Correspondence from Lani Guinier to Karlan, Williams, Schnapper, Ellis, Reed, Nabrit, Murphy, Berger, Still, Blacksher, and Hair Re Moot Court in McGhee v. Granville County Voting Case

    The Supreme Court 
of the United States

Lawrence Dalia
versus
United States of America

Petition and Briefs

Law Reprints
Criminal Law Series 
Volume 10, no. 10 
1978/1979 Term



In The

Supreme Court of itje gutted States

♦

October Term, 1977 

No.

LAWRENCE DALIA,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
______  THIRD CIRCUIT

LOUIS A. RUPRECHT 
Attorney for Petitioner 

1180 Raymond Boulevard 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 

(201) 624-6112



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below ........................................................................  1

Jurisdiction .............      2

Questions Presented .................................................................  2

Statement of Facts ...............   2

Reasons for Granting the Writ:

I. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is in direct conflict with holdings of the 
courts of appeals for two circuits which have 
required prior authorization for a surreptitious 
forced entry to install or remove electronic 
eavesdropping devices.................................................  7

II. The decision below raises an important issue with
respect to the supervisory powers of the courts in 
administering Title III and a question of first 
impression regarding statutory interpretation of an 
important aspect of Title III..............   12

III. The decision below raises an important question of
first impression regarding the role of an appellate 
court in reviewing the alleged excessiveness of a 
sentence........................................................................  15

Page

Conclusion 16



ii

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Application of the United States, 563 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.
1977) ........................................................................... 8, 9, 10

Government of Virgin Islands v. Venzen, 424 F.2d 521 (3d 
Cir. 1970) ..........................................................................  16

Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) ......................... 13

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) ...................  13

United States v. Agrusa, 541 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1976), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977) ....................................  9, 10, 14

United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862 (D.N.J. 1977)........ 2

United States v. Finazzo, 429 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Mich.
1977) .................................................................................. 11

United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976), 553 
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ....................................  7, 8, 10, 11

United States v. Lee, 532 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.), cert, denied,
429 U.S. 838 (1976) ........................................................... 16

United States v. Robin, 545 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1976) ...........  16

United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977) ...........
.............................................................................. 10, 11, 12, 14

Page

United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 
297 (1972) .......................................................................... 14



Contents

Vigorito v. United States, 46 L.W. 3704 (May 15, 1978) ___

Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973) ........

Statutes Cited:

iii

10

16

Page

28 U.S.C. §1254(1) .................................................................  2

18 U.S.C. §2510 et seq.............................................. 2, 8, 11, 12, 14

United States Constitution Cited:

Fourth Amendment ....................................................... 4, 5, 8, 12

APPENDIX

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals For the
Third Circuit Dated May 3, 1978 .................................... la

Judgment Dated May 3, 1978 .................................................  8a

Portion of Decision of the United States District Court For 
the District of New Jersey Dated January 11, 1977 Re­
lating to Surreptitious Entry ............................................ 10a



In The

Supreme Court of the plotted States

------------- -4------ -------

October Term, 1977

No.

LAWRENCE DALIA,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

CIRCUIT

The petitioner, Lawrence Dalia, respectfully prays that a 
writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered in this 
proceeding on May 3, 1978.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed an opinion 
on May 3, 1978. That opinion and the opinion of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey dated

1



2

January 11, 1977 appear in the appendix hereto. The trial court 
opinion is officially reported as United States v. Dalia, 426 F. 
Supp. 862.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
was entered on May 3, 1978. This petition for a writ of certiorari 
has been filed within thirty days of the entry of that judgment. 
The jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court is conferred 
by 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. May Government agents commit an otherwise illegal 
breaking and entry in order to install, maintain and remove 
electronic listening devices when lawful authority to intercept 
oral communications has been granted pursuant to Title III1 but 
when no authority to commit a breaking and entry has been 
sought or obtained and the supervising court has not been 
advised of the manner of the proposed entry or installation?

2. May a sentence imposed within the statutory limits be 
the subject of appellate review?

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The petitioner Lawrence Dalia was indicted for his alleged 
role in transporting, receiving and possessing stolen goods. He 
was found guilty on two counts of a five-count indictment and 
sentenced to serve two concurrent five-year terms. A co­
defendant, Daniel Rizzo, who was alleged to have been a 
hijacker of the interstate shipment pleaded guilty prior to the 
commencement of the trial. 1

1. “Title III” refers to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §2510 et. seq.

2



3

Prior to the indictment of Lawrence Dalia and Daniel 
Rizzo, five other persons had been indicted for their respective 
roles in the hijacking of the interstate shipment and their 
transporting, receiving and possessing the stolen goods. These 
five individuals all pleaded guilty and were sentenced before 
return of the indictment of petitioner Dalia.

Pursuant to a request by the United States Department of 
Justice on March 14, 1973, Judge Frederick B. Lacey granted 
authorization to intercept telephone communications from two 
telephones located at petitioner’s place of business in Linden, 
New Jersey. The authorization for the wiretap extended for 
twenty days. Upon expiration of the initial order, the United 
States Department of Justice applied for a new order 
authorizing continued wire interception of the two business 
telephones of the petitioner. In addition, the application sought 
permission to intercept oral communications of petitioner Dalia 
occurring within his private business office. On April 5, 1973, 
Judge Lacey authorized interception of oral communciations 
taking place within the petitioner’s office. No reference was 
made in the application or the order with respect to the manner 
in which the oral communications would be intercepted nor was 
the court informed that a break-in was contemplated (Tr 1.9-21 
to 1.10-16).

On the night of the issuance of the order and extending into 
the early morning hours of the next day three special agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation broke into the office of 
petitioner Dalia. They received no instructions from the court or 
any attorneys from the Department of Justice with respect to 
their proposed activities while on the premises of the petitioner 
(Appellate Appendix, pp. 106, 112).2 After searching the entire 
building for “safety” reasons (A107) the agents proceeded to 
install a listening device in the ceiling of the petitioner’s office

2. Reference to the Appellate Appendix filed with petitioner’s appellate 
brief is hereinafter referred to a “A".

3



4

(A 110). This listening device enabled the agents to overhear and 
record all conversations taking place in the petitioner’s office for 
twenty days. At the conclusion of that order a third application 
was made to Judge Lacey to continue the interception of 
telephone communications on the business phones and the 
interception of oral communciations in the petitioner’s office. 
Again, no mention was made in the application or order with 
respect to the manner of interception of oral communications at 
the inception of this third twenty-day period. No informal advice 
was given to the court as to what had occurred when the device 
was installed nor was any informal advice about any 
contemplated break-in disclosed (A114).

Without any prior notification to the court, two agents re­
entered petitioner’s office on May 16, 1973 and removed the 
electronic equipment. On both occasions the break-in was 
accomplished by entering through a window during the late 
night or early morning hours. The agents were in the petitioner’s 
premises for two or three hours on the first occasion (A 111) and 
between one-half to an hour the second time (A112). No reports 
or records were made by the agents with respect to their entry 
nor was the court advised of what had occurred after the 
termination of the third order or after the second break-in 
(A106, 114; Trl.9).

A timely motion to suppress the results of the electronic 
surveillance was made on several grounds. One basis was that 
the unauthorized breaking and entry was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. A second 
basis for suppression was a contention of the petitioner that the 
Government had greatly exaggerated the number of 
incriminatory conversations being overheard in the five day 
Progress Reports submitted to the supervising judge in order to 
justify continuation of the eavesdropping and wiretapping. The 
recorded office conversations and intercepted telephone 
conversations resulted in tape recording more than 1,500 hours 
of reels. Over 5,000 telephone conversations were recorded and

4



5

more than 1,150 separately designated conversations were 
overheard and recorded from petitioner’s private office.

Although the motion to suppress was made prior to trial, an 
evidentiary hearing was not entertained until the conclusion of 
the trial. It resulted in an opinion of the court dated January 11, 
1977 denying the motion. The court then sentenced petitioner to 
a maximum five-year term sentence on each of the two counts 
upon which he was convicted; the term sentences to run 
concurrently. The petitioner had no prior criminal record. Of the 
six individuals who had previously been charged with offenses 
arising out of the criminal transaction for which petitioner was 
convicted, only the petitioner Dalia and another named Joseph 
Higgins played no role in the actual hijacking. With respect to 
Higgins, he was alleged to have stored the stolen goods on his 
property after the hijacking. The petitioner Dalia’s role allegedly 
was to refer other convicted defendants to Joseph Higgins in 
return for which Higgins presumably would have forwarded a 
sum of money to petitioner. Upon sentencing Joseph Higgins for 
his role in the criminal transaction, Judge Lacey had imposed a 
three-year probationary sentence. As noted, Judge Lacey 
imposed a five-year term sentence upon petitioner Dalia. Only 
Dalia had chosen to contest the charges.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
affirmed the conviction and sentencing of petitioner Dalia in an 
opinion filed May 3, 1978. No discussion was given to 
petitioner’s argument that the sentence imposed was an abuse of 
discretion remediable upon appeal other than to recognize that 
the point had been raised. The opinion of the Court of Appeals 
dealt primarily with petitioner’s contention that a breaking and 
entry to install a listening device without first obtaining judicial 
approval is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. After 
acknowledging the fact that other circuits agreed with 
petitioner’s contentions, the Court of Appeals stated:

5



6

“We accept Judge Lacey’s finding that a 
surreptitious entry was the most effective means 
for installing the interception device as well as his 
finding that the installation was based upon 
probable cause and executed in a reasonable 
fashion.3

However, the Court of Appeals was not willing to reject 
unequivocally petitioner’s contention. The Court of Appeals 
added:

“In rejecting appellant’s contention in this case 
that separate authorization was required for the 
forcible surreptitious entry, we do not adopt a 
rule that specific authorization is never required.
In the future, the more prudent or preferable 
approach for Government agents would be to 
include a statement regarding the need of a 
surreptitious entry in a request for the 
interception of oral communications when a 
break-in is contemplated. This burden is minimal 
in light of the Fourth Amendment considerations 
that could be later raised.”

In a footnote, the Court of Appeals seemed to invite the United 
States Supreme Court to clarify the issue with the following 
observation:

“ When the request to in tercep t oral 
communications was made in 1973 in the instant 
case, the Department of Justice was not on notice

3. A review of the trial judge’s opinion indicates the court made no 
finding prior to the break-in that the particular installation was based upon a 
showing of probable cause or that the installation was performed in a 
reasonable fashion. Any such “finding” was made almost four years after the 
break-in. No evidence was ever produced on the motion to suppress to give 
factual support to the conclusion that the intrusion was the only feasible 
manner of accomplishing the eavesdropping.

6



7

of any conflict among the Circuits. Since that 
time, absent a Supreme Court decision, there has 
developed an irreconcilable conflict among the 
various Courts of Appeals.”

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
is in direct conflict with holdings of the courts of appeals for 
two circuits which have required prior authorization for a 
surreptitious forced entry to install or remove electronic 
eavesdropping devices.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in deciding the 
case at bar conceded that on the issue presented, “there has 
developed an irreconcilable conflict among the various courts of 
appeals.” Within the last two years, the issue of surreptitious 
entries to effectuate electronic eavesdropping has been the 
subject of a decision by five courts of appeals. In two circuits, 
the District of Columbia and the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner’s 
motion to suppress most certainly would have been granted and 
affirmed on appeal. In two other circuits, the Second and now 
the Third, the courts of appeals have held that prior court 
authorization to break and enter to install electronic listening 
devices need not exist once a valid authorization to intercept 
oral communications has been granted. It is probable that the 
Court c f Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would require prior 
authorization before allowing a break and entry to install a 
listening device.

In United States v. Ford, 553 F. 2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977), 
the court was faced with electronic eavesdropping which had 
been accomplished by installing a listening device by way of a 
ruse. Pretending to evacuate a building because of a bomb 
threat, Government agents used the time to install electronic

7



8

listening devices. They had previously discussed the matter with 
the court supervising the Title III application. The court had 
specifically permitted the Government agents to

“Enter and re-enter . . .  for the purpose of 
installing, maintaining and removing the 
electronic eavesdropping devices. Entry and re­
entry may be accomplished in any manner, 
including, but not limited to, breaking and 
entering or other surreptitious entry or entry and 
re-entry by ruse and stratagem.” United States v.
Ford, 553 F. 2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Both the District Judge as well as the Court of Appeals held 
that this authorization was constitutionally overbroad. The 
District Court Judge in Ford held that the warrant gave the 
police “virtually unrestrained discretion in installing a 
surreptitious listening device.” United States v. Ford, 414 F. 
Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976). The Court of Appeals fully concurred 
with the District Court’s analysis, United States v. Ford, supra, 
at pp. 154-55, 165-70, and held that a break-in must be subjected 
to independent Fourth Amendment scrutiny by a neutral and 
detached magistrate upon oath or affirmation. The Court of 
Appeals in Ford held that, “When police seek to invade, 
surreptitiously and without consent, a protected premises to 
install, maintain, or remove electronic surrveillance devices, 
prior judicial authorization in the form of a valid warrant 
authorizing that invasion must be obtained.” 553 F. 2d at 165.

In Application o f the United States, 563 F. 2d 637 (4 Cir. 
1977), the Government had sought a specific authorization to 
make surreptitious entry into the premises of gambling suspects. 
The District Judge denied the order holding that while sufficient 
cause existed to satisfy the Title III requirements for permission 
to electronically eavesdrop, an insufficient showing was made to 
justify a forcible surreptitious entry.

8



9

Upon the Government’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, it 
was held:

“The District Court was thus correct insofar as it 
subjected the request for authorization of 
surreptitious entry to separate Fourth 
Amendment consideration. Since in the absence 
of exigent circumstances, the Fourth Amendment 
commands compliance with the warrant 
requirement, we would normally countenance 
secret entry by federal agents for the purpose of 
installing, maintaining, or removing listening 
devices only under the following conditions: (1) 
where, as here, the District Judge to whom the 
interception application is made is apprised of 
the planned entry; (2) the judge finds, as he did 
here, that the use of the device and the 
surreptitious entry incident to its installation and 
use provide the only effective means available to 
the Government to conduct its investigation; and 
(3) only where the judge specifically sanctions 
such an entry in a manner that does not offend 
the substantive commands of the Fourth 
Amendment.” 563 F. 2d at 643-44.

In United States v. Agrusa, 541 F. 2d 690 (8 Cir. 1976), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977), the court upheld a surreptitious 
entry because the order specifically authorized the break-in. The 
majority in Agrusa acknowledged the holding might be different 
if the supervising judge did not specifically authorize the break- 
in. 541 F. 2d 696, fn. 13. The court limited its decision by the 
following language:

“We hold that law enforcement officials may, 
pursuant to express court authorization to do so, 
forcibly . . . enter business premises. . . .



10

We express no view on the result which obtains 
when one or more of these factual variants is 
altered.”

The other side of the issue presented in this petition is found 
in United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633 (2 Cir. 1977), cert, 
denied, sub. nom. Vigorito v. United States, 46 L.W. 3704 (May 
15, 1978). There, the court held that an order authorizing 
electronic surveillance carries,

“its own authority to make such reasonable entry 
as may be necessary to effect the ‘seizure’ of the 
conversation.

*  *  *

We, therefore, hold that when an order has been 
made upon adequate proof as to the probable 
cause for the installation of a device in particular 
premises, a separate order authorizing entry for 
installation purposes is not required.” 564 F. 2d 
at 640.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in deciding the 
case at bar, grounded its decision upon the holding of United 
States v. Scafidi, supra. While recognizing the “irreconcilable 
conflict among the various courts of appeals” the Third Circuit 
did not give any reasoning why it favored the Scafidi rule over 
the rule set out in Ford and Application o f the United States. 
Compounding the difficulties in attempting to find consistency 
in the circuits, the Eighth Circuit was asked to rehear United 
States v. Agrusa, supra, en banc. 541 F. 2d 704. The court was 
evenly divided and the petition for rehearing was consequently 
denied. Flowever, the four dissenters in the Eighth Circuit 
indicated they had “grave doubts” that any judicial order 
authorizing a break and entry would be valid.

10



11

In addition to the foregoing cases, a District Court within 
the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Finazzo, 429 F, Supp. 803 
(E.D. Mich. 1977) has adopted the Ford rationale and required 
independent authorization for forcible entries to carry out an 
otherwise lawful oral interception order.

There can be no denial that a serious and irreconcilable 
conflict now exists among the circuits with respect to an 
important and sensitive area pertaining to Title III. There can be 
no question but that had petitioner been tried in the District of 
Columbia, the Fourth Circuit and probably the Eighth Circuit, 
the evidence would have been suppressed. It is unjust to litigants 
to permit incriminatory evidence to be admissible solely upon 
the fortuitous circumstance of venue. The issue presented is of 
great public interest and of enormous importance to petitioner 
and to the proper administration of Title III.

In opposing certiorari recently in United States v. Scafidi, 
supra, the Government represented that the problem presented 
may not be a recurring one inasmuch as the Department of 
Justice has recently instructed its supervising attorneys to seek 
explicit judicial approval for each contemplated break-in. 
Presumably, the Government will again seek to oppose certiorari 
on the same grounds. Anticipating such an argument, petitioner 
suggests that such a policy change is an inappropriate basis for 
denial of certiorari. First, it does not answer at all the argument 
that this petitioner has been subjected to an injustice. Second, it 
seems to concede the correctness of petitioner’s position that 
such authorization must be obtained. The argument would be 
more seemly if coupled with a confession of error. Third, 
petitioner contends that prior judicial authorization for a break- 
in is a constitutional command; not simply an administrative 
matter which may subsequently be withdrawn or amended by 
administrative directive. Fourth, the number of similar cases in 
litigation at various stages may well far exceed the handful of 
reported opinions that have appeared to date. Fifth, irrespective 
of the position of the Department of Justice, this issue will

11



12

surely find its way into the federal system through state 
prosecutions since the impermissibility of an unauthorized 
break-in (assuming it is impermissible) is a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.

Unlike United States v. Scafidi, supra, which has been so 
recently the subject of a denial of certiorari, this case presents 
the issue in a more straightforward manner. Here, there is but 
one aggrieved party with no issue as to standing. Scafidi 
involved numerous parties, only one of whom had any arguable 
standing to raise the issue of an illegal breaking and entry to 
install a listening device. Furthermore, the case at bar, unlike 
any of the other reported decisions, involves a situation where it 
is admitted the Government agents made no effort to apprise the 
supervising court, even informally, of their intention to commit 
a break and entry.

It is submitted that this case is the proper vehicle for 
resolution of an important issue which is ripe for decision.

II.

The decision below raises an important issue with respect to 
the supervisory powers of the courts in administering Title III 
and a question of first impression regarding statutory 
interpretation of an important aspect of Title III.

Title III imposes upon the courts a substantial responsibility 
in carrying out the congressional mandate. The proper role of a 
supervising judge is in doubt due to the conflict among the 
circuits. The court below, adopting the rationale of United 
States v. Scafidi, supra, was of the view that the statutory 
permission to eavesdrop electronically upon oral 
communications implied congressional approbation of break-ins 
without prior judicial approval. This reasoning is fallacious. 
Intercepting oral communications does not necessarily imply a

12



13

surreptitious entry. Modern technology permits the aural 
acquisition of conversations from great distances without 
necessitating physical intrusions in every case.4

The obious deficiencies and dangers in the procedure 
adopted by the Government need only be alluded to in passing. 
In the case at bar, as noted, the Government made no attempt to 
advise the court that a break-in was contemplated. The agents 
received no instructions from anyone with respect to how they 
were to conduct themselves on the premises. After they broke 
into petitioner’s premises, they filed no report and made no 
record of their activities. No judge evaluated the need for a 
break-in. Alternative avenues entailing less intrusive methods 
were never discussed; e.g., installation by way of a ruse or use of 
an informant or decoy. No affidavits or testimony were 
submitted to support the Government’s desire to conduct a 
break and entry. No order was ever issued limiting the number 
of times the agents could enter, the number of agents to be on 
the premises, the amount of time the agents would be permitted 
to search the premises for “safety” reasons, the rights and duties 
of the agents while on the premises, the right to make 
subsequent entries to re-position, repair, maintain or remove the 
equipment, the right of the agents to be armed, the duty to 
advise local police of the break-in, the duty of Government 
attorneys to supervise the agents, or consideration of whether 
the premises would likely be vacant thereby lessening the chance 
of an unfortunate incident.

While it may be argued that it is not within the expertise of 
a federal judge to pass upon the methods selected by 
Government agents in carrying out their plans to electronically 
eavesdrop upon oral communications, the language of this 
Court in a slightly different setting is most appropriate:

4. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 468, fn. 16 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). See also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09.

13



14

"We cannot accept the Government’s argument 
that internal security matters are too subtle and 
complex for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly 
deal with the most difficult issues of our society.
There is no reason to believe that federal judges 
will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the 
issues involved in domestic security cases. 
Certainly, courts can recognize that domestic 
security surveillance involves different 
considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary 
crime.’ If the threat is too subtle or complex for 
our senior law enforcement officers to convey its 
significance to a court, one may question whether 
there is probable cause for surveillance.” United 
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 320.

Title III is silent as to obligations of the Government in 
securing an authorization to eavesdrop on oral communications 
where a break-in is contemplated or deemed necessary. 
Irrespective of the constitutional requirements, the courts in 
Agrusa, Scafidi (concurring opinion of Judge Gurfein) and even 
the court below all suggested that, in making Title III 
applications, the Government should apprise the supervising 
judge of the necessity to break in and the court should take it 
upon itself to make a decision whether to permit such an entry. 
But no guidance has been given to the courts as to what it is the 
district judge should do, other than say yes or no. It is essential 
that if such a duty is imposed upon the supervising court, either 
implicitly by Title III itself or by an independent supervisory 
duty, then the parameters of such supervision must be set out. 
The failure of this Court to set out specific guidelines will only 
result in jeopardizing future prosecutions. Even under the new 
Department of Justice guideline in which the court is to be 
apprised of the Government’s intentions, there will be litigation 
dealing with the proper exercise of supervision by the court 
unless the issue is clarified by the Court in this case.

14



15

III.

The decision below raises an important question of first 
impression regarding the role of an appellate court in reviewing 
the alleged excessiveness of a sentence.

The petitioner was sentenced to two concurrent five-year 
terms of imprisonment. He had no prior criminal record. Of the 
seven individuals indicted as a result of the criminal 
transaction, only one other defendant had as limited a 
participation as petitioner and that individual was the person 
who actually stored the stolen goods. The only real distinction 
between petitioner and that other individual was that petitioner 
failed to plead guilty. He was tried and convicted on two of the 
five counts.

The apparent disparity in sentences should be grounds for 
some judicial review and explanation, if justified. When raised 
on appeal, the Government answered the contention with the 
following complete argument:

“Appellant contests as excessive the sentence 
imposed on him for the crimes which the jury 
found he committed.

That sentence being within the statutory 
limitation, it may not be reviewed by this court.”

The court below dealt with the issue in a footnote, as 
follows:

“Appellant also maintains . . . that the trial court 
abused its discretion in sentencing Dalia to two 
five-year concurrent terms. We find no merit to 
these contentions.”

15



16

There is no clear directive to the courts of appeals with 
respect to the scope of appeal of an allegedly excessive 
sentence. Certain recent cases have intimated that a remedy for 
an excessive sentence will lie if it rises to the level of “an abuse of 
discretion”. Woosley v. United States, 478 F. 2d 139 (8 Cir. 
1973); United States v. Robin, 545 F. 2d 775 (2 Cir. 1976). The 
Government in the case below took the position that any 
sentence within a statutory limit is not reviewable, citing United 
States v. Lee, 532 F. 2d 911 (3 Cir.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 838 
(1976) and Government o f the Virgin Islands v. Venzen, 424 F. 
2d 521 (3 Cir. 1970).

An issue of such significance to the public, to criminal 
defendants and to the administration of justice Should be the 
subject of a definitive ruling by this Court.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons set forth above, it is submitted a 
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit should be issued.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Louis A. Ruprecht
Attorney for Petitioner

APPENDIX

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals For the 
Third Circuit Dated May 3, 1978 ....................................

Judgment Dated May 3, 1978 .................................................

Portion of Decision of the United States District Court For 
the District of New Jersey Dated January 11, 1977 Re­
lating to Surreptitious Entry ............................................

16



(Stt dje Supreme (Eourt of the -United States

October Term, 1978

No. 77-1722
Lawrence Dalia, petitioner 

v.

United States of America

ON PETITION FOR A W R IT  OF C E R T IO R A R I TO 
THE UNITED S T A T E S  C O U R T  OF A P P E A L S  FOR  

THE THIRD  CIRCU IT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES 
IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-8a) is 
not yet reported. The opinion of the district court (Pet. 
App. 1 Oa-18a) is reported at 426 F. Supp. 862.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered 
on May 3, 1978. The petition for a writ of certiorari was 
filed on June 2, 1978. The jurisdiction of this Court is 
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether, in executing a valid court order author­
izing the interception of oral communications in 
petitioner’s office, law enforcement agents lawfully

(1)
17



2

entered the otlice, without separate express judicial 
authorization, to install the device used to make the 
interceptions.

2. Whether petitioner’s sentence is excessive.

STATEMENT

Following a jury trial in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, petitioner was convicted of 
receipt ot goods stolen from an interstate shipment, in 
violation ot 18 U.S.C. 2315, and conspiracy to transport, 
receive, and possess goods stolen from an interstate 
shipment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. Concurrent five- 
year prison terms were imposed on the two counts. The 
court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. la-8a).

1. The evidence at trial showed that on March 27, 
1973, one of a group of fabric thieves asked petitioner if 
he could store “a load of merchandise” on petitioner’s 
business premises (Tr. 1.64). Petitioner refused this 
request because three months before he had stored stolen 
fabric for the same group but had been angered about the 
way that transaction had been handled and about the fact 
that he had been paid only $300 to store the stolen 
property (Tr. 3.140-3.141, 3.167-3.173, 4.57-60, 4.73-4.75). 
Instead, petitioner arranged for another associate, Joseph 
Higgins, to store the stolen material, and the two agreed 
to split the $1500 fee for concealing it (Tr. 3.162-3.163).

On April 3, three men hijacked a Farah Manufacturing 
Company tractor trailer in Brooklyn, New York. The 
truck, which was carrying more than 600 rolls of fabric, 
was unloaded at Higgins’ warehouse and then abandoned 
on Staten Island (Tr. 1.72-1.73, 3.68-3.77, 3.160-3.161, 
4.64-4.69). Two days later, FBI agents arrested Higgins 
and four others while they were loading the rolls of fabric 
into two U-Haul trucks (Tr. 2.29-2.30, 3.163-3.166).

18



3

After petitioner learned of the arrests, he discussed with 
Higgins moving everything that was not legitimate out of 
Higgins’ warehouse (Tr. 3.183, 3.196), and he advised 
another associate that “[y]ou can only play with fire so 
long * * * we’ll just have to legit * * * we’ll just have 
to lav off the hot merchandise” (Tr. 3.99-3.100). That 
night, petitioner was expecting a mailtruck carrying $2.5 
million in currency to be hijacked and the currency to 
be brought to him. When he learned of the arrests, he 
directed that the hijacking be called off; he later learned 
that the mailtruck hijacking had been “bad news” (Tr. 
3.86, 3.184-3.186).

2. At trial, the government introduced evidence of 
telephone conversations to which petitioner was a party 
and also of seven conversations that took place in his 
office. The telephone conversations were intercepted pur­
suant to an order entered by the district court on March 
14, 1973, and a subsequent order entered on April 5. The 
admission of those conversations is not challenged here. 
Petitioner challenges only the admission of seven 
conversations in his office that were intercepted by a 
listening device. Those conversations were intercepted 
pursuant to an order of the district court entered on April 
5, 1973. The night that the order was entered, FBI agents 
secretly entered petitioner’s office and installed a listening 
device with which to make the interceptions (C.A. App. 
101).1

The interceptions of both wire and oral com­
munications were continued pursuant to a court order of 
April 27, 1973. On May 16, 1973, all electronic
surveillance ended, and FBI agents removed the listening 
device from petitioner’s office. Between April 5 and May 
16, no entries into the premises were made by govern­
ment agents (C.A. App. 102). *

'“C.A. App.” refers to the joint appendix in the court of appeals. 19



4

Prior to trial, petitioner moved to suppress the 
conversations intercepted by means ot the listening device. 
Following a post-trial evidentiary hearing, the suppression 
motion was denied (Pet. App. 10a-18a), The district court 
found that the interception was lawlul and that “the safest 
and most successful method of accomplishing the 
installation of the [device] was through breaking and 
entering the premises in question” (Pet. App. 17a). The 
court further concluded that once the court had found 
that there was probable cause to support the interception, 
“ implicit in the court’s order is concomitant authorization 
for agents to covertly enter the premises in question and 
install the necessary equipment” (Pet. App. 18a). 
Accordingly, the court concluded that it was not 
necessary under the circumstances of this case for the 
government to obtain explicit judicial approval for the 
entry (ibid.).

The court of appeals affirmed, noting that Judge 
Lacey, the judge who had both authorized the 
interception and tried the case, had “found that in this 
case a surreptitious entry was within contemplation” when 
the interception was authorized (Pet. App. 6a-7a). The 
court stated that it would not adopt a rule that specific 
authorization for an entry to install a listening device is 
never required, but it held that in this case, where the 
entry was contemplated by the issuing judge, where it was 
supported by probable cause and executed in a reasonable 
fashion, and where it was the most effective means for 
installing  the listening device, separate jud icial 
authorization for the entry would not be required (Pet. 
App. 7a).

ARGUMENT

1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 7-14) that the surreptitious 
entry into his office to install a court-authorized listening 
device violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the

20



5

entry was not separately and explicitly authorized by the 
district court. This Court recently declined to review a 
similar contention in Vigorito, et al. v. United States, 
certiorari denied, Nos. 77-1002, 77-1003, 77-1004, 77- 
6026, 77-6035, and 77-6165, May 15, 1978, and, for the 
reasons set out in our brief in opposition in that case, we 
submit that review should likewise be denied here.2

As we argued in our brief in opposition in Vigorito 
and as the district court found in this case, oral 
communications are normally intercepted by placing a 
listening device within the premises in which the 
interceptions are to occur. Thus, as the district court also 
found, the secret entry to install the listening device was 
implicitly authorized by the court order approving the 
interceptions at petitioner’s office. The entry thus did not 
violate petitioner’s rights under either the Fourth 
Amendment or Title 111 of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

While two other circuits have announced divergent 
views on the issue presented by this case, both decisions 
arose in a context different from that presented here 
and in United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633 (C.A. 
2), certiorari denied sub nom. Vigorito v. United States, 
Nos. 77-1002 et al.. May 15, 1978. The decision of the 
District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. ford, 553 
F. 2d 146, involved a re-entry to repair a listening device. 
The court there held that the district court had improperly 
delegated to government agents the right to make re­
entries in any number and manner without any showing 
of the necessity for such broad authorization. The Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Application o f  United States, 563 F. 
2d 637, arose prior to any interceptions and held only 
that the government must establish a “paramount” or 
“compelling” need to justify judicial authorization of a 
surreptitious entry to install a listening device. Thus, while

2We are sending p e titio n e r  a copy of our brief in 
opposition in Vigorito.



6

both opinions do contain language suggesting that those 
courts would not agree with the subsequent decisions of 
the Second and Third Circuits in Scafidi and the instant 
case, respectively, there is no actual conflict between the 
holdings in Ford and Application o f United States and 
the holding in the instant case.

Moreover, as we noted in our brief in opposition in 
Vigorito (pp. 18-19), the federal government has adopted 
a policy of seeking express judicial approval prior to 
undertaking any entry or re-entry to install or maintain 
a court-authorized electronic listening device. Accordingly, 
we do not anticipate that this issue will be of sufficient 
continuing importance to require resolution by this 
Court.

Indeed, there is even less reason for review in this case 
than there was in Vigorito. There, FBI agents entered the 
premises under surveillance not only to install and remove 
the listening devices, but also to repair and move the 
devices. These additional entries, while essential to the 
proper execution of the interceptions in that case, are not 
required in every case and may arguably be outside the 
contemplation of the issuing judge at the time surveillance 
is approved. In this case, by contrast, the single surrep­
titious entry required to install the listening device 
was contemplated by the district court when the 
interceptions were authorized (Pet. App. 6a).3

Finally, even assuming that the entry into petitioner’s 
office was unlawful, the error in the introduction of 
evidence derived from the interceptions was harmless. The 
evidence most damaging to petitioner consisted of the

’While most of the petitioners in Vigorito lacked standing to 
contest the validity of the surveillance-related entries, one of the 
petitioners, James Napoli, Sr., clearly had standing to raise the issue.

22



7

testimony of eye-witnesses, including co-conspirator 
Higgins, and telephone conversations overheard by means 
of wire interceptions that involved no entries into peti­
tioner’s office. The oral interceptions were not initiated 
until after the Farah truck was hijacked and Higgins and 
his associates were arrested. The subsequent oral 
interceptions produced only evidence of petitioner’s 
concern about the possible discovery of other stolen 
merchandise and his efforts to prevent the disclosure of 
his role in the illegal scheme. Under these circumstances, 
there can be little doubt that the jury’s verdict would have 
been the same even if the evidence derived from the oral 
interceptions had been excluded. See Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371; Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18.

2. Petitioner further contends (Pet. 15-16) that the 
sentence imposed by the district court was too harsh. The 
short answer to this claim is that the sentence was within 
the statutory limits and therefore not subject to appellate 
review. See Dorszvnski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 
440-441; Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393.

Neither Woosley v. United States, 478 F. 2d 139 (C.A. 
8), nor United States v. Robin, 545 F. 2d 775 (C.A. 2), 
holds, as petitioner suggests (Pet. 16), that a sentence 
within statutory limits may be reviewed as unduly harsh 
in light of the nature of the offense. In Woosley, the trial 
judge followed a mechanical approach of sentencing all 
defendants convicted of refusing induction into the armed 
forces to the statutory maximum and therefore failed to 
exercise his discretion in that class of cases. In Robin, the 
defendant was denied a fair opportunity to rebut 
government evidence, unrelated to the heroin conviction 
for which sentence was being imposed, that the defendant 
was a major heroin trafficker. Thus, both cases involved

23



8

intirmities in the process by which sentence was imposed, 
not review ot the length of the sentence. See Dorszvnski v. 
United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 443.

In any event, petitioner’s contention that he played 
a “ limited” role in the offenses for which he was convicted 
is belied by the record, which shows that, as the district 
judge stated at sentencing, “ Mr. Dalia played a very 
important, very significant role in the matters that are 
subject to this conviction” (C.A. App. 137).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.

Wade H. McCree, J r., 
Solicitor General.

Philip B. Heymann, 
Assistant Attorney General.

J erome M. Feit,
Paul J. Brysh,

Attorneys.
J uly 1978.

24



In The

JSupranr Court of thr 33ttit?d States

—------------♦-------------

October Term, 1978 
No. 77-1722

LAWRENCE DALIA,

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Writ o f Certiorari to the United States Court o f Appeals for 
the Third Circuit

Petition for Certiorari Filed June 2, 1978 Certiorari Granted 
October 2, 1978

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

LOUIS RUPRECHT 
Attorney for Petitioner 

1180 Raymond Boulevard 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 

(201) 624-6112



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below ........................................................................  ]

Jurisdiction ...................     2

Constitutional Provision Involved ...............     2

Question Presented ................................................................... 2

Statement of the Case .............................................................  2

Summary of Argument ..........................................................  8

Argument:

Page

I. A court has no statutory power to permit a breaking 
and entry in order to install electronic eavesdropping 
devices nor is a lawful order authorizing interception 
of oral communications an implicit authorization to
commit a break-in......................................................  9

II. It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment to permit 
law enforcement officers to conduct surreptitious 
entries under the authority of Title III.................... 19

III. Assuming the right of a court to authorize a 
surreptitious entry to install a listening device 
pursuant to Title III, such authority was neither 
applied for, considered nor given and the consequent 
entry of the law enforcement officers to install
listening devices was unlawful...................................  25

Conclusion ................................................................................ 29

27



TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited:

Application of the United States, 563 F. 2d 637 (4 Cir.
1977) ..................................................................  13,18,26,27

Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) .............................. 22, 23

Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) ......................... 16

Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).....................  18

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)........... .................... 19

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)........................... 22

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) >...........................20, 21, 22

Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) .......................  28

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) .........  17, 18, 19

United States v. Agrusa, 541 F. 2d 690 (8 Cir. 1976), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977) ............... .. 9, 10, II, 15, 20

United States v. Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862 ............................... 1

United States v. Dalia, 575 F.2d 1345 (3 Cir. 1978) . . . .  1, 13, 14

United States v. Finazzo, ___  F. 2d ___  (6 Cir. decided
August 28, 1978) .....................................................  14, 15, 20

ii

Contents
Page

28

United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1976), 
affd, 553 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) . . . .  11, 12, 20, 25, 26, 27



Contents

United States v. Santora, ___  F. 2d ___  (9 Cir. decided
October 6, 1978) ................................................ 14, 17, 20, 22

United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633 (2 Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied sub nom Vigorito v. United States, 435 U.S.
903 (1978) ..........................................................................  13

United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972) ..........................................................................  22

Statutes Cited:

18 U.S.C. §2 .............................................................................  3

18 U.S.C. §371 .........................................................................  2

18 U.S.C. §659 .........................................................................  3

18 U.S.C. §801(d) ...................................................................17,27

18 U.S.C. §1951 ...............................   3

18 U.S.C. §2314 .......................................................................  3

18 U.S.C. §2315 .......................................................................  3

18 U.S.C. §§2510-2520 et seq...........................................2, 8, 9, 16

18 U.S.C. §3109 .......................................................................  10

28 U.S.C. §1254(1) .................................................................  2

United States Constitution Cited:

Page

Amendment IV 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28



IV

Contents
Page

Other Authority Cited:

23 D.C. Code §§541-556 (1973) ...................................... . 11

30



In The

Supreme Court of the gutted State*

-----------—«------------
October Term, 1978

No. 77-1722 

LAWRENCE DALIA,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit filed an opinion 
on May 3, 1978. That opinion appears in the appendix to the 
petition for writ of certiorari filed in this cause. The opinion of 
the Third Circuit is officially reported as United States v. Dalia, 
575 F. 2d 1345. The opinion of the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey was filed on January 11, 1977 and 
also appears in the appendix to the petition for writ of certiorari. 
The trial court opinion is officially reported as United States v. 
Dalia, 426 F. Supp. 862.

31



2

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
was entered on May 3, 1978. A petition for writ of certiorari was 
timely filed with the United States Supreme Court and granted 
on October 2, 1978. Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme 
Court is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED 

Amendment IV

“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”

QUESTION PRESENTED

May government agents commit an otherwise illegal 
breaking and entry in order to install, maintain and remove 
electronic listening devices when lawful authority to intercept 
oral communications has been granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§2510 et seq., but when no authority to commit a breaking and 
entry has been sought or obtained and the supervising court has 
not been advised of the manner of the proposed entry of 
installation?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Lawrence Dalia was indicted on November 6, 
1975 with a co-defendant, Daniel Rizzo, in a five count 
indictment.

32



3

Count One charged the defendants with conspiring with five 
other persons to transport and possess goods stolen in interstate 
commerce in March, 1973. The statutory reference was to the 
general conspiracy charge found in 18 U.S.C. §371. Count Two 
charged the two named defendants and the five unnamed co­
conspirators with robbing an interstate truck shipment in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §2 and §1951. Count Three charged the 
two named defendants and four of the previously unindicted co­
conspirators with transporting stolen goods in interstate 
commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2 and §2314. Count Four 
again charged the two defendants and the five previously named 
unindicted co-conspirators with receiving goods which had been 
stolen while engaged in interstate commerce in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §2 and §2315. The last count charged both defendants 
and the other five individuals with possessing goods which had 
been stolen in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§659.

Immediately prior to commencement of trial, the co­
defendant Daniel Rizzo, entered a plea of guilty. The five 
persons named in the indictment as unindicted co-conspirators 
had previously been prosecuted for their involvement in the 
alleged criminal transaction and had all pleaded guilty 
approximately two years before petitioner’s trial.

Petitioner’s trial was held in the District of New Jersey 
before Honorable Frederick B. Lacey, J.D.C. on June 15, 16, 17 
and 18, 1976. The trial judge granted a motion for judgment of 
acquittal on Counts Two and Three at the conclusion of the 
Government’s case (R4.131). Extensive redaction of the 
indictment was accomplished to comport with trial proofs and 
consequent rulings. On June 18, 1976, the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty on Counts One and Four. The jury acquitted petitioner 
on possessory Count Five.

Extensive electronic surveillance had preceded the 
indictment and appropriate motions to suppress had been made. 
However, the court determined to decide these motions at the



4

conclusion of the trial. Consequently, post-trial evidentiary 
hearings were conducted resulting in the denial of petitioner’s 
motions. On January 24, 1977, petitioner was sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of five years on Count One. Another five 
year sentence was imposed on Count Four to run concurrently 
with the term sentence imposed on Count One.

As a result of pre-trial discovery and evidence adduced at 
post-trial hearings, it was developed that on March 14, 1973, 
Judge Lacey had issued an order authorizing the interception of 
wire communication emanating from petitioner’s business 
premises in Linden, New Jersey. The order provided that two 
separate telephones were to be the subject of the interception.

After the two telephones had been tapped for 20 days, the 
Government applied again to Judge Lacey for an order 
permitting continued electronic surveillance. This time, however, 
the Government sought and was granted the right to intercept 
both telephone conversations, as well as oral communications. 
This second order was granted on April 5, 1973 and recited the 
same two telephones which had been subjected previously to 
interception. The order also found,

“(e) There is probable cause to believe that 
the business office of Larry Dalia, consisting of 
an enclosed room, approximately fifteen (15) by 
eighteen (18) feet in dimension, and situated in 
the northwesterly corner of a one-story building 
housing Wrap-O-Matic Machinery Company,
Ltd., and Precise Packaging, and located at 1105 
West St. George Avenue, Linden, New Jersey, 
has been used, and is being used by Larry Dalia 
and others as yet unknown in connection with 
the commission of the above-described offenses.”
(A7).

The order then provided that the previously mentioned 
34 telephones could be intercepted again. The order went on to 

state that the Government could,



5

“(b) Intercept oral communications of Larry 
Dalia, and others as yet unknown, concerning the 
above-described offenses at the business office of 
Larry Dalia . . (A8).

This order, as was the first, was a 20-day order. It provided 
that New Jersey Bell Telephone Company should offer whatever 
assistance was necessary to provide for the interception of the 
wire communications, however, it made no provision for the 
manner in which oral communications were to be intercepted.

In accordance with the authorization of the foregoing order, 
the two business telephones of petitioner were tapped for 
another 20 days. Additionally, for 20 days his office was 
“bugged” and all conversations taking place therein were 
recorded.

Upon the expiration of the second order, the Government 
again applied to Judge Lacey to continue its eavesdropping. On 
April 27, 1973, Judge Lacey authorized interception of wire and 
oral communications in a manner identical to that which had 
been done on April 5, 1973. This third order again was for 20 
days. It applied to the same two telephones and to oral 
communications emanating from petitioner’s office. Pursuant to 
that order, the Government intercepted all telephone 
communications from the two business telephones for an 
additional 20 days and all conversations conducted in 
petitioner’s office for an additional 20 days (All-15).

When the indictment came on for trial before Judge Lacey 
on June 15, 1976, the court first alluded to petitioner’s pending 
motion to suppress evidence based upon the method of 
electronic surveillance. The court requested counsel to set out 
their respective positions and then asked the Government 
attorney whether he had instructed the law enforcement officers 
as to how they were to effectuate the order authorizing 
interception of oral communications. The relevant passage is 
instructive:

35



6

“THE COURT: . . . was there any
discussion between you and the agent on the one 
hand and me on the other as to how this order 
was going to be carried out?

MR. DEICHERT: No.

THE COURT: All right. That was one 
question that you wanted asked.

MR. RUPRECHT: That’s correct Your 
Honor.

THE COURT: Now, before we get into the 
affidavits — and I’ll deal with that in a moment 
— I think your record also ought to reflect you 
have raised this as another issue. I think your 
record also reflected a response to that issue.

My recollection, again, is that I gave no 
limiting instructions on how my order was to be 
carried out.

MR. DEICHERT: That’s correct.

THE COURT: And my recollection further 
is that I did not explore afterwards how my order 
was carried out. Is that correct? In terms of how 
the entry was made.

MR. DEICHERT: Yes, that’s correct as 
well.” (A21-22).

At trial, the Government introduced several tape recordings 
of intercepted telephone conversations as well as eight separate 
tape recorded office conversations which had been overheard by 
the electronic listening device installed pursuant to the second 

36 and third orders.



7

On July 29, 1976, the court directed counsel to appear for a 
post-trial hearing on petitioner’s pending motions to suppress 
evidence. Petitioner had filed an affidavit (A45) establishing his 
belief that any electronic surveillance in his office might have 
resulted from a break and entry. The Government had three FBI 
agents in court who had apparently participated in the break-in 
to install listening devices. Agent Neil E. Price was called by the 
Government as its first witness. He said he had made an entry 
through a side window of petitioner’s place of business on April 
5, 1973. He said that he did this in order to install a listening 
device in the ceiling of petitioner’s office. While on the premises, 
he denied taking anything or speaking to anyone about anything 
he had seen present inside the premises. He admitted to 
reentering the building on May 16, 1973 to remove the installed 
device. He said that three agents entered the building on April 5, 
1973 and two entered on May 16, 1973 (A29-42).

On cross-examination, Agent Price testified he did not 
prepare any reports dealing with his activities, but the court 
would not permit him to answer why reports had not been 
made. The court would not permit interrogation as to what 
position Agent Price’s superior held who directed the break-in 
(A34). The agent testified that no one gave him any instruction 
whatsoever as to the method or manner of performing his task. 
He said that he did not prepare any documents for submission 
to the court dealing with the break-in. He admitted there had 
been no briefing sessions or instructions by any members of the 
Department of Justice or United States Attorney’s Office 
respecting the manner in which they should conduct themselves 
while on the premises (A35).

While on the premises, the agent said he looked throughout 
petitioner’s entire building for “safety” reasons. He testified 
that he was in petitioner’s office building for two or three hours 
and in petitioner’s personal office “maybe a half an hour total.” 
(A37, 39).

37



8

The court indicated it considered the factual issues to be 
extremely narrow and continually restricted the cross- 
examination of Agent Price. At the conclusion of the agent’s 
testimony, the court inquired of the Government attorney 
whether the other two FBI agents who were on hand, “if called, 
would testify substantially, at least, as this agent has.” Upon the 
Government attorney’s representation that they would, the court 
said, “I’m not going to then permit the calling of the other 
agents.” (A43).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court reminded 
counsel that “the method of breaking . . . was not brought to 
my attention.” (A43).

Defense counsel then noted that petitioner would take the 
stand to testify that there were several “breaks and entry during 
the period of time that we are concerned with and specifically a 
break-in that occurred the night before the alleged removal of 
the — .” (A43). The Government attorney agreed that this was 
already in the case through affidavit proof and he did not wish 
to cross-examine on it, therefore, no further testimony was 
adduced (A44).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510-§2520 does not authorize a court to permit 
law enforcement officers to commit otherwise illegal breakings 
and entries in order to install electronic listening devices. The 
legislative history of the act fails to reveal such an intention. It is 
not unduly weakening the tools of law enforcement officers to 
refuse them the right to commit surreptitious entries without 
explicit legislative approval.

In the event it is found that the Third Circuit correctly 
interpreted Title III, then such an interpretation is violative of 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. A



9

statute which permits law enforcement officers to conduct 
breakings and entries is unconstitutional because such an 
activity is necessarily unreasonable.

If it is assumed that Title III may constitutionally be 
interpreted as authorizing a court to empower law enforcement 
officers to break and enter in order to install listening devices, 
then the order and search in this case were violative of the 
Fourth Amendment. The order was overbroad in failing to give 
any direction to the law enforcement officers. Too much 
discretion was given to the officers in conducting their search 
and no independent hearing and order existed dealing with the 
specific breakings and entries which were conducted.

ARGUMENT

I.

A court has no statutory power to permit a breaking and 
entry in order to install electronic eavesdropping devices nor is a 
lawful order authorizing interception of oral communications an 
implicit authorization to commit a break-in.

Since 1976 several cases have considered whether federal 
agents may conduct surreptitious entries to install, maintain, 
position or remove electronic listening devices pursuant to a 
Title III1 order. The decisions are in hopeless disarray with no 
common thread of reasoning in their fabric. A brief review of 
the cases is necessary to place the issue in proper perspective.

The first case discussing the issue was United States v. 
Agrusa, 541 F. 2d 690 (8 Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1045 
(1977). There,

1. “Title 111” refers to Title III of the Omnibus Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §2510, et seq.

39



10

“The order authorized the Government to  make 
secret and, if necessary, forcible entry any time of 
day or night which is least likely to jeopardize the 
security of this investigation, upon the 
premises . . .  in order to install and subsequently 
remove whatever electronic equipment is 
necessary to conduct the interception of oral 
communications in the business office of said 
premises.’” 541 F. 2d at 693.

Upon appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that such an order 
and entry was not violative of the Fourth Amendment. The 
court then apparently assumed statutory authority of the court 
to permit a breaking and entry; not by reading it implicitly into 
Title III but by referring to 18 U.S.C.§31092 as a codification of 
a law enforcement officer’s common law right to enter under 
exigent circumstances. The court stressed that the premises was 
an unoccupied commercial building in holding that sufficient 
exigent circumstances existed. The analysis concluded by stating:

“We hold that law enforcement officials may, 
pursuant to express court authorization to do so, 
forcibly and without knock or announcement 
break and enter business premises which are 
vacant at the time of entry in order to install an 
electronic surveillance device, provided the 
surveillance activity is itself pursuant to court 
authorization, based on probable cause and 
otherwise in compliance with Title III. We

2. 18 U.S.C. §3109 reads:

“The officer may break open any outer or inner door or 
window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything 
therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his 
authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when 
necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the 
execution of the warrant.”

40



11

express no view on the result which obtains when 
one or more of these factual variants is altered.”
541 F. 2d at 701.

There was a strong dissent from Circuit Judge Lay who 
noted that the exigencies sufficient to permit a breaking and 
entry had not been demonstrated. He then noted that, 
presumably on Fourth Amendment grounds, he would reverse 
because,

“[r]ather then draw artificial distinctions, I would 
hold searches such as this to be unreasonable per 
se." 541 F. 2d at 704.

Thereafter the Eighth Circuit was petitioned to rehear the 
matter, en banc. By an evenly divided vote, the petition was 
denied, however, the four voting for rehearing expressed “grave 
doubts” on constitutional grounds that any order authorizing a 
break and entry would be valid and,

“. . . we believe that the Fourth Amendment does 
not permit government agents to break into and 
enter private property to spy out evidence which 
might develop in the future by planting an 
electronic bug in such premises.” United States v.
Agrusa, supra, en banc, 541 F. 2d 704.

The second case was United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. 
879 (D.D.C. 1976), affd, 553 F. 2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There, 
federal agents secured an order to electronically surveil 
commercial premises.3 The agents informed the issuing court 
that they intended to gain entry to install a listening device by 
evacuating the building through a bomb scare. The court, in its 
order, permited the agents to,

3. The interception and electronic surveillance was conducted pursuant to 
23 D.C. Code §§541-556 (1973) which is practically identical to Title III.

41



12

“Enter and re-enter . . .  for the purpose of 
installing, maintaining and removing the 
electronic eavesdropping devices. Entry and re­
entry may be accomplished in any manner, 
including, but not limited to, breaking and 
entering or other surreptitious entry or entry and 
re-entry by ruse and stratagem.” 553 F. 2d at 149.

The circuit court held that,

“When police seek to invade, surreptitiously and 
without consent, a protected premises to install, 
maintain or remove electronic surveillance 
devices, prior judicial authorization in the form 
of a valid warrant authorizing that invasion must 
be obtained.” 553 F. 2d at 165.

The district court had concluded that while Title III did not 
expressly empower officers to break and enter, the Legislature 
had intended this result. United States v. Ford, 414 F. Supp. at 
883. The circuit court dealt entirely with Fourth Amendment 
considerations in striking down the court order as facially 
overbroad. It did not resolve the issues of whether Title III in 
fact permitted break-ins4 or whether a break-in could ever 
withstand constitutional challenge.5

4. “Though we need not reach in this case the issue whether 
covert entry may be authorized by a court order, we note 
that the statutory provisions could be read to apply only to 
the kind of devices which are technically trespassory under 
the doctrine of Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 
(1961), but do not require covert or surreptitious entry for 
installation.” 553 F. 2d at 151, footnote 20.

5. “We do not decide when, if ever, surreptitious entries are 
reasonable within the Fourth Amendment . . . .  If police are 
to be permitted to enter private premises to conceal 
eavesdropping devices — a question we leave unresolved 
— they at least must be required to proceed in accordance 
with the authorization of a warrant narrowly tailored to the 
demonstrated demands of the situation.” 553 F. 2d at 170.



13

In Application o f the United States, 563 F. 2d 637 (4 Cir. 
1977) the circuit court overturned a district court which had 
subjected an application for surreptitious entry to a scrutiny 
which demanded the Government show a “paramount interest” 
before authorizing such manner of entry. It was held by the 
Fourth Circuit that Title III contemplated surreptitious entries 
but the supervising judge had to make independent findings of 
need to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. The court stated:

“[permission to surreptitiously enter private 
premises cannot, therefore, be implied from a 
valid Title III order sanctioning only the 
interception of oral communications.” 563 F. 2d 
at 644.

The overseeing court had to sanction, “such an entry in a 
manner that does not offend the substantive commands of the 
Fourth Amendment.” Ibid.

There next followed two cases which stand for the 
proposition that Title III implicitly empowers law enforcement 
officers to conduct discretionary breakings and entries if armed 
with an order authorizing interception of oral communications. 
In United States v. Scafidi, 564 F. 2d 633 (2 Cir. 1977), cert, 
denied sub. nom., Vigorito v. United States, 435 U.S. 903 
(1978) the court held that an order authorizing electronic 
surveillance carries,

“. . . its own authority to make reasonable entry 
as may be necessary to effect the seizure of the 
conversation.” 564 F. 2d at 640.

The case at bar was decided by the Third Circuit in a brief 
opinion [United States v. Dalia, 575 F. 2d 1344 (3 Cir. 1978)], 
which relied primarily upon United States v. Scafidi, supra, and 
the district court opinion in Dalia. The holding was summarized 
in the following fashion:

43



14

“We agree with Judge Lacey that an order 
au tho riz ing  the in tercep tion  of oral 
communications does not require explicit 
authorization for a forcible surreptitious entry 
and we affirm.” 575 F. 2d at 1345.

Within recent weeks, two more circuits have dealt with the
issue presented here. In United States v. Finazzo, -----  F. 2d
___  (6 Cir. decided August 28, 1978), the court refused to
accept the premise that Title III authorized breakings and 
entries:

“In some circumstances, the installation of an 
electronic bug may not be possible without a 
forcible breaking and entering of the suspect’s 
premises, but that does not imply that the power 
to break and enter is subsumed in the warrant to 
seize the words. The breaking and entering 
aggravates the search, and it intrudes upon 
property and privacy interests not weighed in the 
statutory scheme. Interests which have 
independent social value unrelated to confidential 
speech. We are not inclined to give the 
Government the right by implication to intrude 
upon these interests by conducting official break- 
ins, especially when the purpose is secretly to 
monitor and record private conversations, a 
dangerous power, otherwise carefully limited and 
defined by statute.” (Slip opinion at 9.)

Even more recently, the Ninth Circuit came to a similar
conclusion in United States v. Santora,___ F. 2d ____(9 Cir.
decided October 6, 1978). In an exhaustive study of pertinent 
legislative history (slip opinion at 8-18) Judge Hufstedler 
concluded:

“We agree with the Government that Congress 
‘was aware of the entry problem.’ But we disagree



15

that from that awareness Congress chose to grant 
authority to permit either break-ins or technical 
trespasses to install bugging devices by 
implications derived from its silence.” (Slip 
opinion at 15.)

The threshold question, then, that must be addressed on 
this appeal is whether there exists statutory authority in Title III 
to permit a breaking and entry to install listening devices. If 
none exists, then the interception of petitioner’s office 
conversations was clearly unlawful. Since the overseeing judge 
was not apprised of the Government’s intentions and never 
specifically authorized the entries, it is unnecessary to consider 
the argument of the Government, made and rejected in United 
States v. Finazzo, supra,

“. . . that federal judges have inherent or 
common law power under the Fourth 
Amendment, independent of any statutory 
authority, to permit break-ins in the execution of 
an otherwise valid eavesdrop warrant.” (Slip 
opinion at 10.)

Further, since the Government, in its brief below, did not argue 
that law enforcement officers had an inherent power to break 
and enter, nor did the district court or Third Circuit so hold, 
petitioner respectfully expresses his intention to answer such an 
argument, if made, by way of reply brief.6

When the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 was enacted containing Title III dealing with wiretapping

6. The only case in which this argument has been made by the 
Government is United States v. Finazzo, supra, at slip opinion pp. 16-22. The 
majority in United States v. Agrusa, supra, stated that it based its affirmance 
upon the warrant issued by the district court to conduct a surreptitious entry 
but did not discuss the source of the court’s power to issue the warrant.

45



16

and electronic surveillance, the Act set out a detailed procedure 
under which law enforcement officers could, in a most limited 
fashion, wiretap and conduct electronic surveillance. Title III 
has been referred to as a “comprehensive scheme for the 
regulation of wiretapping and electronic surveillance.” Gelbard 
v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972).

Various portions of Title III regulate the circumstances for 
which an order permitting wiretapping and electronic 
surveillance may be resorted. Only specified crimes may be the 
subject of electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C. §2516(l)(a) to (g). 
The prosecutorial decision to apply for an order permitting 
wiretapping or electronic surveillance must come from the 
highest levels of the Department of Justice. 18 U.S.C. §2516(1). 
There are provisions for minimization of the number and extent 
of overheard conversations and the interception must end upon 
the achievement of its objective but in no case beyond 30 days. 
18 U.S.C. §2518(5). Electronic surveillance may not be utilized 
unless the Government is able to show that conventional 
investigatory methods are inappropriate. 18 U.S.C. §2518(1 )(c). 
Not only must a substantial showing of probable cause be made 
that incriminatory information will be forthcoming but the 
suspected individuals must be identified as well as a description 
of the type of communications which are sought to be 
intercepted. 18 U.S.C. §2518(l)(b). There are detailed 
requirements with respect to inventorying and sealing the results 
of the interceptions as well as notification to the subjects. 18 
U.S.C. §2518(8)(a) to (d). The matter has been considered so 
sensitive that judges are obliged to file reports with the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts of all 
important details with respect to applications and orders for 
electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C. §2519(1). Further, in the first 
month of each year, high officials of the Department of Justice 
are obliged to report to the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts with respect to their utilization of Title III. 18 
U.S.C. §2519(2).

46



17

It is noteworthy that at the time Title III was enacted, the 
Congress inserted certain findings into the body of the statute. 
18 U.S.C. §801(d) provides that:

“To safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, 
the in tercep tion  of all wire or oral 
communications where none of the parties to the 
communication has consented to the interception 
should be allowed only when authorized by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and should 
remain under the control and supervision of the 
authorizing court.”

The foregoing recitation serves as a reminder of the care the 
Congress gave to the enactment of a statute which carries with it 
an inherent capacity for abuse. Despite the required 
detailed overseeing of law enforcement officers by the courts 
when Title III is resorted to as a investigative tool, there is 
absolutely nothing in the Act which authorizes government 
agents to conduct otherwise illegal breakings and entries to 
effectuate its purpose. Nowhere in Title III may there be found 
authorization for a court to permit an otherwise illegal breaking 
and entry.

The Third Circuit in its opinion below found that despite 
the silence of Title III on the issue, there is implicit authorization 
for surreptitious entries. However, given the extensive 
protections afforded by Title III, it is inconceivable that 
legislative authority to commit otherwise illegal breakings and 
entries may be found simply because there is authority to 
eavesdrop on conversations.

The legislative history so carefully detailed in United States 
v. Santora, supra, shows there is very little that can be said to 
imply a legislative intent to authorize breakings and entries. 
Congress was presumptively aware of Silverman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). There it had been held that a

47



18

trespassory eavesdropping violated the Fourth Amendment to 
the Constitution. One could hardly conceive that Silverman, was 
“overruled” by Title III through implication.

The argument presented by the Fourth Circuit in support of 
its holding in Application o f the United States, supra, was that 
authority to break and enter must be implied lest criminals find 
a “loophole” in the law. This argument is founded upon the 
supposition that electronic surveillance may be conducted only 
by wiretapping or breakings and entries. However, it is quite 
possible for electronic surveillance to take place without a 
breaking and entry. In Silverman v. United States, supra, the 
electronic surveillance was trespassory but not the product of a 
breaking and entry. There, a spike microphone was driven 
through a wall into a heating duct enabling law enforcement 
officers to pick up conversations from an adjoining apartment. 
In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) electronic 
surveillance was accomplished by placing a “detectophone” 
against a wall. Many other forms of electronic surveillance, not 
necessitating breakings and entries, can be contemplated. For 
example, parabolic microphones pick up conversations at great 
distances. Informants, lawfully upon the premises, can secrete 
transmitters or leave tape recorders behind. Consequently, it 
does not follow as a matter of logical necessity that the 
Legislature’s permission to conduct electronic surveillance also 
implies its permission to commit breakings and entries. The far 
more likely explanation for the absence of any explicit 
authorization in Title III is that there was no consensus to 
permit breakings and entries. The utter absence of any legislative 
history that can be pointed to indicating a conscious decision to 
permit surreptitious entries is powerful evidence that Congress 
did not intend to confer such authority upon law enforcement 
officers or the courts. Certainly an issue with such enormous 
public interest and political consequences would have been the 
subject of specific debate had it been the intent to confer such 
authority through Title III. It does not do an injustice to Title

48



19

III or the Congress, nor does it create an intolerable burden 
upon law enforcement officers to interpret Title III as not an 
authorization to break and enter in order to effect electronic 
surveillance.

II.

It is a violation of the Fourth Amendment to permit law 
enforcement officers to conduct surreptitious entries under the 
authority of Title III.

If it should be found that Title III, by implication, 
authorizes a court to permit law enforcement officers to commit 
breakings and entries, then petitioner urges that such an 
interpretation is violative of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.

In referring to trespassory intrusions to effect electronic 
surveillance, it was held in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505, 509-51 / (1961),

“Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such 
a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even 
those decisions in which a closely divided court 
has held that eavesdropping accomplished by 
other electronic means did not amount to an 
invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.”

In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), police officers broke 
into the petitioner’s home to install and reposition 
eavesdropping devices. The plurality opinion read in pertinent 
part,

“Each of these repeated entries of petitioner’s 
home without a search warrant or other process 
was a trespass, and probably a burglary, for 
which any unofficial person should be, and



20

probably would be, severely punished. . . . That 
officers of the law would break and enter a home, 
secrete such a device, even in a bedroom and 
listen to the conversation of the occupants for 
over a month would be almost incredible if it 
were not admitted. Few police measures have 
come to our attention that more flagrantly, 
deliberately and persistently violated the 
fundamental principle declared by the Fourth 
Amendment.”

As previously noted in Point I, United States v. Ford, 
supra, United States v. Santora, supra, and an equally divided 
panel in United States v. Agrusa, supra, mention the 
troublesome Fourth Amendment problem without expressly 
ruling upon it. Further, in United States v. Finazzo, supra, the 
Sixth Circuit, after deciding the case on statutory grounds, 
added,

“We need not decide whether we agree with the 
four members of the Eighth Circuit en banc court 
who would hold that break-ins to install 
eavesdrop devices violate the Fourth Amendment 
under all circumstances, even if authorized by 
statute. We need not decide whether such a 
statute would be constitutional.”

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. It is respectfully submitted that legislative 
authority for law enforcement officers to commit otherwise 
illegal breakings and entries into the home or office of a suspect 
is inherently unreasonable. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 
(1963), local officers utilized a passkey to gain entry into the 
home of Ker who was suspected of possessing narcotics. Ker was 
arrested on the premises and the officers conducted a search 
incident to that arrest. Narcotics were found on the premises in 
the search and were introduced against Ker at trial. A sharply

50



21

divided court upheld the conviction on the basis that exigent 
circumstances justified the officers’ failure to give notice of their 
intention to enter. A state statute existed authorizing an 
unannounced entry where exigent circumstances such as the 
imminent destruction of evidence existed. The majority held:

“Here, justification for the officers’ failure to give 
notice is uniquely present. In addition to the 
officers’ belief that Ker was in possession of 
narcotics, which could be quickly and easily 
destroyed, Ker’s furtive conduct in eluding them 
shortly before the arrest was ground for the belief 
he might well have been expecting the police. We 
therefore hold that in the particular 
circumstances of this case, the officers’ method of 
entry, sanctioned by the law of California, was 
not unreasonable under the standards of the 
Fourth Amendment as applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.”

An analysis which finds the Fourth Amendment not 
violated by the circumstances in Ker might well find a violation 
where officers are authorized to commit what would otherwise 
be considered a breaking and entry. The circumstances of this 
case are more aggravated than in Ker. Here, law enforcement 
officers, according to the Third Circuit, are permitted to enter 
into a suspect’s premises and wander about for “safety” reasons. 
The officers are permitted to stay on the premises for an 
indefinite period of time, presumably in their own discretion, to 
do whatever they believe is necessary to effect electronic 
surveillance. The number of entries, the time, the number of 
persons authorized to go upon the premises all are within the 
discretion of the law enforcement officers.

The majority in Ker v. California, supra, went on to state:

“Implicit in the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
from unreasonable searches and seizures is its 51



22

recognition of individual freedom. That 
safeguard has been declared to be ‘as of the very 
essence of constitutional liberty’ the guarantee of 
which ‘is as important and imperative as are the 
guarantees of the other fundamental rights of the 
individual citizen. . . While the language of the 
amendment is ‘general’, it forbids every search 
that is unreasonable; it protects all, those 
suspected or known to be offenders as well as the 
innocent, and unquestionably extends to the 
premises where the search was made.”

The four members joining in the opinion to affirm Ker, found 
that the exigent circumstances surrounding the arrest and entry 
made the consequent search not unreasonable. However, the 
four dissenters in Ker held that an unannounced police intrusion 
into a private home is violative of the Fourth Amendment,

“[ejxcept (1) where the persons within already 
know of the officer’s authority and purpose or (2) 
where the officers are justified in the belief that 
persons within are in imminent peril of bodily 
harm or (3) where those within, made aware of 
the presence of someone outside (because, for 
example, there has been a knock on the door) are 
then engaged in an activity which justifies the 
officers in the belief that an escape or the 
destruction of evidence is being attempted.” 374 
U.S. at 47.

The opinion of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Santora, supra, demonstrates the awareness of the Congress 
which enacted Title III of the leading cases of Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). In fact, Title III was, in large measure, a careful 
response to the Berger and Katz holdings. See, United States v. 
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 307 (1972). Thus, it 
is not unreasonable to look to these cases as an interpretation of



23

Title III and also to refer to them to see if the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation of Title III squares with their holdings.

In Berger v. New York, supra, a New York statute 
authorizing electronic surveillance resulted in the placement of a 
listening device in the office of one Neyer. On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, the New York statute was found 
unconstitutional because in the words of the Berger court, it

. . permits unconsented entry without any 
showing of exigent circumstances. Such a 
showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice, 
would appear more important in eavesdropping, 
with its inherent changes, than that required 
when conventional procedures of search and 
seizure are utilized. . . .  In short, the statute’s 
blanket grant of permission to eavesdrop is 
without adequate judicial supervision or 
protective procedures.” 388 U.S. at 60.

According to Berger, the barest minimum constitutionally, 
would be a statutory requirement of exigency. Title III has none.
But petitioner’s argument goes even further. Few things are 
more susceptible to abuse than that which the Government seeks 
to legitimatize in the instant case. One can conceive of few 
activities by the police more repugnant than the breaking into 
private premises by law enforcement officers as if common 
burglars and the consequent unsupervised rummaging around to 
install, maintain, reposition and remove listening devices.

It is especially interesting to note that in the instant case the 
officers who entered petitioner’s premises pursuant to an order 
of electronic surveillance did so when they never could have got 
in with a search warrant. There was nothing in the various 
government applications for electronic surveillance that would 
indicate petitioner had any contraband or incriminatory 
evidence that might be seized under a search warrant. Thus, the 
intolerable situation arises where officers who could not obtain a 53



24

valid search warrant can manage to come upon a suspect’s 
premises, in a totally secret and unsupervised manner, conduct a 
search for “safety” reasons and then depart. Surely a statute 
which countenances this activity is violative of the Fourth 
Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches.

If the public is to have confidence in its law enforcement 
officers, they must conduct themselves in a manner which is 
beyond reproach. While the examination of the one entering 
officer was unsatisfactory because of the restrictions imposed, 
his unusual nighttime activities raise numerous questions. The 
petitioner filed an affidavit and accompanied it with a police 
report (A47), showing that during the two months he was being 
subjected to electronic surveillance, his business was entered on 
numerous occasions. One documented instance was the night 
after the FBI agent admitted entering the premises. Whether law 
enforcement officers were responsible for the May 16, 1973 
break-in may never be known. However, unnecessary questions 
and unnecessary suspicions are raised. Confidence in the probity 
of law enforcement officers demands that they be held to higher 
standards than permitted by the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
Title III. The conduct which the Third Circuit permits law 
enforcement officers to engage in pursuant to Title III is 
fundamentally unreasonable. It is this unreasonableness which 
raises the objection to the constitutional level.

54



25

III.

Assuming the right of a court to authorize a surreptitious 
entry to install a listening device pursuant to Title III, such 
authority was neither applied for, considered nor given and the 
consequent entry of the law enforcement officers to install 
listening devices was unlawful.

The warrant in the instant case simply authorized law 
enforcement officers to intercept conversations in petitioner’s 
office. The Government concedes that the issuing judge was 
never apprised of the intention of the officers to enter 
petitioner’s premises. If it is assumed that Title III implicitly 
authorizes surreptitious entry to install listening devices, then the 
Fourth Amendment requires that such an entry be the specific 
subject of judicial authorization. In United States v. Ford, 
supra, the court was concerned with an order specifically 
authorizing officers to break and enter in order to install a 
listening device. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the warrant was overbroad. It was the holding 
of that court that under well-established case law dealing with 
search and seizure, a warrant must be particular and specific if it 
is to withstand constitutional attack. Among the failures in that 
case was the absence of any direction as to the manner in which 
the entry was to take place, the persons who were to make the 
entries, the number of entries that would be authorized or the 
length of time the officers would be permitted to remain on the 
premises. The court stated,

“A person whose physical privacy is to be 
invaded has a right to expect the judicial officer 
issuing an intercept order will authorize only 
those entries and those means of entry necessary 
to satisfy the demonstrative and cognizable needs 
of the applicant. This is the method by which the 
magistrate exercises the degree of supervision 
required by the Fourth Amendment in the

55



26

absence of statutory safeguards. There having 
been a failure in this regard, we affirm the 
judgment of the District Court that, given the 
showing to the District Judge in this case, the 
failure of the order to limit time, manner or 
number of entries over a 40-day period made the 
authorization far too sweeping.” (Footnotes 
omitted) 553 F. 2d at 170.

In the instant case, there was no prior decision by a neutral 
and detached magistrate that a breaking and entry was required 
in this case. In Application o f the United States, supra at 644, 
the court held that:

“Permission to surreptitiously enter private 
premises cannot, therefore, be implied from a 
valid Title III order sanctioning only the 
interception of oral communications. . . . With 
respect to the instant case, this means that even 
had the district court issued an order of 
authorization on the basis of its preliminary 
conclusion that the statute permitted interception 
of the target conversations, the door would not 
have been automatically opened for the 
Government to plant listening devices in the 
manner proposed.

The district court was thus correct insofar as it 
subjected the request for authorization and 
surreptitious entry to separate Fourth 
Amendment consideration. Since in the absence 
of exigent circumstances the Fourth Amendment 
commands compliance with the warrant 
requirement, we would normally countenance 
secret entry by federal agents for the purpose of 
installing, maintaining or removing listening 
devices only under the following conditions: (1)

56



27

where, as here, the district judge to whom the 
interception application is made, is apprised of 
the planned entry; (2) the judge finds, as he did 
here, that the use of the device in the 
surreptitious entry incident to its installation and 
use provides the only effective means available to 
the Government to conduct its investigation; and 
(3) only where the judge specifically sanctions 
such an entry in a manner that does not offend 
the substantive commands of the Fourth 
Amendment. Such a requirement is not novel to 
the law of search and seizure. It also comports 
with the interception scheme of Title III, since it 
is apparent that the legislature anticipated 
meticulous judicial supervision of all aspects of 
electronic eavesdropping.”

Title III is unusual in that the Congress saw fit to insert 
detailed findings prior to the text of the statute. Among these 
findings was the following:

“(d) To safeguard the privacy of innocent 
persons, the interception of wire or oral 
communications where none of the parties to the 
communication has consented to the interception 
should be allowed only when authorized by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and should 
remain under the control and supervision o f the 
authorizing court." (Emphasis supplied.) 18 
U.S.C. §801(d).

The control is not only mandated by statute. This control is 
of constitutional import as United States v. Ford, supra, and 
Application o f the United States, supra, both show. The control 
comes about by having the court exercise its independent 
judgment as to the need for surreptitious entry only after that 
need has been established under oath. The control is furthered 
by requiring a particularized warrant directing the officers as to 
exactly what it is they may do. 57



28

In addition to the constitutional and statutory demands that 
exist to control police officers when engaged in a sensitive 
invasion of the peoples’ rights, there is a control to be exercised 
by the courts as part of their general supervisory duties over 
police practices. For example in Osborn v. United States, 385 
U.S. 323 (1966) law enforcement officers wished to record an 
anticipated conversation with a suspect believed to be involved 
with jury tampering. Application was made to the court for 
specific authorization and after hearing the application and 
being satisfied of the need, the court did give specific authority 
to conduct the surveillance. No statute was involved, the case 
having preceded Title III. In any event, such consentual 
“overhearing” would not qualify as a “interception” under Title 
III. Notwithstanding the absence of any statute which would 
make the proposed surveillance illegal, the district court, as 
well as the Supreme Court approved the procedure of judicial 
supervision over such activities.

In dealing with surreptitious entries to install listening 
devices, the courts are dealing with perhaps the most sensitive 
area in which law enforcement officers intrude into the life of the 
public. It is essential that such a grave intrusion so susceptible to 
abuse be subjected to the most stringent controls. These controls 
must not be simply minimal constitutional controls dictated by 
the Fourth Amendment. They should be controls tailored by the 
courts to meet the specific problem at hand. It is urged that if 
surreptitious entries are to be countenanced, they be permitted 
only upon the closest judicial supervision.

The failure of the Government to apprise the supervising 
court that a break-in was anticipated invalidates the fruits of 
that unlawful entry. In the case at bar, there was never even an 
evaluation by “the neutral and detached magistrate” as to the 
need for surreptitious entry. At no time was there ever any 
question put to the Government as to its supposed need to 
conduct a breaking and entry. Never was inquiry made as to 
why a less intrusive form of surveillance could not have

58



29

accomplished the same end. Furthermore, once the agents 
received their authorization to intercept oral communications, 
they were left with absolutely no restrictions on how many times 
they might enter petitioner’s premises. There is no way of 
knowing whether the agents were of the belief that once they 
were “lawfully” on the premises, they were thereby entitled to 
conduct a full-scale search. No one had briefed them on their 
rights, duties or obligations while on petitioner’s premises. The 
total absence of judicial participation and control over this 
sensitive area demands suppression of the results of the unlawful 
entry.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, it is respectfully urged 
that the admission into evidence of seven conversations which 
were the product of an unlawful entry was error. Consequently, 
the conviction of petitioner should be reversed and the matter 
remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Louis A. Ruprecht
Attorney for Petitioner

59



No. 77-1722

In %  ̂ uprottF (Emtrt of %  l&nxttb ilateo
October Term, 1978

Lawrence Dalia, petitioner

v.

United States of America

ON W RIT  OF CERTIO RARI TO THE  
UNITED S T A T E S  COURT OF A P P E A L S  

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

Wade H. McCree, J r.
Solicitor General

P hilip  B. Heymann 
Assistant Attorney General

Andrew L. F rey 
Deputy Solicitor General

William C. Bryson 
Kenneth  S. Geller 

Assistants to the Solicitor General
J erome M. Feit 
Katherine Winpree

Attorneys
Department of Justice 
Washington, D,C. 20530

61



I N D E X

O pinions below  .............................................................. 1

Ju r is d ic t io n  ......   1

Q uestion  p re se n te d  ......................................................  2

S ta tu te  a n d  ru le  involved .......................................  2

S ta te m e n t ............................................      6

S u m m ary  o f a rg u m e n t ............................................... 13

A rg u m e n t ..........................................................................  18

I. T he F o u r th  A m en d m en t does n o t p ro ­
h ib it  c o u r t-a u th o riz e d  s u r re p ti t io u s  en ­
tr ie s  to  in s ta ll  e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  
devices ..................................................................  18

A. E lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  is  con­
s ti tu tio n a lly  p e rm issib le  ...................  20

B. T itle  I I I  p ro v id es  a  schem e fo r  elec­
tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  th a t  m eets  
c o n s titu tio n a l s ta n d a rd s  ...................  22

C. T he F o u r th  A m en d m en t p e rm its
s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  to  execute 
eav esd ro p p in g  o rd e rs  issu ed  in  
com pliance w ith  T itle  I I I  ..............   26

II. D is tr ic t  c o u r ts  have  s ta tu to ry  p o w er to 
a u th o riz e  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  fo r  th e  
p u rp o se  o f in s ta llin g  e lec tro n ic  eaves­
d ro p p in g  devices ........................................... 32

I I I .  T he e n try  onto  p e t i t io n e r ’s b u siness 
p rem ises  to  in s ta ll  a  lis te n in g  device 
w as  la w fu l even  th o u g h  th e  d is tr ic t  
c o u r t d id  n o t s e p a ra te ly  a n d  ex p ressly  
au th o riz e  th e  e n t ry  in  ad v an ce  .................  44

C o n c lu s io n ..........................................................................  57

Page

63



II

C IT A T IO N S
C ases: P ag e

Agnello v. United States, 269 U .S . 20 .... 30
Alderman v. United States, 394 U .S . 165 .. 28
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U .S . 463 ....... 55
Androscoggin R.R. v. Richards, 41 Me.

233 ................................................................. -.......  31
Application of United States, 563 F .2 d

637 ..... ........................................ 18-19, 42, 43, 44, 49
Berger v. New York, 388 U .S . 41 ....21 , 22, 23, 26,

27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 37
Boyd v. United States, 116 U .S . 616 .........  51
Chapman v. United States, 365 U .S . 610 .. 30
Cox v. United States, 449 F .2 d  679 .........  25
Fields v. United States, 355 F .2 d  543,

c e rt, d ism issed , 384 U .S . 935 ..............  31
Goldman v. United States, 316 U .S . 129 .. 20, 21 
Hart v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. A pp. 3d

496, 98 Cal. R p tr .  565 ..................................  29
Irvine v. California, 347 U .S . 1 2 8 .......... . 21, 36
Katz y. United States, 389 U .S . 347....20, 21, 22,

24, 26, 34, 36
Ker v. California, 374 U .S . 23 .................30, 34,48
Lewis v. United States, 385 U .S . 206 .... 45
Lopez v. United States, 373 U .S . 427 ------- 21, 36
Marron v. United States, 275 U .S . 192 .... 48
McDonald v. U n ite d  States, 335 U .S . 451 .. 50
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U .S . 499 ..............  30
Miller v. United States, 357 U .S . 3 0 1 .........  30
Mincey v. Arizona, N o. 77-5353 ( J u n e  21,

1978) ..................... ...................................... ........  30
Nardone v. United States, 308 U .S . 338 .. 43
Nixon v. Administrator of General Serv­

ices, 433 U .S . 425 ............................................ 25

64



Olmstead v. United States, 277 U .S . 438 _. 20
On Lee v. United States, 343 U .S . 747 .... 20, 21 
Osborn v. United States, 385 U .S . 323..22, 27, 34 
Outlaw v. State, 208 M iss. 13, 43 So. 2d

661 ..........................................................................  29
Payne v. United States, 508 F .2 d  1391,

c e rt, den ied , 423 U .S . 933 ........................  29
Penton v. Brown, 1 K eble 699, 83 E n g .

Rep. 1193 ...........................................................  31
People v. Johnson, 231 N .Y .S .2 d  689 .......  29
People v. Law, 55 M isc. 2 d  1075, 287 N .Y .S .

2d  565 ................................................................... 29
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U .S .

585 ................................... ......................... 30, 31, 45, 51
Scott v. United States, 436 U .S . 128 ....... 23, 25
Silverman v. United States, 365 U .S.

505 ...................................................... 2 0 ,3 3 -3 4 ,3 6 ,4 1
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U .S . 557 ..............  48
State v. Calvert, 219 T en n . 534, 410 S.W .

2d  907 ................................................................... 29
State v. Dropolski, 100 V t. 259, 136 A.

835 ........................................................................ 29
State v. Gutierrez, 91 N .M . 542, 557 P .2 d

440 ..........................................................................  29
State v. Robinson, 354 Mo. 74, 188 S.W .

2d  664 ..................................................................  29
State v. Williams, 250 L a. 64, 193 So. 2d

787 ..........................................................................  29
Thigpen v. State, 51 O kla. C rim . 28, 299

P . 230 ..................................................................  29
United States v. Agrusa, 541 F .2 d  690,

c e rt, denied, 429 U .S . 1045 ................ 19, 29, 31,
34-35, 41, 49

United States v. Barker, 546 F .2 d  940 .... 19
United States v. Bobo, 477 F .2 d  974 ....... 25, 27

Ill
Cases—Continued Page

65



United States v. Brown, 467 F .2 d  419 .... 51
United States v. Brown, 556 F .2 d  304 .... 29
United States v. Bustamonte-Gomez, 488

F .2 d  4, c e rt, denied, 416 U .S . 9 7 0 ..........  31
United States v. Cafero, 473 F .2 d  489,

c e rt, den ied , 417 U .S . 918 ........................  25, 27
United States v. Carter, 566 F .2 d  1265,

c e rt, denied, No. 78-1326 (1 9 7 8 ) .................  31
United States v. Chavez, 416 U .S . 562 ....... 25
United States v. Cox, 462 F .2 d  1293 .........  25
United States v. Cravero, 545 F .2 d  406,

c e rt, denied, 429 U .S . 1 1 0 0 ........................  51
United States v. Donovan, 429 U .S .

413 ............................................................ 24, 25, 27, 41
United States v. Finazzo, 583 F .2 d

837 ............................................................ 19, 33, 42, 49
United States v. Ford, 414 F . S upp . 879,

a f f d  553 F .2 d  146 .................... 19, 43, 45, 49, 54
United States v. Gervato, 474 F .2 d  40,

c e r t, den ied , 414 U .S . 846 ..........................  29
United States v. James, 494 F .2 d  1007,

c e rt, den ied , 419 U .S . 1020 .....................  25
United States v. Kahn, 415 U .S . 1 4 3 ......  2 5 ,4 0
United States v. Murrie, 534 F .2 d  6 9 5   31
United States v. New York Telephone Co.,

434 U .S . 159 ...................................................  3 3 ,4 3
United States v. O’Neill, 497 F .2 d  1020 .. 25
United States v. Ramsey, 503 F .2 d  524,

c e rt, denied, 420 U .S . 932 ........................  25
United States v. Santora, 583 F .2 d

453 .................................... ................................1 9 ,3 4 ,4 1
United States v. Scafidi, 564 F .2 d  633,

ce rt, den ied , 436 U .S . 9 0 3 ............................18, 43,
47, 49, 55, 56

United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F .2 d  
837 ..........................................................................

Cases—Continued Page

2 5 , 27



Y

United States y. Smith, 520 F .2 d  7 4 .........  31
United States v. Tortorello, 480 F ,2 d  764,

c e rt, denied, 414 U .S . 866  ..........................  25
United States v. Turner, 528 F .2 d  143 25
United States v. United States District

Court, 407 U .S . 2 9 7 ......................... 23, 25, 33, 37
United States v. Volpe, 430 F . S upp. 931, 

a ff’d  No. 77-1311 (2 d  C ir. A ug . 7,
1 9 7 8 ), p e titio n  f o r  a  w r i t  o f c e r t io ra r i
p en d in g , No. 78-385 .......    43

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U .S.
547 ..........................................................................  48, 55

C onstitu tion , s ta tu te s  a n d  r u l e :

U n ite d  S ta te s  C o n s titu tio n , F o u r th
A m en d m en t ......................................................passim

D is tr ic t  o f  C olum bia C o u rt R efo rm  a n d  
C rim in a l P ro ced u re  A c t o f 1970, P ub .
L. No. 91-358, 84 S ta t .  473 ...................... 46

F o re ig n  In te llig en ce  S u rv e illan ce  A c t o f 
1978, P u b . L. No. 95-511, 92 S ta t .  1783:

Section  1 0 5 (b )  ............................................  52
Section  1 0 5 (b )  (1 )  (D ) ........................... 52

O m nibus C rim e C on tro l a n d  S a fe  S tre e ts  
A c t o f 1968, P u b . L . No. 90-351, 82 
S ta t. 197, 18 U .S .C . 2510 et seq:

18 U .S .C . 2510-2520 ...............................  8
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 0 (5 )  .........................  41
18 U .S .C . 2511 ...................................  23
18 U .S .C . 2515 ..................................  57
18 U .S .C . 2518 ............................................  2
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (1 )  ..................................  40
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (1 )  ( b ) ( i i )  .......................  42
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (1 )  (c )  ............................. 2 4 ,2 7

Cases—Continued Page

67



VI

18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (3 )  ( a )  .............................  23
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (3 )  (b )  .............................  23
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (3 )  (c )  .............................  2 4 ,2 7
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (3 )  (d )  .............................  2 3 ,4 2
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  ..................................... 42
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  ( a )  .............................  23
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  (b )  .............................  2 3 ,4 2
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  (c )  .............................  24
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (5 )  .....................................  24
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (8 )  ( a )  .............................  2 4 ,2 6
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (8 )  (d )  .............................  24
18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (1 0 )  ( a )  ........................... 57
18 U .S .C . 371 ..............................................  6
18 U .S .C . 2315 ............................................  6
18 U .S .C . 3109 ............................... 30, 31, 34, 51

F ed . R. C rim . P .:

R u le  41 ..........................................5 ,1 5 , 30, 33, 34
A p p en d ix  o f F o rm s , F o rm  1 5 ..............  51

M isce llan eo u s:

A B A  S ta n d a rd s  fo r  C rim in a l Ju s tic e ,
Electronic Surveillance, G en e ra l Com ­
m e n ta ry ; C o m m en ta ry  on Specific 
S ta n d a rd s ;  A p p en d ix  D (A p p ro v ed
D r a f t  1971) ......................................................  3 9 ,4 2

A B A  S ta n d a rd s  fo r  C rim in a l Ju s tic e ,
Electronic Surveillance, S ta n d a rd s  of 
th e  T e n ta tiv e  D ra f t ,  §§ 5 .7 -5 .8 (T e n ta ­
tiv e  D r a f t  1968) ............................................  39

A B A  S ta n d a rd s  fo r  C rim in a l Ju s tic e ,
Electronic Surveillance, P ro p o sed  F in a l 
D r a f t  of S ta n d a rd s , §§ 5.7-5.8 (A p ­
p ro v ed  D r a f t  1971) .......................................  39

Constitution, statutes and rule—Continued Page

68



VII

A d m in is tra tiv e  Office o f th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  
C o u rts , Report on Applications for Or­
ders Authorizing or Approving the In­
terception of Wire or Oral Communica­
tions for the Period January 1, 1975 to
December 31, 1975 ( 19 7 6 ) .......    45

A d m in is tra tiv e  Office o f th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  
C o u rts , Report on Applications for Or­
ders Authorizing or Approving the In­
terception of Wire or Oral Communica­
tions for the Period January 1, 1976 to
December 31, 1976 ( 1 9 7 7 ) .........................  45

A d m in is tra tiv e  Office o f th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  
C o u rts , Report on Applications for Or­
ders Authorizing or Approving the In­
terception of Wire or Oral Communica­
tions for the Period January 1, 1977 to

Miscellaneous—Continued Page

D ecem ber 31, 1977 (1 9 7 8 ) ........................  44
A n ti-C r im e  P ro g ra m : H ea r in g s  on H .R .

5037, etc. B e fo re  the  Su b co m m . No. 5 
o f the  H o u se  C om m , on the  Ju d ic ia ry ,
90 th  Cong., 1 s t Sess. (1 9 6 7 ) ...................  3 6 ,3 8

113 Cong. Rec. 18007 (1 9 6 7 ) ...........................  41
114 Cong. Rec. (1 9 6 8 ) :

p. 11598 ...........................................................  37
p. 12986 .....................................................   38
p. 12989 ..........     37
p. 13208 ........................................................... 35
p. 13209 ..............     41
pp. 14709-14710 .................................    38
pp. 14732-14734 .........................................  38

69



VIII

B lakey , Aspects of the Evidence Gather­
ing Process in Organized Crime Cases 
re p r in te d  in  th e  P re s id e n t’s C om m is­
sion  on  L aw  E n fo rc e m e n t a n d  A d m in ­
is t r a t io n  o f Ju s tic e , Task Force Report:

Miscellaneous—Continued Page

Organized Crime ( 1 9 6 7 ) ............................ 35-36
B lakey , The Rule of Announcement and 

Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United 
States and Ker v. California, 112 U .
P a . L. Rev. 499 (1 9 6 4 ) .............................  30, 31

Controlling Crime Through More Effec­
tive Law Enforcement: Hearings on
S. 300, etc. Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the 
Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 9 0 th
C ong., 1 s t Sess. (1 9 6 7 ) ................................ 38, 41

Hearings on Invasions of Privacy Before 
the Subcomm. on Administrative Prac­
tice and Procedure of the Senate Comm, 
on the Judiciary, 8 9 th  Cong., 2 d  Sess.
(1 9 6 6 ) ............  36

M cN am ara , The Problem of Surreptitious 
Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eaves­
drops: How Do You Proceed After the 
Court Says “Yes”?, 15 A m . C rim . L.
Rev. 1 (1 9 7 7 ) ...................................................  35

N a tio n a l C om m ission fo r  th e  R eview  of 
F e d e ra l  a n d  S ta te  L aw s R e la tin g  to 
W ire ta p p in g  a n d  E lec tro n ic  S u rv e il­
lance, Commission Studies, State of the 
Art of Electronic Surveillance (1 9 7 6 ) ..  46

N ote, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82
H a rv . L . Rev. 63 (1 9 6 8 ) ...........................  35

70



IX

Report of the National Commission for 
the Review of Federal and State Laws 
Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance (Electronic Surveillance)
(1 9 7 6 )  4 4 ,4 5 ,4 6

S. 675, 9 0 th  Cong., 1 s t Sess. (1 9 6 7 ) ............  40
S. 2050, 9 0 th  C ong., 1 s t Sess. (1 9 6 7 ) .... 40, 41
S. R ep. N o. 1097, 9 0 th  Cong., 2d  Sess.

(1 9 6 8 ) ...................................................... 3 8 ,3 9 , 4 0 ,4 1
S. R ep. N o. 95-601, 9 5 th  Cong., 2 d  Sess.

(1 9 7 8 ) ................................................................... 53
T. T ay lo r, Two Studies in Constitutional

Interpretation (1 9 6 9 ) .............................  28

Miscellaneous—Continued Page

71



In %  internin' (Emtrt of %  Imtrfc Biatw
October Term, 1978

N o. 77-1722

Lawrence Dalia, petitioner

v.

United States of America

ON W RIT  OF CERTIORARI TO THE  
UNITED S T A T E S  COURT OF AP P EA L S  

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

B R I E F  F O R  T H E  U N I T E D  S T A T E S

O P I N I O N S  B E L O W

T he op in ion  o f th e  c o u r t  o f ap p ea ls  (P e t. A pp. la -  
8a )  is re p o r te d  a t  575 F .2 d  1344. T he op in ion  of 
the d is tr ic t  c o u r t  (ex ce rp ted  a t  P e t. A pp. 10a-18a) 
is rep o rte d  a t  426 F . S upp. 862.

J U R I S D I C T I O N

The ju d g m e n t o f th e  c o u r t o f ap p ea ls  (P e t. A pp. 
8a-9a) w as  e n te re d  on M ay  3, 1978. T he p e titio n  fo r

( 1 )

73



2

a  w r i t  o f c e r t io ra r i  w as  filed on J u n e  2, 1978, a n d  
w as  g ra n te d  on O ctober 2, 1978, lim ited  to  Q u estion  
One o f th e  p e titio n  (P e t. 2 ) .  T he ju r isd ic tio n  o f th is  
C o u rt r e s ts  up o n  28 U .S .C . 1 2 5 4 (1 ) .

Q U E S T IO N  P R E S E N T E D

W h e th e r  fe d e ra l law  en fo rc e m e n t a g en ts , in  exe­
c u tin g  a  v a lid  c o u r t  o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  th e  in te rc e p ­
tio n  o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s a t  specified  b u sin ess  
p rem ises, m a y  e n te r  those  p rem ises  su r re p ti t io u s ly  
a n d  w ith o u t ex p ress  ju d ic ia l a p p ro v a l to  in s ta ll  th e  
device u sed  to  m ake th e  a u th o riz e d  in te rcep tio n s .

S T A T U T E  A N D  R U L E  I N V O L V E D

18 U .S .C . 2518 p ro v id es  in  p e r t in e n t  p a r t :

(1 )  E ac h  a p p lica tio n  fo r  a n  o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  
o r  a p p ro v in g  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f a  w ire  o r  o ra l 
co m m u n ica tio n  sh a ll be m ad e  in  w r i t in g  u p o n  
o a th  o r  a ffirm atio n  to  a  ju d g e  o f co m p eten t 
ju r isd ic tio n  a n d  sh a ll s ta te  th e  a p p lic a n t’s a u ­
th o r i ty  to  m ak e  such  ap p lica tio n . E ac h  a p p lic a ­
tio n  sh a ll inc lude  th e  fo llow ing  in fo rm a tio n :

( a )  th e  id e n tity  o f th e  in v e s tig a tiv e  o r  law  
e n fo rcem en t officer m a k in g  th e  ap p lica tio n , an d  
th e  officer a u th o riz in g  th e  a p p lic a tio n ;

(b )  a  fu ll a n d  com plete  s ta te m e n t o f th e  fa c ts  
a n d  c irc u m stan c es  re lied  u p o n  by  th e  ap p lican t, 
to  ju s t i fy  h is  b e lie f th a t  a n  o rd e r  shou ld  be is ­
sued, in c lu d in g  ( i )  d e ta ils  a s  to  th e  p a r t ic u la r  
offense th a t  h a s  been, is being , o r  is  a b o u t to  be 
com m itted , ( i i )  a  p a r t ic u la r  d esc rip tio n  o f the  
n a tu re  a n d  loca tio n  o f th e  fa c ilit ie s  f ro m  w hich

74



3

or th e  p lace  w h e re  th e  co m m u n ica tio n  is  to  be 
in te rcep ted , ( i i i )  a  p a r t ic u la r  d e sc rip tio n  o f the  
type o f co m m u n ica tio n s so u g h t to  be in te rcep ted , 
( iv )  th e  id e n tity  o f th e  p erson , i f  know n, com ­
m itt in g  th e  offense a n d  w hose com m u n ica tio n s 
a re  to  be in te rc e p te d ;

(c) a  fu ll  a n d  com plete  s ta te m e n t a s  to 
w h e th e r o r  n o t o th e r  in v e s tig a tiv e  p ro ced u re s  
have been tr ie d  a n d  fa ile d  o r  w hy  th ey  re a so n ­
ably  a p p e a r  to  be u n lik e ly  to  succeed i f  t r ie d  
o r to  be too d a n g e ro u s ;

(d )  a  s ta te m e n t o f th e  p e rio d  o f tim e  fo r  
w hich th e  in te rc e p tio n  is  re q u ire d  to  be m a in ­
ta in ed . I f  th e  n a tu re  o f th e  in v e s tig a tio n  is such  
th a t  th e  a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  in te rc e p tio n  shou ld  
n o t a u to m a tic a lly  te rm in a te  w h en  th e  described  
type o f co m m u n ica tio n  h a s  been  f ir s t  o b ta ined , 
a  p a r t ic u la r  d esc rip tio n  o f f a c ts  e s tab lish in g  
probable cau se  to  believe th a t  a d d itio n a l com ­
m u n ica tio n s  o f th e  sam e ty p e  w ill occu r th e re ­
a f te r  ;

(e )  a  fu ll  a n d  com plete  s ta te m e n t o f th e  fa c ts  
concern ing  a ll p rev io u s  ap p lica tio n s  k now n  to  
the in d iv id u a l a u th o riz in g  a n d  m a k in g  th e  a p ­
p lication , m ad e  to  a n y  ju d g e  fo r  a u th o riz a tio n  
to in te rcep t, o r  f o r  a p p ro v a l o f  in te rc e p tio n s  of, 
w ire  o r  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s in v o lv ing  a n y  of 
the sam e p erso n s, fa c ilit ie s  o r  p laces specified  in  
the ap p lica tio n , a n d  th e  ac tio n  ta k e n  by  the  
judge on each  such  a p p lic a tio n ; a n d

( f )  w h ere  th e  ap p lica tio n  is fo r  th e  ex ten sio n  
of an  o rd e r, a  s ta te m e n t s e tt in g  fo r th  th e  r e ­
su lts th u s  f a r  o b ta in ed  fro m  th e  in te rcep tio n , o r 
a  reasonab le  e x p lan a tio n  o f th e  f a i lu re  to  o b ta in  
such re su lts .

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4
(2 )  T he ju d g e  m ay  re q u ire  th e  a p p lic a n t to  

fu rn is h  a d d itio n a l te s tim o n y  o r  d o cu m en ta ry  ev i­
dence in  s u p p o r t  o f  th e  ap p lica tio n .

(3 )  U pon  such  ap p lic a tio n  th e  ju d g e  m a y  
e n te r  a n  ex  p a r te  o rd e r, a s  re q u es te d  o r  a s  m od i­
fied, a u th o riz in g  o r  a p p ro v in g  in te rc e p tio n  of 
w ire  o r  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s  w ith in  th e  t e r r i ­
to r ia l  ju r isd ic tio n  o f th e  c o u r t  in  w h ich  th e  ju d g e  
is  s itt in g , i f  th e  ju d g e  d e te rm in e s  on th e  b as is  
o f th e  fa c ts  su b m itte d  by  th e  a p p lic a n t th a t—

( a )  th e re  is p ro b ab le  cau se  fo r  be lie f th a t  an  
in d iv id u a l is co m m ittin g , h a s  com m itted , o r  is 
a b o u t to  co m m it a  p a r t ic u la r  offense e n u m e ra te d  
in  section  2516 o f th is  c h a p te r ;

(b )  th e re  is  p ro b ab le  cau se  fo r  b e lie f th a t  
p a r t ic u la r  co m m u n ica tio n s co n ce rn in g  th a t  o f­
fen se  w ill be o b ta in ed  th ro u g h  such  in te rc e p tio n ;

(c )  n o rm a l in v e s tig a tiv e  p ro ced u res  have  been 
tr ie d  a n d  h av e  fa ile d  o r  rea so n ab ly  a p p e a r  to  be 
u n lik e ly  to  succeed i f  t r ie d  o r  to  be too d a n ­
g e ro u s  ;

(d )  th e re  is  p ro b ab le  cau se  fo r  b e lie f th a t  the  
fa c ilit ie s  f ro m  w hich , o r  th e  p lace  w h ere , th e  
w ire  o r  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s  a re  to  be in te r ­
cep ted  a re  b e in g  used , o r  a re  a b o u t to  be used , in  
connection  w ith  th e  com m ission  o f such  offense, 
o r  a re  leased  to, lis ted  in  th e  n am e  of, o r  com ­
m only  u sed  by such  p erson .

(4 )  E a c h  o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  o r  a p p ro v in g  the  
in te rc e p tio n  o f a n y  w ire  o r  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n  
sh a ll sp ec ify —

(a )  th e  id e n tity  of th e  p erso n , i f  know n, 
w hose co m m u n ica tio n s a re  to  be in te rc e p te d ;

(b )  th e  n a tu re  a n d  location  o f th e  co m m u n i­
ca tio n s  fa c ilit ie s  a s  to  w hich , o r  th e  p lace  w here , 
a u th o r i ty  to  in te rc e p t is  g ra n te d ;

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(c ) a  p a r t ic u la r  d e sc rip tio n  o f th e  ty p e  of 
co m m u n ica tio n  so u g h t to  be in te rcep ted , a n d  a  
s ta te m e n t o f th e  p a r t ic u la r  offense to  w h ich  i t  
r e la te s ;

(d )  th e  id e n tity  o f th e  ag en cy  a u th o riz e d  to  
in te rc e p t th e  co m m u n ica tio n s, a n d  o f th e  p erso n  
a u th o riz in g  th e  a p p lic a tio n ; a n d

(e )  th e  p e rio d  o f tim e  d u r in g  w h ich  such  in ­
te rc e p tio n  is  au th o rized , in c lu d in g  a  s ta te m e n t 
a s  to  w h e th e r  o r  n o t th e  in te rc e p tio n  sh a ll a u to ­
m a tic a lly  te rm in a te  w h en  th e  d escribed  com ­
m u n ica tio n  h a s  been f ir s t  ob ta ined .

A n  o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f a  w ire  
o r o ra l co m m u n ica tio n  shall, u p o n  re q u e s t o f th e  
a p p lican t, d ire c t th a t  a  co m m u n ica tio n  com m on 
c a r r ie r ,  lan d lo rd , c u s to d ian  o r  o th e r  p e rso n  sha ll 
fu rn is h  th e  a p p lic a n t fo r th w ith  a ll in fo rm a tio n , 
fa c ilit ie s , a n d  te ch n ica l a ss is ta n c e  n ecessa ry  to 
accom plish  th e  in te rc e p tio n  u n o b tru s iv e ly  an d  
w ith  a  m in im u m  o f in te rfe re n c e  w ith  th e  s e rv ­
ices th a t  such  c a r r ie r ,  lan d lo rd , cu s to d ian , o r  
p e rso n  is  acco rd in g  th e  p e rso n  w hose co m m u n i­
ca tio n s  a re  to  be in te rcep ted . A ny  com m unica­
tio n  com m on c a r r ie r ,  lan d lo rd , cu s to d ian  o r 
o th e r  p e rso n  fu rn is h in g  such  fa c ilit ie s  o r  te ch ­
n ica l a ss is tan ce  sh a ll be co m p en sa ted  th e re fo r  
by th e  a p p lic a n t a t  th e  p re v a ilin g  ra te s .

R ule 41 o f th e  F e d e ra l R u les o f C rim in a l P ro ce ­
du re  p rov ides, in  p e r t in e n t  p a r t :

(b )  P ro p e r ty  W hich  M ay  Be Seized W ith  a  
W a r r a n t .  A  w a r r a n t  m a y  be issu ed  u n d e r  th is  
ru le  to  sea rch  fo r  a n d  seize a n y  ( 1 ) p ro p e r ty  
th a t  co n s titu te s  evidence o f th e  com m ission o f a  
c r im in a l o ffense; o r  (2 ) c o n tra b an d , th e  f r u i t s

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o f c rim e, o r  th in g s  o th e rw ise  c r im in a lly  pos­
sessed ; o r  ( 3 ) p ro p e r ty  d esig n ed  o r  in te n d e d  fo r  
u se  o r w h ich  is  o r  h a s  been  u sed  a s  th e  m ean s  of 
co m m ittin g  a  c r im in a l offense.

* * * * *

(d )  E x ec u tio n  a n d  R e tu rn  w ith  In v en to ry . 
T h e  officer ta k in g  p ro p e r ty  u n d e r  th e  w a r r a n t  
sh a ll g iv e  to  th e  p e rso n  f ro m  w hom  o r  fro m  
w hose p rem ise s  th e  p ro p e r ty  w as  ta k e n  a  copy 
o f th e  w a r r a n t  a n d  a  re c e ip t f o r  th e  p ro p e r ty  
ta k e n  o r  sh a ll leave th e  copy a n d  re c e ip t a t  th e  
p lace  fro m  w h ich  th e  p ro p e r ty  w a s  ta k en . T he 
r e tu r n  sh a ll be m ade  p ro m p tly  a n d  sha ll be ac ­
com pan ied  by  a  w r i t te n  in v e n to ry  o f a n y  p ro p ­
e r ty  ta k en . T he in v e n to ry  sh a ll be m ad e  in  th e  
p resen ce  o f th e  a p p lic a n t f o r  th e  w a r r a n t  a n d  
th e  p e rso n  fro m  w hose possession  o r p rem ises  th e  
p ro p e r ty  w as  ta k e n , i f  th e y  a re  p re se n t, o r  in  th e  
p resen ce  o f a t  le a s t one cred ib le  p e rso n  o th e r  th a n  
th e  a p p lic a n t f o r  th e  w a r r a n t  o r  th e  p e rso n  fro m  
w hose possession  o r  p rem ise s  th e  p ro p e r ty  w as 
tak en , a n d  sh a ll be v e rified  by  th e  officer. T he 
fe d e ra l m a g is tr a te  sh a ll up o n  re q u e s t d e liv e r a  
copy o f th e  in v e n to ry  to  th e  p e rso n  fro m  w hom  
o r  fro m  w hose p rem ises  th e  p ro p e r ty  w as  ta k e n  
a n d  to  th e  a p p lic a n t f o r  th e  w a r r a n t .

S T A T E M E N T

F o llo w in g  a  ju r y  t r i a l  in  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  D is­
t r i c t  C o u rt fo r  th e  D is tr ic t  o f N ew  Je rse y , p e titio n e r  
w as  conv icted  o f rece iv in g  goods sto len  fro m  a n  in ­
te r s ta te  sh ip m en t, in  v io la tio n  o f 18 U .S .C . 2315, an d  
o f co n sp iracy  to  t ra n s p o r t ,  receive, a n d  possess the 
goods, in  v io la tio n  o f 18 U .S .C . 371. H e w as  sen-

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teneed  to  c o n c u rre n t te rm s  o f five y e a r s ’ im p riso n ­
m ent. T he c o u r t o f ap p ea ls  affirm ed (P e t. A pp . l a -  
8a ) .

1. O n M arch  27, 1973, Jo sep h  P a la se , a  m em b er 
of a  g ro u p  o f f a b r ic  th ieves, a sk ed  p e t i t io n e r  i f  he 
could s to re  “a  load  o f m e rc h an d ise” on p e t i t io n e r ’s 
b usiness p rem ise s  in  L in d en , N ew  J e rs e y  (T r .  1.64- 
1.65, 2 .65-2 .69, 2 .8 7 -2 .8 8 ). P e ti t io n e r  re fu se d  th is  
req u es t because  on a  p rev io u s  occasion he h a d  been 
an g e re d  a b o u t th e  w ay  th e  tr a n s a c tio n  h a d  been 
h an d led  a n d  a b o u t th e  f a c t  th a t  he h a d  been p a id  
only $300 to  s to re  th e  m erch an d ise  (T r .  3 .140-3.141, 
3.167-3.172, 4 .54-4 .60, 4 .7 3 -4 .7 5 ). In s te a d , p e titio n e r  
a r ra n g e d  fo r  a n o th e r  asso c ia te , Jo sep h  H ig g in s , to 
s to re  th e  s to len  goods (T r .  2 .65-2 .69, 2 .87-2 .89, 3.135- 
3.139, 3 .1 5 7 -3 .1 5 8 ). H ig g in s  a n d  p e t i t io n e r  a g ree d  to 
divide th e  $1,500 fee  th e y  expected  to  receive fo r  
concealing th e  m erch an d ise  (T r .  2.60-2.62, 3.139, 
3.158, 3 .1 6 2 -3 .1 6 3 ).

On A p ril 3, 1973, co -d e fen d an t D an ie l Rizzo a n d  
two o th e r  m en  h ija ck ed  a  F a r a h  M a n u fa c tu r in g  Com ­
p an y  t r a c to r - t r a i le r  in  B rook lyn , N ew  Y ork . T he 
tru ck  w as  c a r ry in g  664 ro lls  o f p o ly este r  fa b r ic  v a l­
ued a t  a p p ro x im a te ly  $250,000 (P e t. A pp. 2 a ;  T r . 
3.68-3.77, 3.88-3.91, 4 .6 4 -4 .7 0 ). L a te r  th a t  day , th e  
fab ric  w as  u n lo ad ed  a t  H ig g in s ’ w areh o u se  in  W ood- 
bridge, N ew  J e rs e y  (T r .  1 .70 -1 .73 ). T he tru c k  w as  
then  ab an d o n ed  on S ta te n  Is la n d  (T r .  1.73, 2 .2 1 -2 .2 2 ). 
Two d ay s la te r , F B I  a g e n ts  a r re s te d  H ig g in s , P a la se , 
and th re e  o th e r  p e rso n s  a t  H ig g in s ’ w areh o u se  as

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th e y  w ere  lo ad in g  th e  sto len  ro lls  o f f a b r ic  on to  tw o  
U -H a u l tru c k s  (T r .  1.77-1.88, 1 .90-1 .91, 2.29-2.30, 
3 .1 6 3 -3 .1 6 6 ).

2. A t  t r ia l ,  th e  g o v e rn m e n t in tro d u c e d  ta p e  r e ­
co rd in g s  o f 13 te lephone  co n v ersa tio n s  to  w h ich  p e t i­
t io n e r  w as  a  p a r ty  a n d  e ig h t co n v ersa tio n s  th a t  took 
p lace  in  h is  office. T he te lephone  co n v ersa tio n s  ( th e  
ad m iss ib ility  o f w h ich  is  n o t ch a llen g ed  h e re )  w ere  
in te rc e p te d  p u r s u a n t  to  c o u r t  o rd e rs  e n te re d  on 
M arch  14, 1973, a n d  A p ril  5, 1973.1 T h ey  in c lu d ed  
th e  co n v ersa tio n  in  w h ich  p e t i t io n e r  a r r a n g e d  w ith  
H ig g in s  to  le t th e  f a b r ic  th iev es s to re  th e ir  booty  a t  
H ig g in s ’ w areh o u se  (T r .  2 .6 0 -2 .6 2 ), co n v ersa tio n s  
b e tw een  p e t i t io n e r  a n d  P a la se  re g a rd in g  th e  s to rag e  
a r ra n g e m e n t (T r .  2 .65-2 .69, 2 .75-2 .81, 2.87-2.88, 
2 .90, 2 .9 2 -2 .9 3 ), a n d  co n v ersa tio n s  in  w h ich  p e t i­
tio n e r  w as  in fo rm e d  o f th e  a r r e s ts  a n d  ad v ised  o th e rs  
w ho h a d  n o t been  a r r e s te d  to  “ s i t  t ig h t” a n d  n o t to  
u se  th e  te lephone (T r .  2 .97-2 .99, 2 .1 0 0 -2 .1 0 2 ).

T h e  reco rd in g s  o f th e  e ig h t co n v ersa tio n s  in  p e t i­
tio n e r ’s office th a t  w e re  a d m itte d  a t  t r i a l  w ere  in te r -

1 T h e  tw o  w ir e  in te r c e p t io n  o rd er s  w e r e  e n te r e d  p u r su a n t  
to  T i t le  I I I  o f  t h e  O m n ib u s C r im e  C o n tro l a n d  S a fe  S tr e e ts  
A c t  o f  1 9 6 8 , 18  U .S .C . 2 5 1 0 -2 5 2 0 . T h e  f ir s t  o r d e r  a u th o r iz ed  
w ir e  in te r c e p t io n s  f o r  a  p e r io d  o f  2 0  d a y s , a n d  th e  seco n d  
o r d e r  e x te n d e d  th e  a u th o r iz a t io n  f o r  a n  a d d it io n a l 20  d a y s  
(P e t .  A p p . 2 a - 3 a ; A . 6 a - 1 0 a ) . A  th ir d  w ir e  in te r c e p t io n  o rd er  
w a s  e n te r e d  o n  A p r il  2 7 , 1 9 7 3 , e x te n d in g  t h e  a u th o r iz a tio n  
f o r  a n  a d d it io n a l 20  d a y s  (A . l l a - 1 5 a ) , b u t  n o  c o n v e r sa t io n s  
in te r c e p te d  u n d e r  th e  a u th o r ity  o f  t h a t  o r d e r  w e r e  in tr o d u ce d  
a t  tr ia l .  A ll  th r e e  o r d e r s  w e r e  e n te r e d  b y  J u d g e  F r e d e r ic k  
B . L a c e y , w h o  a lso  p r e s id e d  a t  p e t it io n e r ’s tr ia l .

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cepted  p u r s u a n t  to  th e  c o u r t  o rd e r  o f A p ril  5, 1973.® 
In  th e  co u rse  o f those  co n v ersa tio n s , a ll o f  w h ich  took 
place a f t e r  H ig g in s  a n d  th e  fa b r ic  th iev es h a d  been  
a rre s te d , p e t i t io n e r  d iscu ssed  th e  a r re s ts ,  sp ecu la ted  
th a t  som eone h a d  “p u t  th e  f in g e r” on H ig g in s , a n d  
m ade s ta te m e n ts  re fle c tin g  h is  in v o lv em en t in  th e  
fa b r ic  s to ra g e  o p e ra tio n  a n d  in  o th e r  schem es involv­
ing  th e  s to ra g e  o f s to len  p ro p e r ty  (see, e.g., T r . 3.63, 
3.80-3.86, 3 .100, 3 .1 8 2 -3 .1 8 4 ).

3. T he g o v e rn m e n t’s a p p lica tio n  fo r  a u th o riz a tio n  
to co nduct o ra l in te rc e p tio n s  in c lu d ed  a n  affid av it by 
F B I A g e n t D o u g las  L. H o k en stad , w ho wTas  th e n  in  
ch arg e  o f th e  in v e s tig a tio n . T h e  a ffid av it p ro v id ed  a n  
ex tensive  acco u n t o f th e  in v e s tig a tio n  o f p e t i t io n e r ’s 
on-going d ea lin g s  in  s to len  goods a n d  se t fo r th  r e a ­
sons to  believe th a t  p e t i t io n e r  u sed  h is  office on a  
re g u la r  b as is  to  d iscuss th e  sa le  o f s to len  goods 
(H o k en stad  A ffidavit, a t ta c h e d  to  a p p lica tio n  fo r  
A p ril 5, 1973, o rd e r ) .

On th e  b as is  o f th e  ap p lic a tio n  a n d  th e  affidavit, 
the d is tr ic t  c o u r t  e n te re d  th e  A p ril 5 o rd e r  au th o riz -  2 * * * * * * 9

2 T h e  A p r il  5  o r d e r  t h a t  a u th o r iz e d  th e  c o n t in u a t io n  o f  th e
w ire  in te r c e p t io n s  a lso  p r o v id e d  th e  in it ia l  a u th o r iz a tio n  fo r  
th e  in te r c e p tio n  o f  o ra l c o m m u n ic a t io n s  in  p e t it io n e r ’s office
(A . 8 a ) . T h is  a u th o r iz a t io n  w a s  e x te n d e d  on  A p r il  27  (A . 11a-
1 5 a ) ,  b u t  no c o n v e r s a t io n s  in te r c e p te d  p u r su a n t  to  th a t  e x te n ­
sion  o rd er  w e r e  a d m it te d  a t  tr ia l .  S ix  o f  th e  e ig h t  c o n v e r sa ­
tio n s  o v e r h e a r d  b y  m e a n s  o f  th e  d e v ic e s  p la ce d  in  p e t it io n e r ’s
office a n d  a d m itte d  in  e v id e n c e  a t  t r ia l  to o k  p la c e  on  A p r il  6,
th e  d a y  a f t e r  th e  a r r e s ts  (T r . 3 .6 3 -3 .6 4 , 3 .7 8 -3 .8 6 , 3 .9 8 -3 .1 0 0 , 
3 .1 0 1 -3 .1 0 2 , 3 .1 0 3 -3 .1 0 5 , 3 .1 7 5 -3 .1 8 6 ) ,  o n e  to o k  p la c e  on  A p r il
9 (T r . 4 .7 3 -4 .7 5 ) ,  a n d  t h e  la s t  to o k  p la c e  on  A p r il  17  (T r . 
4 .9 3 -4 .9 4 ) .

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in g  th e  in i t ia t io n  o f in te rc e p tio n  o f o ra l co m m u n ica­
tio n s  a n d  th e  co n tin u ed  in te rc e p tio n  o f w ire  com ­
m u n ica tio n s  (A . 6 a -1 0 a ) . T he c o u r t  fo u n d  p ro b ab le  
cau se  to  believe th a t  p e t i t io n e r  a n d  o th e rs  w ere  en ­
g ag ed  in  th e f ts  f ro m  in te r s ta te  sh ip m en ts , sa le  o r  
re c e ip t o f s to len  goods, in te rfe re n c e  w ith  com m erce 
by  th r e a ts  o r  violence, a n d  co n sp irac y  (A . 6a ) .  T he 
c o u r t f u r th e r  fo u n d  th a t  th e re  w as  p ro b ab le  cau se  to 
believe th a t  th e  a u th o riz e d  w ire  a n d  o ra l co m m u n ica­
tio n s  w ould  p ro v id e  ev idence co n ce rn in g  th ese  offenses 
a n d  th a t  n o rm a l in v e s tig a tiv e  m eth o d s a p p e a re d  u n ­
like ly  to  succeed a n d  w ere  too d an g e ro u s  (A . 7 a ) .  
In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  c o u r t fo u n d  th a t  p e t i t io n e r ’s office 
“ [w as] b e in g  used , a n d  is  b e in g  u sed  by  [p e ti tio n e r]  
a n d  o th e rs  a s  y e t u n k n o w n  in  connection  w ith  the  
com m ission  o f th e  above-described  offenses” ( ib id .) .

A ccord ing ly , th e  A p ril  5 o rd e r  a u th o riz e d  F B I  
a g e n ts  to  in te rc e p t o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s  in  p e titio n ­
e r ’s office, w h ich  w as  specifically  id en tified  a s  th e  
15- by  18-foo t room  in  th e  n o r th w e s t c o rn e r  o f th e  
o n e-sto ry  b u ild in g  th a t  housed  h is  b u s in ess  o p e ra tio n  
(A . 8a ) .  T he o rd e r  p ro v id ed  th a t  th e  a u th o riz a tio n  
to  in te rc e p t b o th  o ra l a n d  w ire  co m m u n ica tio n s “ shall 
be ex ecu ted  a s  soon as  p ra c tic a b le  a f te r  s ig n in g  of 
th is  O rd e r  a n d  sh a ll be cond u cted  in  su ch  a  w ay  as 
to  m in im ize  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f co m m u n ica tio n s no t 
o th e rw ise  su b jec t to  in te rc e p tio n  * * *” (A . 9 a ) .  T he 
o rd e r  d id  n o t o th e rw ise  sp ec ify  th e  m a n n e r  o f execu­
tion , ex cep t to  p ro v id e  th a t  th e  N ew  J e rs e y  Bell 
T elephone C om pany  shou ld  fu rn is h  a ll in fo rm a tio n , 
fa c ilit ie s  a n d  tech n ica l a ss is ta n c e  n ecessa ry  to  ac-

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com plish  th e  w ire  in te rc e p tio n  u n o b tru s iv e ly  (A . 9 a ) . 
T he o rd e r  co n ta in ed  no ex p lic it a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  
ag en ts  to  e n te r  p e t i t io n e r ’s p lace  o f b u s in ess  to  in s ta ll  
th e  lis te n in g  device n ecessa ry  to  in te rc e p t th e  o ra l 
com m unica tions.

A t a b o u t m id n ig h t on th e  n ig h t o f A p ril 5-6, F B I  
ag en ts  sec re tly  e n te re d  p e t i t io n e r ’s office fo r  th e  p u r ­
pose o f in s ta llin g  a n  e lec tro n ic  lis te n in g  device (A . 
3 1 a -3 2 a ) . T he a g e n ts  e n te re d  th e  b u ild in g  th ro u g h  
an  open  side w in d o w ; a f te r  d e te rm in in g  th a t  th e  
b u ild in g  w as  em p ty , th e y  w e n t to  p e t i t io n e r ’s office, 
w h ere  th e y  in s ta lle d  th e  lis te n in g  device in  th e  acous­
tica l tile s  in  th e  ce ilin g  d ire c tly  above p e t i t io n e r ’s 
desk (A . 31a-32a, 3 6 a -3 9 a ; E x h ib it  A , a tta c h e d  to  
Gov’t  C.A. B r. a t  3, 6 , 9 ) .  T h e  in s ta lla tio n  a n d  
te s tin g  p ro ced u re  took a b o u t tw o  to  th re e  h o u rs  
(A . 3 9 a -4 0 a ) . T he a g e n ts  seized no evidence w hile 
they  w ere  in  th e  b u ild in g  (A . 3 2 a ) .

T he lis te n in g  device fu n c tio n ed  w ith o u t need  fo r  
a d ju s tm e n t th ro u g h o u t th e  p e rio d  fo r  w hich  th e  o ra l 
in te rcep tio n s  w ere  au th o rized , a n d  b e tw een  th e  d a te  
of in s ta lla tio n  a n d  th e  d a te  o f rem oval th e  ag en ts  
m ade no e n tr ie s  on to  th e  p rem ises  (A . 32a, 4 2 a ) .  
On M ay  16, 1973, a ll e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  ended. 
T h a t n ig h t, F B I  a g e n ts  re -e n te re d  th e  b u ild in g  
th ro u g h  th e  sam e w indow  a n d  rem oved  th e  lis te n in g  
device (A . 36a, 4 0 a -4 1 a ) .

4. P r io r  to  t r ia l ,  p e t itio n e r  m oved to  su p p re ss  th e  
evidence o b ta in ed  by  m ean s  o f th e  e lec tron ic  su rv e il­
lance. A m ong  th e  g ro u n d s  u rg e d  fo r  su p p ressio n  w as 
th a t  th e  a g e n ts  lacked  a u th o r i ty  to  m ake  th e  s u r ­
rep titio u s  e n tr ie s  in to  p e t i t io n e r ’s office to  in s ta ll  an d

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rem ove th e  lis te n in g  device (T r .  1 ,3 -1 .1 2 ). T he d is ­
t r i c t  c o u r t d en ied  th e  m otion  w ith o u t p re ju d ic e  to  
ren ew a l a t  th e  close o f t r i a l  (T r .  1 .1 7 ).

A f te r  t r ia l ,  th e  c o u r t  held  a n  e v id e n tia ry  h e a r in g  
on p e t i t io n e r ’s m otion . F o llo w in g  th e  h e a r in g , th e  
c o u r t  den ied  th e  m otion , f in d in g  th a t  th e  e n t ry  in to  
p e t i t io n e r ’s b u s in ess  p rem ise s  w as  th e  s a fe s t  a n d  
m o st successfu l m ethod  o f in s ta llin g  th e  lis te n in g  
device needed  to  accom plish  th e  in te rc e p tio n  (P e t. 
A pp . 1 7 a ) .  In  m o st cases, th e  c o u r t observed, “ th e  
on ly  fo rm  of in s ta llin g  such  devices is  th ro u g h  b re a k ­
in g  a n d  e n te r in g . T h e  n a tu re  o f th e  a c t  is  such  th a t  
e n t ry  m u s t be s u r re p ti t io u s  a n d  m u s t n o t a ro u se  
susp ic ion , a n d  th e  in s ta lla tio n  m u s t be done w ith o u t 
th e  know ledge o f th e  re s id e n ts  o r  o ccu p an ts” (id . a t  
1 7 a -1 8 a ) . A ccord ing ly , th e  c o u r t  h e ld  th a t  once a  
sh o w in g  o f p ro b ab le  cau se  is  m ade  to  su p p o r t th e  
is su an ce  o f a  c o u r t  o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  th e  in te rc e p tio n  
o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s, “ th e re b y  sa n c tio n in g  th e  
se rio u s  in tru s io n  cau sed  by  in te rcep tio n , im p lic it in  
th e  c o u r t’s o rd e r  is co n co m itan t a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  
a g e n ts  to  co v ertly  e n te r  th e  p rem ise s  in  qu estio n  an d  
in s ta ll  th e  n ecessa ry  eq u ip m en t” (id . a t  1 8 a ) .

5. T he c o u r t o f ap p ea ls  affirm ed (P e t.  A pp. l a -  
8a ) .  I t  accep ted  J u d g e  L acey ’s f in d in g  th a t  s u r ­
re p ti tio u s  e n try  w as  th e  m o st effective m ean s  fo r  
in s ta llin g  th e  lis te n in g  device a s  w ell a s  h is  find ings 
th a t  th e  in s ta lla tio n  w as  b ased  on p ro b ab le  cau se  an d  
w as  ex ecu ted  in  a  reaso n ab le  fa sh io n  (id . a t  7 a ) .  In  
th ese  c ircu m stan ces, th e  c o u r t  held, n e i th e r  T itle  I I I  
n o r  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t re q u ire d  ex p ress  au th o ri-

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za tio n  fo r  th e  e n t ry  beyond  th a t  p ro v id ed  by th e  a u ­
th o riz a tio n  fo r  th e  in te rc e p tio n  itse lf . T he c o u r t 
noted, how ever, th a t  i t  w as  n o t a d o p tin g  a  ru le  th a t  
specific a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  w ould  
n ev e r be re q u ire d  a n d  s ta te d  th a t  in  th e  f u tu r e  i t  
w ould  be p re fe ra b le  f o r  g o v e rn m e n t a g e n ts  to  inc lude  
a  s ta te m e n t re g a rd in g  th e  need  fo r  such  a n  e n try  
w hen  a  b re a k - in  is  co n tem p la ted  ( ib id .) .  B u t  on th e  
fa c ts  o f th is  case, th e  c o u r t  held  th a t  th e  a g e n ts ’ 
fa ilu re  to  in c lu d e  a  specific e n try  p ro v is io n  in  th e ir  
req u es t f o r  a u th o riz a tio n  to  co n d u c t an  in te rc e p tio n  
of o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s d id  n o t r e s u l t  in  a  c o n s ti tu ­
tio n a l o r s ta tu to ry  v io la tio n  a n d  d id  n o t re q u ire  s u p ­
p ressio n  o f th e  in te rc e p te d  co n v ersa tio n s.

S U M M A R Y  O F  A R G U M E N T

T he in te rc e p te d  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s th a t  w ere  
in tro d u ced  a t  t r i a l  in  th is  case  w ere  seized p u r s u a n t  
to a  su rv e illan ce  o rd e r  e n te re d  by  th e  d is tr ic t  c o u r t 
u n d e r  th e  a u th o r i ty  o f T itle  I I I  o f th e  O m nibus 
C rim e C on tro l a n d  S a fe  S tre e ts  A c t o f 1968. T he 
o rd e r specified th e  location  a t  w hich  th e  in te rcep tio n s  
w ere to  ta k e  place, th e  p e rso n s  w hose co n v ersa tio n s 
w ere to  be in te rcep ted , a n d  th e  offenses f o r  w h ich  th e  
in v e s tig a tio n  w as  b e in g  conducted . T he o rd e r  d id  
not, how ever, sp ec ify  th e  m ode by w hich  th e  F B I  
ag en ts  co n d u c tin g  th e  in v e s tig a tio n  shou ld  in s ta ll  th e  
lis ten in g  device n ecessa ry  to  execu te  th e  su rv e illan ce  
order. P e ti t io n e r  cha llenges th e  ad m issio n  o f th e  r e ­
cord ings o f o ra l com m u n ica tio n s in  h is  office on th re e  
g ro u n d s : f irs t, t h a t  th e  C o n s titu tio n  does n o t em-

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p o w er c o u rts  to  a u th o riz e  law  e n fo rcem en t officers 
to  m ake  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  to  in s ta ll  e lec tro n ic  s u r ­
v e illance  eq u ip m en t u n d e r  a n y  c irc u m s ta n c e s ; second, 
th a t  c o u r ts  h av e  no s ta tu to ry  a u th o r i ty  to  p e rm it 
officers to  m ak e  such  e n tr ie s ;  a n d  th ird , th a t  because  
th e  su rv e illan ce  o rd e r  d id  n o t c o n ta in  ex p ress  a u ­
th o r iz a tio n  fo r  a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try , th e  e n t ry  in  
th is  case— a n d  th e  re s u lt in g  in te rc e p tio n s  o f p e titio n ­
e r ’s co n v ersa tio n s— v io la ted  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t.

1. T h e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t c o n ta in s  no ab so lu te  
p ro h ib itio n  a g a in s t  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s . A  fo rc ib le  
e n t ry  on to  p r iv a te  p ro p e r ty  is  p la in ly  p e rm issib le  in  
ex ec u tin g  a  sea rch  w a r r a n t ;  a  co u rt-a u th o riz e d  
se a rch  does n o t depend  on th e  acquiescence o f th e  
o w n er o r  o ccu p an t o f th e  p ro p e r ty  to  be searched . 
T h u s , p e t i t io n e r ’s b ro ad s id e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l a t ta c k  on 
s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  m ade  to  execu te  a  su rv e illan ce  
o rd e r  m u s t be a n  ob jection  to  th e  s u r re p ti t io u s  n a tu re  
o f th e  e n try , th a t  is, to  th e  lack  o f p r io r  o r  con tem ­
p o ran eo u s  no tice  to  th e  o w n er o r  o ccu p an t o f the  
p rem ises. B u t  p r io r  no tice  o f e n try  is n o t c o n s ti tu ­
tio n a lly  re q u ire d  in  th e  c o n tex t o f e lec tro n ic  su rv e il­
lance. To give n o tice  of e n try  to  in s ta ll  e lec tron ic  
eav esd ro p p in g  eq u ip m en t w o u ld  p la in ly  d e s tro y  the 
p u rp o se  o f th e  se a rc h : to  o b ta in  in c r im in a tin g  con­
v e rsa tio n s  w ith o u t th e  sp e a k e r’s a w a re n e ss  th a t  they  
a re  b e in g  reco rded . T h is  C o u rt h a s  c lea rly  in d ica te d  
th a t  e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  is  n o t u n c o n s titu tio n a l 
i f  p ro p e rly  au th o riz e d  by  a  co u rt, a n d  T itle  I I I  p ro ­
v ides a  co n s titu tio n a lly  p e rm issib le  schem e o f co u rt 
a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  th a t  fo rm  o f in v e s tig a tio n . T hus,

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even i f  th e  C o n s titu tio n  im poses a  re q u ire m e n t th a t  
police g iv e  no tice  b e fo re  e n te r in g  a  hom e to  execu te  
a  co n v en tio n a l se a rch  w a r r a n t ,  th a t  c o n s titu tio n a l 
p rin c ip le  h a s  no ap p lica tio n  to  e n tr ie s  m ad e  to  exe­
cu te  a  c o u r t’s su rv e illan ce  o rd e r, p a r t ic u la r ly  w h en  
the  b u ild in g  e n te re d  is n o t a  p r iv a te  hom e, b u t  a n  
unoccup ied  b u sin ess  office.

2 . T he s ta tu to ry  a u th o r i ty  f o r  th e  e n try  to  in s ta ll  
e lectron ic  eav esd ro p p in g  eq u ip m en t is fu rn is h e d  by  
R ule 41 o f th e  F e d e ra l  R u les o f C rim in a l P ro ced u re . 
T h a t ru le  p ro v id es  f o r  th e  se izu re  o f p ro p e r ty  of 
v a rio u s  k in d s, a n d  i t  im p lic itly  a u th o rize s  law  en ­
fo rcem en t a g e n ts  to  e n te r  p r iv a te  p rem ises  w h ere  
n ecessa ry  to  se a rch  fo r  a n d  seize such  p ro p e rty . 
N o th in g  in  T itle  I I I  su g g es ts  th a t  C ongress in ten d ed  
to r e s t r ic t  th e  a u th o r i ty  g ra n te d  u n d e r  R ule  41 to 
e n te r  p r iv a te  p rem ises  to  execu te  a  c o u r t  o rd e r. In  
fac t, th e  leg is la tiv e  h is to ry  o f T itle  I I I  p la in ly  in d i­
cates th a t  C ongress w as  a w a re  th a t  s u r re p ti t io u s  
e n trie s  onto  p r iv a te  p rem ises  w ould  be n ecessa ry  to  
conduct e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  in  m an y  cases. A c­
cord ingly , th e  g e n e ra l s ta tu to ry  a u th o r i ty  to  e n te r  
p r iv a te  p rem ises  g ra n te d  by R ule  41 ap p lies  in  the  
case o f e n tr ie s  to  co n d u c t e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  as 
well a s  in  th e  case o f m ore  con v en tio n al searches.

3. A lth o u g h  th e  su rv e illan ce  o rd e r  in  th is  case d id  
not co n ta in  a n y  ex p ress  a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  th e  s u r ­
rep titio u s  e n try , no such  a u th o riz a tio n  is req u ire d  
e ith e r by  T itle  I I I  o r  by  th e  F o u r th  A m endm en t. 
W hile T itle  I I I  co n ta in s  d e ta iled  req u ire m e n ts  r e ­
specting  w h a t m u s t be show n to  o b ta in  a  su rv e illan ce

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o rd e r , i t  is  s ile n t re g a rd in g  th e  m ode o f e n try  to 
ex ecu te  a n  o rd e r  issu ed  u n d e r  i ts  p ro v isions. T h u s  
T itle  I I I  now here , ex p ress ly  o r  by  im p lica tio n , r e ­
q u ire s  th a t  a  c o u r t  a u th o riz in g  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  
specifically  describe  th e  m ean s  by  w h ich  th e  su rv e il­
lance  w ill be c a r r ie d  o u t, in c lu d in g  a n  a u th o riz a tio n  
o f s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  i f  th a t  is n ecessary .

T h e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t also  does n o t re q u ire  ex ­
p re ss  p r io r  a u th o riz a tio n  o f th e  m ethod  u sed  to  ex ­
ecu te  th e  su rv e illan ce  o rd e r. T he p ro tec tio n s  o f th e  
F o u r th  A m en d m en t a g a in s t  u n rea so n ab le  sea rch es 
a n d  se izu re s  ap p ly , o f course, to  th e  m ethods u sed  by 
la w  e n fo rcem en t ag e n ts  to  c a r ry  o u t co u rt-a u th o riz e d  
e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce . B u t  in  th is  case th e re  is no 
d o u b t th a t  th e  u se  o f a  co v e rt e n try  to  in s ta ll  th e  
lis te n in g  device w as  a  c o n s titu tio n a lly  reaso n ab le  p ro ­
cedure . B o th  c o u r ts  below  fo u n d  th a t  i t  w as  th e  
only  feas ib le  m ean s  of ex ec u tin g  th e  eav esd ro p p in g  
o rd e r, a n d  p e t i t io n e r  does n o t ch allenge those  find ings.

S ince th e  ac tio n  o f th e  ag e n ts  w as  reaso n ab le , 
p e titio n e r  c an  p re v a il on ly  i f  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t 
b a rs  a ll e n trie s , no m a t te r  how  n ecessa ry  o r  re a so n ­
able, in  th e  absence o f ex p ress  ad v an ce  ju d ic ia l a u ­
th o riz a tio n . W e co n ten d  th a t  a  c o u r t  is su in g  a  w a r ­
r a n t  n eed  n o t sp ec ify  th e  m a n n e r  in  w h ich  a  sea rch  
is  to  be conducted . In s te a d , th e  la w fu ln e ss  of th e  
m ean s  u sed  to  execu te  a  w a r r a n t  shou ld  be d e te r ­
m in ed  by a  su b seq u en t ev a lu a tio n  of th e  reaso n ab le ­
n ess o f th e  a g e n ts ’ ac tions. In  c irc u m stan c es  such  as 
those  o f th is  case, w h ere  th e  need  fo r  a  s u r re p ti t io u s  
e n t ry  w a s  ev id en t a t  th e  tim e  th e  c o u r t  considered

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th e  a p p lica tio n  a n d  au th o riz e d  th e  eav esd ro p p in g , w e 
su b m it th a t  th e  issu an ce  o f th e  o rd e r  c o n s ti tu te d  im ­
p lic it a u th o riz a tio n  o f th e  co v e rt e n t ry  n ece ssa ry  to 
c a r ry  i t  ou t.

O u r  an a ly s is  is  su p p o rte d  by  ex a m in a tio n  o f th e  
ru le s  g o v e rn in g  co n v en tio n al search es. U n d e r  th e  
F o u r th  A m en d m en t’s W a r r a n t  C lause , w a r r a n ts  a u ­
th o riz in g  such  sea rch es  m u s t p a r t ic u la r ly  describe  
the  p lace  to  be sea rch ed  a n d  th e  th in g s  to  be seized. 
B u t n e i th e r  th e  te x t  o f th e  A m en d m en t n o r  t r a d i ­
tio n a l p ra c tic e  re q u ire s  a n y  s e p a ra te , ex p ress  a u th o r ­
iza tio n  o f th e  p a r t ic u la r  m ean s  to  be u sed  to  execu te  
the  w a r r a n t ,  in c lu d in g  a n y  fo rc ib le  e n try  in to  p r iv a te  
p rem ises  th a t  m ay  be req u ire d . R a th e r , th e  a u th o r i­
za tio n  to  m ak e  a n  e n t ry  is im p lic it in  th e  a u th o r iz a ­
tion  to  co n d u ct th e  sea rch . T he m a n n e r  o f e n try  is 
su b jec t to  c o n s titu tio n a l in q u iry  fo r  reaso n ab len ess, 
b u t th a t  in q u iry  focuses up o n  th e  p a r t ic u la r  m ean s 
em ployed, n o t u p o n  th e  c o n ten t o f th e  w a r r a n t .

O f course , th e  w a r r a n t  p ro ced u re  can  be u sed  to 
p rov ide ad v an ce  p ro tec tio n  a g a in s t  u n rea so n ab le  
m ethods o f ex ec u tin g  a  se a rch  i f  th e  c o u r t o r  m a g is ­
t r a te  so chooses. T he ju d ic ia l officer h a s  th e  p o w er to 
in q u ire  in to  th e  m ean s  to  be em ployed  to  c a r ry  o u t 
the sea rch  a n d  to  im pose such  re s tr ic tio n s  th e reo n  as 
he deem s a p p ro p r ia te . In  th e  p re s e n t case, w h ere  i t  
w as e v id en t f ro m  th e  a p p lica tio n  th a t  a  co v ert e n try  
w as likely  to  be e sse n tia l to  in s ta ll  th e  lis te n in g  de­
vice, no such  re s tr ic tio n s  w ere  deem ed n ecessary , a n d  
none w as  im posed.

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W e acknow ledge th a t  i t  is  o rd in a r i ly  p re fe ra b le  fo r  
th e  a g e n ts  to  seek a n d  th e  c o u r t  to  g ive  ex p ress  a u ­
th o r iz a tio n  fo r  a n y  co v e rt e n try  n ecessa ry  to  execu te  
a n  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  o rd e r. T h e  D e p a r tm e n t of 
J u s t ic e  h a s  m odified  i ts  p ro ced u re s  so th a t  ex p ress  
a u th o r iz a t io n  is  now  so u g h t w h en ev er a  c o v e rt e n try  
w ill be n ecessa ry . B u t  th e  p ro ced u re  em ployed  in  th is  
case v io la ted  n e i th e r  s ta tu to ry  n o r  c o n s ti tu tio n a l r e ­
q u irem en ts , a n d  th e re  is  acco rd in g ly  no occasion to 
su p p re ss  th e  co n v ersa tio n s  in te rc e p te d  a n d  u sed  in  
ev idence a t  p e t i t io n e r ’s t r ia l .

A R G U M E N T

I

T H E  F O U R T H  A M E N D M E N T  D O E S  N O T  P R O H I B I T  
C O U R T -A U T H O R IZ E D  S U R R E P T I T I O U S  E N T R I E S  
T O  I N S T A L L  E L E C T R O N IC  E A V E S D R O P P I N G  D E ­
V IC E S

P e ti t io n e r  a rg u e s  (B r . 19-24) th a t  th e  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t p ro h ib its  law  e n fo rcem en t a g e n ts  fro m  
m a k in g  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  on to  p r iv a te  p ro p e r ty  
to  in s ta ll  eav esd ro p p in g  devices, even  i f  th e  e n tr ie s  
a re  m ade  p u r s u a n t  to  c o u r t  a u th o riz a tio n . T h is  con­
te n tio n  h a s  been  re je c te d  by ev ery  c o u r t  o f  ap p ea ls  
th a t  h a s  ru le d  on i t ,’3 a n d  i t  is  in c o n s is te n t w ith  th is

3 In  a d d it io n  to  th e  c o u r t  o f  a p p e a ls  in  t h is  ca se , t h e  co u rts  
o f  a p p e a ls  f o r  th e  S eco n d , F o u r th , a n d  E ig h th  C ir c u its  h a v e  
h e ld  t h a t  th e  C o n s t itu t io n  d o es  n o t  im p o s e  a n  a b so lu te  b a n  on  
su r r e p t it io u s  e n tr ie s  to  in s ta ll  e a v e sd r o p p in g  d e v ic e s . S ee  
United States V. Scafidi, 5 6 4  F .2 d  6 3 3 , 6 4 0 , 6 4 2  (2 d  C ir. 
1 9 7 7 ) ,  c e r t , d en ied , 4 3 6  U .S . 9 0 3  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  Application of

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C o u r t’s a n a ly s is  o f th e  a p p lica tio n  o f th e  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t to e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce .

I t  is in d isp u ta b le  th a t  law  e n fo rcem en t ag e n ts  m ay  
b re a k  a n d  e n te r  p r iv a te  p ro p e r ty  to  execu te  a  sea rch  
w a r r a n t .  A ccord ing ly , p e t i t io n e r ’s a t ta c k  c a n n o t be 
on th e  e n try  itse lf , b u t  m u s t be th a t  th e  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t ab so lu te ly  b a rs  e n tr ie s  con d u cted  in  a  
s u r re p ti t io u s  m a n n e r , i.e., w ith o u t co n tem p o ran eo u s 
notice to  th e  in d iv id u a l w hose p rem ise s  a re  en te red . 
Y e t in  th e  c o n tex t o f e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce , p r io r  o r  
co n tem p o ran eo u s n o tice  w ould  p la in ly  d e s tro y  th e  
v ia b ility  o f th e  sea rch . S ince c o u rt-a u th o riz e d  elec­
tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  is  c o n s titu tio n a lly  perm issib le , 
the F o u r th  A m en d m en t’s com m and  o f reaso n ab len ess  
does n o t p ro h ib it s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  on to  p r iv a te  
p ro p e r ty  w h en  su ch  e n tr ie s  a re  n ecessa ry  to  in s ta ll

United States, 5 6 3  F .2 d  6 3 7 , 6 4 3 -6 4 4  (4 th  C ir. 1 9 7 7 )  ; United 
States V. Agrusa, 5 4 1  F .2 d  6 9 0 , 6 9 6 -6 9 8  (8 th  C ir. 1 9 7 6 ) ,  
cert, d en ied , 4 2 9  U .S . 104 5  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  T h r e e  o th e r  c o u r ts  o f  
a p p ea ls  h a v e  d ec lin e d  to  d e c id e  w h e th e r  s u r r e p t it io u s  e n tr ie s  
to in s ta ll  e a v e sd r o p p in g  d e v ic e s  a r e  a b so lu te ly  p r o h ib ite d  b y  
th e  F o u r th  A m e n d m e n t  i t s e l f .  S ee  United States v . Santora, 
583 F .2 d  4 5 3 , 4 6 3  (9 th  C ir . 1 9 7 8 )  ; United States v . Finazzo, 
583 F .2 d  8 3 7 , 8 5 0  (6 th  C ir . 1 9 7 8 )  ; United States v . Ford, 5 5 3  
F .2d  146 , 170  (D .C . C ir. 1 9 7 7 ) .  B u t  se e  United States v. 
Barker, 5 4 6  F .2 d  9 4 0 , 9 5 3  n .4 0  (D .C . C ir . 1 9 7 6 )  (o p in io n  o f  
W ilk ey , J . )  ( “ i f  a  t r e s p a s s  is  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  in  a  p a r t ic u la r  
case to  e f fe c t  a n  e a v e sd r o p , t h e  c o u r t  n eed  n o t  g r a tu ito u s ly  
a u th o r ize  a  su r r e p t it io u s  e n tr y ;  b u t  f e w  w o u ld  q u e stio n  a  
cou rt’s p o w e r  to  do so  in  th o s e  c a s e s  in  w h ic h  i t  is  r e q u ir e d ” ) . 
In a b r ie f  d is s e n t  fr o m  th e  d en ia l o f  en  b a n c  r e v ie w  in  United 
States v . Agrusa, supra, f o u r  ju d g e s  o f  th e  E ig h th  C ir c u it  
sta ted  t h a t  th e y  “ e n te r ta in  g r e a t  d o u b t o f  th e  v a lid ity  o f  a  
ju d ic ia l o r d e r  w h ic h  a u th o r iz e s ” su r r e p t it io u s  e n tr ie s  to  in ­
sta ll e a v e sd r o p p in g  d e v ic e s . 5 4 1  F .2 d  a t  7 0 4 .

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th e  lis te n in g  devices needed  to  execu te  a  c o u r t’s 
eav esd ro p p in g  o rd e r.

M oreover, a n y  c o n s ti tu tio n a l re q u ire m e n t of no tice  
( a  su b jec t n o w h ere  m en tio n ed  in  th e  te x t  o f th e  
F o u r th  A m en d m en t)  is  sa tis f ied  in  th is  case  by  th e  
p o s t-se izu re  n o tice  a ffo rd ed  u n d e r  T itle  I I I .  T h e  con­
te n tio n  th a t  th e  C o n s titu tio n  ab so lu te ly  p ro h ib its  de­
f e r r a l  o f n o tice  o f a  sea rch  o r  e n try , even  w h en  such  
d e fe r r a l  is  in d isp en sab le  to  th e  successfu l execu tion  
o f th e  sea rch , c an n o t w ith s ta n d  an a ly sis .

A. Electronic Eavesdropping is Constitutionally Permis­
sible

P r io r  to  th e  decision  in  K a tz  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  389
U .S . 347 (1 9 6 7 ) , th is  C o u rt h a d  h e ld  th a t  eav es­
d ro p p in g  w ould  be deem ed a  “ se a rc h ” fo r  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t p u rp o ses  only  i f  i t  invo lved  a n  u n la w fu l 
tre sp a s s . S ilv e r m a n  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  365 U .S . 505 
(1 9 6 1 ) ;  O n L ee  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  343 U .S . 747 
(1 9 5 2 ) ;  G oldm an  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  316 U .S . 129 
(1 9 4 2 ) ;  O lm stea d  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  277 U .S . 438 
(1 9 2 8 ) . In  each  o f th e se  cases, th e  g o v e rn m e n t h ad  
u sed  som e device to  o v e rh e a r  th e  d e fe n d a n t’s conver­
sa tio n s, b u t  th e  C o u rt h e ld  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t 
in ap p licab le  u n le ss  th e re  h a d  been  a n  u n a u th o riz e d  
p h y sica l in tru s io n  in to  p r iv a te  p rem ise s  to  conduct 
th e  eav esd ro p p in g . In  none o f th ese  cases d id  the  
police o b ta in  a  w a r r a n t  to  co n d u ct th e  eav esd ro p p in g .4

4 In Silverman the Court noted that the intrusion was “un­
authorized” (365 U.S. at 509), and it observed that the Court 
had never authorized police intrusions into a home or office

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B e r g e r  v. N e w  Y o r k , 388 U .S . 41 (1 9 6 7 ) , c a s t 
se rio u s  d o u b t on th e  co n tin u ed  decisiveness o f th e  
d is tin c tio n  be tw een  tre s p a s s o ry  a n d  n o n -tre sp a sso ry  
in tru s io n s . T he C o u rt in  th a t  case  held  u n c o n s ti tu ­
tio n a l on  i ts  face  a  N ew  Y o rk  s ta tu te  th a t  p e rm itte d  
non-consensual w ire ta p p in g  a n d  eav esd ro p p in g , w ith  
o r w ith o u t p h y sica l in tru s io n s . A lth o u g h  th e  N ew  
Y o rk  p ro ced u re  re q u ire d  c o u r t  a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  elec­
tro n ic  su rv e illan ce , th e  C o u rt held  th a t  th e  p ro ced u re  
nonetheless w as  in a d e q u a te  in  v a r io u s  re sp ec ts  to  
m eet F o u r th  A m en d m en t s ta n d a rd s .

F in a lly , in  K a tz  v. U n ite d  S ta te s , su p ra , th e  C o u rt 
re je c ted  th e  p ro p o s itio n  th a t  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t 
is in ap p licab le  to  sea rch es  n o t in v o lv in g  p h y sica l in ­
tru s io n s  in to  p r iv a te  p rem ises. In s te a d , th e  C o u rt 
held  th a t  w h e th e r  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  c o n s titu te s  a 
“se a rc h ” d epends up o n  reaso n ab le  ex p ec ta tio n s  o f 
p r iv ac y  w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  co m m u n ica tio n s seized 
r a th e r  th a n  w h e th e r  th e re  h a s  been  a  p h y sica l in t r u ­
sion in to  a n  a r e a  in  w h ich  th e  d e fe n d a n t h a s  a  t r a d i ­
tio n a l p ro p e r ty  in te re s t.

for the purpose of eavesdropping “without [a] warrant” (id. 
at 512). Similarly, in Irvine V. California, 347 U.S. 128 
(1954), the Court noted that the police entries to install listen­
ing devices in the defendant’s home were trespassory because 
they occurred “without a search warrant or other process” 
(347 U.S. at 132). In Goldman, Mr. Justice Murphy dissented 
on the ground that the eavesdropping in that case constituted 
a search, but he expressly noted that a warrant could have 
been devised to permit that kind of intrusion. 316 U.S. at 140 
& n.7. See also On Lee V. United States, swpra, 343 U.S. at 
765-767 (Burton, J., dissenting) ; Lopez V. United States, 373 
U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

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T h e  a g e n ts  in  K a tz  a t ta c h e d  a  lis te n in g  device to  
th e  o u ts id e  o f a  te lephone booth  th e  d e fe n d a n t w as  
u s in g  a n d  th e re b y  o v e rh e a rd  h is  p o r tio n  o f sev e ra l 
in c r im in a tin g  te lephone co n v ersa tio n s . U n d e r  th e  
F o u r th  A m en d m en t a n a ly s is  ad o p ted  by th e  C o u rt 
in  K a tz ,  th e  ev idence o b ta in ed  fro m  th e  u se  o f th e  
lis te n in g  device w a s  th u s  th e  p ro d u c t o f a  search . 
S ig n ifican tly , how ever, th e  C o u rt d id  n o t ru le  th a t  
ev idence o b ta in ed  by  a n  eav esd ro p p in g  “ se a rc h ” is 
a lw ay s  in ad m iss ib le . In s te a d , i t  h e ld  th a t  th e  ev i­
dence h a d  to  be su p p re sse d  solely because th e  law  
e n fo rcem en t a g e n ts  h a d  n o t o b ta in ed  c o u r t  a u th o r iz a ­
tio n  fo r  th e  eav esd ro p p in g . 389 U .S . a t  356-357, 359. 
C itin g  i t s  decisions in  O sborn  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  385 
U .S . 323 (1 9 6 6 ) , a n d  B e r g e r  v. N e w  Y o rk ,
su p ra , th e  C o u rt ru le d  th a t  p ro p e rly  au th o riz e d  
e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  w ou ld  be p erm issib le . 389 U .S . 
a t  355-356. In d eed , i t  specifically  s ta te d  th a t  th e  s u r ­
v e illance  o f K a tz ’s co n v ersa tio n s  w ou ld  h av e  been 
la w fu l i f  ju d ic ia l a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  th e  su rv e illan ce  
h a d  been  ob ta in ed . 389 U .S . a t  354.

B. Title III Provides a Scheme for Electronic Eaves­
dropping that Meets Constitutional Standards

F o llo w in g  th is  C o u r t’s decisions in  B e rg e r  a n d  
K a tz ,  C ongress en ac ted  th e  O m nibus C rim e C ontro l 
a n d  S afe  S tre e ts  A c t o f 1968, P u b . L. N o. 90-351, 
82 S ta t .  197. T itle  I I I  of th a t  A c t es tab lish es  a  de­
ta ile d  schem e fo r  ju d ic ia l a u th o riz a tio n  o f in te rc e p ­
tio n s  o f w ire  a n d  o ra l com m unica tions. T h e  p ro v i­
sions closely tr a c k  th is  C o u r t’s an a ly s is  in  B erg er

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in  a n  e ffo rt to  overcom e th e  v a r io u s  c o n s titu tio n a l 
in f irm itie s  th a t  th e  C o u rt h a d  fo u n d  in  th e  N ew  Y o rk  
e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  s ta tu te .  See S c o tt  v. U n ited  
S ta te s ,  436 U .S . 128, 130 (1 9 7 8 ) ;  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. 
U n ited  S ta te s  D is tr ic t C o u rt, 407 U .S . 297, 302 
(1 9 7 2 ).

T itle  I I I  sa tis f ie s  each  o f th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l objec­
tio n s th a t  th e  C o u rt h a d  ra is e d  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  
N ew  Y o rk  s ta tu te .  T he s ta tu te  p e rm its  in te rc e p tio n  
of w ire  a n d  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s only  in  lim ited  c i r ­
cu m stan ces a n d  only  p u r s u a n t  to  c o u r t  a u th o riz a tio n . 
See 18 U .S .C . 2511. A u th o r iz a tio n  m ay  be g ra n te d  
only u p o n  a  d e ta ile d  show ing  a n d  a  f in d in g  by  th e  
c o u r t th a t  th e re  is  p ro b ab le  cau se  to  believe th a t  a n  
in d iv id u a l is  en g ag ed  in  one o f th e  offenses fo r  w hich  
e lectron ic  su rv e illan ce  is  p e rm itte d  (18  U .S.C . 2518 
(3 ) ( a ) ) ,  t h a t  p a r t ic u la r  co m m u n ica tio n s co n ce rn in g  
th a t  offense w ill be o b ta in ed  th ro u g h  th e  in te rc e p tio n  
(18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (3 )  ( b ) ) ,  a n d  th a t  th e  w ire  o r  loca­
tio n  a t  w h ich  th e  in te rc e p tio n  is to  ta k e  p lace  is 
being  u sed  in  connection  w ith  th e  com m ission  o f th e  
offense (1 8  U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (3 )  (d )  ).* T he s ta tu te  also  
re q u ire s  th a t  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o rd e r  id e n tify  w ith  
p a r t ic u la r i ty  th e  p erso n s, i f  know n, w hose com m uni­
catio n s a re  to  be in te rc e p te d  (1 8  U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  
( a ) ) ,  describe  th e  fa c ilit ie s  o r  p lace  a s  to  w h ich  th e  
a u th o r i ty  to  in te rc e p t is  b e in g  g ra n te d  (1 8  U .S.C . 
2 5 1 8 (4 )  ( b ) ) ,  a n d  sp ec ify  th e  ty p e  o f com m unica tion

'These stringent probable cause requirements meet the 
Court’s concern that the New York statute’s “reasonable 
cause” standard was too lax. See 388 U.S. at 54-55.

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24
b e in g  so u g h t a n d  th e  offense to  w h ich  i t  re la te s  (18  
U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  ( c )).*3

T he s ta tu te  f u r th e r  re q u ire s  th a t  th e  officers ex ­
ecu te  th e  o rd e r  quickly , m a in ta in  th e  in te rc e p tio n  fo r  
on ly  a  lim ited  p e rio d  o f tim e , a n d  m ak e  a  tim e ly  r e ­
tu r n  on th e  eav esd ro p p in g  o rd e r  show ing  w h a t w as 
seized. 18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (5 ) ,  2 5 1 8 (8 )  ( a ) . 7 M oreover, 
th e  s ta tu te  re q u ire s  a  sh o w in g  by  th e  a p p lic a n t a n d  
a  f in d in g  by  th e  c o u r t  th a t  o th e r  in v e s tig a tiv e  m e th ­
ods h av e  been  tr ie d  a n d  h av e  fa ile d  o r  reaso n ab ly  
a p p e a r  to  be u n lik e ly  to  succeed o r  too d an g e ro u s  to  
a t te m p t.  18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (1 )  ( c ) ,  2 5 1 8 (3 )  ( c ) .8

F in a lly , th e  s ta tu te  p ro v id es  th a t  th e  p erso n s 
n a m ed  in  th e  o rd e r  sh a ll be se rv ed  w ith  a n  in v e n to ry  
w ith in  a  reaso n ab le  tim e  a f t e r  th e  in te rc e p tio n  is 
au th o rized , g iv in g  n o tice  of th e  o rd e r  o r  ap p lica tio n , 
th e  d isp o s itio n  o f th e  ap p lica tio n , a n d  w h e th e r  com ­
m u n ic a tio n s  w ere  in te rcep ted . 18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (8 )  ( d ) .  
See U n ite d  S ta te s  v. D onovan, 429 U .S . 413, 428- 
432 (1 9 7 7 ) .9

6 T h e s e  p r o v is io n s  a r e  r e s p o n s iv e  to  t h e  C o u r t’s  o b je c t io n  
t h a t  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  p r o c e d u r e  c o n ta in e d  n o  r e q u ir e m e n t  th a t  
t h e  p la c e  to  b e  se a r c h e d  a n d  th e  th in g s  to  b e  s e iz e d  b e  p a r ­
t ic u la r ly  d esc r ib ed . S e e  3 8 8  U .S . a t  5 6 -5 9 .

7 T h e  N e w  Y o r k  s t a tu t e  w a s  c r it ic iz e d  f o r  i t s  fa i lu r e  to  co n ­
t a in  a n y  su c h  p r o v is io n s . 3 8 8  U .S . a t  5 9 -6 0 .

8 T h is  p r o v is io n  w a s  d e s ig n e d  to  re sp o n d  to  t h e  C o u r t’s 
o b se r v a tio n  t h a t  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  s t a tu t e  p e r m it te d  “u n c o n ­
se n te d  e n tr y  w ith o u t  a n y  sh o w in g  o f  e x ig e n t  c ir c u m s ta n c e s .” 
3 8 8  U .S . a t  60 .

9 T h is  p r o v is io n  w a s  a d d r e sse d  to  th e  C o u r t’s  o b se r v a tio n  
t h a t  th e  N e w  Y o rk  s t a tu te  c o n ta in e d  n o  p r o v is io n  f o r  n o tic e  
to  t h e  p e r so n  w h o s e  c o m m u n ic a t io n s  w e r e  o v er h e a rd . 388  
U .S . a t  6 0 .

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In  lig h t o f  th e  close co n tro ls  im posed  by  th e  s t a t ­
u te  a n d  i t s  c a re fu l a t te n tio n  to  th e  c o n s titu tio n a l 
concerns voiced by th e  C o u rt in  B erg er ,  ev e ry  c o u r t 
o f ap p ea ls  th a t  h a s  ru le d  on th e  issu e  h a s  h e ld  th a t  
T itle  I I I  is co n s titu tio n a l. See, e.g., U n ite d  S ta te s  v. 
T u rn e r ,  528 F .2 d  143, 158-159 (9 th  C ir. 1 9 7 5 ) ;  
U n ited  S ta te s  v. SJclaroff, 506 F .2 d  837, 840 (5 th  C ir. 
1 9 7 5 ) ;  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. R a m se y ,  503 F .2 d  524, 526 
(7 th  C ir. 1 9 7 4 ), c e r t, den ied , 420 U .S . 932 (1 9 7 5 ) ;  
U n ited  S ta te s  v. O’N e ill, 497 F .2 d  1020, 1026 ( 6 th  
C ir. 1 9 7 4 ) ;  U n ited  S ta te s  v. Ja m es , 494 F .2 d  1007, 
1013 (D .C . C ir .) ,  c e r t, den ied , 419 U .S . 1020 (1 9 7 4 ) ;  
U n ited  S ta te s  v. T ortorello , 480 F .2 d  764, 775 (2 d  
C ir .) ,  ce rt, den ied , 414 U .S . 866  (1 9 7 3 ) ;  U n ited  
S ta te s  v. Bobo, 477 F .2 d  974, 981 (4 th  C ir. 1 9 7 3 ) ;  
U n ited  S ta te s  v. C afero , 473 F .2 d  489, 495-500 (3 d  
C ir. 1 9 7 3 ), c e rt, den ied , 417 U .S. 918 (1 9 7 4 ) ;  U n ited  
S ta te s  v. C ox, 462 F .2 d  1293 ( 8 th  C ir. 1 9 7 2 ) ;  Cox  
v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  449 F .2 d  679 (1 0 th  C ir. 1 9 7 1 ) .10

10 T h is  C o u r t h a s  n e v e r  h e ld  t h a t  T i t le  I I I  is  c o n s t itu t io n a l  
on  i t s  fa c e , s e e  United States v . Kahn, 4 1 5  U .S . 1 43 , 150  
(1 9 7 4 )  ; United States V. United States District Court, 4 0 7
U . S . 2 9 7 , 3 0 8  ( 1 9 7 2 ) ,  b u t  o n  se v e r a l o c c a s io n s  i t  h a s  u p h eld  
th e  a d m is s io n  o f  e v id e n c e  o b ta in e d  u n d e r  th e  a u th o r ity  o f  
T itle  I I I  d e sp ite  c o n s t itu t io n a l c h a lle n g e . S ee  Scott V. United 
States, supra; United States V. Donovan, 4 2 9  U .S . 4 1 3  (1 9 7 7 )  ; 
United States v . Chavez, 4 1 6  U .S . 5 6 2  (1 9 7 4 )  ; United States
V. Kahn, supra. C f. Nixon V. Administrator of General Serv­
ices, 4 3 3  U .S . 4 2 5 , 4 6 3 -4 6 5  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .

97



26

C. T h e  F o u r th  A m e n d m e n t  P e r m its  S u r r e p t it io u s  E n ­
t r ie s  to  E x e c u te  E a v e s d r o p p in g  O r d e r s  I s s u e d  In  
C o m p lia n c e  w ith  T i t le  I I I

A lth o u g h  p e t i t io n e r  acknow ledges th a t  T itle  I I I  is 
“a  c a re fu l resp o n se  to  th e  B e rg e r  a n d  K a tz  h o ld in g s” 
(B r . 2 2 ) ,  he co n ten d s th a t  th e  s ta tu te  fa ils  to  s a tis fy  
th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l ob jections ra is e d  in  B e rg e r  in  one 
c r it ic a l resp ec t. A cco rd in g  to  p e titio n e r  (B r . 2 3 ) ,  
T itle  I I I  im p ro p e rly  p e rm its  u n co n sen ted  e n t ry  w ith ­
o u t no tice  o r  a  sh o w in g  o f ex igency, a  p o in t th a t  th e  
C o u rt n o ted  in  B e rg e r  a s  one o f th e  in f irm itie s  of th e  
N ew  Y o rk  s ta tu te .  388 U .S . a t  60.

P e ti t io n e r ’s ob jection  to  th e  lack  o f p r io r  o r  con­
tem p o ran eo u s  no tice  is d isposed  o f by  K a tz  v. U n ited  
S ta te s , su p ra , a n d  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. D onovan, sup ra . 
I n  K a tz ,  th e  C o u rt s ta te d  th a t  th e  reaso n s  fo r  r e ­
q u ir in g  n o tice  p r io r  to  a n  e n t ry  o r  a  se izu re  o f ev i­
dence h av e  no b e a r in g  in  th e  c o n tex t of e lec tron ic  
su rv e illan ce . 389 U .S . a t  355 n .16. In  th e  case  of 
ju d ic ia lly  a u th o riz e d  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce , th e  co u rt 
observed , th e  p u rp o ses  th a t  g en e ra lly  u n d e rlie  th e  r e ­
q u ire m e n t o f no tice— av o id in g  th e  shock o f u n a n ­
n ounced  police in tru s io n  in to  th e  hom e a n d  m in im iz­
in g  th e  d a n g e r  to  th e  police o f a n  u n an n o u n ced  
e n try — do n o t app ly . Ib id . T h e  C o u rt m ade  th e  sam e 
p o in t in  D onovan, th is  tim e  w ith  ex p ress  re fe ren c e  
to  T itle  I I I .  C itin g  th e  p o rtio n  o f B e rg e r  on w hich  
p e t i t io n e r  re lies  a n d  th e  p o rtio n  o f K a tz  r e f e r r e d  to 
above, th e  C o u rt held  th a t  th e  no tice  a n d  r e tu r n  
p ro v is io n s  in  T itle  I I I ,  18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (8 )  ( a ) ,  “ s a t­
is fy  c o n s ti tu tio n a l re q u ire m e n ts .” U n ited  S ta te s  v.

98



27

D onovan, su p ra , 429 U .S . a t  429 n .19. T h e  s ta tu te  
en su re s  th a t  n o tice  o f th e  in te rc e p tio n s  w ill be p ro ­
v id ed ; i t  s im p ly  p o stpones th e  n o tice  u n ti l  a f te r  th e  
in te rcep tio n .

P e ti t io n e r ’s ob jection  th a t  th e  s ta tu te  lacks a n  ad e ­
q u a te  re q u ire m e n t th a t  ex igency  be show n is  also  
w ith o u t m e rit .  T itle  I I I  ex p re ss ly  re q u ire s  a  show ­
ing  o f ex igency  b e fo re  a  w ire  o r  o ra l in te rc e p tio n  
m ay  be au th o rized . See 18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (1 )  ( c ) ,  2518 
( 3 ) ( c ) .  P r io r  to  a p p ro v in g  a n y  e lec tro n ic  su rv e il­
lance, th e  c o u r t  m u s t find  th a t  o th e r  in v e s tig a tiv e  
m ethods h av e  been  tr ie d  a n d  hav e  fa ile d  o r  a re  im ­
p rac ticab le . T hese s ta tu to ry  p ro v is io n s  hav e  u n i­
fo rm ly  been  h e ld  to  s a t is fy  th e  ob jection  in  B e rg e r  
th a t  th e  N ew  Y o rk  s ta tu te  p e rm itte d  “u n co n sen ted  
e n try  w ith o u t a n y  sh o w in g  o f e x ig e n t c irc u m sta n c e s” 
(388 U .S . a t  6 0 ) .  See, e.g., U n ite d  S ta te s  v. S k la r -  
off, su p ra , 506 F .2 d  a t  8 4 0 ; U n ite d  S ta te s  v. Bobo, 
supra , 477 F .2 d a t  9 8 2 ; U n ite d  S ta te s  v. C afero , s u ­
pra, 473 F .2 d  a t  498-501.

T he b ro a d e r  co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t 
does n o t p e rm it  e n tr ie s  on to  p r iv a te  p ro p e r ty  to  in ­
stall eav esd ro p p in g  devices u n d e r  a n y  c irc u m stan c es  
is in c o n sis ten t w ith  th e  C o u r t’s  a n a ly s is  in  K a tz ,  
Osborn, a n d  B erg er ,  a n d  w ith  w ell-se ttled  p rin c ip le s  
govern ing  th e  ex ecu tio n  o f se a rch  w a r r a n ts  g en era lly . 
A lthough th e  su rv e illan ce  in  K a tz  a n d  O sborn  d id  
not involve p h y sica l tre sp asse s , th e  ra tio n a le  o f those 
cases su g g es ts  th a t  th e re  sh o u ld  be no d is tin c tio n  fo r  
F o u rth  A m en d m en t p u rp o ses  be tw een  a n  in tru s io n  by 
electronic su rv e illan ce  f ro m  o u ts id e  th e  p h y sica l

99



p rem ise s  in  q u estio n  a n d  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  th a t  
involves a n  u n co n sen ted  e n try . T h e  C o u rt im p lic itly  
recogn ized  th is  p o in t in  A ld e r m a n  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  
394  U .S . 165 (1 9 6 9 ) , w h en  i t  observed  th a t  u n d e r  
th e  p r in c ip le s  o f S ilv e r m a n  a n d  K a tz ,  officers can n o t 
e n te r  a  house to  in s ta ll  a  lis te n in g  device i f  th e  in ­
tru s io n  is n o t m ad e  p u r s u a n t  to  a  v a lid  w a r r a n t .  
See also  T . T ay lo r, T w o  S tu d ie s  in  C o n s titu tio n a l 
In te r p r e ta t io n  114 (1 9 6 9 ) .

M oreover, B e rg e r  i ts e lf  invo lved  a  s u r re p ti t io u s  
e n t ry  to  in s ta ll  a n  e av e sd ro p p in g  device, a n d  the 
C o u r t’s op in ion  n o w h ere  su g g es ted  th a t  th e  in tru s io n  
to  in s ta ll  th e  device w as  p e r  se  u n reaso n ab le . In s tead , 
th e  C o u rt h e ld  only  th a t  th e  N ew  Y o rk  w a r r a n t  p ro ­
ced u re  w a s  too b ro a d  to  p e rm it  “ a  tre s p a s s o ry  in ­
tru s io n  in to  a  c o n s titu tio n a lly  p ro te c te d  a r e a ” (388 
U .S . a t  4 4 ) .  T he C o u rt w a s  c a re fu l to  p o in t o u t th a t  
e av e sd ro p p in g  ca n  be c o n s titu tio n a lly  p erm issib le  
“u n d e r  specific co n d itio n s a n d  c irc u m sta n c e s” (388 
U .S . a t  6 3 ) . T he F o u r th  A m en d m en t, th e  C o u rt ob­
served , does n o t m ak e  th e  hom e o r  th e  office s a n c tu ­
a r ie s  w h e re  th e  law  can  n ev e r  reach , “b u t  i t  does 
p re sc r ib e  a  c o n s ti tu tio n a l s ta n d a rd  th a t  m u s t be m et 
b e fo re  official in v asio n  is  p e rm iss ib le” (388  U .S . a t 
6 4 ) .11

11 T h r e e  m e m b e r s  o f  th e  C o u rt in  Berger w o u ld  h a v e  upheld  
th e  c o u r t-a u th o r iz e d  in tr u s io n  a n d  in te r c e p t io n  in  t h a t  case. 
S e e  3 8 8  U .S . a t  81  (B la c k , J .,  d is s e n t in g )  ; id. a t  94  (H a r la n , 
J ., d is s e n t in g )  ; id. a t  112  (W h ite , J .,  d is s e n t in g ) .  M r. J u stice  
S te w a r t ,  w h o  co n cu rr ed  o n  a  n a r r o w  g r o u n d , w o u ld  n o t  have  
s tr u c k  d o w n  t h e  N e w  Y o r k  s ta tu te ,  b u t , l ik e  th e  th r e e  d is­
s e n te r s ,  w o u ld  h a v e  h e ld  t h a t  e le c tr o n ic  e a v e sd r o p p in g  under  
th e  a u th o r ity  o f  th e  N e w  Y o r k  s t a tu t e  w o u ld  b e  co n stitu tio n a l

28

100



29

T he la w  g o v e rn in g  th e  ex ecu tio n  o f con v en tio n al 
sea rch  w a r r a n ts  is  in  acco rd an ce  w ith  th is  an a ly sis . 
T he c o u r ts  h av e  u n ifo rm ly  held  th a t  e n tr ie s  in to  u n ­
occupied p rem ise s  to  u n d e r ta k e  o th e rw ise  p erm issib le  
sea rch es  a r e  co n s titu tio n a l. U n ite d  S ta te s  v. B ro w n , 
556 F .2 d  304, 305 (5 th  C ir. 1 9 7 7 ) ;  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. 
A g ru sa , su p ra , 541 F .2 d  a t  6 9 8 ; P a yn e  v. U n ited  
S ta te s ,  508 F .2 d  1391, 1393-1394 (5 th  C ir .) ,  ce rt, 
denied, 423 U .S . 933 (1 9 7 5 ) ;  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. Ger~ 
vato , 474 F .2 d  40 (3 d  C ir .) ,  ce rt, den ied , 414 U .S. 
846 (1 9 7 3 ) .“

A lth o u g h  th is  C o u r t h a s  n e v e r  ex p ress ly  h e ld  th a t  
e n tr ie s  in to  unoccup ied  p rem ises  a re  co n s titu tio n a l, 
the  C o u r t’s  F o u r th  A m en d m en t decisions a re  con­
s is te n t w ith  th is  p rin c ip le . O n n u m ero u s  occas­
ions w hen  th e  C o u rt h a s  h e ld  th a t  a  w a r r a n t  w as  
req u ire d  in  o rd e r  to  m ak e  a  v a lid  sea rch , th e  p re m ­
ises in  q u estio n  w ere  v a c a n t o r  th e  p ro p e r ty  u n a t ­
tended , e i th e r  because o f th e  a r r e s t  o f  th e  d e fe n d a n t * 12

i f  a n  a d e q u a te  s h o w in g  o f  p ro b a b le  c a u s e  w e r e  m a d e . Id. a t  
68 (S t e w a r t ,  J . c o n c u r r in g  in  th e  r e s u l t ) .  O n ly  M r. J u s t ic e  
D o u g la s  w o u ld  h a v e  h e ld  e le c tr o n ic  e a v e sd r o p p in g  im p e r m is ­
s ib le  in  a ll c a se s . Id. a t  6 7  (D o u g la s ,  J ., c o n c u r r in g ) .

12 T h e  r u le  in  t h e  s t a t e  c o u r ts  is  th e  sa m e . S ee , e.g., State 
V. Gutierrez, 91  N .M . 5 4 2 , 5 7 7  P .2 d  4 4 0 , 4 4 7 -4 4 8  (1 9 7 8 )  ; Hart 
V. Superior Court, 2 1  C al. A p p . 3 d  4 9 6 , 5 0 2 -5 0 4 , 98  C al. R p tr . 
565, 5 6 9 -5 7 1  ( 1 9 7 1 )  ; State v . Calvert, 2 1 9  T en n . 5 3 4  4 1 0  
S .W .2d  9 0 7  (1 9 6 6 )  ; State V. Williams, 2 5 0  L a . 6 4 , 193  S o. 2d  
787 ( 1 9 6 7 )  ; Outlaw V. State, 2 0 8  M iss . 13, 4 3  S o . 2d  661  
(1 9 4 9 )  ; State v . Robinson, 3 5 4  M o. 7 4 , 188  S .W . 2d  664  
(1 9 4 5 )  ; Thigpen V. State, 5 1  O kla . C rim . 2 8 , 2 9 9  P . 2 3 0  
(1 9 3 1 )  ; People V. Law, 55  M isc . 2d  1 0 7 5  2 8 7  N .Y .S . 2d  565  
(1 9 6 8 ) ; People V. Johnson, 2 3 1  N .Y .S . 2d  6 8 9  (S u p . C t. 1 9 6 2 )  ; 
State V. Dropolski, 1 0 0  V t. 2 5 9 , 136  A . 8 3 5  ( 1 9 2 7 ) .

101



o r f o r  som e o th e r  reason.™ See, e.g., M in ce y  v. A r i ­
zona, N o. 77-5353 ( J u n e  21, 1 9 7 8 ) ;  M ich ig a n  v. 
T y le r ,  436 U .S . 499 (1 9 7 8 ) ;  C h a p m a n  v. U n ited  
S ta te s ,  365 U .S . 610, 615 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ;  A g n e llo  v. U n ited  
S ta te s ,  269 U .S . 20, 32-33 (1 9 2 5 ) . W h ile  som e r e f ­
eren ce  to  th e  su b je c t could  be expected  i f  p e t i t io n e r ’s 
p ro p o s itio n  w e re  co rrec t, th e se  decisions c o n ta in  no 
su g g es tio n , ex p lic it o r  im p lic it, t h a t  th e  ta r g e t  o f  the  
se a rch  o r  som eone a c tin g  on th e  ta r g e t ’s b e h a lf  w ould  
h av e  to  be p re s e n t o r  h av e  p r io r  n o tice  f o r  th e  sea rch  
to  be co n s titu tio n a l.

F in a lly , even  th e  com m on law  ru le  g o v e rn in g  en ­
tr ie s  to  ex ecu te  se a rch  w a r r a n ts  does n o t su p p o r t 
p e t i t io n e r ’s positio n . A t  com m on law , g o v ern m en t 
officers ex ec u tin g  a  sea rch  w a r r a n t  could  n o t b reak  
in to  a  p r iv a te  dw elling , a b se n t e x ig en t c ircu m stan ces, 
w ith o u t f i r s t  an n o u n c in g  th e i r  id e n tity  a n d  purpose. 
See M ille r  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  357 U .S . 301 (1 9 5 8 ) ;  
B lakey , T h e  R u le  o f  A n n o u n c e m e n t a n d  U n la w fu l  
E n t r y :  M ille r  v . U n ite d  S ta te s  a n d  K e r  v. C a lifo rn ia , 
112 U . P a . L . R ev. 499, 501-504 (1 9 6 4 ) . T h a t  ru le  h as  
been  codified in  18 U .S .C . 3109 a n d  h a s  been  c h a ra c te r ­
ized  a s  h a v in g  c o n s ti tu tio n a l overtones. See S a b b a th  v. 
U n ite d  S ta te s ,  391 U .S . 585, 591 n .8 (1 9 6 8 ) ;  K e r  v. 
C a lifo rn ia , 374 U .S . 23, 49, 53 (o p in io n  o f B ren n an , 13

13 T h e  F e d e r a l R u le s  o f  C r im in a l P r o c e d u r e  p la in ly  co n tem ­
p la te  t h a t  so m e  v a lid  w a r r a n t  se a r c h e s  w il l  ta k e  p la c e  w h en  
t h e  p r e m is e s  se a r c h e d  a r e  u n o c cu p ie d . R u le  4 1 ( d )  p ro v id es  
t h a t  a  co p y  o f  th e  w a r r a n t  a n d  a  r e c e ip t  sh a ll b e  g iv e n  to  the  
p e r s o n  fr o m  w h o s e  p r e m ise s  t h e  p r o p e r ty  w a s  ta k e n  o r  [ le f t ]  
a t  th e  p la c e  fr o m  w h ic h  t h e  p r o p e r ty  w a s  t a k e n .” S im ila r ly , 
t h e  in v e n to r y  m u s t  b e  m a d e  in  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  th e  p erso n s  
f r o m  w h o s e  p r e m is e s  t h e  p r o p e r ty  w a s  ta k e n  “ i f  th e y  are  

p r e s e n t .”

30



J . ) -  T h e  com m on la w  re q u ire m e n t o f p r io r  notice, 
how ever, does n o t a id  p e t i t io n e r  h e re  f o r  se v e ra l r e a ­
sons. F i r s t ,  because  fo rm s  o f  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  
w ere  th e n  u n k n o w n , th e  com m on law  ru le  w as  d esig n ed  
solely w ith  re fe re n c e  to  co n v en tio n al sea rch es  fo r  
ta n g ib le  p ro p e r ty  a lre a d y  in  ex istence. T he costs to  
law  e n fo rcem en t o f a  ru le  o f p r io r  no tice  w e re  p ro p ­
e r ly  perce iv ed  a s  m in im a l in  th a t  con tex t. In  th e  
case o f e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce , by  c o n tra s t ,  p r io r  no ­
tice  w ould  in v a ria b ly  d e s tro y  th e  p u rp o se  o f th e  
search . T h u s, i t  is  d ifficu lt to  c re d it  th e  v iew  th a t  
th e  com m on la w  ju d g e s  w ould  h av e  ap p lied  th e  r e ­
q u ire m e n t o f p r io r  no tice  i f  th ey  h a d  been faced  w ith  
th e  p rob lem  o f  c o u r t-a u th o riz e d  e lec tro n ic  s u rv e il­
lance. M oreover, bo th  th e  com m on law  ru le  a n d  18
U . S.C. 3109 ap p ly  on ly  to  p r iv a te  d w ellin g s .14 Ac-

A t  co m m o n  la w , n o  a n n o u n c e m e n t  w a s  e v e r  req u ired  
p r io r  to  s e a r c h in g  a  b u ild in g  o th e r  th a n  a  h o m e. S e e  Penton
V. Brown, 1 K e b le  6 9 9 , 8 3  E n g . R ep . 1 1 9 3  (K .B . 1 6 6 4 )  ; Andro­
scoggin R.R. v. Richards, 41  M e. 2 3 3 , 2 3 8  (1 8 5 6 )  ; B la k e y ,  
The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. 
United States and Ker v. California, supra, 112  U . P a . L . R ev . 
a t  5 0 1 -5 0 4 . S e c t io n  3 1 0 9  is  s im ila r ly  l im ite d  to  e n tr ie s  in to  
d w e llin g s  a n d  h a s  n o  a p p lic a t io n  to  e n tr ie s  in to  o th e r  p r iv a te  
p r o p e r ty . S e e  United States v. Agrusa, supra, 5 4 1  F .2 d  a t  
697 , 6 9 9 -7 0 0  & n n .2 1 , 2 2  (c o lle c t in g  c a s e s )  ; Fields v. United 
States, 3 5 5  F .2 d  5 4 3  (5 th  C ir . ) ,  c e r t , d ism is se d , 3 8 4  U .S .  
935 ( 1 9 6 6 ) .

T h e  c o u r ts  h a v e  r e c o g n iz e d  a n  “ e x ig e n t  c ir c u m s ta n c e s ” e x ­
ce p tio n  to  S e c t io n  3 1 0 9 . S ee , e.g., United States v. Carter, 
566  F .2 d  1 2 6 5 , 1 2 6 8  ( 5 th  C ir . ) ,  ce r t , d en ied , N o . 7 8 -1 3 2 6  
(1 9 7 8 )  ; United States v . Murrie, 5 3 4  F .2 d  6 9 5 , 6 9 8  n . l  (6 th  
C ir. 1 9 7 6 )  ; United States V. Smith, 5 2 0  F .2 d  74 , 7 6 -8 1  (D .C . 
C ir. 1 9 7 5 )  ; United States v. Bustamonte-Gomez, 4 8 8  F .2 d  
4, 11 (9 th  C ir . 1 9 7 3 ) ,  c e r t , d en ied , 4 1 6  U .S . 9 7 0  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  S ee  
a lso  Sabbath v. United States, supra, 3 9 1  U .S . a t  5 9 1  n .8 .

31

103



32
co rd in g ly , n e i th e r  th e  com m on law  n o r  a n y  s ta tu ­
to ry  o r  c o n s ti tu tio n a l ru le  o f p r io r  no tice  ap p lies  
to  th e  e n t ry  o f th is  case  in to  a n  uno ccu p ied  office 
b u ild in g , in  c irc u m stan c es  in  w h ich  th e  g iv in g  o f no ­
tice  w o u ld  h av e  been  f a ta l  to  th e  a b ility  to  execu te  
th e  search .

I I

D I S T R I C T  C O U R T S  H A V E  S T A T U T O R Y  P O W E R  TO  
A U T H O R IZ E  S U R R E P T I T I O U S  E N T R I E S  F O R  T H E  
P U R P O S E  O F  I N S T A L L I N G  E L E C T R O N IC  E A V E S ­
D R O P P I N G  D E V I C E S

P e ti t io n e r  co n ten d s (B r . 9 -19) th a t,  c o n s titu tio n a l 
b a r r ie r s  aside , th e  d is t r ic t  c o u r t  lack ed  s ta tu to ry  
a u th o r i ty  to  p e rm it  la w  en fo rc e m e n t officers to  e n te r  
h is  office s u r re p ti t io u s ly  fo r  th e  p u rp o se  o f in s ta llin g  
th e  e lec tro n ic  eq u ip m en t n ece ssa ry  to  ach ieve the  
ju d ic ia lly  au th o riz e d  in te rc e p tio n  o f h is  o ra l com ­
m u n ica tio n s . H e  b ases  th is  conclusion  solely upon  
th e  absence o f a n y  ex p ress  m en tio n  in  T itle  I I I  o f co­
v e r t  e n tr ie s  to  p la n t  a  “b u g / ’ u rg in g  th a t  th is  s i­
lence on “ a n  issu e  w ith  such  en o rm o u s p u b lic  in ­
te re s t  a n d  p o litic a l consequences” is  “p o w e rfu l evi­
dence” (id . a t  1 8 ) th a t  C on g ress  could  n o t h av e  in ­
ten d ed  to  allow  such  e n trie s .

I t  is  n o t s u rp r is in g , how ever, th a t  T itle  I I I  does 
n o t dw ell on th is  su b jec t. In  th e  w ak e  o f th is  C o u r t’s 
decisions in  B e rg e r  a n d  K a tz ,  w h ich  h a d  re s tr ic te d  
th e  a v a ila b ility  o f e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  a s  a  law  
e n fo rcem en t tech n iq u e  b u t  h a d  su g g es ted  th a t  it 
w ou ld  be possib le  to  c o n s tru c t a  s ta tu to ry  sy stem  th a t 
w ou ld  s a t is fy  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t, C o n g ress’s 
o v e rr id in g  co n cern  w a s  th e  ex p ed itio u s  en ac tm en t

104



of le g is la tio n  th a t  w ou ld  a u th o riz e  th e  sea rch  an d  
se izu re , co n s is te n t w ith  c o n s ti tu tio n a l req u ire m en ts , 
o f a  p e rso n ’s spoken  w ords. See U n ite d  S ta te s  v. 
U n ite d  S ta te s  D is tr ic t  C o u rt, su p ra , 407 U .S . a t  310 
n.9. H ence, a s  th e  C o u rt re ce n tly  observed  in  U n ited  
S ta te s  v. N e w  Y o r k  Telephone Co., 434 U .S . 159, 166
(1 9 7 7 ) (em p h a sis  a d d e d ) ,  “ T itle  I I I  is  concerned  

on ly  w ith  o rd e rs  ‘a u th o r iz in g  o r  a p p ro v in g  th e  in te r ­
cep tion  o f a  w ire  o r  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n  * * ”  n o t
w ith  o th e r, co lla te ra l ty p es  o f in tru s io n s  (su ch  as 
th e  u n co n sen ted  e n t ry  on to  p r iv a te  p rem ise s) th a t  
th e  C o u rt h a d  n o t condem ned  in  B e r g e r  a n d  K a tz  
a n d  th a t  w ere  ad eq u a te ly  covered  by o th e r  s ta tu to ry  
p rov isions.

R u le  4 1 (b )  o f th e  F e d e ra l  R u les o f C rim in a l P ro ­
ced u re  em p o w ers  a  d is t r ic t  c o u r t  to  a u th o riz e  law  
en fo rcem en t officers to  e n te r  p r iv a te  p rem ises  fo r  
the  p u rp o se  o f  co n d u c tin g  a  sea rch  a n d  se izu re . T he 
ru le  ap p lies , w ith o u t q u a lifica tio n , to  th e  se a rch  an d  
se izu re  o f bo th  ta n g ib le  a n d  in ta n g ib le  ob jects 
( U n ite d  S ta te s  v. N e w  Y o r k  T elephone Co., su p ra , 
434 U .S . a t  1 6 9 ) , a n d  p e t i t io n e r  h a s  offered  no reaso n  
w hy i t  w ould  n o t s im ila r ly  a llow  th e  issu an ce  o f a  
w a r r a n t  a u th o riz in g  a n  e n t ry  fo r  th e  p u rp o se  o f 
p la n tin g  a n  e lec tro n ic  lis te n in g  device .15 See, e.g.,

15 T w o  c o u r ts  o f  a p p e a ls  h a v e  co n c lu d ed  t h a t  a  d is t r ic t  c o u r t  
is  w ith o u t  s ta tu to r y  p o w e r  to  a u th o r iz e  a n  e n tr y  o n to  p r iv a te  
p r e m ise s  in  o r d e r  to  in s ta ll  a n  e le c tr o n ic  e a v e sd r o p p in g  de­
v ic e . H o w e v e r , t h e  S ix th  C ir c u it  in  United States V. Finazzo, 
supra, d id  n o t  c o n s id e r  th e  a p p lic a b ility  o f  R u le  41  (b u t  se e  
583 F .2 d  a t  5 8 2  (C e le b r e e z e , J ., c o n c u r r in g )  ( “ fe d e r a l d is tr ic t  
co u rts  g a in  su ff ic ien t  a n c illa r y  p o w e r  fr o m  R u le  41  a n d  th e  A ll  
W r its  A c t  to  o r d e r  s u r r e p t it io u s  e n tr y  t o  im p le m e n t  su ch  in -

33

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34

S ilv e r m a n  v. U n ite d  S ta te s , su p ra , 365 U .S . a t  51 2 ; 
id . a t  513 (D o u g las , J . ,  c o n c u rr in g )  (con v ic tio n  b ased  
on tre s p a s s o ry  e lec tro n ic  e av e sd ro p p in g  ev idence m u s t 
be rev e rse d  “since no se a rc h  w a r r a n t  w a s  o b ta in ed  a s  
re q u ire d  by  th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t a n d  R u le  41 
* * *.” ) .  M oreover, 18 U .S .C . 3109 p ro v id es  th a t  a  
law  en fo rc e m e n t officer “m ay  b re a k  open  a n y  o u te r  
o r  in n e r  door o r  w indow  o f a  house * * * to  execu te  
a  s e a rc h  w a r r a n t” issu ed  p u r s u a n t  to  la w fu l 
a u th o r i ty .’-'5

t e r c e p t io n s  w h o lly  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  p o w e r  to  a u th o r iz e  su ch  
e n tr y  w h ic h  e x i s t s  in  T it le  I I I  i t s e l f ” ) ) ,  w h i le  th e  N in th  C ir ­
c u it  in  United States V. Santora, supra, fo u n d  R u le  41  ir r e le ­
v a n t  o n ly  b e c a u se  “ th e  ru le  d o es n o t  a p p ly  to  t h e  is s u a n c e  o f  
in te r c e p t  o r d e r s” (5 8 3  F .2 d  a t  4 6 4  n .1 0 ) .  T h is  o b je c t io n  is  
b e s id e  th e  p o in t . O f c o u r s e  R u le  4 1  w a s  n o t  d e s ig n e d  to  
e m p o w e r  a  c o u r t  to  a u th o r iz e  e le c tr o n ic  su r v e il la n c e ;  C on ­
g r e s s  e n a c te d  t h e  d e ta ile d  p r o v is io n s  o f  T it le  I I I  f o r  p r e c is e ly  
t h a t  p u r p o se . T h e  f a c t  t h a t  R u le  4 1  d o es  n o t  i t s e l f  a u th o r iz e  
e a v e sd r o p p in g  is  n o  a n s w e r  t o  t h e  c o n te n tio n  t h a t  th e  ru le  
p e r m its  a  c o u r t  to  a u th o r iz e  a  se a r c h , su c h  a s  th e  e n tr y  to  
in s ta ll  a  l i s t e n in g  d e v ic e , t h a t  d o es  n o t  i t s e l f  c o n s t itu te  an  
in te r c e p t io n  o f  c o m m u n ic a t io n s . S u c h  e n tr ie s  a r e  in d is t in ­
g u is h a b le  f r o m  th e  e n tr ie s  o n to  p r iv a te  p r o p e r ty , co n ced ed ly  
w it h in  t h e  sc o p e  o f  R u le  4 1 , t h a t  r e g u la r ly  p r e c e d e  t h e  se a rc h  
f o r  a n d  s e iz u r e  o f  b o o k s, c o n tr a b a n d , o r  o th e r  ta n g ib le  e v i­
d en ce  o f  c r im in a l a c t iv i ty .

16 A lth o u g h  S e c t io n  3 1 0 9  r e q u ir e s  th e  p o lic e  o fficer  to  g iv e  
“ n o t ic e  o f  h is  a u th o r ity  a n d  p u r p o se ,” th e  C o u r t  h a s  r e c o g ­
n ize d , in  th e  c o n te x t  o f  e le c tr o n ic  su r v e illa n c e , “th a t  o fficers  
n eed  n o t  a n n o u n c e  th e ir  p u r p o se  b e fo r e  c o n d u c tin g  a n  o th e r ­
w is e  a u th o r iz e d  se a r c h  i f  su c h  a n  a n n o u n c e m e n t  w o u ld  p r o ­
v o k e  th e  e s c a p e  o f  th e  s u s p e c t  o r  th e  d e s tr u c t io n  o f  c r it ic a l  
e v id e n c e .” Katz V. United States, supra, 3 8 9  U .S . a t  3 5 5  n .1 6 . 
S e e  Berger V. New York, supra, 3 8 8  U .S . a t  6 0 ;  Osborn V. 
United States, supra, 3 8 5  U .S . a t  3 2 8 -3 3 0 ;  Ker V. California, 
supra, 3 7 4  U .S . a t  3 7 -4 1 ;  United States V. Agrusa, supra, 541

106



35

T h ere  is n o t th e  s lig h te s t h in t  in  e i th e r  th e  d e ta ile d  
s ta tu to ry  la n g u a g e  o r  th e  ex ten siv e  leg is la tiv e  h is ­
to ry  o f T itle  I I I  th a t  C ongress in te n d e d  to  a b ro g a te  
th is  e s tab lish ed  g r a n t  o f a u th o r i ty .  To beg in  w ith , 
a lth o u g h  C on g ress  h a d  no need  to  ad d re ss  th e  ques­
tio n  of s u r re p ti t io u s  e n tr ie s  in  T itle  I I I ,  i t  u n q u es­
tio n ab ly  w as  a w a re  d u r in g  i t s  co n s id e ra tio n  o f th e  
s ta tu te  th a t,  w h ile  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f w ire  co m m u n i­
ca tio n s  w a s  ty p ica lly  accom plished  by  m ean s o f an  
o u ts id e  connection  w ith  a  te lephone lin e  (see B e rg e r  
v. N e w  Y o rk , su p ra , 388 U .S . a t  4 6 ) ,  e lec tron ic  
eav esd ro p p in g  tr a d i t io n a lly  re q u ire d  th e  se c re t p lace­
m e n t o f a  lis te n in g  device in  th e  a re a  w h e re  th e  
co n v ersa tio n s  w ere  expected  to  occur.

C ongress w as  in fo rm e d  by  bo th  ad v o ca tes  a n d  op­
p o n en ts  o f e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  le g is la tio n  d ea lin g  
w ith  “ b u g g in g ” th a t  co v e rt e n tr ie s  w ere  o ften  neces­
s a ry  in  th e  co u rse  o f in s ta lla tio n . F o r  exam ple, P ro ­
fe sso r B lakey , w ho fa v o re d  th e  e n a c tm e n t o f le g is la ­
tion  a u th o riz in g  e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  a n d  w as  th e  
p r in c ip a l d ra f ts m a n  o f T itle  I I I ,  c au tio n ed  th a t  “ [ i ] t  
is o f te n  difficu lt i f  n o t im possib le  to  in s ta ll  [eav es­
d ro p p in g  devices] sa fe ly  w h e re  a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  
is  req u ire d . * * * L ik e  a  th ie f  in  th e  n ig h t, th e  o f­
ficer m u s t sec re tly  e n te r  to  in s ta ll  th e  b u g .” B lakey, 
A sp ec ts  o f  th e  E v id en ce  G a th er in g  P rocess in  Or-

F .2 d  a t  6 9 9 -7 0 1 . S e e  a lso  1 1 4  C o n g . R ec . 1 3 2 0 8  (1 9 6 8 )  ; 
M c N a m a r a , The Problem of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate 
Electronic Eavesdrops: How Do You Proceed After the 
Court Says “Yes”?, 15 A m . C rim . L . R ev . 1, 31  n .9 7  (1 9 7 7 )  ; 
N o te , The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82  H a r v . L . R ev . 6 3 , 194  
( 1 9 6 8 ) .

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36
g a n ized  C rim e  Cases, r e p r in te d  in  th e  P re s id e n t’s 
C om m ission  on L a w  E n fo rc e m e n t a n d  A d m in is t ra ­
tio n  o f J u s tic e , T a s k  F orce R e p o r t:  O rg a n ized
C rim e, A pp . C a t  92, 97 (1 9 6 7 ) . O th e r  p e rso n s 
recom m ended  th a t ,  in  l ig h t o f th e se  p rob lem s, th e  
p ro p o sed  leg is la tio n  be  lim ite d  to  ty p e s  o f e lec tro n ic  
su rv e illan ce  th a t  w ould  n o t re q u ire  a  tre sp a s s . See, 
e.g., A n ti-C r im e  P ro g ra m : H e a r in g s  on H .R . 5037, 
etc. B e fo re  the  S u b co m m . N o . 5 o f  th e  H o u se  C om m , 
on th e  J u d ic ia ry ,  9 0 th  C ong., 1 s t Sess. 937 (1 9 6 7 ) . 
T h e  co n g ress io n a l h e a r in g s  c o n ta in  re p e a te d  r e f e r ­
ences by know ledgeab le w itn e sses  to  th e  n ecess ity  fo r  
sec re t e n tr ie s  on to  p r iv a te  p rem ise s  in  connection  w ith  
e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g . See, e.g., H ea r in g s  on I n ­
va sio n s o f  P r iv a c y  B e fo re  th e  S u b co m m . on A d ­
m in is tr a tiv e  P ra c tice  a n d  P rocedure o f th e  S en a te  
C om m , on th e  J u d ic ia ry ,  8 9 th  C ong., 2 d  Sess. 
973, 997-998, 1007, 1011-1012, 1225-1226, 1249- 
1250, 1252, 1517-1518, 1702, 1704-1705, 1731-1732, 
1 9 5 4 ,2 3 3 9 -2 3 4 0 , 2379-2380 (1 9 6 6 ) .

P e rh a p s  m o re  im p o r ta n t , th is  C o u r t’s decisions in ­
vo lv ing  th e  in te rc e p tio n  of o ra l com m unica tions, 
w h ich  w ere  s tu d ie d  closely by  C o n g ress  a n d  c ited  tim e 
a n d  a g a in  d u r in g  th e  leg is la tiv e  h e a r in g s  a n d  floor de­
b a te s  a n d  in  th e  com m ittee  re p o r ts , h a d  a llu d ed  on a  
n u m b e r o f occasions to  th e  need  fo r  co v ert e n trie s . See 
S ilv e r m a n  v. U n ite d  S ta te s , su p ra , 365 U .S . a t  510 ; 
L opez  v. U n ited  S ta te s , su p ra , 373 U .S . a t  467 n .15 
(1 9 6 3 ) (B re n n a n , J .,  d i s s e n t in g ) ; I r v in e  v. C ali­
fo rn ia , su p ra , 347 U .S . a t  130-132. Indeed , as  we 
n o ted  e a r lie r , th e  e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  p rov isions 
o f T itle  I I I  w ere  d ra f te d  in  d ire c t resp o n se  to  the

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37

decision in  B e r g e r  v. N e w  Y o rk , su p ra , w h ich  h ad  
involved a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  onto b u s in ess  p rem ises  
fo r  th e  p u rp o se  o f in s ta llin g  a  lis te n in g  device. 388 
U .S. a t  44, 4 5 ; id . a t  64-65, 67 (D o u g las , J .,  con­
c u r r in g ) .  See U n ite d  S ta te s  v. U n ite d  S ta te s  D is­
tr ic t  C ourt, su p ra , 407 U .S . a t  302.

T h e  le g is la tiv e  h is to ry  is  also m a rk e d  by s ta te ­
m e n ts  by le g is la to rs  them selves in d ic a tin g  reco g n i­
tio n  o f th e  need  fo r  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n trie s . S en a to r  
M orse, an  o p p o n en t o f T itle  I I I  w ho fe a re d  th a t  its  
eav esd ro p p in g  p ro v is io n s w ould  re s u lt  in  th e  in d is ­
c r im in a te  in v asio n  o f in d iv id u a l p riv acy , re m a rk e d  
(114  Cong. Rec. 11598 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) :

I  know  th a t  e lab o ra te  e ffo rts  a r e  m ad e  to  d is ­
tin g u is h  be tw een  a  re a l w ire ta p , o r  bug , w hich  
re q u ire s  som eone to  in tru d e  up o n  p r iv a te  p re m ­
ises to  in s ta ll. T h a t  k in d  o f in v asio n  is  t ru ly  a  
sea rch , re q u ir in g  a  w a r r a n t  u n d e r  cond itions 
s e t fo r th  in  a r t ic le  4. B u t e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce , 
w h ereb y  co n v ersa tio n s  c a n  be p icked  u p  fro m  
scores o f fe e t  aw ay , w ith o u t a n y  p h y sica l in t r u ­
sion  up o n  th e  p rem ises  involved, is a  f a r  m ore  
in s id io u s  in v asio n  o f p riv acy , a n d  one w h ich  I 
do n o t believe shou ld  be to le ra te d  a t  all.

S e n a to r  T y d in g s, a  s u p p o r te r  o f th e  bill, responded  
by co n ten d in g  th a t  th e re  w as  no reaso n  to f e a r  th a t  
tra d i t io n a l in v e s tig a tiv e  tech n iq u es w ould  be w holly 
d ispensed  w ith  in  fa v o r  o f e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce , 
p a r t ly  because (114  Cong. Rec. 12989 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) :

[E le c tro n ic ]  su rv e illan ce  is v e ry  difficult to  use. 
T ap e  [s ic ] m u s t be in s ta lle d  on  telephones, an d  
w ire s  s tru n g . B u g s  a r e  d ifficu lt to  in s ta ll in

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38
m a n y  p laces  s ince  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  is  o ften  
im possib le. O ften , m ore  th a n  one e n try  is  neces­
s a ry  to  a d ju s t  eq u ip m en t.

See a lso  114 Cong. Rec. 14709-14710, 14732-14734 
(1 9 6 8 ) ;  S. R ep. No. 1097, 9 0 th  Cong., 2d  Sess. 67-68, 
102-103 (1 9 6 8 ) ;  A n ti-C r im e  P ro g ra m : H ea r in g s  on  
H .R . 5037, etc. B e fo re  the  S u b co m m . N o . 5 o f  the  
H ouse  C om m , on  th e  J u d ic ia ry , su p ra , a t  1031.

S e n a to r  T y d in g s  also r e fe r re d  d u r in g  th e  d ebates 
to  te s tim o n y  b e fo re  a  S e n a te  su b co m m ittee  co n ce rn ­
in g  h ig h ly  in c r im in a tin g  o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s  th a t  
h a d  been  in te rc e p te d  by  th e  F B I  th ro u g h  u se  o f a 
b u g g in g  device p laced  in  th e  office of a n  o rg an ized  
c rim e  fig u re . See C o n tro llin g  C rim e  T h ro u g h  M ore  
E ffe c t iv e  L a w  E n fo r c e m e n t: H ea r in g s  on S . 300, etc. 
B e fo re  th e  S u b co m m . on C r im in a l L a w s  a n d  P roce­
d u res  o f  th e  S e n a te  C om m , on  th e  J u d ic ia ry , 90 th  
Cong., 1 st Sess. 937-954, 998 (1 9 6 7 ) . T h e  device h ad  
been  in s ta lle d  by  tre s p a s s o ry  m e an s  b u t  w ith o u t a 
w a r r a n t ,  a n d  th e  ev idence o b ta in ed  w a s  th e re fo re  in ­
ad m issib le  in  co u rt. See id . a t  970-971. S en a to r 
T y d in g s  a s su re d  h is  co lleagues th a t  e lec tro n ic  eaves­
d ro p p in g  accom plished  in  th is  m a n n e r  b u t  in  com ­
p lian ce  w ith  th e  p ro v is io n s  of T itle  I I I  re q u ir in g  
ad v an ce  ju d ic ia l a u th o riz a tio n  w ould  h av e  p roduced  
a  d iffe re n t r e s u l t  (114  Cong. Rec. 12986 ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) :

U n d e r  th e  b ill [n o w ] b e fo re  us, w ith  a  p ro p e r  
sh o w in g  of p ro b ab le  cau se  a n d  close ju d ic ia l 
su p erv is io n , th is  su rv e illan ce  could  h av e  been 
u sed  to  in d ic t a n d  conv ict [ th e  ta rg e t  o f the 
su rv e illa n c e ]. T h a t  h e  c a n n o t be held  re sp o n ­
sib le fo r  a ll h is  c r im in a l a c tiv itie s , w ith  a ll th a t  
w e know , is  inc red ib le .

no



D esp ite  th is  c le a r  co n g ressio n al aw are n e ss  o f th e  
n ecess ity  f o r  co v e rt e n tr ie s  in  o rd e r  to  c a r r y  o u t 
ju d ic ia lly  au th o riz e d  eav esd ro p p in g  a p p ro v ed  by th e  
s ta tu te ,  n o th in g  in  T itle  I I I  su g g es ts  th a t  such  te ch ­
n iq u es h e n ce fo rth  w ere  to  be p ro h ib ited . T he m o st 
logical conclusion  to  be d ra w n  fro m  C o n g ress’ f a i lu re  
to  a d d re s s  th e  m a t te r  in  th e  s ta tu te  is th a t  i t  a s ­
sum ed  th a t  th e  n o rm a l m eth o d s o f e ffe c tu a tin g  elec­
tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s w ere  a l­
re a d y  a u th o riz e d  a n d  w ou ld  co n tin u e .17 I t  b e a rs  r e ­
p e a t in g  th a t  T itle  I I I  w as  a  resp o n se  to  c o u r t de­
cisions th a t  h a d  d ec la red  u n c o n s ti tu tio n a l th e  p ro ­
ced u res  fo llow ed in  em p loy ing  sev e ra l in v e s tig a tiv e  
tools th a t  h a d  p ro v en  q u ite  v a lu ab le  to  law  en fo rce ­
m e n t e ffo rts , especia lly  a g a in s t  o rg an ized  crim e. “ T he 
m a jo r  p u rp o se  o f t i t le  I I I , ” a s  th e  S en a te  R ep o rt 
exp la ined , “ is  to  co m b at o rg an ized  c r im e ” (S . Rep. 
No. 1097, su p ra , a t  7 0 ) ,  a n d  acco rd in g ly  C ongress 
h a d  li t t le  in cen tiv e  to  c ircu m scrib e  those  e ffo rts  m ore  
n a rro w ly  th a n  w as  c o n s titu tio n a lly  n ecessary . See

17 In  i t s  co m m e n t o n  th e  s ta tu to r y  d e fin it io n  o f  “o ra l co m ­
m u n ic a t io n ,” f o r  e x a m p le , t h e  S e n a te  R e p o r t  c ite d  Silverman 
a n d  Berger a n d  n o te d  t h a t  T i t le  I I I  w a s  in te n d e d  m e r e ly  to  
re flec t  e x i s t in g  la w . S . R ep . N o . 1 0 9 7 , supra, a t  8 9 -9 0 . A l­
th o u g h  th e  A m e r ic a n  B a r  A s s o c ia t io n  a lso  h a s  re co g n iz ed  
th a t  su r r e p t it io u s  e n tr y  m u s t  a c c o m p a n y  th e  in s ta lla t io n  o f  
m o st  b u g g in g  d e v ic e s  (A B A  S ta n d a r d s  f o r  C r im in a l J u s t ic e ,  
Electronic Surveillance, G en era l C o m m en ta ry , a t  4 5 , 65  n. 
175, 9 1 -9 2 ;  C o m m e n ta r y  on  S p e c ific  S ta n d a r d s , a t  1 3 9 -1 4 0 , 
1 4 9 ; A p p e n d ix  D , a t  2 0 9  (A p p r o v e d  D r a f t  1 9 7 1 ) ) ,  i t  to o  h a s  
n o t a d o p ted  a  sp e c if ic  su r r e p t it io u s  e n tr y  p r o v is io n  in  e ith e r  
th e  T e n ta t iv e  D r a f t  o f  196 8  o r  th e  A p p r o v e d  D r a f t  o f  1971 . 
C o m p a re  §§ 5 .7 -5 .8 , a t  8 in  th e  S ta n d a r d s  o f  th e  T e n ta t iv e  
D r a ft  w it h  §§ 5 .7 -5 .8 , a t  1 8 -1 9  o f  th e  P r o p o se d  F in a l  D r a f t  
o f S ta n d a r d s .

39

I l l



40

U n ite d  S ta te s  v. K a h n , su p ra , 415 U .S . a t  151. I n ­
s tead , th e  s ta tu te  w as  v iew ed  a s  “ [ l e g i s l a t i o n  m e e t­
in g  th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l s ta n d a rd s  s e t o u t in  th e  [B e rg e r  
a n d  K a tz ]  decisions, a n d  g r a n t in g  law  e n fo rcem en t 
officers th e  a u th o r i ty  to  ta p  te lephone w ire s  a n d  in ­
s ta ll  e lec tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  devices in  th e  in v e s tig a ­
tio n  o f m a jo r  c rim es  a n d  up o n  o b ta in in g  a  c o u r t 
o rd e r” (S . R ep. N o. 1097, su p ra , a t  7 5 ) .

In d eed , c o n tra ry  to  p e t i t io n e r ’s  a s se r tio n  (B r . 17) 
th a t  T itle  I I I  is  u t te r ly  s ile n t on th e  m a tte r ,  th e re  
a re  a  n u m b e r  o f in d ic a tio n s  in  th e  s ta tu te  th a t  Con­
g re ss  expec ted  th a t  la w  e n fo rcem en t officers w ould 
h av e  to  en g ag e  in  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n trie s . F i r s t ,  T itle  
I I I  is specifically  d irec ted  to  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f both  
“w ire ” a n d  “o ra l” co m m u n ica tio n s (1 8  U .S .C . 2518 
( 1 ) ) ,  a n d  th e re  c a n  be no se rio u s  d isp u te  th a t  the 
l a t t e r  ty p e  o f in te rc e p tio n  f re q u e n tly  e n ta ils  the  
p la cem e n t o f a  “b u g .” ® Second, C on g ress  b ro ad ly

X8 T it le  I I I  is  t h e  p r o d u c t  o f  t w o  b il ls .  T h e  f ir s t  (S . 675 , 
9 0 th  C o n g ., 1 s t  S e s s . ( 1 9 6 7 ) )  w a s  in tr o d u c e d  b y  S e n a to r  
M cC le lla n  in  J a n u a r y  1 9 6 7 , f iv e  m o n th s  p r io r  to  th e  C o u r t’s 
d e c is io n  in  Berger. S e e  S . R ep . N o . 1 0 9 7 , supra, a t  2 2 5 . T h a t  
b ill p r o p o se d  to  p r o h ib it  w ir e ta p p in g  b y  p e r s o n s  o th e r  th a n  
d u ly  a u th o r iz e d  la w  e n fo r c e m e n t  o fficers a c t in g  p u r s u a n t  to  
c o u r t  o r d e r  b u t  d id  n o t  a t te m p t  to  le g is la t e  w it h  r e sp e c t  to  
e le c tr o n ic  e a v e sd r o p p in g . A t  t h e  t im e  th e  M cC le lla n  b ill w a s  
in tr o d u c e d , fe d e r a l  la w  p r o sc r ib e d  a ll  p r iv a te  a n d  g o v e r n m e n ­
ta l  w ir e ta p p in g . B y  c o n tr a s t , “ b u g g in g ” w a s  c o n s t itu t io n a lly  
a n d  s t a tu to r ily  p e r m is s ib le  so  lo n g  a s  i t  d id  n o t  e n ta il  a  w a r ­
r a n t le s s  p h y s ic a l t r e s p a s s  o n to  p r iv a t e  p r o p e r ty .

S . 6 7 5  w o u ld  h a v e  l e f t  th e  p r e-Berger la w  on  “ b u g g in g ” 
u n c h a n g e d . T w o  w e e k s  a f t e r  th e  d e c is io n  in  Berger, h o w ev er , 
S e n a to r  H r u sk a , w h o  h a d  c o -sp o n so r e d  S . 6 7 5 , in tr o d u c e d  a 
se c o n d  b ill, S . 2 0 5 0 , 9 0 th  C o n g ., 1 s t  S e s s . (1 9 6 7 )  ( s e e  113

112



defined  “e lectron ic , m echan ica l, o r  o th e r  [s u rv e il­
lan ce] device” to  m ean  “a n y  device o r  a p p a ra tu s  
w hich  c a n  be u sed  to  in te rc e p t a  w ire  o r  o ra l com ­
m u n ic a tio n ” (1 8  U .S .C . 2 5 1 0 ( 5 ) ;  em p h asis  a d d e d ) , 
th u s  p la in ly  in c lu d in g  lis te n in g  devices, such  as

41

C on g . R ec . 1 8 0 0 7  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ) ,  w h ic h  w a s  “ta ilo r e d  to  m e e t  th e  
c o n s t itu t io n a l r e q u ir e m e n ts  im p o se d  b y  t h a t  d e c is io n .” S . R ep . 
N o . 1 0 9 7 , supra, a t  2 2 4 . T h is  se c o n d  b ill, w h ic h  a p p lie d  to  
e le c tr o n ic  e a v e sd r o p s  a s  w e ll  a s  to  w ir e ta p s  ( s e e  114  C on g . 
R ec. 1 3 2 0 9  ( 1 9 6 8 ) ) ,  w a s  e v e n tu a lly  e n a c te d , w it h  m o d ifica ­
t io n s  fo l lo w in g  th e  d e c is io n  in  Katz, a s  T i t le  I I I . S e e  United 
States v . Donovan, supra, 4 2 9  U .S . a t  4 2 6 . S e n a to r  H r u sk a ’s  
s ta te m e n ts  d u r in g  th e  le g is la t iv e  h e a r in g s  le a v e  n o  d o u b t th a t  
S. 2 0 5 0  w a s  in te n d e d  to  a u th o r iz e  th e  in te r c e p t io n  o f  o ra l 
c o m m u n ic a t io n s , s u b je c t  to  th e  F o u r th  A m e n d m e n t  r e q u ir e ­
m e n ts  o u tlin e d  in  Berger. S e e  Controlling Crime Through 
More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings on S. 300, etc. 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of 
the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, supra, a t  11.

A s  p e t it io n e r  n o te s  (B r . 1 7 - 1 8 ) ,  th e  N in th  C ir c u it  h a s  
g le a n e d  fr o m  t h is  h is to r y  t h a t  “ [ t j h e r e  is  n o t  th e  s l ig h t e s t  
su g g e s t io n  in  S e n a to r  H r u s k a ’s  r e m a r k s  to  in d ic a te  a n y  in ­
t e n t  o n  h is  p a r t  to  o v e r tu r n  th e  lo n g -e s ta b lish e d  Silverman 
d o c tr in e  t h a t  e v id e n c e  o b ta in e d  b y  t r e s p a s s o r y  b u g g in g  w a s  
in a d m is s ib le  a s  a  v io la t io n  o f  t h e  F o u r th  A m e n d m e n t.” United 
States v . Santora, supra, 5 8 3  F .2 d  a t  4 5 9 . B u t , a s  w e  h a v e  
d isc u sse d  a b o v e  ( s e e  p a g e s  2 0 -2 1  a n d  n o te  4 , supra), Silver- 
man h e ld  o n ly  t h a t  warrantless t r e s p a s s e s  to  p la n t  a  b u g  w e r e  
c o n tr a r y  to  th e  F o u r th  A m e n d m e n t. I t  w a s  th e  a b se n c e  o f  a  
w a r r a n t , r a th e r  th a n  th e  su r r e p t it io u s  e n tr y , t h a t  o ffen d ed  th e  
C o n st itu t io n , a n d  T it le  I I I  wTa s  p la in ly  d e s ig n e d  to  re m ed y  th a t  
d e fe c t  b y  r e q u ir in g  ju d ic ia l  a u th o r iz a t io n  b e fo r e  la w  e n fo r c e ­
m e n t officers co u ld  e n g a g e  in  a n y  fo r m  o f  n o n c o n se n su a l e le c ­
tr o n ic  su r v e illa n c e . S e e  Silverman V. United States, supra, 
365  U .S . a t  5 1 2  ( “a  f e d e r a l o fficer  m a y  [n o t]  without war­
rant a n d  w ith o u t  c o n se n t  p h y s ic a lly  e n tr e n c h  in to  a  m a n ’s 
office o r  h o m e , th e r e  s e c r e t ly  o b se r v e  o r  l is te n , a n d  r e la te  a t  
th e  m a n ’s  su b se q u e n t  c r im in a l tr ia l  w h a t  w a s  se e n  o r  h e a r d ” ) 
(e m p h a s is  a d d e d ) ; United States v . Agrusa, supra, 5 4 1  F .2 d  

a t  6 9 6  n .1 2 .

113



42

“b u g s ,” th a t  in  th e  v a s t  m a jo r ity  o f in s ta n ces  re ­
q u ire  co v ert in s ta lla tio n  w ith in  enclosed p r iv a te  
a re a s . T h ird , th e  s ta tu te  re q u ire s  th a t  th e  in te r ­
cep tio n  a p p lica tio n  a n d  o rd e r  c o n ta in  a  “ fu ll  an d  
com plete  s ta te m e n t * * * in c lu d in g  * * * a  p a r t ic u la r  
d esc rip tio n  o f th e  n a tu r e  a n d  location  o f th e  f a ­
c ilitie s  f ro m  w hich  o r  the p lace w h ere  th e  com m uni­
ca tio n  is to  be  in te rc e p te d  * * *.” 18 U .S .C . 2518 
(1 )  (b )  ( i i )  (em p h a sis  a d d e d ) ;  see a lso  18 U .S.C . 
2 5 1 8 (3 )  ( d ) ,  (4 )  ( b ) .  F in a lly , 18 U .S .C . 2 5 1 8 (4 )  spe­
cifically  au th o rize s  a  co u rt, up o n  re q u e s t o f a  law  
en fo rcem en t officer, to  d ire c t p r iv a te  c itizens, in c lu d ­
in g  a  “ la n d lo rd , c u s to d ian  o r  o th e r  p e rso n ,” to  “ f u r ­
n ish  [ th e  officer] all in fo rm a tio n , fa c ilit ie s , a n d  tech ­
n ica l a s s is ta n c e  n ecessa ry  to  accom plish  the  in te rcep ­
tio n  u n o b tru s iv e ly ” (em p h a sis  a d d e d ) .19 T hese  p ro ­
v isions, as  th e  F o u r th  C irc u it h a s  observed, “ a t  le ast 
in fe re n tia lly , su p p o r t [ ]  th e  * * * p o s itio n  th a t  Con­
g re s s  in te n d e d  to  a p p ro v e  co v e rt e n t ry  as a  p e rm is ­
sib le  co n co m itan t o f ju d ic ia lly -san c tio n ed  eav esd ro p ­
p in g .” A p p lic a tio n  o f U n ited  S ta te s , su p ra , 563 F .2 d

19 S e e  Electronic Surveillance, supra, a t  8 1 . T h e  la n g u a g e  o f  
S e c t io n  2 5 1 8 ( 4 ) ,  a s  J u d g e  C e le b r ez ze  o b se r v e d  in  United 
States V. Finazzo, supra, 5 8 8  F .2 d  a t  8 5 1 , “a p p a r e n t ly  a u ­
th o r iz e s  f u r t iv e  p la c e m e n t  o f  l i s t e n in g  d e v ic e s  b y  g a in in g  
a c c e s s  to  te le p h o n e  lin e s ,  b y  u s in g  a n  a p a r tm e n t  m a s te r  k ey , or  
b y  o th e r  s im ila r  p lo y s . I t  i s  a n o m a lo u s  to  h o ld  t h a t  th e  s ta t ­
u te  d o es  n o t  a u th o r iz e  t h e  e n tr y  in v o lv e d  in  t h is  c a s e  (th ro u g h  
a n  u n lo c k e d  w in d o w )  w h e n  i t  p la in ly  a u th o r iz e s  su ch  an  
e n tr y  w h e n  fa c i l i ta t e d  b y  a  la n d lo rd  o r  c u s to d ia n .” A c c e p t­
a n c e  o f  p e t i t io n e r ’s a r g u m e n t, h e  n o te d , “ co u ld  m a k e  th e  
r e s u lt  in  a  g iv e n  c a s e  tu r n  on  t h e  f o r t u it y  o f  w h e th e r  o n e  is  
a n  o w n e r  o f  h is  p r e m is e s  o r  a  t e n a n t  o r  w h e th e r  o n e  em p lo y s  
c u s to d ia n s  o r  n o t”  (ibid.).

114



a t  642. A ccord, U n ite d  S ta te s  v. Sca fid i, su p ra , 564 
F .2 d  a t  6 3 9 ; U n ite d  S ta te s  v. F ord , 414 F . S upp. 
879, 883 (D . D .C .) , a ff’d, 553 F .2 d  146 (D .C . C ir. 
1 9 7 7 ) ;  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. Volpe, 430 F . S upp. 931, 
932-934 (D . Conn. 1 9 7 7 ), a ff’d, No. 77-1311 (2 d  
C ir. A ug . 7, 1 9 7 8 ), p e titio n  fo r  a  w r i t  o f  c e r t io ra r i  
p en d in g , No. 78-385.

In  sum , g iv en  th e  d ocum en ted  h is to ry  o f T itle  I I I  
le p le te  w ith  re fe ren ces  to  th e  evils o f o rg an ized  

c rim e  a n d  th e  p re s s in g  need  to  a p p re h e n d  its  p e rp e ­
t r a to r s  th ro u g h  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f th e ir  com m uni­
c a tio n s” (A p p lic a tio n  o f  U n ite d  S ta te s , su p ra , 563 
F .2 d a t  6 4 2 ) , th e  s tro n g  ev idence th a t  C ongress w as 
w ell a w a re  th a t  th e  in te rc e p tio n  o f o ra l com m uni­
c a tio n s  is  o ften  accom plished  by  m ean s  o f a  “b u g ­
g in g ” device s u r re p ti t io u s ly  p laced  in  th e  ta rg e t  
p rem ises, a n d  th e  u n m is ta k a b le  in d ica tio n s  in  th e  
s ta tu te  its e lf  th a t  C o n g ress  nonetheless in ten d ed  to 
a u th o riz e  e lec tro n ic  e av e sd ro p p in g  in  a p p ro p r ia te  
c irc u m stan c es  an d , w hen  n ecessa ry , to re q u ire  p e r ­
sons such  as la n d lo rd s  to  a s s is t  in  th e  eav esd ro p p in g , 
i t  w ould  “ im p u t[e ]  to  [C o n g ress] a  se lf-d e fea tin g , 
i f  n o t d is in g en u o u s  p u rp o se ” (.N a rd o n e  v. U n ited  
S ta te s ,  308 U .S . 338, 341 (1 9 3 9 ) )  to  conclude th a t  
T itle  I I I  w a s  m ean t, w ith o u t s a y in g  so, to  fo rb id  law  
en fo rcem en t officers f ro m  u tiliz in g  a  p roven , con­
s ti tu tio n a l in v e s tig a tiv e  tech n iq u e  e ssen tia l to  th e  
success o f a  g r e a t  m an y  o ra l in te rc e p tio n s .20 T he

20 S e e  United States v . New York Telephone Co., supra, 4 3 4  
U .S . a t  170  ( “w e  co u ld  n o t  h o ld  t h a t  th e  D is t r ic t  C o u rt la ck ed  
a n y  p o w e r  to  a u th o r iz e  th e  u s e  o f  p en  r e g is te r s  w ith o u t  d e fy ­
in g  th e  c o n g r e s s io n a l ju d g m e n t  t h a t  th e  u se  o f  p e n  r e g is te r s  
‘b e  p e r m is s ib le ’ ” ) .

43

115



av a ilab le  ev idence su re ly  fa ils  to  in d ic a te  an y  “con­
g re ss io n a l in te n t  to  open  such  a  loophole in  T itle  
H I .” A p p lic a tio n  o f U n ite d  S ta te s , su p ra , 563 F .2 d  

a t  643.
I l l

T H E  E N T R Y  O N T O  P E T I T I O N E R ’S  B U S I N E S S  
P R E M I S E S  T O  I N S T A L L  A  L I S T E N I N G  D E V IC E  
W A S  L A W F U L  E V E N  T H O U G H  T H E  D I S T R IC T  
C O U R T  D I D  N O T  S E P A R A T E L Y  A N D  E X P R E S S L Y  
A U T H O R IZ E  T H E  E N T R Y  I N  A D V A N C E

W h ile  a  te lephone w ire ta p  can  o f te n  be in s ta lle d  
fro m  o u ts id e  th e  ta r g e t ’s p rem ises, in s ta lla tio n  of a n  
e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  device o rd in a r i ly  re q u ire s  a  
s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  in to  th e  a r e a  w h ere  th e  o ra l com ­
m u n ica tio n s  a re  to  ta k e  place. See R e p o r t o f  the  
N a tio n a l C o m m issio n  fo r  th e  R e v ie w  o f F ed era l a n d  
S ta te  L a w s  R e la tin g  to W ire ta p p in g  a n d  E lec tro n ic  
S u rve illa n ce  (E lec tro n ic  S u rve illa n ce )  43-44 (1 9 7 6 ). 
P a r t ly  fo r  th is  reaso n , req u es ts  f o r  eav esd ro p p in g  
o rd e rs  a r e  m u ch  less com m on th a n  req u es ts  fo r  w ire ­
ta p  o rd e rs . In  1977, fo r  exam ple, fe d e ra l a n d  s ta te  
a g e n ts  o b ta in ed  a  to ta l  of on ly  45 eav esd ro p p in g  
o rd e rs , w h ile  in  th e  sam e y e a r  co u rts  issu ed  a  to ta l 
o f 554 w ire  in te rc e p tio n  o rd e rs . A d m in is tra tiv e  O f­
fice o f th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  C o u rts , R e p o r t on A p p lic a ­
tio n s fo r  O rders A u th o r iz in g  or A p p ro v in g  th e  I n ­
te rcep tio n  o f W ire  or O ral C o m m u n ica tio n s fo r  the  
P erio d  J a n u a r y  1, 1977 to  D ecem ber 31, 1977  x iv
(1 9 7 8 ) .21

21 T h e  to ta l n u m b e r  o f  o ra l in te r c e p t io n  o rd er s  e n te r e d  ea ch  
y e a r  h a s  fa l le n  to  t h e  p r e s e n t  le v e l fr o m  a  h ig h  o f  80  in  1973 . 
In  th a t  y e a r  7 3 1  te le p h o n e  w ir e ta p  a u th o r iz a tio n  o r d e r s  w e r e

44

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45

W e h av e  been  in fo rm ed  by  th e  F B I  th a t ,  w h en  i t  
is  feasib le , a g e n ts  em ploy  ru se s  to  o b ta in  access to  
p rem ise s  w h e re  th e  c o u r ts  h av e  a u th o riz e d  o ra l in ­
te rc ep tio n s  in  o rd e r  to  in s ta ll  th e  n ece ssa ry  eav es­
d ro p p in g  eq u ip m en t. A  bom b sca re  ru se , f o r  ex am ­
ple, w as  u sed  in  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. F ord , su p ra . 
U su a lly , how ever, such  tech n iq u es a re  n o t feasib le , 
a n d  a  co v e rt e n t ry  m u s t be m ad e .* 22 See E lec tro n ic  
S u rve illa n ce , su p ra , a t  15, 43. M oreover, i t  is  a lm o st 
n ev e r  possib le  to  co n d u ct e lec tro n ic  eav esd ro p p in g  
w ith o u t som e k in d  o f p h y sica l in tru s io n  in to  th e  t a r ­
g e t p rem ises. T he “ B u ck  R o g e rs” ty p e  o f eq u ip m en t 
d esig n ed  to  o v e rh e a r  co n v ersa tio n s  in  a  closed room  
w ith o u t th e  n ecess ity  o f a  p h y sica l in tru s io n  is  s im ­
p ly  n o t re liab le  en o u g h  a t  p re s e n t to  be o f a n y  re a l

e n te r e d . S e e  Electronic Surveillance, supra, a t  2 6 9 . S e e  a lso  
A d m in is tr a t iv e  O ffice o f  t h e  U n ite d  S ta te s  C o u r ts , Report on 
Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Inter­
ception of Wire or Oral Communications for the Period 
January 1 ,  1976 to December 31, 1976 x v i  (1 9 7 7 )  ; A d m in is ­
t r a t iv e  O ffice o f  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  C o u r ts , Report on Applica­
tions for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception 
of Wire or Oral Communications for the Period January 1, 
1975 to December 31,1975 x iv  ( 1 9 7 6 ) .

22 T h e  c o u r t  o f  a p p e a ls  in  Ford s ta te d  th a t  t h e  te r m  “ s u r ­
r e p t it io u s  e n t r y ” e n c o m p a sse s  b o th  e n tr ie s  b y  r u se  o r  s tr a te -  
g e m  a n d  c o v e r t  e n tr ie s  (5 5 3  F .2 d  a t  154  n .3 2 ) ,  a n d  i t  h e ld  
t h a t  th e r e  is  n o  d iffe r e n c e  b e tw e e n  r u se  e n tr ie s  a n d  c o v e r t  
e n tr ie s  f o r  F o u r th  A m e n d m e n t  p u r p o se s  (id. a t  155 n .3 5 ) .  
W h ile  w e  h a v e  r e s e r v a t io n s  a b o u t t h e  so u n d n e ss  o f  t h is  eq u a ­
t io n  o f  r u se  e n tr ie s  w it h  c o v e r t  e n tr ie s  ( c f .  Sabbath v. 
United States, supra, 3 9 1  U .S . a t  5 9 0  n .7 ;  Lewis v . United 
States, 3 8 5  U .S . 2 0 6  ( 1 9 6 6 ) ) ,  th e  C o u rt n eed  n o t  r e a c h  th is  
is s u e  h ere , s in c e  in  t h is  c a s e  th e  e n tr y  w a s  c o v e r t .

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46

u se  in  c a r ry in g  o u t o ra l in te rc e p tio n  o rd e rs . E lec­
tro n ic  S u rve illa n ce , su p ra , a t  44. N a tio n a l C om m is­
sion  fo r  th e  R ev iew  o f F e d e ra l  a n d  S ta te  L aw s  R e­
la t in g  to  W ire ta p p in g  a n d  E lec tro n ic  S u rv e illan ce , 
C o m m iss io n  S tu d ie s , S ta te  o f  th e  A r t  o f E lec tro n ic  
S u rve illa n ce  171-172, 179-182 (1 9 7 6 ) .

P e t i t io n e r  no n eth e less  co n ten d s (B r . a t  25 -29 ) th a t,  
a lth o u g h  th e  d is tr ic t  c o u r t  au th o riz e d  th e  in te rc e p ­
tio n  o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s  in  h is  office, h is  convic­
tio n  shou ld  be o v e r tu rn e d  because th e  c o u r t  d id  n o t 
s e p a ra te ly  a n d  ex p ress ly  a u th o riz e  th e  e n try  neces­
s a ry  to  in s ta ll  th e  e av e sd ro p p in g  device. W e su b m it 
th a t  th e re  is  no s ta tu to ry  o r  c o n s ti tu tio n a l re q u ire ­
m e n t th a t  th e  e n t ry  be s e p a ra te ly  au th o rized , so long 
a s  th e  e n t ry  is  e sse n tia l to  e ffec tu a te  th e  a u th o rized  
in te rc e p tio n  a n d  is  accom plished  in  a  reaso n ab le  

m a n n e r .
T itle  I I I  i ts e lf  im poses no re q u ire m e n t th a t  a  d is ­

t r i c t  c o u r t s e p a ra te ly  ap p ro v e  th e  e n try  to  in s ta ll  an  
eav esd ro p p in g  device. A s w e h av e  d iscussed , th e  leg ­
is la tiv e  h is to ry  of th e  s ta tu te  p la in ly  show s th a t  
C ongress w as  a w a re  th a t  o n -site  e lec tro n ic  su rv e il­
lan ce  w ou ld  o rd in a r i ly  re q u ire  co v e rt tre s p a s s o ry  in ­
s ta lla tio n . T h e  1970 a m e n d m e n ts 33 p ro v id e  f u r th e r  
su p p o r t fo r  th is  v iew . T hey  au th o riz e  th e  c o u r t  to 
re q u ire  a  la n d lo rd  o r  cu s to d ian , am o n g  o th e rs , to 23 *

23 C o n g r e s s  a m en d e d  S e c t io n s  2 5 1 1 ( 2 )  ( a ) ,  2 5 1 8 ( 4 ) ,  an d  
2 5 2 0  o f  T i t le  I I I  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  D is t r ic t  o f  C o lu m b ia  C ou rt  
R e fo r m  a n d  C r im in a l P r o c e d u r e  A c t  o f  1 9 7 0 , P u b . L . N o . 91-  
3 5 8 , 84  S ta t . 4 7 3 , 6 5 4 . A ll  th r e e  a m e n d m e n ts  r e la te d  to  th e  
a u th o r ity  o f  th e  c o u r t  to  o r d e r  th ir d  p a r t ie s  to  c o o p e r a te  w ith
g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n ts  s e e k in g  to  e x e c u te  a  s u r v e illa n c e  ord er .

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47

fu rn is h  th e  a p p lic a n t w ith  fa c ilit ie s  a n d  eq u ip m en t 
to  accom plish  th e  in te rc e p tio n  “u n o b tru s iv e ly ,” dem ­
o n s tr a t in g  th a t  C ongress co n tem p la ted  th a t  such  
“u n o b tru s iv e ” e n tr ie s  w ou ld  o ften  be n ecessa ry . A s 
J u d g e  G u rfe in  p o in ted  o u t in  h is  c o n c u rr in g  op in ion  
in  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. Sca fid i, su p ra , 564 F .2 d  a t  643, 
th is  p ro v is io n  is  in ten d ed  fo r  th e  b en efit o f th e  a p ­
p lic a n t:  a  “co o p era tio n  o rd e r” is in c o rp o ra te d  in  
th e  su rv e illan ce  o rd e r  only  “up o n  re q u e s t o f th e  a p ­
p lic a n t.” T h u s, i f  th e  a g e n t c an  o b ta in  th e  n ecessa ry  
co o p era tio n  on h is  ow n, o r  i f  no such  co o p era tio n  is 
n ece ssa ry  to  in s ta ll  th e  lis te n in g  device, th e  o rd e r  
a u th o riz in g  th e  su rv e illan ce  need  n o t spec ia lly  a d ­
d ress  th e  m ode o f in s ta lla tio n .

S ince th e  s ta tu te  does n o t re q u ire  a  s e p a ra te  a u ­
th o r iz a tio n  fo r  e n try , p e t i t io n e r ’s c la im  tu r n s  solely 
on th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t. U n d e r  F o u r th  A m en d ­
m e n t an a ly s is , th e  absence o f s e p a ra te  a u th o riz a tio n  
fo r  th e  e n t ry  is  n o t f a ta l  to  th e  su rv e illan ce  o rd er. 
T he o rd e r  in  th is  case au th o riz e d  a  se a rch  a n d  se izu re  
o f p a r t ic u la r  ty p es  o f co n v ersa tio n s  in  a  specified 
p lace ; th is  sa tisf ied  th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l re q u ire m e n t 
th a t  a  w a r r a n t  “p a r t ic u la r ly  d e sc r ib [e ]  th e  p lace  to 
be sea rch ed , a n d  th e  p e rso n  o r  th in g s  to  be seized .” 
T he o rd e r  w as  issu ed  by  a  n e u tra l  ju d ic ia l officer 
upon  a  sw o rn  s ta te m e n t a n d  a f te r  a  ju d ic ia l fin d in g  
of p ro b ab le  cau se  th a t  p e titio n e r  w as  en g ag ed  in  
c r im in a l a c tiv ity , th a t  th e  a c tiv ity  w as  be in g  c a r r ie d  
o u t in  th e  p lace  to  be sea rch ed , a n d  th a t  th e  co n v er­
sa tio n s  to  be seized w ould  c o n ta in  evidence o f th e  
c r im in a l a c tiv ity  u n d e r  in v e s tig a tio n . T he o rd e r  th u s

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48

sa tis f ied  th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a l re q u ire m e n t th a t  a  w a r ­
r a n t  issu e  on ly  “u p o n  p ro b ab le  cause , su p p o r te d  by 
O a th  o r  a ffirm a tio n .” H ence, th e  o rd e r  m e t each  of 
th e  re q u ire m e n ts  o f th e  W a r r a n t  C lause  o f th e  
F o u r th  A m en d m en t. O nly  i f  th e  se a rch  w a s  u n ­
reaso n ab le  a n d  th u s  in  v io la tio n  o f th e  reaso n ab le ­
n ess c lau se  o f th e  A m en d m en t w o u ld  th e  C o n s titu ­
tio n  be offended  a n d  th e  exclusion  o f th e  evidence 
seized be a p p ro p r ia te .

T h e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t, o f course , p ro te c ts  
a g a in s t  u n rea so n ab le  m e th o d s o f ex ec u tin g  w a r ra n ts ,  
j u s t  a s  i t  p ro te c ts  a g a in s t  u n re a so n a b le  m ethods of 
ex ec u tin g  o th e rw ise  p e rm issib le  w a r ra n tle s s  searches. 
See Z u rc h e r  v. S ta n fo r d  D a ily , 436 U .S . 547, 559- 
560 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  M a rro n  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  275 U .S . 192 
(1 9 2 7 ) ;  cf. K e r  v. C a lifo rn ia , su p ra . A ccord ing ly , 
i f  th e re  w e re  reaso n ab le  m ethods s h o r t  o f  a  tres- 
p a sso ry  e n t ry  b y  w h ich  to  in te rc e p t th e  o ra l com m u­
n ic a tio n s  th a t  w ere  th e  su b je c t o f th e  o rd e r, o r if  
th e  la w  e n fo rcem en t a g e n ts  h a d  u sed  u n reaso n ab le  
m ean s  o f g a in in g  e n t ry  to  in s ta ll  th e  lis te n in g  device, 
th e  c o n s ti tu tio n a li ty  o f th e  se a rch  m ig h t p ro p e rly  be 
questioned . S im ila rly , i f  th e  a g e n ts  h a d  d ep a rted  
fro m  th e ir  ta s k  o f in s ta llin g  th e  lis te n in g  device and  
h a d  sea rch ed  fo r  a n d  seized p h y sica l ev idence inside 
th e  b u ild in g , th a t  ev idence w ou ld  be excludab le  as 
th e  p ro d u c t o f a n  u n la w fu l d e p a r tu re  fro m  th e  course 
re q u ire d  to  execu te  th e  w a r r a n t .  See S ta n le y  v. 
G eorgia, 394 U .S . 557, 571-572 (1 9 6 9 ) (S te w a r t ,  J ., 
c o n c u rr in g  in  th e  r e s u l t ) .  B u t  in  th is  case  th e  d is­
t r i c t  c o u r t  specifically  fo u n d  th a t  “ th e  s a fe s t  and

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m o st su ccessfu l m e th o d  o f acco m p lish in g  th e  in s ta l ­
la tio n  o f th e  [e av e sd ro p p in g ] device w as  th ro u g h  
b re a k in g  a n d  e n te r in g  th e  p rem ise s  in  q u es tio n ” 
(P e t. A pp . 1 7 a ) .  T he c o u r t  o f ap p ea ls  accep ted  th e  
d is t r ic t  c o u r t’s fin d in g s  th a t  “a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  
w a s  th e  m o st effective m ean s  fo r  in s ta ll in g  th e  in ­
te rc e p tio n  device” a n d  th a t  “ th e  in s ta lla tio n  w as  
b ased  up o n  p ro b ab le  cau se  a n d  ex ecu ted  in  a  re a so n ­
able fa s h io n ” ( id  a t  7 a ) .  T h u s , because  th e  a g e n ts  
conducted  th e  o ra l in te rc e p tio n s  w ith  a  p ro p e r  w a r ­
r a n t  a n d  because th e  m ean s  o f ex ecu tin g  th e  w a r r a n t  
w ere  reaso n ab le , th e  su b seq u en t se izu re  o f p e t i t io n e r ’s 
co n v ersa tio n s  w as  e n tire ly  co n s is te n t w ith  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t p rin c ip les .

A lth o u g h  th e  Second a n d  T h ird  C irc u its  hav e  
a g re e d  w ith  th is  a n a ly s is  (P e t. A pp. 7 a -8 a ; U n ited  
S ta te s  v. S ca fid i, su p ra , 564 F .2 d  a t  6 3 9 -6 4 0 ), th e  
F o u r th  a n d  D is tr ic t  o f C o lum bia  C irc u its  have  ta k e n  
a  c o n tra ry  p osition . See A p p lic a tio n  o f U n ite d  S ta te s ,  
su p ra , 563 F .2 d  a t  6 4 4 ; U n ite d  S ta te s  v. F ord , su p ra , 
553 F .2 d  a t  152-165.“  In  th e  v iew  o f th e  l a t te r  co u rts ,

24 T h e  E ig h t h  C ir c u it  in  United States V. Agrusa, supra, 
5 4 1  F .2 d  a t  6 9 6  n .1 3 , d ec lin e d  t o  re a ch  th e  q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  
th e  e n tr y  w o u ld  h a v e  to  h a v e  s e p a r a te  e x p r e s s  ju d ic ia l  a u ­
th o r iz a t io n  in  o r d e r  f o r  th e  in te r c e p te d  c o n v e r sa t io n s  to  b e  
a d m is s ib le  in  e v id e n c e . T h e  s u r v e illa n c e  o r d e r  in  t h a t  c a se  
in c lu d ed  a n  e x p r e s s  a u th o r iz a tio n  f o r  s u r r e p t it io u s  e n tr y .  
5 4 1  F .2 d  a t  6 9 3 . In  United States V. Finazzo, supra, th e  S ix th  
C ir c u it  h e ld  t h a t  th e r e  w a s  n o  s ta tu to r y  a u th o r ity  f o r  s u r ­
r e p t it io u s  e n tr y  a n d  th e r e fo r e  d id  n o t  re a ch  th e  q u e s tio n  
w h e th e r  th e  a b se n c e  o f  a  s e p a r a te  e n tr y  a u th o r iz a tio n  w o u ld  
b e  e n o u g h  to  r e q u ir e  su p p r e s s io n  o f  th e  in te r c e p te d  c o m m u n i­
c a t io n s . I n  h is  c o n c u r r in g  o p in io n , h o w e v e r , J u d g e  C e leb rezze  
s ta te d  h is  v ie w  t h a t  a  s e p a r a te  a u th o r iz a tio n  f o r  e n tr y  w a s  
req u ired .

49

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50

th e  e n t ry  to  in s ta ll  th e  eav esd ro p p in g  device a n d  th e  
in te rc e p tio n  o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s  im p lic a te  tw o 
d isc re te  p r iv a c y  in te re s ts  a n d  th u s  re q u ire  tw o  d is ­
t in c t  a u th o riz a tio n s . B u t  th is  a n a ly s is  is  u n d u ly  
r ig id . T o re q u ire  th a t  a  c o u r t  inc lude  s e p a ra te , ex ­
p re s s  a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  each  p r iv a c y  in te re s t  th a t  is 
affec ted  by  a  p a r t ic u la r  g o v e rn m e n ta l in tru s io n  
w o u ld  be in c o n s is te n t w ith  th e  w a r r a n t  p ro ced u re  as 
i t  is  em ployed  in  o th e r  co n tex ts  a n d  w ou ld  affo rd  
l i t t le  i f  a n y  m e a n in g fu l a d d itio n a l p ro te c tio n  fo r  in ­
d iv id u a l p r iv a c y  in te re s ts .

T h e  m a in  p u rp o se  o f a  w a r r a n t  is  to  “ in te rp o se  [] 
a  m a g is tr a te  b e tw een  th e  c itizen  a n d  th e  police * * * 
so th a t  a n  ob jective m in d  m ig h t w eig h  th e  need  to 
in v ad e  [ th e  in d iv id u a l’s] p r iv a c y  in  o rd e r  to  enforce  
th e  la w .” M cD ona ld  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  335 U .S . 451, 
455 (1 9 4 8 ) . A ccord ing ly , i f  th e  scope o f th e  com­
p e tin g  p r iv a c y  a n d  la w  en fo rcem en t in te re s ts  is  r e a ­
sonab ly  c le a r  a t  th e  tim e  th e  m a g is tr a te  issu es  the 
w a r r a n t ,  th e  p u rp o se  o f th e  w a r r a n t  p ro ced u re  is 
served . I t  w ould  be u n n ece ssa rily  cum bersom e to  re ­
q u ire  th e  m a g is tr a te  to  l is t  a n d  ex p ress ly  au th o rize  
each  p o te n tia l in v asio n  o f som e p r iv a c y  in te re s t  th a t  
could  be im p lica ted  in  th e  cou rse  o f ex ecu tin g  the 
w a r r a n t .

T h is  a n a ly s is  acco rds w ith  th e  p ra c tic e  followed 
in  th e  case  o f con v en tio n al w a r r a n ts  a u th o riz in g  the 
se a rch  fo r  a n d  se izu re  o f p h y sica l evidence. T ra d i­
tio n a lly , th e  in tru s io n  san c tio n ed  by  such  w a r ra n ts  
h a s  been  co n sid ered  a  sin g le  in v asio n  o f p r iv ac y  fo r 
F o u r th  A m en d m en t p u rp o ses , even th o u g h  th e  in-

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tru s io n  im p lica te s  bo th  th e  ta r g e t ’s in te re s t  in  th e  
p r iv a te  u n in te r ru p te d  en jo y m en t o f th e  p ro p e r ty  
seized a n d  h is  in te re s t  in  th e  p r iv a c y  o f th e  p rem ise s  
in  w h ich  th e  p ro p e r ty  is located . A s th e  C o u rt no ted  
in  B o y d  v. U n ite d  S ta te s ,  116 U .S . 616, 622 (1 8 8 6 ) , 
th e  e n try  to  effect a  se a rch  a n d  se izu re  is b u t  “ [a n ]  
a g g ra v a tin g  in c id e n t [ ]  o f a c tu a l se a rch  a n d  seiz­
u re .” T h u s, th e  e n t ry  n ece ssa ry  to  accom plish  a  
se a rch  a n d  se izu re  o rd e re d  by a  co n v en tio n a l w a r ­
r a n t  is  n o t re g a rd e d  a s  a  s e p a ra te  in tru s io n  r e q u ir ­
in g  s e p a ra te , ex p lic it ju d ic ia l a u th o riz a tio n . See F ed . 
R. C rim . P ., A p p en d ix  o f F o rm s , F o rm  15. R a th e r , 
th e  w a r r a n t ’s ex p ress  d irec tiv e  to  se a rch  a  d escribed  
p lace  fo r  specified  item s is  deem ed to  c a r ry  w ith  i t  
th e  im p lic it a u th o r i ty  to  u tiliz e  reaso n ab le  m e an s  to  
execu te  th e  sea rch , in c lu d in g  fo rc ib le  b re a k in g  a n d  
e n try  in to  th e  p rem ises , i f  n ecessa ry .

T h e  law  g o v e rn in g  a r r e s ts  p u r s u a n t  to  v a lid  a r r e s t  
w a r r a n ts  p ro v id es  f u r th e r  s u p p o r t  f o r  th is  an a ly sis . 
T he c o u r ts  a r e  in  a g re e m e n t th a t  w hen  a n  officer 
h a s  a  v a lid  a r r e s t  w a r r a n t  a n d  p ro b ab le  cause  to  be­
lieve th e  su b je c t o f th e  w a r r a n t  is  a t  hom e, he m a y  
e n te r  th e  su b je c t’s  hom e w ith o u t th e  need  o f a  sea rch  
w a r r a n t  o r  o th e r  a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  th e  e n try . See 
U n ited  S ta te s  v. C ravero , 545 F .2 d  406, 421 (5 th  
C ir. 1976) (o n  p e titio n  fo r  r e h e a r in g ) ,  c e r t, denied, 
429 U .S . 1100 (1 9 7 7 ) ;  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. B ro w n ,  467 
F .2 d  419, 423 (D .C . C ir. 1 9 7 2 ) ;  cf. S a b b a th  v. U n ite d  
S ta te s , s u p r a A  T h e e n try  in to  th e  hom e in v ad es an  25

25 In  h o ld in g  t h a t  18  U .S .C . 3 1 0 9  a p p lie s  to  th e  e x e c u t io n  o f  
a r r e s t  w a r r a n ts  a s  w e ll  a s  se a r c h  w a r r a n ts ,  t h e  C o u r t  in  
Sabbath im p lic i t ly  a p p r o v e d  e n t r ie s  in to  h o m e s  u n d e r  th e

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a rg u a b ly  s e p a ra te  F o u r th  A m en d m en t in te re s t  fro m  
th e  in te re s t  a ffected  by th e  a r r e s t  itse lf , b u t  the  
c o u r ts  h av e  re g a rd e d  th e  a r r e s t  w a r r a n t  a s  sufficient 
to  o v e rrid e  b o th  in te re s ts .26 T h u s, i f  th e  s e a rc h  or 
se izu re  is  au th o rized , th e  in c id e n ta l in v asio n  o f o th e r 
F o u r th  A m en d m en t in te re s ts  does n o t re q u ire  se p a ­
r a te  a u th o riz a tio n , a t  le a s t  w h e re  i t  a p p e a rs  likely  
a t  th e  tim e  o f th e  a u th o riz a tio n  th a t  th e  in c id en ta l 
in t ru s io n  w ill be n ecessary .

S u p p o r t fo r  th is  a n a ly s is  c an  also  be fo u n d  in  the  
rece n tly  en ac ted  F o re ig n  In te llig en ce  S u rv e illan ce  
A c t o f 1978, P u b . L. No. 95-511, 92 S ta t. 1783. Sec­
tio n  1 0 5 (b )  p ro v id es  th a t  a n  o rd e r  a p p ro v in g  elec­
tro n ic  su rv e illan ce  u n d e r  th e  A c t m u s t specify , am ong 
o th e r  th in g s , “ th e  m e an s  by w h ich  th e  e lectron ic  
su rv e illan ce  w ill be effected  a n d  w h e th e r  physical 
e n t ry  w ill be u sed  to  effect th e  su rv e illan ce .” Section 
1 0 5 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( D ) .  S ig n ifican tly , th e  leg is la tiv e  h is to ry  
o f th e  A c t n o tes  th a t  th e  re q u ire m e n t th a t  th e  su rveil-

authority of arrest warrants, while holding that notice would 
ordinarily be required before entering, absent exigent cir­
cumstances.

26 The courts of appeals are split on the question whether 
an entry can be made into a third party’s home to arrest the 
subject of a warrant, without a separate authorization for the 
entry. Compare United States V. Cravero, supra; United 
States V. McKinney, 379 F,2d 259, 262-263 (6th Cir. 1967) ; 
and United States V. Brown, supra, with Government of the 
Virgin Islands V. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928-930 (3d Cir. 
1974). The somewhat different question of the validity of an 
entry to make an arrest without any kind of warrant is now 
before the Court in Payton v. New York, No. 77-5420.

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lance  o rd e r  sp ec ify  th e  p lace  o r  fa c ilit ie s  a g a in s t  
w h ich  th e  su rv e illa n c e  is  d irec ted  a n d  th e  ty p e  o f in ­
fo rm a tio n  so u g h t is  “ d esigned  to  s a t i s fy  th e  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t’s  re q u ire m e n ts  th a t  w a r r a n ts  d escribe  
w ith  p a r t ic u la r i ty  a n d  specific ity  th e  p e rso n , place, 
a n d  ob jects to  be sea rch ed  o r  se ized .” S. R ep. No. 
95-601, 9 5 th  Cong., 2 d  Sess. 49 (1 9 7 8 ) . T h e  r e ­
q u ire m e n t th a t  th e  m ode o f in s ta lla tio n  be specified, 
how ever, w as  s a id  to  be  “ in  a d d itio n  to  th e  F o u r th  
A m en d m en t’s re q u ire m e n ts” ( ib id .) .  T hus, a lth o u g h  
th e  s ta tu te  in c lu d ed  th e  req u ire m en t, n o t p re s e n t in  
T itle  I I I ,  t h a t  th e  m ode o f e n try  be  specified  in  th e  
o rd e r, th a t  p ro v is io n  w a s  recogn ized  by  C ongress to 
be s ta tu to ry ,  n o t co n s titu tio n a l, in  scope.

A p p lica tio n  of th is  an a ly s is  to  th e  p re s e n t case 
lead s to th e  conclusion  th a t  s e p a ra te , ex p re ss  la n ­
g u a g e  in  th e  o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  e n try  to  in s ta ll  th e  
lis te n in g  device w as  n o t c o n s titu tio n a lly  req u ire d . 
A s w e h av e  no ted , th e  le g is la tiv e  h is to ry  of T itle  
I I I  show s th a t  C on g ress  w as  w ell a w a re  th a t  covert 
e n tr ie s  w ou ld  o rd in a r i ly  be re q u ire d  to  execu te  an  
eav esd ro p p in g  o rd e r . M oreover, a s  is  e v id en t fro m  
th e  d esc rip tio n  o f  th e  p rem ise s  c o n ta in ed  in  th e  
eav esd ro p p in g  ap p lica tio n  a t  issu e  h e re  (see  P e t. 
A pp. 1 7 a -1 8 a ) , “ a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n t ry  w as  w ith in  
co n tem p la tio n ” (id . a t  6a )  w h en  th e  o rd e r  w as  is ­
sued. A ccord ing ly , ju s t  a s  a  conven tional w a r r a n t  
is deem ed to  c o n ta in  im p lic it a u th o riz a tio n  to  use  
such  m ean s  as a re  reaso n ab ly  n ecessa ry  to  execute 
th e  sea rch  a n d  se izu re  i t  com m ands, so th e  a u th o r i­
za tio n  to  in te rc e p t th e  co n v ersa tio n s  in  th is  case m u s t

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reaso n ab ly  be  in te rp re te d  as p ro v id in g  “co n co m itan t 
a u th o riz a tio n  f o r  a g e n ts  to  co v ertly  e n te r  th e  p re m ­
ises  in  q u estio n  an d  in s ta ll  th e  n ece ssa ry  eq u ip m en t” 
(id . a t  1 8 a ) . T o  ho ld  o th e rw ise  is  to  assu m e th a t  
th e  a u th o riz in g  ju d g e  en g ag e d  in  th e  p o in tless  ex e r­
c ise  of o rd e r in g  th e  a g e n ts  to  in te rc e p t c e r ta in  con­
v e rsa tio n s  a t  p e t itio n e r ’s p lace  o f b u s in ess  w hile  
w ith h o ld in g  fro m  th em  th e  m ean s o f c a r ry in g  o u t 
h is  o rd e r.

O u r co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  e av e sd ro p p in g  o rd e r  in 
th is  case  im p lic itly  au th o riz e d  th e  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  
n ece ssa ry  to  im p lem en t i t  is  a  lim ited  one. W e a re  
n o t su g g e s tin g  th a t  i t  w ou ld  be c o n s titu tio n a lly  r e a ­
sonab le  o r  im p lic itly  au th o riz e d  fo r  a g e n ts  to  u se  a 
co v ert e n try  tech n iq u e  in  a n y  case  in  w h ich  th e  in ­
te rc ep tio n  could be accom plished  by less in tru s iv e  
m ean s, n o r  a r e  w e su g g e s tin g  th a t  re -e n tr ie s  f o r  the 
p u rp o se  of im p ro v in g  th e  q u a lity  of th e  in te rcep tio n s  
w ou ld  n o t re q u ire  specific ju d ic ia l co n s id e ra tio n  an d  
a u th o riz a tio n . C o m p are  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. F ord, 
su p ra U  W e sim p ly  co n ten d  th a t  in  a  case  like  th is  
one, w h e re  th e re  h a s  been only  a  s in g le  e n try  to  in ­
s ta ll  th e  e lec tro n ic  lis te n in g  device, w h ere  th a t  en ­
t r y  w as  th e  on ly  feas ib le  m ean s  o f ex ec u tin g  the  
c o u r t’s o rd er, a n d  w h e re  th e  co n d u c t o f th e  ag en ts  
w h ile  in s id e  p e t i t io n e r ’s  p rem ises  w as  lim ite d  to  in ­
s ta l la t io n  o f th e  lis te n in g  device, th e re  is  no basis

27 Unlike the initial entry, re-entries to fix or relocate an 
existing listening device cannot so readily be viewed as having 
been within the contemplation of the judge who issued the 
eavesdropping order.

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f o r  r e fu s in g  to  ho ld  th a t  th e  e n t ry  w as  im p lic itly  
a u th o riz e d  by  th e  eav e sd ro p p in g  o rd e r  a n d  w as  con­
s ti tu tio n a lly  reaso n ab le .

T h e  so u n d n ess  o f th e  fo reg o in g  a rg u m e n t is f u r ­
th e r  b o ls te red  by  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  is su in g  ju d g e , 
k n o w in g  th a t  a  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try  is like ly  to  be 
re q u ire d  to  c a r ry  o u t an  eav e sd ro p p in g  o rd e r , is  f re e  
to  re g u la te  o r  r e s t r ic t  th e  m e an s  o f in s ta llin g  th e  
eq u ip m en t a s  a  co n d itio n  to  issu an ce  o f th e  w a r r a n t  
(see  U n ite d  S ta te s  v. Sca fid i, su p ra , 564 F .2 d  a t  644 
(G u rfe in , J . ,  c o n c u r r in g ) ) ,  j u s t  a s  a ju d g e  o r  m a g is ­
t r a t e  is su in g  a  co n v en tio n al w a r r a n t  c an  im pose con­
d itio n s  upon  th e  m a n n e r  o f its  execu tion . See Z u ch er  
v. S ta n fo r d  D a ily , su p ra , 436 U .S . a t  5 6 6 ; A n d re se n  
v. M a ry la n d , 427 U .S . 463, 482 n . l l  (1 9 7 6 ) . D is­
obedience to  such  d irec tiv e s  p re su m ab ly  w ould  ju s ­
t i f y  su p p re ss io n  o f th e  evidence seized. B u t  th e  fa c t  
th a t  th e  c o u r t  m a in ta in s  co n tro l o v er th e  m a n n e r  of 
execu tio n  o f th e  w a r r a n t  i f  i t  chooses to  exerc ise  such 
co n tro l does n o t m ean  th a t  i t  m u s t so choose o r  th a t  
a  se a rch  is in v a lid  i f  th e  c o u r t  fa ils  ex p lic itly  to  a d ­
d re ss  th e  m a n n e r  o f execu tion , p a r t ic u la r ly  w hen  th e  
likely  m a n n e r  o f execu tion  is  ev id en t to  th e  c o u r t 
f ro m  th e  fa c e  o f th e  ap p lica tio n .

E v e n  th o u g h  w e co n ten d  th a t  i t  is  n o t c o n s titu ­
tio n a lly  req u ired , w e recognize th a t  th e  p re fe ra b le  
co u rse  is  fo r  g o v e rn m e n t a g e n ts  to  inc lude  a  de­
sc r ip tio n  o f th e  p roposed  m ethod  o f in s ta lla tio n  in  
an  a p p lica tio n  fo r  a n  eav esd ro p p in g  o rd e r  a n d  fo r  
th e  c o u r t ex p ressly  to  a u th o riz e  th e  e n try  in  th e  
o rd e r  a u th o riz in g  th e  eav esd ro p p in g . A s sev era l

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c o u r ts  h av e  observed , i t  im poses no s ig n if ic a n t a d ­
d itio n a l b u rd e n  on th e  g o v e rn m e n t to  seek  ex p lic it 
a u th o riz a tio n  fo r  th e  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n try . See U n ited  
S ta te s  v. S ea fid i, su p ra , 564 F .2 d  a t  6 4 4 ; P e t. A pp. 
7a. M oreover, b ecause  a  p o s t- in te rc e p tio n  fin d in g  
th a t  th e  m ethod  used  to  in s ta ll  th e  lis te n in g  device 
w as  u n rea so n ab le  m a y  je o p a rd ize  a  le n g th y  in v e s ti­
g a tio n  o r  a n  im p o r ta n t  p ro secu tio n , i t  he lps e n su re  
th e  success o f th e  in v e s tig a tio n  i f  th e  a p p lic a n t ob­
ta in s  p r io r  ju d ic ia l a p p ro v a l fo r  th e  m e th o d  to  be 
u sed  to  in s ta ll  th e  lis te n in g  device.

In  l ig h t o f th e se  co n sid e ra tio n s , th e  D e p a r tm e n t 
o f J u s t ic e  has, s in ce  th e  decision  in  th e  F o rd  case, 
so u g h t ex p re ss  ju d ic ia l a p p ro v a l in  a ll eav esd ro p p in g  
ap p lic a tio n s  fo r  th e  e n t ry  n e c e ssa ry  to  in s ta ll  th e  
eav esd ro p p in g  device. A tto rn e y s  su p e rv is in g  th e  in ­
te rc ep tio n  o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s hav e  a lso  been 
in s tru c te d  to  seek ex p lic it ju d ic ia l a p p ro v a l f o r  each 
su b seq u en t e n try  re q u ire d  to  e ffec tu a te  th e  su rv e il­
lance. T h e  fo llow ing  la n g u a g e  is  c u r re n t ly  inc luded  
in  D e p a r tm e n ta l a u th o riz a tio n s  o f ap p lica tio n s  fo r  
in te rc e p tio n  o f o ra l co m m u n ica tio n s :

T h e  ap p lica tio n  shou ld  in c lu d e  a  re q u e s t th a t  
th e  o rd e r  p ro v id in g  fo r  th e  in te rc e p tio n  spe­
cifically  au th o riz e  s u r re p ti t io u s  e n t ry  fo r  the  
p u rp o se  o f in s ta llin g  a n d  rem o v in g  an y  e lectron ic  
in te rc e p tio n  devices to  be u tiliz ed  in  accom plish­
in g  th e  o ra l in te rcep tio n . F u r th e r ,  a n  o rd e r 
shou ld  be o b ta in ed  fo r  each  ad d itio n a l e n try  to 
rep lace  o r  m a in ta in  a n y  o ra l in te rc e p tio n  de­
vices.

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B ecause  th e  in te rc e p tio n  in  th is  case  o ccu rred  in  

1973, b e fo re  th e  D e p a r tm e n t’s po licy  w as  in s ti tu te d , 
no s e p a ra te  a u th o riz a tio n  w a s  so u g h t f o r  th e  e n try . 
N onetheless, p e t i t io n e r ’s conviction  shou ld  n o t be u p ­
se t on th is  g ro u n d . F o r  th e  reaso n s  we hav e  s ta te d , 
even th o u g h  a  s e p a ra te  e n t ry  a u th o riz a tio n  m a y  be 
p ru d e n t  a n d  m a y  be re q u ire d  in  som e cases, i t  w as  
n o t re q u ire d  in  th is  case  by  e i th e r  th e  s ta tu te  o r  th e  
C o n stitu tio n . A ccord ing ly , n e ith e r  th e  s ta tu to ry  sup- 
pession  rem ed y  (1 8  U .S .C . 2515, 2 5 1 8 (1 0 )  ( a ) )  n o r  
th e  F o u r th  A m en d m en t’s ex c lu sio n a ry  ru le  re q u ire s  
th a t  th e  reco rd in g s  o f p e t i t io n e r ’s in te rc e p te d  con­
v e rsa tio n s  be su p p ressed .

CONCLUSION

T h e  ju d g m e n t o f th e  c o u r t o f ap p ea ls  shou ld  be 
affirm ed.

R esp ec tfu lly  su b m itted .

Wade H. McCree, J r.
Solicitor General

P hilip  B. Heymann
Assistant Attorney General

Andrew L. F rey 
Deputy Solicitor General

William C. Bryson
Kenneth  S. Geller 

Assistants to the Solicitor General
J erome M. Feit
Katherine Winfree 

December 1978 Attorneys

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