Response to Order to Show Cause

    In the

Supreme Court of tfyr United States
October Term, 1957 

No.................

Leonard D. Speed, J oseph Spagna and J ohnny Herndon,

Petitioners,
—v.—

T he City of Tallahassee, F lorida,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 

CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, 
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

T htjrgood Marshall 
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 1790 
New York 19, N. Y.

Constance Baker Motley 
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 1790 
New York 19, N. Y.

Francisco A. R odriguez 
703 Harrison Street 
Tampa, Florida

Attorneys for Petitioners

L awyers Press, I nc., 214 William St., N. Y. C. 38; ’Phone: BEekman 3-2300



SUBJECT INDEX

PAGE

Opinions of Courts Below .............................................. 1

Jurisdiction ............. ............ ...... ............. ...... ...................  2

Questions Presented .........................................................  3

Constitutional Provisions and Ordinances Involved .... 3

Statement of the Case .....................................................  4

How Federal Questions Were Raised and Disposed of 7

Reasons Relied on for Allowance of W r it ....................  8

Appendix A—Ruling of Municipal Court......................  13

Appendix B—Judgment of Circuit Court......................  14

Appendix C—Order Denying Motion for Review of
Judgment on Appeal................................. 16

Appendix D—Ordinance 741, City of Tallahassee,
F lorida ................................   18

Table of Cases

Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M. D. Ala. 1956),
aff’d 352 IT. S. 903 (1956) .................. .......................  11

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) ....................  9

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S'. 296 (1940) ........ ......  9
Chaplin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 

U. S. 210 (1932) .. ...........................................    10



11
PAGE

Cities Transit, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 2 Race Re­
lations Law Reporter 137 (1957) .............................. 5,11

City of Tallahassee v. Cities Transit, Inc., 2 Race Re­
lations Law Reporter 135 (1957) ..........................5, 8,11

Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 
(1926) .........     10

Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S, 444 (1938) ...........  9

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 IT. S. 390 (1923) ................... 9

Slochower v. Board of Education of N. Y., 350 U. S.
551 (1956) ... ..........    9

Staub v. City of Baxley, IT. S. , No. 48, de­
cided January 13, 1958 ............................................... 8, 9

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957) .... 9

United States v. Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174 (1952) ........ 9
United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U. S. 81 (1921) 9

Winter v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948) ....    9

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) ...............   11
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500 (1926) ...........  10

Otheb A tjthobities

Florida Constitution (1956), Article 5, Section 6 .... 2
Florida Statutes Annotated 26.53 ..................   2



I k  the

(ftmtrt nt tip IntW  ^taPH
October Term, 1957 

No.................

Leokaed D. Speed, J oseph Spagna and J ohnny Herndon,

—V.-
Petitioners,

T he City oe Tallahassee, Florida,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 

CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, 
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

Petitioners pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review 
the judgment of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial 
Circuit of the State of Florida at Tallahassee, Florida, 
entered November 18, 1957, in the above entitled cause.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Municipal Court of the City of Talla­
hassee, Florida which was rendered when it denied peti­
tioners’ motion for a directed verdict appears on page 74 
of the certified transcript of the proceedings in the Mu­
nicipal Court of the City of Tallahassee, Florida, and is 
printed in Appendix A, infra. No other opinion was ren­
dered by that court. No opinion was rendered by the Cir-



2

euit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit other than that 
which is contained in its judgment affirming the judgment 
of the Municipal Court which appears on page 19 of the 
certified record in the Circuit Court and which is printed 
in Appendix B, infra. The Circuit Court rendered no 
opinion upon denying petitioners’ motion for review of 
judgment on appeal other than that contained in its order 
denying said motion and which appears on page 25 of the 
record in the Circuit Court and which is printed in Appen­
dix C, infra. These opinions are not officially reported.

Jurisdiction

Petitioners seek to have this Court review the judgment 
of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the 
State of Florida which affirmed the judgment of the Mu­
nicipal Court of the City of Tallahassee, Florida, holding 
Ordinance No. 741 of the City of Tallahassee, Florida con­
stitutional and adjudging petitioners guilty of a violation 
of the ordinance. The Circuit Court’s judgment was ren­
dered and entered on November 15, 1957. Petitioners’ mo­
tion for review of Circuit Court’s final judgment on appeal 
was denied on November 18, 1957. The Circuit Court was 
the highest court of the state in which a decision could be 
had in this case.1 Petitioners, having challenged the ordi­
nance as repugnant to the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States in both the Municipal and Circuit 
courts, invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 1257(3).

^Florida Constitution (1956) Art. 5, §6; Florida Statutes An­
notated 26.53.



3

Questions Presented

1. Whether Ordinance 741 of the City of Tallahassee, 
Florida, establishes standards to be achieved by the bns 
company in the seating of its passengers which are so vague 
and indefinite as to violate the requirements of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution !

2. Whether the orderly refusal of petitioners to return 
to seats arbitrarily assigned to them by the bus driver, 
pursuant to rules and regulations allegedly adopted by the 
bus company under color of authority conferred by the 
ordinance in question, can be declared and punished as a 
crime, without violating rights secured to petitioners by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution!

3. Whether Ordinance 741 of the City of Tallahassee, 
Florida, which is a criminal ordinance, is so vague, so 
indefinite, and so uncertain in its terms as to be unconsti­
tutional and void on its face!

4. Whether Ordinance 741 of the City of Tallahassee, 
Florida, as applied in this case, violates the equal protec­
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu­
tion in that it was applied in such a manner as to segregate 
the three petitioners from their three companions, solely 
because of their race and color.

Constitutional Provisions and Ordinances Involved

The ordinance involved in this case is Ordinance 741 of 
the City of Tallahassee, Florida, which was adopted on 
January 7, 1957, by the Tallahassee City Commission. It 
is set forth in Appendix D.



4

The case also involves the due process and equal protec­
tion clauses contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution which provide as 
follows:

“ * * * nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”

Statement of the Case

Petitioners boarded a bus of the Florida Associates, Inc. 
in the City of Tallahassee, Florida on January 19, 1957 
(T. 14).2 Petitioners were accompanied by three other per­
sons who boarded with them (T. 15-16). When these six 
persons boarded the bus, the driver assigned each person 
to a seat (T. 13-14). Petitioner Spagna and two of the 
three other persons were assigned seats in front of peti­
tioners Speed and Herndon and the third of the other 
persons boarding with petitioners (T. 12, 14). The other 
three persons were Owens, Folson and Kennedy (T. 11, 
14, 46). After riding about ten blocks, each petitioner 
changed his seat, so that each sat with one of the other 
members of the group (T. 17). The driver ordered the 
petitioners back to the seats assigned to them (T. 16, 19, 
47). Upon their refusal to return to their assigned seats, 
the driver offered to return their fares, which they refused 
(T. 19, 47). The driver then ordered them to leave the bus 
(T. 19, 47). Petitioners refused to leave the bus (T. 19, 47). 
Because of petitioners’ refusal to return to their assigned 
seats or to leave the bus, the driver summoned the police 
and caused petitioners to be arrested for violating Or­

2 The “ T”  references in parentheses refer to the transcript of the 
trial in the Municipal Court.



5

dinance 741 (T. 19). Both the driver and the police testi­
fied that there was no disorder or disturbance at any time 
(T. 32-33, 48).

Ordinance 741, as it recites, was adopted by the City 
Commission as an amendment to Ordinance 368 following 
a local challenge in the courts of the validity of Section IV 
of Ordinance 368 which required racial segregation on the 
buses (Appendix D).3 The ordinance further recites that 
because of the doubtful validity of Section IV of Ordinance 
368, in light of recent decisions of this Court, certain acts 
of violence, destruction of property and threats to the 
peace resulted from operation of the buses. Just prior to 
adoption of Ordinance 741 on January 7, 1957, and during 
the operation of the buses under said Section IV, the 
drivers operated the buses without assigning passengers 
to seats (T. 21). By proclamation of the Governor of 
Florida, dated January 1, 1957, all motor bus transporta­
tion in Tallahassee was suspended until further order of 
the Governor. The ordinance declares that this action was 
taken by the Governor because of the foregoing facts. All 
of these conditions, the ordinance states, resulted in an 
emergency necessitating the adoption of this ordinance 
which, in essence, makes it a crime for a person riding a 
public bus in Tallahassee to occupy any seat or standing 
space other than the seat or standing space assigned to him 
or her by the driver.

The ordinance purports to empower the bus company to 
make and enforce reasonable rules and regulations govern­

3 In Cities Transit, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 2 Race Relations 
Law Reporter 137 (1957), the bus company obtained a preliminary 
injunction against the City enjoining it from interfering with its 
non-segregated operation of the buses in accordance with recent 
decisions of this Court. The City had commenced a proceeding_ in 
the state court to compel the bus company to enforce segregation 
as required by Section IV of Ordinance 368. City of Tallahassee 
v. Cities Transit, Inc., 2 Race Relations Law Reporter 135 (1957).



6

ing the seating and placement of passengers in such a man­
ner as (1) to insure equal distribution of the weight of 
passengers in order to prevent accidents, (2) to insure 
maximum health and safety to the end that life and limb 
not be endangered or threatened by violence or overt acts 
of violence and (3) to insure peace, tranquility and good 
order among passengers and society generally.

But the seats assigned to petitioners were assigned to 
them by the driver on a wholly arbitrary basis as the rec­
ord does not disclose any rules and regulations which were 
in fact adopted by the bus company and approved by the 
City Commission as required by the ordinance. The City 
did not prove or offer to prove, upon the trial of petitioners, 
that any rules or regulations had been adopted by the bus 
company and approved by the City Commission which con­
formed to the standards of the ordinance. The driver tes­
tified that he followed the orders of the company and the 
standards of the ordinance, yet petitioners’ questioning 
brought out that the driver did not weigh the petitioners 
and had no reason to believe that where he assigned peti­
tioners had any effect whatsoever on the weight distribu­
tion in the bus, or upon the health and safety of petitioners 
or other passengers, or upon the peace, tranquility and 
good order of the passengers or society in general (T. 30, 
31-33). Petitioners also brought out on cross examination 
of the driver that there was no disturbance on the bus 
when petitioners entered or at any time thereafter (T. 32- 
33). Although the driver denied that he took race into 
consideration in the assignment of passengers and that he 
demanded that petitioner Spagna return to his assigned 
seat because Spagna sat next to a colored person when 
he changed Ms seat (T. 37), it is clear from the record in 
this case and the recitals of the ordinance that the only 
justification for requiring assignment of seats and stand­
ing space, and making otherwise lawful conduct unlawful,



7

is to afford a subterfuge for continuing the policy of racial 
segregation (T. 43).

How Federal Questions Were Raised and Disposed of

Petitioners were tried and1 convicted on February 27, 
1957 in the Municipal Court of Tallahassee of a violation 
of Ordinance 741 (T. 75). At the close of the City’s case, 
petitioners moved for a directed verdict on the ground 
that the ordinance violates the due process and equal pro­
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fed­
eral Constitution (T. 62-69). The Municipal Court, in 
denying this motion, ruled that the ordinance is clothed 
with a presumption of constitutionality and that petitioners 
had brought forth nothing to demonstrate its unconstitu­
tionality (T. 74). Petitioners were fined $500 and sen­
tenced to 60 days in jail (R. 10, 11, 12).4

From the judgment of conviction, petitioners appealed 
to the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of the 
■State of Florida. In their grounds for appeal petitioners 
assigned the trial court’s refusal to grant their motion for 
directed verdict as one of the grounds upon which they 
based their appeal (R. 7). Upon the appeal, the Circuit 
Court ruled that no denial of any constitutional or statutory 
right of petitioners was shown (R. 19). On November 18, 
1957, the Circuit Court denied petitioners’ motion for re­
view of judgment on appeal (R. 25).

4 The “R” references in parentheses refer to the record in the 
Circuit Court.



8

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF WRIT

I.
The Florida courts have decided a Federal question 

of substance which is not in accord with applicable de­
cisions of this Court.

A. The ordinance in question here establishes standards 
to be achieved by the bus company through the adoption 
of rules and regulations which are patently vague and in­
definite, thus permitting of arbitrary action by the bus 
company. The bus company is required to adopt rules 
and regulations which will maintain peace, tranquility and 
good order not only among its passengers but “ of society 
generally.” As this Court recently held in Staub v. City
of Baxley, ------ - U. S. — —, No. 48 (decided January 13,
1958), such “ criteria are without semblance of definitive 
standard or other controlling guides,” as required by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the 
context of this case, such a standard is so vague and indefi­
nite as to permit the bus company to assign Negro and 
white passengers to separate seats if, in the judgment of 
the bus company, this will maintain the peace, tranquility 
and good of Tallahassee society generally, which, as the 
ordinance discloses, is a society which has had disturbances 
of the peace growing out of desegregation of the buses.5 
And, as the record in this case shows, the driver did order 
petitioner Spagna to return to his assigned seat after he 
had changed his seat and sat next to a colored person. The 
driver could not ascribe any other valid reason for order­

5 City of Tallahassee v. Cities Transit, Inc., 2 Race Relations Law 
Report 135 (1957). Although it is not made clear by the ordinance 
or the record in this case, some disturbances of the peace apparently 
occurred during the time that the bus company operated the buses 
on a non-segregated basis just prior to adoption of Ordinance 741.



9

ing Spagna to return to his seat. Despite this constitutional 
infirmity, which appears on the face of the ordinance, the 
Florida courts have sustained the validity of the ordinance 
over petitioners’ objections that the standards are repug­
nant to due process requirements.

B. The Florida courts have also decided that in this 
case—where it clearly appears that the bus driver assigned 
seats to petitioners on a wholly arbitrary basis and that 
petitioners were charged and convicted of violating an 
ordinance which makes it a crime to occupy any space on 
a bus other than the space assigned by the driver—no viola­
tion of the constitutional rights of petitioners appears. This 
determination is contrary to the long line of applicable 
decisions of this Court holding arbitrary state action which 
interferes with liberty of the individual violative of the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, e.g., Staub v. City of
B axley,------U. S .------- , No. 48, decided January 13, 1958;
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234 (1957); Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 
U. S. 444 (1938); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917). In short, as this 
Court recently said in the case of Slochower v. Board of 
Education of N. Y., 350 U. S. 551 (1956), “ There has not 
been the ‘protection of the individual against arbitrary 
action’ which Mr. Justice Cardozo characterized as the 
very essence of due process.”

C. Florida has also decided this case contrary to ap­
plicable decision of this Court by sustaining the validity 
of an ordinance which is so vague as to make criminal an 
innocent act. The ordinance in question does not specify 
what changes from the seat assigned by the driver consti­
tute a crime. Ordinance 741 creates an entirely new of­
fense. It makes conduct which has always been perfectly



10

lawful suddenly unlawful. It makes innocent conduct a 
crime. As the driver testified on the trial, a man could 
not select a seat next to his wife if he boarded the bus after 
his wife had boarded and was seated, without the express 
permission of the driver (T. 28). Yet the ordinance does 
not notify a man that he is guilty of a crime if he sits or 
stands next to his wife without being assigned to such 
space by the driver. Consequently, a person of ordinary 
intelligence would not know what conduct on the bus would 
subject him to criminal sanctions, and reasonable men 
could easily differ as to what conduct is included in the 
offense. Because of this uncertainty and indefiniteness, as 
this Court has repeatedly held, the ordinance in question 
here is void on its face for vagueness. United States v. 
Cardiff, 344 U. S. 174 (1952); Winters v. New York, 333 
U. S. 507 (1948); Lametta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 
(1939); Chaplin Refinmg Co. v. Corporation Commission, 
286 U. S. 210 (1932); Connolly v. General Construction Co., 
269 U. S. 385 (1926); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 
500 (1926); United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U. S. 81 
(1921). In Winters v. New York, supra, this Court quoted 
language from a state case which is applicable to this case:

“Where the statute uses words of no determinative 
meaning, or the language is so general and indefinite 
as to embrace not only acts commonly recognized as 
reprehensible, but also others which it is unreasonable 
to presume were intended to be made criminal, it will 
be declared void for uncertainty.”

D. Finally, Florida courts have decided this case con­
trary to applicable decisions of this Court construing the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Federal Constitution. It is clear from the recitals con­
tained in the ordinance which constituted the basis of its 
enactment, from the facts of this record, and other related



11

cases,6 that the ordinance is an attempt to facilitate per­
petuation of the policy of segregating the races on the buses 
under the perennial guise of preserving the peace. Browder 
v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M. D. Ala. 1956), aff’d 352 
U. 8. 903 (1956). Tallahassee cannot accomplish indirectly 
by this ordinance that which it is prohibited from doing 
directly by the dictates of the requirement of equal pro­
tection; for even if the ordinance in question can be said 
to be fair on its face, the record discloses that here it was 
in fact used to separate Negro and white passengers solely 
because of their race, no other reason for the separation 
appearing. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).

6 Cities Transit, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 2 Race Relations Law 
Reporter 137 (1957) ; City of Tallahassee v. Cities Transit, Inc., 
2 Race Relations Law Reporter 135 (1957).



12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners respectfully pray 
that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to the Circuit 
Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida to review 
its final judgment in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Thurgood Marshall 
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 1790 
New York 19, N. Y.

Constance Baker Motley 
10 Columbus Circle 
Suite 1790 
New York 19, N. Y.

F rancisco A. R odriguez 
703 Harrison Street 
Tampa, Florida

Attorneys for Petitioners



13

R uling of Municipal Court of Tallahassee, F lorida, 
Upon Petitioners’ Motion for Directed V erdict as I t  
A ppears on Page 74 of the Transcript of Proceedings 

in the Municipal Court

The Court : An ordinance or a law conies into court with 
a presumption of legality and constitutionality and nothing 
has been presented by way of testimony thus far to change 
that presumption in favor of the constitutionality and le­
gality of this ordinance, therefore, the Court is denying 
the motion submitted by the Defense.

A P P E N D I X  A



14

I n th e

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

In and for Leon County

At Law #8581

A P P E N D I X  B

Leonard D. Speed, J oseph Spagna and J ohnny Herndon,

Appellants,

—vs.—

City of T allahassee, F lorida,

Appellee.

F rancisco A. R odriguez, Tampa, for Appellants.

Leo L. F oster and E dward J. H ill, Tallahassee, for 
Appellee.

J udgment on A ppeal F rom the Municipal Court of the 
City of Tallahassee, Florida

This cause coming on to be finally heard upon the appeal 
entered herein on the 4th day of March, A. D. 1957 from a 
judgment and sentence pronounced against appellants in 
the Municipal Court of the City of Tallahassee, Florida, 
and counsel for the respective parties having filed briefs 
and orally argued the said cause before this court, and the 
record in said cause having been examined and no denial 
of any constitutional or statutory right of appellants, or 
prejudicial error otherwise, having been made to appear, 
and the court being duly advised in the premises, it is, 
therefore,



15

Considered, ordered and adjudged that the order of 
judgment appealed from, as pronounced against each of 
said appellants, be and the same is hereby affirmed, and 
the costs incident to this appeal, in the amount of $0.00, 
are taxed against the said appellants.

D one and ordered at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, 
this 15th day of November, A.D. 1957.

/ s /  W . M ay W alker 
W. May Walker

Circuit Judge

[Seal]

State of Florida,
County of Leon.

I, Geo. G. Crawford, Clerk of the Circuit Court in and 
for the County aforesaid, do hereby certify that the above 
and foregoing copy of Judgment on appeal from Municipal 
Court of the City of Tallahassee, Florida, was filed for 
record in my office on the 15th day of November, A. D. 1957, 
at 11:17 o’clock A. M. and was duly recorded the same day 
and hour in Judgment Lien Docket No. 10 at page 161, of 
the public records in this office, also in Minute Book No. 
35, Page 511.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
the seal of said Court the day and year last above written.

/ s /  Geo. G. Crawford, Clerk 

By Myrtle B. DeMilly, D.C.



16

In the

CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

In and por L eon County

At Law #8581

A P P E N D I X  C

Leonard D. Speed, J oseph Spagna and J ohnny Herndon,

Appellants,

—-vs.—

City op Tallahassee, F lorida,
Appellee.

Order Denying Motion eor Review op J udgment on A ppeal

This cause coining on this day to be finally heard upon 
the motion of appellants for review of the court’s final 
judgment entered on the 15th day of November, 1957, and 
counsel for the respective parties now being before the 
court and having argued the merits of said motion, and 
it now appearing to the court that the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the conviction of the said defendants 
was duly considered as well as each and every other as­
signment of error or ground for the appeal, and the court 
now being otherwise duly advised in the premises, it is, 
therefore,

Considered, ordered and adjudged that said motion for 
review of the judgment of this court upon said appeal 
should be and the same is hereby denied.



17

D one and ordered at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, 
this 18th day of November, A.D. 1957.

/ s /  W. May W alker 
W. May Walker

Circuit Judge



18

ORDINANCE No. 741

An ordinance amending Section IV  of that certain or­
dinance entitled “An Ordinance granting to Florida As­
sociates, Inc., a corporation organised and existing under 
the laws of the State of Florida, the authority, right and 
privilege to establish, maintain and operate a bus trans­
portation system in the City of Tallahassee, Florida, for 
the transportation for hire of passengers and fixing the 
terms and conditions of such grant” passed and adopted 
by the City Commission on the 13th day of February, A. D. 
1940, being Ordinance No. 368, as amended by Ordinance 
No. 659, passed and adopted by the City Commission on 
the 10th day of March, A. D. 1953; by providing for the 
making and enforcement of reasonable rules and regula­
tions governing the seating and placing of passengers 
transported on motor buses for hire, and providing for 
penalty for the violation hereof.

W hereas, an emergency exists in the City of Tallahassee, 
in that civil actions at law were recently filed in both the 
Federal and State Courts of Leon County, Florida, asking 
for judicial interpretations as to the validity of Section 
IV, Ordinance 368, requiring the adoption and enforcement 
of operating rules providing for the segregation of the 
human races when more than one race is transported on 
motor buses operated under said ordinance; and

W hereas, the said Section IV of Ordinance 368 is of 
doubtful validity in light of recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States construing similar statute and 
ordinance provisions; and

W hereas, certain acts of violence and destruction of 
property, accompanied by threats to the safety of the

A P P E N D I X  D



19

passengers being transported on the motor buses being 
operated under the provision of said Ordinance, and threats 
to the peace, tranquility and good order of society in Talla­
hassee, have occurred as a result of the operation of said 
motor buses; and

W heeeas, because of the foregoing conditions the Gov­
ernor of Florida, by official proclamation dated January 
1,1957, ordered all motor bus transportation in Tallahassee 
suspended until further order of the Governor, as a result 
of which citizens of this City are without public transporta­
tion; and

W heeeas, it is consideeed to be in the best inteeest of 
the public, the general welfare of the City of Tallahassee, 
that public motor bus transportation be resumed at the 
earliest possible time, and in a manner that will serve the 
needs of the public and at the same time will insure, as 
nearly as practicable, that the health, life, limb and person 
of the passenger using this facility will not be threatened 
or endangered and that peace, tranquility and good order 
will be preserved; and

W heeeas, the conditions recited above have created an 
emergency which demands prompt action by this commis­
sion, therefore an emergency is hereby declared to exist.

B e it enacted by the people of the City of T allahassee :

Section 1. That Section IV of the City Ordinance en­
titled “ An Ordinance granting to Florida Associates Inc., 
a corporation, organized and existing under the laws of 
the State of Florida, the authority, right and privilege to 
establish, maintain, and operate a bus transportation sys­
tem in the City of Tallahassee, Florida for the transporta­
tion for hire of passengers and fixing the terms and condi­
tions of such grant,” passed and adopted on the 13th day 
of February 1940, as amended by Ordinance No. 659, passed



20

and adopted by the City Commission on the 10th day of 
March, 1953, be and the same is hereby amended to read 
as follows:

Section IY.

A. The maximum seating capacity of each motor bus 
operated by the Company shall be not greater than the 
manufacturer’s rated capacity but passengers may be per­
mitted to stand provided each such passenger is assigned 
a place in the bus in keeping with the provisions of Para­
graph B hereof.

B. The Company shall make and enforce reasonable rules 
and regulations governing the seating and placement in its 
motor buses of passengers transported by it for hire in 
such a manner as to insure:

(a) An equal distribution throughout its buses of the 
weight of the passengers being transported, as nearly as 
practicable, to the end that traffic hazards likely to result 
in accidents or collisions may be minimized; (b) The maxi­
mum health and safety of the passengers being transported 
by it to the end that life, limb and person of said passengers 
will not be endangered or threatened by violence or overt 
acts of violence; and (c) That peace, tranquility and good 
order among said passengers being so transported, and of 
society generally, is preserved.

C. The rules and regulations to be adopted by the Com­
pany as required by Paragraph B hereof shall provide for 
the seating of its passengers for hire; shall provide for 
the assignment of a numbered seat for each passenger so 
transported, and shall provide that each passenger so trans­
ported shall occupy only the seat so assigned; and shall 
provide for the placement of its passengers who are per­
mitted to stand.



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D. The rules and regulations to be adopted by the 
Company as required by Paragraph B hereof shall be 
submitted to and approved by the City Commission before 
the same become effective and no operation under the 
provisions of this Ordinance shall be permitted until such 
rules and regulations are agreed upon between the Com­
pany and the City Commission.

E. It shall be unlawful for any person to occupy any 
space on any motor bus transportation facility for hire 
operating under the provisions of this Ordinance within the 
City Limit of the City of Tallahassee, other than the space 
assigned to said person by the Company or its agent, ser­
vants or employees operating the said transportation fa­
cility.

F. Any passenger who refuses to accept and occupy the 
space assigned to him, and who, upon tender of the fare 
paid, refuses peaceably and without disorder to remove 
himself from the motor bus after being requested so to do 
by the driver thereof, shall be guilty of violating the pro­
visions of this Ordinance and shall be punished as provided 
herein.

G-. The word “ space” as used in this Section IV shall 
mean the seat or place assigned to a passenger as provided 
by Paragraphs A, B and C hereof.

H. The driver of any such motor bus public transporta­
tion facility may cause any person violating the provisions 
of this Ordinance to be delivered to the proper authority 
for arrest.

I. The violation of any of the foregoing provisions of 
this Ordinance shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 
Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars, or imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding Sixty (60) days, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment.



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Section 2. It is hereby declared to be in the interest of 
the City Commission that the Sections, Paragraphs, Sen­
tences, Clauses and Phrases of this Ordinance are sever­
able and if any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or sec­
tion of this Ordinance shall be declared unconstitutional 
by the valid judgment or decree of a Court of competent 
jurisdiction, such unconstitutionality shall not affect any 
of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences, paragraphs 
and sections of this Ordinance.

Section 3. This Ordinance shall become effective im­
mediately upon publication as required by the Charter 
Act of said City.

Introduced in the City Commission on the 7th day of 
January, 1957.

Passed the City Commission on the 7th day of January, 
1957.

J ohn Y. Httmphress 
Mayor—Commissioner

Attest:

George C. W hite 
City Auditor and Clerk

January 8------ 3802