Fax to Stein and Smiley RE: Draft of pretrial contentions; proposed pretrial stipulations and letter to Markham re: Webster’s testimony

    ® a Regional 0 ® 

A A 1444 1 Street, NW, 10th Floor 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE Washington, DC 20005 (202) 682-1300 Fax: (202) 682-1312 
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 

FAX TRANSMISSION 

ADAM STEIN - 919-967-4953 

TIARE SMILEY - 919-716-6763 

ToDD A. COX 

ASSISTANT COUNSEL 

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 

1444 1 STREET, N.W., 10TH FLOOR 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005 

(202) 682-1300 

DATE: NOVEMBER 22, 1999 

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER SHEET): 

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, PLEASE CALL (202) 682-1300 TO NOTIFY US. 

MESSAGE: ~~ ATTACHED IS (1) THE LATEST DRAFT OF THE PRETRIAL CONTENTIONS NOW 
ORGANIZED INTO FACTUAL AND LEGAL CONTENTIONS AND WITH TIARE’S 
LATEST EDITS INCORPORATED (I TRIED NOT TO BE REPETITIVE OF THE FACTS 
IN THE LEGAL CONTENTION SECTION); (2) A FEW PROPOSED PRETRIAL 
STIPULATIONS OF OUR OWN THAT EVEN THE PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ABLE TO 
LIVE WITH{ THANKS. 

&t 

_ Af. 7 sed Merb heme) Welder « 

The information contained in this facsimile message is legally privileged and confidential information intended 
only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, 

you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copy of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you 

have received this telecopy in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to 

us at the above address via the United States Postal Service. 

National Office Regional Office 

Contributions are The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) is not part Suite 1600 Suite 208 

deductible for U.S. of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 99 Hudson Street 315 West Ninth Street 
income tax purposes. (NAACP) although LDF was founded by the NAACP and shares its New York, NY 10013 Los Angeles, CA 90015 

commitment to equal rights. LDF has had for over 30 years a separate (212) 219-1900 (213) 624-2405 

Board, Program, staff, and budget. Fax: (212) 226-7592 Fax: (213) 624-0075  



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 

RALEIGH DIVISION 

Civil Action No. 4:96-CV-104 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, ef al. 

Plaintiffs, 

Vv. 

JAMES B. HUNT, JR, et al., PRE-TRIAL ORDER 
  

Defendants, 

and 

ALFRED SMALLWOOD, et al. 

Defendant-Intervenors. 

N
a
r
 

N
w
 

N
u
 

N
w
 

N
a
 

N
u
 

N
a
 

N
o
 

N
w
 

N
a
 

N
a
 

N
a
 

N
a
 

N
a
 

N
a
 

N
a
 

  

Defendant and Defendant-Intervenors Factual Contentions 

L Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that Plaintiff James Ronald Linville 

resides in Congressional District 5 of the 1997 Plan. 

2. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that race was not the predominant 

factor in the creation of Congressional District 1 or Congressional District 12 of the 1997 

Reapportionment Plan and that the General Assembly did not subordinate traditional 

redistricting criteria to racial considerations in creating Congressional District 1 or 

Congressional District 12 of the 1997 Plan. 

3. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that the North Carolina General 

Assembly had two primary redistricting goals in 1997. The first was to remedy 

constitutional defects found by the Supreme Court in the 1992 Plan, including the  



predominance of racial considerations underlying the shape and location of District 12. 

The General Assembly accomplished this goal by utilizing a variety of different 

redistricting techniques, including: 1) avoiding any division of precincts and of counties to 

the extent possible; 2) avoiding use of narrow corridors to connect concentrations of 

minority voters; 3) striving for geographical compactness without use of artificial devices 

such as double cross-overs or point contiguity; 4) pursuing functional compactness by 

grouping together citizens with similar interests and needs; and 5) seeking to create 

districts that provide easy communication among voters and their representatives. The 

second, but equally important, goal was to preserve the even (six Republican and six 

Democratic members) partisan balance in North Carolina’s then-existing congressional 

delegation. With the State House of Representatives controlled by Republicans and the 

State Senate controlled by Democrats, preserving the same partisan balance in the 

congressional delegation was essential to ensure that the General Assembly would be able 

to agree on a remedial plan. The General Assembly felt, as a matter of policy, that the 

legislature, rather than the federal district court, had a constitutional duty to perform the 

necessary balancing of various interests to devise a new redistricting plan. 

4. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that the General Assembly 

succeeded in reaching its stated redistricting goals. 

While the 1992 Plan divided 80 precincts and 44 counties, the 1997 Plan 

only divides two precincts and 22 counties. 

b. District 1 in the 1992 Plan divided 25 precincts while District 1 in the 1997 

Plan does not divide any precincts. District 1 joins citizens together in the mostly  



  

rural, economically depressed counties in the northern and central Coastal Plain. 

C. District 12 in the 1997 Plan is significantly more compact geographically 

than it was in the 1992 Plan. The new District 12 contains parts of six counties, 

rather than ten, and it does not have any areas of only “point contiguity” and does 

not contain any “cross-overs” or “double-cross-overs” as it did in the 1992 Plan. 

In the 1992 plan, District 12°s boundaries divided 48 precincts, while District 12 in 

the 1997 Plan divides only one. The boundaries of the new District 12 were 

determined by partisan considerations and a desire to have an essentially urban, 

Democratic district in the Piedmont region. District 12’s African-American total 

population was reduced from the original 56.63 percent in the 1992 Plan to 46.67 

percent and the voting-age population was reduced from the original 53.34 percent 

in the 1992 plan to 43.36 percent. 

d. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that Districts 1 and 12 each 

encompass a distinct community of interest. District 1 is a distinctly rural district 

whose residents are largely poor. The economy of the region in which the district 

is located is depressed and relies heavily on agriculture and logging and districts 

residents are employed largely in agricultural businesses. The concerns of the 

residents of District 1 are those of a rural population, including, unemployment and 

economic development in an environment in which limited job opportunities are 

available. However, District 12 is a largely urban district and the residents share 

common economic interests in areas, including manufacturing, research, banking 

and higher education. The residents are largely employed in blue collar, suburban, 

 



  

and urban employment, rather than in agricultural businesses. The interests of the 

residents of District 12 are those of a largely urban populous, including mass 

transportation, urban crime problems, unemployment, and housing and economic 

development concerns. 

5 Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that the configuration of District 

12 reflects a strong correlation between the racial composition of the precincts and party 

preference and the General Assembly’s goal of creating a partisan Democratic District 12. 

6. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that during the 1997 redistricting, 

the North Carolina General Assembly was concerned that, when creating District 1 in the 

1997 Plan, the Civil Rights Division might deny Section 5 preclearance if the General 

Assembly failed to create a majority-minority district in the general area comprising 

District 1. Prior to negotiating the 1997 Plan, the State House and State Senate each 

independently proposed plans which included a geographically compact majority African- 

American district in the northeastern and central Coastal Plan. Further, it was important 

to the General Assembly that the 1997 Plan provide fair and equitable electoral 

opportunities to all citizens of North Carolina. Consequently, members of the General 

Assembly were concerned that failure to create a district in northeastern portion of the 

state that provided African-American voters an equal opportunity to elect candidates of 

choice would elicit significant opposition in the African-American community and its 

advocates in the General Assembly which most likely would result in a denial of Section 5 

preclearance. 

7 Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that the State of North Carolina 

 



had a compelling justification in creating Congressional District 1 in order to comply with 

  

the strictures of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. 

a. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that while the General 

Assembly’s primary goals in enacting the 1997 Plan were to correct the prior 

constitutional violation found by the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Hunt and to 

preserve the congressional delegation’s partisan balance, the State was also under 

an obligation to fulfill these objectives without diluting minority voting strength. 

b. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that there is a strong basis 

in evidence for the North Carolina General Assembly to have believed in 1997, that 

the three Gingles preconditions and the factors set forth in the Senate Report 

accompanying Section 2, S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 28- 

29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 177, 207, required to establish a Voting Rights 

Act Section 2 claim exist in North Carolina: 

1. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend, that the African- 

American population in the area encompassed by Congressional District 1 is 

sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 

congressional district. 

2. Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend, and plaintiffs have 

stipulated and agreed for purposes of this trial, that the African-American 

population is politically cohesive. 

3. Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend, and plaintiffs have 

stipulated and agreed for purposes of this trial, that the white majority votes 

 



sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually to defeat the minority’s preferred 

  

candidate. 

C. Defendants and defendant-intervenors contend, and plaintiffs have 

stipulated and agreed for purposes of this trial, that African-Americans in North 

Carolina for many decades were victims of racial discrimination and a substantial 

majority of African-American citizens in North Carolina are still at a disadvantage 

in comparison to white citizens with respect to income, housing, education and 

health; furthermore, through the 1990 elections, some appeals have been made to 

North Carolina voters on the basis of race. 

d. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that there is a strong basis 

in evidence for the State Legislature of North Carolina to have determined in 1997 

that it had a compelling interest in complying with the Voting Rights Act and in 

ensuring that, under the totality of the circumstances, racially polarized voting 

patterns and the lingering effects of the State’s past discrimination did not exclude 

the State’s African-American citizens from equal access to the political process. 

10. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that Congressional District 1 is 

narrowly tailored to meet a compelling justification. District 1 is narrowly tailored to 

remedy the potential Section 2 violation in the northeastern portion of the State of North 

Carolina. The African-American population in the area encompassed by District 1 is large 

and geographically compact. District 1 is located in the northern and central Coastal Plain 

where a high degree of racially polarized voting persists and the African-American 

population is politically cohesive. Moreover, the North Carolina General Assembly did 

 



not subordinate traditional redistricting criteria in creating District 1. District 1 is 

contiguous and geographically compact, encompassing 10 whole counties and whole 

precincts from portions of 10 other rural and economically disadvantaged counties with a 

distinct community of interest. The 1997 Plan substantially encompasses the 

configurations of District 1 initially proposed by the State House and State Senate, and the 

modifications negotiated between the legislative chambers were not based on racial 

considerations. 

Defendant and Defendant-Intervenors Legal Contentions 

}, Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that Plaintiffs are barred from litigating 

the constitutionality of Congressional Districts 1 and 12 in this case. Under the doctrine of 

claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their 

privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Federated 

Dep’ t Stores Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S. Ct. 2424, 2428, 69 L. Ed. 2d 103. 

108 (1981). E.g., Allen v MCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S. Ct. 411, 414, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308. 

313 (1980). All Plaintiffs in this case are bound by the decision by the district court in Shaw 

v. Hunt holding that the 1997 Plan cured the constitutional defect found by the Supreme 

Court in District 12 as urged by the Shaw plaintiffs. That decision is binding on Plaintiffs 

Martin Cromartie and Chandler Muse, because they were plaintiffs in Shaw at the time of that 

judgment and they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims concerning District 

1 and 12 in Shaw. Because they chose not to do so, they are barred from their attempt to 

pursue the claim in this litigation. The remaining plaintiffs are equally barred from challenging 

District 1 on the grounds that the Shaw plaintiffs were their “virtual representatives.” See  



  

Ahng v. Alisteel, Inc., 96 F.3d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. 

Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1995); Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 

751, 761 (1stCir. 1994); Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993); Royal 

Ins. Co. of Am. v. Quinn-L Capitol Corp., 960 F.2d 1286, 1297 (5th Cir. 1992); Jaffree v. 

Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1467-68 (11th Cir. 1988). Similarly, the adverse judgment in Shaw 

holding District 12 constitutional is attributable to all the plaintiffs in this case and bars them 

from litigating the constitutionality of District 12. 

2. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that Plaintiff James Ronald Linville 

does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of District 12. In this case, Plaintiffs 

only have standing where he or she can establish that he or she was personally injured as a 

result of residing in the challenged district or because he or she was otherwise personally 

subjected to a racial classification. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-745 (1995). 

Plaintiff James Ronald Linville is registered voter residing in District 5 of the 1997 Plan and 

has not alleged that he has been injured as a result of having personally been denied equal 

treatment on the grounds of race. He, therefore, has no standing to challenge the 

constitutionality of District 12. 

3 Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that plaintiffs have the burden of 

proving that they have standing to pursue their claim and that race was the predominant factor 

in the creation of the 1997 Plan. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 905 (“The plaintiff bears the burden 

of proving the race-based motive. . . .”) (citation omitted). See also Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. 

4. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that the North Carolina General 

Assembly is entitled to a great deal of deference in creating a redistricting designed to remedy 

 



  

the constitutional infirmities found by the Supreme Court and a presumption that it acted in 

good faith during the redistricting process. Indeed, “[s]tates must have discretion to exercise 

the political judgment necessary to balance competing interests” and “the good faith of state 

legislature must be presumed.” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 915. See also, e.g., Lawyer 

v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. ___ 117 S. Ct. at 2192-3 (1997), aff’g Scott v. United 

States, 920 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 899 n.9; 

Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 42 (1982); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. at 794-95 (1973). 

5 Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that federal law imposed a series of 

obligations on the General Assembly in enacting the 1997 congressional redistricting plan. 

First, one-person, one vote principles established by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 

U.S. 186 (1962) and its progeny required the General Assembly to have a congressional 

redistricting plan in which population was distributed equally among the congressional 

districts in the plan. Second, the Voting Rights Act required the General Assembly to avoid 

diluting the voting strength of minority citizens during the redistricting process. Third, the 

Supreme Court decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and its progeny required that 

the General Assembly develop a plan in which race did not predominate and subordinate 

traditional redistricting criteria. 

6. Defendant and Defendant-intervenors contend that in order for the Court to apply 

strict scrutiny in its evaluation of the 1997 Plan, it must find that “race for its own sake, and 

not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in 

drawing its district lines,” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 952, quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 

at 913, and “that other, legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to race.” Bush, 

 



  

517 U.S. at 958. See generally id. at 259-68. The North Carolina General Assembly was 

permitted to conduct the 1997 redistricting “with consciousness of race.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 

1051. See also, Bush, 517 U.S. at 993. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (States may intentionally 

create majority-minority districts and may otherwise take race into consideration, without 

coming under strict scrutiny) (emphasis in original); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 

(1995) (“We recognized in Shaw. . that the ‘legislature always is aware of race when it draws 

district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and 

a variety of other demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead 

2% inevitably to impermissible race discrimination’) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 

7 Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that, while the configuration of 

District 12 reflects a strong correlation between the racial composition of the precincts and 

party preference and the General Assembly’s goal of creating a partisan Democratic District 

12, this fact does not make the 1997 constitutionally suspect. The General Assembly may 

create a plurality strong partisan Democratic district “even if it so happens that the most loyal 

Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.” 

Hunt v. Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 1547, 143 L. Ed. 2d 731, 741 (1999) (emphasis in the 

original) (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 905; 

Miller, 515 U.S. at 916; Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 646). Indeed, 

Evidence that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one congressional 

district while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring district will 

not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was motivated by race in 

drawing its district lines when the evidence also shows a high correlation 

10 

 



  

between race and party preference. 

Hunt at 119 S. Ct. at 1547, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 741. 

0, Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that the State of North Carolina had 

a compelling justification in creating Congressional District 1 in order to comply with the 

strictures of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Compliance with Section 

2 of the Voting Rights Act can be a compelling state interest, King v. State Bd. of Elections, 

979 F. Supp. 619, 621-22 (N.D. Ill. 1997), summ. aff., ___ U.S. __, 118 S. Ct. 877 (1998) 

(4494 (per curiam) check subsequent cite, provided the State has a ““strong basis in evidence’ for 

finding that the threshold conditions for Section 2 liability” exist. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 

978. See also Shaw, 517 U.S. at 914 (“§ 2 could be a compelling interest” justifying even a 

plan drawn predominantly on a racial basis); Bush, 517 U.S. at 990 (O’Connor, J., 

concurring) (nothing in Shaw or its progeny should be interpreted as calling into question the 

continued importance of complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); id. at 992 

(concluding that States have a compelling interest in complying with Section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act “as [the Supreme] Court has interpreted it”); King v. State Board of Elections, 

US. ___, 118 8. Ct. 877 (1998) (per curiam) (summarily affirming district court ruling 

upholding the constitutionality of Illinois’ Fourth Congressional District found to be narrowly 

tailored to a compelling justification of complying with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); 

DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413-14 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (intentional creation of 

majority-minority districts does not violate Constitution when redistricting plan “evidences 

ajudicious and proper balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistricting, one of which 

was the consideration of the application of the Voting Rights Act’s objective of assuring that 

11 

 



  

minority voters are not denied the chance to effectively influence the political process”), aff'd, 

515 U.S. 1170 (1995); Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1405 (5th Cir. 1996) 

(Higginbotham, J.) (a race-conscious Section 2 remedial plan is acceptable if it is narrowly 

(444 22 

tailored and it “substantially addresses’ the violation and “does not deviate substantially 

from a hypothetical court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly racial reasons”) (citations 

omitted). 

10. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that there is a strong basis in evidence 

for the North Carolina General Assembly to have believed in 1997, that the three 

preconditions established by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) 

and the factors set forth in the Senate Report accompanying Section 2, S. Rep. No. 97-417, 

97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 177, 207, required 

to establish a Voting Rights Act Section 2 claim exist in North Carolina. 

11. Defendants and Defendant-intervenors contend that Congressional District 1 is 

narrowly tailored to remedy the potential Section 2 violation in the northeastern portion of 

the State of North Carolina. In order to be narrowly tailored to remedy a potential Section 

2 violation, the location of the remedial district must substantially correspond to the location 

of the potential violation. See Shaw, 517 U.S. at 915-16 (“[w]here, as here, we assume 

avoidance of § 2 liability to be a compelling state interest, we think that the racial 

classification would have to realize that goal; the legislative action must, at a minimum, 

remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored”) (footnote 

omitted); King, 979 F. Supp. at 623-27 (finding Fourth District narrowly tailored because it 

“remedie[d] the anticipated violation and achieves 2 compliance, and that its consideration 

12 

 



of race (reflected by its noncompactness and irregularity) is no more than reasonably 

necessary to fulfill its remedial purpose.”). 

 



Defendant and Defendant-Intervenors Proposed Stipulations: 

  

  

| Over 25 percent of North Carolina’s population (1.6 million persons) and almost 25 

percent of the State’s geography were assigned to new congressional districts as a result of the 

1997 redistricting. 

2. 41.6% of the geographic area assigned to District 12 in the 1992 Plan remained assigned 

to District 12 in the 1997 Plan. 

3. 180,984 people assigned to District 1 in the 1992 Plan and 174,471 people assigned to 

District 12 in the 1992 Plan were assigned to other congressional districts in the 1997 Plan. 

4. While the 1992 Plan divided 80 precincts, the 1997 Plan divides two precincts. 

5, While the 1992 Plan divided 44 counties, the 1997 Plan divides 22 counties. 

6. District 1 in the 1992 Plan divided 25 precincts while District 1 in the 1997 Plan does not 

divide any precincts. 

7 While District 12 in the 1992 Plan contained parts of 10 counties, District 12 in the 1997 

Plan contains parts of 6 counties. 

8. District 1 of the 1997 Plan is contiguous. 

9, District 12 of the 1997 Plan is contiguous. 

10. The 1997 Plan does not utilize “point contiguity,” “cross-overs,” or “double-cross-overs” 

to maintain contiguity. 

11. District 12’s African-American total population was reduced from the original 56.63 

percent in the 1992 Plan to 46.67 percent in the 1997 Plan. 

12. District 12's voting-age population was reduced from the original 53.34 percent in the 

1992 plan to 43.36 percent in the 1997 Plan. 

13: The dispersion compactness score of District 12 more than doubled from .045 in the 1992 

 



  

Plan to 0.109 in the 1997 Plan. 

14. In the 1997 Plan, the average district in North Carolina increased its level of dispersion 

compactness by 39.1%. The increase in the level of District 12's dispersion compactness score 

was the largest of all congressional districts at 142.2%. 

15. As measured by their dispersion and perimeter scores, the levels of compactness for North 

Carolina’s twelve congressional districts increased in the 1997 Plan as compared to the 1992 Plan. 

16. On average, 76.4 percent of the geographic area in each of North Carolina’s twelve 

congressional districts in the 1992 Plan was preserved in the 1997 Plan, ranging from a high of 

96.7 percent for District 11 to a low of 41.6 percent for District 12. 

 



A A Regional Office 

1444 Eye Street, N.W., 10th Floor 
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND Washington, D.C. 20005 

EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 202-682-1300 202-682-1312 Fax 

November 22, 1999 

Via Telefacsimile 

Douglas E. Markham 

Everett & Everett 

Suite 300 

301 W. Main Street 

P.O. Box 586 

Durham, North Carolina 27609-0629 

Re: Pretrial Order 

Dear Doug: 

Given your position and plans regarding deposition designations and consistent with the 

spirit of the Court’s Order, we will offer Dr. Gerald Webster’s affidavits and expert reports as 

exhibits and designate portions of his deposition as evidence for trial. 

Sincerely, 

eA / 
Todd A. Cox 

Assistant Counsel 

\Dn £ Lty 
Tiare B. Smiley 

Special Deputy Attorney General 

Adam Stein 

The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDP) is not a part of the National ~~ National Office Regional Office 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) although LDF was founded ~~ 99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 315 West 9th Street, Suite 208 
by the NAACP and shares its commitment to equal rights. LDF has had, since 1957, a separate New York, NY 10013-2897 Los Angeles, CA 90015 
board, program, staff, office and budget. Contributions are deductible for US. income tax purposes. ~~ 212-965-2200 212-226-7592 Fax 213-624-2405 213-624-0075 Fax  



NATIONAL OFFICERS 

Julius L. Chambers 
Martin D. Payson 
Co-Chairs 

Daniel L. Rabinowitz 

Roger W. Wilkins 
Co-Vice Chairs 

Elaine R. Jones 
President and 

Director-Counsel 

James M. Nabrit, III 
Secretary 

Eleanor S. Applewhaite 
Treasurer 

Theodore M. Shaw 

Associate Director-Counsel 

Norman J. Chachkin 
Director of Litigation 

Edward H. Gordon 

Director of Finance 

and Administration 

Patricia A.M. Grayson 
Director of Development 

Billye Suber Aaron 

Gerald S. Adolph 

Clarence Avant 

Mario L. Baeza 

Mary Frances Berry 

Theodore L. Cross 

Kenneth C. Edelin 

Toni G. Fay 

Willie E. Gary 

Anthony G. Amsterdam 

William H. Brown, III 

Yvonne Brathwaite Burke 

William K. Coblentz 

William T. Coleman, Jr. 

Charles T. Duncan 

Nannette B. Gibson 

Alice M. Beasley 

Anita Lyons Bond 

Patricia S. Bransford 

Talbot D’Alemberte 

Allison S. Davis 

Ossie Davis 

Peter J. DeLuca 

Adrian W. DeWind 
Anthony Downs 

Robert F. Drinan 

Marian Wright Edelman 

BOARD OF DIRECTORS 

Gordon G. Greiner 

Quincy Jones 

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. 

David E. Kendall 

Caroline Kennedy 

Tonya Lewis Lee 

William M. Lewis, Jr. 

David S. Lindau 

John D. Maguire 

SENIOR DIRECTORS 

Jack Greenberg 
Louis Harris 

Eliot Hubbard, III 

Anna Faith Jones 

Jetta N. Jones 

Robert H. Preiskel 

DIRECTORS EMERITUS 

Christopher F. Edley 

Clarence Finley 

Norman C. Francis 

Marvin E. Frankel 

Ronald T. Gault 

Lucy Durr Hackney 

Patricia L. Irvin 

Herman Johnson 
Harry Kahn 
Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach 

George E. Marshall, Jr. 
Paul Moore, Jr. 

Cecilia S. Marshall 

C. Carl Randolph 

Judith T. Sapers 

William H. Scheide 

Dean E. Smith 

John W. Walker 

George Wallerstein 

Karen Hastie Williams 

Hon. Andrew Young 

Robert O. Preyer 

Norman Redlich 
Charles B. Renfrew 

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. 
Jay Topkis 

James Vorenberg 

M. Moran Weston 

Glendora Mcllwain Putnam 

Henry T. Reath 

Jacob Sheinkman 

George C. Simkins 

Wayman F. Smith III 

Michael I. Sovern 

Bonnie Kayatta Steingart 

Chuck Stone 
Cyrus Vance 

Paula Weinstein 

E. Thomas Williams, Jr. 

October1998