Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lawyers' Committee in Support of Appellants

    No. 98-85 

In The 

Supreme Court of the United States 
October Term, 1998 

+ 

JAMES B. HUNT, JR., in his official capacity as 
Governor of the State of North Carolina, et al., 

Appellants, 

V. 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, et al, 

Appellees. 

¢ 

On Appeal From The United States District Court 
For The Eastern District Of North Carolina 

¢ 

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF 
THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE 

FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS 
tn A 

MATTHEW J. ZINN : 
Jack W. LonpeN, Co-Chair 

(Counsel of Record) DanNieL F. Kou, Co-Chair 
DaviD A. STEIN 

NorMAN RebpricH, Trustee 
STerTOE & JoHNsoN LLP 

BARBARA R. ARNWINE 
1330 Connecticut Avenue, T 
NW. HOMAS J. HENDERSON 

Washington, D.C. 20036 = EFvasp Sm 
Goa R. WiLLiams 

202-429-3000 7 : 
Lawyers’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL 

James U. BLACKSHER RicHTs UNDER Law 

Title Bldg., Suite 710 1450 G Street, N.W., Suite 400 

300 21st Street North Washington, D.C. 20005 

Birmingham AL 35203 202-662-8600 

203-591-7238 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Lawyers’ Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law 

November 10, 1998 

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964 
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831  



  
 



  

  

TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 

INTEREST OF THE AMICLIS CURIAE ... ius. vey. 1 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. uo iii vitae insnis, 2 

ARGUMENT ih 1, Soph tations sa hs vin finns sins sins 5 

I. The Summary Judgment Entered Below Is Erro- 
neous by Any Standard, and It Dramatizes the 
Need for Clarification and Principled Limitation 
of the Shaw v. Reno Jurisprudence............ 5 

II. If the Court Were to Affirm the District Court’s 
Entry of Summary Judgment in this Case, the 
Result Would Be an Unjustifiable Increase in the 
Number of Shaw v. Reno Type Equal Protection 
Cases Brought Before this Court........:...... 21 

[II. Even if the District Court Was Correct in Find- 
ing Race to be the Predominant Factor, the Court 
Erred by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor 
of Plaintiff-Appellees Without First Undertaking 
the Required Strict Scrutiny Analysis.......... 23 

CONCLUSION... des rsd aig al Svat vine vs 27 

 



  

il 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 

Casks 

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 

0 STAN Tp Pa he ot RM ye 23 

Addy v. Newton County, 2 F.Supp.2d 861 (S5.D. Miss. 
ry 4 ERROR SRT The IG Re 25 

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop- 
ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976) ......... 9 11,12: 13 

Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), Clark v. Calhoun 
County, 88 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1996). .......... passim 

Clark uv. Roemer, 500 11.5.:646 (1991) ..... ccs ouvvsis 1,25 

Clinton v. Smith, 488 U.S. 988 (1988)......... EI Lay 1 

DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), 
aff'd summarily in part and dismissed in part, 515 
U.S. 117001995) . . viii nna dri consis 5 Ra cit ntsinte » 20 

Johnson v. Miller, 922 F.Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995), 
afd, NT SCL 1928 (1997). Xo. si. staves cain 19 

King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F.Supp. 619 (N.D. 
Il. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 118 S.Ct. 877 
(998) BF Ln aed na 25 

Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S.Ct. 2186 
A990) a a 1 

Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)... 1, 9, 11, 19, 22, 23 

Mobile v.: Bolden, 446 1.5.55 {1980).........4.0 units 2 

Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186 
(L996)... 5. inet sr LB sae 8 

   



111 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued 
Page 

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 117 S.Ct. 1491 

i000 aN I ne BRST SATS il Sr SE 1 

Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 1996), 
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. IB20.L1997).. . i. ivi ds 25 

Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). ...... 1,5 18,22 23 

Shaw ov. Reno; 509 U.S. 630 (1993) .....00h.csvveis passim 

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)..-........ 2, 24 

United. States v- Hays, 515: U.S, 737 £1995)... . sures 1 

Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 1J.S. 146 (1993) .5..........u> 24 

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).............. 9 

Wright vo. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 5241964)... .i.c.... 2s 10 

Young 0. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 122B (1997). vic vv ve viignnin s 1 

ARTICLES AND Books: 

Charles S. Bullock III & Mark J. Rozell, Southern 
Politics at Century's End, in THE New Pouitics Or 
THE OLb SoutH: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOUTHERN 

Poutics (Charles S. Bullock, III & Mark J. Rozell, 
eds. I908) ii. EB in Swe nen wes s 16, 17 

KeitH J. ByBeg, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: THE SUPREME 

Court AND THE PoLitics Or MINORITY REPRESENTA- 
TION (100) i iis dans sas waits sian te nt Baten ainiin vs Sine 9 

Thomas A. Kazee, North Carolina: Conservatism, 

Traditionalism, and the GOP, in THE New PoLitics 

Or THE OLD SoutH: AN INTRODUCTION TO. SOUTH- 

ERN Pourrics (Charles S. Bullock, III & Mark J. 
ROzZel, eds. 1008) uc. cies tame si onss i nibs vin satis nie 16  



  

1v 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued 

Page 

David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, The Partisan 
Impact of Voting Rights Law: A Reply to Pamela S. 
Karian, 50 Stan. L. Bev. 765:{1998) ... . ..... 5.3, 14, 26 

Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive 

Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: 
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After 
Shaw v. Reno, 92 MicH. L. Rev. 483 (1993) ...... 18, 19 

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL Dictionary (G. 

& C Merriam-1981) s..50.  . Gat  ne S2 read 

   



BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE LAWYERS’ 

COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW 

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS 

This brief in support of appellants is submitted with 

the written consent of counsel for all parties filed with 

the Clerk of the Court.! 

  

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 

The Lawyers’ Committee is a non-profit organization 

created in 1963 at the request of the President of the 

United States to involve private attorneys throughout the 

country in the national effort to assure equal rights to all 

Americans. Protection of the voting rights of citizens has 

been an important aspect of the work of the Committee. 

The Committee has provided legal representation to liti- 

gants in numerous voting rights cases throughout the 

nation over the last 35 years, including cases before this 

Court, see, e.g., Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 117 S.Ct. 

2186 (1997); Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 117 S.Ct. 

1491 (1997); Young v. Fordice, 117 S.Ct. 1228 (1997); United 

States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 

646 (1991); and Clinton v. Smith, 488 U.S. 988 (1988). The 

Committee has also participated as amicus curiae in other 

significant voting rights cases in this Court, see, e.g., Shaw 

v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 

  

1 This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel 
for a party to this proceeding, and no person or entity, other 
than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, made a 

monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this 
brief.  



  

(1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Thornburg wv. 

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); and Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 

55 (1980). 

  

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 

The saga of North Carolina’s District 12 returns to 

this Court for the third time because a second district 

court granted summary judgment for plaintiff-appellees 

on their equal protection challenge to the redrawn Dis- 

trict 12 (previously approved by a different three-judge 

court). In deciding this case on summary judgment, the 

majority below committed serious and patent error. 

The threshold inquiry in a redistricting case such as 

this is whether race was the predominant factor motivating 

the legislature's redistricting decision. This is a very 

demanding inquiry, and the party challenging the redis- 

tricting plan bears the burden of proof on this issue. Such 

a party must establish that the legislature’s predominant 

or controlling motivation or intent in constructing the 

challenged district was a racial classification; that is, an 

unjustified, stereotypical reliance on the race of residents 

must have been the factor that predominated over the 

totality of all of the other factors influencing the legisla- 

ture’s redistricting decision. 

Under the racial predominance test, plaintiffs must 

prove that boundary lines were drawn intentionally and 

predominantly to include or exclude residents based on 

their racial or ethnic characteristics. In addition, properly 

applied, the racial predominance test requires plaintiffs to 

demonstrate convincingly that reliance on race does not 

   



reflect the redistricting choices and political communities 

of the voters themselves, but rests on unjustified and 

unwanted stereotypes regarding their race. Unless the 

principles of Shaw v. Reno and its progeny are clarified, 

they will be interpreted in a manner that subverts the 

constitutionally guaranteed freedom of political associa- 

tion and expression of black citizens. 

Under this standard, the existence of evidence or 

inferences tending to show that racial demographics may 

not have been the predominant factor motivating the 

legislature’s redistricting decision or that the disputed 

districts reflect actual political communities of interest 

shared by members of the same racial or ethnic group, 

should preclude the entry of summary judgment. As long 

as traditional districting criteria were not entirely 

neglected and factors other than impermissible racial 

considerations motivated the legislature, a redistricting 

decision should not be invalidated on summary judgment 

as violating equal protection. 

In this case, there was more than ample evidence to 

preclude the entry of summary judgment. This evidence 

included affidavits from two State legislators intimately 

involved in crafting the redistricting plan and from 

numerous expert witnesses. The affidavits raised genuine 

issues of material fact regarding the legislature’s predom- 

inant motivation and the relative importance of race in 

the redistricting decision. Specifically, the record indi- 

cated that race was not or, at a minimum, may not have 

been the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s 

decision and that, based on election returns, black voters 

in District 12 are a part of a strongly cohesive political  



  

community. The district court majority wrongly disre- 

garded most of this evidence. For example, the district 

court majority relied upon voter registration data to sup- 

port summary judgment, but ignored evidence that the 

State had relied upon actual election results, an alterna- 

tive and more reliable measure of party allegiance, in 

redrawing District 12. This evidence, and other evidence 

of a similar nature, should have been evaluated by the 

court below sitting as a trier of fact. 

If this Court were to affirm the district court’s judg- 

ment in this case, such a decision would likely increase 

the number of unjustifiable redistricting equal protection 

challenges brought before this Court and the district 

courts, and afford an opportunity for some to seek 

invidious outcomes by filing similar suits. Moreover, the 

use of summary judgment to adjudicate these types of 

cases in the district courts will result in more cases 

appealed directly to this Court on incomplete records, 

frustrating this Court's ability to apply and shape the law 

and resulting in inefficient and wasteful litigation. 

Finally, even if race is the predominant factor 

motivating the legislature’s decision, a party challenging 

the redistricting plan still cannot prevail unless the State 

is unable to satisfy strict scrutiny by demonstrating that 

such use of race was narrowly tailored to serve a compel- 

ling state interest. Strict scrutiny is not a hollow inquiry. 

Rather, it gives States a realistic opportunity to demon- 

strate compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, while 

avoiding liability under section 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act. Here, the district court majority erroneously and 

inexplicably failed even to apply the strict scrutiny prong 

of the equal protection inquiry and, for that reason as 

   



well, its order granting summary judgment must be 

reversed. 

  

ARGUMENT 

I. The Summary Judgment Entered Below Is Erroneous 
by Any Standard, and It Dramatizes the Need for 

Clarification and Principled Limitation of the Shaw 
v. Reno Jurisprudence. 

In this case, for the third time in just over five years, 

this Court has been called upon to consider an equal 

protection challenge to the creation of North Carolina's 

Congressional District 12. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 

(1996) (Shaw II); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I). 

This most recent installment of the District 12 controversy 

arises because a divided panel of the district court 

granted summary judgment for plaintiff-appellees who 

alleged that the redrawn District 12 violates the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The 

grant of summary judgment here was in error because it 

employs such an overbroad predominant racial motiva- 

tion standard that it effectively transforms legitimate 

political considerations into constitutionally suspect 

racial classifications wherever there is a correlation 

between race and the freely formed political associations 

of citizens themselves.? 

  

2 While we continue to believe the Shaw line of cases creates 

a species of constitutional violation lacking a requisite injury, 

we argue here that the district court failed correctly and fully to 
apply the standard enunciated in those cases.  



  

The summary judgment in the instant action dramati- 

cally illustrates the problems posed by the erroneous 

application of the Shaw standards. The district court 

majority below did not require plaintiffs to prove that the 

plan’s drafters were imposing “unjustified racial classi- 

fications,” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996), that is, 

stereotypical racial assumptions that all black voters 

“think alike, share the same political interests, and will 

prefer the same candidates at the polls,” Shaw I, 509 U.S. 

at 647. Nor did the district court consider whether black 

voters in District 12 had freely associated to assert politi- 

cal influence and give expression to shared views 

through a representative in Congress, whether through 

formal party institutions or otherwise. On this record, it 

is plain that plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judg- 

ment on the issue of racial predominance. “If district lines 

merely correlate with race because they are drawn on the 

basis of political affiliation, which correlates with race, 

there is no racial classification to justify. . .. ” Bush, 517 

U.S. at 968.3 

Thus, when applying the racial predominance test, 

the courts should consider whether apparent reliance on 

race constituted an unjustified and potentially demeaning 

  

3 The State argues that its drafters considered the wishes of 
black and white voters of District 12 only indirectly by 
determining that they had voted for Democratic candidates in 

the past. While this evidence is responsive, further evidence of 

the wishes of those voters is clearly relevant. This Court should 

clarify the meaning of its precedents to prevent both the lower 
courts and the parties in those courts from failing to give full 
regard to the constitutionally protected political rights of all 
citizens. 

   



racial classification, or whether it reflected the recogni- 

tion of a voluntary affiliation of persons, substantially of 

a particular racial background, who in fact view them- 

selves as members of a distinct political community. 

If the State’s goal is otherwise constitutional 
political gerrymandering, it is free to use the 
kind of political data on which Justice Stevens 
focuses — precinct general election voting pat- 
terns, precinct primary voting patterns, and leg- 
islators’ experience — to achieve that goal 
regardless of its awareness of its racial implica- 
tions and regardless of the fact that it does so in 
the context of a majority-minority district. To 
the extent that the District Court suggested the 

contrary, it erred. But to the extent that race is 
used as a proxy for political characteristics, a 
racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in 
operation. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

In the instant case the district court majority, on 

summary judgment, rejected evidence that District 12's 

lines could be explained on the basis of partisan Demo- 

cratic Party affiliation, and did not even address the 

extent to which race or ethnicity correlates with a com- 

mon political affiliation in District 12. The unavoidable 

implication of its summary disposition is that the district 

court misapprehended this Court’s Shaw jurisprudence as 

erecting a constitutional impediment to political affilia- 

tion and concerted action by black voters. Such a rule 

would serve to deny to black citizens constitutionally 

guaranteed freedoms of political association and expres- 

sion — the opportunity to organize and seek representa- 

tion of common political concerns among themselves and  



  

in coalitions that unite persons of different races or tran- 

scend race — and it would do so on the impermissible 

basis of the race of those with whom they associate 

politically. Clearly this Court has laid down no such rule. 

The Shaw jurisprudence is aimed at preventing state 

actors from drawing district lines that, based on arbitrary 

stereotypes, “convey the message that political identity is, 

or should be, predominantly racial.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 980. 

It is being misinterpreted, however, as judicial authority 

to interfere with the rights of American citizens to form 

political identities themselves. Just as party conventions 

should be thought of as a “state-created framework” for 

the “exercise of private political rights,” Morse v. Republi- 

can Party of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 271-72 (1996) (Thomas, 

J., dissenting), so should legislative redistricting be 

thought of as the exercise of the private political rights of 

the citizens, acting through the many voluntary political 

associations which constitute the body politic, to agree on 

the new shape of their democratic compact. This Court 

should stand guard equally against the unjustified aggre- 

gation of African Americans (and other racial and ethnic 

minorities) and against the interference with the freedom 

of citizens of minority racial or ethnic communities to 

choose to associate with each other and with others to 

give expression to common political values and interests.4 

  

4 A recent scholarly work makes the same point by 
“suggest[ing] a standard for gauging judicial intervention: if 
our government is to remain democratic, then the Court must 

   



This Court should reemphasize that the threshold 

task of demonstrating a predominantly racial purpose 

which justifies judicial scrutiny of legislative redistricting 

is “demanding.” See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928 

(O'Connor, J., concurring). It should not be enough to 

show that some lines were drawn purposefully to include 

or to exclude persons with particular racial or ethnic 

characteristics. In addition, the greatest care should be 

taken to ensure that Shaw and its progeny are applied to 

invalidate only racial groupings which constitute imper- 

missible, stereotypical racial classifications, and not to 

redistricting plans which represent a legitimate recogni- 

tion of defined political interests substantially shared 

among members of particular racial or ethnic commu- 

nities. Plaintiffs should be required to show that legisla- 

tors or plan-makers did not act on the basis of 

demonstrable political communities of interest, but 

instead merely assumed that persons with the same racial 

or ethnic backgrounds share the same political interests. 

The district court displayed its fundamental misun- 

derstanding of the Shaw racial predominance standard by 

citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Develop- 

ment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1976), and Washington v. Davis, 

426 U.S. 229 (1976), to support its summary conclusion 

that a legislative intent to segregate voters was “unex- 

plainable on grounds other than race.” J.S.App. 15a (quot- 

ing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). These equal 

  

not speak for the people in a way that prevents the people from 
finally speaking for themselves.” Keith J. ByBeg, MisTAKEN 
IDENTITY: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE Potritics OF MINORITY 

REPRESENTATION 49 (1998).  



  

10 

protection precedents pertain to discrimination on the 

basis of race, an actual injury or disadvantage suffered by 

the individual plaintiffs. This is the crucial constitutional 

inquiry the district court never made. As this Court held 

in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), segregation of 

voters on the basis of race or ethnicity violates the Equal 

Protection Clause only if it discriminates against those 

voters by minimizing their collective voting strength or 

by manipulating or stereotyping them in a way that 

ignores their free and voluntary political interests in the 

redistricting context. 

It is plain to us that the District Court was not 
compelled to find that these districts were the 
product of a state contrivance to discriminate 
against colored or Puerto Rican voters. As the 
majority below pointed out, the concentration of 
colored and Puerto Rican voters in one area in 
the county made it difficult, even assuming it to 
be permissible, to fix districts so as to have 
anything like an equal division of these voters 
among the districts. Undoubtedly some of these 
voters, as shown by this lawsuit, would prefer a 

more even distribution of minority groups 
among the four congressional districts, but 
others, like the intervenors in this case, would 

argue strenuously that the kind of districts for 

which appellants contended would be undesir- 
able and, because based on race or place of 
origin, would themselves be unconstitutional. 

376 U.S. at 57-58 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

Moreover, the Shaw racial predominance standard is more 

exacting than the standard applied in most equal protec- 

tion cases, where it is sufficient to prove that a discrimi- 

natory purpose was “a motivating factor in the decision.” |% 

   



11 

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. The word “predomi- 

nant” means “holding an ascendancy,” or “having supe- 

rior strength, influence, authority or position.” WEBSTER's 

THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL Dictionary (G. & C. Merriam 

1981). Thus, for a redistricting decision to be subject to 

strict scrutiny, not only must plaintiffs prove that race 

held a position of superior strength, influence, authority, 

or position over all of the other factors collectively 

motivating the legislature in that decision, they must 

prove that such a reliance on the race of voters discrimi- 

natorily classified them in ways which conflict with their 

freely expressed, voluntary political identities. 

Ascertaining the legislature’s predominant motiva- 

tion or intent is no mean task. The district court must 

undertake a “searching” and “sensitive” inquiry into the 

evidence, recognizing the “complex interplay of forces 

that enter into a legislature's redistricting calculus,” to 

determine whether race was, in fact, the predominant 

factor in a redistricting decision and whether the use of 

race impermissibly discriminated against plaintiffs, ste- 

reotypically or otherwise. Bush, 517 U.S. at 958; Miller, 515 

U.S. at 916-17; see also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 

When a redistricting decision stems from “mixed 

motive[s]” — that is, when traditional districting criteria 

are “not entirely neglected” — a “careful review” is neces- 

sary to determine whether the legislature, in its redistrict- 

ing calculus, made race the predominant factor over all of 

the other motives. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 959, 963 (emphasis 

in original). In this review, “the good faith of a state 

legislature must be presumed.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915. In 

this corner of the political thicket, courts must be ever  



  

12 

vigilant not to upset the delicate balance between consti- 

tutional protection of the individual from arbitrary and 

discriminatory treatment by the government and the 

equally compelling constitutional guarantee of freedom 

of association. In every redistricting plan reviewed by the 

Lawyers’ Committee in its long experience working on 

voting rights issues, it has never found race, or any other 

single factor, to be the legislature’s sole motivating factor, 

but has observed that legislative redistricting actions are 

always informed by a variety of different motives.> It is 

only the relative importance of the various motives that 

varies from case to case. 

Because of the high complexity and sensitivity of the 

racial predominance test, summary judgment should not 

be granted to plaintiffs in a Shaw v. Reno type action 

unless there is no dispute as to the impermissible use of 

race. For purposes of deciding a plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment in a case such as this, evidence or 

inferences tending to show that race may not have been 

an impermissibly predominant factor motivating the leg- 

islature’s redistricting decision should be sufficient to 

defeat such a motion. Certainly, where the evidence 

shows only that the race of residents is correlated with 

some of the District's boundaries, as in the instant case, 

the plaintiffs’ and the district court’s task has only begun, 

and a summary conclusion of unconstitutionality cannot 

be justified. 

  

5 Itis exceedingly rare, in any case, for a legislature to make 
decisions motivated by a single concern. See Arlington Heights, 
429 U.S. at 265. 

   



13 

In racial equal protection cases that do not involve 

redistricting, a detailed review of the history of the legis- 

lation and even testimony from legislators may be neces- 

sary to discern legislative intent. Arlington Heights, 429 

U.S. at 267-68. If that level of factual inquiry is required 

in cases where the plaintiff must prove only that race was 

“a motivating factor in the decision,” id. at 265-66 

(emphasis added), the factual inquiry into legislative 

motivation or intent is required to be even more painstak- 

ing and deliberate in a case where the plaintiff must 

demonstrate that race was “the predominant factor 

motivating the legislature’s [redistricting] decision[,]” not 

simply “a motivating factor.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 959 

(emphasis in original). According to the plurality in Bush, 

the required review in a case such as this one must take 

into account “evidence regarding the redistricting plan’s 

respect for traditional districting principles, the legisla- 

tors’ expressed motivations, and the methods used in the 

districting process.” 517 U.S. at 959. By granting sum- 

mary judgment below, the district court largely dispensed 

with this review. | 

The record here contains more than enough evidence 

for a trier of fact to find that the legislature was moti- 

vated predominantly by factors other than race and that 

traditional districting criteria, including respect for dem- 

onstrated political communities of interest, were not 

entirely disregarded in the redistricting legislation. Two 

key committee chairmen stated emphatically that race 

was not the predominant factor in the redistricting deci- 

sion. The respective Chairmen of the Redistricting Com- 

mittees of the North Carolina Senate and House of 

Representatives, Roy A. Cooper, III, a Democrat, and W.  



  

14 

Edwin McMahan, a Republican, submitted affidavits dis- 

cussing the principal factors that motivated the legisla- 

ture in designing the redistricting plan. J.S.App. 69a, 79a. 

The two legislators agreed that the goals of the redistrict- 

ing legislation were, first, to cure the constitutional 

defects in the prior plan by assuring that race was not the 

predominant factor in constructing the plan and that 

traditional redistricting criteria were not subordinated to 

race and, second, to maintain the existing partisan bal- 

ance in the State’s congressional delegation and to protect 

incumbents. J.S.App. 72a-73a, 81a.6 Senator Cooper and 

Representative McMahan acknowledged that race was 

considered in developing the plan, but testified that it 

was not the dominant or controlling purpose. J.S.App. 

77a, 83a. In fact, Professors Lublin and Voss have inde- 

pendently observed that the legislative record in North 

Carolina “shows that incumbency was a major factor in 

the construction of new districts and that legislators were 

keenly aware of the constraints they faced in attempting 

to draw a constitutional plan.” David Lublin & D. Step- 

hen Voss, The Partisan Impact of Voting Rights Law: A Reply 

to Pamela S. Karlan, 50 StaN. L. Rev. 765, 774 (1998) (here- 

inafter “Lublin & Voss”). This record was, for all practical 

purposes, ignored by district court majority. 

  

6 Senator Cooper noted in his affidavit that the boundaries 
of District 12 had to be drawn to avoid placing the residences of 
two sitting congressmen within the District and to exclude from 
the District the home county of a third congressman. J.S.App. 
75a. This evidence, ignored by the majority in the district court 
but credited by the dissenting judge, J.S.App. 37a, suggests that 
“incumbency protection might explain as well as, or better than, 
race” the North Carolina legislature’s decision to design District 
12 the way that it did. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 967. 

   



15 

The North Carolina legislators also testified that 

“election results” were the principal analytical tool used 

to configure the districts in a way that preserved the 

partisan balance. J.S.App. 73a, 81a-82a. Senator Cooper 

stated that “partisan election data, not race, was the 

predominant basis for assigning precincts to districts,” 

including District 12, and that the inclusion of precincts 

having significant black populations in District 12 was 

“simply the result of a strong Democratic voting pattern 

among blacks.” J.S.App. 77a. Assuming the veracity of 

this testimony, as the district court should have done on 

summary judgment, use of such election data in this 

manner for crafting legislative districts plainly does not 

implicate race as the predominant factor in the redistrict- 

ing plan. A correlation between race and political affilia- 

tion does not convert a permissible political gerrymander 

into an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. See Bush, 517 

U.S. at 968. This is so whether the political cohesion of 

black voters demonstrated in the election returns accu- 

rately characterizes them as loyal Democrats or simply as 

politically unified voters. 

The district court majority disregarded this evidence 

of reliance on actual voting data from actual elections — 

that is, evidence of how voters themselves reveal their 

political identities, and relied instead on different data 

showing that certain areas with heavy Democratic regis- 

tration and a higher percentage of white voters were 

excluded from District 12. J.S.App. 8a-9a, 20a-21a. In 

doing so, the majority below impermissibly weighed the 

probative value of conflicting evidence, something it may 

not do on summary judgment. There is a genuine issue of 

fact in this case as to whether the State’s reliance on  



  

16 

election results from actual elections is any less valid than 

the district court majority's reliance on voter registration 

data. By disregarding the State’s evidence on this point, 

the district court majority, in effect, treated the use of 

election results as tantamount to a constitutionally imper- 

missible form of race-conscious decision-making, rather 

than as a more reliable method of measuring political 

party strength and loyalty, and, more importantly, as 

evidence of the real political community of interests in 

District 12 with which black voters have chosen to associ- 

ate themselves. 

Party registration, party identification, and electoral 

support for candidates are all legitimate indicators of 

party strength. Yet, one study recently indicated that, in 

North Carolina, “the success of a party’s candidates is the 

best measure of party vitality.” See Thomas A. Kazee, 

North Carolina: Conservatism, Traditionalism, and the GOP, 

in THE New Pouimics Or THE OLp SoutH: AN INTRODUCTION 

To SoutHERN Politics 152 (Charles S. Bullock, III & Mark J. 

Rozell, eds., 1998) (hereinafter “Kazee”). This conclusion 

follows from the fact that voter registration data does not 

take into account voters who do not always cast ballots 

for candidates from their registered party, whereas actual 

election results do reflect such party-line defections. See 

Kazee, supra, at 152 (“Ticket splitting and partisan defec- 

tion make declarations of partisan affinity less valid mea- 

sures of party strength”); see also ].S.App. 33a (dissenting 

opinion). In the South in particular, scholars have found 

that “Republican candidates have frequently run ahead of 

their party identification numbers[,]” and that white reg- 

istered Democrats are more apt to vote for Republican 

candidates than black registered Democrats. See Charles 

   



17 

S. Bullock III & Mark J. Rozell, Southern Politics at Cen- 

tury’s End, in THE New Poumrics Or THE Op South: AN 

INTRODUCTION TO SouTtHERN Politics 10-11 (Charles S. Bull- 

ock, III & Mark J. Rozell, eds., 1998); see also Lublin & 

Voss, supra, at 769 (“National trends favoring the Repub- 

licans mainly affect white but not black voting behavior 

because African Americans are more loyal Democrats”). 

It was incumbent upon the district court to test the 

evidence of voter registration data on which it relied 

against the evidence of reliance upon actual election 

results proffered by the State defendants at trial. This 

latter evidence may have persuaded the district court, 

sitting as the finder of fact, to conclude that race was not 

the predominant factor in designing District 12, and 

plainly was of sufficient import to preclude the entry of 

summary judgment. 

The uncontroverted testimony of the legislators 

regarding their motivations was buttressed by expert tes- 

timony to provide an empirical basis for confirming the 

express statements of legislative intent. Dr. David W. 

Peterson, a statistician, conducted a study to examine the 

boundary of District 12 and its relation to the racial and 

political makeup of residents of that District and the 

surrounding area. ].S.App. 85a. Dr. Peterson found that 

the boundary of District 12 “can be attributed to political 

considerations with at least as much statistical certainty 

as it can be attributed to racial considerations,” and dis- 

cerned “no statistical indication that race was the pre- 

dominant factor” in determining that boundary. J.S.App. 

87a. Thus, he concluded that “there is at least one other 

explanation that fits the data as well as or better than 

race, and that explanation is political identification.” Id.  



  

18 

Dr. Gerald R. Webster, a professor of geography, eval- 

uated North Carolina’s 1998 redistricting plan in accor- 

dance with five traditional redistricting criteria and 

compared that plan with the 1992 plan found unconstitu- 

tional in Shaw II. ].S.App. 107a. For the two criteria most 

relevant to this type of equal protection case (the alloca- 

tion of local government or electoral units to congres- 

sional districts and geographic compactness), Dr. 

Webster's study showed a marked improvement in the 

current plan. The 1998 plan reduced the number of the 

State’s 100 counties divided among different congres- 

sional districts to 22, down from 44 in 1992, a 50 percent 

reduction. J.S.App. 116a, 133a. The 1998 plan also 

reduced the number of election precincts divided among 

different congressional districts from 80 (out of a total of 

2,531 precincts) in 1992, to only 2 under the current plan. 

J.S.App. 117a. 

Dr. Webster also evaluated District 12 specifically 

using the two mathematical compactness measures, dis- 

persion and perimeter compactness, developed by Pro- 

fessors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi.” See J.S.App. 

120a-130a. For District 12, dispersion compactness 

increased from 0.045 in 1992 to 0.109 in 1998, an increase 

of 142.2 percent, while perimeter compactness increased 

from 0.014 in 1992 to 0.41 in 1998, an increase of 192.8 

percent. J.S.App. 127a-128a, 143a, 145a. Although the 

1998 figures would still be characterized as relatively 

  

7 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, 

“Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MicH. L. Rev. 483, 553-75 
(1993) (hereinafter “Pildes & Niemi”). 

   



10 

“low” according to the Pildes & Niemi criteria? that by 

itself does not indicate constitutional vulnerability under 

Shaw I, since geographic compactness is not a constitu- 

tional requirement. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 962; Shaw I, 509 

U.S. at 647. Indeed, other congressional districts through- 

out the country have low compactness scores, J.S.App. 

121a, and, in each State, some district must be the least 

compact. J.S. App. 36a (dissenting opinion). Moreover, 

these guidelines do not take into account travel time 

compactness or District 12’s design around a major trans- 

portation corridor. J.S.App. 127a, 130a, 134a. Another 

expert witness, Dr. Alfred W. Stuart, testified that of the 

12 congressional districts in North Carolina, the revised 

District 12 “has the third shortest travel time (1.67 hours) 

and the third shortest distance (95 miles) between its 

farthest points[,]” a marked improvement over the 1992 

plan. J.S. App. 105a-106a. Further, District 12 is designed 

around a major transportation artery, Interstate 85, to link 

major urban areas sharing a community of interests. This 

very same interstate highway was described as “a very 

real connecting cable” linking “a palpable community of 

interests” along a corridor of urban, suburban, and rural 

areas in the Eleventh District of Georgia, as redesigned to 

comport with this Court's decision in Miller. Johnson v. 

Miller, 922 F.Supp. 1556, 1563-64 (S.D. Ga. 1995), aff'd, 117 

5.Ct. 1925:(1997).9 

  

8 See Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 564-65. 

9 It is important to note that the challenged district is not a 
majority-minority district. (District 12’s voting age population 

is approximately 43% black and 57% white. J.S.App. 30a-34a 
(dissenting opinion)). Nevertheless, there is no basis in law for 

applying different standards to evaluate majority-minority  



  

20 

Based on the totality of the evidence, the district 

court majority plainly erred in granting summary judg- 

ment in favor of plaintiff-appellees. The record below 

disclosed genuine issues of material fact concerning the 

role of race in the redistricting process relative to tradi- 

tional districting criteria, such as party politics, the legis- 

lature’s predominant motivation or intent, and the 

methods and data used to design the District. Most 

importantly, there was no evidence whatsoever that race 

was considered in a constitutionally impermissible way; 

to the contrary, actual election returns provide compel- 

ling evidence that black voters are included in a depend- 

ably cohesive political community of interest in District 

12. All inferences from this evidence should have been 

drawn in favor of the non-moving party (here, the State 

proponents of the plan). In sum, where the record con- 

tains substantial evidence that race was not or may not 

have been the legislature’s predominant motivation or 

intent in drawing the boundaries of the challenged dis- 

trict, summary judgment should not be granted for plain- 

tiffs in a Shaw v. Reno type equal protection case. 

  

districts, so-called “influence districts” in which blacks or 

Hispanics comprise a substantial minority of the voting 
population, and largely white-majority districts, nor should 
there be. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 958 (noting that strict scrutiny 
does not apply to “all cases of intentional creation of majority- 
minority districts”); see also DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 
(E.D. Cal. 1994) (finding no basis for applying strict scrutiny to 
an intentionally created majority-minority district), aff'd 
summarily in part and dismissed in part, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995). 

   



21 

II. If the Court Were to Affirm the District Court's 
Entry of Summary Judgment in this Case, the 

Result Would Be an Unjustifiable Increase in the 
Number of Shaw v. Reno Type Equal Protection 
Cases Brought Before this Court 

If the Court were to affirm the district court’s entry 

of summary judgment here, the likely result would be an 

increase in the number of racial gerrymandering equal 

protection cases brought before this Court. Affirming the 

decision below would signal potential plaintiffs that the 

predominant factor test is not a major obstacle to suc- 

ceeding in a Shaw v. Reno equal protection challenge. The 

message to potential plaintiffs would be that they can 

prevail, as a matter of law, even when the State presents 

substantial evidence indicating that race may not have 

been the predominant factor in its decision-making. 

Under this Court's precedents, plaintiffs must meet, and 

should be required to meet, a very demanding standard 

in order to prevail on the threshold question of the pre- 

dominant factor motivating the legislature's decision. 

However, the practical effect of the decision below is to 

blur the distinction between the impermissible use of race 

as the “predominant” factor motivating the legislature's 

redistricting plan and the legitimate consideration of race 

as just one of a number of motivating factors. Any such 

blurring of this distinction will unjustifiably increase 

racial gerrymandering equal protection litigation. 

In addition, sustaining the district court’s entry of 

summary judgment for plaintiff-appellees here would 

afford those who have resisted the full enfranchisement 

of African Americans with a vehicle by which to assert 

equal protection challenges in an effort to dilute the  



  

22 

voting power of minorities and obtain a white super- 

majority in order to preclude the election of minority 

candidates or candidates responsive to minority interests. 

The Equal Protection Clause plainly was not enacted for 

the purpose of augmenting white majority voting power 

at the expense of minority voting power, and this Court 

should not sanction its use for such a purpose. 

An increase in the number of challenges to redistrict- 

ing plans in the district courts will inevitably increase the 

number of such cases this Court must address in some 

fashion, given the availability of direct appeal to this 

Court after adjudication of redistricting disputes by 

three-judge district courts. Moreover, given the sensitive 

and complex nature of the predominant factor inquiry, 

allowing district courts to grant summary judgment for 

plaintiffs in cases such as this will result in more appeals 

to this Court on partial and inadequate records. The 

absence of complete, fully vetted evidentiary records and 

detailed fact finding by the district courts in redistricting 

equal protection cases will make this Court's job on 

review more difficult, increase the number of reversals on 

technical or procedural grounds, rather than on the 

merits, and increase the number of times the same cases 

return to this Court.10 The instant proceeding is a case in 

point. It is here all too clear that disposition by summary 

judgment does not promote judicial efficiency, but, quite 

to the contrary, is a prescription for repetitive and waste- 

ful litigation both in this Court and in district courts. 

  

10 This Court’s review in Bush, Shaw II, and Miller was 

based on the fully developed evidentiary records compiled at 
the district court level. 

   



23 

III. Even if the District Court Was Correct in Finding 

Race to be the Predominant Factor, the Court Erred 

by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Plain- 

tiff-Appellees Without First Undertaking the 
Required Strict Scrutiny Analysis 

If a district court finds that race was the predominant 

factor motivating the legislature’s redistricting decision 

and that the legislature subordinated traditional district- 

ing criteria to race, that is not the end of the equal 

protection inquiry. Such a finding merely triggers strict 

scrutiny. Once strict scrutiny is deemed to apply, the State 

must be given the opportunity to show that redistricting 

legislation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 

interest. Bush, 517 U.S. at 976; Miller, 515 U.S. at 920; Shaw 

I, 517 US. at 908; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 658. 

By skipping the second prong of the equal protection 

analysis mandated by this Court, the district court imper- 

missibly treated strict scrutiny as “strict in theory, but 

fatal in fact.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 

200, 237 (1995) (citation omitted). This was error because 

circumstances can and do exist in which a race-conscious 

remedy is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state 

interest. For instance, five Justices have expressed the 

view that compliance with section 2 of the Voting Rights 

Act is a compelling state interest,!! and that section 2 is 

violated if, based on the totality of circumstances, mem- 

bers of a minority group have less opportunity than 

  

11 Bush, 517 U.S. at 990-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 
1033 (Stevens, ]., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, ].J., 

dissenting); id. at 1046 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and 
Breyer, ].]J., dissenting).  



  

24 

others to participate in the political process and to elect 

representatives of their choice. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 

Thus, a district may withstand a constitutional chal- 

lenge even if race was the predominant factor motivating 

the legislature and strict scrutiny is triggered. In order to 

satisfy strict scrutiny, a State may demonstrate a compel- 

ling state interest by showing that there is a “strong basis 

in evidence” for concluding that section 2 liability exists 

or thatthe potential for such liability may exist. Bush, 517 

U.S. at 977 (citation omitted). A State’s predominant 

reliance on race-conscious districting is narrowly tailored 

to serve a compelling interest if it “substantially 

addresses the § 2 violation,” and if traditional districting 

principles are not subordinated to race “substantially 

more than is ‘reasonably necessary’ to avoid § 2 liability.” 

Id. at 977, 979 (citations omitted).12 Further, a district 

designed to comply with section 2 need not have “the 

least possible amount of irregularity in shape,” and may 

pass strict scrutiny without winning “beauty contests” 

against rival districts designed by plaintiffs’ experts. Id. 

at 977. 

  

12 The first precondition for liability under section 2 under 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986), focuses on the 
existence of a sufficient minority population to justify the 
creation of majority-minority districts. Here, of course, the 
challenged District 12 is not a majority-minority district, since 

only 43% of the voting age population of the District is black, 

while 57% is white. ].S.App. 30a-34a. However, in Voinovich v. 
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993), this Court left open the 

possibility that minority voters could state a viable section 2 
claim if a redistricting plan deprived them of “influence 
districts” in which they constitute a substantial (and thus 
supposedly influential) minority. 

   



25 

Relying on this Court's recent decisions on strict 

scrutiny, most lower courts have treated the strict scru- 

tiny analysis as an integral part of the equal protection 

inquiry in redistricting cases. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits 

have each addressed how the strict scrutiny prong of the 

equal protection analysis preserves the availability of 

race-conscious remedies under section 2 of the Voting 

Rights Act. Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1326-29 (10th 

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1820 (1997); Clark wv. 

Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1402-08 (5th Cir. 1996). In 

each of these cases, the court echoed the majority of 

Justices who have indicated that compliance with section 

2 constitutes a compelling state interest and noted that 

districts drawn predominantly on the basis of race will be 

narrowly tailored if race overrides traditional districting 

principles no more than is reasonably necessary to rem- 

edy a section 2 violation. Sanchez, 97 F.3d at 1327; Clark, 

88 F.3d at 1407-08. In at least two instances, district courts 

have held that a district designed with race as the pre- 

dominant motivating factor nevertheless passed strict 

scrutiny because the legislature’s action was narrowly 

tailored to remedy a section 2 violation. Addy v. Newton 

County, 2 ESupp.2d 861 (5.D. Miss. 1997) (appeal pend- 

ing); King v. State Bd. of Elections, 979 F.Supp. 619, 622-27 

(N.D. Ill. 1997), aff'd without opinion, 118 S.Ct. 877 (1998). 

The application of strict scrutiny in the equal protec- 

tion redistricting context must not be construed as “fatal 

in fact” if the Court is to avoid a head-on collision 

between its equal protection redistricting jurisprudence 

and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The tension 

between these two bodies of law creates a dilemma for  



  

26 

state legislatures: if, on the one hand, a district is consid- 

ered not sufficiently compact and the percentage of 

minority voters in the district is high, the district may be 

invalidated for using race as its predominant motivating 

factor; yet, if a substantial minority population is dis- 

persed among different districts in relatively low propor- 

tions, such that minority voters do not have a fair 

opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, then those 

voters may well claim a violation of section 2. The strict 

scrutiny prong of the equal protection inquiry at least 

makes it possible for States to wend their way between 

“the Scylla of racial gerrymandering [as proscribed in 

Shaw and its progeny] . . . and the Charybdis of minority 

vote dilution” under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

See Lublin & Voss, supra, at 773. Strict scrutiny must 

afford a meaningful opportunity for challenged districts 

to pass constitutional muster if States are to be able to 

design districts that comport both with the Equal Protec- 

tion Clause and with section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 

Eschewing this crucial step, as the district court majority 

did here, is unjustified as a matter of law and contrary to 

prudent judicial decision-making. 

*   

   



27 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the order of the district 

court below granting summary judgment in favor of 

plaintiff-appellees should be reversed and the case 

remanded for trial. 

Respectfully submitted, 

MATTHEW J. ZINN 

(Counsel of Record) 
DaviD A. STEIN 

SterTOE & JOHNSON LLP 
1330 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

202-429-3000 

Jack W. LonpeN, Co-Chair 

DanieL F. KoLs, Co-Chair 

NorMAaN RebpricH, Trustee 

BARBARA R. ARNWINE 

THomas J. HENDERSON 

EpwaArD STILL 

Gipa R. WiLLiams 

Lawyers’ CoMMITTEE FOR CIviL 

Ricuts UNDER Law 

1450 G Street, N.W., Suite 400 

Washington, D.C. 20005 
202-662-8600 

James U. BLACKSHER 

Title Bldg., Suite 710 

300 21st Street North 

Birmingham AL 35203 

205-591-7238 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 
Lawyers” Committee for 
Civil Rights Under Law 

November 10, 1998  



\y 

ip 'y 

NYS [= » 
OCKLE PRINTING = 1-800-225-6964 

or 

    

     

    

   
2311 Douglas Street 

Omaha, Nebraska 68102-1283     

Law Brief Specialists 
FAX Nurnber: 402-342-4850 Since 1923 Call Collect (402) 342-2831 

No. 98-85 
  

JAMES B. HUNT, JR., ET AL., Appellants, 
  

Ve 

MARTIN CROMARTIE, ET AL., Appellees. 
  

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 

|, Andy Cockle, of lawful age, being duly sworn, upon my oath state that | did, on the 9 day 
of NOVEMBER, 1998 , send out, postage prepaid, from Omaha, NE, 6 package(s) containing 

3 copies of the BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS 

in the above entitled case. All parties required to be served have been served. Proper postage was affixed to said 
envelope(s) and they were plainly addressed to the following: 

SEE ATTACHED 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9 day of NOVEMBER, 1998 
| am duly authorized under the laws of the State of Nebraska 
to administer oaths. 

  

      
    
    

& GENERAL NOTARY-State of Nebraska Affiant \J 
| PATRICIA C. BILLOTTE ~ il ol SET My Comm. Exp. Nov. 24, 2000 cz lr ccen 

Notary Public 

To be filed for: 

Matthew J. Zinn Jack W. Londen, Co-Chair 

(Counsel of Record) Daniel F. Kolb, Co-Chair 

David A. Stein Norman Redlich, Trustee 

Steptoe & Johnson LLP Barbara R. Arnwine 

1330 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Thomas J. Henderson 

Washington, DC 20036 Edward Still 
(202) 429-3000 Gilda R. Williams 

Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights 

Under Law 

1450 G Street, N.W., Suite 400 

Washington, DC 20005 
(202) 662-8600 
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Lawyers' 

Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law 

 



  

Ho oP 
SERVICE LIST 

re: Hunt v. Cromartie, No. 98-85 (US Sup Ct), [LCCR VR 98-14] 

Todd A. Cox, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 

1444 1 Street, N.W., 10th Floor 

Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 216-5568 

For Intervenors 

Adam Stein, Esq. 

Ferguson, Stein, Wallas, Adkins, Gresham & Sumter, P.A. 

312 West Franklin Street For Intervenors 

Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516 

phone: 919-933-5300 

Elaine R. Jones, Esq. 

Norman J. Chachkin, Esq. 

Jacqueline A. Berrien, Esq. 

NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 

99 Hudson Street, Suite 1600 

New York, New York 10013 

phone: 212-219-1900 

For Intervenors 

Robinson O. Everett, Esq. 

301 West Main Street Suite 300 For Cromartie 

Durham NC 27701 
phone: 919-682-5691 

Martin B. McGee, Esq. 

Williams, Boger, Grady, Davis & Tuttle 

147 Union Street South 

Concord NC 28026 

phone: 704-782-1173 

For Cromartie 

Tiare Bowe Smiley, Esq. 
Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Esq. 

North Carolina Department of Justice 

114 West Edenton Street 

Raleigh NC - 27603 

phone: 919-716-6400 (Speas); 919-716-6916 (Smiley); 

For Hunt, et al.