In Re Paul L. Gault Brief Amicus Curiae

    B u p u m t  Court of %  luttrfc l^tatra
O c t o b e r  T e r m ,  1966

I n T he

N o. 1 1 6

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 

OF

PAUL L. GAULT and MARJORIE GAULT, 
Father and Mother of 

GERALD FRANCIS GAULT, a Minor.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID 
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 

AS AMICUS CURIAE.

F or th e  N ational Legal Aid and D efender A ssociation:

L. M IC H A E L  G E T T Y
D irector of D efender Services 
N ational Legal Aid and  D efender A ssociation 
1155 E. 60th S tree t 
Chicago, Illinois 60637

J A M E S  J. D O H E R T Y
Suite 910
118 N. C lark S tree t 
Chicago, Illinois 60602

M A R S H A L L  J. H A R T M A N
Suite 910
118 N. C lark  S tree t 
Chicago, Illinois 60602



INDEX

PAGE

Brief as Amicus Curiae .......................................   1
Opinion Below ....................................  2
Jurisdiction .......................................   2
Statutes Involved ....................................  3
Question Presented .......................................................  3
Interest of Amicus Curiae ...................................- ...... 4

Statement ....................................... ................................. 7
Summary of Argument ....................................  7

Argument:
I. The Juvenile Court Procedure in Arizona, 

Which Does Not Follow the “Standards for 
a Defender System”, Infringed Constitutional
Guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ...................................  8

II. The Arizona Procedure Is Contrary to the 
Trend in the United States in Dealing With 
Juvenile Matters ...........—................................  10

III. The Holding of the Court Below that a Child 
Is Not Entitled to Counsel in a Juvenile 
Court Proceeding Is Violative of His Rights 
Under the Sixth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment ....................................................................  12

Conclusion  ............................................... ...................  14



11

Appendices:
la—Standards for a Defender System ................... la
lb—Standards for Defender Services ..................... 3a
2a—Survey of Procedures in Juvenile Matters .. 4a
2b—Survey .................................................................  7a
2c—Recapitulation ................................................  8a

3—Letter of National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges ...............................................   12a

L ist  Or A u t h o r it ie s  C it e d .

Cases:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 ..................... . 9
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 ................................ 4
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 ...... ..............  9
Kent v. U. S., 383 U.S. 541, 556, 561 .....................8, 13
McDonald v. Moore, 353 F. 2d 106 ......................... 9
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68-69 .....................  12
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F. 2d 666,

669 .......  10

Miscellaneous:
Juvenile Code of Arizona, Sections 8-201 to 8-329,

Ariz. Rev. Stats...................................................... 3
“Lawyers in the Juvenile Courts,” Field Training 

Materials (Mimeographed 1963) National Council
of Juvenile Court Judges, Chicago, p. 94 .............. 11

U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Wel­
fare, Children’s Bureau Publication Number 437
—1966, pp. 56-57 ........................................ ...........  6

Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 ......................... 12



I n The

( t o r t  n f  %  I n x t th  S t a t e s

O ctober T e r m , 1966

N o. 1 1 6

IN  THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION 

OF

PAUL L. GAULT and M ARJORIE GAULT, 
F ather and M other of 

GERALD FRANCIS GAULT, a Minor.

On Appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona

BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID 
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 

AS AMICUS CURIAE.

The National Legal Aid and Defender Association files 
this Brief Amiens Curiae pursuant to the written consent 
of the parties submitted herewith.



OPINION BELOW.

Judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona entered No­
vember 10, 1965, affirming dismissal of a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus by the Superior Court of Maricopa County. The 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reported in 
99 Ariz. 181, 407 P. 2d 760, and set forth in the Appel­
lant’s Jurisdictional Statement at pp. 25-42. The Su­
perior Court of Maricopa County wrote no opinion. The 
Juvenile Court of Gila County wrote no opinion but issued 
an order of commitment dated June 15, 1964 set forth in 
the Appellant’s Jurisdictional Statement at pp. 48-49.

JURISDICTION.

The jurisdiction of this Court to review by appeal the 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is conferred 
by 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(2). Probable jurisdiction was 
noted on June 20, 1966.



STATUTES INVOLVED.

—3—

The Juvenile Code of Arizona, Section 8-201 to 8-239 
Arizona Revised Statutes, is set forth in full in the Juris­
dictional Statement at pages 50-63.

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Does the Juvenile Code of Arizona, Sections 8-201 to 
8-329, Ariz. Rev. Stats., on its face or as construed and 
applied, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution since it confers un­
limited discretion upon a Juvenile Court, dispenses with 
procedural safeguards required by due process of law in­
cluding: right to notice of the charges of delinquency; 
right to counsel; right to confrontation of adverse wit­
nesses; right to cross examination of adverse witnesses; 
privilege against self-incrimination; right to a transcript 
of the proceedings; right to appellate review of the Ju­
venile Court’s decision.



4-

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.

In the ease at bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona has 
unequivocally held that due process does not require that 
an infant have the right to counsel in a juvenile court 
proceeding involving an alleged violation of the law. 
(Appellants’ Jurisdictional Statement p. 37) Resolution 
of the precise issue thus pinpointed at bar is of vital 
concern to members of the National Legal Aid and De­
fender Association, many of whom regularly represent 
indigents in juvenile court/*) The outcome of the instant 
matter will directly affect the continuing validity of such 
representation and its growth and vitality, because it 
must be presumed that the right to counsel in a juvenile 
court proceeding must enure to the benefit of the poor 
as well as those who can afford paid counsel. (Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12)

The National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
(hereinafter referred to as NLADA) urges reversal of 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in the 
case at bar in that it fails to meet minimum standards

(*> The National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
has in excess of 1400 professional members, many of whom 
represent indigent persons in civil and criminal matters. 
Its membership also embraces the majority of the 577 
Legal Aid Societies, public Defender offices, and assigned 
counsel systems throughout the United States. The extent 
to which these organizations represent indigents in ju­
venile court proceedings is governed by the provisions 
of the various Juvenile Court statutes, and the judicial 
philosophy of the various jurisdictions regarding the 
basic requirements of due process and the theory of parens 
patriae. (See Appendix 2a, b, c.)



•5-

suggested by the Defender Standards Committee of 
NLADA, adopted by its Assembly of Delegates, endorsed 
by the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent 
Defendants of the American Bar Association, and adopt­
ed verbatim by the House of Delegates of the American 
Bar Association. (The minimum standards are set forth 
en toto in Appendix la  attached hereto.)

In their particularly relevant portions the minimum 
standards provide:

“ Every Defender System should:
1. Provide legal representation for every person 

who is without financial means to secure competent 
counsel when charged with a felony, misdemeanor, 
or other charge where there is a possibility of a jail 
sentence.

AU At*-ft- if- "K- tp

3. Provide representation immediately after the 
taking into custody or arrest, at the first and every 
subsequent court appearance and at every stage in 
the proceeding, including appeal or other post-con­
viction proceedings to remedy error or injustice. The 
representation should extend to parole and probation- 
violation proceedings, extradition proceedings, and 
proceedings involving possible detention or commit­
ment of minors or alleged mentally ill persons.

# # # # *
8. Provide effectual notice of the available legal 

services to all persons who may be in need thereof.
* * * * *” (emphasis added)

These minimum standards represent the crystallized 
sentiment of NLADA and its members. They are in accord 
with “ Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts,” pre­
pared by William H. Sheridan in cooperation with the 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency and the 
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges. (U.S. De­



6-

partment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Children’s 
Bureau Publication Number 437—1966) In that publica­
tion, we find the following, pp. 56-57:

“ In at least one-third of the States the statutes 
now have provisions relating to the right to repre­
sentation, notice of right to counsel, or the assign­
ment of counsel or both. In still other States similar 
provisions have been established by rule of court.

If there was any doubt as to whether there was 
a right to counsel it has been dispelled. It is less 
clear from the decisions as to whether there is a 
right to be advised and a duty to furnish counsel 
upon request. The recent statutory enactments, how­
ever, show a definite trend in this direction. As a 
component part of a fair hearing required by due 
process guaranteed under the 14th Amendment, no­
tice of the right to counsel should be required at all 
hearings and counsel provided upon request when 
the family is financially unable to employ counsel.”

That is the position that the amicus curiae urges this 
Honorable Court to adopt.



— 7—

STATEMENT.

The Association adopts Appellants’ Statement.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

The right of counsel in any proceeding in which per­
sonal liberty is at stake is a basic requirement of the 
Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the 14th, 
regardless of the forum.

The Juvenile Court of Gila County deprived Gerald 
Gault of his Constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel and to Due Process of law as guaranteed by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu­
tion of the United States.



-8-

ARGUMENT.

I.
The Juvenile Court Procedure in Arizona Which Does 

Not Follow the “ Standards for a Defender System” In­
fringed Constitutional Guarantees of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The “ Standards for a Defender System” are a policy 
statement of both NLADA and the American Bar Asso­
ciation of minimum requirements under the generative 
principle of due process of law. (Appendix la)

Previous standards, entitled “ Standards for Defender 
Services,” were silent on the right of counsel in juvenile 
court proceedings. (Appendix lb)

The newly adopted standards reflect a growing concern 
of the legal profession for protection of rights of children 
in juvenile court proceedings.

This concern is well founded. On March 21, 1966, Mr. 
Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court in Kent v. U.S., 
observed that:

“ * * * there may be grounds for concern that the 
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets 
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the 
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated 
for children.” 383 U.S. 541, 556.

The Standards provide that every Defender System 
should provide “ legal representation for every person 
* * * charged with a felony, misdemeanor or other charge 
where there is a possibility of a jail sentence * * * The 
representation should extend to proceedings involving 
possible detention or commitment of minors * * *” More­



-9-

over, in order that this be not merely a hollow right 
but one given practical implementation, the system must 
“ provide effectual notice of the available legal services 
to all persons who may be in need thereof.” (Standards 
Nos. 1, 3, 8, Standards for a Defender System). (Appendix 
la)

While in the ease at bar it is not established whether 
or not Gerald Gault or his parents were “ without fi­
nancial means to secure competent counsel,” (Standard 
No. 1, Standards for a Defender System), (Appendix la) 
it is clear that there was no counsel at the juvenile court 
hearing and that neither the defendant nor his parents 
were advised by the court of a right to have counsel.

The right of one accused of crime to have a lawyer 
existed in this country from the outset. In 1963, this 
Court held that an indigent accused is entitled to court 
appointed counsel in all felony cases. Gideon v. Wain- 
wriglit, 372 U.S. 335. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the 5th Circuit has held upon the authority of Gideon 
v. Waimvright that an indigent accused is entitled to 
court appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases where his 
liberty is in jeopardy. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 
263; McDonald v. Moore, 353 F. 2d 106.

With all this concern for the rights of adults to counsel, 
it seems anomalous to us that such rights should be 
denied to a child. We submit that the constitutional 
guarantees of the effective assistance of counsel must be 
afforded to any person whose liberty is in jeopardy.

It is no answer to say that the instant proceedings 
are civil or non-criminal in nature. The fact remains 
that Gerald Gault has been deprived of his liberty for 
an indeterminate length of time which can extend until 
his 21st year; about six years. The United States Court



—10-

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held 
that where a statute provides for a “ hearing” the “ right 
to he heard” when personal liberty is at stake requires 
the effective assistance of counsel in a juvenile court 
quite as much as it does in a criminal court. Shioutakon 
v. District of Columbia, 236 F. 2d 666, 669.

II.

The Arizona Procedure Is Contrary to the Trend in the 
United States in Dealing with Juvenile Matters.

On August 3, 1966, the National Legal Aid and De­
fender Association mailed to approximately 40 of its 
member offices a questionnaire concerning matters re­
lating to Juvenile Court practice in their respective 
jurisdictions, a copy of the letter and questionnaire ap­
pears as Appendix 2a; an Abstract of the results appears 
as Appendix 2b; and a recapitulation as Appendix 2c.

Twenty seven responded that they did handle juvenile 
cases in their jurisdiction.

In gathering this data, the NLADA sought to sample 
a cross section of states and jurisdictions as well as a 
variety of types of services including a purely assigned 
counsel system in Virginia, a Legal Aid Society in New 
York State and several varieties of Defender offices. 
The numerical and relative percentages of the responses 
to each question appears in Appendix 2c.

Special attention of the court is called to question 9, A 
through G, and 10 which touch upon constitutionally 
protected guarantees. Responses to Question 9 indicate 
that in 100% of the jurisdictions reporting, notice of the 
charges is given to the parents; in 78% one is advised



—11—

of the right to counsel; the privilege against self-incrim­
ination is protected in 70%. 49% follow the rules of evi­
dence. (Q. 10)

The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges is 
presently conducting a research project on the role of 
the lawyer in juvenile court proceedings. While the Coun­
cil recognizes the need and the right to competent counsel 
in such proceedings, it expresses the hope that the Court 
will not set rigid guidelines for counsel until research 
results are available some two years hence. It accurately 
observes that the precise function of a lawyer in juvenile 
court proceedings has never been clearly defined. (Ap­
pendix 3)

It should be clearly borne in mind that the amicus 
curiae at bar suggests no rigid guidelines for counsel, 
but simply urges that notice of the right of counsel be 
required in all juvenile hearings and counsel provided 
upon request of the indigent.

Other studies also indicate that there is a growing 
acceptance of counsel in juvenile court. For instance, in 
a 1963 survey of juvenile courts serving 75 of the largest 
metropolitan areas, this question was asked: Do you 
look with favor upon the appearance of attorneys in 
juvenile courts on behalf of children and parents'? 91.4% 
of the judges answered yes. (Of. “ Lawyers in the Juvenile 
Courts,” Field Training Materials (Mimeographed 1963) 
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Chicago, p. 
94.)



—12-

III.
The Holding of the Court Below that a Child Is Not 

Entitled to Counsel in a Juvenile Court Proceeding Is 
Violative of His Rights Under the Sixth Amendment and 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It has been accurately observed that “ Of all of the 
rights that an accused person has, the right to be rep­
resented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it 
affects his ability to assert any other rights he may 
have.” Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8.

Surely the above observation needs no embellishment. 
If it does, we need look no further than the stirring words 
of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
at 68-69:

“ The right to be heard would be, in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to 
be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science 
of the law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the in­
dictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he 
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and con­
victed upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrel­
evant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks 
both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare 
Ms defense, even though he have a perfect one. He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step 
in the proceedings against him. Without it, though 
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his inno­
cence. ’ ’

If this be true with regard to “ the intelligent and ed­
ucated layman” , then a case of a child in a juvenile court 
presents an a fortiori situation.



■13—

But, the Supreme Court of Arizona held in the case at 
bar “ we do not think due process requires that an infant 
have a right to counsel. The parent and the probation 
officer may be relied upon to protect the infant’s inter­
ests.” (Application of Gault, 407 P. 2d 760, 767.)

However, the record reveals that the infant’s mother 
tried in vain to obtain confrontation of the complaining 
witness. (T. 42) And as for the probation officer, he 
was the only prosecution witness against the infant. He 
was the one who compiled inculpatory evidence against 
the infant. He was the one who secured an admission from 
the infant: “ when I asked him to recite Mrs. Cook’s 
phone number, he recited it like it was his own.” (T. 
65) He was the one who filed the petition: “ we set no 
specific charge in it, other than delinquency.” (T. 68) He 
failed to subpoena the complaining witness. He did not 
advise the infant of his privilege against self-incrimina­
tion. Yet, the court below held that he could be relied 
upon to “ protect the infant’s interests.”

Can it be said in truth that the probation officer ade­
quately took the place of a lawyer? A lawyer would not 
have been permitted to represent conflicting interests or 
to reveal anything said to him under the attorney/client 
privilege. Moreover, a lawyer would have been duty bound 
to inform the infant of his 5th Amendment privilege 
against self incrimination. A lawyer would have objected 
to hearsay and demanded confrontation of the complain­
ing witness. In short, the right to counsel affects the abil­
ity of the infant to assert any other rights he may have.

As this Honorable Court said in Kent v. TJ.S., supra, at 
p. 561:

“ The right to representation by counsel is not a 
formality. It is not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic 
requirement. It is of the essence of justice.”



—1 4 -

CONCLUSION.

For the reasons stated it is respectfully submitted that 
the judgment should be reversed.

F or th e  N ational L egal Aid and  D efender A ssociation:

L. M IC H A E L  G E T T Y
D irector of D efender Services 
N ational Legal Aid and  D efender A ssociation 
1155 E. 60th S tree t 
Chicago, Illinois 60637

J A M E S  J. D O H E R T Y
Suite 910
118 N. C lark  S tree t 
Chicago, Illinois 60602

M A R S H A L L  J. H A R T M A N  
Suite 910
118 N. C lark S tree t 
Chicago, Illinois 60602



—la—

APPENDIX la

“STANDARDS FOR A DEFENDER SYSTEM”
Each jurisdiction should have an adequate defender sys­
tem to provide legal representation for persons who are 
financially unable to employ competent counsel in crim­
inal proceedings. Each defender system should be se­
lected locally in accordance with the needs and traditions 
of the jurisdiction to be served. Except in rare instances, 
experience indicates that an uncoordinated assigned- 
counsel system will provide competent representation only 
where the number of indigent-accused is not great. Where 
an assigned-counsel system is in effect, it should be 
administered to insure uniform rotation of counsel whose 
experience is commensurate with the seriousness of the 
charge. In urban areas the community should consider 
the institution of a public defender or other centrally- 
administered service.

Every defender system should:
1. Provide legal representation for every person 
who is without financial means to secure competent 
counsel when charged with a felony, misdemeanor 
or other charge where there is a possibility of a 
jail sentence.
2. Provide standards of eligibility that do not ex­
tend assistance to one having sufficient funds or 
resources to secure competent private counsel but, 
at the same time, are not so stringent as to create 
a class of unrepresented accused.
3. Provide representation immediately after the tak­
ing into custody or arrest, at the first and every 
subsequent court appearance and at every stage in 
the proceeding, including appeal or other post-eon- 
viction proceedings to remedy error or injustice. The 
representation should extend to parole and probation- 
violation proceedings, extradition proceedings, and 
proceedings involving possible detention or commit­
ment of minors or alleged mentally ill persons.



•2a-

4. Provide experienced, competent, and zealous coun­
sel, independent and free from political or economic 
influence. Such counsel owes Ms client his undivided 
loyalty consistent with the highest standards of pro­
fessional ethics and integrity.
5. Provide counsel compensation that is adequate 
and in keeping with his experience and ability. In 
the case of a public defender, compensation should 
not be disproportionate to that of the prosecution, 
lest there be a disparity in professional ability be­
tween the prosecution and defense.
6. Provide sufficient funds for the uniform avail­
ability of investigation, psychiatric examinations, and 
other necessary expert assistance.
7. Provide a place in the court and jail building 
for private interviews, consultations, and necessary 
examinations between the accused and his counsel, 
investigators, and other experts.
8. Provide effectual notice of the available legal 
services to all persons who may be in need thereof.
9. Provide assistance in having reasonable bail set, 
and in appropriate cases, a release without bail.
10. Maintain adequate records on each and every 
case for the proper administration of justice.
11. Encourage the interest of law students and law 
schools in the administration of justice in criminal 
cases.
12. Enlist the support of the community, the bar 
associations, and agencies oriented to rehabilitation.
Approved by: Board of Directors, Defender Commit­
tee, and Assembly of Delegates of the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association on November 19, 1965, 
and House of Delegates, The American Bar Asso­
ciation on February 21, 1966.

(Appendix la )



— 3a-

A P P E N D IX  lb

STANDARDS FOR DEFENDER SERVICES
Adopted by the National Legal Aid and Defender 

Association, October 1959. Adopted by the 
House of Delegates of the American Bar 

Association on recommendation of 
the Standing Committee on Legal 

Aid Work February 1960

The Defender system of every state should:
1. Provide counsel for every indigent person unable to 

employ counsel who faces the possibility of the de­
privation of his liberty or other serious criminal sanc­
tion;

2. Afford representation which is experienced, compe­
tent, and zealous;

3. Provide the investigatory and other facilities neces­
sary for a complete defense;

4. Come into operation at a sufficiently early stage of 
the proceedings so as to fully advise and protect the 
defendant;

5. Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client;

6. Include the taking of appeals and the prosecuting of 
other remedies, before or after conviction, considered 
by the defending counsel to be in the interest of jus­
tice;

7. Maintain in each county in which the volume of crim­
inal cases requiring assignment of counsel is such as 
to justify the employment of at least one full-time 
lawyer to handle the work effectively, a Defender of­
fice, either as a public office or as a quasi-public or 
private organization;

8. Enlist community participation and responsibility and 
encourage the continuing cooperation of the organized 
bar.



—4a—

A P P E N D IX  2a

(Letterhead Of)
N ational  L egal A id  and  D e fe n d e r  A ssociation  

August 3, 1966

I am enclosing a questionnaire which is part of a 
survey to determine practices in juvenile matters through­
out the country.

The National Legal Aid and Defender Association is 
now considering filing a brief amicus curiae in the case 
of In re Gault now pending before the Supreme Court 
of the United States.

The answers which you give as well as those of the 
thirty other offices which have been selected will do 
much to help us determine what course of action will be 
followed.

Please complete and return this important question­
naire in the enclosed envelope just as soon as possible.

Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.
Yours very truly,

LMG/slp L. Michael Getty
Enclosures Director of Defender Services



-5a-

(Letterhead Of)
N ational  L egal x\ id  and  D e fe n d e r  A ssociation

SURVEY OF PROCEDURES IN 
JUVENILE MATTERS

The following survey is being taken in conjunction with 
a proposal that NLADA file a brief amicus curiae in a 
case pending before the Supreme Court of the United 
States {In re Gault) involving the constitutional rights 
of a minor to a fair trial.
1. the name of your office: 

person reporting:
date completed:

2. Do you have jurisdiction to represent juveniles in 
your local juvenile court or its equivalent!
3. State the total number of juvenile court cases in 
which you represented:

A. in 1965
B. during the first half of 1966

4. What test or tests are used by the court to determine 
if counsel should be appointed?
5. Does the court follow a strict or liberal standard of 
eligibility for the appointment of counsel?
6. Does the court in your jurisdiction commonly appoint 
counsel for the parents as well as the child if there is an 
apparent conflict of interest?

YES NO
7. State the point in the proceeding in which your office 
most usually becomes involved in a juvenile court case.
8. State the time in the proceeding in which your office 
usually becomes involved in crimes other than in the 
juvenile court.

(Appendix 2a)



6a—

9. Are the following rights protected in your jurisdiction 
relative to the prosecution of juveniles in the juvenile 
court?
(Circle and make explanation if necessary please)

A. Notice of the charges to the child?
YES NO

To his parents?
YES NO

B. Right to counsel?
YES NO

Advised of right?
YES NO

Furnished counsel by the state if necessary? 
YES NO

C. Confrontation of witnesses?
YES NO

D. Cross-examination of witnesses?
YES NO

E. Right to appellate review?
YES NO

F. Transcript of the proceedings?
YES NO

G. Privilege against self-incrimination ?
YES NO

10. Does the juvenile court follow the rules of evidence?
YES NO

11. Is the system presently followed in your jurisdiction 
fair to the:
Child YES NO
Parents YES NO
Society YES NO

(Appendix 2a)



SURVEY OF PROCEDURES IN JU V EN ILE MATTERS

1 awmsKsair^'

SQO 300 ^amkaiti rJ

?

T £ j f

Co^r***,

XVMi&fW Q |V sW V * j« w* , ‘ '"tuwA M M ^sJ^xsw

i
A,

T
B.

1
B, B,

|i 1
I C

I *>
i: D

A»KC 14 V
9“

., t45 V 'HI Inwif’PWt: ©*vAjV***>.
, l^>5 (n«AA£&sfi*rflg*

&JA

7 £ U l U«- „ A)|i«!kiA^o»4 ;. to" ewva*tM«iA‘ 4 “

\b

y -

« •

y - y ~

F
1
&

to I t 
ft

!*• i a  | y -

H
a

u
c

fwr$«to«* “ n*» <iMWft

y -  | ^  | y * 4$ **#**& .
t *  f e i

xt  < J \  . '«,, A ̂ 43*1 AM&nfeA-Pij I .;

,>V*t B«JWfs«JiR»(dK̂j| ŝ*
I

'! y

»  : ft-A y™
i •• il&$«y

£ f̂§kfcr\
5

r <̂w*-4«'| £\vvr*«

as
•j f 9T &J-j4A * ;

'' * |||**«:  ̂ ’ Q̂ÂCfeaM I:

"OaiCJUi,

■|SgA^. C«As®4»

Up*. 2, M ; -h  Q<«Wr»».

^  \ •»  j as ;! .0«Mbg»Mj.
;

^ J U u . C J C ^

, Qwteft

* sr—f~  y .t T sSA
|| ( exAij ̂ jwwwtsswwit !.

• • if
m&  ¥ H ; M> ; [j

l.« C  ! TOO

. jffts#MWA*l*k,| J l J U k to

«R«̂ 2̂  tfW.r»A|jiAi

« *

y »  ": 3'.a

S’ P®m>M» ;
• 'rA  'v**4" |

' !!1 :.
4 % ^

VfV>*wvl, I'laSHsaĜ  

TW^ ̂ Wvi , IV

O U .C A J W A

i»S9

\%o©e
V  , .

| m

I sac ‘" f t
■fe |:

v»o | |

3 l U M ,0AlL)L«CĤ

h- j Q js**4-£

I W v) J

II ';!*}• |  || 
ft® «AJ^ Of |

M“ t^ Z ~ \" z L x  & & £ $ ’*" t

^ * .  Q , a ; r ^

n a . ^ ^ c A , .

^  |  ■ it-a© j; . is *mm,

t

0«A

^ A J i i tŝ G5M4As«̂  :. ”&4

flifJkdt ! QJfen
U*., dUtnJiunt 

^■tAla" ■■

1 V<uJb

",, ■!„ Ĉ̂ c%4̂ JiE«ft*. ‘; " CM anŵ w»»i*
*|t  ̂ QE*â  ̂ ®JU*M«mssi!’ :

4 “

* •

y «

y »

9 “

y -

3 i U

a 4 ~ t
=}

3:M

.. O f 0*4̂ 1*;: £̂ >n a»»s*la«4&̂K{’
•a* a *

n .  r u • - Fed" ttwi^ »»-f

■^JUL"
j, t

■4 *

■Ill

l ^ J i

' ^ L J l

x\* r T ^ ^ i u j : ' ! ^

y**

y - ?

y *

\H

Tl® i \ I crti^
,i cwLfct; »̂«4. ionj |p4«r «fl*4*̂WBw4

n* *

f ' Q ^ U ,  ‘ > a * „ 4

n® 1 swmii»i*midt ;, k"jwsign«*i"

a^^f4 Cyfen eyiAftft’ ’ ,
»wk«H«»a«4 trwiur • \

4 “

S3“

y -

>

M“

Lsa&wAMU, S1&* ! Ue* L IJa#
f c t U r * !  f  i! 1 I I

y - ! a-

I y*4

|  y -  ? y %

y *  ! \ h  ■ ^

' c«4" 1 ‘
t j t  J  W " i y *  ! ^

^  ;| y *  \ y** l &  [_ i h

xt  i ! f r  ll y*4 ■ y 41

j6*i»  ̂ ^
«MUNnt4 i j p w.  ̂ y*' oSR c

*•• f

^  ;! y** ll ^  § y «  1 ^

n . h*

M** 7..

ll Ds0. gArffii!;

f i r ;

^  j ^
« -  ;l

U*‘

y -

n& A uhk n .

t a p *
' i j u i 0 ^  CUV\#AfivMî  .. y»*

H *

^  | ' f  ; {b

j y *  j y *
1 y** 1 y** : y**

n® iw

; y *  f j b " !  ^
I v  f y -

« • ! * ! * !  
i n  y - 1  ^  1 y -  I

i ■ r 1 r • !>it . j • t }•

LW i| MMnAm j t) r  'i 'fVladS'. e-S ■tV”tj»«
* |  :| I ■ . ' i  il

i s p j
i> ;

y*4 r

s r.

■ IjS» ll l--.4v'fc i^«5fa®*fw | f^4>*ir 6f is4 (bA»4)^«
r  j c ^ j n c ^ i  - ;

j ;• * . *: * . * %
n «* j ^Mkm ci ̂ tteluQ M • j] ’G*»̂
I i| ♦ 1 $ —

« r

i ^ U '
11 !l
1 ! •;

: ^ .,|« 4 :
1j

..j | ;

; u i - J -

C t ^ t ® « 4  2 dfwLsfcifĉT
r onk ;j ywwflfc rt!w awt̂ . | j

y *

M*4

y -

|  , 2

H*- ;| :j Ctt ( W im ***̂  "
;| ■ JL^uSjj 1 jj '!

S fi
&  j y - '

h® j| R’e€T'» ij fait “'•Wt l4*1 '•'*•' t!L 1 . « - * ' • -

A *
■ ! ■

! i«

3 4 J I

j

I <gyps? ia& ^&& ŝ  ,;
* ;' 5 j; I j1; H it 1: Jj

Ĵ Aitŷ i’i' Ifclsu -if
mA ll wlÂpatilL
: 1 i : !H * i  ; j

•y*4 1

lj \ h
n«r 1 ‘'O f

S 1 • .. |

i ^ ! a - 1 !

v .  1! " p ^ c  « u * r n .

U »  9 AO j AS ; j: „ . -islrj^ l4  j' !! ^ 4 * ^ ; t u
u

7H

\ h
M«

y -

jfW

y » f i t  i A

y »  : y»- 1 ( y >  f \ ) >
- - L      jL ____1___ 1____ U L_

| y»

y *  1 y ~  j a

\ h  j r ' -

y * 7  A

n -  | y -  ( a *

A... j -

f

t).

jy*

y »

y

i ^ T q 3  n ’

j
i

V r
t i a

: 1 {

f  I ^  j 4

rj)*- j n»

A

t^«* n«M. . In'S ' Ifsr C«A®1 -Lŝ Al | R w tfif tml |>rf!
jr «n/WM̂TŴ t̂

y

lASto/SiT ̂ wwr, IT'wwf y -  SSC <n<rtw»*>w«\ " CsuwtJijiM
- • 1 «Mwt ■ - .

v h  • " ^ p i p ^ .. ? , .  i y - y**

^ 4 * 3 1 Q h  2 T > « t  «ca*jt^J^MAin« ; O tJ  annsST or

. . . . ; .  .; ; |  A<w** f

y -

4  1 l ,p

\ h  I ^

7« !; fit!

k *  I y *

y »  1 y -
1 i 
i !l! :j

y ~  y *

A i f  i y *
I " !  ! I.
y  I t>» l t i f  ■
! J ; j; !

Dr | (4  :'

lt  | \ y*4

i- : '

*  i y *  y

y

y •

A .

jH

7 *
!

hJtju
S ? .4 h«41W"

>  ! >
AlA*!’

4

1; ^  

I y -

I ®  !
I i! i
f •■ - ji {■.

|l 1! fie-
i || i
p  [ r>

iL

H 4 A 4  |Dr

y *  I j / -
I ■

Dr Dr

itkrtkUA. (s-ii-sMaA
4 8A9v4»̂li*MR& en I

t

w

1
1

.J®

n

y*4

r • • jt t

« *

y *

■ 4 ^ !  h *  S f i .

4  . : ..IV

%  j n®
■ / i

i: ^

n™|k

4 W I p

I y -

4 '  ! V4  ; ^

p r f l ' f

y *  i >

ri fir.

*

t f
4**

M »
h » .

< i

y *

ri
ji :



— 7 a—

A P P E N D IX  2b

SURVEY OF PROCEDURES IN JUVEN ILE MATTERS



A P P E N D IX  2c

RECAPITULATION
S u r v e y  Of  P r o c e d u r e s  I n J u v e n il e  M a t t e r s

1. The name of your office:
Person reporting:
Date Completed:

2. Do you have jurisdiction to represent juveniles in 
your local juvenile court or its equivalent?

Total Replies 27 100%
“Yes” 27 100%

3. State the total number of juvenile court eases in 
which you represented: (See Appendix 2b.)

4. What test or tests are used by the court to deter­
mine if counsel should be appointed?

Total Replies
“Financial Ability of Parents 
and/or Child to Retain Private

26 100%

Counsel”
“Possible Certification out of

13 50%

Juvenile Court” 4 15%
“Gravity of the Offense” 
“Subjective Judgment of the

3 12%

Court” 3 12%
“Upon Request” 2 7%
“In Every Case” 1 4%

i. Does the court follow a strict or liberal 
eligibility for the appointment of counsel?

standard

Total Replies 26 100%
“Liberal” 22 85%
“Strict” 4 15%



9a-

6. Does the Court in your jurisdiction commonly ap­
point counsel for the parents as well as the child if there 
is an apparent conflict of interest?

(Appendix 2c)

Total Replies 26 100%
“Yes” 8 30%
“No” 15 58%
“Uncertain” 3 12%

7. State the point in the proceeding in which your 
office most usually becomes involved in a juvenile court 
case.

otal Replies 26 100%
“Prior to First Hearing”
“At or Following First Hear­

9 34%

ing
“At or Following Initial Court

10 39%

Appearance” 5 20%
“No Cases Handled” 2 7%

8. State the time in the proceeding in which your of­
fice most usually becomes involved in crimes other than 
in the juvenile court.

Total Replies 26 100%
“Prior to First Hearing” 7 27%
“At or Following Preliminary 
Hearing But Prior to Arraign­
ment” 4 15%
“At or Following First Court 
Appearance For Arraignment 
or Indictment” 14 54%
“No Cases Handled” 1 4%



10a-

9. Are the following rights protected in your juris­
diction relative to the prosecution of juveniles in the 
juvenile court? (Circle and make explanation if neces­

(Appendix 2c)

sary please.)
Total Replies

A. Notice of the charges to the child? 
Yes (24) 89% No (3) 11% (27) 100%

To his parents?
Yes (27) 100% No (27) 100%

B. Bight to counsel?
Yes (21) 78% No (5) 19% (27) 100%
Uncertain (1) 3%

Advised of right?
Yes (21) 78% No (6) 22% (27) 100%

Furnished counsel by the state if necessary ?
Yes (20) 74% No (7) 26% (27) 100%

C. -Confrontation of witnesses?
Yes (24) 89% No (3) 11% (27) 100%

D. Cross-examination of witnesses? 
Yes (25) 93% No (2) 7% (27) 100%

E. Right to appellate review?
Yes (24) 89% No (3) 11% (27) 100%

F . Transcript of the proceedings? 
Yes (15) 56% No (11) 41% (27) 100%

Gr.
Uncertain (1) 3%

Privilege against self-incrimination ? 
Yes (19) 70% No (5) 19% (27) 100%
Uncertain (3) 11%



— 11a-

10. Does the juvenile court follow the rules of evidence!
Total Replies

Yes (13) 49% No (7) 26% (27) 100%
Uncertain (1) 3% Qualified Yes (6) 22%<*)

11. Is the system presently followed in your juris-

(Appendix 2c)

diction fair to the:
Total Replies

Child Yes (17) 65% No (7) 27%
Uncertain (1) 4% (**) (l) 4% (26) 100%

Parents Yes (18) 69% No (6) 23%
Uncertain (1) 4% (**) (1) 4% (26) 100%

Society Yes (20) 77% No (4) 15%
Uncertain (1) 4% (**) (1) 4% (26) 100%

(*) Two “yes” replies exclude the hearsay rule.
Three “yes” replies indicate a liberal interpretation. 
One “yes” reply indicates that the rule “depends 
on the individual judge”

(**) These responses indicate that: “procedure is very 
loosely prescribed by statute and fairness or un­
fairness depends very much upon the individual 
characteristics of the judge.”



—12a—

APPENDIX 3

(Letterhead Of)
N atio n a l  C o u n c il  of J u v e n il e  C ourt J udges

September 19, 1966

National Legal Aid and Defender Association 
American Bar Center 
1155 East 60th Street 
Chicago, Illinois

Be: Amicus Brief in the Gault Case 
Gentlemen:

The right to counsel means the right to competent coun­
sel. In delinquency hearings, however, the role of counsel 
has never been clearly defined. There is considerable dis­
agreement as to whether counsel should conduct himself 
as he would in adversary proceedings or whether he should 
assist the court in its attempt to help the child. In the 
latter role, counsel does not function as a trial lawyer 
in the traditional sense but rather serves to interpret the 
court hearing to the child and also helps elicit information 
from the alleged delinquent whom he represents.

To identify the most effective role for counsel, both at 
the adjudicatory and dispositional stages, the National 
Council of Juvenile Court Judges is now undertaking, 
with grant assistance from the Ford Foundation, the 
Major Besearch Project on the role of the lawyer in the 
Juvenile Court. It is hoped that the court will not set 
rigid guidelines for counsel until research results are 
available.

In Chicago, Cleveland and Newark, this project is now 
under way. In each city attorneys have been engaged to 
represent children in delinquency hearings. In two of the 
cities the children represented will be interviewed by the



13a—

Project’s research staff in order to evaluate the impact 
of legal representation. These cases will be compared with 
a control group. Changes in attitude and differences in 
effect, if any, at disposition will be noted. Rates of recid­
ivism will also be studied in follow-up research in both 
groups.

It is expected that at the conclusion of two years, 
definitive information will be available which will assist 
both the bench and the bar in providing counsel which is 
really competent to provide representation in Juvenile 
Delinquency hearings.

Very truly yours,
National Council of Juvenile Court Judges,
John F. X. Irving,
Executive Director

(Appendix 3)