Jenkins v. United Gas Corporation Record on Appeal

    In th e

Inttefc ( ta rt at Appralu
F oe t h e  F ie t h  C ir c u it

No. 24555

T hom as  L . J e n k in s ,

versus
Appellant,

U n it e d  G as C orporation  
and P. G. M a t t h e w s ,

Appellees.

APPEAL PROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

RECORD ON APPEAL

E lm o  R. W illard , III
2160 Washington. Blvd. 
Beaumont, Texas

J ack  G reenberg  
L eroy D . C lark  
R obert B elto n

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, N. Y.

Attorneys for Appellants



I N D E X

PAGE

Plaintiff’s Application for Appointment of Attorney .... 1
Letter Addressed to Thomas Jenkins ...................  3
Commissioner’s Decision .......................................  5

Order Denying Appointment of Attorney ...................  6

Complaint ......................     7

Answer .........   13

Defendants’ Motion for an Early Hearing, and Order 20

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant 23

Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance ..............................  33

Order Overruling Motion for Continuance and Denial 
of Temporary Injunction ............................    36

Defendants’ Suggestion of Mootness of Cause and 
Motion to Dismiss .....................................................  38

Motion to Believe Defendants of Answering Inter­
rogatories .................................................................... 42

Form of Promotion ................................................  47

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Answering 
Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points and 
Authorities ......   48

Memorandum Opinion.................................................... 56

Order of Dismissal .......     60

Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal to U. S. Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit ............................        61

Clerk’s Certificate ....................................    62



Application for Appointment o f Attorney

(Filed March 23, 1966)

I n  t h e

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
In and  F oe. t h e  E a stern  D istr ic t  op T exas 

B ea u m o n t  D iv isio n  

Civil Action No.......... .

T hom as  L. J e n k in s  

versus
U n it e d  G as C orporation

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher, Judge of Said Court:
C om es n o w , T hom as  J e n k in s , your applicant herein, and 

files this, his application for the appointment of an attorney 
to represent him in this cause, pursuant to the provision 
of Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 42 
Section 2000e-5(e) U, S. C. A,), and would show unto this 
Honorable Court the following:

I.
That attached hereto and made a part hereof is a certain 

exhibit in the form of a letter over the signature of Mr. 
George L. Holland, Director of Compliance for the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, which was created 
by the Act above referred to, together with a summary of 
the changes investigated by the Commission, a summary 
of the investigation, and the Commissions’ findings as a 
result of said investigation.



2

Application for Appointment of Attorney

II.
Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 42 

Section 2000e-5(e) U. S. C. A.) provides that this court 
may appoint the charging party an attorney to represent 
him in effectuating compliance with the provisions of the 
Act concerning equality of employment opportunity, with­
out prepayment of costs or security, whenever it is made 
known to the court that said party is unable to employ 
an attorney, all as evidenced by the Commission’s letter 
to your applicant attached hereto as a part of the exhibit 
above referred to.

III.
Your applicant states that he is unable to secure the 

services of an attorney out of his own resources, and 
therefore requests this Honorable Court to appoint E lm o  
R. W illard , III, a practicing attorney, and a member of 
the Bar of this court, to represent him herein, and author­
ize him to commence the filing of a civil action in this 
court to require the above named defendant to comply 
with the Act without prepayment of costs or security.

W h e r e fo r e , your applicant prays that this Honorable 
Court consider this, his application herein, and the exhibit 
attached hereto, and that the same be, in all things granted.

T hom as  J e n k in s , Applicant 
2965 San Antonio Street 
Beaumont, Texas



LETTER ADDRESSED TO THOMAS JENKINS

E Q U A L  SM PU O Y M K N T © PFOISYUW ITY C O M liiSS SO M  
W A M iN a T O H . D .C . IOSM

MAR 7 1966 In Reply Refer to 
File No. 5-11-2573

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED Respondents

United Gas Corporation 
Beaumont, Texas

Mr. Thomas Jenkins 
2965 San Antonio S tree t  
Beaumont, Texas

D ea r  Mr. Jenkins:

Due to the heavy workload of the Commission, it has been impossi­
ble to undertake or to conclude conciliation efforts in the above 
matter as of this date. However, the conciliation activities of 
the Commission will be undertaken and continued.
Under the provisions of Section 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Commission must notify you of your right 
to bring an action in Federal District Court within a limited time 
after the filing of a complaint.
This is to advise you that you may within thirty days of the 
receipt of this letter, institute a civil action in the appropri­
ate Federal District Court. If you are unable to retain an attorney 
the Federal Court is authorized in its discretion, to appoint an 
attorney to represent you and to authorize the commencement of the 
suit without payment of fees, costs or security. If you decide to 
institute suit and find you need such assistance, you may take this 
letter, along with the enclosed Commission determination of reason­
able cause to believe Title VII has been violated, to the Clerk of 
the Federal District Court nearest to the place where the alleged 
discrimination occurred, and to request that a Federal District 
Judge appoint counsel to represent you.
Please feel free to contact the Commission if you have any questions 
about this matter.

Very truly yours

George L. Holland 
Director of Compliance

Enclosure



3



4

COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

(See Opposite) B9P



1 )  . ' ■ . . ’ • J  ■

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Washington, D. C.

Thomas L. Jenkins Case No. 5-11-2573
Charging P a rty

vs.

United Gas C orporation 
Beaumont, Texas

Respondent

Date of alleged incident: August 16, 1965
Date of filing: November 4, 1965
Date of serv ice  of charge: November 29, 1965 *

COMMISSIONER DECISION

SUMMARY OF CHARGE

The Charging P a rty  alleges d iscrim ination  based on race  (Negro) in that 
Caucasians have been tra n s fe rre d  into the Service D epartm ent and prom oted 
to Servicem en, while he and other N egroes rem ained H elpers, although 
qualified to be Servicem en.

SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

The investigation substan tia tes the Charging P a r ty 's  allegation:

Only one Servicem an opening has occurred  since July 2, 1965.
This opening was filled by a Caucasian employee. The Charging 
P a rty  was lis ted  as "not qualified" for promotion to Servicem an 
on Septem ber 8, 1965. The Caucasian employee chosen for the 
job had never done any serv ice  work (other than as a delinquent 
b ill collector) p rio r  to his prom otion, even though the job 
specification s ta tes, "must m eet all the requ irem ents of Job 
No. 3027, H elper, and Job No. 3025, Junior Servicem an, as 
re la ted  to this work, and should have one to two year previous 
experience in th is or re la ted  work. " One of these specifications 
is  the servicing, repairing , testing, and adjusting, delivering 
and installing gas applicances and equipment, which is the 
Charging P a r ty 's  p resen t a ssignm ent. In other words, the 
Charging P arty , who has had one year and nine months in the 
jobs as specified, was not considered qualified, although a 
delinquent bill collector wa s qualified.

•to



-  2 -

On the Charging P a rty  Employee Perfo rm ance and Q ualifica tion  
Review, the notations show him  to be a good w orker, and he 
was charac te rized  as "doing a good job. "

T here a re  no Negro serv icem en in the Respondent organization 
even though there  appears to be at lea s t one qualified Negro, 
other than the Charging P arty .

DECISION

Reasonable cause ex ists to believe that the charge is tru e  in that Respondent 
is  d isc rim in a to rily  refusing to prom ote the Charging P a rty  and other 
qualified N egroes to the position of Servicem an.

f

F eb ru ary  17, 1966
Taither Holcomb 
Vice C hairm an

(Com m ission Seal)

Date of C om m ission Approval:



5

i

I



6

Order

(Filed March 29, 1966)

I n  t h e

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
F oe t h e  E a stern  D istr ic t  op T exas 

B ea u m o n t  D iv isio n  

No.............

T hom as  L. J e n k in s  

versus
U n ited  Gas C orporation

On this the 29th day of March, 1966, came on to be con­
sidered the application of Thomas Jenkins for the appoint­
ment of an attorney to represent him in commencing the 
filing of a civil action to require the above named defen­
dant to comply with Equal Employment Opportunity pro­
visions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 42, Section 
2000e U.S.C.A.), and said application, and all exhibits 
attached thereto, having been examined by the Court and 
under the circumstances the Court does not deem just the 
appointment of an Attorney for complainant or the au­
thorization of the commencement of the action without 
the payment of fees, costs or security.

It is therefore Ordered , A djudged  and D ecreed  by the 
Court that Complainant’s Motion for Appointment of At­
torney and authorization to commence a cause of action 
without the payment of fees, costs or security is Denied.

/s/ Joe J. F is h e r  
United States District Judge



7

Complaint

(Filed April 8, 1966)

In  t h e

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
In and  F ob t h e  E astebn  D istbict  op T exas 

B ea u m o n t  D iv isio n  

Civil Action No. 5152

T hom as  L. J e n k in s , 

v e r s u s
Plaintiff,

U n it e d  G as C obpobation  
a n d  P. G. M a t t h e w s , 

its Area Manager,
Defendants.

Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 
U.S.C., Section 1343. This is a suit in equity authorized 
and instituted pursuant to Title VII of the Act known as 
“The Civil Rights Act of 1964,” Title 42 U.S.C., Sections 
2000e, et seq., and Title 42 U.S.C., Section 1983. The juris­
diction of this court is invoked to secure protection of 
and to redress deprivation of rights secured by (a) Title 
VII of the Act known as “The Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 
Title 42 U.S.C., Sections 2000e, et seq., providing for in­
junctive and other relief against racial discrimination in 
employment and (b) Title 42 U.S.C., Section 1981, pro­
viding for the equal rights of citizens and all persons 
within the jurisdiction of the United States.



8

II.
Plaintiff brings this action in his own behalf and on be­

half of others similarly situated pursuant to Eule 23(a)(3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There are com­
mon questions of law and fact affecting the rights of other 
Negroes seeking equal employment opportunity with the 
defendant corporation, without discrimination on the 
ground of race or color, who are so numerous as to 
make it impracticable to bring them all before this court. 
A common relief is sought and the interests of said class 
are adequately represented by this plaintiff.

III.
This is a proceeding for a preliminary and permanent 

injunction restraining the defendants, and each of them 
their agents, servants, employees, successors or assigns, 
from maintaining a policy, practice, custom and usage of 
withholding, denying, attempting to withhold or deny, 
and depriving or attempting to deprive, and otherwise 
interfering with the rights of plaintiff and others similarly 
situated to equal employment opportunity with or by the 
defendant, United Gas Corporation, without discrimina­
tion on the ground of race or color.

IV.
P l a i n t if f , T h o m a s  L. J e n k in s , is a Negro citizen of 

the United States and the State of Texas residing in the 
City of Beaumont, Texas.

Complaint

V.
Defendant, United Gas Corporation, is a corporation in­

corporated under the laws of the State of Louisiana, doing



9

business in the State of Texas, and in the City of Beaumont, 
and is engaged in a type of business, the nature of which 
affects commerce within the meaning of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, as above referred to.

VI.
The defendant, P. G. Matthews, is the area manager of 

the defendant, United Gas Corporation, maintaining offices 
located at 502 Park Street, Beaumont, Texas, where service 
of process may be had upon him, as well as the defendant 
corporation. He is sued in his official capacity.

VII.
A. At all times material hereto, and from and after the 

2nd day of July, 1965, the effective date of Title VII of 
the Act, the plaintiff was, and still is, employed by the 
defendant corporation in the capacity of a Serviceman’s 
Helper. In the month of May, 1965, the plaintiff applied 
for promotion to the job of “Serviceman,” for which posi­
tion he was fully qualified in all respects, at the time of 
his application. He was told by his immediate supervisor, 
at the time of this application, that he would be considered 
for promotion to such position as soon as the next open­
ing occurred. At the time the next opening occurred, on 
the 16th day of August, 1965, same was filled by a Caucasian 
employee of the defendant corporation, who was not quali­
fied to fill same according to the job specification listing 
the requirements for same published by the defendant 
corporation, and plaintiff to this date, has never been pro­
moted to said position even though other openings have 
occurred and he has been in all respects qualified to fill 
same. And plaintiff says that the defendants, and each of

Complaint



10

them, are denying him equality of opportunity in employ­
ment because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Eights Act of 1964, as above cited and referred to.

B, Plaintiff further alleges, on information and belief, 
that no Negroes are employed as Servicemen at any of 
the plants, offices or service centers under the direct super­
vision and control of the defendant corporation, even though 
there are Negroes other than plaintiff who are qualified 
to hold such positions. And, in the alternative, plaintiff 
alleges that if there are other Negroes employed in such 
capacity by the defendant corporation, that such employ­
ment is on a token basis only; and plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant corporation is wilfully and intentionally de­
nying to him, and other Negro employees similarly situ­
ated, equal employment opportunity in violation of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

C. Plaintiff was refused the promotion to Serviceman, 
as above alleged, on the basis of his race and color pursu­
ant to the defendant corporation’s long standing and well- 
known practice, custom, and usage of refusing to promote 
Negroes to such positions because of their racial origin 
and classification. Pursuant to this policy practice, custom 
and usage, Negroes other than plaintiff have been denied 
promotion to such positions on the basis of race and color.

VIII.

Neither the State of Texas nor the City of Beaumont 
has a law prohibiting the unlawful practices alleged herein. 
On the 4th day of November, 1965, plaintiff filed a com­
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion alleging the denial by the defendants and each of 
them, of his rights under Title VII of The Civil Rights

Complaint



11

Complaint

Act of 1964, Title 42 U.S.O., Section 2000e et seq. On the 
17th day of February, 1966, the Commission found reason­
able cause to believe that a violation of the act had been 
committed by the defendant corporation. Subsequently, 
on or about the 15th day of March, 1966, plaintiff was noti­
fied by the Commission that the defendants’ compliance 
with Title VII had not been accomplished within the maxi­
mum period allowed to the Commission by Title YII of 
“The Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., 
and advising plaintiff of his right to maintain a civil action 
for relief in a United States District Court.

IX.
Plaintiff has no plain, adequate or complete remedy at 

law to redress the wrongs alleged, and this suit for a 
preliminary and permanent injunction is his only means 
of securing adequate relief. Plaintiff and the class he rep­
resents are now suffering and will continue to suffer ir­
reparable injury from defendants’ policy, practice, custom 
and usage as set forth herein.

Wherefore, plaintiff respectfully prays that this court 
advance this cause on the docket, order a speedy hearing 
at the earliest practicable date, cause this matter to be 
in every way expedited, and upon such hearing to :

1. Grant plaintiff, and the class he represents, a prelim­
inary and permanent injunction enjoining the defendants, 
and each of them their agents, servants, successors and 
assigns, and those acting in concert with them and/or at 
their direction from continuing or maintaining the policy, 
practice, custom or usage of denying, abridging, withhold­
ing, conditioning, limiting or otherwise interfering with 
the right of plaintiff and other Negro employees similarly



12

situated, to promotion to the position of Serviceman at 
its plants, offices or Service Centers in the City of Beau­
mont, Texas, on the basis of race or color.

2. Grant plaintiff and the class he represents a prelim­
inary and permanent injunction enjoining defendants, and 
each of them, their agents, servants, successors and assigns, 
and those acting in concert with them and/or at their direc­
tion from continuing or maintaining the policy, practice, 
custom and usage of denying, abridging, withholding, con­
ditioning, limiting or otherwise interfering with the rights 
of plaintiff and others similarly situated to enjoy equal 
employment opportunity as secured by Title VII of the 
Act known as “The Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 42 U.S.C. 
2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. 1981 without discrimination 
on the basis of race or color.

3. Grant plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins, back pay from 
the time of defendant’s wrongful denial of employment 
to the present.

4. Allow plaintiff his costs herein, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees and such other additional relief as may 
appear to the court to be equitable and just.

Respectfully submitted,

J o h n s , W illaed  & H a n n a h

By: / s /  E lm o  R. W illa ed , III 
Elmo R. Willard, III 

Attorney for Plaintiff 
2160 Washington Blvd.

Beaumont, Texas

Complaint



13

Answer

(Filed April 28, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher, United States District 
Judge:

United Gas Corporation and its Area Manager, P. G. 
Matthews, Defendants, come now and answer the Com­
plaint of Thomas L. Jenkins, Plaintiff, and with respect 
show unto the Court as follows:

1.
Denying factually and legally, any proscribed or un­

lawful employment practices or discrimination against the 
Plaintiff or any other employee, the Defendants do not 
agree that jurisdiction over this matter is in this Court; 
however, assuming the existence of the facts which the 
Plaintiff alleges (which facts are not admitted but denied), 
the jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked by the 
Plaintiff under the divers statutes noted in the preamble 
or first unnumbered paragraph of the complaint.

2.

Defendants deny that the class which Plaintiff purports 
to represent is either large or numerous; but, on the con­
trary, these Defendants say that they have not in the past 
nor do they intend in the future to discriminate against 
any employee, including the Plaintiff, because of race or 
color. Consequently, the allegations of Paragraph II of 
the Complaint are denied.



u

3.
The allegations of Paragraph III of the complaint are 

denied. These defendants, both corporate and individual, 
show unto the Court that neither has, since the effective 
date of “The Civil Rights Act of 1964”, been guilty of any 
proscribed conduct therein mentioned with reference to 
the Plaintiff or any other negro employee.

4.
The allegations of Paragraph IV of the Complaint are 

admitted.

Answer

5.
Saying only that it is a corporation organized and 

existing under the laws of the State of Delaware (and not 
the State of Louisiana), the allegations of Paragraph V 
of the Complaint are admitted.

6.

The allegations of Paragraph VI of the Complaint are 
admitted.

7.
A. (1) The first Sentence of Paragraph VII A is ad­

mitted with the qualification that Plaintiff was just a 
“helper.”

(2) The second sentence of Paragraph VII A is denied.
(3) The third sentence of Paragraph VII A is denied.
(4) The fourth sentence is neither admitted or denied 

in its entirety; instead, these Defendants admit that a 
vacancy did occur on or about August 16, 1965, which was



15

filled by a Caucasian employee of the Defendant corpora­
tion. This Caucasian employee was qualified to fill same 
and possessed seniority in occupation over the Plaintiff. 
Admitted that one other vacancy has occurred and the 
Plaintiff was not promoted, but another negro more quali­
fied than Plaintiff with more seniority in occupation did 
receive the promotion.

(5) The fifth sentence of Paragraph VII A is denied.

B. (1) The first sentence of Paragraph VII B is denied.
(2) The first phrase of the second and alternative sen­

tence of Paragraph VII B is not admitted or denied cate­
gorically, these Defendants now say that other Negroes 
are employed but not upon a token basis, and that other 
Negroes will be employed as vacancies occur for which 
they are qualified by training, experience, and service in 
occupation with the Company.

(2) The second phrase of the second sentence of Para­
graph VII B is denied.

C. (1) The first sentence of Paragraph VII C is denied.
(2) The second sentence of Paragraph VII C is denied.

8.

With reference to the allegations contained in Paragraph 
VIII of the Complaint, these defendants say;

(A) Denying any unlawful practices, they admit that 
neither the State of Texas nor the City of Beaumont has 
any law prohibiting the acts complained of by Plaintiff, 
none of which are admitted but expressly denied.

Answer



16

(B) Admitting that Plaintiff did make a complaint, but 
not upon the date alleged, and denying the truth of the 
allegations of the Complaint, Defendants admit the mate­
rial allegations of the second sentence of Paragraph VIII 
of the Complaint for jurisdictional purposes only.

(C) Denying that the Commission acted upon reason­
able grounds or upon adequate evidence and all the while 
maintaining that these Defendants were and are not guilty 
of unlawful employment practices, the Defendants admit 
the material allegations of the third sentence of Paragraph 
VIII of the Complaint for jurisdictional purposes.

(D) Defendants are without knowledge of the truth or 
falsity of the allegations contained in the fourth sentence 
of Paragraph VIII of the Complaint; but, insofar as the 
same are jurisdictional and not made for the purpose of 
establishing the truth thereof, the same are admitted.

9.
The allegations of Paragraph IX of the Complaint, all 

and singular, are denied.
10.

"With reference to the prayer of the Complaint, these 
Defendants respectfully say that they are willing for the 
Court to advance the cause upon the docket and to order 
a speedy hearing at the earliest practicable date, and for 
the Court to cause the matter to be in every way expe­
dited; but, these defendants now say, with reference to 
the particular paragraphs of the prayer:

(A) These defendants have not been guilty of any un­
lawful employment practices at its plants, offices or Ser­
vice Centers in the City of Beaumont, Texas, as defined

Answer



17

in 42 IJSC §2000e-2; consequently they pray that relief 
sought in Paragraph 1 of the prayer of the Complaint be 
denied.

(B) The defendants have not violated the provisions of 
the Act [42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2] and do not intend so to do; 
and, further denying that the Plaintiff is a fair repre­
sentative of an alleged class, they pray that the relief 
sought in Paragraph 2 of the prayer of the Complaint be 
denied.

(C) The Defendants denying any unlawful employment 
practice directed at the Plaintiff because of his race or 
color and denying that the Plaintiff is entitled to any back 
pay, pray that the relief sought in Paragraph 3 of the 
prayer of the Complaint he denied.

(D) Denying that the Plaintiff is entitled to any relief, 
either factually or legally, these Defendants pray that the 
relief sought in Paragraph 4 of the prayer of the Com­
plaint he denied.

First Affirmative Defense:
A. These defendants, both corporate and individual, now 

show unto the Court that since the effective date of the 
Act, July 2, 1965, neither of them has committed any un­
lawful employment practices as defined in 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000e-2, or mentioned elsewhere in said Act; hut, upon 
the contrary, since the effective date of the Act, these De­
fendants have done everything within their power to pre­
vent discrimination against any employee because of his 
race or color. And, these Defendants now show unto the 
Court that they have many employees (both white and 
Negro) in various job classifications and with varying dates 
of service in occupation. These job classifications enable

Answer



18

employees to prepare themselves for advancement by the 
learning of skills and requirements associated with the 
more advanced positions. When a vacancy in a higher 
classification occurs, the employment records of all em­
ployees in the next lower rated classifications are reviewed. 
At such management review, the factors of prior training, 
qualification, performance, and other factors exclusive of 
race of color are considered. After such review, the em­
ployees qualified to fill such job vacancy are listed in 
order of service in occupation and the employee with the 
longest interval of service in occupation is then offered 
the job first. If this employee refuses the job, it is offered 
to the remaining qualified employees in the order of the 
longest period service in occupation. This system has been 
followed uniformly since the effective date of the Act upon 
a non-discriminatory basis and will be followed in the 
future without regard to the race or color of the qualified 
employees eligible for such vacancies.

B. The job vacancy which the Plaintiff mentions in his 
Complaint was filled by an employee in accordance with 
the long-standing policy of offering the job to a qualified 
employee with a longer period of service in occupation 
than Plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff had been qualified, 
which he was not, he would not have received the promo­
tion because his service in occupation was less than that 
of the qualified employee who accepted the job.

C. A subsequent vacancy occurring after the filing of 
Plaintiff’s Complaint with the Commission, but before the 
institution of this suit, was filled by a Negro employee of 
Defendant corporation in accordance with the policy men­
tioned immediately above.

Answer



19

D. Other vacancies will be filled without discrimination 
or the commission of any unlawful employment practices. 
Plaintiff has been upon an approved promotional list in 
the past; and, in all reasonable probability will appear 
upon other such lists when vacancies occur. Plaintiff will 
be considered for promotion to future vacancies in accord­
ance with the long-established promotional policy without 
regard to his race or color.

E. These Defendants, since the effective date of the 
Act, have not discriminated and in the future will not 
discriminate against the Plaintiff or any other employee 
of the corporate defendant because of race or color and 
will not commit any unlawful employment practice as de­
fined in the Act.

Prayer:
W h e b e f o b e , premises considered, and having answered 

fully, the Defendants pray that all relief sought by the 
Plaintiff (individually or as a member of an alleged class) 
be denied and that these Defendants go hence without day 
and recover their costs, and for general relief.

Respectfully submitted,

K e it h , M e h a f f y  & W ebee  
Attorneys for Defendants.

Answer

/ s /  Q u e n t in  K e it h  
Quentin Keith 
1400 San Jacinto Building 
Beaumont, Texas, 77701
Of Counsel.



20

Motion and Order for an Early Hearing

(Filed April 28, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher, United States District 
Judge:

United Gas Corporation and P. G. Matthews, defendants 
in the above entitled and numbered cause, come now and 
join the plaintiff in his request for an early hearing upon 
the plaintiff’s application for a temporary order, and with 
respect now say:

1.
The corporate defendant has many employees, some of 

whom are of the Negro race and others of the Caucasian. 
Plaintiff has made serious charges against not only the 
corporation but its area manager which allegations charge 
a wilful violation of the Civil Bights Act of 1964 and 
charge these defendants with the commission of unlawful 
employment practices as defined in the Act. As is dis­
closed by the answer of these defendants, and as will be 
established by the proof upon a hearing, there is no sub­
stance to the charges filed by the plaintiff; and, these 
defendants verily believe that all temporary and permanent 
relief will be denied by the Court after a consideration of 
the evidence.

Nevertheless, the mere presence of the suit with the al­
legations therein made, has created a feeling of unrest and 
doubt in the minds of some of the employees of the cor­
porate defendant and it is urgent that the matter be re­
solved. Only this Court can resolve the matter by a defini­
tive ruling upon the issues posed by the pleadings of the 
parties.



21

Motion and Order for an Early Hearing

2.

Although served only on April 21, 1966, the defendants 
have now answered the complaint of the plaintiff and 
were originally notified that the cause was upon a hearing 
at 10:00 o’clock A.M., April 29, 1966. Only on April 28 
did these defendants learn that plaintiff’s counsel had 
procured a postponement of the hearing in consultation 
with Your Honor. It is the understanding of counsel for 
these defendants that the Court did advise plaintiff’s 
counsel that he would remove the cause from the hearing- 
on April 29, and would schedule the same for hearing on 
any of the following dates: May 6, May 20, and May 27, 
1966 and for plaintiff’s counsel to attempt to reach an 
agreement on a date.

Plaintiff’s counsel has made no effort to reach an agree­
ment and has not yet advised defendant’s counsel of the 
statements of the Court. Having prepared for the hearing- 
on April 29, only to be advised upon the eve of the hear­
ing that the same had been postponed at plaintiff’s re­
quest, the defendants come now and join the plaintiff and 
ask that the Court grant to the plaintiff the expedited 
and speedy hearing which he has requested; and, in this 
connection, the defendant elects (insofar as it can) for 
the earliest possible date suggested by the Court to plain­
tiff’s counsel, namely May 6, 1966, or the second alternate 
date, respectfully suggesting that said hearing be had 
upon either of said dates.

W h e r e fo r e , premises considered, the defendants respect­
fully request that the Court grant the plaintiff’s motion 
for an early hearing and for expedition of this litigation; 
and, further, respectfully suggest that a hearing at an



22

Motion and Order for an Early Hearing

appointed hour on May 6, or May 20, 1966 would be in 
the interest of all parties to the litigation.

Respectfully submitted,

K e it h , M eh a e e y  & W eber  
Attorneys for Defendants

/ s /  Q u in t in  K e it h  
Quintin Keith 
1400 San Jacinto Building 
Beaumont, Texas, 77701
Of Counsel.

ORDER
The foregoing Motion having been presented to the 

Court; and, the Court after considering the same and 
being of the opinion that an early hearing would be de­
sirable ; it is,

O rdered that the Motion o f  the plaintiff for an early and 
expedited hearing upon his application for temporary relief 
be and the same is hereby granted and said application 
will be heard by this Court at 10:00 o’clock A.M., May 20, 
1966. Notice will be given by certified mail to plaintiff’s 
counsel.

This the 28th day of April, 1966.

/ s /  J oe J .  F is h e r  
United States District Judge



23

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant

(Filed May 16, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To: U n it e d  Gas C orporation , and P. G. M a t t h e w s , 
its Area Manager, Defendants 
Beaumont, Texas

P l e a s e  t a k e  n o t ic e  that plaintiff demands, pursuant to 
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
defendant answer, under oath, within 15 days after the 
service hereof, the following written interrogatories, which 
written interrogatories relate to defendant’s place of busi­
ness in the City of Beaumont, Texas, known as United 
Gas Corporation, and after the answer to each of the 
following written interrogatories, identify, separately and 
in a manner suitable for use as a description in a subpoena, 
all sources of information (whether documentary, human 
or otherwise) and all records maintained by defendant, or 
any other person or organization, upon which defendant 
relied in answering the interrogatory or which pertain or 
relate to the information called for by the interrogatory:

1. State whether or not United Gas Corporation is en­
gaged at Beaumont, Texas, as a public utility, with supply­
ing natural gas to homeowners, subscribers, and/or users 
of same in this area.

2. State whether United Gas Corporation is a subsidiary 
to any other company or companies.

3. If the answer to interrogatory No. 2 is “yes,” state 
the name of such company or companies.



24

4. State whether United Gas Corporation is engaged in 
or conducts any type of business activity outside of the 
State of Texas.

5. If the answer to interrogatory No. 4 is “yes,” state 
the nature of such business activity.

6. State whether any parent company of United Gas 
Corporation is engaged in any business activity outside 
the State of Texas.

7. If the answer to interrogatory No. 6 is “yes,” state 
the nature of such business activity and the name of any 
and all parent companies engaging in same.

8. State whether any of the work done by your com­
pany, or any parent company, is pursuant to a contract 
with any Department of the United States Government.

9. State the total number of persons employed by United 
Gas Corporation as of August 16, 1965.

10. State the total number of Negroes employed by 
United Gas Corporation as of August 16, 1965.

11. State whether the employees of United Gas Corpo­
ration are classified according to jobs performed. If the 
answer is “yes,” list all Departments, and job classifica­
tions within each Department, and if no Departments, 
then list all the various job classifications or categories 
that are utilized by United Gas Corporation in making- 
work assignments for its employees.

12. List the name of each Negro currently employed by 
United Gas Corporation together with respect to each

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



such person the length of time so employed, present job 
classification, the number of wage increases during said 
employment, and the number of times transferred to a 
higher job classification during said employment.

13. List the number of Negroes and the number of 
whites employed in each such job classification on the 
last day of 1963, 1964 and the 16th day of August, 1965.

14. State whether or not United Gas Corporation main­
tains a custom, policy or practice of not hiring Negroes in 
certain of its job classifications.

15. State, with respect to each job classification listed 
in interrogatory No. 11, the number of Negroes who are 
foremen, assistant foremen, supervisors, inspectors, or ser­
vicemen.

16. List the job classifications in which United Gas 
Corporation has never employed a Negro. If any, please 
state reason.

17. List the job classification in which United Gas Cor­
poration has never employed a white person. If any, state 
reason.

18. With respect to each such job classification listed 
in interrogatory No. 11, state the average hourly wage 
for workers employed therein on the last day of 1963, 
1964 and the 16th day of August, 1965.

19. Is there a general differentiation amongst employees 
recognized by United Gas Corporation and for its em­
ployees between “laborers” and “helpers,” “junior service­

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



26

men,” and “servicemen ?” If the answer is “yes,” define 
these terms as used by United Gas Corporation and its 
employees.

20. List the number of Negroes who made application 
for jobs as “laborers,” “helpers,” “junior serviceman,” and 
“serviceman,” since April, 1965.

21. List the number of whites who made application for 
jobs as “laborers,” “helpers,” “junior serviceman,” and 
“serviceman,” since March of 1965.

22. List the number of Negroes who were qualified, 
according to the job specification for each classification, 
to hold jobs as “laborers,” “helpers,” “junior servicemen,” 
and “servicemen,” as of the 16th day of August, 1965.

23. List the name of each Negro employee so qualified 
for each job classification inquired about in interrogatory 
No. 22, as of August 16, 1965.

24. List the number of whites who were qualified, ac­
cording to the job specification for each classification, to 
hold jobs as “laborers,” “helpers,” “junior servicemen,” 
and “servicemen,” as of the 16th day of August, 1965.

25. List the name of each white employee so qualified 
for each job classification inquired about in interrogatory 
No. 24, as of August 16, 1965.

26. List the number of Negroes hired as “laborers,” 
“helpers,” “junior servicemen,” and “servicemen,” since 
March, of 1965.

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



27

27. List the number of whites hired in the capacities 
inquired about in interrogatory No. 26, since March of 
1965.

Plaintiff's Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant

28. What, if any, objective standards does United Gas 
Corporation use for making promotions of “laborers,” 
“helpers,” “junior servicemen,” and “servicemen,” i.e., 
seniority, education, etc.

29. Was the plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins, ever enrolled 
in an educational program or course of study in Lake 
Charles, Louisiana, sponsored by United Gas Corporation, 
or held under its auspices ?

30. What was the purpose of this educational program 
or course of study and when was it held!

31. Were there any “servicemen,” “junior servicemen,” 
“laborers,” or “helpers,” also enrolled in such course?

32. If the answer to interrogatory No. 31 is “Yes,” list 
the name and total number of each employee of United 
Gas Corporation enrolled in such cause for each job classi­
fication inquired about in such interrogatory.

33. List the total number of United Gas employees en­
rolled in such course.

34. List the name and total number of Negro employees 
of United Gas Corporation enrolled in such course.

35. What was the plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins’ final 
grade or score in such course?



36. What was the highest grade or score made in such 
course?

37. State in detail the training and educational oppor­
tunities made available to any and all of the employees of 
United Gas Corporation.

38. List the names of each Negro who has advanced to 
a higher wage job classification between July 2, 1965 and 
the present.

39. List the name of each white who has advanced to a 
higher wage job classification between July 2, 1965 and 
the present.

40. Does seniority play a part in the opportunity for 
promotion or advancement?

41. Does service in occupation play a part in the oppor­
tunity for promotion or advancement?

42. Which of the two standards inquired about in inter­
rogatories Nos. 40 and 41 is paramount in determining 
an employee’s opportunity for promotion or advancement 
with United Gas?

43. Describe in detail the seniority system as it applies 
to promotional opportunity with United Gas.

44. Describe in detail the service in occupation system 
as it applies to promotional opportunity with United Gas.

45. Has United Gas ever promoted any of its white 
employees to the position of “serviceman” who had less 
seniority than the plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins?

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



29

46. If the answer to interrogatory No. 45 is “Yes,” list 
the names and give the total number of such employees 
so promoted?

47. Has United Gas ever promoted any of its white 
employees to the position of “serviceman” who had less 
service in occupation than the plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins?

48. If the answer to interrogatory No. 47 is “Yes,” list 
the names and give the total number of such employees 
so promoted.

49. Does United Gas presently have in its employ a 
white serviceman whose surname is Clariday?

50. When was Mr. Clariday promoted to the position 
of serviceman?

51. What job or position did Mr. Clariday hold with 
United Gas prior to his promotion to “serviceman?”

52. Did Mr. Clariday acquire greater seniority for the 
position of “serviceman,” in accordance with the job speci­
fications for such classification, in his prior job with United 
Gas, than did the plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins?

53. If the answer to interrogatory No. 52 is “Yes,” de­
scribe in detail how such greater seniority was acquired.

54. Did Mr. Clariday acquire greater service in occupa­
tion for the position of “serviceman,” in accordance with 
the job specifications for such classification, in his prior 
job with United Gas than did the plaintiff, Thomas L. 
Jenkins?

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



30

55. If the answer to interrogatory No. 54 is “Yes,” de­
scribe in detail how such greater service in occupation was 
acquired.

56. Was Mr. Clariday better qualified to fill the posi­
tion of “serviceman,” according to the objective standards 
used by United Gas Corporation in determining promo­
tions to such classification, than the plaintiff, Thomas L. 
Jenkins, on the date of his promotion to such classification!

57. If the answer to interrogatory No. 56 is “Yes,” 
explain in detail how such qualifications were attained, 
in accordance with such standards.

58. What is the relationship, if any, between United 
Gas Corporation and United Gas Pipeline Company!

59. Describe in detail the seniority system of United 
Gas Pipeline Company as it applies to promotional oppor­
tunity with United Gas Corporation.

60. Describe in detail the service in occupation system 
of United Gas Pipeline Company as it applies to promo* 
tional opportunity with United Gas Corporation.

61. Did United Gas Corporation, in or about the month 
of April, 1965, promote certain employees of United Gas 
Pipeline Company to the position of “serviceman,” with 
United Gas Corporation!

62. If the answer to interrogatory No. 61 is “Yes,” list 
the name, race and total number of employees of United 
Pipeline Company so promoted.

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



31

63. Did any of such employees of United Gas Pipeline 
Company acquire greater seniority for the position of 
“serviceman,” in accordance with the job specifications for 
such classification, in their prior jobs with the Pipeline 
Company, than did the plaintiff, Thomas L Jenkins?

64. If the answer to interrogatory No. 63 is “Yes,” de­
scribe in detail how such greater seniority was acquired, 
as to each.

65. Did any of such employees of United Gas Pipeline 
Company acquire greater service in occupation for the 
position of “serviceman,” in accordance with the job speci­
fications for such classification in their prior jobs with the 
Pipeline Company, than did the plaintiff, Thomas L. 
Jenkins?

66. If the answer to interrogatory No. 65 is “Yes,” de­
scribe in detail how such greater service in occupation was 
attained as to each.

67. Were all of such employees of United Gas Pipeline 
Company better qualified to fill the position of “service­
man,” according to the objective standards used by United 
Gas Corporation in determining promotions to such classi­
fication, than the plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins, on the date 
of their promotion?

68. If the answer to interrogatory No. 67 is “Yes,” ex­
plain in detail how such qualifications were attained as to 
each of said employees of United Gas Pipeline Company, 
in accordance with such standards of United Gas Corpo­
ration.

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



32

69. State whether a representative of the Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Commission has attempted to con­
ciliate the formal charges asserted against United Gas 
Corporation by the plaintiff.

70. If the answer to interrogatory No. 69 is “Yes,” 
state any agreements, adjustments or changes resulting 
from conciliation efforts relative to such plaintiff.

71. If the answer to interrogatory No. 70 is “None,” 
state what, if anything, this plaintiff may do, either per­
sonally, or through counsel, to effectuate a meaningful 
conciliation or adjustment of this dispute, which would be 
fair to all concerned.

D ated : May 16, 1966

J o h n s , W illard  & H a n n a h

By / s /  E lm o  R . W illard , III 
Elmo R. Willard, III 

Attorney for Plaintiff 
2160 Washington Blvd.

Beaumont, Texas

Plaintiff’s Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant



33

Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance

(Filed May 17, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher, Judge of Said Court:
Now c o m es  the Plaintiff, Thomas L. Jenkins, and files 

this his motion for a continuance of this cause and as 
grounds therefor would show, by and through his counsel 
of record, the following:

L

That counsel filed this lawsuit on the 8th day of April, 
1966.

II.

That thereafter, to wit, on or about the 29th day of 
April, 1966, counsel received a copy of the defendants’ 
original answer, and defendants’ motion for an early setting 
of this cause.

III.

That between the two dates above mentioned this counsel 
had received, through telephonic communication with court, 
three possible dates on which this cause might be heard, 
in its preliminary features, said dates being, May 6th, 
May 20th and May 27th.

IV.

That counsel for this plaintiff and counsel for the de­
fendants herein, agreed that this cause could be heard by 
this Honorable Court on the 20th day of May, 1966, and 
mutually chose said date for said preliminary hearing, 
and so informed the court.



34

Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance

V.

That counsel for plaintiff made said agreement upon the 
assumption that by said date he would be furnished with 
a copy of the investigator’s report from the Office of Equal 
Employment Opportunity, Washington, D. C., or at the 
very least informed of the contents thereof.

VI.

To date, neither said report, nor the contents thereof 
have been forthcoming, and counsel has had to resort to 
the discovery procedures afforded by Rule 33 of the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in an attempt to ascertain 
or uncover certain facts which would be necessary in order 
to make a prima facie case, and which this counsel, nor 
the plaintiff herein, have personal knowledge of.

VII.

That as of the date of the filing of this motion said dis­
covery procedures are not completed, and counsel has 
good reason to believe that even after the answers to the 
written interrogatories heretofore served on said defen­
dants are received by him, other discovery procedures in 
the form of depositions will need to be resorted to in 
order to establish the fact of racial discrimination in em­
ployment, as per the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint 
herein.

VIII.

That by the exercise of due diligence herein counsel 
could not have discovered the facts relied upon as grounds 
for this motion earlier and said motion is not made for 
delay but only that justice might be done.



35

Plaintiff’s Motion for Continuance

W h e r e fo r e , plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court 
grant him a continuance herein.

Respectfully submitted,

J ohn 's, W illard  & H a n n a h

By: / s /  E lm o  R. W illard , III 
E lm o  R. W illard , III



36

Order Overruling Motion for Continuance 
and Denial o f Temporary Injunction

(Filed May 19, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

B e it  r e m e m b e r e d  that upon the 18th day of May, 1966, 
came on to be considered the motion of the Plaintiff for a 
continuance of the hearing upon Plaintiff’s application for 
a temporary injunction; and, the Court, after considering 
the said motion and finding that this suit was instituted 
by the Plaintiff on April 8, 1966, with the Plaintiff seek­
ing temporary relief; and, the Defendant having sought 
and this Court having granted Defendant’s motion for an 
early hearing and the Court having, by order dated April 
28, 1966, set this cause for hearing on May 20, 1966, is of 
the opinion that the Plaintiff has not used diligence in 
exercising his rights to discovery and that the hearing- 
should not be postponed or continued; it is, therefore,

O rd er ed  that the motion for continuance filed by the 
Plaintiff seeking to avoid a hearing upon his application 
for a temporary injunction be, and the same is hereby 
overruled and refused, Plaintiff duly excepting.

T h e r e u p o n , the Court inquired of the Plaintiff’s counsel 
if he would be ready for a trial on May 20, 1966, or upon 
May 23, 1966, and if the Plaintiff would be in position to 
offer testimony in support of the allegations in the said 
complaint upon which he sought the temporary relief; 
whereupon, Plaintiff’s counsel then and there stated that 
such proof was not available and would not be available 
upon either of the dates suggested and that the Plaintiff 
would not be in position to proceed to the trial of said 
application for the temporary injunction; and, it further



37

Order Overruling Motion for Continuance 
and Denial of Temporary Infunction

appearing to the Court, from the admissions so made, 
that it would be futile to hold and conduct a hearing 
thereon and that the Plaintiff’s application for temporary 
injunction in this cause should be in all things denied and 
refused; it is, therefore,

Ordered that the Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary 
relief and a Temporary Injunction be, and the same is 
hereby, denied and refused.

This cause shall stand for final trial upon the merits 
in its regular and usual order and will be considered by 
the Court in due time.

E n tered  this the 19th day o f  May, 1966.

/s/ Joe J. F is h e r  
United, States District Judge



38

(Filed June 7, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher,
United States District Judge:

Now come United Gas Corporation and P. G. Matthews, 
its Area Manager, and respectfully file this suggestion that 
the cause of action asserted by the Plaintiff, if in truth and 
in fact he has any cause of action, is now moot and Defend­
ants now move the Court to dismiss this cause for the fol­
lowing reasons:

1.
(a) On or about April 8, 1966, Plaintiff caused this suit 

to be filed alleging that as a member of the Negro race and 
an employee of the corporate Defendant he had been de­
prived of his civil rights because of an alleged discrimina­
tory promotion policy followed by the Defendants. He 
asserted that the suit was a class action under the provisions 
of Rule 23(a)(3), FRCP, and sought both a temporary and 
a permanent injunction from a continuation of the alleged 
discriminatory practices. The original of the complaint is 
incorporated herein by reference for the purpose of show­
ing* the nature of the demand of the Plaintiff.

(b) In due time, the Defendants answered denying the 
discriminatory practices and specifically denied that this 
was an appropriate class action. Further, affirmatively, the 
Defendants pleaded a non-discriminatory promotional 
policy and the fact that at least one negro employee of 
the Corporate Defendant in the Beaumont area had re­
ceived a promotion to a job such as that sought by the

Defendants’ Suggestion of Mootness
of Cause and Motion to Dismiss



39

Plaintiff, Jenkins, and assigned valid I’easons why such 
other employee, rather than Jenkins, actually received the 
promotion. The answer of these Defendants is likewise 
incorporated herein by reference as fully as if set out herein 
in haec verba.

(c) Responding to the Defendants’ motion for an early 
hearing upon the Plaintiff’s application for a temporary 
injunction, this Court did set the same for hearing on May 
20, 1966, such assignment having* been made by an order 
dated April 28, 1966. But, the Plaintiff having filed a mo­
tion for continuance and having announced to the Court 
that he could not go forward with his proof at the time set 
for hearing, the application for the temporary relief was 
denied and refused by an order dated May 19, 1966, which 
said order is incorporated herein by reference.

2.

(a) Thereafter, a vacancy in the position of Serviceman 
did occur in the Beaumont District of the Corporate Defend­
ant; and the Plaintiff Jenkins being entitled to such pro­
motion in that he possessed the requisite training and 
service in occupation all as had been shown in the answer 
theretofore filed, the promotion was duly tendered to the 
Plaintiff on or about the 24th day of May, 1966. Such tender 
of promotion, was made by these Defendants not because of 
the pendency of this suit, but solely because the Plaintiff 
was eligible for such promotion in accordance with the pro­
motional policies of the Corporate Defendant which were 
and are applicable uniformly among the employees of the 
corporate defendant without regard to race or color.

(b) On or about the 31st day of May, 1966, with the ad­
vice and consent of his counsel, the Plaintiff Jenkins ac­

Defendants’ Suggestion of Mootness of Cause and
Motion to Dismiss



40

cepted the offer of promotion, executed the necessary 
written documents in connection therewith, and immediately 
entered upon the discharge of his duties as a Serviceman, 
where he is still so employed. There was an immediate and 
substantial increase in the basic compensation of the said 
Plaintiff and a change in his duties. Such promotion was 
accepted by the said Plaintiff with full knowledge of the 
fact that the acceptance thereof would be made known to 
the Court in this cause.

3.
(a) Notwithstanding the fact that only one person was 

named as a Plaintiff herein (Jenkins) and such person has, 
since the filing of this suit, conclusively demonstrated that 
there has not been and there is not now an invidious dis­
criminatory promotional policy of the corporate defendant, 
counsel for the named Plaintiff has declined and refuses to 
stipulate upon a dismissal of this cause, even without preju­
dice.

(b) No colored employee of the Corporate Defendant in 
the Beaumont area has been denied a promotion because 
of race or color; no other negro employee of the Corporate 
Defendant has filed or made any claim with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission alleging any dis­
criminatory action on the part of either of these Defendants.

(c) No other employee of the Corporate Defendant is 
entitled to prosecute or maintain this action since the con­
ditions precedent thereto have not been accomplished, 
namely, there has been no finding by said Commission of 
reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII 
of the Civil Eights Act of 1964, Title 42 U. S. C., Section

Defendants’ Suggestion of Mootness of Cause and
Motion to Dismiss



41

2000e, et seq., and there is no one qualified to prosecute or 
further maintain this suit.

(d) Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s counsel insists upon his 
right to maintain this suit in the nature of a class-action 
under Rule 23(a)(3) even though there are no other per­
sons remotely situated as was the Plaintiff Jenkins at the 
time of the institution of the suit herein. Plaintiff’s counsel, 
therefore, continues to prosecute and maintain this suit for 
a non-existent class, none of whom claim any right to bene­
fits therefrom and none of whom possess the requisite con­
ditions precedent to the maintenance of the suit.

4.
This cause of action is moot and has been rendered moot 

by the action of the Plaintiff in accepting a promotion ten­
dered to him in good faith and has conclusively established 
that there is no such discriminatory promotional policy as 
he averred in his complaint and such action on the part of 
the said Plaintiff has taken from this Court the power to 
order any corrective action on the part of these Defendants 
since he has conclusively demonstrated no need therefor.

W h e r e fo r e , premises considered, defendants pray that 
after considering this suggestion of mootness together with 
the supporting affidavit hereto attached the Court enter an 
order dismissing this cause and for the entry of such other 
and further orders as may be requisite and proper in the 
premises.

K e it h , M e h a f f y  & W eber , 
Attorneys for Defendants

B y  ,/s/  Q u e n t in  K e it h

Q u e n t in  K e it h

1400 San Jacinto Bldg.
Beaumont, Texas 77701

Defendants’ Suggestion of Mootness of Cause and
Motion to Dismiss



42

Motion to Relieve Defendants o f 
Answering Interrogatories

(Filed June 7,1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher,
United States District Judge:

Now come the Defendants in the above entitled and 
numbered cause, United Gas Corporation and P. G. 
Matthews, and file this motion for relief and to he relieved 
of the obligation to answer interrogatories heretofore 
served upon these Defendants, and say:

1.
(a) Heretofore and on or about the 16th day of May, 

1966, the Plaintiff in the above entitled and numbered cause, 
through his counsel, served upon the Defendants a series 
of interrogatories propounded under Rule 33 numbering 
seventy-one (71) in number, many of which require exten­
sive answers and exhibits. Said interrogatories are incor­
porated herein for the limited purpose of showing the 
nature, scope, and detailed nature thereof.

(b) As is apparent from the face of the Plaintiff’s com­
plaint, this suit alleg-es a course of discriminatory conduct- 
violative of the Plaintiff’s civil rights under the provisions 
of the Civil Bights Act of 1964 (42 U. S. C. § 2000e, et seq.).

(c) Subsequent to the filing of said suit the Defendants 
duly answered denying the discriminatory practices charged 
by the Plaintiff and asserting the right to promote employ­
ees without regard to race or color in accordance with its 
long-established non-discriminatory promotional policy.



43

(d) With the pleadings in the status indicated, the Plain­
tiff did, on or about May 31, 1966, accept a promotion to a 
higher and more lucratively paid position, said promotion 
being- tendered and accepted under the terms of the non- 
discriminatory promotional policy pleaded by the Defend­
ants, as aforesaid. The act of the Plaintiff in so accepting 
said promotion and entering upon the discharge of his 
duties in the higher paid job amounted in law to an abandon­
ment of his claim of discrimination because of race and 
mooted all of the contentions of the Plaintiff as shown and 
more fully made known to the Court in the suggestions of 
mootness filed herein by the Defendants, said suggestions 
being incorporated herein by reference for all intents and 
purposes.

(e) It is true and such is apparent from the pleadings 
and proof in this cause, there is no employee of the Corpo­
rate Defendant who has standing to assert and maintain 
jurisdiction in this Court under the provisions of said Civil 
Bights Act of 1964 and no employee of the Corporate De­
fendant has sought and been denied a promotion because of 
race or color.

2.

The nature, scope, and complex nature of the several in­
terrogatories propounded by the Plaintiff, as aforesaid, 
would cause these Defendants to be put to great expense 
and trouble in the assembly of the necessary information, 
figures, charts, etc. required to give comprehensive answers 
thereto. That there is no presently existing controversy 
which would authorize the Plaintiff or his counsel to further 
insist upon answers to the said interrogatories, and to re­
quire the Defendants to complete said answers and to serve

Motion to Relieve Defendants of Answering Interrogatories



44

the same upon Plaintiff’s counsel would not serve any use­
ful end in this litigation.

Motion to Relieve Defendants of Answering Interrogatories

3.
Defendants show that by stipulation of counsel, the time 

for the filing of answers to said interrogatories has been 
extended and this application for relief is, therefore, timely 
filed.

W h e r e fo r e , premises considered, Defendants pray that 
the Court make and enter an order relieving these Defend­
ants of the duty of preparing and filing of answers to said 
interrogatories, ordering the same stricken, and for the 
entry of such other orders as may be requisite and proper 
in the premises.

Bespectfully submitted,

K e it h , M e h a f f y  & W eber  
Attorneys for Defendants

B y  / s /  Q u e n t in  K e it h  
Q u e n t in  K e it h  
1400 San Jacinto Bldg.
Beaumont, Texas 77701

T h e  S tate of T exas ^
C o u n ty  of J e ffe r so n  ^

B efore  m e , the undersigned authority, on this day per­
sonally appeared P. Gf. Matthews, known to me and being 
by me first duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says as 
follows:



45

“I am over the age of twenty-one years and have been 
employed by United Gas Corporation for more than twenty 
years and for more than two years have been Area Mana­
ger for said corporation at Beaumont, Texas. I have per­
sonal knowledge of the facts and matters stated in the 
Answer filed herein, and particularly the material set forth 
in the affirmative defense therein pleaded, and all of such 
facts stated in said answer are, within my personal knowl­
edge, true and correct.

“Further, I have read the foregoing suggestion of moot­
ness and motion to dismiss said cause and each and every 
statement therein contained is, within my personal knowl­
edge, true and correct; and, of the legal conclusions therein 
expressed, I  verily believe the same to be true.

“Attached to this affidavit and incorporated herein by 
reference is a written form used by the Coi'porate Defend­
ant, United Gas Corporation, in the regular course of its 
business; such form shows, and it is true, that the Plain­
tiff, Thomas L. Jenkins did duly accept a promotion which 
was unconditionally offered to him and has now entered into 
and is now actively engaged in the discharge of the duties 
of his new job to which he was promoted.”

/s /  P. G. M a tth ew s  
P. G. M a tth ew s

S w o rn  to and subscribed  before  m e  this the 6th d a y  o f 
June, 1966.

( se a l )
/ s /  M rs. E lsie  D avis T u n n ey  

Notary Public
in and for Jefferson County, Texas

Motion to Relieve Defendants of Answering Interrogatories



46

F o r m  o f  P r o m o t io n  A n n e x e d  to  M o t io n  to  B e l ie v e  

D e f e n d a n t s  o f  A n s w e r in g  I n ter r o g a t o r ies

(See Opposite) iSr”



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47



48

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to D efendants’ Motion
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant o f Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation o f Points 
and Authorities

(Filed June 20, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

To the Honorable Joe J. Fisher, Judge of Said Court:
Now c o m es  the plaintiff, Thomas L, Jenkins, in the above 

entitled and numbered cause, and files this his motion in 
opposition to Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss and to be 
relieved of the obligations of answering interrogatories pre­
viously served upon them, and as grounds and authority 
therefor would show the following:

I.
Plaintiff Has Standing to Maintain the Instant Suit Against 
Defendants’ Racially Discriminatory Employment Practice

There are two distinct concepts which, for purposes of 
clarification, should be analyzed separately. Mainly, the 
“standing” of the plaintiff as opposed to “mootness” of the 
case.

In Singleton vs. Board of Commissioners of State Insti­
tutions, 356 F. 2d 771, the Court carefully delineated these 
two concepts in the context of a suit, like the present one, 
to end a policy of racial discrimination. As regards the 
concept of “standing” the two issues are whether the plain­
tiff has been sufficiently engaged in, and injured by, the 
practice of discrimination of which he complained, and 
secondly, whether prospectively, he can be so injured. The 
interest here is in having a party before the Court who has 
actually experienced the condition complained of, and who 
would be affected by a decree of the Court. Stated differ-



49

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

ently, the plaintiff must show that he is still a member of 
the class he purports to represent. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 
U.S. 31. Clearly the plaintiff here meets the tests for stand­
ing. He was, at the time and prior to the filing of this suit, 
being directly injured by the defendants’ denial of equal 
job opportunity to Negro persons. The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission found that a less qualified white 
worker had been given a job which, absent his race, plaintiff 
would have received.

Secondly, plaintiff is still employed by the defendant. He 
may therefore be injured by the defendants’ practice of 
racial discrimination in the future. Although he has been 
recently promoted, what would prevent the defendant from 
bypassing him again sometime in the future when he be­
comes entitled to another promotion. Indeed there is 
nothing to protect the plaintiff from being deprived of his 
recent promotion (solely on the basis of race) should the 
Court dismiss this suit without issuing an injunction.

Further, plaintiff’s complaint, along with injunctive relief 
seeks damages in back wages. Under Title VII of the Civil 
Eights Act of 1964, Sec. 706(g) he is entitled to back wages 
from the date of the refusal of promotion in 1965. He there­
fore, has not been made whole for the injury which resulted 
from the defendants’ discriminatory promotional policy.

II.
The Complaint Is Not Moot as Regards Persons 

in the Class Other Than the Plaintiff
Any claim that the instant action is “moot” must take into 

account the fact that plaintiff brings this suit as a class



50

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Ansivering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

action, on behalf of himself and other Negro employees of 
the defendant. Mootness arises only when there is “no 
longer a subject matter on which the judgment of this 
Court (can) operate.” St. Pierre v. U.S., 319 U.S. 41, 42. 
As noted above, this case is clearly not “moot” for the 
plaintiff. Yet, further the nature of plaintiff’s complaint 
was not solely that he as an individual had been denied a 
specific job, but rather it was a complaint that the total 
employment practices of the defendant is governed by con­
sidering the race of the employees.

Therefore, all Negro employees in the plant of whom 
plaintiff is a representative, are subject to the same bars in 
promotion because of their color. As noted in Potts v. 
Flax, 313 F. 2d 284, when the plaintiff sued for himself and 
others similarly situated to prohibit a policy of racial dis­
crimination, changes in the plaintiff’s condition do not ren­
der the case moot where policies may still obtain for the 
class. Defendants assert in paragragraph 1(e) of the mo­
tion to quash the plaintiff’s interrogatories that “there is 
no employee of the corporate defendant who has standing 
to assert and maintain jurisdiction in this Court under the 
provisions of said Civil Eight Act of 1964.” The case of 
Hall v. Werthan Bag Co., 251 F. Supp. 184 (Middle Dis­
trict, Nashville Division, Civil Action 4312, Order dated 
March 3, 1966) has held exactly the contrary. There, an 
employee who was not one of the parties who filed a com­
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion was allowed to intervene in a suit brought by such a 
party. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
in supporting rights of the Negro employee to intervene, 
stated that the nature of the reasonable cause finding nec-



51

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

essarily meant that all Negroes in the plant, whether they 
had complained before the Commission or not, would be 
subjected to job limitations not applied to white workers. 
(See attached copy of letter.)

m.
Defendants Have Not Made a Sufficient Predicate to 

Substantiate Their Claim of Mootness
The claim of mootness under a change in defendants’ con­

duct can only be maintained where the defendant admits 
the illegality of the prior practices and gives sufficient as­
surances that these practices will not be continued in the 
future. U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629. The defend­
ant here has done neither. To the contrary, the defendants 
consistently maintain, both in their answer and in the mo­
tion to dismiss, that their promotional policies are legal. 
Therefore, there presently exists in this matter an actual 
controversy as to whether in fact, or in law, these practices 
are violative of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Walling v. 
Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a statement 
that there was a grave and widespread practice of employ­
ment discrimination to which any of the twenty odd million 
Negroes in this country might be subjected. It was serious 
enough to require a national policy to prohibit these prac­
tices. An injunction should issue, where there is a public 
interest in having the legality of the practice settled even 
where there are some indications that a defendant may 
abandon the illegal practices. U.S. v. Trans Missouri 
Freight Association, 166 U.S., 290; U.S. v. Parke Davis &



52

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

Co., 365 U.S. 125. Here, an injunction is necessary to settle 
the illegality of defendants’ promotional policy and to as­
sure that the race of the plaintiff and all other Negro per­
sons in defendants’ employ will not he considered in dis­
pensing job opportunities in the future.

The issuance of an injunction also has utility for the 
defendants; their obligation to establish non-discriminatory 
policies will be made specific and clear and they will be 
preserved from future complaint or litigation on this issue 
by other Negro employees.

W h e r e fo r e , p re m is e s  c o n s id e re d , p la in t i f f  p r a y s  t h a t  d e ­
f e n d a n ts ’ m o tio n  to  be  re l ie v e d  o f  th e  o b lig a tio n  to  a n s w e r  
th e  in te r r o g a to r ie s  p r e v io u s ly  s e rv e d  u p o n  th e m , to g e th e r  
w ith  th e i r  m o tio n  to  d ism is s , be  in  a ll  th in g s  d e n ie d  a n d  
b e c a u se  o f  th e  p r e s s in g  p u b lic  im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  is s u e s  
p r e s e n te d  h e re , p la in t i f f  p r a y s  f u r th e r  t h a t  th is  co u n se l be  
p e r m i t te d  th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  to  p r e s e n t  o r a l  a rg u m e n t .

Respectfully submitted,
J o h n s , W illard  & H a n n a h

B y : / s /  E lmo R. W illard, III 
E lmo R. W illard, III 
2160 Washington Blvd. 
Beaumont, Texas 
J ack Greenberg 
L eroy Clark 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

A ttorneys for Plaintiff,
T hom as  L. J e n k in s



53

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Believe Defendant of Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

(Emblem)
E qual E m plo y m en t  O ppo r t u n it y  C o m m issio n  

W a sh in g t o n , D. C. 20506

February 3, 1966
Honorable Frank Gray 
Judge of the United States District 

Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee, Nashville Division 

Nashville, Tennessee
Re: Hall v. Werthan Bag Corporation 

Civil Action No. 4312

Dear Judge Gray:
This Commission has been advised by the attorneys for the 
plaintiffs in the above-styled proceeding that at the hear­
ing held on or about Friday, January 28,1966, you requested 
the submission of briefs on certain issues on Friday, Feb­
ruary 4, 1966.
As these issues involve procedural questions of significance 
with respect to the administration and interpretation of 
Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Commission 
should appreciate the opportunity of presenting its position. 
Due to the brief time available, we respectfully request per­
mission to state our position by letter, copies of which are 
being forwarded to the attorneys for all the parties 
involved.
It is the position of this Commission that when the “person 
claiming to be aggrieved,” who has filed a charge in ac­
cordance with the provisions of Section 706(a) of Title VII,



54

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

brings a civil action in a United States District Court as 
provided for in Section 706(e) and ( f ) : (1) be may bring 
a class action; and (2) a member of that class may inter­
vene as party plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that he was 
not himself a charging party.
The Commission has arrived at this conclusion after due 
consideration of the language and legislative history of 
Section 706(g) and (i), dealing with remedial action, and 
applicable provisions of the Rules of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the United States District Courts, in par­
ticular Rule 23(a), which provides for the institution of a 
class action where the character of the right sought to be 
enforced for the class is several, and there is a common 
question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a 
common relief is soug'ht, and Rule 24(b), which provides 
for permissive intervention when an applicant’s claim and 
the main action have a question of law or fact in common.
We should appreciate the opportunity to submit a memo­
randum of law supporting this position within 20 days.
Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely yours,
C h a r les  T. D u n c a n  

General Counsel
cc: A von  N. W il l ia m s , J k., Esq.

Z. A lexander  L ooby, Esq.
D avid V in c e n t , Esq.
Looby & Williams 
327 Charlotte Avenue 
Nashville, Tennessee 37201



55

Plaintiff’s Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss and to Relieve Defendant of Answering 

Interrogatories, Containing Citation of Points 
and Authorities

J ack  G reen berg , Esq.
L eroy  Cla r k , Esq.
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

T ba bu e , M in ic k , S turdivant  
& H arbison

Life and Casualty Tower 
Nashville, Tennessee
J o h n  J. H ooker , Esq.
Nashville Bank and Trust Building 
Nashville, Tennessee
P r a n k  A. C onstancy , Esq.
1900 Peachtree Center Building 
230 Peachtree Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Attorneys for Defendant



56

(Filed December 22, 1966)

[ t it l e  o m it t e d ]

This is a suit by the plaintiff, a Negro employee of 
the defendant, for an injunction against the defendant, 
alleging violation of Title VII of the Civil Eights Act of 
1964, Title 42, U.S.C., 2000(e), et seq. The plaintiff con­
tends that he was subjected to discrimination and denied 
promotions in his employment solely because of his race. 
The plaintiff brings the suit for himself individually, 
and as a class suit under the provisions of Eule 23(a)(3), 
F.E.C.P., on behalf of others similarly situated.

Now before the Court is defendant’s Motion to Dismiss 
in which the defendant states that the plaintiff has been 
promoted, subsequent to the filing of this suit, from “Ser­
viceman’s Helper” to “Serviceman”, under the promotional 
policy of defendant, which policy is based on the seniority 
of the employee and other qualifications, without regard 
to race or color. The defendant suggests that the plain­
tiff’s cause of action is now moot, due to his promotion.

The plaintiff has filed a motion in opposition main­
taining that his cause of action is not moot, that he is not 
protected from racial discrimination in the future, and 
that he is entitled to back wages from the date of the 
refusal of the promotion in 1965 until his promotion. 
The plaintiff further maintains that the cause of action 
is not moot in regard to persons other than the plaintiff, 
in the class he represents, i.e., other Negro employees 
of the defendant.

According to the enforcement provisions of the statute, 
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Memorandum Opinion



57

Commission shall make a determination and attempt to 
persuade the employer to cease his discriminatory prac­
tices. Section 2000e-5(e) provides:

“If, within 30 days after a charge is filed with the 
Commission . . . the Commission has been unable to 
obtain voluntary compliance with this sub-chapter, 
the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved 
and a civil action may be brought against the respon­
dent named in the charge, (1) by the person claiming 
to be aggrieved . .

This is what has occurred in the instant case.
It must now be determined, (1) whether or not the 

plaintiff’s cause of action is moot since the plaintiff re­
ceived a promotion subsequent to the filing of his suit 
in this court, and (2) if the plaintiff’s cause of action 
is moot, does his suit as a class action nevertheless survive 
for the benefit of all others in his class!

As to the question of mootness, the plaintiff argues 
that he has “standing” in this court since he was being 
denied a promotion at the time the suit was filed, and 
also that his future with the defendant may again be 
hampered by discrimination unless an injunction issues. 
The statute, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(g) provides:

“If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally 
engaged in or is engaging in an unlawful employment 
practice charged in the complaint . . . the court may 
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 
employment practice, and order such affirmative ac­
tion as may be appropriate, which may include re­
instatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
back pay . . .”

Memorandum Opinion



58

Comparing the above quoted section with the section 
describing the purpose of the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Commission as being to obtain “voluntary com­
pliance” with the statute, it follows that the remedy of 
the plaintiff is to be freed from the discriminatory prac­
tices to which he is subjected. When the discrimination, 
if any there was, is ended voluntarily by the defendant, 
either before or subsequent to the filing of a suit in court, 
then the cause of action, as to the plaintiff individually, 
becomes moot.

As to the issue of a class suit brought by the plain­
tiff for the benefit of all others similarly situated in his 
class, under Rule 23(a)(3) F.R.C.P., it seems that these 
actions will be allowed in some cases. Potts v. Flax, 313 
F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963). Plaintiff relies principally on 
the case of Hall v. Werthan Bag Corporation, 251 F.Supp. 
184 (M.D.Tenn. 1966), as an illustration of a class action 
being permitted in an employee discrimination suit. In 
the Hall case, the court allowed Ray Tate to intervene as 
a plaintiff in an action brought under the same section 
of the statute as the instant case. The court allowed 
him to intervene on the basis that it was a class suit for 
the benefit “of all other Negroes similarly situated.”

The above cited case is distinguishable from the instant 
case in that here no other plaintiff has moved to intervene 
or appeared seeking any relief, nor has it been indicated 
to the court the size of the class the plaintiff represents. 
Furthermore, under Rule 23(a)(3), a class suit may be 
allowed if “there is a common question of law or fact 
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.” 
In the instant case, this court is of the opinion that no 
common question of fact exists as to all Negro employees 
of the defendant, since different circumstances surround

Memorandum Opinion



59

their different jobs and qualifications in the structure of 
the corporation. This may be distinguished from a school 
desegregation class suit wherein all the Negroes would be 
in a common fact situation of being prohibited from attend­
ing the school.

This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff’s 
individual cause of action is now moot due to his promo­
tion, and that the cause of action as a class suit is not 
proper. The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Entered this 22nd day of December, 1966.

/s/ Job J. F isher 
United States District Judge

Memorandum Opinion



60

Order o f Dism issal

(Filed January 4, 1967)

[t it l e  o m it t e d ]

Upon this the 22nd day of December, 1966, the Defen­
dants’ Motion to Dismiss this Cause because of mootness 
having been considered by the Court and the Court being 
of the opinion that the same should be in all things sus­
tained for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Opin­
ion filed with the Clerk of this Court, which is incorporated 
herein by reference, it is, therefore,

Obdeked, A d ju d g ed , and D ecreed  by the Court that the 
above entitled and numbered cause be and the same is 
hereby dismissed at the cost of the Plaintiff.

To which action of the Court the Plaintiff then and there 
excepted.

Entered this the 4th day of January, 1967.

/s/ Joe J. F ishes 
United States District Judge



61

Notice of Appeal

(Filed January 19, 1967)

[ t it l e  o m itted ]

N otice  is hereby given that Thomas L. Jenkins, plaintiff 
above named, hereby appeals to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the Order of Dis­
missal of this Court of January 4, 1967, dismissing on the 
ground of mootness plaintiff’s action against United Gas 
Corporation and P. G. Matthews, its area manager, the 
defendants in this cause.

, / s /  E lmo  R . W illabd , III 
Elmo R. Willard, III 

2160 Washington Blvd 
Beaumont, Texas

J ack  Greenberg  
L eroy C lark  
R obert B elto n

10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York

Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Thomas L. Jenkins



62

Clerk’s Certificate

I n  t h e

DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
F ob t h e  E a stern  D istr ic t  oe T exas 

B ea u m o n t  D iv isio n

I ,  J am es R. C ooney , C l e r k  of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, do hereby certify 
that the above and foregoing is the Original Record in 
Civil Action No. 5152 in the Beaumont Division of said 
Court, entitled Thomas L. Jenkins, Plaintiff, vs. United 
Gas Corporation and P. G. Matthews, its Area Manager, 
Defendants.

W it n e ss  m y  h a n d  and the seal of said Court at Beaumont, 
Texas, this the 23rd day of February 1967.

J am es  R. C ooney , C ler k

/s /  By V ir g in ia  R. S en s

Deputy Clerk
SEAL



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