Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners

    In T he

Supreme Court of the United Slates
October T erm, 1973

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 
vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-435

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,

vs.
RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-436

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Petitioner,vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.
Respondents.

On A ppeal from the U nited States C ourt of 
A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT 

OF PETITIONERS 
AND

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

(Counsel listed on inside cover}



FRED W. FREEMAN,
CHARLES T. HARRIS and 
DICKINSON, WRIGHT, McKEAN 

& CUDLIP
Of Counsel fo r  Bloomfield Hills 

School District

KELLER, THOMA, McMANUS, 
TOPPIN & SCHWARZE
Of Counsel for Birmingham Public 

Schools, Northville Public 
Schools and Southgate 
Community Schools

DELL, SHANTZ, BOOKER & 
SHULTE
Of Counsel for Clarenceville 
School District, South Red ford  

Schools and West Bloomfield 
School District

RAYMOND G. GLIME and 
MATHER, GLIME & DAOUST

Of Counsel for Clintondale 
Community Schools

SEMPLINER, THOMAS & GUTH
Of Counsel for Plymouth

Community School District of 
Wayne and Washtenaw Counties

CHARLES F. CLIPPERT
1700 North Woodward Avenue 
P.O. Box 509
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013
Counsel for Bloomfield Hills 

School District

CHARLES E. KELLER
THOMAS H. SCHWARZE

Suite 1600 — Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Counsel for Birmingham Public 

Schools, Northville Public 
Schools and Southgate 
Community Schools

JOHN F. SHANTZ
222 Washington Square Building 
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067
Counsel for Clarenceville School 

District, South Redford 
Schools and West Bloomfield 
School District

RAYMOND McPETERS
403 Macomb Daily Building 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043
Counsel for L ’Anse Creuse 

Public Schools

WALTER J. GUTH, JR.
711 West Ann Arbor Trail 
Plymouth, Michigan 48170
Counsel fo r  Plymouth Community 

School District of Wayne and 
Washtenaw Counties

TONY FERRIS 
158 Cass Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043
Counsel fo r  Van Dyke Public 

Schools

PERRY CHRISTY
One Parklane Boulevard 
Dearborn, Michigan 48126
Counsel for Westwood

Community School District



In T he

Supreme Court of the United States

October T erm, 1973 

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 
vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-435

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-436

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Petitioner,vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.
Respondents.

On A ppeal from the U nited States C ourt of 
A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF 
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT 

OF PETITIONERS



The undersigned school districts respectfully move for leave 
to file the attached brief as amici curiae in this cause. The consent 
of the attorneys for plaintiffs Ronald G. Bradley, et ah, state 
defendants, and defendants Allen Park Public Schools, et al., 
Grosse Pointe Public School System, Royal Oak Public Schools, 
School District of the City of Detroit, Southfield Public Schools 
and Professional Personnel of Van Dyke has been obtained. The 
consent of the attorneys for defendants Kerry Green, et al., 
Detroit Federation of Teachers Local 231, American Federation 
of Teachers, AFL-CIO, and Denise Magdowski, et al., was re­
quested but no response has been received from the attorneys for 
said defendants.

The undersigned school districts are located in Macomb, 
Oakland, Washtenaw and Wayne Counties in southeastern 
Michigan. Their interests in this case arise out of the possibility 
that the District Court will order metropolitanization of their 
public schools. None of the undersigned school districts was a 
party to the proceedings below or to the appeal taken therefrom, 
although all of them were recently joined as defendants by Order 
of the District Court dated September 10, 1973, subsequent to 
remand from the Court of Appeals.

The undersigned school districts believe that the attached 
brief deals with questions of law that may not adequately be dis­
cussed in the briefs to be filed by the parties to the appeal. In 
particular, they believe that the parties will not adequately deal 
with the failure of the Courts below to assure that the proceedings 
on remand will accord due process to the undersigned school dis­
tricts by vacating all rulings affecting them. Furthermore, because 
the briefs of parties in the Court of Appeals did not discuss at 
length the question of the appropriateness of the trial forum, the 
undersigned school districts believe that the attached brief will 
contain a more complete argument on the issue of the necessity of 
convening a three-judge court.

Respectfully submitted
FRED W. FREEMAN,
CHARLES T. HARRIS and 
DICKINSON, WRIGHT, McKEAN

& CUD LIP
Of Counsel for Bloomfield Hills

CHARLES F. CLIPPERT
1700 North Woodward Avenue 
P.O. Box 509
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013  
Counsel for Bloomfield Hills

School District School District



KELLER, THOMA, McMANUS, 
TOPPIN & SCHWARZE
O f Counsel for Birmingham Public 

Schools, Northville Public 
Schools and Southgate 
Community Schools

DELL, SHANTZ, BOOKER & 
SHULTE
Of Counsel for Clarenceville

School District, South Redford 
Schools and West Bloomfield 
School District

RAYMOND G. GLIME and 
MATHER, GLIME & DAOUST

O f Counsel for Clintondale 
Community Schools

SEMPLINER, THOMAS & GUTH
Of Counsel for Plymouth

Community School District o f  
Wayne and Washtenaw Counties

CHARLES E. KELLER
THOMAS H. SCHWARZE

Suite 1600 — Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Counsel for Birmingham Public 

Schools, Northville Public 
Schools and Southgate 
Community Schools

JOHN F. SHANTZ
222 Washington Square Building 
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067
Counsel for Clarenceville School 

District, South Redford 
Schools and West Bloomfield 
School District

RAYMOND McPETERS
403 Macomb Daily Building 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043
Counsel for L ’Anse Creuse 

Public Schools

WALTER J. GUTH, JR.
711 West Ann Arbor Trail 
Plymouth, Michigan 48170
Counsel for Plymouth Community 

School District o f Wayne and 
Washtenaw Counties

TONY FERRIS 
158 Cass Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043
Counsel for Van Dyke Public 

Schools

PERRY CHRISTY
One Parklane Boulevard 
Dearborn, Michigan 48126
Counsel for Westwood

Community School District





In T he

Supreme Court of the United Slates
October T erm, 1973

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 

vs.
RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-435

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,

vs.
RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-436

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM,
Petitioner,

vs.
RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.

Respondents.

On A ppeal from the U nited States C ourt of 
A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS





1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE .......................................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................2

ARGUMENT ...........................................................................  5

I. THE INTERESTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED
SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW COULD NOT ADEQUATELY BE REP­
RESENTED BY OTHERS ......................................5

*

II. THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS BELOW TO
ASSURE THE UNDERSIGNED SCHOOL DIS­
TRICTS A FULL AND FAIR HEARING ON ALL 
ISSUES AFFECTING THEM CONSTITUTES A 
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS ..................................11

III. BECAUSE THE VOIDING OF STATE STAT­
UTES EMBODYING IMPORTANT STATE POLI­
CIES IS NECESSARILY INVOLVED, A ONE- 
JUDGE DISTRICT COURT LACKS JURISDIC­
TION TO ORDER METROPOLITANIZATION . . 18

CONCLUSION 25



11

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Armstrong v. Manzo 

380 U.S. 545 
85 S. Ct. 1187
14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965) ................................................ .. 12

Attorney General v. Lowrey 
131 Mich. 639 
92 N.W. 289 (1902) 
a ff’d, 199 U.S. 233 
26 S. Ct. 27

Page

50 L. Ed. 167 (1905) ......................................................... 20
Board o f Managers o f Arkansas Tr. Sch. v. George

377 F.2d 228 (C.A. 8, 1967)..............................................  24
Bradley, et al. v. Milliken, et al.

433 F.2d 897 (C.A. 6, 1970)
438 F.2d 945 (C.A. 6, 1971)
468 F.2d 902 (C.A. 6, 1972) 
cert denied, 409 U.S. 844 (1972)
338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich., 1971) 
345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich., 1972) 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
484 F.2d 215 (C.A. 6, 1973) 
eert granted 42 U.S.L.W. 3306
(U.S. Nov. 19, 1973) ................................................ 2,3,16.19

Ex Parte Bransford 
310 U.S. 354 
60 S. Ct. 947
84 L. Ed. 1249 (1940) ......................................................  24

Briggs v. Elliott 
347 U.S. 483 
74 S. Ct. 686
98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) ......................................................... 19

Britton v. Green
325 F.2d 377 (C.A. 10, 1963) 17



Ill

Cases (cont’d.)

Brown v. Board o f Education 
347 U.S. 483 
74 S. Ct. 686
98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) ............................................

Page

........ 19,22
Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co.

157 F.2d 216 (C.A. 5, 1946) 
cert denied, 329 U.S. 782 
67 S. Ct. 205
91 L. Ed. 671 (1946) ........ ...............................................  17

Child Welfare Society v. Kennedy School District 
220 Mich. 290
189N.W. 1002 (1922) ......................................................  20

Davis v. County School Board 
347 U.S. 483 
74 S. Ct. 686
98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) ........................................................  19

Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
338 F.2d 25 (C.A. 7, 1967) 
modified, 395 U.S. 100 
89 S. Ct. 1562
23 L. Ed. 2d 129(1969) .......................................... 13

Heyman v. Kline
444 F.2d 65 (C.A. 2, 1971)..................................... ........  15

Hiers v. Detroit Superintendent o f Schools 
376 Mich. 225
136 N.W. 2d 10 (1965) ............................................

Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein 
370 U.S. 713 
82 S. Ct. 1294
8 L. Ed. 2d 794(1962) ............................................ ........  18

Irving Parents’ & Landowners’ Association 
v. State Board o f Education 
45 Mich. App. 387 
206 N.W. 2d 503 (1973) 
leave to appeal denied
(Slip Opinion, July 26, 1973) ................................. ........  9



IV

Cases (cont’d)
Page

Jenkins v. McKeithen 
395 U.S. 411 
89 S. Ct. 1843
23 L. Ed. 2d 404(1969) ..................................................... 13

Jones v. Branigin
433 F.2d 576 (C.A. 6, 1970 )..............................................  20

Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools 
349 Mich. 1
84N.W. 2d 327 (1957) ................................................ .. 5,6
MacQueen v. Port Huron City Commission 

194 Mich. 328
160 N.W. 627 (1916) ......................................................... 6

Moor v. County o f Alameda 
411 U.S. 693 
93 S. Ct. 1785 
36 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973)
reh. denied, 412 U.S. 963 (1973) ...................................... 7

Petitions for Writ of Certiorari filed by Bloomfield Hills 
School District, School District of the City of Birmingham, 
West Bloomfield School District and Clarenceville School Dis­
trict

cert denied, 410 U.S. 954
35 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1973) ..................................................... 21

Phillips v. United States 
312 U.S. 246 
61 S. Ct. 480
85 L. Ed. 800(1941) ........................................................  18

Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson 
390 U.S. 102 
88 S. Ct. 733
19 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1968) ......................... ........................... 17

Sailors v. Board o f Education o f the County o f Kent 
387 U.S. 105 
87 S. Ct. 1549
18 L. Ed. 2d 650(1967) ....................................................  24



V

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
411 U.S. 1 
93 S. Ct. 1278 
36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973)
reh.denied, 411 U.S. 959(1973) ...............................  9,10,12

Spencer v. Kugler
326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.C. N.J., 1971)

Cases (cont’d)
Page

aff’d, 404 U.S. 1027 
92 S. Ct. 707
30 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1972) ....................................................  23

Spencer v. Kugler
454 F.2d 839 (C.A. 3, 1972)...................................  20,23,24

Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge 
295 U.S. 89 
55 S. Ct. 678
79 L. Ed. 1322 (1935) ............................. ......................... 24

Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co.
282 U.S. 10 
51 S. Ct. 8
75 L. Ed. 135 (1930) ........................................................  18

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board o f Education
402 U.S. 1 
91 S. Ct. 1267
28 L. Ed. 2d 554(1971) 
reh. denied, 403 U.S. 912 
91 S. Ct. 2200
29 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1971) ................................................11,24

Swift & Co. v. Wickham 
382 U.S. I l l  
86 S. Ct. 258
15 L. Ed. 2d 194(1965) ................................................18,19

United States ex rel. McNeill v. Tarumianz
242 F.2d 191 (C.A. 3, 1957) ..........................................23,24

Welling v. Livonia Board o f Education 
382 Mich. 620
171 N.W. 2d 545 (1969) ....................................................  9

L. B. Wilson, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission 
170 F.2d 793 (C.A. D.C., 1948) ................................. 13



VI

Wright v. Council o f City o f Emporia 
407 U.S. 451 
92 S. Ct. 2196
33 L. Ed. 2d 51 (1972) ....................................................... 12

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.
395 U.S. 100 
89 S. Ct. 1562
23 L. Ed. 2d 129(1969) .................................... ................  14

Statutes

Title 28 U.S.C. §2281 .................................... .. .18,19,20,22
State Administrative Procedures Act 23,25

M.C.L.A. 24.201
M.S.A. 3.560(101), et seq ..................................................  9

Michigan Teachers’ Tenure Act 
M.C.L.A. 38.71
M.S.A. 15.1971, et seq ...................................................21,24

M.C.L.A. 38.91, M.S.A. 15.1991 ......................... .................. 21
Michigan School Code of 1955 

M.C.L.A. 340.1
M.S.A. 15.3001, et seq ........................................................ 24

M.C.L.A. 340.3, M.S.A. 15.3003 ....................... .................... 20
M.C.L.A. 340.21, M.S.A. 15.3021 ........................................... 20
M.C.L.A. 340.51, M.S.A. 15.3051 ..........................................  20
M.C.L.A. 340.52, M.S.A. 15.3052 ........................................... 20
M.C.L.A. 340.77, M.S.A. 15.3077 ..........................................  21
M.C.L.A. 340.101, M.S.A. 15.3101 .........................................20
M.C.L.A. 340.102, M.S.A. 15.3102.........................................20
M.C.L.A. 340.141, M.S.A. 15.3141 .........................................20
M.C.L.A. 340.142, M.S.A. 15.3142.........................................20
M.C.L.A. 340.181, M.S.A. 15.3181 .........................................20

Cases (cont’d)
Page



M.C.L.A. 340.182, M.S.A. 15.3182............................. 20
M.C.L.A. 340.352, M.S.A. 15.3352 ........................................ 6
M.C.L.A. 340.356, M.S.A. 15.3356 ........................................ 21
M.C.L.A. 340.401, M.S.A. 15 .3401,^5^ ............................. 20
M.C.L.A. 340.431, M.S.A. 15.3431, et seq ..............................20
M.C.L.A. 340.461, M.S.A. 15.3461, et seq ..............................20
M.C.L.A. 340.563, M.S.A. 15.3563 ........................................ 6
M.C.L.A. 340.567, M.S.A. 15.3567 ........................................ 6
M.C.L.A. 340.567a, M.S.A. 15.3567(1) ...............................  6
M.C.L.A. 340.569, M.S.A. 15.3569 ............ ......................  6,21
M.C.L.A. 340.569c, M.S.A. 15.3569(3) ...............................  6
M.C.L.A. 340.574, M.S.A. 15.3574 .......... ............................. 6
M.C.L.A. 340.575, M.S.A. 15.3575 ...................................  9,21
M.C.L.A. 340.576b, M.S.A. 15.3576(2) ...............................  7
M.C.L.A. 340.576c, M.S.A. 15.3576(3) ...............................  7
M.C.L.A. 340.578, M.S.A. 15.3578 ........................................ 6
M.C.L.A. 340.582, M.S.A. 15.3582 ........................................ 21
M.C.L.A. 340.583, M.S.A. 15.3583 ...................................  7,21
M.C.L.A. 340.584, M.S.A. 15.3584 ........................................ 7
M.C.L.A. 340.585, M.S.A. 15.3585 ........................................ 7
M.C.L.A. 340.586, M.S.A. 15.3586 ........................................ 7
M.C.L.A. 340.587, M.S.A. 15.3587 ........................................ 7
M.C.L.A. 340.589, M.S.A. 15.3589 ...................................  7,21
M.C.L.A. 340.590, M.S.A. 15.3590, et seq ...........................  7
M.C.L.A. 340.602, M.S.A. 15.3602 ........................................ 7
M.C.L.A. 340.605, M.S.A. 15.3605 ........................................ 7
M.C.L.A. 340.613, M.S.A. 15.3613 ..................................... 7
M.C.L.A. 340.614, M.S.A. 15.3614................................... 6,21
M.C.L.A. 340.711, M.S.A. 15.3711, et seq ...........................  6

Vll

Statutes (cont’d)
Page



Vlll

M.C.L.A. 340.882, M.S.A. 15.3882 ........................................  21
M.C.L.A. 388.201, M.S.A. 15.1916(101) .............................  9
M.C.L.A. 388.681, M.S.A. 15.2299(1) .................................. 9
M.C.L.A. 388.711, M.S.A. 15.2299(51), et seq ...................9,20
M.C.L.A. 388.1009, M.S.A. 15.1023(9) ...............................  9
M.C.L.A. 388.1015, M.S.A. 15.1023(15) .......... ..................  9
Public Employment Relations Act 

M.C.L.A. 423.201
M.S.A. 17.455( 1), et seq . . ..................... .......................21,24

M.C.L.A. 423.209, M.S.A. 17.455(9) .................................... 21

Constitutions
U.S. Const, amend. V .............................................................. 11
Mich. Const, art. VIII, §2 (1963)............................. \  . . . 5,9,21
Mich. Const, art. VIII, §3 (1963)....................................7,8,9,10
Mich. Const, art. IX, §6 (1963) ............................................  5
Mich. Const, art. IX, § 11 (1963)............................................  5
Mich. Const, art. IX, § 16 (1963) ............................................  5
Convention Comment, Mich. Const.

art. VIII, §3 (1963)..............................................................7,8

Court Rules
Rule 19, F.R.C.P................................................................. 3,16,17

Treatises
Note, “The Three Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure 

Under §2281”
77Harv.L. Rev. 299 (1963) ..............................................  20

Reed, “Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions”
55 Mich. L. Rev. 327 (1957) ..............................................  17

Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 16.02(a), nn. 48-52(1972) .........................   17

Statutes (cont’d)
Page



In T he

Supreme Court of the United States
October T erm, 1973 

No. 73-434

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., 
vs.

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,

Petitioners,

Respondents,

No. 73-435

ALLEN PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.,
vs Petitioners,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents,

No. 73-436

THE GROSSE POINTE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM,
vs Petitioner,

RONALD G. BRADLEY, et al.,
Respondents.

On A ppeal from the U nited States C ourt of 
A ppeals for the Sixth Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are the following Michigan school districts: 

Birmingham Public Schools, Bloomfield Hills School District, 
Clarenceville School District, Clintondale Community Schools, 
L’Anse Creuse Public Schools, Northville Public Schools, Ply­
mouth Community School District of Wayne and Washtenaw



2

Counties, Southgate Community Schools, South Redford Schools, 
Van Dyke Public Schools, West Bloomfield School District, and 
Westwood Community School District. Approximately 88,900 
pupils are currently enrolled in the schools in these districts. Amici 
are located in Macomb, Oakland, Washtenaw and Wayne Counties 
in southeastern Michigan and are affected by the Rulings and 
Orders entered by the District Court in Bradley v. Milliken and 
approved by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Not being 
parties to the trial proceedings in Bradley, amici have been af­
forded no meaningful opportunity to litigate any of the matters 
presented to the District Court, nor have they had standing to ap­
peal its Rulings and Orders. Although amici were joined as defen­
dants by Order of the District Court dated September 10, 1973, as 
entities whose presence has been deemed necessary for public 
school metropolitanization, no assurance was,-accorded them of a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge the constitutional predicate 
for metropolitanization.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici curiae are school districts organized and operating un­
der the Constitution and laws of the State of Michigan. According 
to Michigan law, each school district is a corporate body having 
independent legal status and possessing broad powers with respect 
to educating the public school children residing within its geogra­
phic boundaries.

None of the undersigned school districts was joined as a de­
fendant in the proceedings below until September 10, 1973, al­
though the Complaint was filed on August 18, 1970, and an exten­
sive trial and several appeals intervened. Even though the District 
Court took no proofs with respect to the establishment of the 
boundaries of the undersigned school districts or whether they had 
committed any act of de jure segregation, eight of them were in­
cluded within the so-called “desegregation area” described in the 
District Court’s Ruling on Desegregation Area and Order for De-



3

velopment of Plan of Desegregation entered on June 14, 1972.11]

On the basis of its finding that school districts which are to 
be affected by the decree of the District Court are “necessary par­
ties” under Rule 19, F.R.C.P., and, as a consequence, must be 
made parties to the litigation, the Court of Appeals vacated the 
District Court’s June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order. [2] However, the 
District Court’s September 27, 1971, March 24, 1972 and March 
28, 1972 Rulings, which are the predicate for that vacated order, 
were affirmed.^]

Two fatal errors permeate the rulings below:
First, the District Court concluded that a finding of consti­

tutional violation within the School District of the City of Detroit 
permitted it to order metropolitanization of public schooling, not­
withstanding the absence of a finding of constitutional violation in 
any school district other than Detroit. In sanctioning this proce­
dure, the Court of Appeals disregarded this Court’s prior decisions 
holding that the exercise of judicial power must be predicated 
upon a finding of constitutional violation. Because no such finding

I1] The District Court’s vacated June 14, 1972 Ruling and Order required 
the inclusion of 53 school districts in addition to Detroit to comprise 
the “desegregation area” (10a). * * On August 31, 1973, plaintiffs filed 
an Amended Complaint, in which they allege that 84 local and inter­
mediate school districts in addition to Detroit are necessary for deseg­
regating Detroit’s public schools. Of the 84, eight of amici are identified 
in Paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint, and four of amici are id­
entified in Paragraph 16 (la 297-la 298).

* Parenthetical page references followed by the letter “a” refer to the 
appendix filed by Petitioners in conjunction with their Petitions for 
Writ of Certiorari; page references preceded by a Roman numeral and 
the letter “a” refer to the five-volume appendix filed in this Court with 
Petitioners’ Brief.

[2] Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F. 2d 897 (C.A. 6, 1970); 438 F.2d 945 (C.A. 
6, 1971); 468 F.2d 902 (C.A. 6, 1972); cert, denied 409 U.S. 844 
(1972); 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich., 1971); 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. 
Mich., \912)-,aff’din part, rev’d in part, 484 F.2d 215 (C.A. 6, 1973); 
cert, granted 42 U.S.L.W. 3306 (U.S., Nov. 19, 1973).

I3 ] The Court of Appeals affirmed the March 24, 1972 Ruling, in part, but 
vacated it (190a). The affirmance apparently relates to metropolitaniza­
tion (172a-173a).



4

has been made with respect to school districts other than Detroit, 
it was error to decree metropolitanization.

Second, the June 12, 1973 decision of the Court of Appeals 
deprived the undersigned school districts of due process because it 
failed to vacate the District Court’s Ruling on Issue of Segregation 
(September 27, 1971), Ruling on Propriety of Considering a 
Metropolitan Remedy to Accomplish Desegregation of the Public 
Schools of the City of Detroit (March 24, 1972) and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Detroit-Only Plans of Desegrega­
tion (March 28, 1972). These three Rulings are the essence of the 
case. They were predicated upon evidence developed in a trial con­
ducted in the absence of the undersigned school districts. Thus, 
these districts were deprived of an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time in the proceedings.

The undersigned school districts should have been joined as 
parties to the action as soon as the District Court had reason to 
believe that their interests might be affected. Its failure to join 
them, either on its own motion or by granting the motion to com­
pel joinder that pended before the District Court from June 17, 
1971 until June 14, 1972, was error. Even though the Court of 
Appeals has now required the joinder of all affected school dis­
tricts, the District Court’s error has not been corrected because the 
Rulings of September 27, 1971, March 24, 1972[4]and March 28, 
1972, upon which the joinder of those school districts is predi­
cated, were not vacated. In fact, the Court of Appeals did not even 
require the District Court to receive any additional evidence with 
respect to these Rulings. Joinder of parties after the critical issues 
of a case have been decided vitiates due process.

Amici raise this additional argument: Metropolitanization 
will necessarily involve the invalidation of state statutes imple­
menting Michigan’s policy to retain local initiative and control of 
public schools in local school districts. Consequently, if this mat­
ter is remanded for further proceedings which could lead to metro­
politanization of independent school districts, this Court should 
require the convening of a three-judge court.

[41 See note 3.



5

ARGUMENT

I. THE INTERESTS OF THE UNDERSIGNED SCHOOL DIS­
TRICTS IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW COULD NOT 
ADEQUATELY BE REPRESENTED BY OTHERS.

The Court of Appeals sanctioned the District Court’s con­
clusion th a t metropolitanization of public schools is con­
stitutionally required even though the proceedings in the lower 
court were conducted in the absence of many school districts 
thereby affected. In so doing, the Court of Appeals misap­
prehended both the legal status and the functional role of local 
school districts in Michigan.

It is manifest from an examination of the laws of Michigan 
that a school district is a corporate entity having independent legal 
status and possessing broad responsibility, authority and discretion 
with respect to the conduct of the educational process within its 
boundaries. The importance of local school districts in Michigan 
public education is recognized in Article VIII, § 2 of the Constitu­
tion of 1963, which provides:

“Sec. 2. The legislature shall maintain and support a 
system of free public elementary and secondary schools as 
defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the ed­
ucation of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, 
creed, race, color or national origin.” (Emphasis supplied)

Michigan’s reliance upon local school districts to provide for the 
education of their pupils is recognized in three other provisions of 
its 1963 Constitution: art. IX, § 6; art. IX, § 11; and art. IX, § 
16.

As set forth in Mich. Const., art. VIII, § 2 (1963), the autho­
rity to delegate powers, duties and responsibilities to local school 
districts in Michigan resides in the legislature. In Jones v. Grand 
Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich. 1, 84 N.W. 2d 327 (1957), the 
Michigan Supreme Court said:

“It has been repeatedly recognized by this Court that the leg­
islature is vested with complete authority to determine the



6

manner in which the directives of the Constitution shall be 
carried out, the creation and operation of a system of public 
schools, the creating of school districts, and the powers and 
duties of school officials chosen in accordance with the law.” 
(349 Mich. 1,4.)

In fulfillment of the responsibility vested in it under Michi­
gan’s successive constitutions, the legislature presently provides for 
the operation of approximately 600 school districts. Each of these 
entities has been established for the purpose of carrying out the 
legislature’s responsibility to maintain and support public educa­
tion. In Jones v. Grand Ledge Public Schools, supra, the Michigan 
Supreme Court recognized that local school districts “were given 
large plenary powers and control of school matters.” (349 Mich. 1, 
5, quoting from MacQueen v. Port Huron City Commission, 194 
Mich. 328, 336, 160 N.W. 627 [ 1916]). This proposition was re­
cently reaffirmed in Hiers v. Detroit Superintendent o f Schools, 
376 Mich. 225, 136 N.W. 2d 10 (1965).

In furtherance of its constitutional obligation to “maintain 
and support” public schools in Michigan, the legislature has esta­
blished each school district as a “body corporate” which may sue 
and be sued, acquire and take property, and hold, use and sell the 
same. M.C.L.A. 340.352, M.S.A. 15.3352. The legislature has 
granted to each of Michigan’s local school boards the responsibi­
lity for general care and custody of the schools and property of its 
district, and has empowered each board to make and enforce rules 
and regulations for the general management of its schools and the 
preservation of its property. M.C.L.A. 340.578, M.S.A. 15.3578; 
M.C.L.A. 340.614, M.S.A. 15.3614. Among the multitude of spe­
cific powers held by local school district authorities are the fol­
lowing: The power to acquire lands for school purposes by con­
demnation, M.C.L.A. 340.711, M.S.A. 15.3711, et seq.; the power 
to hire and contract with teachers and other personnel, M.C.L.A. 
340.569, M.S.A. 15.3569; M.C.L.A. 340.569c, M.S.A. 15.3569(3); 
M.C.L.A. 340.574, M.S.A. 15.3574; the power to levy taxes neces­
sary for all school operating purposes, M.C.L.A. 340.563, M.S.A. 
15.3563; the power to borrow against anticipated receipts and to 
invest receipts, M.C.L.A. 340.567, M.S.A. 15.3567; M.C.L.A. 
340.567a, M.S.A. 15.3567(1); the power to acquire real or per­
sonal property and equipment necessary for operation of the



7

school program, M.C.L.A. 340.576b, M.S.A. 15.3576(2); M.C.L.A. 
340.576c, M.S.A. 15.3576(3); the power to determine courses of 
study, M.C.L.A. 340.583, M.S.A. 15.3583; the power to suspend 
or expel pupils, M.C.L.A. 340.613, M.S.A. 15.3613; the power to 
receive gifts and bequests for educational purposes, M.C.L.A. 
340.605, M.S.A. 15.3605; the power to decide whether to offer a 
kindergarten program, M.C.L.A. 340.584, M.S.A. 15.3584; the 
power to offer adult education, M.C.L.A. 340.586, M.S.A. 
15.3586; the power to offer nursery or day care programs, 
M.C.L.A. 340.587, M.S.A. 15.3587; the power to establish and 
operate camps, M.C.L.A. 340.602, M.S.A. 15.3602; the power to 
establish and operate vocational schools, M.C.L.A. 340.585, 
M.S.A. 15.3585; the power to establish attendance areas, M.C.L.A. 
340.589, M.S.A. 15.3589; the power to operate and maintain a 
bus transportation program, M.C.L.A. 340.590, M.S.A. 15.3590, 
et seq.

We submit that the foregoing delegations of power by the 
Michigan legislature are persuasive indicia that each Michigan 
school district enjoys independent status. Cf, Moor v. County o f 
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S. Ct. 1785, 36 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1973), 
reh. denied 412 U.S. 963 (1973), at 411 U.S. 719-720. Conse­
quently, those districts which could be affected by metropolitani- 
zation were entitled to independent participation in the pro­
ceedings below from their inception.

The Court of Appeals also failed to perceive that neither the 
State Board of Education nor the state officers named as de­
fendants could adequately represent the interests of the under­
signed school districts in the proceedings below. Consequently, it 
did not recognize the prejudice to the undersigned school districts 
resulting from their absence from the important phases of those 
proceedings. We urge this Court to remedy that error.

There are important legal and functional distinctions between 
local school districts and the State Board of Education. The State 
Board of Education is responsible for providing leadership and 
general supervision of all public education in Michigan. Mich. 
Const, art. VIII, § 3 (1963). Its contemplated function appears 
in the Convention Comment to that constitutional provision:



8

“This is a new section combining and enlarging upon the 
provisions in Section 2 and 6, Article XI, of the present con­
stitution. It attempts to embody two fundamental principles: 
(1) the concern of all people in educational processes as a 
safeguard for democracy; (2) greater public participation in 
the operation of educational institutions.

“The enlarged state board provides a policy-making 
body on a state level. Michigan is one of three states that 
does not have such a board. Creation of a state board places 
the superintendent in the position of having constantly avail­
able a consultative and deliberative body of outstanding citi­
zens who are representative of the people of the state.

** *

“It is proposed that the board be the unifying and co­
ordinating force for education within the state and receive in­
formation from all o f the various levels o f public education. 
Such information would be considered by the board in deter­
mining advice to local school boards, governing boards o f col­
leges and universities, and the legislature as to the total needs 
of education in this state.

“Appointment of the superintendent of public instruc­
tion by the state board follows present day trends in other 
states and would assure selection from among the most com­
petent people available. Michigan elects its superintendent 
under the present constitution. The superintendent would be 
considered as administrative head of the state department of 
education and as such should be a staff officer to the 
governor and on his administrative board.” (Convention 
Comment, Mich. C onst, art. VIII, § 3 [ 1963]; emphasis sup­
plied)

The State Board of Education serves as a clearinghouse of infor­
mation from all levels of education within the state and, after con­
sultation and deliberation, renders advice to other entities within 
the state having educational responsibilities.

The legislature has acted to implement the State Board’s con­
stitutionally defined role, declaring that it “serves as the general 
planning and coordinating body for all public education including



9

higher education.” M.C.L.A. 388.1009, M.S.A. 15.1023(9). While 
the State Board has been granted the power to make rules and reg­
ulations, M.C.L.A. 388.1015, M.S.A. 15.1023(15), those rules 
must be adopted in accordance with the State Administrative Pro­
cedures Act of 1969. M.C.L.A. 24.201, M.S.A. 3.560(101), et 
seq.; Irving Parents’ and Landowners’ Association v. State Board 
o f Education, 45 Mich. App. 387, 206 N.W. 2d 503 (1973), leave 
to appeal denied (Slip Opinion, July 26, 1973).

It is manifest that the boundaries of Michigan school districts 
are subject to oversight by the legislature and that, under specified 
circumstances, the State Board of Education has been legislatively 
authorized to participate in school district reorganizations (168a- 
169a). M.C.L.A. 388.681, M.S.A. 15.2299(1); M.C.L.A. 388.711, 
M.S.A. 15.2299(51); M.C.L.A. 388.201, M.S.A. 15.1916(101). 
The point we emphasize is this: The State Board of Education is 
powerless to alter school district boundaries absent enabling legis­
lation.

The Court of Appeals relied upon Welling v. Livonia Board o f 
Education, 382 Mich. 620, 171 N.W. 2d 545 (1969) in apparently 
concluding that the State Board of Education, rather than local 
school districts, controls public education in Michigan (165a- 
171a). But in fact the Welling case merely confirms what is plain 
from Michigan’s Constitution: Responsibility for education in 
Michigan is distributed between local school districts, which pro­
vide for the education of their pupils (art. VIII, § 2), and the 
State Board of Education, which provides districts with leadership 
and general supervision (art. VIII, § 3). [5]

In short, the distribution of educational responsibilities 
between school districts and the State Board of Education in 
Michigan is much like that of Texas as described in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 5

[5] The Court of Appeals plainly erred in stating that the State Board of 
Education was acting under its constitutional mandate without 
legislative authority in establishing an administrative rule requiring local 
school boards to provide a minimum number of hours per school year 
(167a). In fact, the statute, M.C.L.A. 340.575, M.S.A. 15.3575, 
construed in Welling specifically authorized the State Board to establish 
rules for its implementation.



10

1278, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), reh. denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973), 
where Mr. Justice Powell concluded:

“Although policy decision-making and supervision in certain 
areas are reserved to the State, the day-to-day authority over 
the ‘management and control’ of all public elementary and 
secondary schools is squarely placed on the local school 
boards. *** It cannot be seriously doubted that in Texas edu­
cation remains largely a local function and that the pre­
ponderating bulk of all decisions affecting the schools are 
made and executed at the local level guaranteeing the greatest 
participation by those most directly concerned.” (411 U.S. 1, 
52, n. 108.)

Of the remaining state officer defendants, ,none has any signi­
ficant authority over local school districts. The State Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction is selected by the State Board, serves 
as its chairman without the right to vote and is responsible for the 
execution of its policies. He is the principal executive officer of 
the State Department of Education. The Governor and Attorney 
General do not control the operation of school districts or any 
other aspect of the public educational system in Michigan, 
although the Governor is an ex officio member of the State Board 
of Education without vote. (art. VIII, § 3)

School districts in Michigan derive their broad authority over 
the operation of public schools both from constitutional recogni­
tion and legislative enactments. Their authority extends to the ex­
ercise of independent discretion over vital educational areas, in­
cluding basic responsibility for the day-to-day administration of all 
public schools in their respective districts. Neither the Michigan 
constitution nor any act of the legislature establishes local school 
districts as agencies of the State Board of Education, the Super­
intendent of Public Instruction or any other state officer defen­
dant. Local school districts are constitutionally, legislatively and 
judicially recognized as independent legal entities in the State of 
Michigan.

As a consequence, any inference that the State Board of Edu­
cation, Governor or any other defendant named in this case could 
serve as a proxy for the undersigned school districts in the pro­
ceedings in the District Court is without basis in law or fact, nor



11

can it be supported on a functional basis. Accordingly, the opinion 
of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it assumed the existence of 
such a relationship, was erroneous.

II. THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS BELOW TO ASSURE 
THE UNDERSIGNED SCHOOL DISTRICTS A FULL AND 
FAIR HEARING ON ALL ISSUES AFFECTING THEM 
CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

Notwithstanding the facts that:
(a) In Michigan, education remains a local function, 

where the preponderating bulk of all decisions affecting the 
schools are made and executed at the local level;

(b) the District Court took no proofs respecting the es­
tablishment of the boundaries of the 86 public school dis­
tricts in the counties of Wayne, Oakland and Macomb; and

(c) the District Court took no proofs on the issue of 
whether any school district (other than the Detroit school 
district) committed any act of de jure segregation,

the District Court decreed that the pluralistic school district con­
cept adopted by the people of the State of Michigan must be 
swept aside, to be supplanted by metropolitanized schools. This 
decree was formulated following trial proceedings conducted in 
the absence of the undersigned school districts. These districts 
have thus been deprived by the federal courts of any meaningful 
opportunity to be heard with respect to the predicate for metro- 
politanization. This procedure has denied them due process under 
U.S. Const, amend. V.

The Court of Appeals confirmed that the District Court had 
power to follow this procedure, characterizing school district 
boundaries in Michigan as “artificial” (172a). This characterization 
is without foundation either in Michigan law or in the trial record. 
Moreover, the labeling of school district lines as “artificial bar­
riers” ignores the important recent rulings of this Court in Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board o f Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. 
Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1971), reh. denied, 403 U.S. 912, 91



12

S. Ct. 2200, 29 L. Ed. 2d 689 (1971), and San Antonio Indepen­
dent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 36 
L. Ed. 2d 16 (1973), reh. denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).

This Court stated in Swann that “it is important to remember 
that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a consti­
tutional violation.” Swann, supra, 402 U.S. 1, 16. Cf, Wright v. 
Council o f City o f Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S. Ct. 2196, 33 L. 
Ed. 2d 51 (1972). “This Court has never doubted the propriety of 
maintaining political subdivisions within the States and has never 
found in the Equal Protection Clause any per se rule of ‘territorial 
uniformity.’ ” San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri­
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 54 n. 110 (1973). Nevertheless, the Court of 
Appeals, without any evidence of a constitutional violation by any 
school district other than Detroit, and without any proofs with 
respect to the establishment of school district boundaries, approv­
ed the dismantling of local school districts in southeastern 
Michigan.

It will doubtless be argued that the metropolitanization order 
is justified by the District Court’s finding of constitutional viola­
tion with respect to the School District of the City of Detroit. It 
defies every element of due process, however, to predicate metro­
politanization upon proceedings conducted in the absence of all 
but one of the affected school districts.

Due process requires that each affected school district be af­
forded a meaningful opportunity to be heard on all issues — parti­
cularly the basic issue of constitutional violation. The importance 
of meaningful involvement in litigation by a party potentially af­
fected thereby as an essential element of due process has often 
been forcefully enunciated by this and other courts:

“A fundamental requirement of due process is ‘the op­
portunity to be heard.’*** It is an opportunity which must 
be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man­
ner.” (Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 
1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 [1965])



13

“ The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment 
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. An essential element of 
due process is an opportunity to be heard before the reaching 
of a judgment. By due process of law is meant ‘a law, which 
hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and 
renders judgment only after trial.’ Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, U.S. 1819,4 Wheat. 518,581,4 L.Ed. 
629 (Webster’s argument). As said in Galpin v. Page, U.S. 
1873, 18 Wall. 350, 368, 21 L.Ed. 959: ‘It is a rule as old as 
the law, and never more to be respected than now, that no 
one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in 
court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to 
appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. 
Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all 
the attributes of a judicial determination: it is judicial usurpa­
tion and oppression, and never can be upheld where justice is 
justly administered.’ (Italics supplied).” (L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission, 170 F.2d 793, 802 
[(C.A. D.C., 1948)]

* * *

“We have frequently emphasized that the right to con­
front and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of 
procedural due process.” (Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 
41 1, 428, 89 S. Ct. 1843, 23 L. Ed. 2d 404 [(1969)]

The requirement of due process has been applied in circum­
stances analogous to those before this Court in this appeal. In 
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F. 2d 25 
(C.A. 7, 1967), modified, 395 U.S. 100, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed. 
2d 129 (1969), the court of appeals concluded that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against the parent cor­
poration of Hazeltine Research, Inc., even though there were signi­
ficant similarities in personnel and operations between the parent 
and its subsidiary and despite the parent’s informed awareness of 
the litigation. In reaching this result, the court of appeals empha­
sized that the parent had not been named as a party, was not 
served with process and did not participate in the trial except to 
appear specially to contest entry of judgment against it. The court



14

of appeals reasoned that the parent was not “adequately represent­
ed” at trial by the subsidiary on an “alter ego” theory because 
that issue could only be resolved after an adversary determination 
of the facts involved.

The opinion of the court of appeals was affirmed in pertinent 
part in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 
100, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 23 L. Ed. 2d 129 (1969), in which this Court 
said:

“The Court of Appeals was quite right in vacating the 
judgments against [the parent corporation]. It is elementary 
that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting 
from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to 
which he has not been made a party by service of process. 
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940). The consistent 
constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to ad­
judicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has juris­
diction over the person of the defendant. E.g.„ Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 
416, 418 (1957).” (395 U.S. 100, 110)

The Hazeltine ruling, we contend, applies here. The under­
signed school districts were not named as parties, were not served 
with process, and had no opportunity to participate in the trial of 
any of the issues now before this Court on appeal. The District 
Court did not purport to obtain jurisdiction over them until entry 
of its Order joining them dated September 10, 1973. Until then, 
the District Court was without power to adjudicate matters 
affecting the undersigned school districts.

The fact that certain state defendants were named as parties 
to the action from the outset does not, under the Hazeltine rule, 
permit the District Court to bind the undersigned school districts 
by its decree. First, as established in the first section of this brief, 
Michigan school districts are bodies corporate, with distinct 
powers to sue and be sued. Moreover, the state defendants had 
neither the power nor the duty to “adequately represent” the in­
terests of the undersigned school districts at the trial of the basic 
issue of constitutional violation. They could not have done so, 
even if so empowered, because the question of constitutional 
violation in any school district other than Detroit was not in issue.



15

Accordingly, all of the rulings and orders of the District 
Court, specifically including those relating to the question of 
constitutional violation, should be vacated. The failure to name 
the undersigned school districts as defendants prior to trial, and 
the failure to allege any wrongdoing on their part, precluded ade­
quate representation of their interests. See also, Heyman v. Kline, 
444 F. 2d 65 (C.A. 2, 1971).

The Court of Appeals, while characterizing Michigan school 
districts as “instrumentalities of the State created for administra­
tive convenience” (165a), ultimately accepts our analysis of their 
status. This is apparent from its holding that school districts 
“which are to be affected by the decree of the District Court are 
‘necessary parties’ ”, and must be made parties to this litigation 
“and afforded an opportunity to be heard” (177a). Yet the man­
date of the Court of Appeals is constitutionally deficient because 
it does not require the District Court to reopen the proceedings 
upon which metropolitanization was predicated.

Counsel for plaintiffs’ description of the expected format of 
further proceedings at trial underscores this fatal deficiency in the 
mandate of the Court of Appeals:

“ JUDGE DeMASCIO: The question I’m concerned 
about: What was the reason or reasons for vacating the 
metropolitan order?

“MR. LUCAS: I think simply because one of the parties 
who should have been there when the metropolitan remedy 
was shaped, or a number of parties, weren’t there. It’s as if 
this Court did not grant the defendant the presence at his 
sentencing, and the Court of Appeals sent it back and said: 
He’s got to be resentenced, and that’s maybe an unfortunate 
analogy, but I tried to put it within the framework of this 
Court.’’t6 7]

This colloquy depicts proceedings on remand quite different from 
those described in plaintiffs’ Response To Petitions For Cer­
tiorari.^]
[6] Transcript of argument on Motion of School District of the City of 

Detroit heard on December 11, 1972 before District Judges Kaess, 
Kennedy and De Mascio during absence from the bench of Judge 
Stephen J. Roth, at 64.

[7] See n. 2, p. 3, plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Petitions for 
Writs o f Certiorari.



16

The Court of Appeals recognized that the undersigned school 
districts should have been joined as parties:

“We hold that school districts which are to be affected 
by the decree of the District Court are ‘necessary parties’ 
under Rule 19. As a prerequisite to the implementation of a 
plan in this case affecting any school district, the affected di­
strict first must be made a party to this litigation and 
afforded an opportunity to be heard.” (177a; 484 F.2d 215 
251-252)

However, its mandate to the District Court falls short of meeting 
the obligation embodied in Rule 19, F.R.C.P., because it does not 
compel vacation of the District Court’s September 27, 1971 Rul­
ing on the Issue of Segregation (17a), its March 24, 1972 Ruling 
on Propriety of Considering a Metropolitan Remedy to Ac­
complish Desegregation of the Public Schools of the City of 
Detroit (48a) [8] or its March 28, 1972 Findings of Fact and Con­
clusions of Law on the Detroit-Only Plans of Desegregation (53a). 
Those rulings of the District Court are the essence of the case. 
They significantly affect the interests of the undersigned school 
districts, and should not be permitted to stand now that these 
school districts have been joined.

Under the mandatory language of Rule 19, the District Court 
was obligated to join as a defendant any school district not before 
it upon discovering that disposition of the action in the absence of 
that school district might, as a practical matter, impair or impede 
its ability to protect an interest affected by the action. Rule 19(a), 
F.R.C.P. The District Court’s failure to order timely joinder, and 
the Court of Appeals’ subsequent refusal to vacate the ruling on 
constitutional violation, have deprived the undersigned school 
districts of their right to protect their interests.

The potentiality of metropolitanization was apparent to the 
District Court early in the trial proceedings. The trial judge indi­
cated his awareness of the metropolitan thrust of the litigation 
well before filing the September 27, 1971 Ruling on the Issue of 
Segregation.[9] He did not, however, take the step which Rule 19 
compels: Joinder of all school districts whose interests might be 
affected by metropolitanization. * 9
^  See note 3.
[9]

See colloquy between District Court and counsel for plaintiff atlla  44 
and between District Court and witness at Ilia 90, Ilia 92 and Ilia 153.



17

On June 17, 1971, intervening defendants Magdowski, et al., 
filed a motion requesting entry of an order joining as parties de­
fendant all of the school districts located in the counties of 
Macomb, Oakland and Wayne, describing those school districts as 
entities without which complete relief could not be granted to 
plaintiffs (la 119). The District Court continued the motion under 
advisement by Order entered March 15, 1972 (la 204) and con­
sidered it as withdrawn by Order entered June 14, 1972 (Ct. of 
Appeals app., Ia 407).

As outsiders, nonparties to the proceedings below, the under­
signed school districts cannot be bound by any ruling of the Dis­
trict Court. This proposition was recently reaffirmed in Provident 
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 88 S. 
Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed. 2d 936 (1968), wherein this Court stated:

“Of course, since the outsider is not before the court, he can­
not be bound by the judgment rendered. This means, how­
ever, only that a judgment is not res judicata as to, or legally 
enforceable against, a nonparty.” (390 U.S. 102, 110.)

Consequently, the September 27, 1971 Ruling, the March 24, 
1972 Ruling and the March 28, 1972 Findings are not binding 
upon the undersigned nonparty school districts. Nonjoinder of a 
party may be raised on appeal, sua sponte. In the event of remand, 
the nonparty school districts should be permitted a full opportun­
ity to litigate the matters in issue affecting their interests. Failure 
to accord this opportunity constitutes a violation of due process. 
See Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (C.A. 10, 1963); Calcote v. 
Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216, 224 (C.A. 5, 1946), cert, 
denied, 329 U.S. 782, 67 S. Ct. 205, 91 F. Ed. 671 (1946); Reed, 
“Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions”, 55 Mich. F. 
Rev. 327, 336 (1957); Wright & Miller, FEDERAF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE, § 1602(a), nn. 48-52 (1972).

If this Court does not vacate the September 27, 1971, March 
24, 1972 and March 28, 1972 decisions of the District Court, the 
undersigned school districts should be dismissed as parties because 
the Rulings affecting them were based upon proceedings con­
ducted in the absence of indispensable parties. Any other conclu­
sion contravenes “equity and good conscience.” Rule 19(b), 
F.R.C.P.



18

III. BECAUSE THE VOIDING OF STATE STATUTES EM­
BO DY IN G  IMPORTANT STATE POLICIES IS NECES­
SARILY INVOLVED, A ONE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT 
LACKS JURISDICTION TO ORDER METROPOLITANIZA- 
TION.

The District Court erred, once it had concluded that Detroit- 
only plans of desegregation were inadequate, because it failed to 
convene a three-judge district court pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 
2281. The Court of Appeals also erred by failing to order the con­
vening of a three-judge court on remand. Idlewild Bon Voyage 
Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S. Ct. 1294, 8 L. Ed. 2d 
794(1962).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, a single-judge district court is pro­
hibited from restraining the enforcement, operation or execution 
by state officials of state statutes of general application upon the 
ground of the unconstitutionality of such statutes. Because they 
have this restraining effect, the metropolitanization rulings entered 
on March 24, 1972 (48a), March 28, 1972 (53a) and June 14, 
1972 (97a) by the District Court are void for want of jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction in affirm­
ing the March 24 and March 28, 1972 rulings. Stratton v. St. Louis 
S.W.R. Co., 282 U.S. 10,51 S. Ct. 8, 75 L. Ed. 135 (1930).

Reduced to its essence, the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 is to 
provide “procedural protection against an improvident state-wide 
doom by a federal court of a state’s legislative policy.” Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 251, 61 S. Ct. 480, 483, 85 L. Ed. 
800 (1941). As described by Mr. Justice Harlan in Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 86 S. Ct. 258, 15 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1965):

“Section 2281 was designed to provide a more responsi­
ble forum for the litigation of suits which, if successful, 
would render void state statutes embodying important state 
policies. The statute provides for notification to the State of 
a pending suit, 28 USC § 2284 (2) (1964 ed), thus prevent­
ing ex parte injunctions common previously. It provides for 
three judges, one of whom must be a circuit judge, 28 USC § 
2284 (1) (1964 ed), to allow a more authoritative determina­
tion and less opportunity for individual predilection in sensi-



19

five and politically emotional areas. It authorizes direct 
review by this Court, 28 USC § 1253, as a means of acceler­
ating a final determination on the merits;. . (382 U.S. I l l ,
119; emphasis added)

Recognizing that 28 U.S.C. § 2281 has frequently been applied in 
desegregation cases (.Brown v. Board o f Education, Briggs v. 
Elliott, and Davis v. County School Board, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 
686, 98 L. Ed. 873 [1954]), the question is: Does the require­
ment for a three-judge court apply in the case at bar?

So long as the proceedings in this case were confined to issues 
respecting the School District of the City of Detroit, the case was 
properly heard by a district court of one judge because the issues 
were then “local in application.” Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 
897, 900 n.2 (C.A. 6, 1970). But the “local” nature of the litiga­
tion ended when the District Court decided to apply its orders to 
school districts other than Detroit.

Sanctioned by the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and pur­
suant to the September 10, 1973 Order of the District Court (la 
300), metropolitanization will affect 85 local school districts. 
These 85 districts educate approximately 932,300 children, or 
roughly 43.1% of Michigan’s total school population.[ 10] Any 
metropolitanization order will necessarily restrain the operation of 
state statutes affecting some or all of these independent school dis­
tricts, including large numbers of teachers and administrators. In 
the face of an order of such magnitude, it can scarcely be argued

f 101 As of the date of printing this Brief, the Michigan Department of Edu­
cation has indicated that the public school population in the State of 
Michigan for 1973-74 totals 2,161,435, although this figure may be 
subject to adjustment. (Michigan Department of Education Report, 
Vol. 8, No. 5, December 10, 1973) Pupil populations for the 85 af­
fected local school districts are reported in MICHIGAN EDUCATION 
DIRECTORY AND BUYER’S GUIDE 1973-1974, with the exception 
of four districts (Hamtramck Public Schools, Inkster Public Schools, 
Romulus Community Schools, and Westwood Community Schools), 
data with respect to which were excerpted from the “District Summary 
1973 Fourth Friday Report” filed by each of those districts with the 
Michigan Department of Education. No data with respect to Macomb 
County Intermediate School District, Oakland County Intermediate 
School District, or Wayne County Intermediate School District are in­
cluded in any of these figures.



2 0

that considerations of economy in judicial administration prevail 
against the convening of a three-judge court. Jones v. Branigin, 
433 F.2d 576 (C.A. 6, 1970). Failure to convene a three-judge 
court under the mandate of 28 U.S.C. §2281 will more likely 
result in “extended delay, duplication of judicial effort, and harm 
to the parties.” See, Note, The Three Judge District Court: Scope 
and Procedure Under §2281, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 299, 305(1963). In 
the event this cause is remanded to the District Court, ordering the 
convention of a three-judge court now will assure the litigants that 
they will not be “detoured” around a “procedural avenue” 
(Spencer v. Kugler, 454 F.2d 839, 846 [C.A. 3,1972] )en route to 
the ultimate resolution of the controversy.

Any order for metropolitanization of the school districts in 
southeastern Michigan must necessarily involve restraining the 
enforcement, operation or execution of statutes of statewide ap­
plication. As noted in the first section of this brief, the entire 
statutory plan for delivery of educational services in Michigan is 
predicated upon a system of pluralistic school districts. School 
boards within such school districts are charged with the enforce­
ment of state statutes within their boundaries. Examples of such 
statutes include:

(a) Legislation dealing with school district bound­
aries. [11]

1111 Under Michigan law, the legislature is vested with the authority to pro­
vide by statute for the creation or modification o f school district 
boundaries. Attorney General v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289 
(1902), aff’d, 199 U.S. 233, 26 S. Ct. 27, 50 L. Ed. 167 (1905); Child 
Welfare Society v. Kennedy School District, 220 Mich. 290, 189 N.W. 
1002 (1922). The present legislative policy in this regard is set forth in 
M.C.L.A. 340.21, M.S.A. 15.3021; M.C.L.A. 340.51, M.S.A. 15.3051; 
M .C .L .A . 3 4 0 .1 0 1 ,  M .S.A. 15.3101; M.C.L.A. 340.141, M.S.A. 
15.3141; and M.C.L.A. 340.181, M.S.A. 15.3181, which confirm and 
continue the school districts in existence at the time o f enactment of 
the School Code o f 1955. The legislature has also established statutory 
procedures in very limited circumstances and under carefully prescribed 
statutory guidelines for the reclassification of school districts (M.C.L.A. 
340.52, M.S.A. 1 5.3052; M.C.L.A. 340.102, M.S.A. 15.3102; M.C.L.A. 
340.142, M.S.A. 15.3142; and M.C.L.A. 340.182, M.S.A. 15.3182), 
and for the dissolution (M.C.L.A. 340.3, M.S.A. 15.3003), consolida­
t io n  (M .C .L .A . 3 4 0 .4 0 1 ,  M.S.A. 15.3401, et seq.), annexation 
(M.C.L.A. 340.431, M.S.A. 15.3431, et seq.), transfer of territory 
(M .C .L .A . 340.461, M.S.A. 15.3461, et seq.) and reorganization 
(M.C.L.A. 388.711, M.S.A. 15.2299 (51), et seq.) o f school districts.



21

(b) The obligation of each school district to afford 
educational opportunities to its resident pupils and to control 
the attendance of students who are nonresidents of the dis­
trict (M ich. Co n st , art. VIII, § 2 (1963); M.C.L.A. 
340.356, M.S.A. 15.3356; M.C.L.A. 340.589, M.S.A. 
15.3589; M.C.L.A. 340.582, M.S.A. 15.3582).

(c) The responsibility of each school district to employ 
and allocate its teaching and administrative staff to educate 
resident pupils upon terms satisfactory to each school district 
(M.C.L.A. 340.569, M.S.A. 15.3569; M.C.L.A. 423.209, 
M.S.A. 17.455(9); M.C.L.A. 38.91, M.S.A. 15.1991) and in 
connection therewith each school district must abide by the 
Michigan Teachers’ Tenure Act (M.C.L.A. 38.71, M.S.A. 
15.1971) and the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining 
Act (M.C.L.A. 423.201, M.S.A. 17.455(1)).

(d) The right of each school district to control the con­
struction, expansion and use of its school facilities (M.C.L.A. 
340.77, M.S.A. 15.3077).

(e) The power of each school district to provide for the 
curriculum, activities, standards of conduct and safety of stu­
dents within each school district. (M.C.L.A. 340.575, M.S.A. 
1 5.3575; M.C.L.A. 340.583, M.S.A. 15.3583; M.C.L.A. 
340.614, M.S.A. 1 5,36 14; M.C.L.A. 340.882, M.S.A. 
15.3882).
It is clear that implementation of the June 14, 1972 Ruling 

and Order of the District Court, now vacated by the Court of Ap­
peals, would have restrained each affected school district in the 
enforcement, operation and execution of the foregoing stat­
utes. [12) it is equally clear that any metropolitanization order 
fashioned in proceedings on remand would necessarily require 
issuance of an injunction barring the enforcement, operation or ex­
ecution of the foregoing statutes.

[121 s ee petitions for Writ o f Certiorari filed in this Court by Bloomfield 
H ills School District, School District o f the City o f Birmingham 
Clarenceville School District and West Bloomfield School District, cert. 
denied, 410 U.S. 954, 35 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1973); see also la 285- la 286.



2 2

The June 12, 1973 Opinion of the Court of Appeals reflects 
its belief that a statute of general application is under constitu­
tional challenge in this case. The convening of a three-judge court 
should have been a consequence of that belief.

In that opinion, the Court of Appeals summarily rejected the 
notion that the boundaries of Michigan school districts are “sacro­
sanct” (174a) even though such boundaries are legislatively 
sanctioned. It described school district boundaries as “artificial” and 
declared that they may be disregarded (172a). Indeed, it held that 
school district boundaries in Michigan violate the constitutional 
mandate of Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 
686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) and that such boundaries “cannot be 
frozen for an unconstitutional purpose” (174a). [13]

Any doubt that the Court of Appeals concluded that Michi­
gan’s statutory framework must be subjected to significant 
alteration is put to rest by its suggestion that Michigan’s state legis­
lature should respond to its opinion (177a). Any judicial action 
taken in lieu of a legislative response must obviously include action 
restraining the enforcement of existing laws of statewide applica­
tion. Only a three-judge court has such power.

The necessity for convening such a tribunal is further con­
firmed upon review of plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, filed 
August 31, 1973 (la 291). That pleading, on its face, seeks injunc­
tive relief extending beyond the geographic boundaries of the 
Detroit school district (la 298). The prayer for such relief is pre­
dicated upon allegations, inter alia, that certain defendants “have 
advantaged themselves of existing school district lines and jurisdic­
tional boundaries” (la 295) and that “present school district 
boundaries serve no compelling state interest” (la 296). Because 
the Constitution is the only yardstick against which proofs in sup­
port of these allegations may be measured, that requisite of 28 
U.S.C. §2281 is present.

That plaintiffs contemplate relief which, if decreed, must 
conflict with existing Michigan statutes is likewise apparent from

[13] We reiterate that no proofs were taken by the District Court as to 
whether the boundaries o f any school district were drawn or main­
tained for the purpose o f furthering racial segregation (59a-60a).



23

their allegation in the Amended Complaint that the “pupils, 
teachers, resources and facilities” of some 53 local school districts 
(la 297) educating approximately 455,800 pupils in Michigan are 
necessary” to accomplish effective desegregation of the Detroit 

schools, which educate approximately 277,500 pupils. Further, 
plaintiffs allege that the “pupils, teachers, resources and facilities” 
of an additional 33 local school districts educating approximately 
199,000 students H4] are similarly “necessary” (la 297-la 298). 
Plaintiffs specifically invoke the power of the District Court to 
review any additions to school building capacity and staff hiring in 
the latter group of districts to determine the effect thereof “on 
the school desegregation plan” (la 298). Manifestly, the operation 
of Michigan’s existing public education legislation must be re­
strained if the “pupils, teachers, resources and facilities” of the 85 
school districts named in plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint are dis­
persed outside their respective boundaries. We reiterate that be­
cause the enforcement of a statute may only be enjoined on con­
stitutional grounds (United States ex rel. McNeill v. Tarnmianz, 
242 F.2d 191 [C.A. 3, 1957]) and because the statutes here 
sought to be enjoined are of statewide application,28 U.S.C.§ 2281 
is operative.

Notwithstanding pleadings which may be indirect or obscure, 
a challenge to the constitutional validity of a state’s education 
statutes is “beyond the discretionary purview of a single-judge dis­
trict court and must be submitted to a three-judge panel.” Spencer 
v. Kugler, 454 F.2d 839, 845 (C.A. 3. 1972). This Court approved 
the convening of a three-judge court where the pleadings presented 
a constitutional challenge to existing school district boundaries. 
Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.C. N.J., 1 971), affd., 
404 U.S. 1 027, 92 S. Ct. 707, 30 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1972).

It is clear that the imposition of metropolitanized schools in 
southeastern Michigan will require interdiction of statutes of state­
wide application rather than statutes which are “local in applica-

See note 9 for sources of data. The appendix printed for this Court 
apparently does not reflect errata appearing in the Amended Complaint 
as filed with the District Court. Those errata include the addition of 
Clarenceville, West Bloomfield, Livonia and Garden City to paragraph 
1 5 and deletion of South Lake from paragraph 16 of the Amended 
Complaint.



24

tion.” Sailors v. Board o f Education o f the County o f Kent, 387 
U.S. 105, 87 S. Ct. 1549, 18 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1967).

It is equally clear that the restraints which metropolitaniza- 
tion would necessarily impose upon the enforcement and execu­
tion of such statutes would be restraints upon “state officers”. As 
this Court said in Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 
55 S. Ct. 678, 79 L. Ed. 1322 (1935):

“Where a statute embodies a policy of statewide con­
cern, an officer, although chosen in a political subdivision 
and acting within that limited territory, may be charged with 
the duty of enforcing the statute in the interest of the State 
and not simply in the interest of the locality where he 
serves.” (295 U.S. 89, 94)

The members of Michigan’s local school boards are charged with 
the duty of enforcing, within the boundaries of each school dis­
trict, policies of statewide concern set forth in the 1963 Michigan 
Constitution, the Michigan School Code of 1955 (M.C.L.A. 340.1, 
M.S.A. 15.3001, et. seq.), Teachers’ Tenure Act (M.C.L.A. 38.71, 
M.S.A. 15.1971, et. seq.) and Public Employment Relations Act 
(M.C.L.A. 423.201, M.S.A. 17.455, ef seq.).

It must be emphasized that plaintiffs’ attack is not based 
upon allegations of erroneous administrative actions by school of­
ficials. The attack is upon the constitutionality of the statutory 
scheme itself; consequently, a three-judge court should be con­
vened. Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 60 S. Ct. 947, 84 L Ed. 
1249 (1940); Spencer v. Kugler, 454 F.2d 839, 844-845 (C.A. 3, 
1972).

In order to “disregard” the “artificial barriers” posed by local 
school district lines (172a), there must be a finding of a constitu­
tional violation {Swann, supra). To conclude otherwise, permitting 
the nullification of a statute without passing upons its constitu­
tionality “would be a contradiction of reason, a usurpation of 
power.” Tarumianz, supra, 242 F.2d 191, 195 Board o f Managers 
of Arkansas Tr. Sch. For Boys v. George, 377 F.2d 228 (C.A. 8, 
1967).



25

It is apparent that metropolitanization hearings would en­
compass all the requisites of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. Therefore, if this 
case is remanded for such proceedings, a three-judge court should 
be convened.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is respectfully submitted that:
A. If the decision of this Court mandates metropolitaniza­

tion proceedings, all rulings below should be vacated and a three- 
judge court should be convened;

B. If the decision of this Court mandates metropolitanization 
proceedings but does not vacate all rulings below, this Court 
should order the dismissal of the undersigned school districts;

C. If the decision of this Court does not mandate metropoli­
tanization proceedings, this Court should order the dismissal of 
the undersigned school districts.

FRED W. FREEMAN,
CHARLES T. HARRIS and 
DICKINSON, WRIGHT, McKEAN 

& CUD LIP
O f Counsel for Bloomfield Hills 

School District

KELLER, THOMA, McMANUS, 
TOPPIN & SCHWARZE
O f Counsel for Birmingham Public 

Schools, Northville Public 
Schools and Southgate 
Community Schools

DELL, SHANTZ, BOOKER & 
SHULTE

Of Counsel for Clarenceville 
School District, South Redford 
Schools and West Bloomfield 
School District

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES F. CLIPPERT
1700 North Woodward Avenue 
P.O. Box 509
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013
Counsel for Bloomfield Hills 

School District

CHARLES E. KELLER
THOMAS H. SCHWARZE

Suite 1600 — Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
Counsel for Birmingham Public 

Schools, Northville Public 
Schools and Southgate 
Community Schools

JOHN F. SHANTZ
222 Washington Square Building 
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067
Counsel for Clarenceville School 

District, South Redford 
Schools and West Bloomfield 
School District



26

RAYMOND G. GLIME and 
MATHER, GLIME & DAOUST

O f Counsel for Clintondale 
Community Schools

SEMPLINER, THOMAS & GUTH

Of Counsel for Plymouth
Community School District o f  
Wayne and Washtenaw Counties

RAYMOND McPETERS
403 Macomb Daily Building 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043
Counsel for L ’Anse Creuse 

Public Schools

WALTER J. GUTH, JR.
711 West Ann Arbor Trail 
Plymouth, Michigan 48170
Counsel for Plymouth Community 

School District o f Wayne and 
Washtenaw Counties

TONY FERRIS 
158 Cass Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043
Counsel for Van Dyke Public 

Schools

PERRY CHRISTY
One Parklane Boulevard 
Dearborn, Michigan 48126
Counsel for Westwood

Community School District



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Charles F. Clippert, one of the attorneys for amici curiae 
Bloomfield Hills School District, et ah, and a member of the Bar 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that on 
January 2, 1974, I served copies of the foregoing Motion For 
Leave To File Brief As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners and 
Brief Of Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners on the Petitioners 
and Respondents by depositing such copies in the United States 
mail, postage prepaid and addressed to the attorneys of record for 
Petitioners and Respondents, as follows:

Richard P. Condit, Esq.
Condit & McGarry, P.C.
860 W. Long Lake Road 
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013

Paul R. Dimond, Esq.
210 East Huron Street 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48108

Jack Greenberg, Esq.
Norman J. Chachkin, Esq.
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General 
Eugene Krasicky, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General 
720 Law Building 
525 West Ottawa Street 
Lansing, Michigan 48913

Robert J. Lord, Esq.
8388 Dixie Highway 
Fairhaven, Michigan 48023

Louis R. Lucas, Esq.
Ratner, Sugarman & Lucas 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103



Kenneth P. McConnell, Esq.
Hartman, Beire, Howlett, McConnell 

& Googasian 
74 W. Long Lake Road 
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013

Alexander B. Ritchie, Esq.
Fenton, Nederlander, Tracy, Dodge 

& Barris
1930 Buhl Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

William Ross, Esq.
Ross Bruff & Henriksen
215 S. Gratiot Avenue
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043

George T. Roumell, Jr. Esq.
Riley and Roumell 
720 Ford Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Theodore Sachs, Esq.
Rothe, Marston, Mazey, Sachs, 

O’Connell, Nunn & Fried, P.C.
1000 Farmer Street 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

William M. Saxton, Esq.
Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile 
1881 First National Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Theodore W. Swift, Esq.
Foster, Lindemer, Swift & Collins, P.C. 
900 American Bank & Trust Building 
Lansing, Michigan 48933

Douglas H. West, Esq.
Hill, Lewis, Adams, Goodrich & Tait 
3700 Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Charles F. Clippert