Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, TN Brief for Appellees

    IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 72-2143

ROBERT W. KELLEY, et al.,
Plaintif fs-Appellants,

vs.
1^ 1

THE METROPOLITAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

AVON N. WILLIAMS, JR.
1414 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
SYIV IA DREW 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appellants
1



I N D E X
Page

Issue Presented for Review ..........................  1
Statement.................. ^  7 i ................... 2
ARGUMENT ............................................  7
Conclusion..........................................  15

Appendix............................................  la

Table of Cases
Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949) .........  10
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) ...........  9
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 324 F. Supp.

439 (E.D. Va. 1971)   8-9, 11
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)   12
Harvest v. Board of Public Instruction of Manatee

County, Civ. No. 65-12-T (M.D. Fla., April 11,
1970)   12

Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Educ., 463
F.2d 732 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 41 U.S.L.W.
3254 (November 6, 1972)   2

Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir. 1956) .........  9
Laird v. Tatum, No. 71-288, 41 U.S.L.W. 3208

(October 10, 1972)   11
Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 466 F.2d

890 (6th Cir. 1972)   12
Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 635

(6th Cir. 1971) ..................................  12
Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. K-88-71

(W.D. Mich., August 9, 1972)   12



Table of Cases (continued)

Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1957) 
Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. United States,

415 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1969) ......

Paqe 
. . 9

Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966)
SEC v. Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1970) .. 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 

U.S. 1 (1971) ............
Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949)
Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1967) • . 9
United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1971) 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) . 
United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967)

. . 9 
• • 9
•• 8, 11

Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1968)

ii



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 72-2143

ROBERT W. KELLEY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

THE METROPOLITAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.,

j Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 

Issue Presented for Review

Did the District Judge err when he recused himself 
upon the filing, hy one of the defendants in this school 
desegregation action, of a motion under 28 U.S.C. §144 —  

despite the Judge's clearly correct determination that the 
motion and affidavit were legally insufficient, that the



motion was filed as a subterfuge to remove the Judge because 
of disagreement with his rulings, and without any indication 
that personal embarrassment or other cause existed for a 
recusal sua sponte?

Statement

The long history of this school desegregation case 
involving the public schools of Nashville, Tennessee, is set 
out in this Court's most recent opinion, Kelley v. Metropolitan 
County Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 732 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 41 
U.S.L.W. 3254 (November 6, 1972). In that decision, this Court 
said:

The District Court order in this case 
specifically retained jurisdiction.
Thus, upon our affirmance, the door of 
the District Court is clearly open (as 
it has been!) to the parties to present 
any unanticipated problems (not 
resulting from failure to comply with 
its order) which may have arisen or 
may arise in the future.

(463 F.2d at 747). Accordingly, on July 17, 1972, the
Metropolitan County Board of Education filed a Petition in the

1/
district court (A. 1-6) alleging, in substance, that serious
practical problems had developed in the administration of the
desegregation order entered by the Court which in the board's
view justified certain modifications to the order. In
particular, the board proposed changes in the plan in order to 
1/ Citations are to the Appendix herein.

-2-



free twenty-nine busses which would be 
used to transport students attending 
other schools . . . [and which would thus]
allow all schools to open no later than 
9:30 a.m. and to close no later than 4:00 
p .m.

(A. 3)[emphasis added]. To achieve this result, the board was 
proposing changes in the junior high school desegregation plan 
pursuant to which "Washington and Wharton schools would become 
virtually all black walk-in schools and Hillwood Junior High 
would become virtually all white" (A. 2).

A hearing on the board's petition was held August 16, 
1972. Testimony of the Superintendent and two assistants 
indicated that the changes were being proposed only to attempt 
to alleviate the problem of school days for elementary children 
at twelve facilities ending after 4:00 p.m. (A. 30-31, 58); 
that the system considered the resegregation of the junior high 
schools to be undesirable (A. 36, 240) and required only because 
sufficient transportation facilities did not exist (A. 55-56, 
212-13). In turn, the evidence revealed that the school system 
had sought funds from the Metropolitan Government and City 
Council to purchase additional equipment, but that requests 
were denied (A. 16, 60-62) with the clear message from individ­
ual Council members that funds for additional buses in order

2/ The Petition also sought to make minor boundary adjustments 
for elementary schools, which were unopposed, and which the 

district court permitted (See A. 44-54).

-3-



to implement the desegregation plan would not be voted (A. 65). 
The Superintendent, on cross-examination, also acknowledged 
that the Mayor had expressed opposition to the desegregation 
plan because it involved busing (A. 66).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the District 
Court ruled from the bench (A. 246-47) that the elementary 
school boundary line modifications (see n.2 supra) would be 
permitted but the proposed resegregation of junior high schools 
would not be allowed. In light of the school board's expressed 
concern for the safety of pupils dismissed from classes 
after 4:00 p.m., the Court directed the school authorities 
to immediately place a purchase order for a sufficient number 
of buses to end such scheduling and to make suitable arrange­
ments for the rental or other temporary use of such vehicles 
until delivery of the new ones. Finally, reflecting the evidence 
concerning the role of the City Council members in preventing 
an earlier solution of the safety problem by the school 
authorities, the court took the occasion to grant a year-old
motion which had been made by plaintiffs seeking the addition

3 /
of the Mayor and Council members as parties defendant, and 
they were temporarily restrained pending a hearing a week 
thereafter from interfering with execution of the Court's 
Orders or putting pressure upon the school board in that regard.

17
See Supplemental Appendix in Nos. 71-1778 & -1779, pp.

78-81 (attached hereto as Appendix A).

-4-



The following day, a written Order, somewhat more precise in 
its injunctive provisions, was entered superseding the oral 
bench order (A. 249-51) and on August 18 a Memorandum supportive 
of the Order was filed (A. 252-63).

Thereafter, on August 22, 1972, the Mayor of Nashville 
(C. Beverly Briley) filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 
demanding that the District Court recuse itself. The affidavit 
supporting the motion set out numerous excerpts from the 
transcript of the August 16, 1972 proceedings which the Mayor 
claimed indicated a personal bias on the part of Judge Morton 
against him (although the Mayor is nowhere mentioned in the 
Court's remarks) and contained quotations from the Court's 
rulings (A. 264-84):

The same day, without any response to the motion
having been filed by any of the other parties, the Court issued
an Order finding the motion and affidavit completely legally
insufficient under the statute (A. 285). However, even while
recognizing that the motion was a "subterfuge," the District
Judge determined to recuse himself. Plaintiffs thereupon
filed a Motion to Vacate the Order of Recusal (A. 286-88)
which was denied after a hearing in a Memorandum (A. 292-96)
which concluded as follows:

The Court, upon considering the motion to 
recuse and the affidavit, considers the same 
to be without merit. The action of the Court 
stands, however, on a different basis.
Integrity of the judicial process requires not 
only fairness and impartiality, but also the

-5-



appearance of fairness and impartiality. The 
motion to recuse is a device to accomplish this 
purpose. it is sparingly used by counsel for 
the reason that it is usually instantly granted.
It is, however, also available as a subterfuge 
ploy and to the Court's surprise, it appears to 
be so utilized by counsel in this case. Such 
utilization does not, however, change the basis 
for the Court's decision.
The quality of justice cannot be dependent upon 
the identity of a particular individual who sits 
on a particular Court at a particular time. A 
general uniformity of justice is effected by the 
nature and structure of our judicial system. It 
is the process, not the particular person, which 
determines the justice applied in our society.
It is the Court's observation that everything 
that has occurred to date in this case is the 
natural, necessary, inevitable, and fully 
predictable consequence of the School Board's 

" '^hard-line policy —  however induced or influenced.
It is likewise this Court's opinion that 
changing the judge won't change anything else 
unless the Board seizes the opportunity to modify 
its attitudes. Perhaps changing Judges can 
operate as it sometimes appears when baseball 
clubs change managers -- maybe emotions can be 
calmed so intelligence can have an opportunity.
The motion to reconsider is denied.

(A. 295-96) (emphasis added). Subsequently, a hearing was
conducted before the Hon. Frank Gray, Chief Judge of the District
Court, who sustained the propriety of the temporary restraining
order against the Mayor and City Council while vacating it since
bus orders had been placed, the purpose of the order had been
accomplished, and the Court believed "that all defendants in
the case will now proceed, in good faith, to assist in the
implementation of the orders heretofore entered in this action
..." (A. 297-300, at 300). x N

-6-



September 14, 1972, certain members of the City Council 
filed a Notice of Appeal from the August 17 Order of Judge 
Morton requiring the acquisition of additional buses to alleviate 
safety problems (that appeal has since been dismissed) and on 
September 15, 1972 plaintiffs appealed the Order of Recusal.

ARGUMENT

This appeal brings before this Court a very serious 
problem of federal judicial administration: the substantial 
pressures placed upon federal district judges by local or 
national politicians in an effort to influence the course of 
decision. Not only is the problem arising with greater frequency 
than ever in school desegregation actions, but one may hardly 
imagine a class of cases in which the character of the judicial 
response is as important to the maintenance of strong and inde­
pendent federal courts. Additionally, just as vigorous and sus­
tained leadership on the part of local school boards plays an 
immensely important role in the success of desegregation 
efforts, so too may the firm and courageous stand of a federal 
district judge in support of his oath of office engender the 
respect for the law so essential to the survival of our system.

The situation presented to the District Court in 
this case called for— if anything— disciplinary action against 
counsel, rather than stepping down from the case. Beyond any 
peradventure, the motion and affidavit were so devoid of any 
possible merit as to be frivolous, scandalous and designed only

-7-



to diminish public respect for the office of the Court.

The briefest discussion of the law concerning § 144 
motions will serve to demonstrate the technical and substantive 
sufficiency of that made in this case. In the first place, 
counsel were apparently unwilling or unable to accompany the 
motion with a certificate of good faith, United States v.
Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1966); and see, cases cited 
by plaintiffs in opposition to motion to recuse (A. 289-90). 
Furthermore, the extensive quotations from the August 16 
transcript contained in the Mayor's affidavit are hardly suffi­
cient to suggest a personal bias. They are in most instances 
"taken somewhat out of context [and a]fter reconstruction of 
the incidents ... do not ... rise to the level of exhibiting a 
bent of mind impeding impartiality of judgment," Wolfson v. 
Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1968). Indeed, the Mayor—  
who executed the affidavit— was never mentioned by the District 
Court during the hearing.

The affidavit attempts to connect the District Court's
"objectionable comments" with some kind of bias by referring
to the Court's expression of legal opinion contained in the
Memorandum accompanying the temporary restraining order (A. 275) .

Prejudgment as to the law, of course, is 
manifestly insufficient by reason of the 
fact that every judge presumably knows 
his legal premises before the evidence 
comes in, and if he is in error the remedy 
is by appeal. Indeed, even if a judge 
thinks a party's legal position is weak 
or in error, this would not in any way impede a judge's ability to conduct a 
fair trial.

-8-



Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 324 F. Supp. 439, 445 (E.D.
Va. 1971). Accord, Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F.2d 79, 84 (7th 
Cir. 1950). The general rule is that the fact of adverse 
rulings during the proceedings will not support a § 144 motion 
to recuse. Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6th Cir. 1956); 
Palmer v. United States, 249 F.2d 8, 9 (10th Cir. 1957); Tynan 
v. United States, 376 F.2d 761, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United 
States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351, 369 (7th Cir. 1971).

There may have been some close questioning by the 
Court at the August 16 hearing, designed to elucidate all of 
the relevant evidence, but that is hardly indicative of the 
Court's prejudice. As the Fifth Circuit has said of a some­
what analogous situation: "A last ditch, last hour stand in 
defense of the racial purity of the public schools of Plaquemines 
Parish, could hardly be expected to pass into history without 
producing some fireworks," Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v.
United States, 415 F.2d 817, 825 (5th Cir. 1969).

The relevant inquiry is whether the affidavit success­
fully reveals a personal bias stemming from an extrajudicial 
source, Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921); United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). But, while the
affidavit correctly quotes instances in the August 16 hearing 
in which the District Court attempted to ascertain the occur­
rence or correctness of events which had been suggested by the 
media prior to the hearing, in every relevant instance the 
matters which formed the basis for the Court's August 17 ruling

-9-



were established by sworn testimony at the trial. "A record 
which reflects an appropriate ground for a trial court's 
observations refutes any claim of personal bias." SEC v. 
Bartlett, 422 F.2d 475, 481 (8th Cir. 1970), and cases cited.

The Mayor was in essence complaining that the District 
Court was biased and prejudiced because it enforced the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

The facts set forth in this affidavit, however, 
show no personal bias on the part of the judge 
against any of the defendants, but, at most, 
zeal for upholding the rights of Negroes under 
the Constitution and indignation that attempt 
should be made to deny them their rights. A 
judge cannot be disqualified merely because he 
believes in upholding the law, even though he 
says so with vehemence. Personal bias against 
a party must be shown.

Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391, 394 (4th Cir. 1949). While we 
commend the District Court's actions and rulings of August 16-17, 
we hardly think they are indicative of a bias against the Mayor 
and City Council; the situation was brought to the attention 
of the Court on October 21, 1971 when plaintiffs filed a motion 
to join the Mayor and Council as parties (see n.3 supra) but 
was ignored by the Court from that time until the evidence and 
testimony of August 16 were received upon a subsequent school 
board motion.

We come, then, to question the propriety of the 
District Court's action in recusing itself upon the filing of 
so inadequate a motion and affidavit. As Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
has recently summarized,

-10-



The federal courts of appeals which have 
considered the matter have unanimously 
concluded that a federal judge has a duty 
to sit where not disqualified which is 
equally as strong as the duty to not sit 
where disqualified. Edwards v. United States,
334 F.2d 360, 362 (CA 5 1964); Tynan v.
United States, 376 F.2d 761 (CADC 1967); In 
re Union Leader Corporation, 292 F.2d 381 
(CA 1 1961); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 
121 (CA 2 1968); Simmons v. United States,
302 F.2d 71 (CA 3 1962); United States v.
Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (CA 6 1967); Tucker v.
Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (CA 7 1950); Walker v.
Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (CA 8 1969).

Laird v. Tatum, No. 71-288, 41 U.S.L.W. 3208, 3210 (October 10, 
1972). See also, Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, supra, 324 F. Supp. at 449.
And while a district judge is always free to withdraw from a 
case irrespective of the insufficiency of the motion and affidavit, 
see United States v. Hoffa, supra, 382 F.2d at 861; Wolfson v. 
Palmieri, supra, 396 F.2d at 125, "there are strong counter­
vailing considerations which must affect a judge's decision:"

A judge has a duty to decide whatever cases 
come before him to the best of his ability.
28 U.S.C. § 453. There is an obligation not 
to disqualify one's self, therefore, solely 
by reason of the personal burdens related 
to the task. The duty is the more compelling 
when a single judge has acquired by experience 
familiarity with a protracted, complex case, 
which could not easily be passed on to a second judge ....

Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, supra, 324 F.2d at 448-49.

Two especial considerations in school desegregation 
cases enlarge the significance of this principle. First, the 
litigation is extraordinarily complex (particularly when its 
subject matter is a school system of the size involved herein)

-11-



and calls for the exercise of an enlightened federal equitable 
jurisdiction, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1 (1971), which must be informed by a thorough knowledge.
Second, such cases assume extraordinary significance in the 
political arena and are readily perceived as appropriate vehicles 
for publicized attempts to influence the course of decision 
through pressure. E,g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958);
Harvest v. Board of Public Instruction of Manatee County, Civ.
No. 65-12 T. (M.D. Fla., April 11, 1970).

The very magnitude and continuing nature of the problem, 
we believe, compels an exercise of this Court's supervisory
power in this instance. The practice of political figures'

| | .attempts to extort :specified results from federal district
judges is not a relic of an antiquarian age, fifteen or even
five years ago. It is a repeatedly recurring problem in the
district courts of this Circuit. A motion to recuse followed
a favorable district court ruling in the Kalamazoo case, Oliver
v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 448 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1971), for
example. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. K-88-71
(W.D. Mich., August 9, 1972).

District judges tend almost unavoidably to respond to 
these pressures. In the Memphis case, Northcross v. Board of 
Educ. of Memphis, 466 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1972), for example, 
the district court initiated recusal proceedings by a letter to 
counsel in which the Court stated that his son was attending 
the Memphis public schools and the Court desired to be informed

-12-



whether either party desires that the Court recuse itself. 
Frankly, the plaintiffs viewed this letter as some indication 
that the Court was aware of community pressures, and responded 
as follows:

After full consideration of the matter 
our clients have instructed us to submit 
this request that the Court recuse himself 
in this case. Because of the community 
tension, the campaign last year and this 
year of public hostility led by public 
officials and the resulting abuse and harass­
ment of the Court and counsel, plaintiffs 
request that in accordance with the guidelines 
for nondisclosure that you communicate our 
motion that the Court, pursuant to 28 USC 292 (b) request that the Chief Judge of the 
Circuit, in the public interest, designate a 
Judge not resident in this district to hear 
this case.

The District Court did not recuse itself but transmitted the 
response to the chief Judge, who entered an order July 12, 1971 
denying the request, stating that no grounds for disqualification 
existed.

The point of this recital is not that there should 
have been a change of judges in the Memphis case, but that the 
problem of judicial response to community pressures in school 
desegregation cases merits the attention of this Court.

Appellants here have absolutely no preference as 
between Hon. L.Clure Morton and Hon. Frank Gray, the United 
States District Judges for the Middle District of Tennessee. 
Indeed, Judge Gray's Order (A. 297-300) subsequent to the recusal 
of Judge Morton verifies the latter's observation (A. 296) that

-13-



"changing the Judge won't change anything else." However, it 
is also undeniable that Judge Gray, already burdened with a 
full docket and with additional administrative responsibilities 
as Chief Judge of the District Court, will require substantial 
additional time to become familiar with the details and intri­
cacies of the metropolitan Nashville school system so as to be 
in a position to deal with any future request for modification 
of the plan, etc. Nor is the goal of a strong and independent 
federal judiciary able to effectuate federal Constitutional 
guarantees served if parties who disagree with rulings on issues 
of public importance can secure the withdrawal of a judge by 
the filing of a frivolous motion and affidavit.

Nothing in the comments or Orders of the original 
District Judge in this case indicates that personal embarrass­
ment, etc., played a part in the decision to recuse. Rather, 
the Court states what seems to us a very infelicitous metaphor:

Perhaps changing Judges can operate 
as it sometimes appears when baseball 
clubs change managers —  maybe emotions 
can be calmed so intelligence can have 
an opportunity.

(A. 296). It seems apparent from this remark that the District 
Judge was strongly influenced to recuse himself by the mere 
filing of a motion by Mayor Briley, however insubstantial and 
insufficient. If that is indeed the case, we think it evident 
that Judge Morton should have continued with the matter.

Appellants cannot in good conscience request this 
Court to direct Judge Morton to resume jurisdiction in the cause.

-14-



However, it would seem appropriate, in light of the circumstances 
and precedent set out above, for the matter to be remanded with 
instructions that Judge Morton reconsider his recusal, and 
with guidance from this Court to the effect that no obligation 
whatsoever toward recusal should be considered to have been 
created by the filing of the frivolous motion and affidavit 
submitted by Mayor Briley.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, appellants 
respectfully pray that this matter be remanded to the District 
Court for reconsideration of the Order of Recusal entered by 
Hon. L. Clure Morton in accordance with such suggestions and 
guidance as the Court elucidates in its opinion.

Respectfully submitted,

AVON N. WILLIAMS, JR.
1414 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
SYLVIA DREW

10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Appellants

-15-



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of January, 
1973, I served two copies of the Brief for Appellants Kelley, 
et al. in the above-captioned matter upon the following counsel 
for the parties herein by depositing same in the United States 
mail, first-class postage prepaid, addressed to each of them as 
follows:

James H. Harris, Esq. 
Metropolitan Court House 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
Seymour Samuels, Jr., Esq. 
Third National Bank Bldg. 
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Larry Snedeker, Esq. 
Metropolitan Court House 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
Gilbert S. Merritt, Esq. 
Life & Casualty Tower 
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

Harland Dodson, Jr., Esq.
900 Nashville Bank & Trust Bldg 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201
James F. Neal, Esq.
Third National Bank Bldg. 
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Ogden Stokes, Esq.
1507 Parkway Towers 
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
Hon. Charles H. Anderson 
United States Attorney 
Nashville, Tennessee 37203

Attorney^for Appellants





IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ' 

NOS. 71-1778 and 71-1779

ROBERT W. KELLEY, et al.,
HENRY C. MAXWELL, JR., et al.,

Piainti ffs-Appellees-Cross 
Appellants,

vs . _ ----
METROPOLITAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
NASHVILLE and DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants-Cross 
Appellees.

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

AVON N. WILLIAMS, JR.Suite 1414, Parkway Towers 
404 James Robertson Parkway 
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
SYLVIA DREW10 Columbus CircleNew York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Plaintiffs- 
Appellees-Cross Appellants



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