Ginsburg v. Sullivan Motion to Dismiss or Affirm

    In The

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1958

NO. 372

PAUL GINSBURG, Petitioner 
v.

HON. PHILIP L. SULLIVAN, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division, and HON. ROY H. JOHNSON, 
Clerk of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

Paul Ginsbueg
Counsel for Petitioner

Carlton House 
550 Grant Street 
Pittsburgh 19, Pa.

S M IT H  B R O S . C O . I N C .,  LA W  P R IN T E R S , 4 3 4 - 4 3 6  B L V D . O F  A L L IE S , P IT T S B U R G H  IS , P A .



In The

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1958

NO. 372

PAUL GINSBURG, Petitioner 
v.

HON. PHILIP L. SULLIVAN, Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division, and HON. ROY H. JOHNSON, 
Clerk of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

The petitioner makes this reply to the “Answer To 
Petition For Certiorari” filed for the respondents just as 
if it were a Brief In Opposition timely filed under the 
Rules.

The “Answer” of the respondents was made, of 
course, by the same attorneys who are the defendants in 
petitioner’s civil action for damages in the District Court 
(App. 1-2, 13-14) before respondent Judge Philip L. 
Sullivan; and who prior to the pre-trial conference be­
fore Judge Sullivan, wherein they appeared as defendants 
pro se, started to represent the interests of the Judge’s 
brother, Harold E. Sullivan, Esquire, after his appeal 
was filed from convictions of income tax evasion, and on 
whose behalf they made the principal argument in the 
Court of Appeals and the only argument in this Honor­
able Court at No. 1 October Term, 1957 (App. 3, 15) ;



and who still are  representing the in terests  of said 
Judge’s b ro ther in th a t ease on rem and to the D istric t 
Court as well as in o ther crim inal cases in which the 
Judge’s b ro ther has been indicted. A fter these per­
suasive a tto rneys prevailed upon the lower courts in 
Chicago to  render decisions which slaughtered the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and the  law of the land, 
they  now presum e to  reappear before th is  Honorable 
Court to defend the respondents’ actions which are in­
excusable, indefensible and judicially obnoxious beyond 
belief in th is  m ost w estern of the W estern Democracies. 
N ot even ignorance could be accepted as a defense, as it  
does not take a member of the bar to know how wrong 
and illegal th e ir actions have been. Laymen readily 
understand  it. I t  is respectfully subm itted th a t th is 
Honorable Court should hasten  to deordorize these cur­
ren t slaughterhouse cases from  Chicago before said cases 
get cited by others fo r a sim ilar escape from  th e ir liabil­
ities imposed by law.

The reappearance of these atto rneys herein gives 
added w eight to  pe titioner’s p rio r contention th a t re ­
spondent Judge Sullivan should have disqualified him ­
self (App. 23-24). C ertainly the  reasons of Mr. Justice 
F ran k fu rte r fo r recusing him self and declining to take 
p a rt in the consideration or decision of the case of 
Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, 
et al.} v. Poliak, et al., 343 U. S'. 451, should have applied 
a fortiori to Judge Sullivan below. In said case Mr. Ju s ­
tice F ran k fu rte r sta ted  (466-7), “B ut it  is also true  
th a t reason cannot control the subconscious influence of 
feelings of which it is unaw are. W hen there  is ground 
fo r believing th a t  such unconscious feelings m ay oper­

2
Petitioner’s Reply Brief.



Petitioner’s Reply Brief.
3

ate  in the  u ltim ate judgm ent, or m ay not un fa irly  lead 
others to believe they  are operating, judges recuse them ­
selves. They do not s it in judgm ent. They do th is  for 
a varie ty  of reasons. The guiding consideration is th a t  
the  adm inistra tion  of justice should reasonably appear 
to  be d isinterested as well as be so in fa c t”. Since Judge 
Sullivan w as actually  conscious of the fac t th a t  his coun­
sel herein, who were petitioner’s defendants before His 
Honor, were then  and still are  en trusted  w ith  the  free­
dom of the Judge’s b ro ther (App. 23-24) from  sen­
tencing to imprisonm ent, paym ent of fines, subsequent 
disbarm ent, etcetera, could anyone be so naive as to 
believe th a t  Judge Sullivan was not even having sub­
conscious o r unconscious feelings in the m atte r?

This is no tim e fo r the respondents to invoke (p. 
2) w hat “our law provides”, because our law is all 
against them. They never invoked our law before, when 
they  rendered those Chicago decisions. Contrarily, they  
butchered our law in Chicago. W hen they  re fer (p. 2) 
to the  “final” adjudication below, they  p ray  th a t  th is 
Honorable Court should en ter a conflict w ith  its  de­
cision in the  case of Judge Sullivan’s brother, United 
States of America v. Shotwell Manufacturing Co., Har­
old E. Sullivan, et ail., 355 U. S. 233, wherein th is  Court 
rem anded the case to the D istric t Court fo r fu r th e r pro­
ceedings a fte r a “final” adjudication. Therefore, it  is 
the petitioner who invokes our law, again, and our law 
leaves th is Honorable Court no alternative b u t to  g ran t 
certiorari.

Even assum ing arguendo th a t  the “A nsw er” of 
respondents be true  instead of false, tenable instead of 
untenable and supportable instead of insupportable, the



4
Petitioner’s Reply Brief.

“answer” does not contain any legal defense whatever 
for the respondent Judge, and does not even attempt to 
defend the respondent Clerk’s refusal to file and make 
Docket Entries of petitioner’s pleadings (App. 10-11, 23- 
24). What more serious and appalling departures from 
the usual and accepted course of judicial proceedings 
could confront this Honorable Court to provoke the ex­
ercise of its powers of supervision over the lower courts? 
Therefore, the “Answer” must be taken as a mere hope 
that certiorari be denied and actually as a real admis­
sion by the respondents that certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Paul Ginsburg,
Counsel for Petitioner