Younger v. Harris Jr. Appellant's Supplemental Brief on Re-Argument

    3n %  $itpmn? (Court
OF THE

Intfrfc i>tatrs

October Term, 1969

No. 4

Evelle J. Y ounger,
Appellant,

vs.

J ohn H arris, J r., et al.,
Appellees.

APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF ON REARGUMENT

T homas C. Lynch ,
Attorney General of the State of California,

A lbert W. H arris, J r.,
Assistant Attorney General of the State of California,

Clifford K. T hompson, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney General of the State of California, 

6000 State Building,
San Francisco, California 94102,
Telephone: (415) 557-0204,

Attorneys for Appellant.

P E R N A U - W A L B H  PRINTINC3 D O. ,  BAN F R A N C I S C O



Subject Index

Page
Summary of argument .................................   1
Argument ......................................... . ........................................... 3

Dombrowski v. Pfister does not authorize federal inter­
vention in this ease .........................................................  3
A. Absence of an actual case or controversy............  3
B. Abstention is proper absent bad faith enforce­

ment of a statute challenged as unconstitutionally 
vague ........................................................................... 5

C. Dombrowski does not authorize federal invalida­
tion of California’s Syndicalism Act because it is 
susceptible of a limiting construction readily to 
be anticipated as a result of the pending prose­
cution ......................... ............................. . .................  11

Conclusion ......................................................................................  14

Table of Authorities Cited

Cases Pages
Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953).............................  12
American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education, 59

Cal.2d 203, 379 P.2d 4 (1963)..............................................  12
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).............................  5

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).................................  9
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).............................. 11,12
Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff’d 

mem., 391 U.S. 361 (1968)....................................................  2,10

Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965).............................  8
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)....................2 ,9 ,10 ,14
Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F.Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966) . . . .  8

Cunningham v. A.J. Aberman, Inc., 252 F.Supp. 602 (W.D.
Pa. 1965), aff’d per curiam, 358 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.
1967) ........................ .................................................... . 7

Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536,
171 P.2d 885 (1946)...................................................... . .5, 12,13

Dawkins v. Green, 285 F.Supp. 772 (N.D. Fla. 1968)........  4



1 1 Table oe Authorities Cited

Pages
Delta Book. Distributors, Inc. v. Cronvich, 304 F.Supp. 662

(E.D. La. 1969)......................................................................... 4
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)........................passim
Buncombe v. State of New York, 267 F.Supp. 103 (S.D.

N.Y. 1967) ............ ......... ........................................................  11

Golden v. Zwieker, 394 U.S. 103 (1969)............................... 2,4,6

Harris v. Younger, 281 F.Supp. 507 (C.D. Cal. 1968 ) . . . . .  5,13 
Harrison v. N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167 (1959).......................  10

People v. Bpton, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9, 227 N.E.2d 829 (1967),
cert, denied, 390 U.S. 29 (1968).........................................  5,13

People v. Flanagan, 65 Cal.App, 268, 223 Pae, 1014 (1924) 13
People v. Malley, 49 Cal.App. 597, 194 Pae. 48 (1920) . . . .  13

Turner v. Labelle, 251 F.Supp. 443 (D.C. Conn. 1966) . . . .  11

Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 18 (1967)........... 5

Wells v. Hand, 238 F.Supp, 779 (M.D. Ga. 1965)................. 8
Wells v. Reynolds, 382 U.S, 39 (1965)..................................  2,8
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).........................  12
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S, 507 (1948)............................ 12

Zwieker v. Boll, 270 F.Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967)............ 11
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967)................................. 6,8,9

Codes
Penal.Code Section 11401(3).....................................................  3,11

Constitutions
United States Constitution, Art. I ll , Sec. 2 ..........................1,2,4

Statutes
28 U.S.C. 2283 ............................................................................. 7,13
42 U.S.C. 1983 (Civil Rights A c t ) ................................... ... 3

Texts
69 ColL.Rev. 808, 812, n. 32 (1969).....................................  4
69 Col.L.Rev. 808, 816 (1969)..................... ..........................  9
75 Yale L .j; 1007, 1037 (comment) (1966).......................... 7



Jtt tl|c ^upmur (Eourt
OF T H E

Intteii t̂atea

October Term, 1969

No. 4

Evelle J. Y ounger,
Appellant,

vs.

J ohn H arris, J r., et al.,
Appellees.

APPELLANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF ON REARQUMENT

SUM M ARY OF ARGUMENT

Dombrotvski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), does 
niot authorize federal intervention in this ease. Appel­
lees Dan, Hirsich, and Broslawsky, the district court 
found, stand in no danger of prosecution under the 
California Criminal Syndicalism Act;. The mere ex­
istence of an arguably vague and overbroad state 
statute regulating expression or association does not 
create an actual ease or controversy within the mean­
ing of Article III , section 2 of the United States



2

Constitution. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S, 103 (1969). 
The district court, therefore, exceeded its jurisdiction 
in reviewing separate and severable sections of the 
Syndicalism Act not involved in the prosecution of 
appellee Harris.

The district court erred in declining to abstain from 
declaring unconstitutional that provision of the Syn­
dicalism Act under which Harris is charged. Absten­
tion, or nonintervention, must be the rule where, as 
here, (1) statutory overbreadth results from vague­
ness, and (2) there is no showing of bad faith en­
forcement of the challenged statute. By clarifying an 
allegedly vague enactment, state courts may narrow 
the law SO' as to eliminate overbreadth, thereby allow­
ing federal courts to* avoid adjudicating the most 
delicate constitutional question: the extent of federal 
limitations on state power. Where state officials do 
not take advantage of vague language in a. statute so 
as to expand its scope to include constitutionally pro­
tected conduct, the statute does not produce the in­
tolerable “ chilling effect”  which demands federal 
intervention. Bad faith enforcement of the challenged 
statute is equally relevant to determining the pro­
priety of federal declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Dombrowski did not hold otherwise. Wells v. Reyn­
olds, 382 U.S. 39 (1965) ; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 
U.S. 611 (1968) ; Brooks v. Briley, 274 F.Supp. 538 
(M.D. Tenn. 1967), aff’d mem,, 391 U.S. 361 (1968).

Finally, because the Criminal Syndicalism Act is 
susceptible of a limiting construction readily to he 
anticipated as a result of the prosecution pending



3

against Hands, Dombroswki prohibited the district 
court from declaring it invalid.

ARGUMENT

DOMBROWSKI V. PF1STER DOES NOT AUTHORIZE 
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN THIS CASE.

A. Absence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

Appellees Harris, Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky 
complained under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, attacking the California, Criminal Syndicalism 
Act as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and 
seeking an injunction against its enforcement. Harris 
was under indictment for violating a single provision 
of the Act, Penal Code section 11401(3). Dan, Hirsch, 
and Broslawsky were not accused of violating the 
Act, nor had the State engaged in any overt acts 
directed toward their conduct. Acknowledging that 
“ our decision in no way stems from any apprehension 
of our own that plaintiffs Dan, Hirsch or Broslawsky 
stand in any danger of prosecution . . . because of the 
activities that they ascribed to themselves in the com­
plaint . . .,”  the three-judge federal court, acting upon 
the authority o f Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 
(1965), nevertheless declared unconstitutional on 
their face all sections of the Syndicalism Act, Brief 
for Appellant, 6-8.

The decision below, therefore, stands for the prop­
osition that the mere existence of an arguably vague 
and overbroad state statute regulating expression or



4

association authorizes a federal court to declare it 
invalid. Anyone may seek federal equitable relief, as 
everyone has standing-. Contra, Dawkins v. Green, 285 
F.Supp, 772, 775 (NJD. Fla. 1968). The District 
Court’s opinion has been understood to mean that 
“ an injunction should issue whenever a statute might 
possibly infringe on first amendment freedoms de­
spite the chance that it could possibly be interpreted 
in one state proceeding with ‘ requisite narrow specifi­
city.’ ” Note, 69 Col.L.Rev. 808, 812 n.32 (1969).

Dombrowski v. Pfister, however, does not. authorize 
federal courts to strike down arguably vague state 
statutes simply because they exist. Federal interven­
tion is appropriate only if  the State has engaged in 
overt acts of enforcement resulting in irreparable in­
jury, or “ chilling effect.” In Dombrowski all plain­
tiffs had been indicted and had been otherwise 
aggrieved by the systematic and abusive enforcement 
of the challenged state law.

The case or controversy requirement of Article III , 
section 2 of the United States Constitution marks a 
boundary beyond which the holding of Dombrowski 
may not be extended. We have previously urged that 
appellees Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky present no 
justiciable controversy. Therefore, the District Court 
exceeded its jurisdiction in reviewing separate and 
severable sections of the Syndicalism Act not involved 
in the prosecution against Harris. Brief for Appel­
lant, 26-30. Delta Book Distributors, Inc. v. Cromrich, 
304 F.Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1969). Golden v. Zwickler, 
394 U.S. 103 (1969), confirms our view.



B. Abstention is Proper Absent Bad Faith Enforcement of a 
Statute Challenged as Unconstitutionally Vague.

Appellee Harris presents an actual controversy. He 
alleged that the Syndicalism Act was on its face 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The District 
Court interpreted Dombrowski as forbidding absten­
tion. Harris v. Younger, 281 F.Supp. 507, 510-11 
(C.D. Cal. 1968). We urge that Harris does not pre­
sent; a proper case for federal intervention in a state 
criminal prosecution.

Abstention, or nonintervention, must be the rule 
where (1) statutory overbreadth results from vague­
ness, and (2) there is no showing of bad faith 
enforcement of the challenged statute.

In such a case abstention permits state courts to 
invalidate challenged statutes, thereby eliminating a 
direct federal affront to state sovereignty. See, e.g., 
Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 18 (1967). 
Alternatively, state courts may clarify an allegedly 
vague enactment, thereby narrowing the law so as to 
eliminate overbreadth. See, e.g., Danskin v. San Diego 
Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 
(1946) ; People v. Epton, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9, 227 N.E.2d 
829 (1967), cert, denied, 390 H.S. 29 (1968). In the 
latter event, federal courts avoid a most delicate con­
stitutional question;: the extent; of federal limitations 
on state power. Cf. Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U.S. 288, 
346-48 (1936).

Abstention confers other benefits which may be 
enjoyed without chilling free expression: it avoids 
long delays in state criminal prosecutions ; it reduces



6

the burden on federal district courts and on this 
Court,: it encourages state courts to assume full re­
sponsibility for protecting federally guaranteed 
rights; it recognizes state courts as the ultimate 
arbiters o f state law.

Dombrowshi decided that a “ chilling effect” upon 
First Amendment freedoms was an unacceptable price 
for the benefits of abstention. Mr. Justice Harlan has 
characterized the “ chilling effect” doctrine as “ amor­
phous,” “ slippery,” and “ ubiquitous.”  Zwickler v. 
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 255, 256 n.2 (concurring opin­
ion) (1967). Certainly, the concept is an amiable 
fiction deserving of scrutiny. Golden v. Ztvickler, 394 
U.S. 103 (1969), decided that the mere existence of 
an arguably unconstitutional statute regulating con­
duct in the First Amendment area did not produce 
an intolerable in terrorem or “ chilling” effect. Nor 
does the good faith enforcement of such a law unac­
ceptably inhibit free expression. Indeed, appellees 
here emphasize that publications appended to our 
opening brief are dated after Harris’ indictment. 
Appellees’ Supplemental Brief on Reargument, 17 
n.19. The inadequate allegations of Dan, Hirsch, and 
Broslawsky reflect Harris’ difficulties in discovering 
other plaintiffs actually inhibited by the Syndicalism 
Act, or by Harris’ prosecution.

An unacceptable restraint on free expression may 
result where state officials take advantage of vague 
language in a, statute so as to expand its scope to 
include constitutionally protected conduct. This oc­
curred in Dombrowshi; it did not happen here. Such



7

enforcement has the same effect as the enforcement 
of an overbroad statute. Given systematic and abusive 
enforcement of a vague statute, abstention may be 
improper. Absent a showing of bad faith enforce­
ment, the balance falls in favor of nonintervention, 
in favor o f permitting state courts to uphold state 
laws by construing them in a manner consistent with 
the requirements of the Constitution.

W e view the absence of bad faith enforcement as 
equally relevant on the separate questions of declara­
tory and injunctive relief. We do not regard a judg­
ment declaring a state statute unconstitutional to be 
a substantially lesser interference with a state’s good 
faith administration of criminal justice than an ini- 
junction against future enforcement. Nor do we 
regard a declaratory judgment to be a permissible 
circumvention of the federal anti-injunction statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 2283. Cunningham v. A. J. Abet •man, Inc., 
252 F.Supp. 602 (W.D. Pa. 1965), aff’d per curiam, 
358 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1967). The same criteria should 
apply in determining the propriety of declaratory 
judgments and injunctions.

“ Statutory vagueness should be eliminated as an 
independent ground for intervention. The bad 
faith standard should be broadened to require 
consideration of the general pattern o f police 
conduct toward the complaining group.”  Com­
ment, 75 Yale L.J. 1007, 1037 (1966).

W e do not ask that Dombrowski be abandoned, only 
that its limitations, recognized elsewhere, be acknowl­
edged here. The abstention, or nonintervention, prin­



8

ciple we urge is consistent with this Court’s decisions 
following Donibrowski. Federal intervention was de­
manded there because of bad faith enforcement of a 
statute both vague and overbroad. Arrests, seizures 
of records, and threats of continued prosecutions oc­
curred despite efforts by the plaintiffs to vindicate 
their rights in successful state court actions.

In Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742 (1965), 
Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart, dissenting, ex­
pressed their opinion that federal intervention was 
justified only when a, vague and overbroad statute 
was enforced in bad faith. Id. at 748.

Plaintiffs in Wells v. Hand, 238 F.Supp. 779 (M.D. 
G-a. 1965), attacked the constitutionality o f a Georgia 
statute forbidding the circulation of insurrectionary 
papers. Bad faith enforcement was alleged but not 
shown. Id. at 784. The District Court, being of the 
opinion that the statute was capable of a narrowing 
construction, refused to declare it unconstitutional on 
its face or to enjoin its enforcement.1 This Court, per 
curiam, affirmed the decision of the District Court. 
Wells v. Reynolds, 382 U.S. 39 (1965). Our case 
differs from Wells only in that here bad faith en­
forcement is not alleged much less shown.

The impact of Donibrowski was next considered in 
Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). Zwiekler at­
tacked a New York statute exclusively on grounds of 
overbreadth, asserting that it punished conduct pro­
tected by the First Amendment, This Court held that

1Th.e same statute later was declared unconstitutional on its face. 
Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F.Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966).



9

abstention from a declaratory judgment was inap­
propriate because the state law was not susceptible 
of a narrowing construction by state courts. Id. at 
249-52, 256-57. This followed the holding of Baggett 
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), wherein the Court 
declined to abstain from passing on the constitution­
ality o f a 1931 Washington loyalty oath because : 

“ W e doubt, in the first place, that a construction 
of the oath provisions, in light of the vagueness 
challenge, would avoid or fundamentally alter the 
constitutional issue raised in this litigation.” Id. 
at 375-76.

Unlike Koota and Baggett, the question o f over- 
breadth ini our case may be resolved by a narrowing 
interpretation by California, courts. Indeed, it is our 
position that such a, limiting construction has been 
placed upon the Syndicalism Act. Brief for Appel­
lant, 15-26.

Later, in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), 
this Court said “ W e viewed Dombrowski to be a case 
presenting a situation o f the ‘ impropriety o f [state 
officials] invoking the statute in bad faith to impose 
continuing harassment in order to discourage appel­
lants’ activities, . . ”  390 U.'S. at 619. Some saw in
this a step away from Dombrowski:

“ It must ble assumed . . . that in Cameron vL 
Johnson I I  the Court retreated from its position 
in Dombrowski that the mere existence of a law 
unconstitutional on its face provides a basis for 
attacking it.”  Note, 69 Col.L.Rev. 808, 816 (1969).

In fact, Dombrowski did not hold that the mere exist­
ence o f a statute warranted federal review.



10

On the authority o f Cameron II, the Court then 
affirmed the decision of the District Court in Brooks 
v. Briley, 274 F.Supp. 538 (M.D. Term. 1967), aff’d 
mem., 391 U.S. 361 (1968). Brooks held abstention 
appropriate where a state statute was attacked as 
vague and overbroad, absent a showing' of bad faith 
enforcement.

“ While the Dombrowski opinion contains lan­
guage which may be susceptible of the interpreta­
tion! that abstention is never appropriate where 
statutes regulating expression are properly chal­
lenged for facial vagueness or overbreadth, we 
do not believe that the Supreme Court has com­
mitted itself to such a doctrinaire position where, 
as here, there is no predicate for finding a 
bad faith invocation or use of criminal laws, 
or chilling effects or irreparable injury if  state 
criminal proceedings are allowed to continue. 
This would appear to be indicated by the Su­
preme Court’s affirmance, after its Dombrowski 
decision, of Wells v. Hand. . . Brooks v. Briley, 
274 F.Supp. at 550.

The principle to be distilled from the Court’s deci­
sions is this: abstention is proper where in a, pending 
case a state court may, by clarifying a vague statute, 
eliminate overbreadth; provided that state officials 
have not exploited the uncertainty of the law by ap- 

^  ^ without hope of conviction so as to discour-
Y  /  age the exercise of protected freedoms. Dombrowski 

did not wholly discard the teaching of Harrison v. 
N.A.A.C.P., 360 U.S. 167, 176-177 (1959), that fed- 
eral courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality.Ar

(\ v 5"

of state statutes fairly open to interpretation until

A '• J v  -w,
•X Y



11

state courts have been afforded a proper opportunity 
to pass upon them.2 Accord, Turner v, Labette, 251 
P.Supp. 443 (D.C. Conn. 1966); Buncombe v. State 
of New York, 267 P.Supp. 103 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); 
Zwicker v. Boll, 270 P.Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967).

C. Dombrowski Does Not Authorize Federal Invalidation of 
California’s Syndicalism Act Because It Is Susceptible of a 
Limiting Construction Readily to be Anticipated as a Result 
of the Pending Prosecution.

W e have pointed out that in reviewing the Syndi­
calism Act, the District Court completely ignored sev­
eral decisions by California appellate courts clarify­
ing and limiting the terms of the statute. Brief for 
Appellant, 15-26. Words used by a state supreme 
coprt in construing a statute are as much a part of 
the statute as if  the Legislature had put them there.

2The entire Syndicalism Act was no more placed before the state 
courts by Harris than before the federal district court by all of the 
appellees. The state trial court was never afforded an opportunity to 
narrow the meaning of the Penal Code section 11401(3) by limiting 
instructions. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969). 
The state appellate courts did not pass upon the- merits of the- con­
stitutional challenge in denying Harris a writ of prohibition, for 
the writ is discretionary.

Harris complains that the state courts allowed his prosecution to 
proceed without requiring a showing that his conduct created a 
clear and present danger that a change in indiistrial ownership or 
political reform would result, a showing that his conduct consti­
tuted incitement to imminent lawless action, and a showing of 
specific intent to accomplish immediate political or economic change. 
Appellees’ Supplemental Brief on Reargument, 7-15.

First, since the Act proscribes advocacy of violent acts for the 
purpose of achieving political or economic change, the state is 
obliged to show that a defendant’s conduct gave rise to a clear and 
present danger of violent acts, not to a likelihood of social change. 
Second, the clear and present danger test is judicially imposed 
after the facts surrounding the charged offense have been developed 
at trial. Similarly, intent to incite others to imminent lawless action 
and conduct having the effect of incitement are factual matters to 
be shown at trial.



12

Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948); 
Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 244 (1953). Nev­
ertheless, the District Court overlooked Danskin v. 
San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 545, 
171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946), wherein Justice Traynor 
wrote that:

“ The Criminal Syndicalism Act can . . .  be 
applied only when there is imminent danger that 
the advocacy of the doctrine it seeks to prohibit 
will give rise to the evils that the state may 
prevent.”

Danskin thus narrowed the definition of advocacy 
proscribed under the Act to conform with the require­
ments of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 
(1969). W e adhere to our position that, as construed 
by our state courts, the Syndicalism Act is consti­
tutional. As we did not rely upon Whitney v. Cali­
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), holding that the statute 
is constitutional as enacted, the overruling o f Whit­
ney in Brandenburg does not affect our submission.

Appellees argue that the recited language in Dan- 
skin is dictum. Appellees’ Supplemental Brief on 
K('argument. 14 n,15. Our disagreement on this point, 
however, is insignificant for the quoted statement by 
Justice Traynor surely cannot be authoritative or 
nonauthoritative according to a lawyer’s esoteric dis­
tinction between dictum and holding.3 Danskin and 
other state appellate decisions allay all reasonable

sAppellees’ suggestion that the declaration in Danskin is nullified 
by American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education, 59 Cal.2d 
203, 379 P.2d 4 (1963), is utterly devoid of merit. Appellees’ Sup­
plemental Brief on Reargument, 14 n.15.



13

fears that the Act can be applied to constitutionally 
protected conduct.

Assuming, however, that had the District Court 
considered relevant state court decisions, it could 
properly have concluded that they failed authorita­
tively to cure vagueness and overbreadth, it should 
have found reason in those decisions to abstain from 
declaring the statute unconstitutional. i, ,

Kp
Dombrowski expressly states that abstention is ^ . 

proper where “ a readily apparent construction sug- prpY 
gests itself as a Vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes / ‘ ,u^
in a single prosecution. . . . ” Id. at 491. Danskin 
People v. Malley, 49 Cal.App. 597, 1194 Pac. 48 ^  ^  
(1920), People v. Flanagan, 65 Cal.App, 268, 276, 223 c' ' . \
Phc. 1014, 1017 (1924), and other state decisions 
supply a rehabilitating construction. California */' "
courts, which “ regularly have shown full alertness 
to accept and be governed by the constitutional inter­
pretations that are enunciated by the Supreme 
Court,” should have been permitted to supply that 
construction in the Harris prosecution. Harris v.
Younger, 281 RSupp. at 510. Com,pare People v.
Epton, 281 N.Y;S.2d 9, 227 N.E.2d 829 (1967), cert, 
denied, 390 U.S. 29 (1968). Instead, contrary to the 
inhibition of 28 U.S.C. § 2283, the prosecution pend­
ing against Harris was enjoined.



14

CONCLUSION

The District Court administered an overdose of the 
“ strong medicine”4 prescribed by Dombrowski v. 
Pfister. The decision o f the District Court declaring 
the Syndicalism Act unconstitutional should be re­
versed. The injunction against appellant Younger 
should be dissolved.

Dated, February 20, 1970.
Thomas C. L ynch,

Attorney General of the State of California,

A lbert W . H arris, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General of the State of California,

Clifford K. T hompson, Jr.,
Deputy Attorney General of the State of California,

Attorneys for Appellant.

iCam,eron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 622, 623 (dissenting opinion 
of Mr. Justice Fortas) (1968).