Myers v. Gilman Paper Company Motion to Dismiss the Appeal and Brief in Support

    TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1957

No. 91

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCE­
MENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, A  CORPORATION, 
PETITIONER,

vs.

STATE OF ALABAMA, EX REL. JOHN PATTERSON, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED MARCH 20, 1957 
CERTIORARI GRANTED MAY 27, 1957



SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1957

No. 91

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCE­
MENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, A CORPORATION, 
PETITIONER,

vs.

STATE OF ALABAMA, EX REL. JOHN PATTERSON, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL.

ON WKIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA

I N D E X
Original Print

Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama .... 1 1
Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of the 

15th Judicial Circuit of Alabama, Montgomery County,
Alabama ______________________________________________  1 i
Exhibit I—Decree of Circuit Court of Montgomery County 

of June 1, 1956 for temporary restraining order and
injunction .............................................................................. 16 18

Exhibit II—Interlocutory decree of Circuit Court of Mont­
gomery County of July 11, 1956 on motion of the State 
to require respondent to produce certain books, papers
and documents ......................................................................  18 20

Exhibit III—Decree of Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County of July 30, 1956 denying petition to stay order
of July 25, 1956 _____________________________________  21 22

Submission of cause _____________________________________  21% 23
Opinion, per curiam ........   22 23
Order denying writ of certiorari and dismissing petition .......  30 31
Clerk’s certificate (omitted in printing) ................................... 31 31

Order extending time to file certiorari ....................................  32 32
Order granting certiorari ................................................................  33 32

R ecord P ress, P rinters, N ew  Y ork , N. Y., A ugust 23, 1957



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[fol. 1]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
THIRD DIVISION

No.........

N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d van cem en t  of 
C olored P eople , a corporation, Petitioner

In R e : N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d van cem en t  
of C olored P eople , Petitioner-Respondent

v.
S tate  of A labam a  on t h e  R elation  of J o h n  P atterso n , 

Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Respondent- 
Complainant

P e titio n  for W rit  of C ertiorari to  t h e  C ir c u it  C ou rt  of 
t h e  15t h  J u d icial  C ir cu it  of A lab a m a , M on tgom ery  
C o u n t y , A la b a m a , in  E q u ity

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Alabama

Comes the petitioner-respondent and respectfully peti­
tions this Honorable Court to review and determine the 
judgments and orders adjudging petitioner in contempt 
and fixing punishment against petitioner therefor in the 
sums of $10,000 and $100,000 rendered by the Circuit Court 
of the 15th Judicial Circuit of Alabama, Montgomery 
County, Alabama, in Equity, on July 25, 1956, and on 
July 31, 1956, in a cause styled No. 30468, State of Ala­
bama on the relation of John Patterson, Attorney General 
of the State of Alabama, complainant against the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a 
corporation, respondent.

Petitioner avers that the state, on June 1, 1956, filed a 
complaint in the court below alleging: (1) That petitioner, 
a New York corporation, maintains its Southeast Regional’ 
office in Birmingham, Alabama; (2) that petitioner has 
employed agents to operate this office; (3) that local chap­
ters of petitioner are organized in the State of Alabama;



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(4) that membership dues and contributions for said chap­
ters and petitioner are solicited; (5) that petitioner has 
[fol. 2] paid monies to Autherine Lucy and Polly Myers 
Hudson to aid them to enroll as students at the University 
of Alabama to test its policy of denying entrance to 
Negroes; (6) that petitioner has furnished legal counsel to 
represent Autherine Lucy in her proceedings against the 
University of Alabama; (7) that petitioner has supported 
and financed an illegal boycott to compel the Capitol Motor 
Lines of Montgomery, Alabama, to seat passengers without 
reference to race; (8) that petitioner’s officers, agents and 
members have for years past and are presently engaged in 
organizing chapters in the State of Alabama, in collecting 
dues therefor, soliciting contributions and expending 
monies in advancing the aims of petitioner; (9) that peti­
tioner has never filed with the Secretary of State a certi­
fied copy of its Articles of Incorporation and other infor­
mation required by Title 10, Sections 192, 193 and 194 of 
the Code of Alabama, 1940; (10) that petitioner has been 
and continues to do business in the State of Alabama and in 
the County of Montgomery in violation of Article 12, Sec­
tion 232, Constitution of Alabama, 1901, and Section 194, 
Title 10, Code of Alabama, 1940; (11) that petitioner is 
continuing to do business within the state without first 
having complied with the aforesaid constitutional and 
statutory provisions and is thereby causing irreparable 
injury to the property and civil rights of the citizens of 
Alabama for which criminal prosecution and civil action at 
law afford no adequate relief.

The state prayed for a temporary injunction enjoining 
and restraining petitioner, its agents and members from 
further conducting its business within the state and organ­
izing chapters and maintaining offices within the state, it 
requested dissolution of all existing chapters of the organ­
ization and that upon final hearing the court issue a perma­
nent injunction embodying the foregoing and oust peti­
tioner from the state.

On June 1, 1956, the day this bill was filed without notice 
or opportunity for hearing, the court below issued a tempo­
rary restraining order and injunction. The aforesaid order 
and judgment is appended hereto as Exhibit No. I to this



3

petition and made a part thereof. It restrained petitioner, 
its agents, all parties in active concert with petitioner, 
and all persons having notice of the court’s order from 
conducting any further business of any description or kind 
within the state; from further organizing chapters within 
the state; from maintaining offices within the state; from 
soliciting members, contributions or collecting member­
ships for petitioner or any local chapters or wholly con­
trolled subsidiaries in the State of Alabama. The court 
[fob 3] further enjoined petitioner—although the state’s 
bill did not request it—from filing with the Department of 
Revenue and the Secretary of State of Alabama any docu­
ment to qualify to do business within the state.

Petitioner avers that this order and judgment is null and 
void and beyond the jurisdiction of the court below in that 
the court seeks to exert authority not in keeping with the 
decisions of this Court and which invades petitioner’s 
right under Article I, Section 8 and the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States.

On July 2, 1956, petitioner filed a motion to dissolve the 
temporary restraining order and injunction and demurrers 
to the bill. Hearing thereon was set for July 17, 1956.

On July 5, 1956, the state filed a motion to require peti­
tioner to produce certain books, documents and papers, 
as set out below, alleging the examination thereof was 
essential to its preparation for trial:

1. Copies of all charters of branches or chapters of 
the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People in the State of Alabama.

2. All lists, documents, books, and papers showing 
the names, addresses and dues paid of all present mem­
bers in the State of Alabama of the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.

3. All lists, documents, books and papers showing 
the names, and addresses of all contributors in the 
State of Alabama who have contributed money, goods, 
services or anything of value, to the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., 
within the last twelve months next preceding the date 
of filing the petition for injunction in this case.



4

4. All lists, documents, books, and papers showing 
the names, addresses and official position in respondent 
corporation of all persons in the State of Alabama 
authorized to solicit memberships in and contributions 
to the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Inc.

5. All files, letters, copies of letters, telegrams and 
other correspondence, dated or occurring within the 
last twelve months next preceding the date of filing the 
petition for injunction, pertaining to or between the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, Inc., and persons, corporations, associations, 
groups, chapters and partnerships within the State of 
Alabama.

6. All deeds, bills of sale and any written evidence 
of ownership of real or personal property by the Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, Inc., in the State of Alabama.

7. All cancelled checks, bank statements, books, pay­
rolls, and copies of leases and agreements, dated or 
occurring within the last twelve months next preceding 
the date of filing the petition for injunction, pertaining 
to transactions between the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., and persons, 
chapters, groups, associations, corporations and part­
nerships in the State of Alabama.

8. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters, docu­
ments, agreements, correspondence and other memo­
randa pertaining to or between the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., and 
Autherine Lucy, Autherine Lucy Foster and Polly 
Myers Hudson.
[fol. 4] 9. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters,
documents, agreements, correspondence and other 
memoranda pertaining to or between the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund and Artherine 
Lucy, Artliwrine Lucy Foster and Polly Myers Hudson.



5

10. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters, docu­
ments, agreements, correspondence and other memo­
randa pertaining to or between the National Associa­
tion for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., and 
the Montgomery Improvement Association.

11. All lists, books and papers showing the names 
and addresses of all officers, agents, servants and em­
ployees in the State of Alabama of the National Asso­
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.

12. All lists, books and papers showing the names 
and addresses of all officers, agents, servants and em­
ployees of the various chapters of the National Asso­
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., 
in the State of Alabama.

13. All papers, books, files, documents, letters, 
copies of letters and correspondence, cancelled checks, 
bank statements, leases, contracts and agreements in 
the Southeastern Regional Office of the National Asso­
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., 
in Birmingham, Alabama, or in possession of any offi­
cer, agent, servant or employee of said corporation in 
the State of Alabama.

14. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters, files, 
documents, agreements, correspondence and other 
memoranda pertaining to or between the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Inc., and Aurelia S. Browder, Susie McDonald, Claud­
ette Colvin, Q. P. Colvin, Mary Louise Smith and 
Frank Smith, or their attorneys, Fred D. Gray and 
Charles D. Langford.

15. All papers, books, letters, copies of letters, files, 
documents, agreements, correspondence, cancelled 
checks, bank statements, financial statements and all 
other memoranda, dated or occurring within the last 
twelve months next preceding the date of the filing of 
petition for injunction in this case, concerning all trans­
actions and activities within the State of Alabama of 
the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, Inc.



6

This motion was set down for hearing on July 9, 1956. 
On July 11, 1956, after hearing argument by the state and 
petitioner in which the petitioner raised objections to the 
motion on grounds supported by basic principles of equity 
jurisprudence, by decisions of this Court and by the Con­
stitution of the United States, the court overruled the 
objections and issued an interlocutory order and decree 
requiring the petitioner to produce certain of the docu­
ments as requested in the motion. The order of the court 
is appended hereto as Exhibit II and made a part of this 
petition.

Petitioner avers that the aforesaid order is null and void 
and outside the jurisdiction of the court below under basic 
principles of equity jurisprudence, the decisions of this 
Court and the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
namely, the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 8 
of the Constitution of the United States and Title 42, 
United States Code, Section 1981.

Petitioner was ordered to produce the documents as indi- 
[fol. 5] cated in the order as of July 16, 1956. Thereafter, 
the court extended the time to produce until July 24, 1956; 
it simultaneously postponed until July 25, 1956, hearing on 
the demurrers and motion to dissolve.

On July 23, petitioner filed its answer, admitting: (1) 
That it was a New York corporation; (2) that it main­
tained its Southeast Regional Office in Birmingham; (3) 
that it hired and employed agents to operate this office; but 
(4) denied that it had organized local chapters in the state 
and that agents of the corporation solicited for said local 
chapters and the parent corporation; denied (5) that it had 
employed or paid money to Autherine Lucy and Polly 
Myers Hudson to encourage or aid them in enrolling in the 
University of Alabama; admitted (6) furnishing legal 
counsel to assist Autherine Lucy in prosecuting her suit 
against the University of Alabama; admitted (7) that it 
had given moral and financial support to Negro residents 
of Montgomery in connection with their refusal to use the 
public transportation system of Montgomery and had 
furnished legal counsel to assist Rev. M. L. King and other 
Negroes indicted in connection with that matter, but denied 
all other allegations and inferences contained in that alle­



7

gation and bill of complaint; and denied (8) that its officers, 
agents or employees have engaged in organizing chapters 
for the Corporation in Alabama and Montgomery County, 
collecting dues, soliciting memberships, loaning or giving 
personal property to aid present aims of the Corporation; 
admitted (9) that it had never filed with the Secretary of 
State Articles of Incorporation or designated a place of 
business or authorized agents within the State; but denied 
(10) that it was required by Sections 192, 193 and 194 of 
Title 10, Code of Alabama to do so. Petitioner denied that 
it has violated Article 12, Section 232, Constitution of Ala­
bama, 1901 and Section- 192, 193 and 194, Title 10, Code of 
Alabama, 1940; further petitioner denied (11) that its acts 
are causing irreparable injury to the property and civil 
rights of the residents and citizens of the State of Alabama.

In addition to the various defenses to the Bill of Com­
plaint, petitioner, while asserting that Title 10, Sections 
192, 193 and 194 of the Code of Alabama, 1940, was not 
applicable, had procured the necessary forms from the 
Office of the Secretary of State, Montgomery, Alabama, and 
had filled in the forms as required by law and offered to 
file the same. Said forms were attached to its answer and 
[fob 6] petitioner stated that it would file these forms if 
the court would dissolve its orders barring petitioner from 
registering and would permit petitioner to file the forms 
attached to its answer.

With its answer petitioner filed a motion to set aside the 
order to produce. Hearing on this motion was set down 
for July 25, 1956. On that date, testimony in support of 
the motion to set aside was introduced. The Attorney 
General testified that if petitioner would agree that it was 
doing business in the State of Alabama, the material sought 
by its motion would not be needed. The court overruled 
the motion to set aside and ordered petitioner to produce 
the documents aforesaid.

Petitioner avers that the court order overruling its mo­
tion to set aside the order to produce is null and void and 
beyond the jurisdiction of that court in that the court below 
acted arbitrarily and contrary to principles enunciated in 
decisions of this Court and in violation of petitioner’s right 
to due process and equal protection of the laws as secured



8

by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.

Petitioner, advised by counsel that the order was arbi­
trary and unreasonable and not in accord with the Consti­
tution and laws of the State of Alabama and Constitution 
and laws of the United States, informed the court that it 
was unable to comply with the court’s order. The court, 
thereupon, found and adjudged petitioner in willful con­
tempt for failure to produce the documents in accordance 
with the court’s order and assessed a fine of $10,000 against 
petitioner as punishment for this contempt:

This suit seeks to enjoin among other things, the 
respondent, from further conducting its business with­
in the State of Alabama, seeks the dissolution of all its 
chapters in the State, and asks that on final hearing 
an order of ouster be entered against the respondent. 
Due and proper service of the bill has been had upon 
the respondent, and through its attorneys it has en­
tered an unqualified appearance in the cause. A tempo­
rary restraining order was issued upon the filing of the 
bill. Later the State filed a motion to require respond­
ent to produce certain books, documents and papers. 
This was duly set down for hearing before the court. 
At that time counsel for respondent objected to the 
motion to produce and the court ruled, as showm by its 
order on file, that certain books, papers and documents 
mentioned in the motion to produce should be brought 
into court, and a time was fixed for the production 
of the evidence requested by the State. Later the re­
spondent moved the court to set aside the order to 
produce, assigning in substance that it had filed a full 
and complete answer, that the information called for 
by the State was already known to the Attorney Gen­
eral and that the books and papers were not now ma­
terial or necessary to the trial and determination of 
the issue raised in the suit.

The motion to set aside the order to produce has been 
argued at length before the court by the Attorney 
General and by counsel for the respondent, and the 
respondent has offered oral testimony on the motion to



9

set aside. Several hours have been consumed in hearing 
[fol. 7] the matter in open court. The grounds of the 
motion to vacate are not well taken.

Upon the denial by the court of the motion to set 
aside the order to produce, the court offered respond­
ent additional time to produce the documents hereto­
fore ordered produced. Counsel for respondent stated 
in open court that additional time would not be re­
quired, that respondent would not produce the books, 
documents and papers as ordered by the court and that 
it elected to stand on its decision not to bring the 
papers into court for the inspection of the State.

The action of the respondent without question puts 
it in contempt of court, and its counsel practically con­
cede this. So the respondent is in willful contempt of 
the court, and the only matter before the court at this 
time is a formal order adjudging respondent in con­
tempt and in taking judicial sanctions against it for 
its contempt.

The court adjudges and decrees that the respondent 
is in willful contempt in failing to obey the order of the 
court to produce for inspection the documents re­
ferred to in the order to produce. This brings up now 
for the consideration of the court what punishment 
should be decreed against the respondent. Before fix­
ing that punishment these general principles of equity 
may be stated: The purpose of punishing for a con­
tempt is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the 
court from the disrespect shown to its orders, to aid 
in compelling the performance of the court’s order, 
performance which is confessedly in the power of the 
respondent at this time, and which performance re­
spondent’s counsel state will not be given. In the 
present contempt proceeding the court must consider 
the character and magnitude of the harm threatened 
by respondent’s continued contumacy and the probable 
effectiveness of the sanction invoked.

Under the law, there is no way by which a corpora­
tion can be jailed or imprisoned, so a fine must be im­
posed, and in the imposition of this fine the presiding 
judge may properly consider the extent of the willful



10

and deliberate defiance of the court’s order, the seri­
ousness of the consequences of the contumacious be­
havior, the necessity of effectively terminating re­
spondent’s defiance as required by the public interest, 
and the importance of deterring such acts in the future. 
The extent of the punishment is discretionary with the 
court.

The present willful and deliberate, and considered, 
defiance of the court’s order is not to be lightly taken. 
It is not such an act which admits of any but severe 
punishment. The court can not permit its orders to be 
flouted. It cannot permit a party, however wealthy 
and influential, to take the law in his own hands, set 
himself up above the law, and contumaciously decline 
to obey the orders of a duly constituted court made 
under the law of the land and in the exercise of an 
admitted and ancient jurisdiction. If this were allowed 
there would be no government of law, only the govern­
ment in a particular case of the litigant who elected to 
defy the court for his own private and selfish ends. 
The respondent in this case has elected to stand on its 
brazen defiance of the order of a court with full power 
and authority to issue the order against it. Respond­
ent having made its election to defy the court must 
abide the consequences of its stand. Upon a full con­
sideration of the record in this case, it is

Ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People is in contempt of court for its willful and de­
liberate refusal to produce the documents described 
in the former order of the court in this cause.

Ordered, adjudged and decreed further by the court 
that as punishment for its said contempt the said Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People be and it is hereby fined the sum of Ten Thou­
sand Dollars, and judgment is hereby rendered against 
the said respondent and in favor of the State of Ala­
bama for said sum of Ten Thousand Dollars, for which 
let execution issue.

Ordered, adjudged and decreed further that in the 
event the respondent fully complies with the court’s



u
order to produce within five days from this date, then 
it may move to have this fine reduced or set aside. 
However, in the event the respondent fails to comply 
fully with the order to produce within five days from 
this date, then it is ordered, adjudged and decreed 
[fol. 8] that the fine for this contempt be $100,000.00.

Let the costs in this matter, to be taxed by the Reg­
ister, be paid by the said National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People.

Done in open court in the presence of the counsel 
for the parties to this suit on this July 25, 1956.

/ s /  Walter B. Jones 
Circuit Judge Presiding

Petitioner avers that this order and judgment is null and 
void and beyond the jurisdiction of the court in that it is 
clear on the face of the order that the court has exceeded 
the limits set by Title 13, Section 143 of the Alabama Code 
of 1940.

Petitioner further avers that the fine fixed is so arbitrary 
and excessive, without any reasonable relationship to the 
act committed, or to petitioner’s ability to pay it as to 
render the judgment null and void and beyond the juris­
diction of the court below in that it violates petitioner’s 
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States.

On July 30, 1956, petitioner filed a motion to set aside 
and/or stay execution of said order pending review, and 
tendered compliance with the court’s order to produce as 
set forth in the Affidavit of its Executive Secretary, Roy 
Wilkins.

As to documents requested in paragraph 1 in the state’s 
motion as listed supra and ordered produced by the court, 
petitioner tendered a copy of the standard form of charter 
issued to 58 branches in the State of Alabama. Petitioner 
alleged that it was unable to produce a copy of each such 
charter since no copies are kept by it, but asserted that 
each charter issued Branches in the state conform to the 
standard form which petitioner tendered.



12

As to documents requested in paragraph 4 of the state’s 
motion and ordered produced by the court below, peti­
tioner asserted that it does not authorize any person or 
persons as such to solicit memberships or to secure con­
tributions for it; that Mrs. Ruby Hurley and W. C. Patton 
are the only persons impliedly authorized by virtue of their 
employment to solicit memberships and/or contributions. 
Persons soliciting memberships are volunteers and peti­
tioner prescribes no restrictions in this regard.

As to documents requested in paragraph 5 of the state’s 
motion and ordered produced by the court below, petitioner 
[fol. 9] stated that its files are kept under subject matter 
headings and that to comply with this portion of the court’s 
order would require it to search all of its files in order to 
secure the information requested; that it receives corre­
spondence at the rate of 50,000 letters per year and that 
files are maintained for a period of ten years. Petitioner 
tendered, however, all memoranda to branches during the 
twelve-month period preceding June 1, 1956, which would 
include memoranda to its branches in the State of Alabama.

As to documents listed in paragraph 6 of the state’s 
motion and ordered produced by the court, petitioner as­
serted that it owns no real property; that all bills of sale 
for purchase of personal property were in the possession 
of Mrs. Hurley, who is on vacation, and that petitioner has 
no key to this office; that the only personal property peti­
tioner owns in the state consists of desks, filing cabinets, 
chairs, typewriters, mimeograph machine and office sup­
plies estimated to be approximately valued at $400.00 and 
that this personal property is in its Southeast Regional 
office in Birmingham. The only bills of sale in its posses­
sion were two which petitioner tendered.

As to documents listed in paragraph 7 of the state’s mo­
tion and ordered produced by the court, petitioner sub­
mitted all the cancelled checks and payroll checks covering 
transactions in Alabama and a copy of the lease of the 
office used by petitioner in Birmingham, and averred that 
there are no other agreements. Petitioner asserted it does 
not maintain a bank account in the State of Alabama. Peti­
tioner’s bank statements are statements referring to its 
general funds from all sources, and petitioner tendered



13

a statement showing all income and expenditures in the 
State of Alabama prepared by its accountant.

As to documents listed in paragraph 8 of the state’s 
motion and ordered produced, petitioner submitted all pa­
pers, books, letters, etc., pertaining to or between it and 
Autherine Lucy, Artharine Lucy Foster and Polly Myers 
Hudson received from and sent to the State of Alabama.

As to documents listed in paragraph 14 of the state’s 
motion, petitioner asserted that it had no papers of any 
kind in this category.

With respect to paragraphs number 2 and 11 of the state’s 
motion as granted in the court’s order which required peti­
tioner to submit a list of the names and addresses of its 
[fol. 10] members and names and addresses of its officers, 
employees and agents, etc., in the State of Alabama, peti­
tioner asserted through affidavit of its Executive Secretary 
that it believes in good faith that to make available to 
the Attorney General the names and addresses of its offi­
cers and members would subject these persons to private 
economic reprisals, loss of public and private employment, 
to harrassment by persons opposed to integration in public 
schools, to threats of use of force, intimidation and the use 
of actual force. In support of this, petitioner tendered as 
exhibits to the affidavit of its Executive Secretary, the affi­
davits of several of its members residing in Selma, Ala­
bama, whose names had been published for signing a peti­
tion requesting the Board of Education to consider de­
segregation of the public schools in Selma, Alabama, in 
accordance with the decisions of the United States Su­
preme Court and, as a result, had been discharged from 
their employment. Petitioner attached to this affidavit evi­
dence that local laws applicable to Macon and Marengo 
Counties had been enacted authorizing the Board of Educa­
tion of these counties to discharge school teachers who 
belong to organizations advocating racial integration; and 
newspaper clippings which show that groups operating in 
the State are organized for the express purpose of opposing 
the policy and program of petitioner. Despite this show­
ing, the court overruled petitioner’s motion to set aside or 
modify its adjudication of contempt and refused to stay 
execution of its judgment pending review by this Court.



14

The decree of the court denying and overruling petitioner’s 
motion to set aside, modify or stay its order of July 25, 
1956, is attached hereto as Exhibit III and made a part of 
this petition.

Petitioner avers that the decree and judgment of the 
court below denying and overruling its motion to set aside, 
modify or stay its order of July 25, 1956, is null and void 
and beyond the jurisdiction of the court below in that it 
denies to petitioner equal protection and due process of 
law secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and rights se­
cured under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the 
United States.

On July 30, petitioner filed a motion to stay execution of 
the judgment below in this Court pending review here. 
After hearing on this application on July 31, this motion 
was denied on the ground that no petition for writ of cer­
tiorari was before the court. While this Court was con­
sidering petitioner’s application for a stay, the court below 
issued a new order and judgment, adjudging petitioner in 
[fol. 11] further contempt and fining and punishing peti­
tioner for that contempt in the sum of $100,000.00:

This Court, having by decree, dated July 25, 1956, 
ordered, adjudged and decreed respondent, National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
in contempt of Court for its willful and deliberate 
refusal to produce the documents described in the for­
mer order of the Court in this cause, dated July 11, 
1956, and having further ordered, adjudged and de­
creed that as punishment for said contempt the said 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People, be fined the sum of $10,000.00, and judgment 
rendered against the said respondent in favor of the 
State of Alabama for the sum of $10,000.00, and having 
further ordered, adjudged and decreed that in the 
event respondent fully complied with the Court’s order 
to produce within five days from July 25, 1956, that it 
might move to have its fine reduced or set aside, but 
in the event the respondent failed to comply fully with 
the order to produce within five days from July 25, 
1956, it was ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
fine for this contempt be $100,000.00.



15

And the respondent, National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, having failed to com­
ply with this order and not having produced the docu­
ments described in the former order of the Court in 
this cause by midnight, July 30, 1956, It Is;

Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by the Court that 
the National Association for the Advancement of Col­
ored People, is in contempt of this Court for its will­
ful and deliberate refusal to produce the documents 
described in the former order of the Court in this 
cause by midnight, July 30, 1956.

It Is Further Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed by 
the Court that as punishment for its said contempt the 
said National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, be and it is hereby fined the sum of 
$100,000.00, and judgment is hereby rendered against 
the said respondent and in favor of the State of Ala­
bama for said sum of $100,000.00, for which let execu­
tion issue.

That the costs in this matter to be taxed by the Reg­
ister be paid by the said National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People.

Done in Montgomery, Alabama, on this the 31st day 
of July, 1956.

/ s /  Walter B. Jones 
Circuit Judge, Presiding

Petitioner avers that this order and judgment is null and 
void and beyond the jurisdiction of the court in that it is 
clear on the face of the order and judgment that the court 
has exceeded the limits set by Title 13, Section 143 of the 
Alabama Code of 1940.

Petitioner further avers that the fine fixed is so arbitrary 
and excessive, without any reasonable relationship to the 
act committed, or to petitioner’s ability to pay it as to 
render the judgment null and void and beyond the jurisdic­
tion of the court below in that it violates petitioner’s rights 
to due process and equal protection of the laws secured by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.



16

Petitioner further avers that it has been denied access 
to Alabama courts resulting from the action of the court 
[fol. 12] below to secure a hearing on the merits of this 
cause and to seek a vindication of its rights to continue 
its operations in the state and that such denial of access 
constitutes an infringement of its rights to procedural due 
process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States.

Petitioner avers that it has done everything within its 
power, consistent with its rights and the rights of its 
members, to comply with the order of the court below to 
produce certain documents and papers for pre-trial dis­
covery, and that it has failed and refused to comply further 
with the court’s order solely because to do so would con­
stitute a waiver of basic constitutional rights. Petitioner 
has no other adequate remedy to seek a review of the orders 
and judgment of the court below except by this petition, 
[fol. 13] Petitioner respectfully shows unto this Honor­
able Court as follows:

1. That the Circuit Court erred in entering its order of 
July 11, 1956, requiring petitioner to produce certain 
documents and papers set out therein.

2. That the Circuit Court erred in overruling petitioner’s 
motion to set aside its order to produce.

3. That the Circuit Court erred in adjudging petitioner 
in contempt and assessing a $10,000 fine against it as 
punishment therefor.

4. That the Circuit Court erred in punishing petitioner 
$10,000 for contempt in excess of its statutory authority 
under Title 13, Section 143 of the Alabama Code of 1940.

5. That the Circuit Court erred in overruling petitioner’s 
motion to set aside and/or modify its order and judgment 
adjudging petitioner in contempt and/or stay execution of 
its judgment pending review by this Court.

6. That the Circuit Court erred in adjudging petitioner 
in contempt and in assessing a $10,000 fine against it as 
punishment therefor.



17

7. That the Circuit Court erred in punishing and fining 
petitioner $100,000 for contempt in excess of its statutory 
authority under Title 13, Section 143 of the Alabama Code 
of 1940.

i

8. That the Circuit Court erred in granting the tempo­
rary restraining order.

9. That the Circuit Court erred in failing to dissolve its 
injunction and in refusing to permit petitioner to register 
with the Secretary of State after it had tendered com­
pliance with its answer.

10. That all of the errors committed by the Circuit Court 
and set forth above are in violation of petitioner’s right 
and the rights of its members to due process of law and 
equal protection of the laws secured under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
violate petitioner’s rights under the commerce clause of 
the federal Constitution.

Wherefore, your petitioner most respectfully prays that 
a writ of certiorari be issued out of and under the seal of 
this Court directed to the Circuit Court, Montgomery 
County, commanding and requiring said Court to certify 
and send to this Court on a day certain to be designated 
by this Court, a full and complete transcript of the record 
[fob 14] and all proceedings of said Circuit Court, in the 
cause numbered and entitled aforesaid, to the end that this 
cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court, and 
that this Court thereupon proceed to review and correct 
the errors complained of and to reverse the judgment of 
the Circuit Court or render such judgment as said Court 
should have rendered.

Petitioner further prays that it be permitted to proceed 
in this matter without bond or with cost bond only in that 
the judgment entered below is not a money judgment in the 
real sense but a penal judgment; that the state needs no 
indemnification, that petitioner is suffering irreparable 
harm in that its operations and activities have been dis­
rupted by virtue of the court’s injunction; that petitioner 
has no assets to enable it to put up bond in excess of 
minimum herein requested and that to require such bond



18

would in effect deny petitioner its right to a hearing in 
this Court in violation of its rights to due process of law.

And petitioner prays for such other, further and addi­
tional relief in the premises as to this Court may seem 
appropriate, and to which he may be entitled and your peti­
tioner will ever pray, etc.

Respectfully submitted,
Fred D. Gray, 113 Monroe Street, Montgomery, 

Alabama.
Robert L. Carter, 107 West 43rd Street, New York, 

New York.
Arthur D. Shores, 1630 Fourth Avenue, North, 

Birmingham, Alabama.
Attorneys for Petitioner.

[fol. 15] D u l y  S w orn  to by  F red D . G ray  (Jurat omitted 
in printing).

We hereby certify that we have served personally a 
copy of this petition upon the Honorable John Patterson, 
Attorney General of the State of Alabama, at Montgomery, 
Alabama.

This the 20th day of August, 1956.
Fred D. Gray, Attorney for Petitioner.

[fol. 16] E x h ib it  I to P etitio n

In t h e  C ir c u it  C ourt  of t h e  15t h  J u d icial  C ir cu it  
of A lab a m a , M o n tg o m ery  C o u n t y , A labam a  

In Equity

S tate  of A labam a  on  t h e  R elatio n  of J o h n  P atterso n , 
Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Complainant

vs.
N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d v a n c e m e n t  of 

C olored P eople , a corporation, Respondent



19

D ecree for T em porary  R estrain in g  O rder and  I n ju n c t io n

This cause, being submitted to the Court upon applica­
tion of the complainant duly verified as required by law 
for a temporary restraining order and injunction as prayed 
for in the original complaint filed in this cause and upon 
consideration thereof and of the evidence offered in sup­
port thereof in the form of sworn petition and exhibits 
attached thereto, and the State not having elected to give 
bond, the Court is of the opinion same should be granted.

It Is, T herefore , O rdered, A djudged  and D ecreed by 
the Court that the respondent, its agents, servants, em­
ployees, attorneys, and all officers thereof and all persons 
in active concert or participation with respondent, and all 
persons having notice of this order be, and they hereby 
are, restrained and enjoined until further orders of the 
Court from:

1. Conducting any further business of any description 
or kind or respondent within the State of Alabama; organ­
izing further chapters of respondent within the State of 
Alabama; maintaining any offices of respondent within the 
State of Alabama.

2. Soliciting membership in respondent corporation or 
any local chapters or subdivisions or wholly controlled 
subsidiaries thereof within the State of Alabama.

3. Soliciting contributions for respondent or local chap­
ters or subdivisions or wholly controlled subsidiaries there­
of within the State of Alabama.
[fol. 17] 4. Collecting membership dues or contributions
for respondent or local chapters or subdivisions or wholly 
controlled subsidiaries thereof within the State of Alabama.

5. Filing with the Department of Revenue and the Sec­
retary of State of the State of Alabama any application, 
paper or document for the purpose of qualifying to do busi­
ness within the State of Alabama.

It Is F u r t h e r  O rdered, A djudged  and D ecreed that the 
Sheriff of Montgomery County, Alabama, or any other 
lawful officer of the State of Alabama, serve a copy of the



20

petition and this order upon the respondent by service 
thereof upon any officer, agent or servant of respondent 
found within the State of Alabama.

D one at  M o n tg o m ery , A labam a , this the 1 day of June, 
1956.

s / Walter B. Jones
Circuit Judge

[fob 18] E x h ib it  II to P etitio n

In t h e  C ir cu it  C ourt  of M o n tgom ery  C o u n t y , A labam a  
In Equity No. 30468

S tate  of A labam a  on t h e  R elation  of J o h n  P atterso n , 
Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Complainant

vs.
N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d v a n c e m e n t  of 

C olored P eople , a corporation, Respondent

I n terlocu to ry  D ecree on M otion  of t h e  S tate  to R equire 
R espon d en t  to P roduce C ertain  B ooks, P apers and  
D o cu m en ts

The present suit was initiated by the State of Alabama 
filing an original bill having for its purpose among other 
things the issuance of a temporary injunction restraining 
the Respondent from further conducting its business within 
the State of Alabama; and praying on final hearing that 
the Respondent be permanently enjoined from conducting 
any business within the State of Alabama and that the 
Respondent be enjoined from organizing or controlling any 
chapters and from exercising any of its corporate func­
tions within the State of Alabama.

In accordance with the prayer of the bill, a temporary 
restraining order was issued on June 1st, 1956, and on 
July 5th the Complainant filed its motion to produce and 
same was duly set for hearing on July 9th, 1956. Then on



21

June 26, 1956, the Respondent filed its motion to dissolve 
the temporary injunction and also demurrers to the bill, 
which were duty set for hearing on July 17, 1956; but the 
matter is now before the Court and is submitted on the 
motion to produce filed by the State. A hearing has been 
had on this motion to produce at which time the same was 
argued to the Court by the Attorney General and Counsel 
for the State, and by Counsel for the Respondent.
[fob 19] In support of the State’s motion to produce, the 
Attorney General offered the sworn original bill, the sworn 
motion to produce, and the answer of the Respondent in 
its motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order.

It is the contention of the Respondent that the motion 
to produce is premature, that the motion should not be 
ruled upon until the demurrer to the bill has been passed 
upon, and the Attorney for the Respondent makes the con­
tention that the motion to produce is in the nature of 
discovery by the State in aid of a penalty or forfeiture 
against the Respondent, and Respondent argues that a 
Court of Equity will not grant discovery in aid of a penalty 
or forfeiture.

The State, on the other hand, contends that its bill is 
one for discovery and relief in aid of a public purpose, and 
that under a motion to produce the Respondent may be 
compelled to present any papers, books, or documents 
relating to matters within the exclusive knowledge of the 
Respondent. The State also insists that, aside from any 
statute, a Court of Equity has inherent power to compel 
the production of original documents for evidential pur­
poses. This is settled law in Alabama, and this right, as 
our Supreme Court has frequently said, is a right given 
under the inherent power of a Court of Equity to compel 
the production of books and documents when it is shown 
that such production is indispensable to the doing of jus­
tice as auxiliary to any proper relief.

The Court is of opinion that the points urged by the 
Respondent are not well taken, and that, to the extent here­
inafter indicated the Respondent should produce on or 
before 10:00 a.m., Monday, July 16, 1956, in the office of 
the Register of the Court, for the inspection of the State 
of Alabama, the records hereinafter named. It is, there­
fore,



22

[fol. 20] O rdered, A djudged , and D ecreed b y  the Court 
that Respondent on or before the above-named date and at 
the above-named place, do produce all of the books, papers 
or documents described in paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 
11 and 14 of the Motion to Produce.

All other questions reserved.
Done at Montgomery, Alabama, this July 11, 1956.

(Signed) Walter B. Jones
Circuit Judge

[fol. 21] E x h ib it  III to P etitio n

I n  t h e  C ir cu it  C ourt  of M o n tgom ery  C o u n t y , A labam a  
In Equity No. 30468

S tate  of A labam a  on t h e  R elation  of J o h n  P atterso n , 
Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Complainant

vs.
N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d v an cem en t  of 

C olored P eople , a corporation, Respondent

D ecree D e n y in g  P e t itio n  to S tay  O rder of 
J u l y  25, 1956

This matter now comes on to be again heard upon the 
Petition filed this day in open court requesting the Court 
to set aside, modify, or stay its order of July 25, 1956, 
wherein Respondent was decreed to be in contempt of 
court. There are now present in court the attorneys for 
both the Complainant and the Respondent and the said 
motion to stay or set aside the Court’s order of July 25, 
1956, in this court has been argued to the Court by Counsel 
for the respective parties. The Court took the matter 
under consideration and is now of opinion that the said 
motion is not well taken. It is, therefore,

O rdered, A djudged  and D ecreed by the Court that the 
motion of Respondent filed herein this day to set aside,



23

modify, or stay the execution of said order of July 25, 1956, 
be, and the motion is hereby denied and overruled.

Done this July 30, 1956.
s / Walter B. Jones 

Circuit Judge Presiding

[ fo l .  2 1 % ]  I n t h e  S u prem e  C ourt  of A labam a
S u bm ission  of C ause— August 20, 1956

Come the parties by Attorneys, and submit this cause on 
briefs for decision.

[ fo l .  22] I n t h e  S u prem e  C ou rt  of A labam a  
October Term 1956-57

3 Div. 779

Ex P arte  N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d van cem en t  
of C olored P eople , a Corporation

I n  r e : T h e  S tate  of A labam a  ex r e l . J o h n  P atterso n , 
as Attorney General of the State of Alabama

v.

N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d van cem en t  
of C olored P eople , a Corporation

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
IN EQUITY

O p in io n — December 6, 1956
Per Curiam.

The Circuit Court ordered the petitioner to bring certain 
books, documents and papers into court on a certain date 
for inspection by the State of Alabama in a cause filed by 
the Attorney General on behalf of the State against the 
petitioner. On the date set to produce, the court granted



24

the petitioner eight additional days within which to comply 
with its order.

Thereafter the court offered the petitioner additional 
time to produce the documents. In reply to the court’s offer 
to grant additional time, counsel for petitioner stated in 
open court that additional time would not be required, 
that the petitioner would not produce the books, documents, 
and papers as ordered by the court and that it elected to 
[fol. 23] stand on its decision not to bring the papers into 
court for inspection by the State.

As a result of petitioner’s brazen defiance of the order 
of the court, the petitioner was adjudged in contempt of 
court and fined $10,000.00. The decree provided that in the 
event the petitioner failed to comply fully with the order 
to produce within five days from that date that the fine for 
contempt would be raised to $100,000.00.

On the last day that petitioner had to comply with the 
court’s order or suffer the fine to be raised for refusing to 
comply, the petitioner offered to bring some of the docu­
ments into court, but refused to fully comply with the order 
to produce. This offer of partial compliance by the peti­
tioner was not accepted by the court. Thereafter the court 
decreed that the fine be raised as indicated above.

This petition for writ of certiorari presents the single 
question, v iz: The legality vel non of the order of contempt.

The ultimate aim and purpose of the litigation is to deter­
mine the right of the state to enjoin petitioners from doing 
business in Alabama. That question, however, is not before 
us in this proceeding.

On the petition for certiorari the sole and only review- 
able order or decree is that which adjudges the petitioner 
to be in contempt. Certiorari cannot be made a substitute 
for an appeal or other method of review. Certiorari lies 
to review an order or judgment of contempt for the reason 
that there is no other method of review in such a case.— 
Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218. Review on 
certiorari is limited to those questions of law which go to 
the validity of the order or judgment of contempt, among 
which are the jurisdiction of the court, its authority to make 
the decree or order, violation of which resulted in the judg­



25

ment of contempt. It is only where the court lacked juris­
diction of the proceeding, or where on the face of it the 
order disobeyed was void, or where procedural require­
ments with respect to citation for contempt and the like 
[fol. 24] were not observed, or where the fact of contempt 
is not sustained, that the order or judgment will be quashed.

It is well to remember that “ a proceeding for contempt 
is not a part of the main case, before the court, but is col­
lateral to it, a proceeding in itself.” Ex parte Dickens, 
supra. In the process of the trial in the main case there 
are ample remedies for review. Appeal lies from inter­
locutory decrees, such as those on demurrer to the bill, 
orders granting, or refusing temporary injunctions, orders 
sustaining or denying motions to dissolve or disteharge.— 
Tit. 7, §§ 754, 1057, Code of 1940.

An order requiring defendant to produce evidence in a 
pending cause may be reviewed on petition for mandamus. 
—Ex Parte Hart, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So. 783. Hence, if peti­
tioner felt itself aggrieved by the order requiring it to 
produce certain evidence, it should have sought to have 
the order reviewed by mandamus. Where a party to a 
cause elects not to avail of such remedies to test the valid­
ity of an order requiring him to do or refrain from doing 
a certain act and simply ignores or openly declines to obey 
the order of the court, he necessarily assumes the conse­
quences of his defiance, and is remitted to the lone hope of 
having the reviewing court find and declare the order of 
contempt void on its face. That is the status of petitioner 
here.

Here we do not have before us a decree on the equity of 
the bill, or a final decree granting relief to complainant, 
or, in fact, the decree granting a temporary injunction. All 
that we have presented to us is the order adjudging the 
petitioner to be in contempt, and as we will show that order 
is well sustained.

So, were the sanctions imposed upon petitioner for its 
willful contempt committed in the presence of the court 
within the court’s lawful authority? We will first inquire 
whether the contempt in the instant case is in its nature 
civil or criminal.

We approved the following definition of a civil contempt 
in Ex parte Dickens, supra.



26

“A ‘civil contempt’ consists in failing to do something 
ordered to be done by a court in a civil action, for 
[fol. 25] the benefit of the opposing party therein.” 
162 Ala. 276.

The distinction between civil and criminal contempts is 
thus stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contempt, §6, p. 392:

“ Criminal contempt proceedings are those brought 
to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the 
court and to punish for disobedience of its orders. Civil 
contempt proceedings are those instituted to preserve 
and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and 
to compel obedience to orders and decrees made for 
the benefit of such parties. The former are criminal 
and punitive in their nature, and the government, the 
courts, and the people are interested in their prosecu­
tion. The latter are civil, remedial, and coercive in 
their nature, and the parties chiefly interested in their 
conduct and prosecution are those individuals for the 
enforcement of whose private rights and remedies the 
suits were instituted.”

Criminal and civil contempts are defined in 17 C.J.S., 
Contempt, §§ 5 and 6, pp. 7, 8, to be as follows:

“A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed 
against the dignity and authority of the court, or a 
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the 
administration of justice which tends to bring the court 
into disrepute or disrespect.

*  *  #  #  #

“ Civil contempt consists in failing to do something 
ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the 
benefit of the opposing party therein, and is, therefore, 
an offense against the party in whose behalf the vio­
lated order is made. If, however?/, the contempt con­
sists in doing a forbidden act, injurious to the opposite 
party, the contempt may be considered criminal.”

We indicated our approval of both of the above quotations 
in Ex parte King, 263 Ala. 487, 491, 83 So. 2d 241, 245.



27

We held the contempt to be criminal in the King case at 
page 490 because it was “ ‘ * * * punishment for what has 
been done, and it committed petitioner to jail for a definite 
period of time.’ ” We further stated at page 491, “ It seems 
to us that the penalty is for past disobedience rather than 
to compel obedience.”—Ex parte King, supra.
[fol. 26] We also held the contempt to be criminal in Ex 
parte Hill, 229 Ala. 501, 158 So. 531, for the same reasons.

The petitioner insists that its contempt was criminal 
because the trial court used the word punishment in the 
decree. The Supreme Court in United States v. United 
Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 297, n. 64, 67 S. 
Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884, speaking of the use of the word 
punishment as indicating the type of contempt said: 
“ ‘punishment’ has been said to be the magic word indicat­
ing a proceeding in criminal, rather than civil contempt. 
* * * But ‘punishment’ as used in contempt cases is am­
biguous. ‘It is not the fact of punishment but rather its 
character and purpose. . . .’— Gompers v. Bucks Stove <£ 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1941).” There were two fines 
in the United Mine Workers of America case. The fine 
assessed for past contumacy was held to be for criminal 
contempt; and the fine to coerce the union into future 
compliance with the court’s order was held to be for civil 
contempt.

In the light of these principles it is clear to us that the 
fines in the instant case were for civil contempt. The decree 
adjudging the $10,000.00 fine said:

“ Ordered, adjudged and decreed further that in the 
event the respondent fully complies with the court’s 
order to produce within five days from this date, then 
it may move to have this fine reduced or set aside. 
However, in the event the respondent fails to comply 
fully with the order to produce within five days from 
this date, then it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
the fine for this contempt be $100,000.00.” (Emph. sup.)

The $10,000.00 fine was coercive because it gave the peti­
tioner a right to have the fine set aside after full com­
pliance with the order to produce. The $100,000.00 fine



28

was coercive because the petitioner had five days within 
which to comply with the court’s order or to be fined said 
amount. Neither fine apparently was severe enough or 
the petitioner would have produced the documents within 
[fol. 27] the time allowed instead of offering partial com­
pliance with the court’s order on the last day of grace.

The time given the petitioner in the instant case prior to 
assessing the larger fine was the same time given the union 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in modifying 
the civil contempt fine in the United Mine Workers of 
America case, supra. We quote from page 305:

“ * * * to pay a fine of $700,000, and further to pay 
an additional fine of $2,800,000 unless the defendant 
union, within five days after the issuance of the man­
date herein, shows that it has fully complied * * # ” 
(Emph. sup.)

Our statutes limit punishment for contempt by the cir­
cuit court to five days in jail and a fine of fifty dollars.— 
Title 13, §§ 9 and 143, Code of 1940. But our cases hold 
that the statutory limitations apply to criminal contempt 
and not to civil contempt.—Ex parte King, supra; Ex parte 
Hill, supra; Ex parte Dickens, 162 Ala. 272, 50 So. 218.

The amount of the fine in the instant case, not being lim­
ited by statute, is within the sound discretion of the court 
and in the absence of an abuse thereof will not be disturbed. 
—Maclrmis v. United States, C.A. Cal. 191 F. 2d 157, 342 
U.S. 953, 96 L. Ed. 708 cert, denied 72 S. Ct. 628; United 
States v. Landes, C.C.A. N.Y., 97 F. 2d 378; Ex parte Hill, 
supra. The fine adjudged by the circuit court is not exces­
sive.

We could well conclude here by ordering a denial of the 
writ and a dismissal of the petition, but will discuss briefly 
the merits of the order to produce so that the parties may 
know the views entertained by the court.

The petitioner argues that its belated offer to produce 
included everything except items number 2 and 8 as set 
out in its brief, and that it was not required to produce 
these. Items 2 and 8 are:

[fol. 28] “ 2. All lists, documents, books, and papers,
addresses and dues paid of all present members in the



29

State of Alabama of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Incorporated.

* * * # *

“ 8. All lists, books, papers showing the names and 
addresses of all officers, agents, servants and employees 
in the State of Alabama of the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.”

Assuming that the petitioner did offer to bring in for 
inspection by the State everything except the documents 
listed in items 2 and 8, could the court require the petitioner 
to disclose this information? We think so. The court held 
the information to be competent and relevant; and the peti­
tion shows that the court had jurisdiction of the petitioner 
and of the subject matter.

This court in holding that an officer of the Ku Klux Klan, 
Inc. was in contempt of court for failing to turn over a list 
of members of said organization when ordered to do so by 
the court, said:

“ The first duty of every citizen is allegiance to the 
constitution and laws of the state and nation and the 
lawful judgments and decrees of the courts. . . . Only 
privileged communications and facts made so by the 
law or lawful government regulations are protected 
from disclosure. The identity of the membership of 
said organization does not fall within such privileged 
class.”—Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 554; 42 So. 2d 
17.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently upheld 
a contempt citation of a labor union official, for his failure 
to produce before a grand jury, union records “ showing its 
collections of work-permit fees, including the amounts paid 
therefor and the identity of the payors. . . .”  (Emph. sup.). 
The court said at page 705:

“ The union and its officers acting in their official 
capacity lack the privilege at all times of insulating 
the union’s books and records against reasonable de- 
[fol. 29] mands of governmental authorities.”—United 
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 
1542.



30

The courts, when their jurisdiction is duly invoked, have 
authority to exercise visitatorial powers and inquire as to 
the acts of such corporations as the petitioner and keep 
them within the bounds of their lawful authority.—Essgee 
Co. of China v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 S. Ct. 514, 
67 L. Ed. 917; In re Verser-Clay Co., 10 Cir., 98 F. 2d 859, 
120 A.L.R. 1098; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 
31 S. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 558; Ex parte 
Morris, supra.

The guaranties found in the Federal and State Consti­
tutions against compulsory self-incrimination do not extend 
to a private corporation so as to justify it in refusing, on 
the ground that it might be thereby incriminated, to comply 
with a lawful order directing it to produce corporate rec­
ords in legal proceedings.—United States v. White, 322 U.S. 
694, 64 S. Ct. 1248, 88 L. Ed. 1542; Wilson v. United States, 
supra; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. 
652; United States v. Laivn, S.D.N.Y., 115 F. Supp. 674.

It is clear, therefore, that the circuit court, in equity, had 
authority to order the petitioner to disclose names, ad­
dresses and dues paid by petitioner’s members, officers, 
agents, and employees and that the petitioner could be 
held in contempt of court for non-compliance with the 
court’s order to produce.

Writ denied and petition dismissed.
All the Justices concur.



31

[fol. 30] I n the S upreme Court of A labama

Ex Parte:
N atio n al  A ssociation  for t h e  A d van cem en t  

of C olored P eople , a Corporation,

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to 
Montgomery Circuit Court, In Equity.

[In r e : T h e  S tate  of A la b a m a  ex rel. J o h n  P atterson , 
as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, vs. N a ­
t io n a l  A ssociation  for t h e  A d van cem en t  of C olored 
P eople , a Corporation.]

O rder D e n y in g  W rit  of C ertiorari and  
D ism issin g  P e t it io n — December 6, 1956

Comes the Petitioner, National Association For The 
Advancement of Colored People, a Corporation, by Attor­
neys, and the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Cir­
cuit Court of Montgomery County, In Equity, being sub­
mitted on briefs and duly examined and understood by the 
Court,

It is Considered and Ordered that a Writ of Certiorari 
to Montgomery Circuit Court, In Equity, be and the same 
is hereby denied, and that the Petition be and the same 
is hereby dismissed at the cost of the Petitioner, National 
Association For The Advancement of Colored People, a 
Corporation, for which costs let execution issue accordingly.

[fol. 31] Cl e r k ’s C ertificate  to F oregoing T ran script  
(omitted in printing).



32

[ fo l .  32] S u prem e  C ou rt  of t h e  U n ited  S tates

[Title omitted]

Order E x te n d in g  T im e  to F ile  P etitio n  for 
W r it  of C ertiorari

Upon Consideration of the application of counsel for 
petitioner(s),

It Is Ordered that the time for filing petition for writ of 
certiorari in the above-entitled cause be, and the same is 
hereby, extended to and including March 20th, 1957.

Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States.

Dated this 4th day of March 1957.

[ fo l .  33 ] S u prem e  C ou rt  of t h e  U n ited  S tates

[Title omitted]

O rder A l lo w in g  C ertiorari—Filed May 27, 1957
The petition herein for a writ of certiorari to the Su­

preme Court of the State of Alabama is granted.
And it is further ordered that the duly certified copy of 

the transcript of the proceedings below which accom­
panied the petition shall be treated as though filed in re­
sponse to such writ.