Enmund v. Florida Reply Brief for Petitioner

    No. 81-5321

I n  the

l& t jir m ?  ( t a r t  ni tljr lu i t n i
October Term, 1981

Earl Enmund,

V.
Petitioner,

State op Florida,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OP FLORIDA

R EPLY  BRIEF FOR PET IT IO N ER

W illiam C. McL ain
Assistant Public Defender 
Hall of Justice Annex 
495 N. Carpenter Street 
Bartow, Florida 33830-3798 
(813) 533-6715

Attorney of Record

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, I I I  
Joel Berger 
John Charles Boger 
Deborah F ins 
James S. L iebman 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

A nthony G. A msterdam 
New York University 

Sebool of Law 
40 Washington Square So. 
New York, New York 10012

Attorneys for Petitioner



Questions Presented

1, Whether death i s  an unconst i tu-  

t i o n a l l y  e x c e s s i v e  and d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  

p e n a l t y  under the E i ghth  and F ou r t e en th  

Amendments f o r  one who ne i the r  took l i f e ,  

a t t em pted  t o  t ake  l i f e ,  nor in t ended  to  

take l i f e ?

2. Whether p e t i t i o n e r ' s  d e g r e e  o f  

p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the k i l l i n g s  was g i v e n  

inadequ a te  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and inadequa te  

w e i g h t  by t h e  F l o r i d a  c o u r t s ,  t h e r e b y  

v i o l a t i n g  his r i g h t s  under the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments?

x



INDEX

Page

Table o f A u th o r i t i e s  ...............................  i i i

Argument .................................... ....................  1

A . Respondent Misconceives 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s  Legal  Con­
tent ions  .................................... 2

B. Respondent Misconceives 
the A pp l i c a t i on  o f  P e t i ­
t i o n e r ' s  Contentions to 
F l o r i d a ' s  Cap i ta l -Sentenc­
ing Statute  .......................... 12

C. Respondent Miss tates  the 
Facts and P r i o r  Pro­
ceedings o f  Record . . . . . .  17

1 . The ev idence at the 
gu i l t - innocen ce  
phase . .......................... 18

2. The sentencing pro­
ceedings ............... .. 31

3. Proceedings on
appeal .........................  38

Conclusion . ..................................................  44

Appendix



Ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Armstrong v.  S ta te ,  399 So. 2d 953
(F la .  1981) ......................................  passim

Coker v. Georgia,  433 U.S. 584
( 1 977) ......................... ............ .. 3,4,11,15

Eddings v.  Oklahoma, ____ U.S. ____, 50
U.S.L.W. 4161 (January 19,
1 982) ....................................................  3

Enmund v.  S ta te ,  399 So. 2d 1362
(F la .  1981) .....................................  passim

Locket t  v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
( 1 978) ................. ................................. 4,6

State  v. Quinn, 623 P. 2d 630
(Ore. 1981) .......................................... 10

Statutes

F la .  S ta t .  Ann. § 775.082 .....................  1 4

F la .  S ta t .  Ann. § 782.04 .......... 41

F la .  S ta t .  Ann. § 812.13 .......... 14

F la .  S ta t .  Ann. § 921.141 . . . .  29,36,37,38

F la .  S ta t .  Ann. § 947.1 6 .........  14

Other A u th o r i t i e s

S. Rep. 143, 97th Cong.,  1st
Sess.  (1981) ...................................... 11



No. 81-5321

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1981

EARL ENMUND,

P e t i t i o n e r ,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

R e s p o n d e n t ' s  b r i e f  n e c e s s i t a t e s  

r e p l y .  I t  d i s t o r t s  the issues by miscon­

c e i v i n g  (A)  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

content ions ,  (B) the a pp l i c a t i on  o f  those 

content ions to the operat ion  o f  F l o r i d a ' s  

c a p i t a l - s e n t e n c i n g  s t a t u t e ,  and (C) the



2

a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  those  c o n t e n t i o n s  and o f  

that  s ta tu te  to the f a c t s  and proceedings 

in th is  case.

A. Respondent  Misconceives  P e t i t i o n ­
e r ' s  Legal  Contentions

Respondent  r e p e a t e d l y  a s c r i b e s  to  

p e t i t i o n e r  an argument which would e re c t  

a " b r i g h t  l i n e  ru le "  f o r  ca p i t a l - s en tenc ing  

de terminat ions that  i s  somehow incons i s ­

ten t  with p a r t i c u l a r i z e d  cons iderat ion  o f  

the f a c t s  o f  each ind iv idua l  case in which 

the  death p e n a l t y  i s  in i s s u e .  E . g . , 

Resp. Br. 28-33. P e t i t i o n e r  makes no such 

argument. Earl  Enmund's case n e ces sa r i l y  

presents  the quest ion o f  the minimum s ta t e  

o f  c u l p a b i l i t y  t h a t  can suppor t  a death 

s e n t e n c e  c o n f o r m i n g  t o  t h e  E i g h t h  and 

Fourteenth Amendments' command o f  propor ­

t i o n a l i t y  in c a p i t a l  s e n t e n c i n g .  At or  

above that minimum s t a t e ,  c a p i t a l  punish­

ment may and must be i n d i v i d u a l i z e d .  E. g . ,



3

Eddings v .  Oklahoma, ____ U.S. ____, 50 U.S.

L.W. 4161 (January 1 9, 1 982).  Below that

minimum s t a t e ,  c a p i t a l  p u n i shm en t  i s  

fo rb idden.  Coker v.  G eo rg i a , 433 U.S. 584 

(1977) .

This l a t t e r  p r o h ib i t i o n  i s  not p e t i ­

t i o n e r ' s  i n v e n t i o n .  Coker e s t a b l i s h e d  

i t  upon abundant Eighth Amendment author­

i t y .  See cases c i t e d  in Pe t r .  Br. 10-11. 

Unless Coker i s  over ru led ,  and unless the 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are held 

t o  p e r m i t  a d e a t h  s e n t e n c e  f o r  p e t t y  

la rc eny  or  v eh i cu la r  homicide,  some l i n e  

must be drawn between degrees o f  c u l p a b i l ­

i t y  f o r  which the  S t a t e s  can and cannot 

i n f l i c t  t h e  pu n i shm en t  o f  d e a t h . - ^  a

_1_/ In the midst o f  i t s  attack on "br igh t  
l i n e s , "  respondent at one point  suggests 
i t s  own such demarcat ion:  between homi­
c id a l  and nonhomicidal crimes. Resp. Br. 
36-37. As the veh i cu la r  homicide example 
suggests ,  and as the analys is  in Pe t r .  Br.

[Footnote 1/ continues on next page. ]



4

" b r i g h t e r "  l i n e  would seem b e t t e r  than a 

"m u rk i e r "  one f o r  t h i s  purpose ,  so tha t  

rev iewing  courts need not make a de novo 

judgment upon each death sentence.  But, in 

any e v e n t ,  p e t i t i o n e r  contends  th a t  the 

f a c t s  o f  h i s  case f a i l  t o  e s t a b l i s h  the 

minimum s t a t e  o f  c u l p a b i l i t y  requi red  by 

the Eighth Amendment f o r  a death sentence 

e i t h e r  (a)  under the r e l a t i v e l y  b r i g h t - l i n e  

p r i n c i p l e  conv inc ing ly  a r t i c u l a t e d  in Jus­

t i c e  Whi te ' s  concurring op in ion in Lockett  

v- Ohio , 438 U.S. 586, 624-25 (1978 ) , —̂  or 

(b)  under any proper in d i v i d u a l i z e d  con-

]_/ continued

16-17 demonstrates,  such a l i n e  i s  incon­
s i s t e n t  with the " o b j e c t i v e  ind i ca to r s  o f  
s o c i e t y ' s  ' e v o l v in g  standards o f  decency ' "  
( Coker v.  Geo rg i a , supra, 433 U.S. at 603 
(Ju s t i c e  Powe l l ,  c o n cu r r in g ) ) .

2/ We say r e l a t i v e l y  b r i g h t - l i n e  because 
o f  the subs tant ia l  f l e x i b i l i t y  a v a i l a b l e  to 
l e g i s l a t o r s  in framing,  and t r i e r s  o f  f a c t



5

s

c

i d e r a t i o n

ircumstances

o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  f a c t s  and
3/shown by the record he r e . -

2/ continued

in apply ing ,  intent -based standards.  See 
Pe t r .  Br. 44 n .64.

As we note in our opening b r i e f ,  the 
c o n s t i t i o n a l  ru le  might be l im i t e d  to three 
o b j e c t i v e  f a c t o r s  whose a b s e n c e  h e r e  
d is t in gu i sh es  th is  case from almost every 
o t h e r  case in which a death p e n a l t y  has 
been imposed in th i s  country ove r  the past 
decade: ( i )  phys i ca l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the
l e t h a l  ac t ;  ( i i )  presence at the s i t e  o f  
the ac t ,  and ( i i i )  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in a p l o t  
t o  k i l l ,  i f  absen t .  P e t r .  B r . 36 n .55 .
See Appendix  E t o  P e t r .  B r . ( s e p a r a t e l y  
bound). Such a ru le  would be narrower,  but 
i t  would r e q u i r e  f a c t u a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  
l e s s  common in the c r i m i n a l  law o f  the 
var ious  Sta tes  than a simple de terminat ion ,  
requi red  in some w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  form by 
the cr imina l  codes o f  a l l  f i f t y  S ta t es ,  o f  
w h e t h e r  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  had a c o n s c i o u s  
purpose to k i l l .

3/ Respondent is  o f  two minds about the 
i n d i v i d u a l i z e d  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  due th e  
r e l e v a n t  c i r cumstances  o f  Ea r l  Enmund' s 
case .  At one p o i n t ,  F l o r i d a  g r u d g i n g l y  
concedes  tha t  " th e  f a c t  tha t  i t  was not 
proved that  P e t i t i o n e r  intended the murders 
to  occur might be r e l e vant  in m i t i g a t i o n . "

[Footnote 3/ continues on next page. ]



6

Th is  major  m i s c o n c e p t i o n  o f  p e t i ­

t i o n e r ' s  a rgument  i s  e m b r o i d e r e d  by a 

number o f  minor ones. F i r s t ,  p e t i t i o n e r  

^as fiot "argued that  . . .  the death pena l ty

3/ continued

R e s p .  Br .  9. T h i s  much and m ore ,  o f  
course,  i s  e s tab l i shed  by Locket t  v .  Ohio, 
suPra t which reversed the death sentence o f  
a fe lony-murder  accessory - -  who proposed 
and a s s i s t e d  in  p l a n n i n g  t h e  r o b b e r y ,  
o f f e r e d  t o  s e c u r e  a weapon t o  use in  
ca rry ing  i t  out,  drove the getaway car,  and 
h i d  t h e  murder  weapon and two o f  h e r  
accompl ices from the p o l i c e ,  438 U.S. at  
590-91 - -  because her l im i t e d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in the homicide i t s e l f ,  and her lack o f  an 
in t en t  to  k i l l ,  had not been considered in 
m i t i g a t i o n .  Id_. at 604.

Elsewhere,  however, respondent approv­
i n g l y  acknowledges  " t h e  F l o r i d a  c o u r t s '  
f i n d i n g s  o f  _ the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  any 
m i t i g a t in g  circumstances" in p e t i t i o n e r ’ s 
c a s e .  R e sp .  B r . 65 ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) .

Respondent cannot have i t  both ways. 
I t  cannot argue that  in d i v i d u a l i z e d  m i t i ­
g a t i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  the l a ck  o f  an 
in t en t  to k i l l  and o f  nonpar t i c i pa t i on  in 
the  l e t h a l  ac t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  make a 
death  s en t ence  imposed in such c i rcum-  
s t a n c e s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  and t h e n  t u r n  
around and argue tha t  those  f a c t o r s  are  
somehow devoid o f  "any m i t i g a t i n g "  weight  
in p e t i t i o n e r ' s  case.  See Pe t r .  Br. 47-49.



7

has not o f t e n  been imposed in  a f e l o n y ­

murder c o n t e x t . "  Resp. Br. 49. P e t i t i o n e r  

has argued and demonstrated that  the death 

pena l t y  has i n f r equ en t l y  been imposed upon 

o f f en de r s  who ne i the r  took l i f e ,  attempted 

to  take l i f e ,  or  intended to  take l i f e ,  and 

whose g u i l t  o f  f i r s t - d e g r e e  murder was 

t h e r e f o r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  s o l e l y  under the 

f e l o n y - m u r d e r  r u l e .  P e t r .  B r .  3 2 - 3 6 ;  

.Apendices D and E. P e t i t i o n e r ' s  a r g u ­

ment wou ld  no t  make the  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  

unava i l ab le  to the States  in fe lony-murder  

cases,  o r  even f o rb id  the States to  con­

s i d e r  the f a c t  o f  fe lony-murder as an ag­

g r a v a t i n g  c i r cum stance  in  cases  mee t ing  

the  minimum l e v e l  o f  c u l p a b i l i t y  f o r  a 

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  death s e n t e n c e .  Respon­

den t ' s  page 49, fo o tnot e  10 thereon,  and 

Appendix th e r e t o ,  r e f e r r i n g  to death sen­

tences meted out in F lo r ida  f o r  k i l l i n g s  

in "a f e l o n y -m u r d e r  c o n t e x t "  (Resp .  Br.



8

49) , are a l l  simply wide o f  the mark.”  

The same misconcept ion animates respon­

de n t ' s  ana lys is  o f  the var ious s t a t e  s t a t ­

utes which i t  c a t e g o r i z e s  in fo o tn o te  8 at 

pages  43-45.  Respondent  asks the wrong 

quest ions about these s t a t u t e s ,—̂ and ge ts

4/ In '  each case c i t ed  by respondent in 
T ts  appendix—save ,  o f  course,  p e t i t i o n -  
e r ' s — the  de fe ndan t  e i t h e r  took  l i f e  o r  
was a c tu a l l y  present  a id ing  and abet t ing  
a code f endan t  who took  l i f e .  See P e t r .  
Br. Appendix E. While an in t en t  to take 
l i f e  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  not  r e q u i r e d  under 
F l o r i d a  law e i t h e r  to conv ic t  a defendant 
o f  f i r s t - d e g r e e  murder or to  sentence him 
t o  d i e ,  t h e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  in  t h e  v a s t  
m a j o r i t y  o f  the " f e l o n y - m u r d e r  c o n t e x t "  
cases c i t e d  by respondent in i t s  appendix, 
u n l i k e  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  c a s e ,  t h e  F l o r i d a  
Supreme Court e i t h e r  express ly  found, or 
e x p r e s s l y  a f f i r m e d  the t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  o r  
j u r y ' s  f i n d in g ,  that  the defendant intended 
t h a t  l i f e  be taken.  The cases  are  ana­
l y z e d  in  t h e  A p p e n d i x  t o  t h i s  R e p l y  
B r i e f .

5/ Respondent asks which " s t a tu t e s  a l low 
an a ider  and abet t or  to be convic ted o f  a 
c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e ,  even though i n t e n t  to  
murder e i t h e r  has not been o r  cannot  be 
p r o v e d . "  Resp.  Br.  43 n .8 .  By l o o k i n g



9

u 6/the wrong answer.

Respondent  i s  s i m i l a r l y  rem iss  in 

r e p o r t i n g  the p r o g r e s s  o f  death  p e n a l t y

5/ continued

s o l e l y  at prov is ions  d e f in in g  the crime o f  
c a p i t a l  murder, respondent simply misses 
the f a c t  that :  (1) s e ve ra l  S ta tes  include 
a r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  t h e  f e 1o n y - m u r d e r  
defendant have taken l i f e ,  or  have intended 
to  do so,  in the aggravat ing  or  m i t i g a t in g  
circumstance por t ions  o f  t h e i r  c a p i t a l - sen­
tenc ing  s ta tu tes  (see the United Sta t es ,  
Arkansas, Colorado,  I l l i n o i s ,  Indiana,  New 
Mexico and North Carol ina p rov i s i ons  c i t ed  
i n  P e t r .  B r .  28-29  n n . 4 3 - 4 0 ) ;  and ( 2 )  
s e ve ra l  S ta tes  do not even inc lude f e l o n y ­
murder as an aggravat ing  circumstance that  
w i l l  j u s t i f y  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  d e a t h  
pena l ty  ( see the Ar i zona ,  Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Dakota s ta tu tes  
c i t e d  in Pe t r .  Br. 29 n. 45) .

6/ Contrary to Respondent 's asse r t i on ,  
s ix  s t a tu te s  i t  c i t e s  (Arkansas, Delaware, 
Kentucky, Texas, Utah, and Washington) ,  do 
inc lude mens rea requirements in s e t t i n g  
f o r t h  those  t ypes  o f  murder or  f e l o n y ­
murder that  are c a p i t a l .  Those r e q u i r e ­
ments are a l l  quoted in P e t i t i o n e r ' s  Open­
ing B r i e f  at page 28 n.43. (Respondent 's 
c i t a t i o n  o f  a Washington s ta tu te  that  was 
r e c e n t l y  ruled unconst i tu t iona l  and l a t e r  
reenacted in a d i f f e r e n t  form accounts f o r



-  10

l e g i s l a t i o n  p r e sen t l y  being considered in 

the United Sta tes  Senate.  Although i t  i s  

t rue that  Senate B i l l  114 o r i g i n a l l y  "would 

[have] au thor i z e [d ]  the impos i t ion o f  the 

d e a t h  p e n a l t y  f o r  a number o f  f e d e r a l  

f e l o n i e s  in which death r e s u l t s ,  even i f  

t h e r e  i s  no f i n d i n g  t h a t  the de f e n da n t  

e i t h e r  committed the crime wi th the con­

scious purpose o f  causing death or  p a r t i c i ­

pated in the homicidal  a c t , "  Resp. B r . 23,. 

S e n a t o r  Thurmond's J u d i c i a r y  Committee 

amended the b i l l  be fo re  r epo r t ing  f a vo ra b l y  

upon i t .  The amendment requ i re s  that  every  

death sentence be supported by a f i nd ing  

that  the defendant e i t h e r  " i n t e n t i o n a l l y  

" i n t e n t i o n a l l y  i n f l i c t e d  ser ious

6/ continued

one o f  t hese  e r r o r s .  See P e t r .  B r . 28
n* 43. ) The Oregon death-pena l ty  s ta tu te  
c i t e d  by respondent was ruled unconst i tu­
t i o n a l  in 1981, State  v .  Quinn, 623 P. 2d 
630 (Ore.  1981), and Oregon remains without 
a death pena l t y  at th i s  t ime.



-  11

b o d i l y  i n j u r y , "  or  " i n t e n t i o n a l l y  p a r t i c i ­

pated in an act  which he knew or  reasonably 

should have known would c r ea t e  a grave  r i sk  

o f  death to a p e r s o n a n d  the v i c t im  did d ie  

as a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  the a c t ."  S. Rep.

1 43, 1 43, 97th Cong.,  1st Sess.  33 ( 1 981)

(emphasis added) .  The Committee concluded 

that  th is  requirement o f  "a high l e v e l  o f  

culpable involvement in the homicide" was 

necessary " t o  meet c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l ­

t i e s  under Coker v .  G eo rg i a ." Id .  at 5.

Respondent 's most remarkable m iss ta t e ­

ment o f  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  conten­

t ions  is  i t s  ass e r t i on  that  the "next  s tep"  

f o l l o w in g  acceptance o f  those content ions 

"would be an a ttack upon c a p i t a l  punishment 

f o r  those  who planned death  but d id  not 

a c t u a l l y  commit the k i l l i n g . "  Resp. Br. 

55-56. P e t i t i o n e r ' s  argument that  a death 

sentence i s  unconst i tu t iona l  ( e i t h e r  on the 

f a c t s  o f  th is  p a r t i c u l a r  case or in gen-



12

e r a l ) in the absence o f  an in t en t  to take 

human l i f e  obv ious ly  does not look to im­

munizing persons who d e l i b e r a t e l y  h i r e  or 

s o l i c i t  others to k i l l  f o r  them. I t  looks 

180 d e g r e e s  in  the o p p o s i t e  d i r e c t i o n .

B* Respondent Misconceives the A p p l i ­
ca t ion  o f  P e t i t i o n e r ' s  Contentions

__F l o r i d a ' s  C a p i t a l  —Sen tenc ing
Statute

Respondent 's asserted  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  

fon i n f l i c t i n g  the death pena l ty  in cases 

o f  a c c e s s o r i a l  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  un intended 

homicides occurr ing  during a f e l o n y  invo l ve  

s im i l a r  misconcept ions o f  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  con­

t en t i on s ,  as w e l l  as complementary miscon­

c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  F l o r i d a  d e a t h - p e n a l t y  

s t a t u t e .

F i r s t ,  respondent asse r ts  that  " [ j u ­

d i c i a l  acceptance o f  [ p e t i t i o n e r ' s  p o s i ­

t i o n ]  . . .  wou ld  be t a n t a m o u n t  t o  t h e  

issuance o f  'death warrants '  f o r  innumer­

able  convenience s t or e  c l e rks  and s e r v i c e



13

s t a t i o n  o p e r a t o r s "  (Resp .  Br.  61) whom 

robbers would thereby  be l i c ensed  to  k i l l  

" i n  orde r  to prevent  subsequent i d e n t i f i c a ­

t i on  by the v i c t im "  (Resp. Br. 60 n.12;  see 

a l so  Resp. Br. 8 -9 ) .  Of course nothing in 

any o f  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  c o n t e n t i o n s  would  

f o r b i d  d e a t h  s e n t e n c e s  in  such c a s e s  

as respondent descr ibes which are a l l ,  by 

express ( "w i tness  e l im in a t i o n " )  hypothes is ,  

i n t e n t i o n a l  k i l l i n g s .  Nor  would  any 

prosecutor  have any d i f f i c u l t y  in convinc­

ing  the  t r i e r  o f  f a c t  t o  i n f e r  such an 

in t en t  to  k i l l  in any case where the f a c t s  

suppor ted  the i n f e r e n c e  - -  as ,  i ndeed ,  

occurred in the only  two actual  cases c i t e d  

in th is  context  by respondent.  (See the

ana lys i s  o f  the Vaught and Hargrave cases
7/

m  the Appendix, i n f r a . )~

]_/ Respondent goes so f a r  as to say that  
a r obb e r  in F l o r i d a  "has . . .  no th ing  t o  
l o s e  by murder ing  the  v i c t i m "  un les s  he



14

But t h e  F l o r i d a  s t a t u t e  d o e s  no t  

r e q u i r e  a f i n d i n g  o f  i n t e n t  t o  k i l l  

or  to  " e l im ina t e  w i tnesses"  ( see Resp. Br. 

9) as the c o n d i t i o n  o f  a death s en t ence  

f o r  a c c e s s o r i a l  f e l o n y - m u r d e r ,  and the 

f a c t s  o f  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  case w i l l  support no 

such f i n d in g .  To the contrary ,  the F l o r i da  

Supreme Court found that  the k i l l i n g s  here 

were the " spon taneous "  a c t i o n s  o f  p e t i ­

t i o n e r ' s  r o b b e r y  a c c o m p l i c e ,  Sampson 

A r m s t r o n g ,  u n d e r t a k e n  in  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

absence a f t e r  one o f  the robbery v i c t im s

7/ continued

f a c e s  the death p e n a l t y .  Resp.  Br.  60. 
This a sse r t i on  i s  absurd. In F l o r i d a ,  as 
e l sewhere in the United Sta t es ,  the pena l ty  
f o r  murder i s  g r e a t e r  than the pena l ty  f o r  
robbery.  Compare F la .  S ta t .  Ann. §§ 775. 
082, 813.13, 947.16 ( f i r s t - d e g r e e  murderer 
not sentenced to  d i e  must r e c e i v e  a l i f e  
sentence without  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  pa ro l e  f o r  
25 years ;  robber who does not k i l l  may be 
sentenced to  any term o f  years from 0 to  
l i f e ,  and may be paroled at  any t ime a f t e r  
one y e a r . )



opened f i r e  on Armstrong and his  w i f e ,  A. 

55;  399 So .  2d a t  1373,  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  

Armstrong  v .  S t a t e , 399 So, 2d 953, 963 

(F la .  1981).

Both respondent ' s  " c r ea t i o n  o f  r i sk "  

(Resp. Br. 39-47) and "de t er r ence "  (Resp. 

Br. 48-63, e s p e c i a l l y  60-63) j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  

a lso  defend a F l o r i da  s t a tu te  that  does not 

e x i s t .  These arguments express ly  j u s t i f y  

the death pena l ty  f o r  the underly ing f e l ­

ony, not f o r  a k i l l i n g  that  "spontaneously"  

occurs during i t s  commission. I f  they were 

v a l i d  arguments, Coker v.  Georgia could not 

have been decided as i t  was, s ince rape no 

l e s s  than robbery i s ,  and has been d e t e r ­

mined by "numerous s ta t e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  [ to  

be , ]  . . .  so dangerous that  death i s  a f o r -  

seeable  and l i k e l y  r e s u l t  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  

in  t h a t  c o n d u c t . "  Re sp .  B r .  43 -44 .

The F l o r i d a  s t a t u t e  under  whi ch

p e t i t i o n e r  stands condemned to d ie  does not



r e q u i r e  a f i n d i n g  o f  f o r e s e e a b i l i t y  o f  

death - -  l e t  alone a f i nd in g  that  " loaded 

f i rearms are used" in the under lying f e l ­

ony ,  Resp.  Br.  42. To the  e x t e n t  tha t  

i t  expresses a g ene r i c  f i n d in g  o f  the l i f e -  

endanger in g  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a l l  enumerated 

f e l o n i e s ,  that  f i nd ing  no more j u s t i f i e s  

the death pena l ty  f o r  Earl  Enmund than f o r  

Ehr l i ch  Coker. See Pe t r .  B r . 7-10.

Respondent p lays the opera t i on  o f  the 

F l o r i d a  s ta tu te  f a l s e  in ye t  another c r i t i c a l  

regard.  Under that  s t a tu te ,  respondent says, 

" [ i ] n  p r a c t i c e ,  a death  sen t ence  f o r  an 

a id e r  and abe t t or  w i l l  only  be imposed in 

ex t reme cases  where the  d e f e n d a n t ' s  i n ­

vo lv em en t  i s  m a j o r . "  Resp.  Br.  46-47.  

P e t i t i o n e r ' s  death s en t ence  s u f f i c e s  to 

r e f u t e  t h i s  g l i b  a s s e r t i o n .  Nowhere in 

i t s  b r i e f  does r esponden t  t e l l  us what 

" e x t r e m e  c a s e s "  means o r  u n d e r t a k e  t o  

demonst ra t e  tha t  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  i s  one o f

-  16 -



17

them. Respondent  does argue th a t  p e t i ­

t i o n e r ’ s involvement in the robbery,  not 

the murder "was major , "  but t h i s ,  again,  

i s  a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  p u n i s h i n g  t h e  

robbery,  not the murder, with death.  And 

in any event ,  respondent a r r i v e s  at even 

th i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  by d i s r e ­

garding  —  and in some cases misrepresent ­

ing - -  the record,  to which we next turn.

C. R e s p o n d ent  M i s s t a t e s  the Facts  
and P r i o r  P r o c e e d in g s  o f  Record

Page l i m i t a t i o n s  r e q u i r e d  the om is ­

s ion o f  a d e t a i l e d  statement o f  the fa c t s  

from p e t i t i o n e r ' s  i n i t i a l  b r i e f .  Conse­

q u e n t l y ,  r e s p o n d e n t  has c h a r g e d  t h a t  

" [ p e t i t i o n e r ' s  s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  ca s e  

om i t s  m a t e r i a l  f a c t s "  (Resp .  Br.  1) and 

has e x p l o i t e d  t h i s  o m i s s i o n  by o f f e r ­

i n g  a g r o s s l y  i n c o m p l e t e  and s l a n t e d  

v e r s i o n  o f  the r e c o r d .  We now s e t  the

record s t r a i g h t .



18

1• T he e v i d e n c e  at  the g u i l t - i n n o ­
cence phase

The f o l l o w in g  ev idence was presented 

at  the f i r s t  phase o f  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  b i f u r ­

cated jury  t r i a l :

At 7:45 a.m. on A p r i l  1, 1975, Harold

Elems was work ing  on h i s  p r o p e r t y  in a 

rura l  po r t i on  o f  Hardee County, F l o r i d a ,  

when he h e a rd  " [ w ] h a t a p p e a r e d  t o  be 

gun f i r e  . . .  , "  R. 1 043, i . e . , "more than

s i x  but not  f i f t e e n "  shots  f i r e d  " i n  a 

short  l ength o f  t im e . "  R. 1044. Although 

he cou ld  not  then see the nearby  Ke rsey  

home, a minute or two l a t e r  he drove his 

t ruck to  w i thin  100 yards o f  the back o f  

that  house, o f  which he had "a p r e t t y  c l e a r  

v i ew . . .  f o r  probably a minute or so . "  R. 

1044-45. Seeing nothing unusual, Mr. Elems 

d ro v e  on,  a r r i v i n g  at  h i s  d e s t i n a t i o n ,  

s e v e r a l  minutes away, a t  p r e c i s e l y  7:50 

a.m. R. 1 045-47. He t e s t i f i e d  that  as o f



1 9

approximately  7:47 a.m. he not i ced  no cars 

on or near the road in f r on t  o f  the Kersey 

p roper t y .  R. 1047.

The bodies o f  Thomas and Eunice Kersey 

were d iscovered  between 7:55 and 8:00 a.m.,  

on A p r i l  1. They were l y in g  head to head, 

p a r t i a l l y  in the k i t c h e n  and p a r t i a l l y  

across the rear  doorway. R. 1019-21, 1056, 

1070. Mr. Kersey had been shot tw ice ,  his 

w i f e  s ix  t imes.  R. 1102, 1106. No weapons 

were d iscovered  at the scene or  introduced 

at  t r i a l ,  R. 1567, although a b a l l i s t i c s  

e x p e r t  t e s t i f i e d  th a t  b u l l e t s  had been 

f i r e d  from a .22 and a .38 c a l i b e r  weapon. 

R. 1055-57, 1139-41.

The p o l i c e  were unable to  l o c a t e  Mr. 

K e r s e y ' s  w a l l e t  (R.  1084 -85 ) ,  a l though 

test imony at  t r i a l  ind ica ted  that  he kept 

i t  on his person at a l l  t imes.  The night 

b e f o r e  he was s h o t ,  Mr. Ke r sey  t o l d  h i s  

son t h a t  he had $1,400 o r  $1,500 in  h i s



-  20 -

w a l l e t .  R. 1013-14.-

The State  r e l i e d  almost e x c l u s i v e l y  on 

t h e  t e s t i m o n y  o f  Jay  B. N e a l ,  a c l o s e  

f r i e n d  o f  Sampson Armstrong, f o r  a d e s c r i p ­

t i o n  o f  the events at the Kersey res idence  

on the morning o f  A p r i l  1, 1975. R. 1345. 

A c c o r d i n g  t o  N e a l ,  A r m s t r o n g  t o l d  him 

"about  a j o b "  he and h i s  w i f e  J e a n e t t e  

A r m s t r o n g  "had d o n e , "  d u r i n g  wh ich  an 

" o l d  l a d y  shot  J e a n e t t e . "  R. 1 347-48.  

Sampson t o l d  Nea l  t h a t  he and h i s  w i f e  

went to  the door o f  a ranch house owned by 

"two o ld persons"  and asked f o r  some water 

b e c a u s e  t h e i r  " c a r  had run h o t . "  R. 

1348. When the man went behind his  house 

t o  g e t  a w a t e r  j u g ,  Sampson " g r a b b e d  

the o ld  man . . .  around the neck and put the

8/ According to  s eve ra l  w i tnesses ,  Mr. 
Kersey usual ly  ca r r i ed  l a r g e  sums o f  money 
in  $100 denomina t ions  in h i s  w a l l e t  and 
l i k e d  " t o  f l a sh  h is  money around," not only 
among f r i ends  and at church, but a lso  to 
s t range rs .  R. 993, 1005-06, 1010.



21

gun on him . . .  ho ld ing  him to  the back door 

l i k e . "  R. 1349. According to  Nea l ,  Samp­

son then said that :

He was t e l l i n g  J e a n e t t e  
t o  g e t  t h e  m o n e y .  And 
somehow o r  o t h e r  t h e  o l d  
man h o l l e r e d  f o r  h i s  w i f e  
and h i s  w i f e  h e a r d  t h e  
sc r eam  and he c o u l d  l o o k  
through the back window and 
s e e  t h e  o l d  l a d y  c o m i n g  
a round t h e  house  w i t h  th e  
gun. . . .  As soon as she got  
t h e r e  s h e  s h o t  and h i t  
J e a n e t t e  and he h i t  t h e  
o ld  man and knocked him down 
and s h o t  t h e  l a d y . . . .  By 
t h e  t i m e  he s h o t  t h e  l a d y  
and the  o l d  man go t  up and 
he shot  the o l d  man in  the 
c h e s t . . . .  Then he say  he 
t ook  them in the house and 
pu t  them head by head . . .
[and] l e f t  . . . .
9/

R. 1350-51.

9/ P o l i c e  t e s t im o n y  e s t a b l i s h e d  tha t  
J e a n e t t e  A r m s t r o n g  was a d m i t t e d  t o  a 
l o c a l  h o s p i t a l  w i th  a gunshot wound on 
A p r i l  1 , 1 975, and t h a t  a b l ood  sample
t a k e n  f r om h e r  matched a b l o o d  s t a i n  
found ins ide  the Kersey home, which did not 
match e i t h e r  v i c t i m ' s  b l o od .  R. 1057, 
1070-71, 1125-30, 1157.

[Footnote 9/ continues on next page. ]



22

Contrary to  respondent ' s  f a l s e  asser ­

t i on  that  "Armstrong had t o ld  [Jay B. Neal ]  

that  he, p e t i t i o n e r ,  and Armstrong's w i f e  

had robbed and k i l l e d  an e l d e r l y  coup le , "  

Resp. Br. 3, Neal did not impl i ca te  p e t i ­

t i o n e r  in any way. Indeed, as the F lo r ida  

Supreme C o u r t  n o t e d  on a p p e a l ,  N e a l ' s  

account "d id not include any r e f e r ence  to 

[ p e t i t i o n e r ] . "  A. 49; 399 So. 2d at 1270. 

Nor did the cr ime-scene ev idence impl i ca t e  

p e t i t i o n e r  in e i t h e r  the  r ob b e r y  o r  the

9/ continued

Jeanette  Armstrong's mother, Ida Jean 
Shaw, a lso  corroborated N ea l ' s  test imony in 
s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s .  Ms. Shaw t e s t i f i e d  
that  her daughter confessed to  her about "a 
robbery , "  R. 1190, 1196, and that  Sampson
Armstrong t o ld  her that  he had $600 l e f t  
"out  o f  the robbery . "  R. 1197; see a lso  R. 
1195-96, 1202, 1246-47. According to  Shaw, 
Sampson a lso  t o ld  her "he made sure that  
the people was dead."  R. 1207-08. Fin­
a l l y ,  Ms.  Shaw t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  she  saw 
e i t h e r  J e a n e t t e  A r m s t r o n g  o r  Sampson 
Armstrong with a .38 c a l i b e r  weapon some­
t ime  b e f o r e  A p r i l  1, 1975. R. 1200-01.



23

shoot ings that  began when Mrs. Kersey f i r e d  

on Jeanet te  Armstrong.

The only  ev idence l i n k in g  p e t i t i o n e r  

to the robbery f a l l s  in t o  three c a t e g o r i e s :

( i )  Sometime dur ing  the  e a r l y  

p a r t  o f  March, 1975, p e t i t i o n e r  and two 

acquaintances stopped at Mr. Ke r sey ’ s house 

to  buy a c a l f  that  Mr. Kersey had adver­

t i s e d  f o r  s a l e .  Upon r e c e i p t  o f  t he  

purchase money, Mr. Kersey d isp layed  the 

c o n t e n t s  o f  h i s  w a l l e t  t o  a l l  p r e s e n t ,  

p r e c i p i t a t i n g  a d iscussion  among the four 

men about " the money th i s  man's g o t . "  R. 

997-1 000.

( i i )  The State  introduced the

t e s t im o n y  o f  W i l l i e  Lee ,  a ne i gh bo r  o f  

p e t i t i o n e r ,  who was standing on the road 

o u t s i d e  h i s  house on A p r i l  1 , 1 975 f o r

s eve ra l  hours wa i t ing  f o r  a r i d e  that  never 

came. R. 1298, 1302. As summarized by the 

F l o r i da  Supreme Court,  Lee



24

sa id  tha t  at  a p p r o x im a t e l y  
6 : 30  o r  6 : 4 5 ,  he saw E a r l  
Enmund and h i s  f o r m e r  
common- law w i f e  I da  Jean 
Shaw in t h e i r  y e l l o w  Buick 
with a v in y l  top.  Ida Jean 
Shaw was d r i v i n g .  There were 
two others in the back seat ,  
one male and one female.  The 
c a r  t r a v e l e d  n o r t h  t o wa r d  
t own .  . . .  At  about  8 : 00  
o ' c l o c k ,  the  car  came back 
t r a v e l l i n g  " p r e t t y  f a s t "  . . . ,  
with [ p e t i t i o n e r ]  . . .  d r i v ­
i n g ,  I d a  Jean Shaw i n  t he  
f r o n t  s e a t ,  and one o f  the 
two o ther  people  in the car 
l y i n g  down ac ross  the back 
s e a t .

A.  37;  399 So .  2d a t  1364 - 65 ;  s e e  R.

1 300-04. Lee t e s t i f i e d  that  the male and 

fe m a l e  occupants  o f  the  back s ea t  were 

" y o u n g e r "  and b l a c k ,  as a re  Sampson and 

J e a n e t t e  A rmst rong .  R. 1301, 1307-08,

1 323.

The State  a lso  introduced the t e s t i ­

mony o f  Mary A l i c e  Gibbs and Robert Clark 

Davis,  who drove past the Kerseys '  home at 

around 7:35 on the morning o f  A p r i l  1. 

Both saw a y e l l o w  or  c r e a m - c o l o r e d  car



25

ju s t  o f f  to the r i g h t  ( e a s t )  s id e  o f  Route

62, about 200 yards  west  o f  the Ke rsey

res iden ce ,  and both saw "one person in the

car under the [ s t e e r in g ]  whee l . "  R. 1025,

1026, 1028, 1037, 1039. The only  p o s i t i v e

d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t ha t  pe rson at  t r i a l  was

Mrs. Gibbs'  statement that  she saw "a black
1 0/

male in the c a r . " —  The F l o r ida  Supreme 

Court concluded that  Mrs. Gibbs'  test imony 

was the "only  e v idence , "  a l b e i t  " i n f e r e n ­

t i a l ] "  ev idence ,  that  placed p e t i t i o n e r  in 

t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  t he  K e r s e y  home when 

Sampson and Jeanette  Armstrong robbed and 

k i l l e d  i t s  occupants. A. 49-50; 399 So. 2d 

at  1370.

1Q/ Mrs. Gibbs t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  the car  
""had an 18 t a g . "  R. 1 026. Other test imony 
revea led  that  Ida Jean Shaw's y e l l ow  Buick 
had "an 18 t a g . "  R. 1094-95. Contrary to 
respondent ' s  asse r t i on  that  " P e t i t i o n e r  was 
seen in a car near the scene o f  the mur­
d e r s , "  Resp. Br. 2, ne i the r  Mrs. Gibbs nor 
Mr. Davis could i d e n t i f y  p e t i t i o n e r  as the 
pe rson she or  he saw in a car  near  the 
Kersey home. R. 1038, 1039.



( i  i  i ) The 

ev idence touching on

26

t h i r d  c a t e g o r y  o f  

p e t i t i o n e r  consisted 

o f  the test imony o f  Ida Jean Shaw,11/ F i r s t ,

1 V  The prosecutor  conceded to  the ju ry  
that  Ms. Shaw was h e r s e l f  a suspect in the 
Ke rsey  a f f a i r .  R. 1568. At t r i a l ,  she 
r epea ted ly  admitted ac t ions that  impl i ca ted  
her  as a t  l e a s t  an a c c e s s o r y  a f t e r  the 
f a c t .  See A. 39-40; 399 So. 2d at  1365-66; 
R. 1213-14, 1232, 1238-39, 1249.

Ms. Shaw admit ted ly  gave a number o f  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  s t o r i e s  under oath  b e f o r e  
t r i a l .  A.  43;  399 So.  2d at  1367; s e e ,  
e . g .  , R. 1 208-09, 1 225-26, 1 233-35, 1 257- 
59. _ As a r e s u l t ,  she spent t h i r t e e n  days 
in j a i l  be fo re  t r i a l  on charges o f  p e r ju ry  
and was re leased  by the State  on ly  a f t e r  
she agreed to  repudiate c e r t a in  p r i o r  sworn 
statements in which she exonerated p e t i ­
t i o n e r  and inculpated her daughter and two 
companions in the robbery and shoot ing .  R. 
272-74, 280-81, 1178-80, 1259, 1261, 1572. 
Ms. Shaw was c a l l e d  as a w i t n e s s  by the 
c o u r t  because o f  her  " h o s t i l i t y "  t o  the 
S t a t e ,  and t e s t i f i e d  under  a g r a n t  o f  
immunity by the State  from prosecut ion  f o r  
murder, robbery and pe r ju ry .  R. 103-06, 
274,  281-82,  429-30,  1178-80, 1251-52.  
At t r i a l ,  she admitted to having per jured 
h e r s e l f  aga in  dur ing  the  c o u r t ' s  d i r e c t  
e x a m i n a t i o n .  Compare R. 1194,  1196 
and R. 1205. As she summed i t  up: "Some­
t imes I ju s t  l i e  because I  can."  R. 1222. 
The v e r s i o n  o f  Ms. Shaw's t e s t im o n y  r e ­
ported here is  the most damaging to  p e t i ­
t i o n e r .



27

Ms. Shaw t e s t i f i e d  that  at about 7:55 a.m. 

on A p r i l  1, 1975, she was in the wash house 

when e i t h e r  Sampson or p e t i t i o n e r  —  she 

could not remember which— informed her that  

Jeanet te  had been shot.  R. 1 187, 1 188,

1212,  1224.  Ten mi nu t e s  e a r l i e r ,  t he

Armstrongs and p e t i t i o n e r  had been gone, R. 

1 185-86, and Ms. Shaw t e s t i f i e d  that  she 

did not "have any reason to b e l i e v e  that  

Jeane t te ,  Earl  and Sampson did not return 

t o g e t h e r . "  R. 1212.

Next ,  Ms. Shaw t e s t i f i e d  tha t ,  whi l e 

r i d in g  in a car with p e t i t i o n e r  l a t e r  that 

d a y ,  a f t e r  J e a n e t t e  had c o n f e s s e d  t he  

robbery to  her,  she asked p e t i t i o n e r  " [w]hy  

he d i d  i t , "  and he r e s p o n d e d  " t h a t  he 

had seed the man with money . . .  the time he 

. . .  went  o u t  t h e r e  t o  buy a c o w . "  R. 

1205-06. When asked i f  she remembered 

a t  any t ime  t a l k i n g  t o  p e t i t i o n e r  about 

"whether he was ins ide  that  house or  no t , "



28

she answered ,  "No,  because J e a n e t t e  had
12/

t o l d  me." R. 1206-07.—

F i n a l l y ,  Ms. Shaw t e s t i f i e d  that ,  f o r  

a couple o f  days a f t e r  A p r i l  1, 1975, p e t i ­

t i o n e r  hid e i t h e r  two or three guns in the 

l o f t  o f  h is  house, and t h e r e a f t e r  "Sampson 

and Ear l "  ins t ructed  Shaw " t o  ge t  r id  o f  

a l l  the  guns . "  R. 1199-1200, 1201-02,

1231-32. She did so, f i r s t  by burying them 

in her garden, and l a t e r  by g i v in g  them to 

a f r i e n d  i n  " a  b u c k e t  o f  g r e e n s "  w i t h  

i n s t r u c t i o n s  " t o  g e t  r i d  o f  [ t h e m ] . . , "  

which he d i d .  R. 1200, 1201-02,  1213,

1232, 1272-77.

*  *  *

12/ Jeanet te  Armstrong was t r i e d  separ­
a t e l y ,  convic ted  o f  two counts o f  second- 
d e g r e e  murder and one count o f  r o b b e r y ,  
and sent enced  to  t h r e e  c o n s e c u t i v e  l i f e  
terms. See A. 51; 399 So. 2d at  1371. Her 
confess ions  to the p o l i c e  and to  Ms. Shaw, 
s t a t in g  that  p e t i t i o n e r  remained outs ide  in 
the car during the robbery,  are discussed 
in nn. 15-16, i n f r a .



29

During p e t i t i o n e r ' s  case,  he admitted 

purchasing a cow from Mr. Kersey in March, 

but denied any knowledge o f  the robbery and 

s h o o t i n g .  R. 1500, 1509-11.  He gave  a 

minute-by-minute account o f  his a c t i v i t i e s  

on and around his farm on A p r i l  1 , 1 975.

R. 1475-83.

P e t i t i o n e r  t e s t i f i e d  tha t  he i s  a

f o r t y - t h r e e - y e a r - o l d ,  p a r t i a l l y  d isab led

v e t e r a n  w i t h  f o u r  c h i l d r e n ,  a g e s  one

to e l e ven .  R. 1467-68. He descr ibed his

w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  t i e s  t o  the community

( i n c l u d i n g  h i s  ownersh ip  o f  a home and

orchard)  and his longstanding employment

as a c o n t r a c t  h a u l e r  and p i c k i n g - c r e w
1 3/

c h i e f .  R. 1467-70.

13/ F la .  S tat .  Ann. § 921.141(3)  requi red 
the t r i a l  court  to consider  th is  m i t i g a t in g  
ev idence introduced at the gu i l t - innocence  
phase in passing sentence on p e t i t i o n e r .  
At the pena l ty  phase, p e t i t i o n e r ' s  counsel 
a l so  argued that  " very  d e f i n i t e  m i t i g a t in g



30

In c l o s i n g  argument,  the  p r o s e c u t o r  

acknowledged that  the S t a t e ' s  case did not 

prov ide  "a c l e a r  and complete and accurate 

p i c tu r e  o f  what went on. "  R. 1558-59. In 

h i s  v i e w ,  however ,  the e v i d e n c e  demon­

s t ra t ed  that  "Jeanet te  Armstrong was there 

and that  she got  shot by Mrs. Kersey ; "  that  

"Sampson Armstrong k i l l e d  the o ld p e op l e ; "  

and t h a t  p e t i t i o n e r  "was in  t h a t  c a r  

be tween those  two t i m e s . "  R. 1576-77.

F o l l o w i n g  the S t a t e ' s  r e q u e s t  f o r  a 

" p r i n c i p a l  and accessory"  i n s t ru c t i on  (R.

13/ continued

c i r cum stance [ s ] " were presen t ,  inc luding  
(1)  the absence o f  any ev idence " tha t  Earl  
Enmund was at  the house at the time o f  the 
shoo t in g , "  and (2) that  the k i l l i n g s  were 
not " a n t i c i p a t e d , "  but were the r e s u l t  o f  
a "spontaneous gun f ight "  between the Arm­
st rongs and the Kerseys which p e t i t i o n e r  
"could not be associa ted  w i th . "  R. 1683— 
85. Respondent g r o s s l y  misrepresents the 
record in asse r t ing  that  p e t i t i o n e r  " f a i l e d  
t o  p r e s e n t  or  p r o f f e r  any ev idence at a l l  
in m i t i g a t i o n . "  Resp. B r . 67 (emphasis in
o r i g i n a l ) .



31

1395, 1553), the t r i a l  judge tw i ce  charged
14/

the jury that  " [ t ] h e  k i l l i n g  o f  a human 

being whi l e  engaged in the pe rpe t r a t i on  o f  

. . .  robbery is  murder in the f i r s t  degree 

even though there i s  no premeditated design 

or  in ten t  to k i l l , "  and that  the defendant 

could be convicted o f  f i r s t - d e g r e e  murder 

i f  " the deceased was k i l l e d  by . . .  someone 

a c t i n g  in  c o n s o r t  [ s i c ]  w i th  the d e f e n ­

dant . "  A . ' 6 ,  8, 15, 17. The ju ry  subse­

q u e n t l y  announced i d e n t i c a l  v e r d i c t s  

as t o  Sampson Armstrong  and p e t i t i o n e r :  

g u i l t y  o f  two counts o f  f i r s t - d e g r e e  murder 

and one coun t  o f  r o b b e r y .  R. 1639, 

1643, 1644-49.

2. The sentencing proceedings

At the sentencing phase o f  the t r i a l ,

14/ Three hours a f t e r  the jury  r e t i r e d  to  
d e l i b e r a t e  the foreman requested,  and the 
t r i a l  court  prov ided,  fu r th e r  ins t ruct i ons  
" [ o ] n  the d i f f e r e n c e  between f i r s t  degree 
and s e c o n d  d e g r e e "  murder .  A.  13 -19 .



32

the S t a t e ’ s on ly  witness was Hardee County 

S h e r i f f  Newton Murdock who t e s t i f i e d  that ,  

because the two v i c t im s  were advanced in 

y e a r s  and a number o f  sho ts  were f i r e d ,  

" t h i s  is  the worse homicide I have been to 

i n vo l v ing  two p eop l e . "  R. 1658-59. The 

S t a t e  a l s o  i n t r od u ce d  a judgment o r d e r  

showing that  p e t i t i o n e r  had been convic ted  

in  1957 o f  r obbery  and sen tenced  t o  one 

year  in j a i l .  R. 1667; S t a t e ' s  Sentencing 

E x h i b i t , No. 1.

In his c l o s ing  argument on sentence,  

the prosecutor  conceded that  Sampson Arm­

st rong was the " t r i g german ."  He argued, 

h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  p e t i t i o n e r  was " j u s t  as 

g u i l t y  as t h e  t r i g g e r m a n , "  w h e t h e r  o r  

n o t  he " s e t  f o o t  i n s i d e  t h a t  h o u s e , "  

because he " s e t  i t  a l l  up . . .  [and] drove 

them t h e r e . "  R. 1679-80.

The t r i a l  judge d i r e c t ed  the ju ro rs  to 

"determine by a m a jo r i t y  v o te  whether or



33

not you advise  the impos i t ion o f  the death 

pena l ty "  based upon "one, whether s u f f i ­

c i e n t  aggravat ing  circumstances as here ­

a f t e r  enumerated e x i s t e d  t o  j u s t i f y  the 

death pena l ty ;  [and] two, whether s u f f i ­

c i e n t  m i t i g a t i n g  c i r cum stances  e x i s t  as 

h e r e a f t e r  enumerated which ou twe igh  the 

aggravat ing  circumstances found to e x i s t  

. . . . "  A. 19. The i n s t r u c t i o n s  d id  not 

r equ i r e  the jury  to  f i n d ,  as a pr econd i t i on  

to  impos i t ion o f  the death pena l t y ,  that  

the defendant intended to take l i f e ,  ac­

t u a l l y  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in a homicidal  ac t ,  or  

was present  when the homicide occu-rred.

The j u r y  recommended imposing the 

death pena l ty  on both defendants.  A. 23- 

24; R. 1690-91. The t r i a l  court  immediate­

l y  sentenced p e t i t i o n e r  and Sampson Arm-
11/

st rong to d i e  on both counts o f  murder.

1 5/ A l though  the t r i a l  cour t  heard no 
f u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  b e f o r e  r e a c h i n g  t h i s



34

A. 27-28; R, 1698, 1701. In o ra l  remarks 

p r e fa c ing  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  death sentence,  the 

court  found four  aggravat ing  circumstances 

in the  case :  " t h i s  c a p i t a l  f e l o n y  was 

committed whi l e  the Defendant was engaged 

in or was an accomplice in the commission 

o f  . . .  a robbery;  t h i s  c a p i t a l  f e l o n y  was 

committed whi l e  the Defendant was engaged

15/ continued

conc lus ion ,  i t  had an a dd i t i ona l  source o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  b e f o r e  i t  t h a t  had not  been 
introduced at t r i a l :  the f u l l  t e x t  o f  the
sworn p r e t r i a l  statements o f  Ida Jean Shaw. 
R. 283 ; see  R. 1 700. A c c o rd in g  t o  Ms. 
Shaw's statements:  (1)  Jeanet te  Armstrong
t o l d  he r  th a t  "We went out  t h e r e  t o  rob 
them, but w e r e n ' t  i n t e n d in g  t o  have no 
sh oo t ing , "  May 5, 1975 statement ,  at  p. 18, 
and that  "we d i d n ' t  know the man had a w i f e  
and he h o l l e r ed  and t o ld  his w i f e  to br ing 
the gun, and . . .  she s tar t ed  shoot ing and 
the b u l l e t  h i t  [ J e a n e t t e ] , "  Aug. 19, 1975
statement,  at p. 11; (2) Sampson Armstrong
t o l d  her that  "we went to rob them and had 
to  k i l l  them," May 5, 1975 statement ,  at p. 
18; and (3) p e t i t i o n e r  t o ld  her that  "he 
took them out there and stayed in the car"  
and that  he "was . . .  in the car the whole 
t im e , "  Aug. 19, 1975 statement ,  at pp. 18-
19.



35

in or  was an accomplice in the commission 

o f  . . .  a robbery;  t h i s  c a p i t a l  f e l o n y  was 

committed f o r  pecuniary g a i n [ ; ]  . . .  th i s  

c a p i t a l  f e l o n y  was e s p e c i a l l y  h e inous ,  

a t r oc ious ,  or c r u e l [ ;  and] t h i s  Defendant 

. . . had p r e v i o u s l y  been c o n v i c t e d  o f  a 

f e l o n y  in vo l v ing  the use or threat  o f  use 

o f  v i o l e n c e  to a person. "  A. 28. The court 

found "no m i t i g a t in g  c i rcumstances. "  A.

16/ In both i t s  o ra l  sentencing opinions 
and i t s  subsequent w r i t t en  f ind ings  (see 
the f o l l o w in g  paragraph o f  t e x t ) ,  the t r i a l  
court  expr es s l y  s ta ted  that  i t  was r e l y in g  
upon " th e  background o f  t h i s  De fendant  
based on the Court 's  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in th i s  
t r i a l  and o f  [ s i c ]  the [separate]  t r i a l  o f  
one J e a n e t t e  A rm s t r o n g . "  A. 27, 31; see 
a l so  R. 1697. Jeanette  Armstrong's t r i a l  
d i f f e r e d  from p e t i t i o n e r ' s  in that  Jeanette 
A r m s t r o n g ' s  w r i t t e n  c o n f e s s i o n  and p o r ­
t i o n s  o f  a t r a n s c r i p t  o f  t a p e - r e c o r d e d  
admissions made by her ju s t  p r i o r  to her 
w r i t t e n  statement (R. 298-355),  were in ­
t roduced  at  her  t r i a l ,  but not  at  p e t i ­
t i o n e r ' s .  R. 259-65, 328-29. The t r i a l  
j u d g e  r e l i e d  on t h e s e  s t a t e m e n t s  in  
s e n t e n c in g  p e t i t i o n e r  even though,  a t  a



36

The t r i a l  court  did not f i l e  w r i t t e n  

f i n d ings  o f  f a c t  in support o f  the ca p i t a l  

sentence —  as requi red by F la .  S ta t .  Ann. 

§ 921.141 —  u n t i l  nineteen months a f t e r  

p e t i t i o n e r ' s  t r i a l ,  when the Supreme Court 

o f  F l o r i d a  o r d e r ed  w r i t t e n  f i n d i n g s  in 

connect ion with p e t i t i o n e r ' s  appeal .  A. 

29. The co ur t  aga in  concluded  t h a t  the 

four  aggravat ing  circumstances enumerated

16/ continued

j o i n t  p r e t r i a l  hear ing,  he forbade, counsel 
f o r  p e t i t i o n e r  to cross-examine Ms-v Arm­
st rong concerning the statements,  "because 
her con fess ion would not be admiss ible in 
t r i a l  a g a i n s t  your c l i e n t . "  R. 328-29.  
Because the  t r i a l  c o u r t  c o n s i d e r e d  Ms. 
Armstrong 's statements,  we note here that 
she t o l d  t h e  p o l i c e  t h a t  Sampson and 
Jeanet te  Armstrong, a lone,  went up to the 
Kerseys '  house because p e t i t i o n e r  "wouldn ' t  
go no f u r t h e r .  He s tayed  in the c a r . "  
According to  Jeanet te ,  when she and Sampson 
were t a k in g  Mr. K e r s e y ' s  w a l l e t  at  gun­
p o in t ,  Mr. Kersey ca l l e d  out to  his  w i f e  to 
"shoot  the n i g g e r , "  and Mrs. Kersey th e r e ­
upon f i r e d  " t h e  f i r s t  s h o t , "  s t r i k i n g  
J e a n e t t e .  S t a t e ' s  Ex. 3, Aug.'  11, 1975
(see R. 313, 354-55).



37

above were present  in p e t i t i o n e r ' s  case,  

and that  " none o f  the s t a tu to ry  m i t i g a t ­

ing circumstances appl ied to th i s  de fen-  
1 7/

d a n t . "  a . 30-32 ( emphas is  in o r i g i ­

nal  ) .

In suppor t  o f i t s  f i n d i n g t h a t  the

c a p i t a l f e l o n y  in p e t i t i o n e r ' s case  was

" e s p e c i a l l y  heinous , a t r oc ious  or c r u e l , "

the t r i a l  court  s ta ted  that  the k i l l i n g  o f  

Mr. and Mrs. Kersey "was not a spontaneous 

m at t e r , "  but was done f o r  the "purpose . . .  

o f  e l i m i n a t [ i n g ]  . . .  w i t n e s s e s  t o  armed 

robbery . "  A. 30. The judge a l so  stated 

that  i t  was " reasonable  to conclude,  and

17/ As in i t s  i ns t ruc t ions  to  the jury  at 
the sentencing phase o f  the t r i a l ,  in which 
the ju ry  was t o ld  that the on ly  m i t i g a t in g  
circumstances i t  was to consider  were those 
" h e r e a f t e r  enumerated" - -  i . e . ,  the seven 
s p e c i f i c  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  en um era ted  "by  
S t a t u t e "  - -  A. 19-21,  the t r i a l  cour t  
c o n f i n e d  i t s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  m i t i g a t i n g  
c i r cum stances  e x c l u s i v e l y  to  the  seven 
" s t a t u t o r y "  c i r cumstances  in F l a .  S t a t .  
Ann. § 921.141(6) .  A. 32.



-  38 -

the  co u r t  so f i n d s ,  t h a t  the de f e n da n t  

Enmund and the defendant Sampson Armstrong 

each f i r e d  in to  the bodies o f  Mr. and Mrs. 

Ke rsey . "  A. 31. However, in i t s  f i nd ings  

d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  " m i n o r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n "  

m i t i g a t in g  circumstance o f  F la .  S ta t .  Ann. 

§ 92 1 .141 (6 ) ( d ) ,  the t r i a l  court  abandoned 

the  a bove -quo ted  s ta temen t  and in s t e a d  

ch arac t e r i z ed  p e t i t i o n e r  as an "accompl ice  

to  the c a p i t a l  f e l o n y , "  whose p a r t i c i p a ­

t i o n  was l i m i t e d  t o  b e f o r e - t h e - f a c t  

planning o f  the robbery and the a f t e r - t h e -  

f a c t  d i sposa l  o f  weapons. A. 32.

3. Proceedings on appeal

On a p p e a l ,  t h e  Supreme C o u r t  o f  

F l o r i d a  r e j e c t e d  the t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  f i nd ings  

i n s o f a r  as they  a s s i g n e d  p e t i t i o n e r  any 

r o l e  in  t h e  s h o o t i n g  o f  Mr. and Mrs .



K e r s e y .

39

e x p r e s s l y  

o f  f i r s t -

The Supreme Court
18/

upheld p e t i t i o n e r ' s conv ic t  ion

18/ The t r i a l  court  based i t s  conclusion 
that  p e t i t i o n e r  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in the shoot ­
ing on three  f a c tu a l  premises:  that  both
Kerseys were shot whi le  in a "prone p o s i ­
t i o n ; "  that  Jeanet te  Armstrong had p r e v i ­
o u s l y  " s u s t a i n e d  s e r i o u s  w o u n d s ; "  and 
that  " d i f f e r e n t  c a l i b e r  guns" were used to 
k i l l  the Kerseys.  The f i r s t  two premises 
a r e  s i m p l y  i n c o r r e c t .  As t h e  F l o r i d a  
Supreme C o u r t  n o t e d ,  t h e  p a t h o l o g i s t  
t e s t i f i e d  that  " there  i s  r e a l l y  no way [he] 
c o u l d  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  p o s i t i o n s "  o f  t h e  
v i c t im s  when shot.  A. 36; 399 So. 2d at
1364. The Court  a c c o r d i n g l y  conc luded  
t h a t  t h e  e v i d e n c e  a t  t r i a l  " a s  t o  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  f i r e  and the p o s i t i o n  o f  the 
v i c t im s  when shot [was] . . .  equ ivoca l  at 
b e s t . "  A. 55, 399 So. 2d at 1 373, in co r ­
po rat ing  Armstrong v .  S ta t e ,  supra, 399 So. 
2d at  963; see a lso  R. 1104-05, 1112, 1114. 
And there was no test imony at  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  
t r i a l  concerning the s e v e r i t y  o f  Jeanette 
Armstrong 's wound.

More fundamental ly,  none o f  the t r i a l  
judge ' s  fa c tu a l  premises,  even were they 
c o r r e c t ,  con t rad i c t  Sampson and Jeanet te  
Armstrongs'  separate admissions to both Jay 
B. Neal  and Ida Jean Shaw that  they alone 
went  t o  t h e  K e r s e y s  home, o r  Sampson 
Armstrong 's separate admissions to both Jay 
B. Nea l  and Ida  Jean Shaw th a t  he a l one  
k i l l e d  the v i c t ims  a f t e r  Mrs. Kersey f i r e d  
on Jeanet t e .  See B r i e f  f o r  P e t i t i o n e r  at 
52 n.69.



40 -

d e g r e e  murder and h i s  s en t ence  o f  death  

s o l e l y  on a theory o f  a c c e s s o r i a l  l i a b i l i t y  

based upon his  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in a robbery 

during which, and outs ide  o f  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

actual  presence,  Sampson Armstrong k i l l e d  

the  K e r s e y s ,  The c o u r t  found t h a t  " the 

only  ev idence o f  the degree o f  [Earl  En- 

mund's] p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i s  the j u r y ' s  l i k e l y  

in f e r ence  that  he was the person in the car 

by the s ide  o f  the road near the scene o f  

the cr imes . "  I t  nonetheless concluded that  

t h i s  ev idence

was s u f f i c i e n t  to  f i n d  th a t  
the appe l lant  was a p r in c ip a l  
o f  the second degree ,  const ruc­
t i v e l y  p r e s e n t  [19/] a i d i n g  
and a b e t t i n g  the commission

19/ According to  the cour t ,  one i s  "con­
s t r u c t i v e l y  present"  i f  he does not commit 
the  r obb e ry  "w i t h  h i s  own hands" but i s  
" ' s u f f i c i e n t l y  near and so s i tuat ed  as to 
abet or encourage, o r  render ass is tance  to 
the actual  p e rpe t ra t o r  in committing the 
f e l o n i o u s  ac t  or  in e s cap ing  a f t e r  i t s  
commiss ion. ' "  A. 49; 399 So. 2d at 1370 
(emphasis added ) .



o f  the crime o f  r obbery . This 
conclusion supports the v e r d i c t s  
o f  murder in the f i r s t  degree on 
the bas is  o f  the f e l on y  murder 
po r t i on  o f  [F la .  S ta t .  Ann.] 
s e c t i o n  7 8 2 . 0 4  ( 1 ) ( a ) .

A. 49-50 ; 399 So. 2d at  1 370 ( emphas is

added) .

Further ,  the Supreme Court ex pres s l y  

d i s a p p r o v e d  two o f  the f o u r  a g g r a v a t i n g  

circumstances on which the t r i a l  court  had 

r e l i e d .  The cour t  f i r s t  he ld  th a t  the 

"pecuniary gain"  circumstance could not be 

r e l i e d  upon in  a d d i t i o n  to  the r o b b e r y -  

murder aggravat ing  circumstance.  A. 55; 

399 So .  2d a t  1373. I t  th en  r e j e c t e d  

t h e  t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e  

c a p i t a l  f e l o n y  was " e s p e c i a l l y  he inou s ,  

a t r o c i o u s  or  c r u e l , "  t o g e t h e r  w i th  the 

fa c tu a l  f ind ings  on which that  conclusion 

had res ted .  I t  found that  " the shoot ings 

were . . .  spontaneous and were p r e c i p i t a t e d

by the armed r es is tance  o f  Mrs. Kersey,



42

and that  " [ i ] t  simply cannot be said that  

there was proo f  that  the robbers k i l l e d  in 

o r d e r  t o  assure  th a t  t h e r e  would be no 

wi tnesses aga inst  them." A. 55; 339 So. 2d 

at 1373, inco rpora t ing  Armstrong v.  S t a t e , 

399 So. 2d 953, 963 (F l a .  1981).

Despi te  i t s  repudiat ion  o f  two o f  the 

t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  a g g r a v a t i n g - c i r c u m s t a n c e  

c o n c l u s i o n s  and s e v e r a l  o f  t h e  t r i a l  

c o u r t ' s  fa c tu a l  p r ed i ca t es  f o r  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

sentence o f  death,  the Supreme Court upheld 

that  sentence on the ground that  there  were 

two rema in ing  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r cum stances  

( t h e  c o m m is s i o n  o f  a h o m i c i d e  " i n  t h e  

course  o f  a r o b b e r y , "  and p e t i t i o n e r ' s  

"prev ious  co nv i c t i on  o f  a v i o l e n t  f e l ony "  

—  the 1957 robbery f o r  which he rece i ved  

a one-year sentence)  and, in the co u r t ' s  

v i ew,  no m i t i g a t in g  circumstances.  A. 55;



43

20/
399 So. 2d at 1373.—

F i n a l l y ,  the Supreme Court o f  F l o r ida  

r e j e c t e d  p e t i t i o n e r ’ s c l a i m  t h a t  " t h e  

t r i a l  court  erred in sentencing appe l lant  

to death where the ev idence f a i l e d  to  show 

he a c t u a l l y  cau sed  t h e  d e a t h  o f  t h e  

v i c t im s ,  or  intended to  cause t h e i r  death, 

and at  b e s t  showed a p p e l l a n t  m in im a l l y  

invo lved  in the f e lony-murder . "  Supple­

mental B r i e f  o f  Appe l lan t ,  at  7-12. The 

Court he ld :

Appe l lant  contends that  s ince 
the ev idence does not es tab­
l i s h  that  he intended to  take 
l i f e  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  i s  
i m p e r m i s s i b l e  u n d e r  t h e  
e ighth amendment ban on cruel

20/ J u s t i c e  Ove r ton  d i s s e n t e d .  In h i s  
op in i on ,  the co u r t ' s  " f i n d i n g "  that  p e t i ­
t i o n e r  "did not a c tu a l l y  p a r t i c i p a t e  in the 
shoot ing"  so s u b s ta n t i a l l y  undermined the 
t r i a l  c o u r t ' s  p r e m i s e  f o r  s e n t e n c i n g  
p e t i t i o n e r  to d i e  —  i . e . ,  that  p e t i t i o n e r  
"was present  and ass is ted  in the commission 
o f  the  murder" —  t h a t  r e s e n t e n c i n g  was 
necessary.  A. 56; 399 So. 2d at 1373. See 
P e t r .  Br. 53.



44 -

and unusual punishment. Ap­
p e l l a n t  o f f e r s  us no binding 
l e g a l  au thor i t y  that  d i r e c t l y  
suppor ts  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  
and we t h e r e f o r e  r e j e c t  
i t .

A. 51; 399 So. 2d at 1371.

CONCLUSION

On t h i s  r e c o r d ,  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  death  

sentence cannot c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  be sus­

ta ined .  The judgment o f  the Supreme Court 

o f  F l o r i d a ,  i n s o f a r  as i t  l e a v e s  t h e  

sentence o f  death undisturbed,  should be 

r e v e r s e d .

R esp ec t fu l l y  submitted,

WILLIAM C. McLAIN
Ass i s tan t  Pub l i c  Defender 
Hal l  o f  Just i c e  Annex 
495 N. Carpenter S t r e e t  
Bartow, F lo r ida

33830-3798 
(813) 533-6715

ATTORNEY OF RECORD



45

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
JOEL BERGER 
JOHN CHARLES BOGER 
DEBORAH FINS 
JAMES S. LIEBMAN 

Suite  2030 
10 Columbus C i r c l e  
New York/ New York 10019

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 
New York U n i v e r s i t y  

School o f  Law 
40 Washington Square So. 
New York, New York 10012

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER



APPENDIX



APPENDIX

In f o o t n o t e  10 on page  49 o f  i t s  

b r i e f ,  respondent s t a t e s :

Of the s i x t y - s i x  inmates 
awai t ing  execut ion at  F l o r i da  
State  Pr ison whose death sen­
tences have been a f f i rmed by 
the F l o r i d a  Supreme Cou r t ,  
f o r t y - f i v e  ( 68%)  w e re  i n ­
vo lved  in the commission o f  
u n d e r l y i n g  f e l o n i e s  when 
h o m i c i d e s  o c c u r r e d .  See 
Appendix.

To a s s i s t  the Court  t o  examine the  

45 " f e lony-murder context "  (Resp. B r . 49)

cases c i t ed  by respondent from a perspec­

t i v e  that  bears meaning fu l l y  on the issues 

in the  p r e s e n t  ca se ,  we d i v i d e  those  45 

cases  i n t o  3 c a t e g o r i e s  be l ow :  In the

f i r s t  c a t e g o r y  a r e  t h o s e  36 o f  th e  45 

" f e lony-murder context "  cases in which the 

F l o r i d a  Supreme C ou r t  e i t h e r  f ound  o r  

a f f i rmed a t r i a l  court  or  jury  f i n d ing  that  

the defendant intended l i f e  to be taken. 

In the second category ,  are the 8 " f e l o n y ­



A-2

murder context "  cases in which the F l o r i da  

Supreme Court has not passed one way or 

the o ther  on the quest ion o f  in t en t .  In 

the  l a s t  c a t e g o r y ,  i s  the one " f e l o n y ­

murder context "  case —  p e t i t i o n e r ' s  - -  in 

which the  F l o r i d a  Supreme Court  d id  not  

make a f i n d i n g  o f  an i n t e n t  t o  k i l l  and 

a f f i rmed the sentence o f  death de sp i t e  i t s  

assumption that no such f i n d ing  could be 

made on the record be fo re  i t .

I . F l o r i da  "Felony-Murder
Context"  Cases In vo l v ing  
Findings That The Defen­
dant Intended to  Take L i f e

A lvord v.  S ta te ,  322 So. 2d 533, 540 
(F la .  1975) ( " c o l d ,  ca l cu la ted  
design to  k i l l " )

Booker v. S ta te ,  397 So. 2d 910, 917 
(F la .  1981) (defendant k i l l e d  
" f o r  the purpose o f  avo id ing  
a r r e s t "  )

Brown v.  S ta te ,  381 So. 2d 690, 695 
(F la .  1980) ( "premeditated de­
s ign to e f f e c t  death" )

Buford v. S ta te ,  403 So. 2d 943, 949
(F la .  1981) ( " p r em ed i ta t i on " )



A - 3

Clark v.  S ta te ,  379 So. 2d 79, 104
(F l a .  1979) ( " i n t e n t  to e l im in ­
ate a w i t n e s s " )

Combs v.  S ta te ,  403 So. 2d 418, 421 
(F la .  1976) ( " c o l d ,  ca l cu la ted  
and premedi tated"  k i l l i n g )

Cooper v. S ta te ,  336 So. 2d 1133, 1140 
(F la .  1976) (defendant k i l l e d  
" f o r  the purpose o f  avo id ing  
a r r e s t " )

Darden v.  S ta te ,  329 So. 2d 287, 288 
(F la .  1976) ( " a s sa u l t  with in­
tent  to  commit murder" aga inst  
second v i c t im  in same t ransac t ion  
as f i r s t  v i c t im  was k i l l e d )

E l l edge  v. S ta te ,  346 So. 2d 998,
1000-01 (F la .  1977) (defendant 
k i l l e d  " f o r  the purpose o f  avo id -  
a r r e s t " )

Ford v.  S ta te ,  374 So. 2d 496, 502,
503 (F la .  1979) (same)

Foster  v.  S ta te ,  369 So. 2d 928 (F la .  
1979) (defendant convic ted  o f  
"premeditated murder")

Francois v.  S ta te ,  Case No. 54,461 
(F la .  op inion f i l e d  Oct.  15,
1981) (defendant was " the actual  
p e rpe t ra t o r  o f  f i v e  premeditated 
murders" )

Funchess v. S ta te ,  341 So. 2d 762,
763 (F la .  1977) ( " pr emed i ta ted" )



A-4

Goode v. S ta te ,  365 So. 2d 381, 384 
(F la .  1978) ( " p lan  to k i l l " )

Hal l  v.  S ta t e ,  403 So. 2d 1231, 1323 
(F la .  1981) (defendant convic ted  
o f  premeditated murder)

Hargrave v.  S ta te ,  366 So. 2d 1, 2, 3 
(F la .  1978) ( " d e l i b e r a t e "  taking 
o f  l i f e )

Henry v.  S ta te ,  328 So. 2d 430, 431 
(F la .  1976) ( "premeditated 
des i gn" )

Jackson (Car l )  v.  S ta te ,  359 So. 2d 
1190, 1194 n .3 (F la .  1978) (de ­
fendant k i l l e d  " f o r  the purpose 
o f  avo id ing a r r e s t " )

Jackson (Ronald) v .  S ta te ,  366 So. 2d 
752, 756 (F la .  1978) ( " i n t e n t i o n  
. . .  to e l im ina te  and execute the 
wi tness to the r o b b e r y " )

Jacobs v. S ta t e ,  396 So. 2d 1113, 1118 
(F la .  1981) (defendant k i l l e d  
" f o r  the purpose o f  avo id ing  
a r r e s t " )

Jent v. S ta te ,  Case No. 58,744 (F la .  
opinion f i l e d  Dec. 3, 1981) 
( "premeditated murder")

Johnson v. S ta te ,  393 So. 2d 1069,
1073 (F la .  1981) ( l i f e  taken 
" coo l y  and with c a l c u l a t i o n " )

King v.  S ta t e ,  390 So. 2d 315 (F la .
1980) ( s im i l a r  to Darden, supra)



A-5

Knight v. S ta te ,  338 So. 2d 201, 202 
(F la .  1976) (defendant k i l l e d  
" f o r  the purpose o f  avo id ing  
a r r e s t " )

Meeks v. S ta te ,  339 So. 2d 186, 190 
(F la .  1976) (same)

Mikenas v. S ta t e ,  Case No. 49, 928 
( F l a . ,  op inion f i l e d  Nov. 5,
1981) (same)

P r o f f i t t  v. S ta te ,  315 So. 2d 461,
466 (F la .  1975) ( "premeditated 
d e s i g n " )

Raulerson v. S ta t e ,  358 So. 2d 828,
834 (F la .  1978) (defendant 
k i l l e d  " f o r  the purpose o f  avo id­
ing a r r e s t " )

Ru f f in  v.  S ta t e ,  397 So. 2d 277 (F la .  
1981) (same as H a l l , supra)

S i r e c i  v.  S ta t e ,  399 So. 2d 964, 971 
(F la .  1981) (defendant took l i f e  
" f o r  the purpose o f  avo id ing  
a r r e s t " )

Smith v. S ta te ,  365 So. 2d 704, 708 
(F la .  1978) ( " des i gn "  to  take 
l i f e )

Su l l i v an  v.  S ta te ,  303 So. 2d 632, 637 
(F la .  1974) (Overton,  J . , con­
curr ing )  (defendant " f u l l y  i n ­
tended to  murder the v i c t i m " )

Thompson v.  S ta te ,  389 So. 2d 197, 198
(F la .  1980) ( " t o r t u r e  murder")



A-6

Vaught v. S ta te ,  Case No. 52,835
( F l a . ,  opinion f i l e d  Jan 7, 1982) 
(defendant took l i f e  " f o r  the pur­
pose o f  avo id ing  a r r e s t " )

Washington v. S ta te ,  362 So. 2d 658 
662-66 (F la .  1978) (same)

White v. S ta t e ,  403 So. 2d 331, 337-38 
(F la .  1981) (same)

I I .  F l o r i da  "Felony-Murder Con­
t e x t "  Cases in Which There 
Was No Determination'  One~~Way 
or  the Other By the F l o r i da  
Supreme Court as to Whether 
the Defendant Intended to 
Take L i f e

Adams v. S ta t e ,  341 So. 2d 765 (F la .
1977) (defendant was tr iggerman)

A ld r id ge  v.  S ta t e ,  351 So. 2d 942
(F la .  1977) (defendant was t r i g ­
german)

Armstrong v. S ta te ,  399 So. 2d 953
(F la .  1981) (defendant was t r i g ­
german)

LeDuc v. S ta te ,  365 So. 2d 149 (F la .
1978) (defendant was tr i ggerman)

McCrae v. S ta t e ,  395 So. 2d 137 (F la .  
1976) (defendant was t riggerman)



Peek v.  S ta te ,  395 So. 2d 492 (F la .
1980) (defendant was tr iggerman)

Shriner  v.  S ta t e ,  386 So. 2d 525
(F la .  1980) (defendant was t r i g -  
german)

I I I .  F lo r ida  "Felony-Murder Con­
t e x t "  In Which F l o r ida  
Supreme Court Assumed that  
an In tent  to K i l l  Could Not 
Be Found On the Record

Enmund v.  S ta te ,  399 So. 2d 1362, 1371 
(F la .  1981)



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