 06 1345 lone city 906 6491 4244
PL 06 1347 Irvine city 42178 109935 2160
PL 06 1350 Irwindale city 272 982 0
PL 06 1355 Isleton city 350 826 13
PL 06 1365 Jackson city 1597 5426 278
PL 06 1390 Karman city 1745 5405 0
PL 06 1400 King city 2373 7290 112
PL 06 1405 Kingsburg city 2580 7141 134
PL 06 1410 La Canada Flintridge city 6919 19333 155
PL 06 1415 Lafayette city 9261 24482 1365
PL 06 1420 Laguna Beach city 12768 23055 166
PL 06 1424 Laguna Niguel city 18130 42913 20
PL 06 1428 La Habra city 18307 50170 253
PL 06 1429 La Habra Heights city 1852 5328 0
PL 06 1434 Lake Elsinore city 6828 17920 175
PL 06 1445 Lakeport city 2139 4364 234
PL 06 1455 Lakewood city 26776 73177 63
PL 06 1460 La Mesa city 24183 52805 1243
PL 06 1462 La Mirada city 13355 40354 1437
PL 06 1476 Lancaster city 35248 95101 4281
PL 06 1477 La Palma city 4265 13682 2
PL 06 1480 La Puente city 9273 36450 246
PL 06 1482 La Quinta city 5693 10723 2
PL 06 1485 Larkspur city 5880 10759 206
PL 06 1490 Lathrop city 1954 6564 11
PL 06 1500 La Verne city 11106 30827 671
PL 06 1505 Lawndale city 9729 26831 50
PL 06 1510 Lemon Grove city 6650 23763 773
PL 06 1515 Lemoore city 4871 13477 16
PL 06 1525 Lincoln city 2596 7157 94
PL 06 1550 Lindsay city 2669 8285 51
PL 06 1581 Live Oak city 1431 4315 118
PL 06 1570 Livermore city 21244 55848 194
PL 06 1575 Livingston city 1691 7087 0
PL 06 1585 Lodi city 19546 41808 990
PL 06 1588 Loma Linda city 6859 18084 1583
PL 06 1590 Lomita city 8254 19336 138



487
506
29

749
53

236
0
1

218
0

276
1306
625
121

0
1419
840
324
153

3192
228

2644
202
20

331
452

3079
229

0
0

137
57

438
271
583

34
1177
5831

122
31

A-182

Name
All

Housing Units Ail Persons
Lompoc city 13061 34435
Long Beach city 169824 423394
Loomis town 2009 5613
Los Alamitos city 4277 17853
Los Altos city 10087 26162
Los Altos Mills 2614 7326
Los Angeles city 1292728 3420235
Los Banos city 4820 13443
Los Gatos town 11693 26905
Loyalton city 369 854
Lynwood city 14467 58741
McFarland city 1767 6959
Madera city 9507 28892
Mammoth Lakes town 7063 4717
Manhattan Beach city 14713 32003
Manteca city 13878 39668
Maricopa city 432 1160
Marina city 7865 22980
Martinez city 13768 33510
Marysville city 5079 12253
Maywood city 5694 27602
Mendota city 1733 6605
Menlo Park city 12471 28412
Merced city 18939 55289
Millbrae city 8124 20187
Mill Valley city 6124 12973
Milpitas city 14589 50278
Mission Viejo city 25355 69951
Modesto city 60105 162262
Monrovia city 13719 34782
Montague 552 1410
Montclair city 8908 28232
Montebello city 19211 59260
Monterey city 13183 30807
Monterey Park city 20337 60567
Monte Sereno city 1185 3262
Moorpark city 7899 24912
Moraga town city 5696 14760
Moreno Valley city 36885 116421
Morgan Hill city 7821 22924
Morro Bay city 5871 9632
Mountain View city 31184 85375
Mount Shasta city 1531 3256
Napa city 24853 61553
National City city 15088 52471
Needles city 2357 51186
Nevada City city 1391 2806



A-183

Code Name
AH

Housing Units Ail Persons
Persons in 

Group Qtrs

PL 06 1900 Newark city 12272 37604 31
PL 06 1910 Newman city 1518 4145 0
PL 06 1915 Newport Beach city 3489 66453 719
PL 06 1919 Norco city 5780 22893 4750
PL 06 1950 Norwalk city 27224 93739 2440
PL 06 1955 Novato city 18817 47452 286
PL 06 1965 Oakdale city 4547 11736 177
PL 06 1970 Oakland city 153919 380855 7409
PL 06 1990 Oceanside city 50478 126202 1252
PL 06 1995 Ojai city 3151 7501 190
PL 06 2005 Ontario city 42419 131869 764
PL 06 2015 Orange city 37921 109877 9334
PL 06 2020 Orange Grove city 1314 5534 0
PL 06 2030 Orinda city 6511 16704 45
PL 06 2035 Orland city 2006 5172 200
PL 06 2045 Oroviile city 4920 11951 654
PL 06 2050 Oxnard city 51580 137568 1666
PL 06 2060 Pacifica city 13623 37036 125
PL 06 2065 Pacific Grove city 7335 15920 185
PL 06 2072 Palmdale city 22914 66357 50
PL 06 2080 Palm Desert city 12627 22808 115
PL 06 2085 Palm Springs city 29782 38586 534
PL 06 2090 Palo Alto city 25107 54847 855
PL 06 2095 Palos Verdes Estates city 5064 13349 0
PL 06 2100 Paradise town 11628 25363 384
PL 06 2115 Paramount city 13698 47340 269
PL 06 2120 Parlier city 1798 7802 43
PL 06 2125 Pasadena city 53112 129518 4149
PL 06 2130 Patterson city 2702 8593 29
PL 06 2138 Perris city 7190 20835 182
PL 06 2140 Petaluma 16516 42937 499
PL 06 2145 Pico Rivera city 16263 56747 510
PL 06 2150 Piedmont city 3849 10572 0
PL 06 2160 Pinole city 6401 17147 6
PL 06 2170 Pismo Beach city 4563 7687 63
PL 06 2175 Pittsburg city 16845 47190 345
PL 06 2195 Placentia city 13503 40477 187
PL 06 2200 Placerville city 3513 8183 563
PL 06 2210 Pleasant Hill city 13373 31115 430
PL 06 2215 Pleasanton city 19185 49722 180
PL 06 2220 Plymouth city 396 689 2
PL 06 2223 Point Arena city 97 187 0
PL 06 2230 Pamona city 38275 129315 3145
PL 06 2245 Porterville city 9532 27823 8855
PL 06 2250 Port Hueneme city 7534 18932 1148
PL 06 2255 Portola city 1001 2190 9
PL 06 2257 Portola Valley city 1741 4319 40



201
230
381
487

1688
2024

36
1934
220

1105
811
720

11
0

11
148

6093
0

858
0
0

892
94

7760
7960

51
1190

147
4732
1247
2109

81
53
1

5507
1086

52
3846
449
121
222

6
0102

0
145
355

A -184

Name 

Poway city
Rancho Cucamonga city 
Rancho Mirage city 
Rancho Palos Verdes city 
Red Bluff city 
Redding city 
Redlands city 
Redondo Beach city 
Redwood City city 
Reedley city 
Rialto city 
Richmond city 
Ridgecrest city 
Rio Dell city 
Rio Vista city 
Ripon city 
Riverbank city 
Riverside city 
Rocklin city 
Rohnert Park city 
Rolling Hills city 
Rolling Hills Estates city 
Rosemead 
Roseville city 
Ross town 
Sacramento city 
St. Helena city 
Salinas city 
San Anselmo town 
San Bernardino city 
San Bruno city
San Buenaventura (Ventura) city
San Carlos city
San Clemente city
Sand City city
San Diego city
San Dimas city
San Fernando city
San Francisco city
San Gabriel city
Sanger city
San Jacinto city
San Joaquin city
San Jose city
San Juan Bautisto city
San Juan Capistrano city
San Leandro city

All
Housing Units All Persons

14604 43933
36169 99064
9174 9606

15440 41486
4987 12144

26641 64722
22802 69329
28129 58860
26726 65261
4758 15583

23153 70795
33676 83716
11282 28161

1237 2982
1403 3784
2519 7269
2626 8497

79582 223221
7274 15840

13755 35827
699 1828

2908 7059
14129 51158
17528 44384

752 2056
153449 364663

2351 4946
33965 105604
7216 16250

57782 159637
15439 39073
37699 91744
11188 25704
18733 40905

85 179
428618 7094524

11655 32439
5754 22131

326713 711407
12753 36760
4918 16700
6505 15754

541 2265
257347 765207

596 1541
9540 25978

30117 67718



A-185

Code Name
All

Housing Units All Persons
Persons in 
Group Qtrs

PL 06 2535 San Luis Obispo city 17745 41691 1439
PL 06 2537 San Marcos city 14442 38620 38
PL 06 2545 San Marino city 4466 12920 157
PL 06 2555 San Mateo city 36918 84829 1555
PL 06 2560 San Paolo city 8333 24709 476
PL 06 2565 San Rafael city 20996 47792 1278
PL 06 2567 San Ramon city 13130 34170 23
PL 06 2570 Santa Ana city 74593 257987 4843
PL 06 2575 Santa Barbara city 36096 94298 2400
PL 06 2580 Santa Clara city 37800 92090 2499
PL 06 2583 Santa Clarita city 39776 107741 1143
PL 06 2585 Santa Cruz city 19325 47832 2830
PL 06 2590 Santa Fe Springs 4831 15541 3
PL 06 2595 Santa Maria city 21173 60722 708
PL 06 2600 Santa Monica city 47569 85880 2510
PL 06 2605 Santa Paula city 8077 24443 183
PL 06 2615 Santa Rosa city 47609 112345 1461
PL 06 2623 Santee city 18243 52641 1582
PL 06 2630 Saratoga city 10272 27864 369
PL 06 2640 Sausalito city 4238 6857 0
PL 06 2647 Scotts Valley city 3515 8479 329
PL 06 2650 Seal Beach city 14198 24732 261
PL 06 2655 Seaside city 10841 31756 538
PL 06 2665 Sebastopol city 2944 6940 195
PL 06 2670 Selma city 4690 14541 145
PL 06 2675 Shaffer city 2630 6397 125
PL 06 2690 Sierra Madre city 4868 10727 136
PL 06 2693 Signal Hill city 3654 8276 279
PL 06 2702 Simi Valley city 53099 99316 204
PL 06 2704 Solano Beach city 6331 12892 0
PL 06 2705 Soledad city 1554 6895 0
PL 06 2710 Solvang city 2046 4660 182
PL 06 2715 Sonoma city 4144 7867 83
PL 06 2720 Sonora city 2089 4080 147
PL 06 2725 South El Monte city 4751 20100 58
PL 06 2730 South Gate city 23115 86211 433
PL 06 2737 South Lake Tahoe city 14141 21237 147
PL 06 2755 South Pasadena city 10715 23759 258
PL 06 2765 South San Francisco city 18514 53090 486
PL 06 2800 Stanton city 10685 30047 300
PL 06 2805 Stockton city 72021 203861 4365
PL 06 2820 Suisun city 6867 22000 28
PL 06 2835 Sunnyvale city 50394 115439 512
PL 06 2845 Susanville city 2931 5646 184
PL 06 2855 Sutter Creek city 977 1873 0
PL 06 2860 Taft city 2368 5848 139
PL 06 2873 Tehachapi city 2455 5656 23



1073
180

1
218

0
1084
1837

0
573
412
424

7590
2698

8
396

2
1833
1754

14
853

7
84

376
156
418
407

0
274

0
252

0
2502

64
57

157
0
9

750
0

13
1423
123

A-186

All
Name Housing Units All Persons
Tehama city 176 399
Temecula city 9683 25557
Temple City city 11509 30769
Thousand Oaks city 37748 102795
Tiburon town 3434 1195
Torrance city 54654 132382
Tracy city 11848 32331
Trinidad city 200 361
Tulare city 11290 33063
Tulelake city 436 990
Turlock city 15331 41933
Tustin city 19275 50349
Twentynine Palms city 5934 11449
Ukiah city 5818 14520
Union City city 16229 53307
Upland city 24407 62771
Vacaville city 23411 70496
Vallejo city 39680 107330
Vernon city 52 152
Victorville city 15142 36482
Villa Park city 1956 5279
Visalia city 26953 74769
Vista city 26202 89245
Walnut city 8082 25905
Walnut Creek city 29984 60547
Wasco city 3604 12327
Waterford city 1457 4719
Watsonville city 9693 29764
Weed city 1246 3048
West Covina city 30723 94391
West Hollywood city 23379 35121
Westlake Village city 2928 7402
Westminister city 25883 77752
Westmoreland 432 1377
West Sacramento city 11609 28528
Wheatland city 684 1838
Whittier city 26412 78838
Williams city 701 2079
Willits city 1956 49??
Willows city 2241 5982
Winters city 1546 4497
Woodlake city 1543 5647
Woodland city 14791 39156
Woodside town 1861 4833
Yorba Linda city 17286 52120
Yountville town 970 3224
Yreka city 3071 6904



AH Persons in

A-187

Code Name Housing Units All Persons Group Qtrs

PL 06 3185 Yuba City city 10978 27103 564
PL 06 3186 Yucaipa city 14207 32632 306
PL 06 7003 Orange city 0 0 0
PL 06 7070 Orange city 0 0 0
IR 06 0020 Aqua Caliente Reserv. 19533 18726 278
IR 06 0095 Alturas Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 0125 Augustine Reservation 0 0 0
IR 06 0155 Barona Rancheria 151 544 0
IR 06 0185 Benton Paiute Reserv. 28 63 0
IR 06 0200 Berry Creek Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 0215 Big Bend Rancheria 3 3 0
IR  06 0240 Big Lagoon Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 0250 Big Pine Rancheria 156 445 0
IR 06 0265 Big Sandy Rancheria 18 48 0
IR 06 0275 Big Valley Rancheria 41 107 0
IR 06 0290 Bishop Rancheria 471 1298 0
IR 06 0325 Blue Lake Rancheria 29 58 0
IR 06 0350 Bridgeport Colony 21 50 0
IR 06 0415 Cebaten Reservation 192 793 26
IR 06 0435 Cahuilla Reservation 37 104 0
IR 06 0450 Campo Reservation 87 225 0
IR  06 0495 Capitan Grande Reserv. 0 0 0
IR 06 0555 Cedarville Rancheria 5 8 0
IR 06 0585 Chamchoul Reservation 734 357 0
IR 06 0620 Chicken Ranch Reservation 37 73 0
IR 06 0720 Cold Springs Rancheria 80 187 0
IR 06 0735 Colorado River Reserv. 1454 807 1
IR 06 0750 Colusa (Cochil Duke) Rancheria 9 22 0
IR 06 0780 Cortina Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 0825 Coyote Valley Reservation 42 134 0
IR  06 0870 Cuyapaipa Reservation 0 0 0
IR  06 0955 Dry Creek Rancheria 12 75 0
IR  06 1010 Elk Valley Rancheria 29 73 0
IR  06 1055 Enterprise Rancheria 4 5 0
IR  06 1170 Fort Bid well Reservation 47 118 0
IR  06 1195 Fort Independence Reservation 9 19 0
IR  06 1235 Fort Mojave Reservation 39 119 0
IR 06 1280 Fort Yuma (Quechan) Reserv. 620 1339 4
IR 06 1390 Greenville Rancheria 16 24 0
IR 06 1395 Grind Stone Creek Rancheria 24 103 0
IR 06 1515 Hopland Rancheria 60 175 0
IR 06 1560 Inaja-Cosail Rancheria 0 0 0
IR  06 1640 Jackson Rancheria 8 21 0
IR 06 1670 Jaoul village 0 0 0
IR  06 1750 Karok Reservation 9 28 0
IR  06 1850 La Jolla Reservation 32 127 27
IR  06 1895 La Posia Reservation 8 10 0



A -188

Code Name AH Persons 
Housing Units All Persons Group Q

IR 06 1925 Laytonville Rancheria 54 144 0
IR 06 1955 Likely Rancheria 0 0 o
IR  06 1970 Lone Pine Rancheria 90 241 o
IR 06 1980 Lookout Rancheria 5 17 0
IR 06 1995 Los Coyotes Reservation 0 0 0
IR  06 2100 Manchester (Point Arena) Reserv. 50 181 0
IR 06 2115 Manzanita Reservation 2 34 30
IR  06 2190 Mesa Grande Reservation 33 76 0
IR 06 2255 Middletown Rancheria 31 79 0
IR 06 2330 Montgomery Creek Rancheria 6 11 0
IR 06 2360 Morango Reservation 416 1069 0
IR 06 2495 North Fork Rancheria 2 4 o
IR  06 2635 Pala Reservation 285 773 0
IR 06 2715 Patuma Reservation 0 0 o
IR 06 2745 Pechanga Reservation 143 330 0
IR 06 2775 Picayune Rancheria 11 32 0
IR 06 2820 Pinoieville Rancheria 37 120 5
IR  06 3020 Quartz Valley Rancheria 31 71 0
IR 06 3070 Ramona Reservation 0 0 o
IR 06 3095 Redding Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 3115 Redwood Valley Rancheria 43 134 0
IR 06 3145 Resighini Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 3165 Rincon Reservation 105 519 o
IR 06 3185 Roaring Creek Rancheria 4 17 0
IR  06 3195 Robinson Rancheria 29 124 o
IR  06 3220 Rohnerville Rancheria 0 0 o
IR 06 3230 Round Valley Reservation 485 1150 0
IR 06 3235 Rumsey Rancheria 4 7 0
IR 06 3445 San Manual Reservation 20 82 0
IR 06 3460 San Pasqual Reservation 151 521 0
IR 06 3520 Santa Rosa Rancheria 1 3 0
IR 06 3525 Santa Rosa Reservation 14 50 0
IR 06 3540 Santa Ynez Reservation 117 260 3
IR 06 3550 Santa Ysabel Reservation 56 169 0
IR 06 3720 Sheep Ranch Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 3735 Sherwood Valley Rancheria 9 0 0
IR  06 3750 Shingle Springs Rancheria 0 0 0
IR 06 3855 Smith River Rancheria 42 105 0
IR 06 3870 Soboba Rancheria 119 369 0
IR 06 3985 Stewariz Point Rancheria 19 83 0
IR 06 4030 Sulphur Bank (El-Em) Rancheria 23 91 0
IR 06 4060 Susanville Reservation 31 87 0
IR 06 4090 Sycuan Reservation 1 4 0
IR 06 4095 Table Bluff Rancheria 16 46 0
IR 06 4110 Table Mountain Rancheria 17 52 0
IR  06 4255 Torres-Martinez Reservation 443 1419 0
IR 06 4275 Trindad Rancheria 26 78 0



A-189

A!! Persons in
Code Name Housing Units All Persons Groupi

IR 06 4300 Tule River Reservation 212 796 o’
IR 06 4330 Tuolumne Rancheria 54 135 0
IR 06 4375 Twenty-Nine Palm Reservation 0 0 0
IR  06 4430 Upper Lake Rancheria 23 63 0
IR  06 4500 Viajas Rancheria 154 402 0
IR  06 4665 Woodfords Community 64 234 0
IR 06 4680 XL Ranch Reservation 12 32 0
IR 06 4760 Yurck Reservation 1416 3358 76
TL 06 1235 Fort Mojave Trust Lands 3 4 0
TL 06 2835 Pit River Trust Lands 3 7 0
TL 06 3250 Round Valley Trust Lands 0 0 0



A-190

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
Bureau of the Census
Washington, D.C. 20233
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Aug 8 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR All Governors, State Legislative
Leader and 1990 Census Redistricting
Data Program Liaisons 

From: Marshall L. Turner, Jr.
Chief, 1990 Census Redistricting Data 
Office

Subject: Delivery of P.L. 94-171 Redistricting
Data to States

Since the 1970 census, the Census Bureau has given considera­
tion to states that face tight time deadlines for accomplishing 
congressional and legislative redistricting and require small-area 
decennial census counts.

For the 1990 Census Redistricting Data Program (Public Law 
94-171), we have asked the Governors and majority and minority 
leaders of all 50 states to confirm to us any state constitutional, 
statutory or court-imposed deadlines that apply to when they 
must redistrict in 1991. Based on their replies, we have catego­
rized states into the four tiers shown on page 2 this memoran­
dum. The assignment of states reflects also such factors as dates 
of 1991 legislative sessions, coverage under Section 5 of the Vot­
ing Rights Act, 1991 primary and general election dates, and so 
forth. Material from the National Conference of State Legisla­
tures, the American Legislative Exchange Council and discus­
sions with U.S. Justice Department officials were also used in 
these categorizations.

We will attempt to process the P.L. 94-171 Counts in a se­
quence of Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, and Tier 4.



A-191

Two important points should noted:
1. We cannot predict what, if any, processing or other 

unforeseen problems might make it impossible to complete 
and deliver the P.L. 94-171 data for a given state at a given 
time prior to the legal deadline of April 1, 1991.

2. We now expect that the time to finish all states’ data 
will be an 8 to 9-week period beginning in late January 1991 
and extending through late March 1991.

1990 Census P.L. 94-171 
Data Files Planned Processing Sequence

Tier 1
Arkansas
Indiana
Louisiana
Mississippi
New Jersey
South Dakota
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
Wyoming
Tier 2
Alabama
Delaware
Hawaii
Illinois
Missouri
Nebraska
Nevada
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon
Tier 3
California
Connecticut
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland

New York 
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Tier 4
Alaska
Arizona
Colorado
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Kentucky
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
New Hampshire
New Mexico
North Dakota
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Utah
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin



A-192

If you have questions, please contact me at (301) 763-3856 or 
Cathy Talbert at (301) 763-4070. Telefax messages to (301) 763- 
5148.

DECLARATION OF DR. WILLIAM A. V CLARK
I, William A. V. Clark, hereby declare as follows:

1. I have personal, first hand knowledge of the facts stated in 
this declaration and, if called to testify, could and would testify 
thereto.

2 .1 am Chairman of the Geography Department at UCLA, am 
a professional demographer, and was an expert witness in the trial 
proceedings in this case.

3. The Bureau of the Census has released preliminary city and 
county population data. The 1990 census preliminary population 
estimate for Los Angeles County (“County”) is 8,719,699. The 
allocation of this Census Bureau population across the 5 districts 
of the Garza plan ordered by the district court as the remedy plan 
in this case reveals significant differences with the Population 
Estimation and Projection System (“PEPS”) data used by the 
district court.

Population Estimates for Garza Plan

Dist

PEPS 
1990 Pop Diff from

Census 
1990 Pop Diff from

Diff
Between 

PEPS and
Estimate l/5 th  Dist Estimate l/5 th  Dist Census

1 1,799,835 3,813 1,456,565 -281,129 -323,270
2 1,775,665 -3 5 7 1,616,898 -120,796 -158,767
3 1,763,985 -12,037 1,777,166 39,472 +  13,181
4 1,776,240 218 1,805,842 68,148 +  29,602
5 1,784,383 8,361 2,031,998 294,304 +247,615

Total 8,880,108 8,688,469 -191,639

4. The allocation procedure I used to obtain the above figures 
involved assigning the city population to the respective districts 
and calculating the population of tracts not in cities from the



A-193

housing units in each tract. The population in each tract in the 
unincorporated areas and in Los Angeles city was calculated 
from the number of housing units times a population per housing 
unit determined from the value of a nearby city. The census esti­
mate created from summing the city population and the tract 
estimates is 31,200 less than the Census Bureau published esti­
mate and 191,639 less than the PEPS 1990 estimate. While the 
population totals for PEPS and the Census Bureau are similar, 
there are considerable differences in the distribution of population 
across districts. The analysis reveals that there is a 33% variance 
over the districts of the Garza plan, and District 5 is almost 17% 
greater than one-fifth of the County’s reported population.

1990 Census Population Estimates for Garza Plan

Dist

Pop in 
Other than 
LA Cities

Pop in Grp 
Qrts in LA 
City & Co.

Pop in Occ. 
Housing 
Units in

City & Co. Total Pop Var

1 755,723 24,597 676,245 1,456,565 -16 .18
2 521,256 16,113 1,079,529 1,616,898 -6 .9 5
3 204,222 29,367 1,543,577 1,777,166 +  2.27
4 1,344,270 5,306 456,266 1,805,842 +  3.92
5 1,465,776 16,858 549,364 2,031,998 +  16.94

Total 4,291,247 92,241 4,304,981 8,688,469 33.12

5. Even if the higher 1990 PEPS total population estimate, 
rather than the Census Bureau’s estimate, is accepted for the total 
Los Angeles County population and all additional 191,639 per­
sons are assigned to District 1, the population variance in the 
Garza plan will still be 21.6 percent.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America and the State of California that the above is 
true and correct.

Executed on September 20, 1990 at Los Angeles, California.

Dr. William A.V. Clark



A-194

FILED 
Oct 18 1990

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

IN  TH E U N IT E D  STATES CO URT O F A PPE A L S  
FO R  TH E N IN T H  CIRCUIT

YOLANDA GARZA,
SALVADOR LEDEZMA,
RAYMOND PALACIOS,
MONICA TOVAR, et al.,

Plaintiff/Appellees,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,
DEANE DANA,
PETER F. SCHABARUM,
KENNETH F. HAHN, et al.

Defendants/Appellants.

Before: SCHROEDER, NELSON and KOZINSKI, Circuit 
Judges.

Appellant County of Los Angeles motion to take judicial notice 
is DENIED.

No. 90-55944/45 

D .C .# CV-88-05135-Kn

O R D E R



A-195

U N IT E D  STATES DISTRIC T COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRIC T O F C A LIFO RN IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants,

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al,
Plaintiff-Interveners.

No. CV 88-5143-Kn 

CV 88-5435-Kn

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 

Los Angeles, California 

August 3, 1990

RON WORTH, CRS 
Official Court Reporters 
406 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 680-4047



A -196

me to ask two or three questions.

THE COURT: Mr. Field?

MR. FIELD: No objection.

THE COURT: Does a special election cost more than a general 
election, a regular election? That opens it. He can answer.

In the context that we have been discussing, what is the cost 
effect?

THE WITNESS: All right. Generally, the cost of a special 
election is two dollars per voter. The cost of putting on a major 
general election is approximately three dollars per voter.

MR. BURKE: Is that per registered voter in the area?

THE WITNESS: Per registered voter in the area where the 
election is being conducted.

MR. BURKE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MR. MCDERMOTT: Could we have just a moment, Your 
Honor?

THE COURT: Sure.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MCDERMOTT: We have no further questions.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

MR. M. ROSENBAUM: Your Honor, we have one

1158



A -197

FILED 
AUG 3 1990
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al.
Plaintiffs-Intervenors.

The Court, having received and considered the remedial plan 
proposed by the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los An­
geles, the papers filed in support thereof and in opposition there­
to, and having held an evidentiary hearing on the validity of such 
plan, HEREBY REJECTS the proposed remedial plan as submit­
ted and RENDERS the following findings of fact and conclusions 
of law:

No. CV 88-5143 KN(Ex)

No. CV 88-5435 KN(Ex)

FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW Re Proposed 
Remedial Plan Submitted 
by County of Los 
Angeles

I. Background
1. On June 4, 1990, this Court issued its Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law determining that the 1981 redistricting plan 
for the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors violates Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu­
tion.



A-198

2. On June 7, 1990, at a status conference, the Court provided 
a reasonable opportunity to the defendants1 to propose a remedial 
redistricting plan.

3. On June 27, 1990, defendants submitted a proposed remedial 
plan to the Court, (hereinafter “the County Plan”).2

II. General Features o f Proposed Plan
4. District 3 is the most heavily Hispanic district, with a 1990 

Hispanic total population of approximately 74 percent; a Novem­
ber 1988 Spanish surname voter registration percentage of 45.5 
percent; and an estimated Spanish Origin percentage of 47.8 per­
cent. Under the County Plan, Hispanics constitute 57.3 percent 
of the voting age citizens.3

5. Two narrow fingers extend west from the main body of 
District 3 in downtown Los Angeles. The southwesterly finger 
extends to the residence of Supervisor Edelman. The northern 
finger includes portions of Sun Valley, Sylmar and Pacoima and 
the City of San Fernando. The San Fernando extension moves 
away from the central part of the Hispanic Core4 area in the San 
Gabriel Valley, north through a non-Hispanic territory to a por­
tion of the San Fernando Valley.

'Since the commencement of this lawsuit, Supervisors Hahn and 
Edelman have retained counsel separate from the law firm representing 
the County and Supervisors Antonovich, Dana and Schabarum. The 
term “defendants,” in this context is used in reference to the County of 
Los Angeles and to Supervisors Antonovich, Dana and Schabarum.

"Supervisors Antonovich, Dana and Schabarum voted to submit the 
redistricting plan at issue in this remedial phase of the litigation to the 
Court (hereinafter “County Plan”). Supervisors Edelman and Hahn 
oppose the County Plan as do the United States, the Garza plaintiffs, 
and the Irvin intervenors.

3The County Plan utilizes the Estrada methodology for estimating 
voting age citizenship. Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Au­
thorities in Support of County’s Remedial Redistricting Plan at 15.

4This term refers to a compact and contiguous area containing a 
concentration of the County’s Hispanic population. The Hispanic Core, 

(Footnote continued on next page)



A-199

6. District 2 is the most heavily black district in the County 
Plan. District 2 has a 1990 black population percentage of ap­
proximately 36 percent. Supervisor Hahn resides within District 
2. The cities of Beverly Hills and West Hollywood and part of 
the City of Compton are added to District 2, along with most of 
the Hollywood community. Downtown areas formerly in District
2 are moved under the County Plan to District 3 and West Los 
Angeles is moved to District 4.

7. District 1 remains almost entirely within the San Gabriel 
Valley. Outgoing incumbent Supervisor Schabarum and the two 
candidates scheduled for a November run-off election reside in 
District 1. District 1 retains significant portions of the Hispanic 
Core in the San Gabriel Valley, including the Hispanic-majority 
cities of La Puente and Irwindale, and portions of the Hispanic- 
majority cities of Baldwin Park, El Monte, Montebello, 
Rosemead and Santa Fe Springs.

8. District 5 gives up population to the San Fernando Valley 
finger in District 3, while adding other population from District
3 in the San Fernando Valley. Supervisor Antonovich remains the 
incumbent in District 5.

9. District 4 is relatively unchanged from the existing plan with 
the exception of part of the City of Compton moving to District 
2 and taking in areas of West Los Angeles from District 2. Su­
pervisor Dana remains the incumbent in District 4.

10. The County Plan is based on the Los Angeles County De­
partment of Health Services’ projections of total population for 
1990, by race and ethnicity, pursuant to the Department’s Popu­
which begins in the eastern part of the City of Los Angeles and extends 
eastward into the San Gabriel Valley, includes Boyle Heights, Lincoln 
Heights and El Sereno in the City of Los Angeles, the unincorporated 
East Los Angeles community, and the cities of Rosemead, Pico Rivera, 
Montebello, La Puente, El Monte, Maywood, Vernon, Bell Gardens, 
and other cities and unincorporated communities. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, June 4, 1990 at 17.



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lation Estimation and Projection System (PEPS). The Court finds 
that 1990 PEPS projections are a reliable and acceptable popula­
tion basis for redistricting Los Angeles County.

11. The projected total population of Los Angeles County in 
1990 is 8,880,109 persons. White non-Hispanics comprise 39.8 
percent of the total population; Hispanics 36.6 percent; Blacks 11 
percent; and 12.6 percent Asian or other. Based on the 1990 
PEPS projections, each district in a five-district plan should con­
tain 1,776,022 persons.

12. The projected voting age population Los Angeles County 
in 1990 is 6,503,939 persons. White non-Hispanics comprise 44.1 
percent of the voting age population; Hispanics 32.7 percent; 
Blacks 10.4 percent; and 12.8 percent Asian or other.

13. At the time of the 1990 primary election, Los Angeles 
County had 3,398,512 registered voters, of whom 14 percent were 
Spanish-surnamed and 15.1 percent were of Spanish-origin as 
determined by a procedure presented by Dr. O’Hare during the 
liability phase of this litigation.

14. PEPS data demonstrates that between 1980 and 1990, the 
Hispanic Core of contiguous census tracts in which 50 percent or 
more of the total population was Hispanic increased in number 
from 229 census tracts to 298 census tracts. The Hispanic Core, 
according to the 1990 PEPS data, contains 2,107,807 persons, of 
whom 74.5 percent are Hispanic.

15. In 1990, there are 23 cities in Los Angeles County with 
Hispanic-population majorities, 21 of which are located within 
the Hispanic Core area.

16. In addition to the Hispanic Core area, several smaller con­
centrations of Hispanic population are developing in areas which 
include the San Fernando Valley in and around the City of San 
Fernando and the communities of Pacoima and Sylmar, in and 
around the City of Los Angeles.



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17. The population characteristics of the County Plan are as
follows:

District Total White Black Hispanic Other

1 1,780,555 45.3 3.7 35.6 15.4
2 1,775,224 23.4 35.5 28.4 12,7
3 1,782,630 12.6 3.3 74.1 10.0
4 1,757,996 55.8 7.2 22.5 14.5
5 1,783,704 62.2 5.3 22.2 10.3

Total 8,880,109 39.8 11.0 36.6 12.6

18. Using the estimates of the voting age citizen population 
derived by plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Leobardo Estrada, the County
Plan has the following characteristics:
District Total White Black Hispanic Other

1 1,030,461 58.1 4.0 29.4 8.6
2 1,001,433 34.1 43.2 14.6 8.2
3 659,989 27.9 6.4 58.2 7.5
4 1,104,851 69.5 7.3 14.8 8.4
5 1,111,878 76.2 5.5 13.5 4.9

Total 4,908,612 55.8 13.4 23.4 7.5

19. Using 1990 voter registration, the County Plan has the
following characteristics:

Spanish Spanish
District Total Surname Origin

1 712,918 19.1 20.4
2 672,617 6.9 7.9
3 341,847 47.5 49.6
4 831,916 8.3 9.2
5 839,214 7.1 8.1

Total 3,398,512 14.0 15.1

III. Standard of Review

20. The task of redistricting and reapportioning legislative 
bodies is traditionally a legislative function which federal courts 
should make every effort not to preempt. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 
U.S. 535, 539 (1978). The Court, therefore, upon finding a viola­
tion of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti­



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tution, afforded the Board of Supervisors of the County of Los 
Angeles a reasonable opportunity to meet constitutional require­
ments by adopting a substitute plan.

21. The rationale for deferring to state legislators, as enunci­
ated by the Supreme Court in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 
(1977), is that a state legislature is “by far the best situated to 
identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the 
constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population 
equality.” By contrast, federal courts “possess no distinctive man­
date to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment 
policies in the people’s name.” Id.

22. However, the Supreme Court has made clear that “when 
those with legislative responsibilities do not respond,” Wise, 437 
U.S. at 540, or when a legislature fails “constitutionally to recon­
cile . . . conflicting state and federal goals,” Finch, 431 U.S. at 
415, a federal court is left with the “unwelcome obligation” of 
performing in the legislature’s stead . . . ”

23. Counsel for the County argues that the singular task before 
the Board of Supervisors was to create a majority Hispanic voting 
age citizen district. Having done so, the County maintains that 
the plan must be accepted by the Court in accordance with 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

24. This Court, however, is unable to construe the task at hand 
so simply or to read Gingles so narrowly as to conclude that the 
plan proposed provides a full and complete remedy to the viola­
tions set forth in the Court’s Order of June 4, 1990. The com­
ments in the Senate Report concerning the 1982 amendments to 
the Voting Rights Act adopt:

[t]he basic principle of equity that the remedy fashioned 
must be commensurate with the right that has been violated 
. . . The court should exercise its traditional equitable powers 
to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior



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dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal 
opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect 
candidates of their choice.

S.Rep.No. 97-417, 97th Cong.2d Sess. 28, 31 (“S.Rep.”). See also 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965) (finding that 
district court has not merely the power but the duty to render a 
decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory 
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future).

25. The problems presented to the Court by this case are not 
solved by a uniform formula. “[I]t is neither practicable nor de­
sirable to establish rigid mathematical standards for evaluating 
the constitutional validity of a state legislative apportionment 
scheme under the Equal Protection Clause.” Roman v. Sincock, 
377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). Rather, in determining the appropri­
ateness of a remedial plan, the Court should consider the totality 
of the circumstances. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority 
report accompanying the bill that amended Section 2 of the Vot­
ing Rights Act of 1965 sets forth a flexible, fact-intensive test for 
determining Section 2 violations.

“The question whether the political processes are ‘equally 
open’ depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the 
‘past and present reality’ and on a ‘functional’ view of the 
political process.”

S.Rep. at 30 n.120. Accordingly, in Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 
1398, 1412 (7th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985), the 
Seventh Circuit rejected a remedial plan because the minority 
populations in the wards established to remedy the violation did 
not exceed a mere majority of the voting age population. The 
court found that the district court had failed to consider all of 
the factors present such as low voter registration and turnout and 
concluded that it was appropriate under the circumstances of that 
case for the district court to use a supermajority of total or voting 
age population to define a minority ward. Id. at 1413. The court 
reasoned that “[tjhere is simply no point in providing minorities



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with a ‘remedy’ for the illegal deprivation of their representa­
tional rights in a form which will not in fact provide them with a 
realistic opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.” Id.

IV. The Adoption o f the Proposed Plan
26. The announcement by Supervisor Schabarum that he 

would not run for reelection in March 1990 created an open seat 
in District 1.

27. District 1 contains over 196,000 of the registrants in the 
Hispanic Core, 40 percent more than any other district in the 
County.5

28. The open seat lies in the heart of the Hispanic Core.

29. Incumbent supervisors are significantly advantaged in elec­
tion contests for the Board of Supervisors. Since 1960, only three 
incumbents have been defeated in bids to retain their seats.

30. Supervisor Schabarum characterized the incumbency ad­
vantage as the ability to raise substantially more funds than the 
challenger, to use his position as he sits in it to gain media atten­
tion and therefore name identification.

31. The Court finds enormous differences between running 
against an incumbent and for an open seat. The County should 
have at least considered allowing Hispanic citizens the opportu­
nity to run for election in the open seat that had naturally devel­
oped in their neighborhoods in District 1 without judicial inter­
vention. Instead, as the testimony of Joseph Shumate unequivo­
cally sets forth, Supervisor Dana never instructed Mr. Shumate, 
in devising a remedial plan to explore alternatives, including an 
Hispanic district outside of Supervisor Edelman’s district. There 
was no discussion about exploring the possibility of putting the 
Hispanic district in any other district than District 3.
5The next largest Hispanic registrant district is District 3 with 139,986 
registrants, 40 percent less than District 1.



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32. The Hispanic district contains a finger-like extension to 
Supervisor Edelman’s residence in Westwood. Using 1990 PEPS 
data, the Edelman finger adds 96,613 persons, of whom 33.8 
percent are Hispanic. In terms of 1990 registration, the extension 
adds 30,887 voters, of whom only 7.6 percent are Hispanic. In 
contrast, Supervisor Schabarum’s resides in West Covina which 
is adjacent to the Hispanic Core. The placement of the residence 
of Supervisor Schabarum [sic] in the Hispanic District would 
have enabled each current incumbent to reside in separate dis­
tricts and, effectively, would have created an open seat in the 
Hispanic majority district.

33. While the Court agrees with defendants that a legislative 
body may consider incumbency in fashioning a reapportionment 
plan, incumbency concerns must not be permitted to encroach 
upon configurations designed to recognize and protect minority 
voting strength. Mississippi v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 569, 583 
(D.D.C. 1979), ajffd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980). In Jeffers v. Clinton, 
No. H-C-89-004 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 8, 1990) (three-judge court) 
(1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2507), the court was faced with selecting 
a remedial plan after finding a Voting Rights Act violation. One 
plan was proposed, under court order, by the Arkansas Board of 
Apportionment. The plaintiffs and defendant Governor Clinton 
objected to the Board’s plan on the grounds that it failed to create 
a majority black district without an incumbent in East Arkansas, 
“the center of black population.” The court agreed with plaintiffs 
and Governor Clinton concluding:

All other things being equal, there is nothing wrong with 
a desire to protect incumbents. But in the present case, all 
other things are not equal. The desire to protect incum­
bents . . . cannot prevail if the result is to perpetuate viola­
tions of the equal-opportunity principle contained in the 
Voting Rights Act.

Id. Additionally, the court observed that “[t]he opportunity to 
run for an open seat is worth at least two or three [voting age



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population] percentage points.” Id. In Jeffers there was no proof 
that defendants acted affirmatively to deprive the minority plain­
tiffs of an open seat that had occurred naturally in their jurisdic­
tion. It was, rather, the failure to create such a district to which 
the court objected.

1. The June 5, 1990 Primary

34. In District 1, ten candidates vied for the open seat, three of 
whom were Hispanic and two of whom were black.

35. No candidate received a majority of the votes cast in the 
primary election in District 1. Sarah Flores, an Hispanic, received 
35 percent or [sic] the vote. Judge Gregory O’Brien, an Anglo, 
received 22 percent of the vote. Ms. Flores and Judge O’Brien are 
scheduled to compete in a general election in November 1990.

36. Unique circumstances affected the outcome of the June 5, 
1990 primary election for Supervisor District 1.

37. In February 1990, Supervisor Schabarum informed Judge 
O’Brien that he did not plan to seek reelection, encouraged him 
to run for the position and requested that Judge O’Brien keep the 
matter of the open seat to himself. The Court finds that the effort 
by Supervisor Schabarum to withhold disclosure of his decision 
not to run from the public and from his colleagues was, in part, 
an effort to ensure that Hispanic Congressman Esteban Torres 
would not become a candidate for Supervisor in District 1.

38. None of Supervisor Schabarum’s fellow Board members 
learned of his decision not to run until after the filing deadline 
had passed. At that point, Congressman Torres had already filed 
for reelection to Congress.

39. The filing deadline for declarations of candidacy was ex­
tended for five days until March 14, 1990 pursuant to Section 
23521.5 of the California Election Code.



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40. Sarah Flores and Judge O’Brien filed their declarations of 
candidacy during the extension period.

41. Sarah Flores, an assistant chief deputy to Supervisor 
Schabarum, learned on March 10, 1990 that Supervisor 
Schabarum had failed to file for reelection by the March 9, 1990 
deadline.

42. Having never run for or been elected to any public office, 
Sarah Flores decided to run for Supervisor in District 1 on Sun­
day, March 11, 1990.

43. According to the testimony of Supervisor Antonovich, he 
endorsed Sarah Flores in a public gathering on the evening of the 
filing deadline March 9, 1990 without her knowledge. Supervisor 
Schabarum did not endorse Ms. Flores.

44. The Court finds the testimony of Judge O’Brien regarding 
the statements of Supervisors Dana and Antonovich as to their 
reasons for endorsing Sarah Flores credible. According to Judge 
O’Brien’s testimony, these two supervisors decided to endorse the 
candidacy of Ms. Flores in the belief that their support of an 
Hispanic candidate would favorably influence the outcome of this 
pending lawsuit. Specifically, Judge O’Brien testified that Super­
visors Dana and Antonovich stated in separate conversations 
with him that the judge could be influenced by political manipu­
lation and that if the two Supervisors backed a successful His­
panic candidate, the judge would be persuaded to dismiss the 
lawsuit.

45. Supervisors Dana and Antonovich denied making those 
statements to Judge O’Brien.

46. Supervisor Antonovich testified that he had known Sarah 
Flores since high school; had encouraged hundreds of individuals 
to run for elective office; and had never approached Ms. Flores 
to run for any office until after the trial of this case was underway.



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47. Supervisors Antonovich and Dana co-sponsored a fund­
raising dinner at the Biltmore Hotel for Ms. Flores. Proceeds 
from the function totalled $250,000, more than 60 percent of the 
$400,000 Ms. Flores raised and spent on her primary campaign.

48. Judge O’Brien, endorsed by Supervisor Schabarum, also 
raised and spent approximately $400,000 in the primary cam­
paign.

49. Sarah Flores and Judge O’Brien spent more on their cam­
paigns than any of the other eight candidates.

50. In Gingles, 478 U.S. at 75, the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of the legal significance of some minority candidates’ 
success. The Court stated that while Section 2(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act provides that “[t]he extent to which members of a 
protected class have been elected to office . . .  is one circumstance 
which may be considered,” the Senate Report had expressly 
stated that the election of a few minority candidates did not nec­
essarily foreclose the dilution of the black vote. The Committee 
noted that if it did, the possibility would exist “that the majority 
citizens might evade [§2] by manipulating the election of a ‘safe’ 
minority candidate.” Id. citing S. Rep. at 29. The Senate Com­
mittee decided to require an “independent consideration of the 
record.” Id. According to Gingles:

[T]he court could properly notice the fact that black elec­
toral success increased markedly in the 1982 election—an 
election that occurred after the instant lawsuit had been filed 
—and could properly consider to what extent the pendency 
of this very litigation [might have] worked a one-time advan­
tage for black candidates in the form of unusual organized 
political support by white leaders concerned to forestall sin­
gle member districting.

Id. at 76 quoting Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345, 367 n.27 
(E.D.N.C. 1984).



A-209

51. In District 3 in the June, 1990 primary, Mr. Edelman re­
ceived 75 percent of the total vote. Mr. Edelman raised $1 mil­
lion. Gonzalo Molina raised $11,000 and received 25 percent of 
the vote. Mr. Molina had ran for supervisor in District 3 on three 
prior occasions.

2. The Legislative Process

52. Federal courts are instructed to defer to legislative plans of 
apportionment, in part, because the political process of legislative 
redistricting typically involves the sort of give-and-take between 
citizens and their elected officials that federal courts are unable 
to achieve. Cook v. Luckett. 735 F.2d 913, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1984).

53. In this case, the plan approved by three members of the 
Board of Supervisors was prepared by a San Francisco political 
consultant, Joseph Shumate. Mr. Shumate never met with Super­
visor Hahn or Supervisor Edelman, and his services, paid for with 
County funds, were never made available to either Hahn or 
Edelman.

54. Following the Court’s ruling on June 4, 1990, a meeting 
was held in Supervisor Dana’s office to discuss the preparation of 
a remedial plan. Present at this meeting were: Supervisor Dana; 
Don Knabe, Chief Deputy to Supervisor Dana; Ron Smith, for­
mer deputy to Supervisor Dana and the manager of Sarah Flores’ 
campaign; Gaye Williams, a deputy to Supervisor Dana; Tom 
Silver, Chief Deputy to Supervisor Antonovich; Allen 
Hoffenblum, a political consultant and advisor to Supervisor 
Antonovich; and Joseph Shumate, a political consultant and for­
mer partner of Ron Smith.

55. No representative of Supervisors Hahn, Edelman or 
Schabarum were present at the meeting.

56. Mr. Shumate was instructed to proceed to develop a plan 
on the basis of a five-district plan previously drafted by Michael



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Myers. The Myers Plan had fingers to Supervisor Edelman’s resi­
dence and to the San Fernando Valley. District 2 had been con­
figured to include Beverly Hills and West Hollywood. The Myers 
Plan can be traced back at least to February 1990.

57. The Court finds that there was no legislative “give-and- 
take” between the members of the Board of Supervisors yielding 
a plan that represented the Board’s collective legislative judgment 
and preference for its supervisorial boundaries.

58. No public hearings were held.

59. Supervisor Dana testified that there was no time to allow 
for public comment. Nor was there “any obligation” to make any 
of it public.

60. The Court finds that Supervisors Antonovich and Dana did 
not seriously consider any alternative plans which differed in any 
major respect from the configuration for District 2 and 3 devel­
oped by Michael Myers and modified by Joseph Shumate. Super­
visor Antonovich testified that he could not recall reviewing any 
plans during the period of June 4 through June 27 that did not 
include the San Fernando finger.

61. The testimony of Supervisor Antonovich that he had al­
ways instructed his staff that he would like to retain San Fer­
nando and Pacoima in his district rather than transfer them to 
District 3 is inconsistent with Mr. Shumate’s testimony that he 
was never asked by Supervisor Antonovich or any of his aides to 
determine if it was possible to retain the Hispanic areas in the San 
Fernando Valley in District 5 as an alternative to their transfer 
to District 3.

62. Mr. Shumate did not recall ever being provided with any 
of the alternative plans prepared by plaintiffs’ experts.

63. The Court finds that the San Fernando finger-like extension 
was unnecessary and deleterious. Such an extension, designed to



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incorporate majority Hispanic census tracts in the San Fernando 
Valley away from the Hispanic Core, resulted in the: (1) fragmen­
tation of the majority Hispanic and growing Hispanic communi­
ties in the San Fernando Valley and (2) inclusion of non-majority 
Hispanic areas to form a connection with the Hispanic Core part 
of the district.

64. At trial, plaintiffs’ experts provided extensive testimony 
regarding the Hispanic Core area of Los Angeles County. Plain­
tiffs’ experts established that the Hispanic population in Los An­
geles County is expanding primarily in a southeastward direction 
from the Hispanic Core into the San Gabriel Valley.

65. Several illustrative plans were submitted by plaintiffs dur­
ing the liability phase as alternatives to the current configuration 
of supervisorial districts.

66. All of these plans developed, or attempted to develop, an 
Hispanic majority district by including the Hispanic Core. Fur­
ther, the Hispanic majority district in all of the illustrative plans 
extended eastward to areas with increasing Hispanic populations 
in the San Gabriel Valley.

67. At the liability phase, the Court found that the Board of 
Supervisors’ repeated expansion of District 3 northwest into the 
San Fernando Valley, instead of southeastward into the San Ga­
briel Valley, indicated its unwillingness to consider the pattern of 
growth of the Hispanic population in Los Angeles County.

3. Split Cities

68. The plan proposed by the Board splits numerous cities in 
the County. The Court heard a great deal of testimony to the 
effect that city splits are disfavored and administratively unsound. 
Neither the 1971 nor the 1981 redistricting plan split any cities 
other than the City of Los Angeles.



A-212

69. In the County Plan, 10 cities are split; 5 are majority His­
panic in population, all 5 are located in or adjacent to the His­
panic Core.

70. In political campaigns, the ability to make use of endorse­
ments and other assistance from local elected officials as well as 
from community organizations located within the cities helps to 
minimize total campaign expenditures. This type of grassroots 
campaigning particularly affects candidates with limited financial 
resources.

71. Supervisor Schabarum testified that splitting cities divides 
representation, plays havoc with communities of interest and is 
generally not a good option.

72. The City of Compton has a population of approximately 
103,000 persons and is heavily black. In the Meyers Plan drafted 
in February 1990, Compton was placed in District 2. That place­
ment was consistent with the expressed desire of black commu­
nity leaders in Compton in 1981. In the plan drawn by Mr. 
Shumate after June 4, 1990, Compton was wholly in District 2. 
Mr. Shumate was later instructed by Don Knabe, an aide to 
Supervisor Dana, to split Compton.

73. Supervisor Dana testified that if there were more time to 
develop a plan, Compton probably would not be split.

74. The Court finds that whatever time pressures defendants 
claim to have been under, the splitting of Compton and its related 
effect on a decline of black citizen voting age population in Dis­
trict 2 are not due to time constraints.

4. Inclusion o f Beverly Hills and West Hollywood in District 2
75. The black population in the existing District 2 constitutes 

a community of interest.

76. District 2 under the 1981 plan required little or no change 
in its boundaries in order to achieve population equality.



A-213

77. The County Plan moves approximately 330,000 persons 
from District 3 into District 2 from areas including West Holly­
wood and Beverly Hills.

78. The Court has taken judicial notice of the socio-economic 
status of Beverly Hills. Beverly Hills is one of the wealthiest 
communities in the County and in the country. The population 
of Beverly Hills is less than 3 percent black.

79. Maxine Waters, Assemblywoman for the 48th Assembly 
District, testified that Watts is so absolutely different from Bev­
erly Hills economically and socially, that it is hard to conceive of 
anyone wanting to construct a plan that includes the two in the 
same district, and hope for representation from someone who 
could serve both of those communities very well.

80. The County Plan reduces the black citizen voting age pop­
ulation in District 2, the district with the highest black popula­
tion. Under current lines, Dr. Estrada estimated the black citizen 
voting age population of District 2 to be 46.7 percent. The County 
Plan would reduce it to 43.18 percent, a decline of 3.52 percent. 
Dr. Grofman testified that this change would constitute a reduc­
tion in realistic terms, i. e. as a percentage of black citizen voting 
age population rather than as a proportion of total population.

81. An Hispanic district could have been drawn without de­
creasing the black citizen voting age population in District 2.

82. The inclusion of Beverly Hills, West Hollywood and the 
5th Councilmanic District will make it more difficult for the Af­
rican American community to elect a representative of choice. 
While the addition of these areas will not numerically overwhelm 
the proposed District 2, those communities could have an over­
whelming influence on the course of supervisorial elections.



A-214

83. Black voters in Los Angeles County are politically cohesive 
in their support of black candidates and are more likely to vote 
for a black candidate than a candidate of another group.

84. The collective testimony of defendant supervisors An­
tonovich, Dana and Schabarum, their chief deputies, and several 
of defendants’ witnesses, clearly established that defendants, in 
devising their redistricting plan, gave no consideration to the 
critical issue of safeguarding the electoral franchise of African 
Americans by protecting the black citizen voting age population.

V. Conclusion

The remedial plan proposed by the Board of Supervisors of the 
County of Los Angeles is not commensurate with the character 
of the liability established at trial. The placement of an incumbent 
with a substantial war chest in the newly created Hispanic district 
without considering placement in an open seat in the heart of the 
Hispanic Core, coupled with the splitting of the San Gabriel Val­
ley and the incorporation of the San Fernando finger, operate to 
impede the ability of the County’s Hispanic voters to elect a 
candidate of choice. Further, the Court finds that the plan prof­
fered by the Board unnecessarily reduces the voting strength of 
the African American voting population in the County and fur­
ther diminishes its influence by placing in District 2 a community 
which has strikingly dissimilar interests.

The Court finds that the adoption of this plan was not a good 
faith attempt by concerned legislators to comply with this Court’s 
June 4, 1990 Order and that the remedy fashioned by the County 
neither completely rectifies the prior dilution of minority voting 
strength nor fully provides an equal opportunity for Hispanic 
citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice to 
the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County.



A-215

For these reasons, the Court, in the interest of justice, Hereby 
Rejects the County’s plan for its failure to provide a full and 
complete remedy under the Voting Rights Act.

It Is So Ordered.

DATED: August 3, 1990

David V. Kenyon
United States District Judge



A-216

FILED 
AUG 3 1990
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YOLANDA GARZA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

vs.
CV 88-5143 KN (Ex)

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants.

CV 88-5435 KN (Ex) 

ORDER

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors.

The Court HEREBY REQUESTS that plaintiffs prepare and 
lodge a proposed order which includes the following:

1. The acceptance by this Court and proposed findings re 
Garza Plan I including a waiver of the requirement of resi­
dence for all persons living within District 1 and District 5 
who seek election in District 1 and the minor revisions re­
quired to include all parts of particular cities.

2. The decision to hold a special election on November 6, 
1990 and the reasons therefore as well as a proposed sched­
ule for the conduct of such elections.



A-217

3. The injunctive and declaratory relief requested with 
respect to the run-off election in District 1 currently sched­
uled for November 6, 1990.

It Is So Ordered.

DATED: August 3, 1990

David V. Kenyon
United States District Judge



A-218

U N IT E D  STATES DISTRIC T CO URT  
CENTRAL DISTRIC T O F C A LIFO RN IA

YOLANDA GARZA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendant.

No. CV 88-5143 KN 
(Ex)

No. CV 88-5435 KN 
(Ex)

AMENDED ORDER

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors.

The Court HEREBY AMENDS the Order issued August 3, 
1990 as follows:

L The acceptance by this Court and proposed findings 
re Garza Plan I including a waiver of the requirement of 
residence for all persons living within the present District 1 
who wish to seek election in the new District 1 but do not 
reside in the new District 1, and the minor revisions required 
to include all parts of particular cities.

It Is So Ordered.

DATED: August 3, 1990

David V. Kenyon 
United States District Judge



A-219

U N IT E D  STATES DISTRIC T COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRIC T O F CA LIFO RN IA

CIVIL M IN U T E S— G ENERAL

Date August 6, 1990
Case No. CV 88-5143; CV 88-5435KN

Title Yolanda Garza, et al., etc. v. County of Los Angeles, et 
al.

DOCKET ENTRY

PRESENT:

HON. DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE

Lenora Wallace None
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
None

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
None

PROCEEDINGS:

IN CHAMBERS:

The Court has received and considered defendants’ Motion for 
a Stay of the Injunction Pending Appeal filed August 3, 1990. The 
Court HEREBY DENIES defendants’ motion.

It Is So Ordered.

Initials of Deputy Clerk LW
Minutes Form 11 
Civil-Gen



A-220

U N IT E D  STATES COURT O F A PPEA LS  
FO R TH E N IN T H  CIRCUIT

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plain tiffs—Appellees,

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., 
Defendants—Appellants.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff—Appellee,
and

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al,
Intervenors—Appellees
v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al, 
Defendants—Appellants.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al, 
Petitioners

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE CENTRAL 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, 

Respondent,
and

FILED 

AUG 9, 1990

CATHY A, CATTERSON, 
CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 90-55944

D C # CV 88-05143 Kn 
Central California

No. 90-55945

D C # CV-88-05435 KN 
Central California

No. 90-71288

D C # CV-88-05143-Kn 
D C # CV-88-05435-KN 
Central California

ORDER

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Real Parties in Interest.

Before: NELSON, BEEZER and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges

The County of Los Angeles and the other appellants in appeals 
nos. 90-55944 and 90-55945 (collectively “the County”) have 
filed a “motion or petition” to stay in docket no. 90-70288. Be­



A-221

cause of the pending appeals, the County may not obtain relief 
by mandamus. Accordingly, the stay motion and all subsequent 
filings in this matter have been transferred to the appeals dockets. 
No further filings shall be accepted in no. 90-70288.

The Garza plaintilfs/appellees have filed a motion to have the 
stay application considered by another panel. This motion is de­
nied.

The Clerk shall schedule oral argument on the application for 
a stay pending appeal for the morning of August 16, 1990, in San 
Francisco. The parties shall be notified by telephone of the exact 
place and time of the argument. The district court’s order of 
August 6, 1990, is stayed pending disposition of the stay applica­
tion. Unless extended by this panel, the stay shall expire on Au­
gust 17, 1990.

Regardless of this panel’s decision on the application for a stay, 
these appeals will be considered on an expedited basis and con­
solidated for purposes of briefing and argument. The requirement 
that the appellants file a civil appeals docketing statement is 
waived and the appeals are released from the pre-briefing confer­
ence program. Appellants shall secure the filing of the certificate 
of record as soon as possible.

Appellants’ opening brief is due August 31, 1990. Appellees’ 
briefs are due September 14, 1990. Appellants’ optional reply 
brief, if any, is due September 21, 1990. Principal briefs by the 
parties shall not exceed 75 pages and the reply brief shall not 
exceed 40 pages; amicus briefs shall not exceed 25 pages. Motions 
for additional pages are strongly discouraged and shall be granted 
only for the most compelling reasons. All briefs shall be served 
by hand or by overnight delivery service. No extensions of time 
shall be given. Any party who has participated as amicus before 
the district court or this court may file an amicus brief in these 
appeals; any motion to file an amicus brief by additional parties



A-222

shall be referred to the panel that considers these appeals on the 
merits. Amicus briefs are due at the same time as the principal 
brief of the party the amicus is supporting.

The Clerk shall calendar these appeals for argument before a 
regularly scheduled merits panel sitting in Pasadena during the 
week of October 1, 1990.



A-223

DECLARATION OF DR. WILLIAM A. V CLARK
I, William A.V. Clark, hereby declare as follows:
1. I have personal, first hand knowledge of the facts stated in 

this declaration and, if called to testify, could and would testify 
thereto.

2. I am Chairman of the Geography Department at UCLA, I 
am a professional demographer, and was an expert witness in the 
trial proceedings in this case.

3. Attached as Exhibit “A” hereto is a list of the 46 cities in 
Los Angeles County filing challenges with the Census Bureau to 
the 1990 preliminary Census count. I have designated each of 
these cities with the number of the supervisorial district in which 
they have been placed in the Garza remedial plan adopted by the 
district court.

4. I have reviewed the County’s submittal to the Census Bu­
reau. The block level changes requested all would result in in­
creasing the number of people in the blocks in question, never for 
the purpose of decreasing the number. That means the County’s 
submittal to the Census Bureau will not change the fact that 
PEPS greatly underestimated the population in District 5.

5. I have also reviewed all challenges filed with the Census 
Bureau of the preliminary census counts for Districts 1 and 5. 
These challenges were filed by 14 cities in District 5, by 5 cities 
in District 1, by the City of Los Angeles, parts of which are in 
both Districts 1 and 5 and by the County of Los Angeles. I then 
modified the population numbers reported in my previous decla­
ration to incorporate these challenges to the Census Bureau pre­
liminary lists of housing units and population in group quarters. 
Assuming all challenges are validated and using the persons per 
dwelling factor previously calculated, I find that the population 
numbers for Districts 1 and 5 (the most divergent districts based 
on he 1990 PEPS projected populations) are similar to those pre­
viously reported. The revised population estimate for District 1 
is 1,497,951 persons which is —16.8 percent different form the 
1990 PEPS reported number. The revised population estimate for



A-224

District 5 is 2,059,293 persons which is 15.4 percent different 
form the PEPS reported number. There is a 561,342 person dif­
ference between Districts 1 and 5.

Initial Population 
from Preliminary 

District Counts
Est. of Population Modified
From Challenges Population

1 1,456,565 41,386 1,497,951
5 2,031,998 27,295 2,059,293

6. There was a question as to how I derived population per 
housing unit for unincorporated areas of the County. The mathe­
matical calculation utilized city population data where available 
and for tracts in unincorporated areas and the portion of Los 
Angeles city in each district the count of housing unites was 
multiplied by a population per housing unit factor. Population 
data for tracts in Los Angeles city (which may be in any of the 
districts) and for county unincorporated tracts were estimated by 
taking the number of housing units in that tract subtracting va­
cant units and multiplying by a population per housing unit fac­
tor and adding the population in group quarters. The factors were 
developed by calculating the persons per unit for the cities in the 
county (city population less population in group quarters and 
then divided by the number of units to estimate a persons per unit 
factor). The nearest city with the highest person per unit was used 
to estimate unincorporated tract populations. Tracts in Los An­
geles City in the San Fernando Valley were assigned the Los 
Angeles City rate of 2.59, the tracts in Los Angeles city in the 
Santa Monica Mountains were assigned the Beverly Hills rate, 
the portions of District 2 which are adjacent to district 1 and Los 
Angeles City in District 1 were assigned the higher Montebello 
rate of 3.06. Tracts in Los Angeles city adjacent to Inglewood 
were assigned the Inglewood.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the united 
States of America and the State of California that the above is 
true and correct.

Executed on October 3, 1990 at Los Angeles, California.

Dr. William A.V. Clark



A-225

EXHIBIT “1”
(TO CLARK DECLARATION)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY GOVERNMENTS 
CHALLENGING THE PRELIMINARY CENSUS COUNT

County of Los Angeles

3 Agoura Hills City 1 Maywood
5 Azusa city 5 Monrovia
1 Bell 1 Monterey Park
1 Bell Gardens 5 Palmdale
5 Bradbury City 4 Palos Verdes Estates
2 Carson 5 Pomona
4 Cerritos 5 Pasadena
5 Claremont 1 Pico-Rivera
2 Compton 4 Rancho Palos Verdes
5 Covina 4 Redondo Beach
2 Culver City 4 Rolling Hills
4 El Segundo 5 San Dimas
2 Gardena 3 San Fernando
5 Glendale 5 San Gabriel
4 Hermosa Beach 5 Santa Clarita
1 Huntington Park 3 Santa Moncia
2 Inglewood 5 Sierra Madre
5 Canada/Flintridge 5 Temple City
4 Lakewood 4 Torrance
4 La Mirada 3 West Hollywood
4 Long Beach 3 Westlake Village

4 Whittier
All Los Angeles 

2 Lynwood



A-226

FILED
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

JUN 7 1990
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DeWitt W. Clinton, Esq.
COUNTY COUNSEL OF LOS ANGELES 
Mary Wawro
SENIOR ASSISTANT COUNTY COUNSEL
648 Hall of Administration
500 W. Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 974-1811
John E. McDermott, Esq.
Richard K. Simon, Esq.
McDe r m o t t , w il l  & e m e r y
2029 Century Park East,
Suite 3800
Los Angeles, California 90067-2917 
Attorneys for Defendants

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. CV 88-5143 Kn (Ex)

No. CY 88-5435 KN (Ex)
DEFENDANTS’ SECOND 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL 
NOTICE

Date: June 7, 1990 
Time: 3:15 p.m.
Place: The Honorable David

V. Kenyon 
Courtroom 3 
312 N. Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA 
90012

Pursuant to the provisions of Federal Rule of Evidence 201, the 
defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the fol­
lowing facts:

YOLANDA GARZA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
vs.

COUNTY OF LOS 
ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al, 
Plaintiffs-Intervenors



A-227

1. In the June 5, 1990 primary election involving the Dis­
trict 1 seat on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 
Sarah Flores received the highest total votes of any of the 
ten candidates in the election. Ms. Flores received 68,266 
votes or 34.69% of the votes cast. Gregory O’Brien received 
the second highest vote total in this election; 39,534 votes or 
20.09% of the total votes cast. In support of the request for 
notice of these facts, the defendants submit the County of 
Los Angeles Registrar-Recorder’s “Semi-Official Election 
Returns June 5, 1990 Primary Election,” a true and correct 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit A hereto.

DeWitt W. Clinton, Esq.
County Counsel of Los Angeles
Mary Wawro
Senior Assistant County
Counsel

McDe r m o t t , w il l  &
EMERY
John E. McDermott, Esq.
Richard K. Simon, Esq.
Lee L. Blackman, Esq.

DATED: June 6, 1990

By
John E. McDermott 

Attorneys for defendants



A-228

Exhibit A

[Relevant Page Only]



SEMI-OFFICIAL ELECTION RETURNS—JUNE 5, 1990 PRIMARY ELECTION
Treasurer AI

Paul Neeuwenberg 2,274 100.00
Treasurer PF

Janet D Lewis 398 28.71
Elizabeth A Makano 595 42.92
Lewis J Shireman 393 28.35

Attorney General DEM
Ira Reiner 354,309 57.71
Arlo Smith 259,594 42.28

Attorney General REP
Daniel E Lungren 332,675 100.00

Attorney General LIB
Paul N Gautreau 2,154 100.00

Attorney General PF
Robert J Evans 1,179 100.00

Insurance Commissioner DEM
Michael Blanco 17,045 2.80
Ray Bourhis 18,225 3.00
Conway Collis 109,758 18.09
John Garamendi 157,801 26.01
Larry Murphy 14,261 2.35
Bill Press 257,793 42.49
Walter A Zelman 31,730 5.23

Insurance Commissioner REP
Wes Bannister 88,978 26.08
Joseph D Dunlop 23,226 6.80
John L. Hardin 61,740 18.09
John S Parise 95,650 28.03
Thomas A Skornia 71,567 20.97

Insurance Commissioner LIB
Ted Brown 2,154 100.00

Insurance Commissioner PF
Tom Condit 720 55.08
B Kwaku Duren 587 44.91

Superintendent of Public Instruction
Bill Honig 533,706 54.61
Mark Isler 109,092 11.16
Carol S Koppel 154,205 15.77
Samuel Rodriguez 180,264 18.44

Member State Board of Equalization DEM
2nd District
Tom Baldwin 10,814 8.24

Joseph G Colman 18,746 14.28
Louis John Papan 10,418 7.93
Emil G Poliak 8,125 6.19
Brad Sherman 76,734 58.47
Edward Tabash 6,395 4.87

Member State Board of Equalization 
2nd District

REP

Bill Duplissea 36,405 36.99
Claude W Parrish 62,008 63.00

Member State Board of Equalization 
2nd District

AI

N W Kudrovzeff 657 100.00
Member State Board of Equalization 

2nd District
LIB

Lyn Sapowsky-Smith 696 100.00
Member State Board of Equalization 

2nd District
PF

Nancy Lawrence 291 100.00
****PCTS 1667 RPTG 1,667

Member State Board of Equalization 
4th District

DEM

Paul Carpenter 166,183 44.90
Fred W Chel 22,539 6.09
Charles Davis 67,455 18.22
Gary Gillan 38,974 10.53
Warren Harwood 28,508 7.70
Tim Mock 46,436 12.54

Member State Board of Equalization 
4th District

REP

Joe H Adams Jr 231,880 100.00
Member State Board of Equalization 

4th District
PF

Salomea Honigsfeld 747 100.00
****PCTS 1667 RPTG 

Assessor
1,667

Monica Anderson 37,590 3.92
John Carl Brogdon 58,128 6.06
Jay Curtis 158,804 16.57
Sid Delgado 67,531 7.04
Joe Gardner 81,846 8.54
Kenneth P Hahn 270,432 28.23
John J Lynch 283,652 29.60

Sheriff
Roland C Biscailuz 218,044 23.60
Sherman Block 620,114 67.12
Joseph G Senteno 85,694 9.27
jpervisor 1st District
Robert Harriett 23,039 11.70
Joe Cravez 4,983 2.53
Louis A Chitty III 4,959 2.52
Sarah M Flores 68,266 34.69
Jim Lloyd 19,170 9.74
Jim Mihalka 5,602 2.84
Gary V Hiller 11,951 6.07
W Charles Moore 2,866 1.45
Gregory O’Brien 39,534 20.09
Nell Soto 16,408 8.33
****PCTS 1249 RPTG 1,249

jpervisor 3rd District
Edmund D Edelman 113,233 74.78
Gonzalo Molina 38,178 25.21
****PCTS 1046 RPTG 1,046

County Measure—A 
Advisory—Rail Transit Alternative 

Through San Fernando Valley
1-Monorail 102,810 47.65
2-Metro Rail 22,044 10.21
3-Light Rail 45,599 21.13
4-No Rail 45,289 20.99
****PCTS 1283 RPTG 1,283

State Measure—107
1990 Housing and Homeless Bond Act

Yes 644,718 59.84
No 432,584 40.15

State Measure—108 
Governor’s Review of Legislation 

Yes 579,808 56.74
No 442,022 43.25

State Measure—109 
Governor’s Review of Legislation 

Yes 579,808 56.74
No 442,022 43.25

State Measure—110 
Property Tax Exemption For Severely 

Disabled Persons 
Yes 885,785 82.80
No 184,000 17.19

A
-229



A-230

FILED 
OCT 31 1989

CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

U N IT E D  STATES DISTRIC T COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRIC T O F CA LIFO RN IA

CV 88-5143 KN (Ex)

CV 88-5435 KN (Ex)

ORDER Re (1) Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
on Common Section 2 
Claims; (2) Motion for 
Summary Judgment on 
Garza Plaintiffs’ Second, 
Third and Fourth Claims 
for Relief; (3) Motion to 
Dismiss on the Grounds 
of Mootness and Laches;
(4) Motion to Strike; and
(5) Motion to Continue 
Trial and Reopen 
Discovery

The Court, having received and considered defendants’ mo­
tions and the papers filed in support thereof and in opposition 
thereto and having heard oral argument on these motions on 
October 26, 1989, HEREBY GRANTS defendants’ motion to 
reopen discovery and HEREBY DENIES the other motions.

Procedural Background

These related actions challenge section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). In Yolanda Garza, et

YOLANDA GARZA, et al., 
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al,
Plaintiff-Intervenors.



A-231

al. v. County o f Los Angeles, et al., CV 88-5143, the plaintiffs 
(hereinafter referred to as the “Garza plaintiffs”) seek a declara­
tory judgment that the 1981 supervisorial redistricting plan for 
the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors violates the Act as 
well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. The Garza plaintiffs also seek a permanent 
injunction enjoining the further use of this election system. Plain­
tiffs bring this class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(2) on their own behalf and on behalf of all His­
panic citizens whose right to vote has been or will be abridged by 
the adoption and maintenance of the 1981 supervisorial redistrict­
ing plan used for the elections of the Los Angeles County Board 
of Supervisors. Plaintiffs, Yolanda Garza, Salvador Ledezma, 
Raymond Palacios, and Guadalupe de la Garza are registered 
voters in Los Angeles County and are residents of supervisorial 
districts one through four respectively.

Defendants are the County of Los Angeles (hereinafter referred 
to as “the County”); the Board of Supervisors of the County; 
Deane Dana, Board Chairman; Peter Schabarum, Kenneth 
Hahn, Edmund Edelman and Michael Antonovich, elected mem­
bers of the Board of Supervisors. Each supervisor is sued in his 
official capacity. Additional defendants in this action are Richard 
Dixon, County Administrative Officer and Frank Zolin, County 
Clerk/Executive Officer.

The Garza plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that according to the 
1980 census, the population of defendant County was 7,477,503. 
Of this population 27.6% were Hispanic (2,066,103); 12.6% were 
Black (943,968); and 5.8% were Asian or Pacific Islanders 
(434,850). The census also revealed that the Hispanic population 
in the County is “concentrated in geographically identifiable 
areas” and that the Hispanic population is large enough to form 
a “majority Hispanic district.” Garza Complaint, 14, 15.

The Garza complaint further states that there has been a his­
tory of official discrimination in State of California and in Los



A-232

Angeles County that has denied the Hispanic community equal 
access to the political process. The redistricting plan adopted by 
the Board of Supervisors in 1981 allegedly fragmented the voting 
strength of the Hispanic community and affected Hispanic voters 
residing in these districts. In adopting this plan, plaintiffs main­
tain the County was aware of the low voter registration and elec­
tion participation rates of the Hispanic community and knew that 
the plan would fragment the community and result in unequal 
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. Garza Complaint, 20.

The complaint alleges that the redistricting plan had a discrim­
inatory effect on the voting strength of plaintiffs and the Hispanic 
community as a whole; that the plan was adopted for a discrimi­
natory purpose; that the Hispanic community is politically cohe­
sive; and that the 1981 redistricting plan constitutes a voting 
standard practice or procedure under 42 U.S.C. Section 1973. 
Garza Complaint [sic] 28-31.

In United States v. County o f Los Angeles, et al., CV 88-5435, 
the Attorney General on behalf of the United States brings a 
related action against the same defendants as the Garza action 
with the addition of Charles Weissburd, Registrar-Recorder of 
Los Angeles County. As with the other named defendants, Mr. 
Weissburd is sued in his official capacity. The claim of the United 
States (“U.S.”), based on alleged factual circumstances summa­
rized below, is that the governance and election plan for the 
Board of Supervisors results in the denial and abridgement of the 
right to vote in violation of Section 2 of the Act, as amended. U.S. 
Complaint 17. The complaint further states that it is within the 
Board’s power to remedy the fragmentation of Hispanic voting 
strength occasioned by the 1981 redistricting even without voter 
approval and that the Board has failed to take the action neces­
sary to allow Hispanic citizens a fair opportunity for equal politi­
cal participation. U.S. Complaint 18.



A-233

On March 21, 1989, the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People (“NAACP”) filed a complaint in inter­
vention on behalf of the following plaintiff-intervenors: Lawrence 
Irvin, Rev. James Lawson, Jr., John T. McDonald, Jr. and Er­
nestine Peters, all black citizens and registered voters in Los An­
geles County; the Los Angeles Branch of the NAACP; the South­
ern Christian Leadership Conference; and the Los Angeles Urban 
League. This class of plaintiffs are intervening on behalf of all 
black citizens in Los Angeles County whose right to vote has been 
or may be denied by the electoral system now in place. NAACP 
Complaint in Intervention, 19.

Factual Background

The County of Los Angeles is governed by a five member 
Board of Supervisors. Each Board member serves a four-year 
term. Staggered elections for the Board of Supervisors are held 
every two years. Districts 1 and 3 will be the subject of elections 
in 1990 while Districts 2, 4 and 5 will elect their supervisors in
1992. The five members of the Board are elected from single­
member districts. Each supervisor represents approximately 1.5 
million persons, a figure, as the U.S. Complaint points out, three 
times the number of persons represented by a member of the 
United States House of Representatives. U.S. Complaint 8.

During the period from 1970 to 1980, the County increased the 
number and percentage of Hispanic residents. The 1970 Census 
indicated that the population of Los Angeles County was 
7,032,075 of whom 18% (1,289,311) were Hispanic. By the 1980 
Census, the population had grown to 7,477,503 of whom 27.6% 
were Hispanic (2,066,103).

Under state law, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors 
is required before the first election following a decennial federal 
census, to revise its supervisorial election district boundaries to 
the extent necessary to ensure population equality among the



A-234

districts “using population . . .  as a basis.” Cal.Elec.Code § 35000 
(West 1989). In addition, the Board may “[a]t any time between 
the decennial adjustments of district boundaries . . . adjust the 
boundaries of the supervisorial districts . . .  on the basis of popu­
lation estimates.” Cal.Elec. Code § 35003 (West 1989) (emphasis 
added). State law also identifies permissible redistricting criteria:

In establishing the boundaries of the districts, the board may 
give consideration to the following factors: (a) topography, 
(b) geography, (c) cohesiveness, continuity, integrity, and 
compactness of territory, and (d) community of interests of 
the districts.

Cal.Elec.Code § 35000 (West 1989)
The Los Angeles County Charter provides that: The Board 
of Supervisors may, by a two-thirds’ vote of its members, 
change the boundaries of any supervisorial district. No such 
boundaries shall ever be so changed as to affect the incum­
bency in office o f any supervisor. Any change in the bounda­
ries of any supervisorial district must be made within one 
year after a general election.

Charter of the County of Los Angeles, Art. II, Sec. 7 (1985) 
(emphasis added).

I. Motion for Summary Judgment on Common Section 2 Claims

Defendants move this Court for an order granting summary 
judgment on the grounds that both the Garza plaintiffs and the 
United States cannot prove that in 1981 Hispanics could have 
formed a majority of the voting age citizens in any district of a 
five district system containing districts with equivalent popula­
tion. Defendants argue that it is undisputed that Hispanics could 
not have met this necessary precondition in 1981. Defendants 
further contend that since the County is not constitutionally re­
quired to redistrict itself more than decennially, the evidence con­
cerning population growth subsequent to the Board’s adoption of 
the 1981 plan is without relevance.



A-235

The United States alleges in its complaint that if nondiscrimi- 
natory plan-drawing criteria is followed, Hispanics would consti­
tute a significant voting age majority of the population in one of 
the resulting five districts. U.S. Complaint 13. The U.S. Com­
plaint further asserts that nonpartisan elections for positions on 
the Board of Supervisors, are characterized by patterns of racial 
and ethnic block voting. Id. at 14. No Hispanic person, and no 
black or Asian-American person, ever has been elected to the 
Board of Supervisors or any county-wide office in Los Angeles 
County. Id.

The United States agrees that to prevail they must offer proof 
that Hispanic citizens would have the potential to elect a super­
visor of their choice under an alternate election plan. United 
States’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Common Section 
2 Claims at 3. To demonstrate that potential, plaintiffs present 
alternate redistricting plans that, like the challenged plan, have 
five districts and allegedly comply with the one person, one vote 
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. maintains 
that their plan, referred to as the “Grofman Plan,” created by an 
expert with the same name, would give Hispanic citizens the 
potential to elect a supervisor of their choice in District 3. The 
Garza plaintiffs use their own expert and devise what will be 
referred to as the “Estrada Plan” to achieve the same result.

A. Geographical Compactness

In Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the North Caro­
lina General Assembly enacted a legislative redistricting plan for 
the State’s Senate and House of Representatives. Plaintiffs, black 
registered voters, brought suit in federal district court challenging 
one single-member district and six multi-member districts on the 
ground that the plan impaired black citizens’ ability to elect rep­
resentatives of their choice in violation of section 2 of the Act. 
After plaintiffs brought suit but before trial, section 2 of the Act



A-236

was amended to make clear that a violation could be proved by 
showing discriminatory effect alone without showing discrimina­
tory purpose and to establish as the relevant legal standard the 
“results test.” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35.

Section 2(a) of the Act prohibits a State or political subdivision 
from imposing any voting qualifications or prerequisites to vot­
ing, or any standards, practices, or procedures that result in the 
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote on ac­
count of race or color. 96 Stat. 134. Section 2(b) of the Act 
provides that section 2(a) is violated where the “totality o f cir­
cumstances” reveals that “the political processes leading to nom­
ination or election . . . are not equally open to participation by 
members of a [protected class] in that its members have less op­
portunity than other members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice,” 
and that the extent to which members of a protected class have 
been elected to office is one circumstances that may be consid­
ered. Id.

The district court, applying the “totality of circumstances” test 
set forth in section 2(b) of the Act, held that the redistricting plan 
violated section 2(a) because it resulted in the dilution of black 
citizens’ votes in all of the disputed districts. Gingles v. Edmisten, 
590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (three judge panel), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part sub nom, Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 
(1986). The Supreme Court on direct appeal from the Attorney 
General held that the district court had carefully considered the 
totality of the circumstances and found that in each district ra­
cially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in 
voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health serv­
ices; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice 
acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme to im­
pair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive 
groups of black voters to participate equally in the political proc­
ess. Thornburg, 478 at 80.



A-237

The Senate Report which accompanied the 1982 amendments 
to section 2 elaborated on the nature of section 2 violations and 
on the proof required to establish these violations. The Report 
specifies factors which typically may be relevant to a section 2 
claim: (1) the history of voting-related discrimination in the State 
or political subdivision; (2) the extent to which voting in the 
elections of the State or political subdivision is racially polarized; 
(3) the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used 
voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportu­
nity for discrimination against the minority group, such as un­
usually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and 
prohibitions against bullet voting; (4) the exclusion of members 
of the minority group from candidate slating processes; (5) the 
extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past 
discrimination in areas such as education, employment and 
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the 
political process; (6) the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in 
political campaigns; (7) the extent to which members of the mi­
nority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 
Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45 quoting S. Rep. 28-30.

The Supreme Court noted the Senate Committee had explicitly 
stated that there was no requirement that any particular number 
of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or 
the other. Id. The Senate Committee determines that “the ques­
tion whether the political processes are ‘equally open’ depends 
upon a searching practical evaluation o f ‘past and present reali­
ty,’ ” and “on afunctional view of the political process.” (empha­
sis added). Id.

As a threshold matter, however, the Court in Thornburg con­
cluded that in order for multimember districts to operate in such 
a way to impair minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of 
their choice, the minority group must demonstrate: (1) that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a ma­
jority in a single-member district; (2) that it is politically cohesive;



A-238

(3) that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it, 
in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority 
candidate running unopposed, usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate. Id. at 51. (emphasis added)

Defendants’ primary contention is that plaintiffs under any ex­
perts’ proposed redistricting plan fail to comport with the Thorn­
burg geographical compactness requirements. As a matter of law, 
defendants argue that only population data concerning conditions 
at the time the plan was adopted are relevant and that the major­
ity standard applies to the citizen voting age population.

(1) Population Data

Defendants maintain that this case is indistinguishable from 
McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988), 
in which the most concentrated black districts that could be 
drawn for the park system and the school system were 50.04% 
and 50.2% respectively in total population. Summary judgment 
was granted because these districts were but 43.7% and 43.2% 
in voting age population and therefore did not satisfy the Thorn­
burg geographical compactness test. The court in McNeil rejected 
appellants’ contention that a court, in considering section 2 
claims, must explore the totality of the circumstances without 
first determining whether the Thornburg threshold criteria are 
met. Id. at 943.

In McNeil, plaintiffs maintained that their proposed single­
member district contains a black voting age majority because of 
population growth since the 1980 census. Id. at 946. The court 
found two problems with this argument: First, the court faulted 
plaintiffs for never raising it at the district court level. Secondly, 
the court found that the census is presumed accurate until proven 
otherwise and that proof of changed figures must be clear and 
convincing to override the presumption. Id. The court concluded 
that plaintiffs failed to provide any concrete evidence to rebut the 
presumption in favor of the census. Id.



A-239

According to plans submitted by the U.S. and the Garza plain­
tiffs, relying on post-1980 demographic data utilized by the Coun­
ty, a district can be created by which Hispanics constitute a ma­
jority of those eligible to vote. Based on current citizen voting age 
estimates, Hispanics currently comprise a majority (approxi­
mately 55%) of the citizen voting age population. Since 1980, the 
Hispanic population has experienced dramatic growth. The total 
Hispanic population has increased by about 43 percent, while the 
white population has decreased by about 9.5 percent. O’Hare 
Decl. 16-19.

As the Court stated in McNeil, proof of changed figures must 
be clear and convincing to override the presumption in favor of 
the census. 851 F.2d at 946. Employing the language of Thorn­
burg that a court must consider “past and present reality,” the 
Court agrees with the U.S. and the Garza plaintiffs that, at a 
minimum, plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether the County planning and voter registration data 
relied upon by plaintiffs’ experts are more reliable than the 1980 
census for assessing post-1980 County populations and whether 
this current data should be used to satisfy the geographical com­
pactness requirement under Thornburg.

(2) Citizen Voting Age Population

In Romero v. City o f Pomona, F. 2d , CV 87-6326, slip 
op. (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 1989), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis­
trict court’s granting of a motion for involuntary dismissal hold­
ing that the eligible minority voter population, rather than total 
minority population, is the appropriate measure for determining 
geographical compactness required for a section 2 claim under 
the Voting Rights Act. The Ninth Circuit found that plaintiffs 
mistakenly interpreted Thornburg by using the total minority 
population rather than the “effective voting majorities” to deter­
mine geographical compactness. Romero, slip op. at 10063. In a 
footnote, the Ninth Circuit noted that raw population totals are



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relevant only to the extent that they reveal whether the minority 
group constitutes an effective voting majority in a proposed sin­
gle-member district given such factors as low voter registration 
and turnout patterns. Id. at n.13. The Ninth Circuit also ruled 
that the three requirements of Thornburg must be met in order 
to succeed on a section 2 claim. Id. at 10067. In accordance with 
Romero, therefore, the Court agrees with defendants that the 
citizen voting age population is the appropriate measure in deter­
mining geographical compactness.

B. Decennial Redistricting

In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964), the Supreme 
Court stated that “decennial reapportionment appears to be a 
rational approach to readjustment of legislative representation in 
order to take into account population shifts and growths.” De­
fendants maintain that in accordance with Reynolds, the County 
cannot be compelled to redistrict before 1991 absent a determi­
nation that the 1981 plan was invalid when adopted. Defendants’ 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 13. The Supreme Court in stating that 
decennial redistricting was a constitutional minimum stated spe­
cifically that it did not intend to intimate that more frequent 
reapportionment would not be constitutionally permissible. Id. at 
584. Rather, if reapportionment were accomplished with less fre­
quency than every ten years it would “assuredly be constitution­
ally suspect.” Id.

The legislative intent of section 2 of the Act would be obviated 
if a violation could not be rectified for the entire ten year period. 
Clearly, the language of the California Election Code indicates, 
that while decennial districting may be the standard procedure, 
the Board may “[a]t any time between the decennial adjustments 
of district boundaries . . . adjust the boundaries . . .  on the basis 
of population estimates.” Cal. Elec. Code § 35003 (West 1989). 
While the Court considers redistricting more frequently than



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decennially to be an extraordinary remedy, the Court finds that 
upon sufficient proof of section 2 violations, the County of Los 
Angeles may be so compelled.

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment on plaintiffs’ 
common section 2 claims is HEREBY DENIED.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment on Garza Plaintiffs Second, 
Third and Fourth Claims for Relief

Defendants maintain that the Garza plaintiffs second claim, 
that the County’s 1981 redistricting plan was adopted for a dis­
criminatory purpose and the third claim, that the plan was 
adopted for the purposes of diluting, minimizing, and cancelling 
out Hispanic voting strength must be dismissed because the un­
disputed facts demonstrate that plaintiffs cannot satisfy the 
threshold “results” criteria set forth in Thornburg. In denying the 
motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs common section 2 
claims, that material facts in dispute with respect to geographical 
compactness also preclude granting summary judgment on these 
claims. Moreover, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that the test for 
a Fourteenth Amendment violation is not the same as that re­
quired for a section 2 claim. See City o f Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55 (1985) (stating that in order to demonstrate equal protection 
violation it must be shown that a governmental body conceived 
of or operated purposeful device to further racial discrimination).

Further, the Court HEREBY DENIES summary judgment on 
the Fifteenth Amendment claims in the Garza plaintiffs’ third 
and fourth causes of action. Defendants, in bringing this motion, 
submit that the Fifteenth Amendment is not relevant to a ques­
tion of ethnic vote dilution unless the claim concerns the purpose­
ful denial of minority rights to register to vote and cast ballots. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
555 n.29 (1964), quoting South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 279 (1950) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting):



A-242

There is more to the right to vote than the right to mark a 
piece of paper and drop it in a box or the right to pull a lever 
in a voting booth. The right to vote includes the right to have 
the ballot counted . . .  It also includes the right to have the 
vote counted at full value without dilution or discount . . . .

The Court is unwilling to read the Fifteenth Amendment so nar­
rowly as to include only those claims which involve “actual in­
terference in the voting or registration process.” Defendant’s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Mo­
tion for Summary Judgment at 10. The Court believes that plain­
tiffs should be given an opportunity to demonstrate their claim 
that the 1981 redistricting plan resulted in the denial and abridge­
ment of plaintiffs’ right to vote as well as the rights of the class 
they seek to represent. Hence, summary judgment is HEREBY 
DENIED on the Garza plaintiffs’ Fifteenth Amendment claims.

The Court also DENIES summary judgment on the Garza 
plaintiffs’ fourth claim that Article II, Sections 4 and 5 of the Los 
Angeles County Charter, restricting the number of Los Angeles 
County supervisorial districts to five (5), constitutes a voting stan­
dard which results in the denial and abridgement of plaintiffs’ 
right to vote as well as the rights of the class they seek to repre­
sent. It is defendants’ contention that this claim must be dis­
missed because there is no constitutional or Voting Rights Act 
basis for asserting that the chosen number of representatives is 
improperly small.

The Supreme Court in Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44-45, citing S. 
Rep. at 28-29, identified as a factor typically relevant to a section 
2 claim “the extent to which the state or political subdivision has 
used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such 
as unusually large election districts.” See also Cruz Gomez v. City 
o f Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1417 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 
109 S. Ct. 1769 (1989) (characterizing unusually large districts as 
disfavored voting procedure under section 2 of Act). It is the



A-243

Court’s belief that in accordance with the Act and the Constitu­
tion it may find that the size of Los Angeles County minimizes 
the voting strength of Hispanic citizens. Moreover, the question 
as to whether this Court possesses equitable authority to remedy 
a section 2 violation or a violation of the Fourteenth and Fif­
teenth Amendments by ordering enlargement of the number of 
districts properly awaits the remedy stage of this litigation. Sum­
mary judgment on the Garza plaintiffs’ fourth claim for relief is 
HEREBY DENIED.

III. Motion to Dismiss
The Court HEREBY DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss 

on the grounds of mootness and laches. As to mootness, the cases 
cited by plaintiff's indicate that a federal court is empowered to 
modify election schedules to effect its broad equitable remedies. 
Thus, this Court finds that it may, if the need arises, alter the 
deadlines set forth by the affiants in support of defendants’ mo­
tion, shorten the term of the incumbents in the 1990 election or 
order any additional relief required.

The Court also finds that laches is not a proper ground for 
dismissal in this case. Specifically, the Court finds that defendants 
have not been prejudiced by the filing of this action in August of 
1988. Defendants’ familiarity with special elections and past mod­
ifications of pre-election deadlines makes it clear that the altera­
tion of such deadlines in this instance would not constitute suffi­
cient prejudice to dismiss the action. Furthermore, this Court has 
serious doubts as to whether the defense of laches is applicable 
against the United States or in a situation where continuing vio­
lations of the Act are alleged. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on 
these grounds is HEREBY DENIED.

IV. Motion to Continue Trial Date and Reopen Discovery
The Court HEREBY DENIES the motion to continue the trial 

and HEREBY GRANTS defendants’ motion to reopen discovery



A-244

to allow defendants to depose the nine experts whose declarations 
were filed regarding the motion for summary judgment. These 
include and are limited to: United States’ experts Dr. Grofman, 
Dr. Lichtman, Dr. O’Hare and Dr. Robinson; Garza Plaintiffs’ 
experts Dr. Estrada and Dr. Kousser; and Defendants’ Experts 
Dr. Clark, Dr. Klein and Dr. Seigel. It does not seem unreason­
able to expect that these depositions can be completed between 
November 1, 1989 and November 17, 1989. The trial will com­
mence on November 21, 1989 at 8:00 a.m.

V. Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Experts’ Declarations

The Court HEREBY DENIES defendants’ motion. Allowing 
discovery to be reopened for the limited purpose of deposing these 
experts eliminates, in the Court’s mind, the need to strike these 
declarations. The Court does not find that plaintiffs’ analysis of 
partisan elections, the development of an alternative redistricting 
plan and the estimation of the number of Spanish-origin regis­
tered voters reaches the level of unfair surprise to justify remov­
ing these declarations from consideration for the purpose of these 
motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 31, 1989

David Y. Kenyon 
United States District Judge



A-245

INITIAL REPORT OF LEOBARDO F. ESTRADA

1. I have been an Associate Professor of Urban Planning in the 
Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning at the Uni­
versity of California, Los Angeles since 1977.

2 . I have a masters and doctorate degree in sociology with a 
specialty in demographic studies from Florida State University. I 
have been employed at North Texas State University, the Univer­
sity of Texas at El Paso, the Institute of Social Research at the 
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and at U.C.L.A. I also 
worked at the U.S. Bureau of the Census in Suitland, Maryland, 
as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Population Division from 
1975-1977, and as Staff Assistant to the Deputy Director from 
1979 to 1980. I specialize in the study of and methods used to 
measure ethnic racial populations of the United States.

3. Counsel for the plaintiffs asked me to:
a. review patterns of Hispanic population growth in Los 

Angeles County;
b. identify whether a Hispanic supervisorial district can be 

drawn which meets the necessary criteria;
c. review population projections by race and ethnicity in 

Los Angeles County;
d. compare the socioeconomic status of Hispanic and non- 

Hispanics in Los Angeles County; and
e. review attitudinal studies conducted in Los Angeles 

County which reflect intergroup differences in perceived 
treatment and describe results of attitudinal surveys of the 
non-Hispanic population toward Hispanics.

SUMMARY

4. My findings show that prior and present supervisorial dis­
trict lines have fragmented the major core of geographically con­
centrated Hispanic population of Los Angeles County. It is possi­



A-246

ble to construct a supervisorial district around this core concen­
trated Hispanic population which meets the criteria of a majority 
population 18 years and older. Additional analysis indicates that 
this “Hispanic district” also has a majority population 18 years 
and older who are citizens. Population estimates and projections 
by race and ethnicity support the trends for this constructed 
“Hispanic district” to further increase its number and proportion 
of Hispanic population. The results also indicate that the His­
panic population shows lower levels of socioeconomic status 
along several indicators than the non-Hispanic population. As 
measured by survey methods, the Hispanic population of Los 
Angeles County perceives high levels of discrimination against 
them by non-Hispanics.

RESULTS
5. As the number of Hispanics grew in Los Angeles County, 

the supervisorial lines drawn fragmented the geographically con­
centrated core community of Hispanics. Despite the obvious geo­
graphic concentration, boundary lines did not attempt to main­
tain that Hispanic core community within a single supervisorial 
district.

a. In 1950, Los Angeles County had a total population 
of 4,151,687. Hispanics (measured as persons with Spanish 
surnames) comprised 287,614 persons or about 6.9% of the 
County’s population. As indicated in Map 1, the vast major­
ity of the population resided in a concentrated geographic 
area east of the civic center. Map 1 highlights the census 
tracts that were 50% or more Hispanic and that define the 
core of the Hispanic community or “barrio” at that time. 
The supervisorial boundary lines drawn after the 1950 cen­
sus in 1953 are indicated in Map 2. This map shows that the 
third District was inclusive of the East L.A. barrio. This 
district included the civic center and its southern boundary 
included the cities of Vernon, Maywood, Bell, Cudahy and 
Commerce. The boundary lines then went in a northwesterly 
direction to include Bell Gardens and Montebello. The east­



A-247

ern boundary continues to include Montebello and then 
moves below the city of Alhambra and proceeds north to 
include Highland Park and Eagle Rock. The northern 
boundary then proceeds northwesterly to the northeast San 
Fernando Valley to include Arleta until it arrives at Inter­
state 405 (the San Diego Freeway) where the western bound­
ary line moves south along the interstate freeway until it 
reaches Wilshire Boulevard. There, the boundary line pro­
ceeds eastward along Wilshire part of the way and south of 
Wilshire until it arrives at the downtown area.

The Third supervisorial District as drawn in 1953 was inclusive 
of the core Hispanic community as well as including outlying 
areas in which Hispanics would expand over time. The 1953 dis­
trict lines were amended slightly in 1957 and again in



A-248

Los Angeles Times Tues. Sept. 16, 1958

ROYBAL GIVEN FORD’S BACKING
City Councilman Edward R. Roybal, candidate for Supervisor 

from the 3rd District, yesterday received endorsement from Su­
pervisor John Anson Ford, retiring from the office at the end of 
his present term.

“As the campaign for a Supervisor to take my place grows 
tense,” Ford said, “I want to tell why I am so strongly in favor 
of Edward Roybal. The bigness of our county government (a 
budget of $470,000,000) offers unparalleled chances for unselfish 
service—or for selfishness and corruption.

“Integrity, courage and understanding are the great essentials. 
Roybal has these qualities. As Councilman for eight years he has 
resisted sordidness and evil compromises. Elis emphasis on effi­
ciency and economy in public offices reflects his UCLA training 
in business administration.”

Roybal races his fellow Councilman, Ernest E. Debs in the 
Nov. 4 final election.

____________________________ ________________ p. 00026

DEBS CONSIDERED BEST SUPERVISOR CANDIDATE
Two L.A. City Councilmen in Contest 

for Important County Administrative Post
From the standpoint of local importance and public 

the office of County Supervisor is one of the most 
important posts to be filled in Tuesday’s balloting.

Two Los Angeles City Councilmen, Ernest E. Debs and Ed­
ward Roybal are the contenders.

The pair offer a combination of contrasts. Each is a Democrat. 
Debs leaning more to the conservative and Roybal farther to the 
left in political action.



A-249

Debs Admired

The record of the antagonists have led many of the county’s 
representative leaders in business, civic, cultural and political ac­
tivities to conclude that Debs would make a far abler county 
administrator than would his adversary.

Councilman Debs is a former member of the State Assembly 
and during his career in the Los Angeles City Council has won 
wide recognition for his fair and able consideration of public 
business.

The Times believes he would bring to the Supervisorial office a 
balanced and seasoned point of view that would represent a tre­
mendous asset to a body charged with the transaction of so many 
vital aspects of public business.

Debs is neither timid nor a controversialist; he is a capable, 
intelligent and energetic public servant. The Times recommends 
his election to all who desire a county government run on an 
orderly, efficient, honest basis.
______________________________________________ p.00043

Los Angeles Times March 25, 1959, pt. II, p. 1

DEBS AND CHACE AGREE TO REARRANGE DISTRICT

Under an agreement reached yesterday Supervisors Ernest E. 
Debs and Burton W. Chase, a sizeable slice of Chace’s 4th Su­
pervisorial District was assigned to Debs’ 3rd District.

The arrangement transfers in effect, nearly 59,000 voters from 
the 4th to the 3rd and brings about a better balance between the 
two county, governmental divisions.

Chace’s district at present has 479,000 registered voters while 
that of Debs contains only 353,000 it was pointed out.



A-250

The change gives Debs virtually all of Beverly Hills and por­
tions of West Los Angeles. Registered voters will be officially 
notified of the realignment prior to future elections.

The redistricting will become a legal reality after drawing up 
of a special ordinance by County Counsel Harold W. Kennedy. 
__________________________________________ p. 00057

Los Angeles Daily Journal March 25, 1959 p.l

SUPERVISOR DISTRICT BOUNDARIES SHIFTED

Residents of Beverly Hills, West Los Angeles, West Hollywood 
and Westwood will be represented by Supervisor Ernest E. Debs 
instead of Supervisor Burton W. Chace under a change in District 
Boundaries approved yesterday.

The action transferred about 100,000 registered voters from 
Chace’s Fourth District to Deb’s Third District effective June 1.

Debs said the transfer was needed because of the variance in 
voters which now stands at 351,133 in the Third District and 
497,579 in the Fourth.

p. 00058



A-251

Election Result County Races

1958-1988 (Election Records)

Case No. CV 88-5143 Kn (Ex) 
Garza, et al. 
vs. County of LA, et al 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 2363

Date_______________ IDEN.

Date  _____________ EVID

BY__________________
Deputy Clerk

AO 386



A-252

COUNTY
SUPERVISOR—THIRD DISTRICT

ERNEST E. DEBS ...........................................  144,897
EDWARD R. ROYBAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  132,346
Scattering ...........................................    151

ANTELOPE VALLEY HOSPITAL DISTRICT
For a Member of the Board of Directors

MARTIN A. BYRNES, JR. . .............................. 4,623
DONALD C. K A H L ........................................... 4,806
H.E. KICENSKI...............    4,002
BEATRICE T. KINNEY ............  4,002
ROBERT B. McNUTT ....................   7,219
JOSEPH G. OLIVER .....................   4̂ 651
Scattering............................................      1

SOUTH BAY HOSPITAL DISTRICT
For a Member of the Board of Directors

AUTENF. BUSH...................    16,896
CHARLES V. JONES, JR....................................  4,992
CLYDE M ARSH ................................................ 16,327
MORRIS ROCKENMACKER.........................  8,083
FRANK VISCA...............    4,515
Scattering..............................................................  1

BELLFLOWER PARK, RECREATION AND 
PARKWAY DISTRICT NO 11

For a Member of the Board of Directors
JAMES D. BROWN. .................................   13,272
DEWAIN R. BUTLER.......................................  19,739
MIGNON L. CAUGHRAN...................      19,527
FANNIE E. W EISS............................................. 15,449
Scattering..............................................................  5



A-253

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs

vs. VOLUME VII

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants

Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
CV 88-5435-Kn

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

Thursday, January 11, 1990

LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM 
Official Court Reporter 

442-D United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 617-2677



A-254

I asked myself why each side of this bargain, Chace and Debs, 
wanted to do it? And why they wanted to do it then, before the 
1960 census when there was no population equality requirement. 
Why did they want to do it then?

Debs had just run a very tight race against Mr. Roybal, who 
had appealed virtually, if not primarily, to Hispanics who lived 
in the Third Supervisorial District. The district was moved west. 
It was moved into areas of very low Hispanic concentrations, 
Beverly Hills, et cetera, known certainly to everybody to be low 
in Hispanic concentration.

That seemed to me to be a plausible reason: to make the district 
more easily winnable for Debs against either Roybal or a candi­
date who might appeal to the same sort of people as Roybal 
appealed to.

With regard to Chace, the information was that, in an insider 
newsletter, was that he feared that in the 1960 campaign Los 
Angeles City Councilperson named Rosalind Wyman, might run 
against him. He was up for reelection in 1960. And that indicated 
to me why he wanted to do it then, or at least a possible explana­
tion of why he wanted to do it.

In any case, the swap occurred and the Third District became 
more heavily Anglo.

Q. Where did Rosalyn Wyman live?

A. She lived in Beverly Hills.

56

Q. She lived in the area, moved from the Fourth District to



A-255

57

Three.

THE COURT: Wait. Wait. She lived in Beverly Hills, didn’t 
she?

THE WITNESS: I believe that’s correct.

THE COURT: Wasn’t she on the Los Angeles Council, city 
council?

THE WITNESS: That’s correct.

THE COURT: But she lived in Beverly Hills? Well—

THE WITNESS: Maybe she lived in Belaire, maybe she lived 
in one of those areas around there. In any case, she lived in an 
area that was moved from the Fourth to the Third District.

Q. BY MR. STEVE ROSENBAUM: Were Mr. Debs and Mr. 
Chace political allies in other areas?

A. Mr. Chace was a Republican and Mr. Debs was a Demo­
crat. I take it that they were at least to that extent political—they 
may have been political allies in some respect, but at least to that 
extent they were not political allies.

Q. This may be obvious to the court. If it is, I apologize but 
can you identify for the record who Mr. Roybal is and what—

THE COURT: I know.

MR. STEVE ROSENBAUM: Okay.

THE COURT: I know Congressman Roybal.

MR. STEVE ROSENBAUM: Okay.

THE COURT: I know who he is and I’ve talked to him in



A-256

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

January 12, 1990

Volume 8

Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn 
and

CV-88-5435-Kn

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI 
Official Court Reporter 

417 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 680-1515



A-257

Q. So what you are saying is you just don’t know whether the 
definition you are using is consonant with Mobile versus Bolden?

A. There have been certain interpretations of Mobile versus 
Bolden in scholarly literature which clashed with other interpre­
tations of the Mobile versus Bolden, and they seem to me to be 
inconsistent with the way that this Supreme Court has decided 
certain other cases subsequent to Mobile versus Bolden. So I am 
not sure that I understand what concept of intent Mr.—Justice 
Stewart (ph) had in mind.

Q. Well, you described Mobile verse Bolden in your work as 
“Both the seal of approval on an unjust status quo and announce­
ment that a credulous court is ready to defer to any state and 
local authorities who can offer plausible reasons besides race for 
their actions”; isn’t that true?

A. Yes, it is. But I know there are people who disagree with 
me on that interpretation, and I was just trying to be cautious in 
the abstract and to say that they’re disagreements as to what 
Justice Stewart’s opinion means.

Q. You think that the statement that Mobile versus Bolden was 
“A seal of approval on an unjust status quo” was one of your 
more cautious statements?

A. No, it was not one of my more cautious statements.

Q. Let’s turn to redistricting in 1959. I think you said

27



A-258

28

that this really wasn’t a full reapportionment. If I’ve mis- 
characterized—let me ask you a different question.

How many—what happened there and how much of the 
county was moved around.

THE COURT: What happened there and how many who?

BY MR. BLACKMAN:

Q. How much of the county was moved around?

A. I believe what happened in 1959 was that three areas from 
the fourth supervisorial district, West Hollywood, West Los An­
geles and an unincorporated part of the City of Los Angeles and 
Beverly Hills were moved from the fourth district to the third 
district. I think that is all that happened.

Q. There were—apparently there were no exchanges or move­
ment of areas among other districts?

A. I believe that is correct.

Q. This was the redistricting when Mr. Chase, who was a re­
publican, transferred to Beverly Hills, West L.A. and West Hol­
lywood to Mr. Debs who was a democrat; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And you attribute to Mr. Chase the motive of moving 
Rosanne Wyman (ph) out of the district to avoid a potential 
opponent?

A. That is what the Insider Newsletter said.

Q. And Miss Wyman was a democrat?



A-259

29

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. Chase was a republican?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And the areas of West Hollywood and West Los Angeles 
had been fairly traditional democratic strongholds, had they not?

A. I have not seen election returns from that period of time. I 
would assume that they were.

Q. So it would be fair to infer that Mr. Chase was pleased to 
move out of his district liberal areas, and that Mr. Debs, someone 
more liberal than Mr. Chase, would be happy to have them?

A. Perhaps. I’m not absolutely sure that that is so. I guess. As 
I said I have not looked at election returns during that period of 
time.

Q. Have you done any assessment of the number of registered 
voters in either the first—strike that.

Have you done an assessment in the number of registered vot­
ers in either the fourth or the third district in 1959, both before 
and after this exchange of territory?

A. I don’t think I’ve seen those figures. I certainly don’t re­
member them.

Q. And would you look at exhibit 460.

A. Yes, I have it here.



A-260

Q. Was this the first occasion when you thought it would be 
useful to examine the political—let me strike that.

Had you ever considered looking at changes in registered vot­
ers and ethnicity of registered voters from 1959 to 1960 to see just 
what actual effect in terms of the potential outcomes this redis­
tricting had?

A. I don’t think I have. I do not think that there are any figures 
available, so far as I know, on the ethnicity of registered voters 
during this period. And so I didn’t look at that. Perhaps there 
are. I don’t know of any.

Q. Do you know what percentage of the third district was 
Hispanic in 1959?

A. No, I don’t.

Q. Was what—

A. I do not have an overall—

MR. STEVEN ROSENBAUM: Objection.

MR. BLACKMAN: I’m sorry. If he wants to say more than 
he knows, I’ll move to strike it.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: That’s an incorrect statement.

THE COURT: The biggest problem is that we are talking over 
each other. So go ahead and ask the next question.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: I don’t think the witness had an 
opportunity to finish his last answer.

32

THE COURT: Well, he didn’t.



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33

MR. BLACKMAN: Sir I asked you—

THE COURT: I didn’t quite get it because of the two—the 
double—did you have something to finish?

THE WITNESS: Yes, if I may.

I don’t believe that I know whether such figures aggregated on 
the supervisorial district exist. I don’t think any do. At least as 
far as I know I have not seen any such figures.

BY MR. BLACKMAN:

Q. All right. Did you ask?

A. I can’t recall whether I asked. I don’t think I did.

Q. Are you aware of the special tabulations and statistical runs 
that have been done by the parties and the bureau of census 
during the course of this litigation?

A. No. I was pretty much ignorant of those sorts of things. 
There were other experts who were doing it.

Q. At the time in 1959 when this exchange of properties be­
tween the fourth and the third district occurred, did you find any 
article or newspaper report or letter which stated that Mr. Roy 
Ball (ph) intended to mount another campaign?

A. No.

Q. Did you find any evidence, article or the like, showing that 
some other member of the Hispanic community intended to raise 
a challenge to Mr. Debs?

A. No. It was three years before the election.



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that are identified in exhibit 460, the areas that the district 
reexpanded into?

A. Yes, there were.

Q. And can you describe what those areas were?

A. Well, the one that conies to mind, because it was discussed 
in 1981 and several of the plans considered moving it from the 
first district into the third district, was Pico-Rivera. In general, I 
think the way to get an impression of these areas is to look at the 
red areas on the map, the areas of great Hispanic concentration 
which are to the east of the third district boundaries and those 
boundaries have not changed very much in the whole 30-year 
period.

Had you moved into the areas out the San Gabriel Valley and 
down here south, which include Pico-Rivera, you would have 
picked up a more Hispanic concentration than if you move into 
the areas of West Los Angeles, over into the San Fernando Valley 
and Eagle Rock. They could have done so. But they did not.

Q. I have no further questions.

THE COURT: Anything further?

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BLACKMAN:

Q. Just a couple of questions.

With respect to Pico-Rivera, which you said remained

56



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U N IT E D  STA TES D IS T R IC T  C O U R T
C E N T R A L  D IS T R IC T  O F  C A L IF O R N IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al., 
Plaintiff's,

vs. Volume 12

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants.

Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
CV 88-5435-Kn

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California

January 23, 1990

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI and LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM 
Official Court Reporters 

United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012



A-264

36

THE COURT: Sure.

I didn’t quite understand your last answer. Maybe I just didn’t 
connect up enough of it to get it through. You’re talking about 
the district lines and we got on this intent matter here—

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: —but you talked about—you went even further 
and said that it had to do with—what?—the ability to raise mon­
ey? Is that what you said? It wasn’t exactly what you said.

THE WITNESS: Well, it’s that—it’s part of it. Perhaps, if 
Your Honor will allow me, what I said is the individuals are 
viable. As persons themselves, Mr. Munoz and Mr. Molina them­
selves are intelligent people. But the community at large in a 
district such as the one that they’d be running doesn’t know them. 
They are individuals who are running in a large sea of unknown 
factors.

They’re not running in Hispanic districts, therefore, they 
would have a hard time raising money from a non-Hispanic com­
munity, from the business sector. They have tremendous odds 
against them.

CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FAJARDO:
Q. Congressman, turning your attention to the 1974



A-265

Congressional race you ran in. What communities did you do 
poorly in?

A. I did poorly in the communities like Alhambra and in 
Rosemead and Temple City. At the time I recall West Covina was 
part of the district in the ’74 race.

Q. And in 1974 what was the racial composition of those com­
munities?

A. Of those communities?

A. Yes.

Q. They were predominantly Anglo communities, yes.

THE COURT: In ’74 Alhambra was predominantly Anglo.

THE WITNESS: I would say, yes, sir.

THE COURT: What is it now, do you know?

THE WITNESS: I still don’t think it’s predominantly—I think 
it is predominantly Anglo, yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

THE WITNESS: To a lesser degree but—

THE COURT: It seems that—that area seems to have a lot of 
people from Asian countries.

THE WITNESS: That’s correct. A large Asian influence.

THE COURT: Monterey Park, I think even Alhambra.

THE WITNESS: That’s correct.

Q. By Mr. Fajardo: Congressman—

THE COURT: My demographics are all derived from driving 
through the town.

37



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U N IT E D  ST A T E S D IS T R IC T  C O U R T
C E N T R A L  D IS T R IC T  O F  C A L IF O R N IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al, 
Plaintiffs

vs. Volume 10

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF CV 88-5435-Kn
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

January 18, 1990

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI and LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM 
Official Court Reporters 

United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012



A-267

96

THE COURT: Overruled. Overruled.

THE WITNESS: Well, people were bused into the—bused into 
the hearing, so somebody got them there.

Q. BY MR. FAJARDO: And were the persons who were 
bused in to the hearing, were those persons participating in the 
racial aspect of the demonstrations or the testimony?

A. To my knowledge they were.

Q. Now, I’d like to turn your attention back to the 1971 cam­
paign against Mr. Brophy. First of all, what communities are 
included in the 49th Assembly District at the time that you ran 
for office in ’71?

A. East Hollywood, Silver Lake, Echo Park, Lincoln Heights, 
El Sereno, parts of Highland Park, Eagle Rock and Alhambra.

Q. And what was the margin of your loss in that election?

A. 5,000 votes.

Q. And is there anything significant about that number?

A. Yes. The area where I lost by 5,000 votes was in Alhambra.

Q. And what is the racial composition of Alhambra?

A. At that time it was majority were Anglos.

Q. And during the 1971 campaign, were there any subtle or 
overt racial appeals made by your opponents?

A. In the—primarily in the runoff, there were some subtle and 
some overt mailings that went on.

Q. And could you describe these mailings?

A. One was a picture of me in the darkest, ugliest picture



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U N IT E D  ST A T E S D IS T R IC T  C O U R T
C E N T R A L  D IS T R IC T  O F  C A L IF O R N IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS 
ANGELES, LOS ANGELES 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,
et al

Defendants

No. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
CV 88-5435-Kn

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

Wednesday, January 3, 1990

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI 
Official Court Reporter 

417 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 680-1515



A-269

22

Supervisor Dana?

A. I did.

Q. Did anybody from Californios?

A. We—our intention was to meet with all of the supervisors 
and/or deputy because we distributed—we were all working peo­
ple at the time and we were trying to do this as part of outside of 
our work. And, see, I believe that Californios as an organization 
met with all the supervisors. I was not part of all those meeting.

Q. You were not present at those?

A. Correct.

Q. Based on the actions that you described Californios taking, 
what criteria did Californios develop for drawing their plan?

A. First and foremost, we said we would follow the legal re­
quirements of drawing districts which would be the plus or minus 
one percent population deviation, that we were to the get best way 
possible, not cross too many city lines, that we would observe 
communities of interests, that we would want to draw districts 
that are compacted and contiguous so that we wanted to observe 
all of the legal boundaries first and foremost.

Secondly, a major purpose which is why the reason we came 
into being was to maximize the political noise, the representation 
of Latino community, and to



A-270

ensure through an organized effort that the Latino community 
did not continue to be spread out among all of the supervisorial 
districts. We wanted to look, for example, at—the heart of the 
Latino community is considered the east L.A. area, but we also 
saw that there had been a significant growth in the San Gabriel 
population, and the predictions were that the San Gabriel popu­
lation would continue to grow so we saw that that—the two-way 
focus—areas of focus in terms of drawing lines for the Latino 
community.

Q. What resources did Californios use in drawing this plan?

A. Well, used the computers at the Rose Institute.

Q. Are you aware of how Californios obtained use of the com­
puters at Rose Institute?

A. Yes.

Q. And how was that?

A. Through the organization that we established back in Feb­
ruary, the conference was at Claremont, we visited the Rose In­
stitute and my understanding was that through Richard 
Santillan, who was a professor of the Rose Institute, that in fact 
the Rose Institute had agreed to let Californios use computers in 
their off hours.

Q. By “off hours,” could you defined that time period?

23

A. They said we could use the computers from midnight to



A-271

67

around the house and—

THE WITNESS: No. Correct. I did not find them.

MR. BLACKMAN: I see.

BY MR. BLACKMAN:

Q. Now, your role in the Californios process was not on what 
you refer to as the research committee?

A. I was the chair of the Californios research presentation.

Q. Can you tell me what the research committee was?

A. It was the group that was actually involved in going out to 
the Rose Institute and looking at the lines and looking at the 
numbers and the different ethnic breakdowns in the composition 
of the different cities in the county. I was de facto a member of 
the research committee, but I was not involved in every single 
action that they did. As a chair I over—I had responsibility for 
overseeing all the committees, but I was not the chair of the 
research committee, for example.

Q. Were you on the research committee?

A. I went out to the Rose Institute on a couple of occasions.

Q. Now, you testified that your optimum goal or plan was to 
create a district which had the maximum concentration of His- 
panics?



A-272

68

A. Yes.

Q. And you elected not to pursue such a plan?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, do you recall a conversation with Mr. Hoffenblum 
when he said that the Hispanics’ best interest would be served by 
placing the ethnic population in one supervisorial district?

A. Yes.

Q. In fact you took a very strong and adverse position when 
that was recommended, did you not?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. In fact you took a position that was tokenism?

A. Yeah.

Q. And you expressed a position that it was racist?

A. Yes.

Q. You took the position, however, after having concluded 
among yourself that nevertheless represented the best interest of 
the Hispanic community; isn’t that right?

A. I don’t know what you are asking.

THE COURT: I don’t either.

BY MR. BLACKMAN:
Q. You decided early in the process that the optimum plan 

would be to maximize the number of Hispanics in a particular 
district?

A. Yes. And by that we represent a district that would



A-273

have 75 percent Latino population. That’s what we meant by one 
district, 75 percent. Not 50 percent. 75.

Q. Well, didn’t Mr. Hoffenblum early in the process recom­
mend to you a district which would maximize the Hispanic con­
centration?

A. He drew a plan—he proposed a plan to the boundary com­
mittee that had a 50 percent Latino district.

Q. Did you not have a discussion earlier than that with him in 
which the subject of a more Hispanic district came up?

A. I don’t recall.

Q. Do you recall a conversation with Mr. Smith in which it was 
suggested that the best interest of Hispanics would be to concen­
trate the Hispanics in one district?

A. Those were general comments that were made that I already 
said were made before.

Q. Do you recall an offer to draw a district that accomplished 
that process, accomplished the maximum percentage representa­
tion of Hispanics?

A. No, I don’t recall that.

Q. At the boundary committee you made a presentation which 
included what we referred to as your position statement; is that 
right?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall whether you made that presentation

69



A-274

70

before the HofFenblum plan was proposed?

A. I don’t recall the sequence specifically, but somehow—I 
don’t recall the sequence specifically. I’m sorry.

Q. Let me invite your attention, if I may, to exhibit 4108.

A. Okay.

Q. Do you have that in front of you?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. The second page of the document at the bottom recites that 
it was read by you to the committee on the 29th of July, 1981; is 
that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Let me ask you a few questions. That’s what the document 
says is my first question.

A. That’s what’s the document says.

Q. And the document is correct?

A. I hope so. We were a volunteer organization, Mr. 
Blackman, so this could have been a typo.

Q. To the best that you know this was right. If you caught the 
typo at the time, you would have corrected it?

A. We weren’t that good at proofreading frankly.

Q. There are a couple of typos in it that hear you out. The 
statement says on the second page if I may, and I’m in the first 
paragraph, which is a continuation of the



A-275

71

material from the prior page, and in the middle it says:

“Members of this committee have openly stated that Hispanics’ 
best interests are served by placing this ethic population within 
one supervisorial district.”

Do you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. And is that referring to the statements by Mr. Hoffenblum 
and Mr. Smith?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they referring to one district?

A. Yes.

Q. You go on and say, but let me point out that our interests 
are not served by merely a token representative on this board; 
instead, it is best served by creating districts in which the His­
panic population will have a choice and equally important politi­
cal clout and influence over the elected official over the district. 
You said that at the time?

A. Yes.

Q. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you recall if on July 29, 1981 any plan had been 
circulated by Mr. Hoffenblum or Mr. Smith?

A. I don’t recall. As I said, I don’t recall the sequence of these 
events. The comments that have been



A-276

made by Mr. Hoffenblum and Mr. Smith were made from the 
very beginning from the very first boundary committee. So when 
I said members of the committee have openly stated, I stated it 
throughout the process. Throughout the eight meetings of the 
boundary committee.

Q. So the statements to which you were responding were made 
as early as the first meeting of the boundary committee?

A. Correct.

Q. And at the first meeting there was no proposed plan and 
there were no percentages for you to react?

A. No, no, not at all. There were statements made as to side 
comments from Mr. Smith.

Q. Did Mr. Hoffenblum or Mr. Smith ever make the statement 
that Mr. Antonovich or Mr. Dana did not want Hispanics in their 
district?

A. No, I don’t recall that.

Q. Do you recall any meeting with Mr. Dana?

A. No, I don’t.

Q. Do you recall any meeting with Mr. Edelman or his repre­
sentation Mrs. Fitch in which there was a discussion on whether 
Mr. Edelman would be happy—about whether Mr. Edelman had 
any problem representing the number of Hispanics that he then 
had in his district?

A. We had conversations with Mr. Fitch. I’m not sure

72



A-277

they were official meetings in her office. I think there were hall­
way conversations.

Q. Do you recall Mrs. Fitch saying that Mr. Edelman was 
pleased and happy to represent the Hispanic community?

A. Yes.

Q. Now you—

A. I’m sorry. Let me add that the statements were made— 
made were that Supervisor Edelman in fact was happy to repre­
sent the Latino community. I think the issue is a question of how 
many, a percentage, because I remember a conversation with 
Miss Fitch in which she said he does not believe, however, that 
all of the Latino population should be in his district. It would not 
be to the benefit of the Latino community to have all of the 
Latinos in his district, in Supervisor Edelman’s district.

Q. That was a position Californios agreed with; am I right?

A. Well, it is a kind of half there and half here, Mr. Blackman. 
I don’t think that was our position.

Q. What was the public position you took?

A. Our public position was that we wanted to maximize the 
Latino population in two districts.

Q. So it was your public position not to maximize it in one 
district?

A. Not to concentrate only in one district.

73



A-278

U N IT E D  ST A T E S D IS T R IC T  C O U R T
C E N T R A L  D IS T R IC T  O F  C A L IF O R N IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs

vs. Volume VI

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF CV 88-5435-Kn
SUPERVISORS, et al

Defendants

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

Wednesday, January 10, 1990

LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM 
Official Court Reporters 

442-D United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 617-2677



A-279

THE COURT: It was just a simple question. I was trying to 
clarify.

MR. BLACKMAN: It was indeed a simple question, it was 
also a very relevant question.

THE COURT: Well, maybe. What do I know?

Q. BY MR. BLACKMAN: Mr. Huerta, I show you a copy of 
exhibit 4108 which is already in evidence. I’d like you to look at 
the document and tell me if you recall seeing it.

A. I believe I probably did see this at the time it was prepared 
but I don’t have any specific recollection of it.

Q. Do you recall on July 29, 1981, if the Boundary Committee 
had arrived at any recommended or proposed plan?

A. I don’t recall whether they did or not on that particular 
date.

Q. Would you look at the second page of the document.

A. Yes. (Witness complies.)

Q. In the middle of what is the first paragraph, there’s a sen­
tence which begins:

“Members of this committee have openly stated that His- 
panics best interests are served by placing this ethnic popu­
lation within one supervisorial district. Let me point out that 
our interests are not served by merely a token representative 
on this board. Instead it is best served by creating districts 
in which the

147



A-280

Hispanic population will have a choice, and equally impor­
tant, political clout and influence over the elected official of 
the district.”

Do you recall being present when that statement was read?

A. I don’t have a recollection of being present but I probably 
was present.

Q. Do you recall whether there was an explanation at the time 
as to what this meant?

A. By Miss Quezeda?

Q. Yes, by anyone.

A. No, I don’t recall that.

Q. Do you know—

THE COURT: What number is that? I’ll look at it.

MR. BLACKMAN: 4108.

THE WITNESS: Here it is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: This gets to be such a big deal.

THE WITNESS: Here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead, counsel.

Q. BY MR. BLACKMAN: Do you know whether the mem­
bers of the committee understood this to mean that Californios 
did not want a 65 percent district?

A. I would hope they didn’t take it to mean that but I don’t 
know what they would have understood by that statement.

148

MR. BLACKMAN: Thank you.



A-281

U N IT E D  ST A T E S D IS T R IC T  C O U R T
C E N T R A L  D IS T R IC T  O F  C A L IF O R N IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs,

vs. Volume II

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF CV-88-5435-Kn
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

January 4, 1990

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI
Official Court Reporters 

417 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 680-1515



A-282

193

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall when the presentation was made?

A. I recall that there were a number of presentations made. 
This sounds like one of them, yes.

Q. Do you recall a presentation in which the Californios took 
the position that they did not wish to have their population fo­
cused in one district?

A. Yes, because there was a memoranda which I wrote to 
Supervisor Edelman stating that.

Q. Do you recall whether there was a reaction on the boundary 
committee to that proposal, to the fact that the Californios did 
not seek to be focused in one district?

A. Well, as I said in the memoranda, there was some surprise 
at the time that the information was initiated.

Q. Is exhibit 4111 in that same binder?

A. Yes.

Q. Let’s take a look at that exhibit.

A. Would you like me to read it?

Q. It appears to be typed testimony of Dr. Richard Santillan 
of the Los Angeles County Reapportionment Commission, July 
22, 1981.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall Mr. Santillan making any presentation?

A. I recall the name Richard Santillan. It seems to be his 
testimony.



A-283

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Objection, your Honor. Well— 
I’ll wait until the question is asked.

BY MR. BLACKMAN:

Q. Let me ask a straighter question. Turn to 1192.

A. Yes.

Q. At the bottom, would you read the last paragraph.

A. Out loud?

Q. Yes.

A. “Californios for Fair Representation has shown you the two 
districts which we strongly feel will maximize our political repre­
sentation in the county. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to 
have one district which is at least 50 percent and one at 40 per­
cent. Anything less would be unacceptable to the Chicano com­
munity in county.”

Q. Were you aware about this time that the Californios had 
indicated that they would accept no compromise for their propos­
al?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever advocate reducing the Hispanic population in 
Mr. Edelman’s district?

A. No.

Q. Did Mr. Edelman ever take such a position?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Did you ever express opposition to increasing the

194



A-284

U N IT E D  STA TES D IS T R IC T  C O U R T
C E N T R A L  D IS T R IC T  O F  C A L IF O R N IA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs

vs. VOLUME IV

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF CV 88-5435-Kn
SUPERVISORS, et al

Defendants

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

Monday, January 8, 1990

LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM
Official Court Reporter 

442-D United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 617-2677



A-285

124

But go ahead and ask the question.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: In 1981, Mr. Edelman, 
in your judgment there was not two votes or three votes or four 
votes for a plan that would have put 50 percent Hispanics in your 
district and 42 percent Hispanics in Mr. Schabarum’s district; 
isn’t that correct? Wasn’t that the particular reality?

A. I think that’s correct.

Q. And in fact, sir, you never went to Mr. Schabarum or Mr. 
Antonovich and Mr. Dana and said, “Look, we’ll put 50 percent 
in any district, let’s put a 42-percent district in one of your dis­
tricts as the Californios people want.”

A. I don’t know if that took place in that context. The feeling 
and the information that I got based upon discussions with the 
various supervisors and others was that the Californios’ plan as 
presented would not go anywhere.

Q. And you knew as well, Mr. Edelman, that no plan that put 
40 percent, 42 percent Hispanics in Mr. Schabarum’s district and 
50 percent Hispanics in your district was going to go. Didn’t you 
know that, sir?

A. I don’t know precisely. I can’t recall exactly that no plan 
would go. But the Californios plan did some configuration of the 
supervisorial districts that—it lost, I think, some communities of 
interest. Geographically it was composed of areas that I know 
was objected to by the other people, so would have to vote on it.



A-286

Q. It was your information, sir, that the other supervisor’s 
problem with the Californios plan was what it did to the commu­
nities of interest. You think that was the problem and not the fact 
they were putting 42 percent in Mr. Schabarum’s district?

A. That may be—

MR. BLACKMAN: That’s argumentative and misstates the 
witness’ testimony.

THE COURT: Overruled. Overruled.

You may answer.

THE WITNESS: It may have been that as well as the percent­
age put in Mr. Schabarum’s district. I’m sure that there were 
many factors that went into the judgment that I have.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Well, Mr. Edelman, you 
were trying to be a friend to the Californios.

A. I was trying to be helpful to them, yes.

Q. Well, in terms of being helpful, sir, did you ever say to your 
staff, “Let’s sit down with them and get a 50 percent plan in my 
district and a 42 percent plan in Schabarum’s district that won’t 
have these same geographical and community of interest prob­
lems”?

A. I don’t recall.

Q. Wouldn’t that have been what friendship required, sir?

MR. BLACKMAN: Objection; argumentative.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: I withdraw the question.

125



A-287

126

THE COURT: Overruled. Well, all right.

MR. ROSENBAUM: I withdraw the question.

THE COURT: I think that the word “friendship” is ambigu­
ous.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Didn’t you know, sir, 
that there was no way that the board in 1981 was going to put a 
42-percent Hispanic district in a district of the board majority 
and a 50/50 percent district in your district at the same time?

A. It’s possible. Possible.

Q. You knew that Mr. Schabarum and Mr. Antonovich and 
Mr. Dana weren’t going to take more Hispanics in their district; 
isn’t that right, sir?

A. That’s possible. As well as the configuration was not some­
thing that they would accept. Whether it was some underlying 
reason, as you point out, possibly, or other reasons. I can’t—I 
can’t say for sure.

Q. It didn’t occur to you, sir, that maybe what is behind this is 
partisan politics? Do you think it was just a question of aesthetics 
and community of interest?

A. I didn’t say aesthetics. You said aesthetics.

THE COURT: Right, yeah.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Didn’t you regard this, 
sir, as a matter of tough-in fighting?

A. Of course.

Q. And, sir, in fact, with respect to the Holfenblum plan, you



A-288

thought your problem with that plan was that you thought it 
benefitted the Republican supervisors; isn’t that right?

A. No. My problem was that it weakened, in my judgment, the 
opportunity to have influence in the outlying areas of what—by 
“influence,” Democrats, uh—

‘It lumped all the Democrats into my district and Kenny’s 
district. Therefore it would make it much more difficult in carry­
ing out what I thought were very important goals to achieve for 
the county of getting three votes on matters of importance to this 
county in that the other supervisors also hear from people who 
may not share their viewpoint. And, therefore, it was for that 
reason, along with others, including the opposition of the 
Californios, that I opposed the Hoffenblum plan.

Q. You thought, sir, that if the Hispanics and the blacks were 
taken out of Schabarum, Dana and Antonovich’s districts, they 
were going to have a hard time on the board because there 
wouldn’t be any pressure on the three supervisors?

A. Basically that’s correct.

Q. Because those three supervisors didn’t care about those in­
terests; isn’t that right?

A. I won’t say that. I think that is a judgment you’re making.

Q. Isn’t it—

A. It would—

127

THE COURT: Wait.



A-289

THE WITNESS: It would be, in my judgment—and I think 
this was Mr. Hahn’s view, also—it was important that we con­
tinue to have influence on the board by having minorities not 
lumped into one or two districts but have the opportunity for 
their influence in the other districts.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Continue to have them 
spread out in those districts; right, sir? You’re saying that?

THE COURT: Well, I don’t know what that means.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: I mean continue to have 
them disbursed in those other districts; isn’t that right, sir?

MR. BLACKMAN: Same vagueness, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well—

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: The record should reflect that 
the witness was nodding his head yes before Mr. Blackman stood 
up.

MR. BLACKMAN: I’d be happy to agree or disagree if I saw 
that.

THE COURT: It’s clear. It’s just the form of the question is 
kind of—it’s a when-did-you-last-stop-beating-your-wife ques­
tion. It’s a tough one. So I think what you’re saying is what he is 
saying and what you said may be considered the same but I’m 
not sure.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Mr. Edelman, in terms 
of the way you looked at things in 1981, you thought that the 
Hoffenblum and Smith plans benefitted the long-term prospects 
of the

128



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129

Republican supervisors; isn’t that right, sir?

A. It weakened it. I put it differently. It weakened the oppor­
tunity for influence that I felt was important to be brought to bear 
on the three outlying supervi— supervisors. That is, and that to 
me was the important, uh—important goal: Not to weaken the 
influence of minorities on the other supervisors by lumping them 
into my district and into Mr. Hahn’s district.

Q. Mr. Edelman, do you remember being deposed on Septem­
ber 1st of this year, last year. 1989?

A. Yes.

Q. Reading, sir, from page 237, lines—
“Question: In addition to that reason, did you think that by 
the Hoffenblum and the Smith plans the Republicans would 
be strengthening their long-term prospects in those districts? 
“Answer: Yes.”

Were you testifying truthfully at the time, sir?

A. Yes. And that obviously was one concern. But also there 
was concern that, as I just expressed to you—

Q. Sure. And you thought, sir—

MR. BLACKMAN: I’m sorry, Your Honor. Could he tell me 
the page?

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: 237.

THE COURT: 237, and I don’t see that.



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130

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Which day are you on?

MR. BLACKMAN: Okay. I see where you are reading from. 
It was in an earlier question. Okay.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: You thought that these 
plans had a definite partisan effect; isn’t that right, sir?

A. It had as one—it did have that effect as well as what I just 
described.

Q. And you were aware in 1981, were you not, sir, that the 
Hispanics in Los Angeles County were generally Democrats; isn’t 
that right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And you were aware in 1981 that blacks in Los Angeles 
County were generally Democrats.

A. Correct.

Q. And that contributed to why you thought the Republicans 
long-term prospects were going to be strengthened by the move­
ments of those racial and ethnic groups; isn’t that right, sir?

A. Correct.

Q. Sure. And that’s—

THE COURT: “Sure” is not a question.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: I’m sorry. Strike that, please.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Have you ever thought, 
sir, that by setting up a district with 50 percent Hispanic popula­
tion that the Hoffenblum plan was—the phrase you used just a 
few



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131

moments ago—lumping the county Hispanics in one district?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, it wasn’t the 50 percent number that was the problem, 
was it, sir?

A. No.

Q. You thought—

A. Although—

Q. You were aware that was the same number that the 
Californios wanted—

MR. BLACKMAN: I’m sorry, Your Honor, I think he said 
“no” and “although” and then he got interrupted.

THE COURT: He said “no” then the next question started 
and then he said “although,” so, who started it first, it was an 
interrupted question.

So, go ahead, next question.

Q. BY MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: For the Smith plan, sir, 
you thought that by setting up a district with 50 percent Hispanic 
population, that the plan was also lumping minorities, Spanish, 
into one district; isn’t that right, sir?

A. It had that consequence.

Q. But again, sir, it wasn’t the 50 percent number that was the 
problem; isn’t that right?

A. (Pause.) It was—it was, I think, more of lumping the mi­
norities into two districts, my district and Mr. Hahn’s district.



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132

Q. In fact—

A. And weakening any influence that they might have in the 
other districts—

Q. And—

A. —which—

Q. Sorry.

A. —which would jeopardize, I think the goals that Mr. Hahn 
and myself had for county government.

Q. And in each case, sir, those plans put the district, 50 percent 
district, in your district; isn’t that right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And you never went to Mr. Schabarum and said, “How 
about a 50 percent district’’ in his district?

A. I don’t think so.

Q. Or a 45 percent district in his district?

A. I don’t believe I did.

Q. That was part of the political reality that you knew that that 
was hopeless; isn’t that right?

A. Possibly, yes.

Q. During the redistricting process, sir, you knew that four 
votes were necessary—

Incidentally, sir, did you ever tell the Californios people spe­
cifically what you thought was wrong with the plan regarding 
community of interest or the other matters?

A. I don’t recall if I did or not, no.



A-294

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA,

Plaintiffs,

VS' CV 88-5143-Kn (Ex)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES CV 88-5435-Kn (Ex)
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et
al.,

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al.,
Plain tiffs-In tervenors

REPORTER’S DAILY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

Tuesday, February 20, 1990

APPEARANCES: 
(See following page.)

LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM, CSR #2409
ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI, CSR #8626
U.S. Court Reporters
U.S. Courthouse
312 N. Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012



A-295

83

candidates in only two of the six elections; is that correct?

A. Yes. That does indeed appear to be correct.

Q. And Hispanic candidate was the plurality preference of His­
panic voters in three of the six contests; is that correct?

A. Yes. That appears to be correct.

Q. Now, Dr. Grofman, you’ve testified in lots of Voting Rights 
Act cases; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. On the subject of racially polarized voting?

A. Yes.

Q. And isn’t it common for you to generate regression esti­
mates of black support for black candidate, to take an example of 
80, 90, 100 percent?

A. Certainly. In partisan contests such as, for example, North 
Carolina, my estimates were indeed for that sort. Just as in parti­
san contests here, Dr. Lichtman’s estimates are of that sort.

Q. And, in Watsonville, you determined that Hispanic support 
for Hispanic candidates over several elections was essentially 
unanimous; isn’t that correct?

A. That is essentially correct, yes.

Q. And isn’t it true, Dr. Grofman, that you’ve never been 
involved in any case where the point estimates of minority



A-296

support for the minority candidates are as low as they are in the 
six county elections?

A. That is essentially correct, as well.

Q. Isn’t that the real reason Dr. Lichtman was brought in, to 
do these partisan elections?

MR. STEVEN ROSENBAUM: Objection.

MR. MCDERMOTT: If he knows.

THE WITNESS: I have no knowledge of that point. Dr. Licht­
man was brought in, as I was, by the Department of Justice.

BY MR. MCDERMOTT:

Q. Now, if we take Delgado and the ’86 assessor primary, he 
was—he did not receive a majority vote, but he was the plurality 
preference among Hispanic voters; is that correct?

A. Yes. That’s correct.

Q. I assume—let me frame it—you’re not assuming that a 
majority of Hispanics would have voted for Delgado in the run­
off?

A. I’m making no assumptions one way or the other about the 
dynamics of an election that never took place, given the exiting 
[sic] countywide composition of the electorate.

Q. Now, is it—we talked about the first four pages which are 
ecological regression. The last four pages of exhibit 416 are the 
extreme case analysis of the same

84



A-297

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
LOS ANGELES BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants

Volume 9

Nos. CV 88-5143-Kn and 
CV 88-5435-Kn

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Los Angeles, California 

January 17, 1990

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI and LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM 
Official Court Reporters 

417 United States Courthouse 
312 North Spring Street 

Los Angeles, California 90012 
(213) 680-1515



A-298

MR. MC DERMOTT: She is certainly up on all the data that 
is used for that purpose.

THE COURT: I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about 
what “the redistricting purpose” means which maybe—she may 
be. I don’t know.

BY MR. MC DERMOTT:

Q. If you were drawing lines within the county to divide the 
county into fifths and determine with fairly reliable accuracy the 
number of people within each fifth of the county, would you view 
the projections for 1989 and 1990 reliable enough for that pur­
pose?

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Same objection, plus a vague­
ness objection.

THE COURT: Why is it vague?

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: The use of the phrase—first of 
all, it incorporates redistricting purposes in the notion of the 
question.

THE COURT: He talked about dividing it into five equal parts.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Then he used the phrase—I be­
lieve he said fairly accurate or—the word fairly I remember. I 
don’t remember the noun—the adjective that that adverb modi­
fied, but—

MR. MC DERMOTT: Why don’t we re-read the question.

THE COURT: I’m not going to worry about it.

114



A-299

Overruled. I think she can talk about whether she can divide 
first, the district accurate in terms of dividing the county up into 
five equal parts. That’s really the basic testimony.

THE WITNESS: Well, I almost want to answer it in a different 
way. For instance, see one—

THE COURT: How outrageous.

THE WITNESS: One difference between my work which is an 
estimate and the census is that the census can tell you how reli­
able it is. They can say you’ve got 100,000 people plus or minus 
one percent. I can’t say that. I don’t—there is no way for me to 
put confidence limits on my data, and I think and I hope that all 
the users of the data appreciate that, that it is an estimate. I can’t 
stress that enough. It is an estimate. I try to be as careful and we 
try to be as clever as we can, but it is still an estimate, and I don’t 
have confidence limits on it.

BY MR. MC DERMOTT:

Q. My question related to the 1989 and ’90, not the estimates.

MR. MARK ROSEBAUM: I move to strike the other part as 
nonresponsive.

THE COURT: Well, let’s just keep going. Let’s hear what she 
has to say.

115



A-300

THE WITNESS: And the projections that would even apply 
to more because projections, one assumes that as time—you 
know, the further you go out into the future and there’s a lot of— 
I think evidence that the further you go out into the future, the 
less reliable projections become because conditions change. 
That’s just the nature of this work, but again it is hard to discuss 
reliability when you don’t—it is not a sample. It is—it is an 
estimate.

THE COURT: I just want to throw this in to get a picture of 
what you are saying. The question was asked about ’85 over ’80, 
and you said, pretty clearly, you’d rely on ’85, your PEPS.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Now, he’s asking you about ’87 and ’89.

MR. MC DERMOTT: ’89 and ’90.

THE COURT: Excuse me. ’89 and ’90. How does that go with 
that?

THE WITNESS: Well, those are two different questions. He’s 
saying how reliable is the data and the implication for something 
as precise as redistricting, and all I’m telling you is that we’ve got 
an estimate here, and—see, I’ve been saying with a fair amount 
of confidence that the ’85 data is going to give you a better picture 
of L.A. County than the 1980 census would because

116



A-301

we know the county has changed so much. I mean, all you have 
to do is go to Monterey Park to see the changes that have oc­
curred in the ethnic composition of the county and, in fact, the 
whole state. But even more so in L.A. County.

THE COURT: You mean you now have to read the signs?

117

THE WITNESS: Right. But, you know, again because of the 
magnitude of the changes that have occurred since 1980, I feel 
like the ’85 PEPS does depict the county better than the ’80 
census does. But how reliable it is, that is unanswerable. And how 
reliable the ’87 is, again is unanswerable and even more so in ’87 
because I know I have these problems, and that’s the honest-to- 
God truth.

You know, you just can’t—nobody. DOF doesn’t put confi­
dence intervals on their estimates. I think we’re all cognizant of 
that.

Q. I was going to ask this later on, but this just seems like a 
better time.

You were asked a question about whether DOF estimates had 
been validated against the decennial census. Have the PEPS esti­
mates been validated against the decennial census or any decen­
nial census?

A. No.

Q. Do you really know how reliable the PEPS estimates or 
projections are until you have that opportunity to validate



A-302

118

it against the decennial census?

A. That’s true. Even then that—having validated it against the 
decennial census doesn t allow DOF to put confidence limits on 
their data and it won’t us either. It will simply tell us what kind 
of error we might expect but, you know, we could have had a very 
good year or a very bad year with that estimate. So you are 
getting into an area that—you know, I used commonly used tech­
niques and we do the work, you know, as well as we can. But 
when you talk about reliability I always think about confidence 
intervals and those I don’t have.

Q. Okay. Let me turn for a minute to the Pasadena/Long 
Beach problem.

Did you state earlier that the missing data fully affects the ’87 
estimates and it doesn’t affect the ’85 estimates?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, you also made a statement, I think, about having 10 
percent of the records, but you weren’t sure whether that was a 
product of when the problem first arose or whether you were 
getting information from elsewhere in the county, and I’d like you 
to explain that a little bit more.

A. Well, as John and I understand it, and he’s been doing most 
of the talking to the people, but he isn’t completely



A-303

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE 
PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,

VS> CV-88-5143 Kn (Ex)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES CV-88-5435 Kn (Ex)
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors

REPORTER’S DAILY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

Thursday, February 22, 1990

APPEARANCES: 
(See following page.)

LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM, CSR #2409
ROBERT CIPOLLONI, CSR #8626
U.S. Court Reporters
U.S. Courthouse
312 N. Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012



A-304

119

rate of 42.1 percent, so it is not a large change.

Q. Now, in the sentence that immediately is below the table, 
you say that the citizenship rate for Hispanics has dropped by 10 
percentage points during the decade. What was the number that 
you were referring to or—

A. In 1980, the citizenship rate for the 18-and-over population 
in L.A. County of Hispanics was 53.2 percent.

Q. Now, at this stage we’re talking about the county as a whole, 
correct?

A. Correct.

Q. We’re not talking about any subcounty areas?

A. Correct.

Q. Now, your next statement is that it’s difficult to make cal­
culations below the county level since the enormous numbers of 
migrants greatly swing the citizenship rate in any one area.

Let me stop at that point and ask you to explain what you 
meant by that.

A. Well, obviously if you look back at the number of migrants 
as documented by DOF, if you add domestic in-migrants to im­
migrants, 1.6 plus 800,000, you get about—I guess it is about 2.4 
million new people in L.A. County for which we have very little 
data on their citizenship rate and it makes it very difficult.

As I started out with, it is—it is very difficult



A-305

county level even, but at the subcounty level, since we know that 
people don’t distribute randomly, it is very difficult.

Q. Now, further on in that paragraph, you arrive at a figure of 
37 percent as your estimate of the Hispanic citizenship rate in Dr. 
Estrada’s Hispanic opportunity district number one.

Would you explain how you arrived at that figure.

A. Well, if the countywide rate is—and I’ll go ahead and use
42.8 percent since it doesn’t make a lot of difference.

The 42.8 percent compared to the 53.2, if I simply—well— 
that’s not the one I want to compare.

The countywide rate was 53.2 percent and I noted in Dr. 
Estrada’s analysis that the rates of his two districts were 45.7 and 
47.5 percent citizenship rate for 18 and over Hispanics, indicating 
that in those districts there’s a lower citizenship rate than in the 
county as a whole. So I simply assumed that the—that these— 
that those neighborhoods would remain in the same relative po­
sition relative to the county. And I simply ratio’d it.

I said well, if it was 47.5 percent in that district and 52.3 
percent of the county, and I use that same ratio for the new 
county figure to the new district figure, I

120



A-306

come out with—in the case of the 47.5, I guess it was about 39 
percent to keep those ratios the same.

Q. Just a minor clarification. At one point you said 53.2 and 
another point you said 52.3?

A. I mean 52.3.

Q. Just to be precise.

Now, in the next paragraph you made the point that you be­
lieved that it should be even less than 37 percent; is that correct?

A. I say that it is very possible because of the large—-just the 
large amount of unknowns that we have. It is just—it is just—the 
unknown is as great as the known, and it makes it very hard to 
estimate.

Q. The 37 percent assumed that basically everything stayed the 
same, as I understand it?

A. Correct.

Q. And the rationale for why it might go below that is what?

A. Well, we know that people don’t randomly distribute. For 
instance, in my own neighborhood, in the same school district 
and within a few miles of each other, we have one elementary 
school that is almost 40 percent Asian and another that is 10 
percent Asian or 11 percent Asian, and it is just—it just illustrates 
that people don’t randomly distribute. When they migrate, espe­
cially when

121



A-307

they migrate from far away, they tend to seek a community that 
they feel comfortable in or they have services that they value. So 
we know that there is not a random distribution of—particularly 
of immigrants; and therefore, one would expect that there is the 
high probability that you would have selective—you would have 
areas in which citizenship rate would change more than in other 
areas. It would drop faster say than in other areas.

Q. Is it possible in your view that the citizenship rate in His­
panic Opportunity District 1 could be as low as 33 percent?

A. It is possible.

Q. So far I assume you’ve made no adjustment to any figures 
or any adjustment—I’m sorry. Let me rephrase the question.

I assume that so far you have not been making any adjustments 
to the 1980 base for misreporting of citizenship under the Passel 
methodology?

A. Correct.

Q. If an adjustment were to be made, what effect would that 
have on the numbers?

A. It would reduce—it would reduce the citizenship rate.

Q. Now, let me ask you a couple of other questions.

Dr. Estrada indicated a concern in his testimony

122



A-308

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT O F CALIFORNIA

THE HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE 
PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al,
Plaintiffs,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA,
LOS ANGELES BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, et al,

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors

CV-88-5143 Kn (Ex) 

CV-88-5435 Kn (Ex)

REPORTER’S DAILY TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

Thursday, March 1, 1990

APPEARANCES: 
(See following page.)

LUCILLE M. LITSHEIM, CSR #2409
BEVERLY CASARES, CSR 8630
U.S. Court Reporters
U.S. Courthouse
312 N. Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012



A-309

Now, is that the figure that you used to apply to the Estrada 
districts, to the Groffman, to the most Hispanic district in the 
Estrada plan and the Groffman plans?

A. Well, with the correction that there was only one district in 
Estrada—

Q. I’m sorry.

A. —and initially only one district in Groffman and later there 
were plans. But, yes, that is the figure I applied to that most 
Hispanic district.

Q. So you’re applying the countywide Passel corrected citizen­
ship percentage to a subdistrict of the county with most Hispanic 
district that people are trying to draw?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Do you view that as an understatement of the likely level of 
Hispanic—of the number of Hispanic voting age citizens between 
those districts?

A. I think that’s probably an overstatement.

Q. And why is that?

A. Well, from other evidence we know that the Hispanic citi­
zens are not distributed evenly across the county. Those Hispan- 
ics who have moved away from the center of the city to the San 
Fernando Valley. And as I showed in my research paper, partic­
ulars who moved out of the county, were more likely to be citi­
zens.

Hence, those remaining in the concentrated core

97



A-310

were less likely to be citizens. So the average we’re using of 25.6 
would be a little higher for citizenship outside the core, a little 
lower inside the core. We don’t know precisely how much above 
or how much below, but we can make a qualitative statement.

Q. You mentioned earlier that utilizing the county wide adjust­
ment for specific census tracts would be subject to a degree of 
variation. Does it make you more comfortable, less comfortable, 
does it affect your judgment in any way that you’re dealing with 
a case of a supervisorial district with large aggregates of tracts?

A. Well, I think there are a very large number of Hispanics in 
the supervisorial districts that have been drawn essentially in the 
one district that’s been drawn by Dr. Estrada and Dr. Groffman. 
And so I feel fairly comfortable that certainly 25.6 is an upper 
bound to that. But how much below, I don’t know.

Q. How many Hispanics of all Hispanics in Los Angeles 
County are located in Dr. Estrada’s Hispanic opportunity district 
one?

A. Approximately half. Little less than half.

Q. Now, as part of your—

THE COURT: Say that again, how many Hispanics. Say that 
again. Less than half? I didn’t quite get that.

MR. McDERMOTT: A little bit less than half of

98



A-311

all the Hispanics in the county of all ages are located within the 
Estrada district.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: That actually wasn’t the wit­
ness’ testimony, but—

THE COURT: Okay. Is that your testimony?

THE WITNESS: I thought that was.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: I may have misunderstood. I 
thought he said—

THE WITNESS: The question was, as I understood it, your 
Honor, how many of all Hispanics in Los Angeles County are in 
Dr. Estrada’s district? And I said about half or a little less.

THE COURT: A little less than half.
b y  m r . McDe r m o t t  :

Q. Let me direct your attention to page 19.

THE COURT: And this is Hispanic regardless of their status? 

THE WITNESS: That’s correct, in 1980.

THE COURT: Right, age, citizenship, none of that?

THE WITNESS: That’s correct.

THE COURT: Hispanic.

b y  m r . McDe r m o t t :

Q. If I could direct your attention to page 19, the last sentence 
of the carryover paragraph, if that helps at all?

99



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100

A. The last sentence of page 19.

Q. No, no, the last sentence of carryover paragraph in lines 6 
through 8.

A. I’m sorry, you have lost me. Are we on page 18 or page 19?

Q. Page 19.

A. Page 19. For example, the MALDEF district has 46.1 per­
cent of all Hispanic persons, citizens and non-citizens in the coun­
ty. Yes, lines 6 through 8 of page 19. And that MALDEF was 
the terminology I used because at that time it hadn’t been identi­
fied as district. It was later identified as Hispanic Opportunity 
District 1.

Q. As part of your decision to make the adjustment for misre- 
porting, did you also examine the number of foreign-born within 
the most Hispanic district or within Dr. Estrada’s district?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And what did that examination consist of?

A. It showed me that there were, again, a very large proportion 
of the foreign born population in Dr. Estrada’s Hispanic Oppor­
tunity District 1. And I refer to that in paragraph 9 on page 19.

Q. How does that affect your judgment about applying the 
Passel methodology?

THE COURT: About what?



A-313

MR. McDERMOTT: About applying the Passel methodology.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE WITNESS: An important part of the Passel methodology 
is concerned with the foreign-born population. In fact, his resid­
ual method has as a central part of it consideration of the foreign- 
born population.

If we have an area that has a very large proportion of the 
foreign-born population, and it’s coincident with a large propor­
tion of the Hispanic population, I feel comfortable that we’re 
dealing with just that sort of area where there is likely to be a 
significant degree of misreporting of citizenship.

Q. What did you find about the proportionality of the presence 
of foreign born residents in the Estrada district?

A. Well, there are about, if I recall here, about 940,000 foreign- 
born. And the areas identified by the Department of Justice dis­
trict, the initial one, and the MALDEF district, has a very large 
proportion of those foreign-born population. I think about 50 
percent of the foreign-born people are in that area.

Q. How does that affect your opinion, as you stated earlier, that 
you believe you are underestimating the extent of misreporting 
within the Estrada district?

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Objection, leading.

101



A-314

THE COURT: Well, I think he already said that, didn’t he?

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: He said the conclusion, but—

MR. McDERMOTT: Which he stated earlier.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: The question as to the foreign- 
bom part was the leading part of that question.

MR. McDERMOTT: I’ll rephrase the question, because by 
adding a phrase, I think I can solve the problem.

102

Q. How, if at all, did your analysis of the presence of the 
foreign-born affect your earlier opinion that you believed you are 
understanding the degree of misreporting of citizenship within 
the Estrada district?

A. Well, I think I state it very clearly in that paragraph. It’s 
an issue that foreign-born, the foreign-born population can be 
naturalized to become citizens, but they are not citizens by right.

A large proportion of the foreign-bom population are not nat­
uralized, and it gives me confidence that we are dealing with an 
area where there are large proportions of non-citizens.

Q. As part of your decision to apply the Passel methodology, 
did you also examine the legalization applications under the Am­
nesty Act?

A. Yes, I did.



A-315

103

Q. And what exactly did you do?

A. I requested the lists by citizenship code of the applications 
for legalization, and I received those, an initial set of those in the 
spring of last year. And I received an updated list of legalization 
applications in the summer from—I can’t recall the gentleman’s 
name at INS.

Those data showed about three-quarters of a million applica­
tions for legalization in Los Angeles County. Now, some of those 
are—there are two different programs and I perhaps don’t need 
to go into that—but there were about three-quarters of a million 
applications for legalization in Los Angeles County. Many of 
those applications came from areas that had concentrated His- 
panics. In fact, in one set of tracts there were more applications 
for legalization than there were people living in those tracts in 
1980, suggesting that, of course, there was a significant number 
of non-citizens applying for legalized status.

Q. And how does that tie in to your decision to make the 
adjustment for the Passel methodology?

A. I think it’s another piece of confirmation that we are on the 
right track when we make some adjustment for misrecording of 
citizenship, that in these areas people are likely to have made a 
mistake. But we are clearly identifying areas where there are non­
citizens.



A-316

Q. Now, you indicated that you were utilizing the countywide 
Passel corrected citizenship rate for the Estrada district or most 
Hispanic districts in the Groffman plan; is that correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And is there any data at the supervisorial district level that 
you know of that will allow us to make an adjustment at that level 
for Passel?

A. Not at the supervisorial level.

Q. If it had been, what would have the result have been?

A. I believe that the proportion of citizens in the most Hispanic 
district of the GrolFman and Estrada plans would have been 
lower.

Q. Are you aware of any other validation of the Passel meth­
odology, particularly as it relates to Los Angeles County?

A. I believe I was asked this question in one of my depositions 
and couldn t recall any. But since that time, I have come upon a 
paper that was done by David Heer, H-e-e-r, and Jeffrey Passel, 
where they in fact attempted a validation of the measure of un­
documented aliens, and they have an unpublished paper—I have 
not had time to see whether it’s actually been published—they 
have an unpublished paper which relies on a survey methodology 
to check the methodology developed by Warren and Passel.

104



A-317

105

Q. And how does that affect your conclusion here?

A. I don’t have the paper in front of me. But if I recall it, 
generally they—while there were differences in the numbers they 
estimated from their survey methodology and from the applica­
tion of the Warren and Passel methodology for Los Angeles 
County, they concluded that each validated the other and was, 
and they were good ways of confirming these measures of misre- 
porting of citizenship.

Q. Now, was this survey methodology in any way based on 
residual for survey techniques?

A. No, they went out and did a survey just as we would de­
scribe it where they asked people about their citizenship.

Q. And that was in Los Angeles County?

A. That was in Los Angeles County.

Q. Now—

THE COURT: Let me explain. I’ve got some things, matters 
that have come up and I’m just wondering if we could stop a little 
earlier today, whenever. 12:30?

MR. McDERMOTT: I may be done by then.

THE COURT: You may be done?

MR. McDERMOTT: It is possible.

THE COURT: Well, I thought that this was going to be a 
lengthy—

MR. McDERMOTT: It will be, but more on cross than on 
direct.



A-318

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE HONORABLE DAVID V. KENYON, JUDGE 
PRESIDING

YOLANDA GARZA, et al.,
Plaintiff's,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiffs,

vs. CV88-5143-Kn (Ex)

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CV88-5435-Kn (Ex)
CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, et al., Volume 34

Defendants.

LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Intervenors

REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 

March 15, 1990

ROBERT L. CIPOLLONI and BEVERLY A. CASARES 
CSR License #8626 and CSR License #8630 

Official Court Reporters 
417 United States Courthouse 

312 North Spring Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 

(213) 680-1515



A-319

Los Angeles, California, Thursday, March 15, 1990, 8:10 a.m. 

THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.

You are reminded you are still under oath, sir.

We will continue.

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

b y  m r . McDe r m o t t  :

Q. Dr. Clark, I think that when we stopped yesterday, I was 
going to ask you how many of the five Grofman plans put two of 
the current supervisors in the same district.

A. I believe I responded that all of them did.

Q. And what happens to the Hispanic citizenship proportion 
in the most Hispanic district in each of those five plans if you 
don’t put two supervisors in the same district?

A. It would decline.

Q. Do the five Grofman plans split cities?

A. They do.

Q. And how many of the plans split cities?

A. They all split cities because the plans are composed of whole 
tracts.

Q. And what would happen—would you explain your answer, 
your last answer there.

THE COURT: The whole tracts business,

MR. McDERMOTT: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Dr. Grofman, in constructing his plans, uti­
lized whole census tracts and did not make adjustments for those 
tracts that are split among cities.

4



A-320

That means in some cases that you have to make considerably 
more adjustment than just splitting a single tract because that 
tract may be linked to another tract which wouldn’t then be 
contiguous if you split the tracts.

Q. What happens to the Hispanic citizenship proportion in the 
most Hispanic district in each of his five plans if you don’t split 
cities?

A. It would probably decrease.

Q. Do the five Grofman plans move many people from their 
current supervisorial districts?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. And what do you mean when you say they move people 
from their current supervisorial districts?

A. Well, all of the Grofman plans are substantial rearrange­
ments of some of the districts, if not all of the districts, and in 
particular in creating the most Hispanic district it rearranges 
what is presently District 5 and District 3 to create a new District 
3, and that requires that there will be about three-quarters of a 
million people shifted from one district to another because of that 
rearrangement.

Q. Is the same order of magnitude in terms of people being 
moved among supervisorial districts true with respect to the two 
Estrada districts?

5

A. Yes.



A-321

Q. What would happen to the Hispanic citizenship proportion 
in the most Hispanic district in the five Grofman plans or in the 
two Estrada districts if you moved fewer people, say half the 
number that those configurations move?

A. Well, by doing that, you’d be changing the boundaries, and 
as you change the boundaries, you would have a less—a lesser 
proportion of Hispanics and the proportion Hispanic in those 
most Hispanic districts would decrease.

Q. Now, Dr. Clark, do the—do any of the five Grofman plans 
divide the five districts in such a way that there is zero population 
equality?

A. No, they don’t.

Q. I’m sorry. Zero population deviation among the districts?

A. No, they don’t.

Q. And if you—is it possible to divide the five districts in such 
a way that in 1988 or 1990 there would be zero population devia­
tion?

A. It would be possible to come close to it.

Q. And if you did that, what would happen to the Hispanic 
citizenship proportion in most Hispanic districts in the five 
Grofman plans?

A. Again, it would vary, of course, across the plans, but in the 
cases of the most Hispanic district, it would

6



probably decrease in all cases.

Q. And would the same thing be true of the two Estrada dis­
tricts?

A. Yes.

Q. Dr. Clark, did you publish an article on Hispanic relocation 
and spacial assimilation?

A. I did.

Q. And could we turn please to exhibit 4150, your supplemen­
tary report of August 19th, 1989.

A. I don’t have that before me.

Q. Is the article I just asked you about attached to this report?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Where was that article published?

A. In the Journal of Social Science Quarterly.

Q. And is that a referee professional journal?

A. It is.

Q. And did that article focus on Los Angeles County in part?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. And what conclusions, if any, about Hispanic mobility did 
you reach as a result or your research for that article?

A. I think the primary conclusion related to the issue of 
whether or not Hispanic mobility was following a patent



A-323

similar to that of the mobility of other immigrant groups that had 
entered the United States in the early part of the 20th century. 
There was a debate in the literature about that issue and this 
article shows fairly conclusively that the movement of Hispanics 
to the suburban cities and the suburban parts of the county were 
more likely to be citizens and more likely to have been in the 
country sometime, hence they were following this assimilation 
process.

Q. Did you prepare a table for this case on the magnitude of 
Hispanic mobility in Los Angeles County?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Could you turn to exhibit 4881, please. Bates stamp page 
number 7088.

A. Yes.

Q. And what does the exhibit—

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: What’s the bates number, 
please?

MR. McDERMOTT: 7088.

MR. MARK ROSENBAUM: Thank you.

BY MR. McDERMOTT:

Q. What does exhibit 4881 indicate, Dr. Clark?

A. This indicates that the mobility for the total population and 
Hispanic and black population derived from the American hous­
ing survey for Los Angeles County for

8



A-324

9

Q. Who publishes that survey?

A. The Bureau of the Census.

Q. And what conclusions do you reach from this exhibit?

A. The exhibit shows quite simply that the mobility rates for 
Hispanics is higher than that for the total population as a whole.

Q. Now, going back to your article on Hispanic relocation and 
spacial assimilation that’s attached to exhibit 4150, what conclu­
sions, if any, did you reach on the basis of your research for that 
article about the tendency of foreign-born Hispanics and recent 
immigrants to locate in the inner city?

A. I think one of the conclusions I came to was that we found 
that immigrants to Los Angeles County were moving into the 
inner city; that is, into the core of the county, while at the same 
time more immigrants who had been here over one or two or—we 
hypothesize three generations—had moved to the suburban cities 
and the suburban areas of Los Angeles County.

Q. What conclusions, if any, did you reach on the basis of your 
research for that article about the residential concentration of 
foreign-born Hispanics and recent immigrants?

A. Well, the implications, I think, from the research were

1985.



A-325

that you were getting a concentration of foreign-born Hispanics, 
recent immigrants, in the core areas, in the inner city, while the 
people who had been here longer were moving out to the suburbs. 
It was the classic process of suburbanization that occurs over 
time.

10

Q. And how did you measure that?

A. We looked at the data from the public use microsample, the 
PUMS data, to evaluate the mobility of the Spanish origin His­
panic population, looking at those who moved into the country 
recently, as well as the relocations between the inner city and the 
balance of the county.

Q. Did you compute residential dissimilarity indeces?

A. We did.

Q. What conclusions, if any, did you reach from the research 
you did for your article about the socioeconomic status of the 
Hispanics moving out of the inner city into the suburbs?

A. I think we showed in some of the tables in the article that 
those Hispanics moving to the suburbs were more likely to speak 
English, were likely to be in higher occupation—higher status 
occupations, were, as I said earlier, more likely to be citizens, and 
were more likely to have higher incomes.

Q. What conclusions, if any, did you reach about the residen­
tial concentration or dispersion of those Hispanics?



A-326

A. We suggested that the dispersal for Hispanics moving to the 
suburbs was going to be greater and hence the indeces lower—the 
dissimilarity indeces would be lower than for those Hispanics 
concentrated in the core.

Q. Are you aware of any other research on this point?

A. Yes. There are other papers which have explored this issue, 
papers by Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton would be the ones 
who come to mind readily. I’m also aware of Dr. Bruce Kane’s 
writing on this issue for the Los Angeles Times.

Q. What implications does—do the conclusions that you’ve 
just outlined for us have for drawing a majority Hispanic district 
in terms of voting age citizens?

A. I think it suggests that the citizens in particular are dispers­
ing throughout the county, and if you were, for example, to look 
at the mapping of turnout or of citizenship, you find that it is not 
concentrated within these districts simply drawn by Dr. Estrada 
and Dr. Grofman, that there are substantial numbers of citizens 
in the cities and unincorporated areas of the county well outside 
of the most Hispanic core area that’s been drawn by Dr. Grofman 
and Dr. Estrada.

Q. By the way, in your research for that article, did you have 
data on citizenship?

11

A. Yes.



A-327

12

Q. And where did you get that data?

A. The Public Use Microsample, the PUMS data has self-re­
ported citizenship on an individual basis for the five percent sam­
ple that make up the PUMS data for the County of Los Angeles.

Q. What were you using the self-reporting citizenship data for?

A. I was interested in the issue of whether or not there was a 
difference between citizenship rates in the inner city and in the 
suburbs, and I took the self-reported citizenship as a relative 
measure of the difference between the two regions.

Q. Did you consider at all adjusting the data for this recording?

A. That question was posed, but I believe the answer to it is 
the following: That the adjustment for citizenship is a countywide 
adjustment, and the analysis I was carrying out was for the inner 
city and the balance of the county, and that using that citizenship 
adjustment for both pieces would not have altered the relative 
proportion of citizenship in the inner city and in the county. But 
even more important the concern in the original work was on a 
regression analysis where we were interested only in the propor­
tionality within the inner city. So I think there are a number of 
reasons why it wasn’t an appropriate or



A-328

13

necessary methodology.

Q. Could you turn your attention to exhibit 4880.

A. Yes.

Q. Would you indicate what this exhibit is all about.

A. 4880 is a—an exhibit that lists 1988 registration data for the 
five Grofman plans and the two Estrada districts.

Q. Now, the registration data, is that for all groups or just 
Hispanics?

A. This is the registration data for the population as a whole.

Q. Now, let’s take Grofman plan one as an example here. How 
many registered voters are there in the most Hispanic district, in 
Grofman plan one?

A. In 1988 in Grofman plan one, there were 422,724 registered 
voters in the most Hispanic district in Grofman plan one.

Q. That would be District 3?

A. That would be District 3.

Q. How many—do you know how many total registered voters 
there are in the county overall?

A. About 3.7 million.

Q. What percent of all registered voters in the county are in 
District 3?

Q. Oh, probably on the order of 15 percent. I would have



A-329

14

to calculate it to know exactly.

Q. What’s the ratio between the number of registrants in Dis­
trict 3 and the number in District 5?

A. It is about two and a half to one, that is District 5 has about 
two and a half times the—or two and a quarter times the regis­
tered voters in District 3.

Q. Are these districts roughly equal in total population?

A. These are the districts that Dr. Grofman drew, and they 
vary in total population. I suppose we could call them roughly 
equal, but the variation changes across the five plans.

Q. Okay. What would account for the fact that there are so few 
registrants in District 3 relative to the other four districts?

A. Well, the reason is that within District 3, there are a very 
large number of noncitizens.

Q. And is the same thing true of the other four Grofman plans 
in terms of why the number of registrants is so low in District 3?

A. Well, it is true of Grofman plans two, three and four for 
District 3, but he renumbered the districts, and in Grofman plan 
5 it is District 1. That’s the equivalent of District 3 in the other 
plans. And in every case the only explanation is there are a very 
large number of noncitizens because, as we discussed, although 
the population is not



A-330

equal across the districts—the total population, they are roughly 
comparable.

Q. Is your conclusion different with respect to the two Estrada 
districts?

A. No, it isn’t. Again, in the two Estrada districts there are a 
low number of registrants compared to the total number of regis­
trants in the county.

Q. Is it possible to draw a redistricting plan in which districts 
are equal or—roughly equal in population but don’t vary so much 
in terms of registered voters?

THE COURT: But don’t what?

MR. McDERMOTT: But don’t vary as much as these plans 
do in numbers of registered voters.

THE WITNESS: That would be possible.

BY MR. McDERMOTT:

Q. What would happen to the Hispanic citizenship proportion 
in a most Hispanic district in such plans if you were to do that?

A. Let me make sure I heard your question. What would hap­
pen to the proportion Hispanic?

Q. Correct.

A. It would decrease.

Q. Hispanic voting age citizenship proportion?

A. Hispanic voting age citizenship proportion would decrease.

15



A-331

Q. Would you turn your attention to page 14 of exhibit 4151A.

(Pause in proceedings.)

A. Yes.

Q. And could you describe what the table is there on page 14?

A. This is a table which summarizes several different sets of 
data related to the total population, the total citizenship popula­
tion, the 18-and-over self-reported citizenship population, then 
the corrected 18-and-over citizenship population; that is, cor­
rected for misreporting of citizenship, and then the ’88 registered 
voters.

And this table analyzed those five categories for the present five 
supervisorial districts and for a variety of individual districts that 
had been proposed.

Q. Now, the MALDEF district, is that the same thing as Dr. 
Estrada’s Hispanic Opportunity District number 1?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And in that MALDEF district, as appears on the table on 
page 14 of exhibit 4151 A, what happens as you move from total 
population to total citizenship to self-reported voting age citizen­
ship to corrected voting age citizenship to registered voters in 
terms of the Hispanic proportions within that district?

A. It decreases substantially. It starts out at about a

16



A-332

little less than one-fifth, almost 19 percent of the total population. 
And ends up being just a little over 10 percent of the registered 
voters.

Q. In 1988?

A. In 1988.

Q. And returning for a moment to 4881—481 didn’t. I’m sorry. 
What is the range of total variation in registration in total regis­
tration among the Grofman plans?

A. The range is from about minus 40 percent to plus 20 per­
cent. So we’re talking about a total deviation across the plans that 
varies from about 64 percent to 74 percent.

Q. And in the case of two Estrada districts?

A. In those two districts, again, recalling that I only had one 
district so I had to make assumptions about how the other four 
districts would be constructed, the ranges are in the proportions 
55 percent to 62 percent total deviation.

Q. Okay. Did Dr. Grofman and Dr. Estrada—let me rephrase 
the question because I’m not sure Dr. Estrada did that. Did Dr. 
Grofman use total population as his apportionment base for de­
termining population equality for his five plans?

A. That’s correct.

THE COURT: Say that again. Does Dr. Grofman use what?

17



A-333

MR. McDERMOTT: Total population as his apportionment 
base for determining population equality for his five plans—for 
meeting one-man one-vote purpose.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. McDERMOTT:

Q. Did you prepare a table showing what happens if you use 
citizenship or voting age citizenship as the apportionment base?

A. I did.

Q. And could you turn to exhibit 48—4879 and indicate what 
this table shows?

A. This table is an attempt to look at citizen and voting age 
citizen variation in 1990 for the Grofman plans utilizing, of 
course, the citizenship information we have for 1980 and applying 
it to 1990 data.

Q. The table is divided into essentially three parts on over two 
pages in which I look at total citizen variation, voting age citizen 
variation for the Grofman plans and for the two Estrada districts.

Q. And what happens if we use citizenship and voting age 
citizenship as our apportionment base?

A. If we use citizenship—total citizenship as the appor­
tionment base, the variation across the five Grofman plans 
is between 20 and 32 percent. And in the Estrada dis­
tricts, it’s from just a little under 10 percent to

18



A-334

19

almost 20 percent.

If we turn to voting age citizens as distinct from total citizens, 
again recognizing that this is an estimate based on ’80 data and 
used for the 1990 PEPS total population, the variation is from 
about 36 percent to 47 percent for voting age citizens across the 
Grofman plans, and for the Estrada districts it is from about 27 
percent to 35 percent total variation.

Q. Are those variations higher in magnitude than the variations 
you get if you used total population as your apportionment base?

A. They are substantially higher, yes.

Q. And why is that, Dr. Clark?

A. That relates to the way in which the total citizens and the 
voting age citizens are distributed across the county. They’re not 
distributed coincident with the total population.

Q. Does the distribution of total population—does the distri­
bution of Hispanics, if we—within Los Angeles County, if we 
look at them in terms of total population, provide a good measure 
of the distribution of Hispanics if we look at them in terms of 
where they reside in terms of being voting age citizens?

A. No, it does not.

Q. And did you do a similar analysis as appears in 4879



A-335

for 1980 in your summary judgment declaration?

A. I believe so.

Q. And would that be reflected for the MALDEF district in 
paragraphs 22 and 23 on page 12 of exhibit 4151 A?

A. If you could recall the page for me again.

Q. Page 12.

A. Yes.

MR. McDERMOTT: No further questions, your Honor.

20

CROSS EXAMINATION.

MRS. LOFTON: It doesn’t look like the case is before the 
court, at all, from reading the papers. That’s what I think.

THE COURT: Well, I don’t know anything about it ma’am. 
What do you have in mind? We are right in the middle of a trial.

MRS. LOFTON: Well, I think we should be included in this 
trial. We are loosing whole generations of people in the inner city 
because of lack of interest in the situation.

THE COURT: Is there a motion to join? I haven’t seen it yet.

MRS. LOFTON: Yes, and March 26th is the date, but it 
looks like this trial isn’t going to last that long. And we cer­
tainly put our papers in. We should have gotten some sup­
port even from the attorneys who are supposed to be



A-336

REGISTRATION VARIANCES
Garza Plan 1

District 1 ........................................................................  -46.1%
District 2 ........................................................................  ..10 1%
District3............................................................+16.1%
Dlstrlct4........................................................................  +16.4%
Dlstrict 5 ........................................................................  +23.7%

Total Variance  ........................................................  59



A-337

DISTRIBUTION OF SPANISH ORIGIN 
REGISTERED VOTERS AND TOTAL POPULATION 

IN  1982 GENERAL ELECTION PRECINCTS

PERCENT
SPANISH
ORIGIN

SHARE OF 
COUNTY-WIDE 

SPANISH ORIGIN 
VOTERS

SHARE OF 
COUNTY-WIDE 

SPANISH ORIGIN 
POPULATION

0-10% 106,162 26% 135,679 7%
10-20% 77,736 19% 227,633 11%
20-30% 48,952 12% 226,222 11%
30-40% 41,227 10% 195,617 9%
40-50% 31,323 8% 196,329 10%
50-60% 23,565 6% 205,576 10%
60-70% 22,017 5% 249,765 12%
70-80% 23,935 6% 223,480 11%
80-90% 17,496 4% 218,220 11%

90-100% 12,180 3% 187,581 9%
404,592 2,066,103



A-338

D e W itt  W. Clin to n , Esq. 
County Counsel of Los Angeles 
Mary Wa w ro , Esq.
Senior Assistant County Counsel
648 Hall of Administration
500 W. Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
(213) 974-1811
John  E. M cD erm ott , Esq.
R ichard  K. Sim on , Esq.
Lee  L. Blackman , Esq.
Erich  R. Luschei, Esq.
McDe r m o t t , w il l  & e m e r y
2029 Century Park East 
Suite 3800
Los Angeles, California 90067-2917 
(213) 277-4110 
Attorneys for Defendants

U N IT E D  STATES DISTRIC T COURT  
FO R TH E CENTRAL DISTRIC T OF CALIFO RNIA

YOLANDA GARZA, et al„ 
Plaintiff's,

UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA,

Plaintiff,
vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA, LOS 
ANGELES BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS, et al.,

Defendants.
LAWRENCE K. IRVIN, et al, 

Plain tijfs-In tervenors

No. CV 88-5143 Kn (Ex)

No. CV 88-5435 KN (Ex)
DECLARATION OF WIL­
LIAM A.V. CLARK IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFEN­
DANTS’ MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REGARDING THE 
PLAINTIFFS’ COMMON 
SECTION 2 VOTING 
RIGHTS ACT CLAIMS
DATE: October 23, 1989 
TIME: 9:30 a.m.
DEPT: In The Courtroom 

Of The Honorable 
David V. Kenyon



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Declaration of W. A. V. Clark 

I, William A.V. Clark, declare as follows:

1. I have personal first-hand knowledge of the matters stated 
in this declaration and, if called to testify, could and would testify 
competently thereto.

I .

Summary o f Qualifications and Testimony

2. I am a Professor of Geography and professional demogra­
pher. I am Chairman of the Department of Geography at UCLA 
where I have taught since 1970. I received a B.A. in Geography 
from the University of New Zealand in 1960, an M.A. from the 
University of New Zealand in 1961, and a Ph.D. in Geography 
from the University of Illinois in 1964. Attached as Exhibit A is 
a true and correct copy of my vitae.

3 .1 have testified (or been retained as an expert) in several cases 
involving demographic analysis. I conducted research and/or 
provided testimony in these cases on demographic and socio-eco­
nomic issues, especially those relating to the location and struc­
ture of ethnic areas within cities. These cases involved the cities 
of Atlanta, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, 
Topeka and Los Angeles.



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proportion Hispanic would drop from 46.9 to 45.35 self-reported 
voting age citizens.

21. If the population of the MALDEF district were decreased 
further to reach a 50 percent self-reported Hispanic voting age 
citizenship majority, then the MALDEF district falls to 16.4 per­
cent less than a one-fifth district. If the population difference 
between this and a one-fifth district was evenly divided amongst 
the other four districts, then the total deviation for a one-fifth 
district would be 20.5 percent.

22. If the County were divided into fifths on the basis of total 
citizenship, all ages, the MALDEF district would be 27.1% less 
than a one-fifth district and the total variance for an entire plan 
would be nearly 33.9%. If tracts were added to bring the 
MALDEF district to a full one-fifth in total self-reported citizen­
ship, it would be 41% in Hispanic voting age citizenship.

23. If the County were divided into fifths on the basis of self-re- 
ported voting age citizenship, the MALDEF district would be 
nearly 39% less than a one-fifth district and the total variance for 
an entire plan nearly 48% (if the overpopulation of the other four 
districts were evenly divided among them). If tracts were added 
to bring the MALDEF district to a full one-fifth in total self-re- 
ported voting age citizenship, it would be about 37% in Hispanic 
voting age citizenship.

24. The variances reported above would be larger and the fig­
ures for Hispanic voting age citizenship lower if citizenship fig­
ures were corrected for misreporting and/or if city boundaries 
were respected and/or if the district were reconfigured so that all 
supervisors would continue to reside in their current districts.



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VII.

Maximum Hispanic District

25. In contrast to the DOJ and MALDEF plans, I have devel­
oped a district which is contiguous, is close to one-fifth of the 
total County population, respects City boundaries, and contains 
the maximum potential proportion of Hispanic voting age citi­
zens. The district is attached as Exhibit E. The specific details for 
this district are as follows:

Maximum District

Total Population 1467558
Hispanic 973851
% Hispanic 66.4

Voting Age Population 977139
Hispanic 595997
% Hispanic 61.0

Voting Age Citizens, Self-Reported 606143
Hispanic 271571
% Hispanic 44.8

The percentage of Hispanic voting age citizens in this district 
would be significantly less if figures were adjusted for misre- 
porting. A district designed to maximize Hispanic voting age 
citizens under a plan dividing the County into fifths on the basis 
of voting age citizenship would be about 41%. A district designed 
to maximize Hispanic voting age citizenship under a plan divid­
ing the County into fifths on the basis of voting age citizens would 
be about 37%.



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VIII.

Summary o f One Person One Vote Impacts

24. The table below, which is based on the most recent data 
from the Census Bureau, summarizes the variances from the one 
person one vote rule of the different plans and different mea­
sures:*

% total %  total % total 
18 and over corrected 1988 

% total % total self-rep 18 and over registered
pop citizenship citizen citizen voters

Supervisor 1 ................... 20.49 21.10 19.85 19.52 19.43
Supervisor 2 ................... 20.10 19.54 18.90 19.05 17.94
Supervisor 3 ................... 19.95 17.48 17.90 17.62 16.63
Supervisor 4 ................... 19.35 20.62 21.51 21.75 21.96
Supervisors................... 20.10 21.26 21.84 22.07 24.04
Hoffenblum P lan ..........  19.96 16.82 16.52 16.60 15.05
Californios P l a n ........... 19.36 15.63 15.44 15.11 13.60
MALDEF D istric t----- 18.62 14.57 12.28 11.50 10.06
Justice District ............  17.69 14.35 12.09 11.26 10.20
Maximum D is tr ic t----- 19.63 15.65 13.42 12.63 11.20

*1 have foilowed the official Census Bureau position that the 
undercount population of the 1980 Census cannot be estimated with 
accuracy:

“The Census Bureau has concluded that it was not feasible to ad­
just the counts from the 1980 Census on the basis of the available 
data in such a way as to ensure that the adjusted census counts 
would more accurately reflect the true distribution of the 1980 
population than the official counts.”

(1980 Census of Population and Housing. The Coverage of the Popula­
tion in the 1980 Census, Evaluation and Research Reports PHC80-E4, 
by Robert E. Fay, Jeffrey S. Passel and J. Gregory Robinson, February, 
1988, p. 7).

27. The MALDEF and Justice Department districts would 
have the effect of moving large numbers of the present popula­
tions in districts 1 and 3 to other districts. The new MALDEF 
district would move 751,662 into the new district, principally 
from district 1. At the same time adoption of the MALDEF plan 
would move 740,141 out of district 3 to new districts. Similarly 
for the Justice Department district, 697,770 would be moved into



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the new Justice district principally from district 1, and 794,033 
would be moved out of the present district 3 to new districts. The 
calculations are similar for the maximum district. In this case, 
763,179 would be moved into the maximum district principally 
from district 1 and 728,624 would be moved out of present dis­
trict 3 to a new district or districts.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and 
correct.

Executed this 24th day of September, 1989, at Los Angeles, 
California.

William A.V. Clark 

APPENDIX A

THE CENSUS BUREAU CORRECTION 
FOR MISREPORTING OF CITIZENSHIP

1. Because the census process contained no verification of self- 
reported citizenship and experts believed that the data were sub­
ject to significant misreporting of citizenship by immigrants who 
did not have legal status, the Bureau of the Census staff evaluated 
the accuracy with which citizens had been enumerated. The Cen­
sus Bureau subsequently prepared and publicly released calcula­
tions of the number and proportion of voting age citizens in Los 
Angeles County in 1980 who were Hispanic. This information 
and the related calculations (which are approved methods of the 
Bureau of the Census) are set forth in a report by Jeffrey D. 
Passel, Ph.D., a copy of which is attached hereto. 2

2. Dr. Passel’s calculations for Los Angeles County correct and 
revise the census data regarding the actual number and propor­
tion of non-citizens among the County’s 1980 adult Hispanic 
population. The new information represents the latest and most 
accurate information approved by the Bureau of the Census. For 
demographers, it is necessary to incorporate the revised informa-



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tion into calculations of the proportion of Hispanics within the 
County who actually are citizens.

3. The Census Bureau’s approved method of calculation 
shows that 25.6 percent of all Hispanics were voting age citizens 
in Los Angeles County in 1980. Of non-Hispanics, however, the 
percentage who were voting-age citizens was 70.9 percent.1 2 The 
substantial difference between the percentage of Hispanics enti­
tled to vote (25.6) and the percentage of non-Hispanics entitled 
to vote (70.9) is primarily explained by the presence of so many 
aliens among the County’s adult Hispanic population2 as well as 
from the larger percentage of minors among the Hispanic popu­
lation. Only by considering age differences between Hispanics and 
other groups and excluding the alien segment of the population 
from other voting age Hispanics can we calculate the correct 
Hispanic proportion among voting age citizens.

4. The approved Census data indicates that while 659,375 adult 
Hispanics stated that they were citizens in 1980, only 529,017 of 
the County’s voting age Hispanics were actually entitled to regis­
ter and vote. Therefore, although Hispanics constituted 27.6% of 
the total population in the County, Hispanics accounted for only 
12.1% of all voting age citizens. In detail, the Hispanic popula­
tion, based on the most recent data, breaks down as follows:

'This figure (70.9%) could be adjusted downward by not more than 
one tenth of one percent if national estimates for misreporting of citi­
zenship by non-Hispanics of all ages were applied to Los Angeles Coun­
ty. Such an adjustment, however, would have negligible impact on the 
proportion of Hispanic citizens of voting age in any district analyzed for 
this litigation.

2Aliens were approximately 58 percent of Hispanic adults, as shown 
in the attached report from Jeffrey Passel of the Bureau of Census.



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Los Angeles County, 1980
Population Hispanics Percent

Total Population..................... . . .  7477503 2065503 27.6
Population 18+ ..................... . . .  5440815 1264970 23.2
Self-reported Citizens 18+ . . . . . .  4515239 659375 14.6
Corrected Citizens 18+ . . . . . . . . .  4368131 529017 12.1

5. When the figures are corrected for misreporting of citizen­
ship, the government’s district falls from 49.4 percent Hispanic 
voting age citizens to 44.1 percent. The MALDEF district drops 
from 46.9 percent to 41.7%. My maximum district drops from
44.8 percent to 39.6%.

6. If tracts are added to bring the DOJ and MALDEF districts 
to a one-fifth district, the DOJ district drops to 40.76 percent 
corrected voting age citizens and the MALDEF district to 40.18 
corrected voting age citizens.

7. If the County is divided into fifths based on corrected voting 
age citizens, the DOJ district would result in a total variance of 
55% and the MALDEF district would result in a total variance 
of 53%. 8

8. In so adjusting the DOJ and MALDEF districts, I assume 
that non-citizens are at least as prevalent in these heavily His­
panic areas as they are County-wide. I use the Census Bureau’s 
data for Los Angeles County as a basis for making the correc­
tion and determining the Hispanic proportion among voting age 
citizens. Because we are using aggregates of census tracts, we can 
feel confident in applying the 25.6 percent factor to each district. 
While any given tract may vary from the 25.6 percent factor, we 
are aggregating tracts that contain large numbers of Hispanics, 
which gives me confidence that the application of the 25.6% 
factor is a correct procedure. For example, the MALDEF district 
has 46.1% of all Hispanic persons (citizens and non-citizens) in 
the County.



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9. Actually, I have overstated the numbers in favor of plaintiffs 
because I am applying a Countywide estimate of misreporting to 
the DOJ and MALDEF districts. In fact, the misreporting of 
citizenship will be much higher in those districts because there 
are more foreign born residents there. Every noncitizen is foreign 
born, but not all foreign born persons are noncitizens; some have 
been naturalized. Therefore, noncitizens constitute a subset of all 
foreign born persons. Within Los Angeles County, the areas 
where foreign born persons are concentrated are the areas where 
noncitizens reside. There are 2,065,503 Hispanics (persons of 
Spanish origin) in all of Los Angeles County, of whom 45.6 per­
cent (940,897) are foreign born. The areas identified by the DOJ 
and MALDEF districts contain 1,020,294 Hispanics, of whom 
52.65 percent (495,337) are foreign born. This higher percentage 
of foreign born in the DOJ and MALDEF districts shows that 
noncitizens are more concenrated in those tracts than in the 
county as a whole. Applying a Countywide ratio, therefore, 
overstates the proportion of Hispanic citizens in the heavily His­
panic areas.

10. Further evidence that I have overestimated Hispanic citi­
zenship is derived from the applications for legalization in Los 
Angeles County. Analyses of the (I 687) legalization applications 
as of 7/19/89 indicate that there were approximately 616,618 
applications for legalization of citizenship status in the recent 
(1988) amnesty program. Of these applications, 338,409 were 
from the area which contains the MALDEF and the Department 
of Justice tracts, and 278,209 were from the remainder of the 
county. Assuming that most of these legalization applications are 
from persons of Spanish origin (a reasonable assumption in areas 
which are heavily Hispanic), the proportion of applications from 
the MALDEF/Justice Department tracts is much greater than 
from the remainder of the county. Even though some of these 
applications are from persons who were not resident in the county 
in 1980 they confirm the correctness of the foreign bom analysis.



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That is, there are many more applications (i.e., noncitizens) 
within the DOJ and MALDEF census tracts than outside those 
tracts.



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United States District Court 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY BADILLO, CARMEN
FERNANDEZ,
JOE VILLAPANDO, BERRY MEANS,
and

EDWARD ALSTON

V.

CITY OF STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA

□  Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by 
jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its 
verdict.

[3 Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before 
the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision 
has been rendered.

It is Ordered and Adjudged

Text Judgment is Hereby Entered According to the Court’s
Order Filed 1-9-90, Findings and Conclusions in Support of Judg­
ment.

JUDGMENT IN A 
CIVIL CASE

CASE NUMBER: 
CIVS-87-1726-EJG

__________ 1-9-90
Date

_____ J.R. Grindstaff
Clerk

(By) Deputy Clerk S. Conley



A-349

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY BADILLO,
CARMEN FERNANDEZ,
JOE VILLAPANDO,
BERRY MEANS, and 
EDWARD ALSTON,

Plaintiffs, CIV. NO. S-87-1726 EJG

v.

CITY OF STOCKTON, 
CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

Findings and Conclusions 
in Support o f Judgment

This matter was tried to the court, sitting without a jury, from 
June 7, 1989 to June 15, 1989. At the close of plaintiffs’ case-in­
chief, the court granted defendant’s motion for dismissal pursu­
ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and articulated its reasons for doing 
so into the record. On June 28, 1989 the court entered judgment 
against the plaintiffs and in favor of defendant, indicating that a 
written order confirming the court’s oral ruling would follow. 
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) the court writes now to set forth 
its findings and conclusions and confirm its ruling.

Plaintiffs are a combined group of blacks and Hispanics resid­
ing in the City of Stockton, California. They filed this lawsuit to 
challenge the legality of a ballot measure, commonly known as 
Measure C, which was adopted by the voters of the City of Stock- 
ton in June and November of 1986. Plaintiffs allege that Measure 
C, if implemented, will violate the rights of Stockton’s black and 
Hispanic citizens under: 1) § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (42 
U.S.C. § 1973); and 2) the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-



A-350

ments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs seek a declara­
tion that Measure C is unlawful and an order requiring elections 
to be conducted on a district only basis.

Procedural Background

On February 19, 1988 the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for 
a preliminary injunction, enjoining elections under Measure C. In 
addition, plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was granted on 
March 25, 1988.1 On September 23, 1988 the court granted plain­
tiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment resolving certain fac­
tual issues in plaintiffs’ favor. Based on the court’s order the 
following facts were deemed undisputed:

1. The combined group of blacks and Hispanics is suffi­
ciently large and geographically compact to form a majority 
in a single-member district.

2. No black or Hispanic has ever been elected mayor in 
Stockton. Since 1971 there have been two black candidates 
who, in the aggregate, have run for mayor five times, and one 
Hispanic who ran for mayor once in 1977. Only two Hispan­
ics were ever elected under Stockton’s former at-large elec­
toral system. Both were elected in 1967. No black or His­
panic of Mexican-American origin was elected under 
Stockton’s former at-large system.

3. Measure C employs voting procedures, i.e., an at-large 
general election for district representatives, an effective pre­
clusion of single shot voting in the at-large general election, 
and a majority vote requirement, which enhance the oppor­
tunity for discrimination against blacks and Hispanics.2

'The class was later decertified on March 28, 1989 after a conflict 
arose between plaintiffs’ counsels.

2The court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor on two additional issues as well in 
reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 
852 F,2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1988). However, these issues were later deemed 
disputed when the Ninth Circuit deleted those portions of the Gomez 
opinion on which this court had relied. See Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 
863 F.2d. 1407 (9th Cir. 1988), amending 852 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1988).



A-351

Thereafter, on May 26, 1989, plaintiffs filed a motion request­
ing the court to take judicial notice of the following factual issues 
withdrawn by the Ninth Circuit in the amended Gomez opinion:

1. There is a history of official discrimination against the 
plaintiff class affecting the right to vote, to register to vote, 
or to participate in the democratic process.

2. The population in Stockton consisting of blacks and 
Hispanics bears the effects of discrimination in such areas of 
housing, education, employment and health.

At the close of plaintiffs’ case-in-chief the court denied the motion 
for the reasons stated in its oral analysis.

Standards for Rule 41(b) motion
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides in pertinent part:

After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a 
jury, has completed the presentation of evidence, the 
defendant. . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that 
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right 
to relief. The court as trier of the facts may then determine 
them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may de­
cline to render any judgment until the close of all the evi­
dence.

In making this determination, the trial judge is not required to 
consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See 
Wilson v. United States, 645 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1981). In a 
case tried to the court, “[t]he judge is the trier of fact and ‘may 
weigh and consider the evidence and sustain defendant’s motion 
though plaintiff’s evidence establishes a prima facie case that 
would have precluded a directed verdict for defendant in a jury 
case.’ ” Stone v. Millstein, 804 F.2d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986), 
quoting 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, paragraph 41.13[4] at 41-193 
through 94 (2d ed. 1980).

Having weighed and considered the evidence, the court makes 
the following findings and conclusions.



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I. Section 2 o f the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prevents a state or political 
subdivision from imposing any voting practice which results in 
an abridgment of the right to vote based on race. To prevail in a 
§ 2 case challenging an at-large voting system, plaintiffs must 
satisfy three necessary preconditions.

First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that 
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to consti­
tute a majority in a single-member district. . . . Second, the 
minority group must be able to show that it is politically 
cohesive. . . . Third, the minority must be able to demon­
strate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to 
enable i t . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred can­
didate.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). Failure to prove 
any one of these preconditions is dispositive of a § 2 case. Id. See 
also, Romero v. City o f Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853, 863 (C.D. Cal. 
1987), affd  883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989).

A. Geographic Size and Compactness

The first of the three Thornburg preconditions requires plain­
tiffs to prove that the minority group “is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-mem­
ber district.” Id. In this case the minority group consists of a 
combined group of blacks and Hispanics in the City of Stockton. 
On September 23, 1988 the court resolved the issue of the com­
bined group’s size and compactness in plaintiffs’ favor when it 
granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, finding 
that the combined group is sufficiently large and compact to form 
a majority in a single-member district.

However, plaintiffs have failed to present the court with any 
facts indicating that either blacks or Hispanics, when considered 
separately, are sufficiently numerous or concentrated to form a 
majority of the eligible voters in any district, either under



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Stockton’s former nine-district system or under the six-district 
system established by Measure C. Therefore, the court finds that 
the first Thornburg precondition is satisfied as to the combined 
group of blacks and Hispanics, but that plaintiffs have failed to 
prove that either blacks or Hispanics, when considered separate­
ly, are sufficiently numerous or concentrated to form a majority 
of the eligible voters in any district.

B. Political Cohesiveness
The second precondition requires political cohesion within the 

minority group. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50. “The inquiry is es­
sentially whether the minority group has expressed clear political 
preferences that are distinct from those of the majority.” Gomez, 
863 F.2d at 1415.

In this case plaintiffs define the minority group as a combined 
group of blacks and Hispanics. Plaintiffs primarily sought to 
prove that blacks and Hispanics are politically cohesive through 
electoral analyses conducted by their expert, Dr. Race Davies. 
They also presented lay testimony, as well as the testimony and 
report of Dr. Gerald Hewitt. For the reasons that follow, this 
evidence fails to prove that blacks and Hispanics in Stockton are 
politically cohesive, either when combined or treated separately.

Since no elections have yet been conducted under Measure C, 
the court did not have the benefit of examining the results pro­
duced by elections thereunder. Therefore, Dr. Davies’ conclusion 
concerning political cohesion was based on his election analyses 
of previous mayoral, city council, county supervisor and school 
board elections. His analysis included four city wide elections: 1) 
the 1977 mayoral race involving two black candidates, an His­
panic candidate, and one white candidate; 2) the 1981 mayoral 
race involving two black and two white candidates; 3) the 1985 
mayoral race involving one black and three white candidates; and 
4) the 1985 water district election involving one black and one 
white candidate.



A-354

Three of the four elections examined whether Hispanics will 
vote for a black candidate when opposed by a white candidate. 
However, as Dr. Davies conceded, none of the elections examine 
whether blacks will support an Hispanic candidate when opposed 
by a white candidate. The court finds this lack of information 
about black support for Hispanic candidates a major deficiency 
in plaintiffs’ proof on the issue of political cohesion. The court 
also finds Dr. Davies analyses of non-citywide elections 
unpersuasive. Both black and Hispanic candidates ran, indicating 
that each group may have voted for candidates of its own race.

In addition, the court was not impressed with Dr. Davies’ tes­
timony, or his ultimate conclusion, which comprised the bulk of 
plaintiffs’ case. His inherent bias as a consultant for plaintiffs’ 
counsel was apparent throughout his testimony therefore making 
it impossible for the court to accept his testimony and report with 
the level of confidence necessary to find that the evidence prepon­
derates in plaintiffs’ favor on the issue of political cohesiveness.

Plaintiffs also offered the testimony of lay witnesses who testi­
fied that blacks and Hispanics work together to resolve common 
issues facing both groups as well as provide political support to 
each other. The court finds that blacks and Hispanics do face 
some common issues and that black and Hispanic organizations 
have worked together towards resolution of these issues. Howev­
er, the evidence presented did not demonstrate the community of 
political interest necessary for a finding of political cohesion. In 
addition, the court has discounted the testimony of two of the lay 
witnesses, Mr. Summers and Mr. Oliver, finding it pervaded by 
personal bias.

Based on all the evidence the court finds that plaintiffs have 
failed to prove that blacks and Hispanics, when viewed as either 
a single minority group or when treated separately, are politically
cohesive.



A-355

C. White Bloc Voting
The third of the three Thornburg preconditions requires plain­

tiffs to show that “the white majority votes sufficiently as a block 
to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candi­
date.” Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. The court finds that 
neither Dr. Davies’ testimony nor the raw data on which he relies 
provide the court with sufficient evidence to meet plaintiffs’ bur­
den of proof on this issue. Dr. Davies’ credibility as well as his 
statistical analyses suffered from serious failings. Moreover, none 
of the evidence presented suggests that white block voting has the 
tendency to overshadow minority voting strength.

Since plaintiffs have failed to satisfy all three of the precondi­
tions necessary to prevail in a Section 2 case, the court finds no 
need to proceed the additional step and analyze the seven Senate 
factors considered by Congress in its 1982 amendment to Section 
2.

II. Constitutional claims
Plaintiffs also allege claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 

amendments to the United States Constitution. To succeed on the 
constitutional claims plaintiffs must prove that Measure C was 
adopted for a discriminatory purpose and that it resulted in mi­
nority vote dilution. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 
(1982); Romero v. City o f Pomona, 665 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal. 
1987), affirmed, 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989). Racial discrimi­
nation need not be the sole purpose behind the measure, and its 
discriminatory intent may be inferred from the totality of the 
facts. Romero, 665 F. Supp. at 868-69.

Plaintiffs’ only direct evidence concerning the intent behind the 
development and adoption of Measure C was an editorial from 
the Stockton Record containing pictures of two controversial lo­
cal politicians, one white and one black. The tenor of the editorial 
sought a change in Stockton’s election system and was used as a 
campaign flier by proponents of Measure C. Plaintiffs called the



A-356

editorial a “hit piece” and contended that the inclusion of the 
picture of Ralph White, the black politician, demonstrated Meas­
ure C’s discriminatory intent.

The court rejects plaintiffs’ conclusion that the editorial’s in­
clusion as part of a campaign flier on the eve of the election 
warrants categorizing it as a hit piece. Based on the evidence 
presented the court finds that the editorial presented a relatively 
well-balanced analysis of the desire for change in Stockton’s elec­
tion system. Moreover, the record is replete with testimony from 
plaintiffs own witnesses to show that Mr. White’s race was not 
the reason for his unpopularity.

Equally unpersuasive is plaintiffs’ reliance on the results of 
Professor Hewitt’s interviews of several Stockton residents con­
cerning their perceptions of Measure C. Although Hewitt testified 
that all ten to fifteen persons interviewed believed the purpose of 
Measure C was to oust Ralph White from the city council, the 
interviewees did not constitute a random sample; rather, they 
were selected by Hewitt because of their political activism.

Other than the Stockton Record editorial, plaintiffs have failed 
to present evidence sufficient to prove a discriminatory intent 
behind Measure C. In addition, plaintiffs have failed to prove a 
discriminatory effect. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evi­
dence presented establishes that Measure C does not violate the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments.

III. Retrogression
At trial plaintiffs raised an additional basis for relief contending 

that Measure C is retrogressive. This claim is rejected as a matter 
of law on the ground that the City of Stockton is not a jurisdiction 
covered under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated in its oral analysis as well as those con­

tained herein, defendant’s motion for involuntary dismissal pur­
suant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is granted.



A-357

It  is so Or dered . 

DATED: January 9, 1990.

Edward J. Garcia, Judge 
United  States D istrict Court



A-358

Constitutional Provisions And Statutes Involved
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides, in pertinent part:
No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const, amend XIY, § 1.

The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in pertinent part:

Section  1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.

U.S. Const, amend XV, § 1.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 

standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied 
by any State or political subdivision in a manner which re­
sults in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in 
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is estab­
lished if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown 
that the political processes leading to nomination or election 
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to 
participation by members of a class of citizens protected by 
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to partici­
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of 
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected 
class have been elected to office in the State or political sub­
division is one circumstance which may be considered: Pro­
vided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have 
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to 
their proportion in the population.



A-359

42 U.S.C.§ 1973 (1965) as amended by Act of June 29, 1982,
Pub.L, 97-205 § 3, 96 Stat. 134.

California Elections Code § 35000 provides:

Following each decennial federal census, and using popu­
lation figures as validated by the Population Research Unit 
of the Department of Finance as a basis, the board shall 
adjust the boundaries of any or all of the supervisorial dis­
tricts of the county so that the districts shall be as nearly 
equal in population as may be. In establishing the boundaries 
of the districts the board may give consideration to the fol­
lowing factors: (a) topography, (b) geography, (c) cohesive­
ness, contiguity, integrity, and compactness of territory, and 
(d) community of interests of the districts.

Cal. Elec. Code § 35000 (West 1989).

California Elections Code § 35001 provides:

The boundaries of the supervisorial district shall be ad­
justed by the board before the first day of November of the 
year following the year in which each decennial federal cen­
sus is taken. If the board fails to adjust the boundaries before 
the first day of November following the year in which the 
federal census is taken, a supervisorial redistricting commis­
sion shall do so before the 31st day of December of the same 
year. The adjustment of the district boundaries shall be im­
mediately effective the same as if the act of the supervisorial 
redistricting commission were an ordinance of the board, 
subject, however, to the same provisions of referendum as 
apply to ordinances of the board.

Cal. Elec. Code § 35001 (West 1989).

California Government Code § 25005 provides:
A majority of the members of the board constitute a quo­

rum for the transaction of business. No act of the board shall 
be valid or binding unless a majority of all the members 
concur therein.



A-360

Cal. Govt. Code § 25005 (West 1988).

Article II, section 7 of the Los Angeles County Charter pro­
vides:

Sec. 7. The Board of Supervisors may, by a two-thirds’ 
vote of its members, change the boundaries of any supervi­
sorial district. No such boundaries shall ever be so changed 
as to affect the incumbency in office of any supervisor. Any 
change in the boundaries of any supervisorial district must 
be made within one year after a general election.

L.A. County Charter, art. II, § 7.