Sweeny Independent School District v. Harkless Brief for Respondents in Opposition
Public Court Documents
October 31, 1977

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Sweeny Independent School District v. Harkless Brief for Respondents in Opposition, 1977. eb8540a3-c59a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c0a29bcd-0f4d-4e65-a13b-ef5b14029031/sweeny-independent-school-district-v-harkless-brief-for-respondents-in-opposition. Accessed May 04, 2025.
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I n the G l m t r t o f % l l m t t b S t a t e s October Term, 1977 No. 77—392 Sweeny I ndependent School D istrict, et al., v. M ildred H arkless, et al. on petition for a w rit oe certiorari to the united states court of appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION W eldon S. Berry 711 Main Stret Suite 620 Houston, Texas 77002 Jack Greenberg James M. N abrit, III James C. Gray, Jr. 10 Columbus Circle Suite 2030 New York, New York 10019 Counsel for Respondents October 1977 I N D E X STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. The Proceedings Below On the Merits 1 B. Procedural History o f the Jur isd ic t ion Issue 7 ARGUMENT 1. The Record On Appeal Was Adequate And A Remand On The Merits Un necessary 8 2. P l a i n t i f f s ' Or ig ina l Complaint Set Forth A Cause Of Action Under 42 U.S.C. §1981 And Justice Required That P l a i n t i f f s Be Al lowed To Invoke The Court 's Jur isd ic t ion Pursuant To That Statute 13 CONCLUSION 16 Page Table o f Authori t ies Cases: Campbell v. Gadsden County D is t . School Board, 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976) 14 Chambers v. Hendersonvil le Ci ty Board of Educ., 364 F .2d 189 (4th C ir . 1966) 10 City o f Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S 507 (1973) 7 Conley v . Gibson, 355 U.S 41 (1957) 15 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S 178 (1962) 16 - l i - Page Haney v. County Board o f Educ. o f Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364 ( 8th Cir.1970) 11 Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School D i s t . , 300 F.Supp. 794 (S.D.Tex. 1969) 7 Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School D i s t . , 427 F.2d 319 (5th C ir . 1970) 7 Jackson v. Wheatley School Dis t. No.28, 430 F.2d 1359 ( 8th C ir . 1970) 11 Keyes v . School D is t . N o . l , Denver Colorado, 413 U.S. 109 (1973) 11 Moore v. Board o f Educ. o f Chidester School D i s t . , 448 F.2d 709 ( 8th C ir . 1971) 11 Newberry v . Central o f Georgia Railway, 276 F.2d 337 (5th C ir. 1921) c e rt, den. 257 H.S 662 Jorrii Cara Lina. Teachers Assn. v . As i c e r c C irr 3aam nr Educ. . 3a 3 F .Id ~3b < —t±i d m ISftfc) m h '. r s - Imrnry I i m rsi ILfiac* c i in s e t '.i Emnrty, 391 WJ2&A 77 fittSi 'Cir. U t t ) 11 U.S. v. Je f ferson County Board o f Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th C ir . 1966) 10 U.S. v . National Assn, o f Real Estate , Boards, 339 U.S 485 (1950) 11 -11 1 - Page V i l l a g e o f Ar l ington Heights v.Metro po l i tan Housing Development Corp . , _ U.S ____, 95 S.Ct.555, 50 L.Ed. 2d 450 (1977) Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure: Rule 15 Rule 52 8,9,10 7,13,16 11,12 Sta tutes : 28 U.S.C. §1343 28 U.S.C. §1653 42 U.S.C. §1981 42 U.S.C. §1983 Other Au thor i t ies : Wright & M i l l e r , Federal P ractice and Procedure (1969) 7,8,13,15,16 7,13,15,16 7 > O t i 4 , b J* IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1977 NO. 77 - 392 SWEENY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et a l . , v. MILDRED HARKLESS, et a l . On P e t i t i o n For a Writ of C e r t i o ra r i to The United States Court o f Appeals for The F i f th C ircu i t BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. The Proceedings Below On the Merits This a c t i o n was brought in May o f 1966 by twelve black teachers whose contracts with the I v eeu 7 Independent Schoo l D i s t r i c t were not r s i e s s : f o r the 1966-67 sch oo l y e a r . Respon dents are tew o f the o r i g i n a l p l a i n t i f f s , the remetadrg two having withdrawn p r io r to the 1' r~ dxnsl. P l a i n t i f f s sought to br ing th is action, as a class action on behal f o f thews e lves and the f i v e o t t e r black teachers who were discharged, bet the - 2 - D i s t r i c t Court denied c la s s a c t i o n s t a tu s . P l a i n t i f f s charged in th e i r complaint that defen dants, p e t i t i on e rs here, had refused to re ta in them because o f th e i r race and sought re in s ta te ment, back pay and l o s t a l low ances , and t h e i r cos ts in c lu d in g reasonab le a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s . P r io r to the 1966-67 school year, the Sweeny Independent School D i s t r i c t mainta ined a dual school system with r a c i a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e student bodies and f a c u l t i e s . P e t i t ioners operated four w h i t e schoo ls and one b lack s ch oo l . In 1966, pe t i t i on e rs dismantled this dual school system and in the process determined not to renew the con t rac ts o f seventeen (17) teachers, a l l o f whom were black. In doing so, pe t i t ioners dismissed on the eve o f desegregation 70% o f the black facu l ty in the d i s t r i c t . With the e x c ep t ion o f one teacher who substituted fo r a year and a h a l f , respondents had each taught at leas t f i v e years in the d i s t r i c t and had on the average f ou r te en years experience with the d i s t r i c t . At issue in th is case was whether the dec i s ion to d ismiss 7 0% o f the d i s t r i c t ' s b lac k facu l ty and re ta in 100% o f i t s white faculty was r a c i a l l y based. In the appea l , the D i s t r i c t Court 's account o f the actual occurence o f events was not disputed; rather i t s analysis and in t e r pretat ion o f those events were at issue. The school board had a study prepared which showed that twelve (12) fewer teachers would be needed fo r the 1966-67 school year when the system would be desegregated. This s t a f f in g requirements study a l l e ged ly provided the ra t iona le f o r d i s cha rg ing s even teen (17 ) b lack t e a c h e r s . In a c tu a l i t y , only four fewer teachers were employed and the d i s t r i c t h i r e d at l e a s t s e v en teen new teachers to f i l l the vacancies l e f t by the non—re newed hlack teachers and by retained, v inca caacn— ars wtlc l e f t the system. ALL o f the new caacrters h ired were m i t e . Ob-4, t—-t-1— . i—i i—ri „ The super in tenden t d in n e t retcnnmenc the seventeen black teachers f o r renewal a t a meeting o f the Board o f Trustees held on March 8, 1966. ~e recommended a l l whites f o r renewal. Between —■£tch 1 and March 7, three o f the white pr inc ipals and the black p r inc ipa l prepared the annual Steck corn; evaluations o f th e i r teachers. The pr inc ipals cct the f i r s t time also rated the teachers on a a rroB "2 to 10". The sup er in t en d en t and i-i - ~. . .m d i r e c t o r a lso rated a l l o f the teach ers , including those at the white school where the p r inc ipa l was absent, on this "2 to 10" scale. - 3 - - 4 - At the t r i a l o f th i s m at te r , p e t i t i o n e r s defended th e i r dismissal o f 70% o f th e i r black facu l ty claiming that i t resulted from a r a c i a l l y neutra l eva luat ion based on the Steck form/rating system by which a l l the teachers in the d i s t r i c t were compared against the i r counterparts. The Steck form/ratings were due from the pr incipals on March 7, and the recommendations f o r renewal were made the very next day. I t was undisputed, however, that p r io r to the March 8th recommendation to the Bo-are. t i e black teachers — only s ix o f who® along wisth m e black p r in c ipa l were re ta ined — had beea snotyett ed to two forms o f " e v a l u a t i o n " which wh i t e teachers did not have to undergo. The superinten dent and curriculum d i r e c to r , e i th e r o f whom could contro l the outcome o f the o v e ra l l ra t ing system, also were the ind iv iduals who subjected the black teachers to th is spec ia l treatment. F i r s t , only the black teachers were sub jec t ed to an "anecdotal eva luat ion" by the curriculum d i rec to r prepared at the request o f the superinten den t . This " e v a l u a t i o n " focused on p e rso n a l cha rac te r i s t i c s and emphasized r a c i a l considera t ions . (A-5, A-53). 5 Second, the b lack teachers were ranked a g a in s t each o the r on the bas is o f p e r c e i v e d competence by the superintendent, the curriculum d i r e c to r and the black p r inc ipa l . Of the s ix black teachers retained along with the demoted black p r in c ipa l , f i v e o f them were the teachers ranked one to f i v e by this ranking process and the sixth was the black p r in c ip a l ' s w i f e . The white teachers were not ranked against each other. (A 5-6,A-55) . The worksheet upon which this b lack-aga inst-b lack ranking was performed shows e ight teachers r e c e i v i n g f i n a l s c o r e s . These e i g h t ranked from one t o seven w i th two t i e d f o r seventh p l a c e . So at tempt was made to rank above seven . Only seven black teachers were reh ired . ( A - 5 ) . On these undisputed f a c t s , the D i s t r i c t Court ru led in f a v o r o f the d e f en dan ts . The d i s t r i c t court "reconstructed" a comparison o f the teachers on a system-wide basis using the ratings given by the superintendent, curriculum d i r e c to r and various p r inc ipa ls . Based upon i t s "recon s t r u c t i o n " , the D i s t r i c t Court h e ld tha t tha t process had been used to se le c t the teachers who would not be r e t a i n e d . (A55-56) The D i s t r i c t Court in i t s f i n d in g s d iscounted the ev idence showing that the Board dismissed f i v e more teach ers than needed according to i t s a l le ged requ ire ments study, that only blacks were non-renewed and whites were subsequently hired to replace them, that only blacks were subjected to the curriculum d i r e c t o r ' s " a n ec d o ta l e v a l u a t i o n " and ranked against each other f o r the seven "most competent". I t also discounted the sub jec t iv e nature o f the o v e ra l l ra t ing system and the c lear a b i l i t y o f the superintendent and curriculum d i rec to r to control the outcome o f any comparat ive r a t in g s by the s cores they gave , which s cores in f a c t were c o n s id e r a b l y lower f o r the non-renewed b lack teachers than those given by the pr inc ipa l who worked with them. The Court o f Appeals, a f t e r reviewing the r e c o r d , r e v e r s e d as " c l e a r l y e rroneous" the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d in g s that the employment dec isions were based on a d i s t r i c t wide eonipai i~ son using the Steck form evaluations and ovum I! r a t i n g s . The Court o f Appeals found Chn ■>.: evidence in the record showed inter-t w u a n * d iscr iminat ion . (A7, A - l l ) - 6 - 7 B. Procedural History o f the Jur isd ic t ion Issue In 1966, when this action was f i l e d , p la in t i f f s invoked the court 's ju r i s d i c t i o n pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1343, charging a v i o l a t i o n o f 42 U.S.C. §1983. A f te r a jury t r i a l which resu lted in a l imited f ind ing in p l a i n t i f f s ' favor , the D is t r i c t Court, i n t e r a l i a , d ism issed the a c t i o n f o r f a i lu r e to s ta te a claim under §1983. 300 F.Supp. 794 (S .D . Tex. 1969) . The Court o f Appea ls r e ve r s ed the d i s t r i c t court on t h i s and o th e r grounds and remanded for further proceedings. 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir . 1970). A f t e r further proceed ings the case was submitted t o the D i s t r i c t Court for dec ision in June 1972. In June 1973, this Court decided City o f Kenosha v . Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), dea l ing with the scope o f j u r i s d ic t ion under §1983. The D i s t r i c t Court asked the part ies to b r i e f the e f f e c t o f Ci ty o f Kenosha on the ju r i sd i c t i o n a l issue. P l a i n t i f f s did so and a l s o moved to amend t h e i r compla int to a l l e g e addit ional bases o f ju r i s d i c t i o n . ‘ he D i s t r i c t Court in i t s January 1975 dec is ion denied p l a i n t i f f s ' motion in a l l respects. (A-36) The Court o f Appeals reversed, holding that in l i gh t o f 28 U.S.C. §1653 and Rule 15 of - 8 - the Federal Rules o f C i v i l Procedure, the t r i a l court abused i t s d isc re t ion in re fusing to grant the por t ion o f the motion to amend r e la t in g to 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. §1981. (A. 15). ARGUMENT This P e t i t i o n does not present any issues which j u s t i f y the granting o f c e r t i o r a r i under Rule 19. There i s no c la im o f a c a n f L i c t a£ c i r c u i t s , no issue o f public importance jmt to p laus ib le claim that the F i f th Circuit; tea '-er to f o l l o w any app l icab le dec is ion o f th is Court, 1. The Record On Appeal Was Adequate And A Remand On The Mer its Un necessary The Court o f Appeals held that the D i s t r i c t Court 's f ind ing as to the decision-making process was c l e a r l y erroneous and overturned i t s conclu s ion tha t th e re was no r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against p l a i n t i f f s . The Court o f Appeals dec is ion applied V i l l a g e o f Ar l ing ton Heights v . Metropo l i tan Housing Development Corp. . _____ U.S. _____ , 9 5 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). P e t i t i on e rs argue that the Court o f Appeals should be fau lted because i t appl ied Ar l ing ton Heights to the record - 9 - before i t , instead o f remanding to the D is t r i c t Court fo r further consideration. The P e t i t i o n does not contend tha t the Court o f Appea ls in co r r ec t l y applied Ar l ington Heights , but only that the matter should have been remanded. We submit that the Court o f Appeals was correct in avoiding s t i l l another delay in the d ispos i t ion o f this eleven year old case which was already before i t f o r the second time. Pe t i t ione rs assert the broad proposit ion that an appe l la te court must always remand to the the d i s t r i c t court when an inte rvening dec is ion has implications for reso lv ing the issue at bar. P e t i t i on e rs r e l y on three cases where remands occurred. In each o f the cases, i t is apparent that the court o f appeals decided that the d i s t r i c t court was in a b e t t e r pos i t ion than i t i t s e l f to take add i t iona l evidence or arguments or otherwise to consider the issues or questions ra ised. These cases, however, do not stand for a broad requ ire ment o f d e f e r r i n g to the lower courts on a l l appl ications o f intervening law as urged here by p e t i t i o n e r s . The record on appeal was fu l l y developed and the issue o f whether discriminat ion had occurred 10 - ex tens ive ly b r ie fed and argued.—̂ There were no undeveloped facts or issues that required further fa c t - f in d in g or presentation o f evidence. The Court o f Appeals had no need to remand since i t was in as good a pos i t ion to analyze the evidence as the D i s t r i c t Court and the D is t r i c t Court had been " c l e a r l y erroneous" in i t s past analyses. Reviewing the fac ts before i t , the court came to the unanimous conclusion that the D i s t r i c t Court "was c l e a r l y in error in f ind ing that no in ten t iona l r a c ia l d iscriminat ion occurred in the non-renewal o f p l a i n t i f f s ' teaching con trac ts and in f ind ing that the Steck Form/overall ra t ing process was the method ac tua l ly used to eva luate the teachers to a r r i v e at the employment dec is ion on March 8 . " (A. 11) _1/ The c l ea r guidance provided by Ar l ington Heights in analyzing the record made i t unneces sary f o r the Court o f Appea ls to r e l y on the developed case law on teacher dismissals during d e s e g r e g a t i o n in o rd e r to reach th is c o r r e c t r esu l t . The D i s t r i c t Court was in c lear error in i t s a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p r i o r case law. See, U.S. v , J e f f e r s o n County Board o f Educ. , 372 F.2d 836 (5th C ir . 1966); Chambers v. Henderson v i l l e Ci ty Board o f Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir . 1966) ; Worth Carol ina Ttach«r » A o n , v. Ashboro C i t y Board o f Educ. . 393 F.2d 736 (4 th C i r . 11 - P e t i t i o n e r s ' argument at page 8 o f t h e i r P e t i t i o n that the appeals court 's dec is ion under mines the i n t e g r i t y o f Rule 52 o f the Fede ra l Rules o f C i v i l Procedure i s based on a f a u l t y p rem ise . P e t i t i o n e r s quote from t h i s C o u r t ' s dec is ion in U.S. v. National Assn, o f Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950), to the e f f e c t that f indings o f fac t should not be disturbed because they might be construed d i f f e r e n t l y , unless they are c l e a r l y e rroneous . The Court o f Appea ls unquestionably found the t r i a l court to be " c l e a r ly erroneous". Since th is basic requirement of Rule 52 was met, the dec ision in no way undermines the in t e g r i t y o f the Rule. M oreover , the Court o f Appea ls d id not d ismiss e x t e n s i v e f i n d in g s made by the t r i a l court, as suggested by p e t i t i o n e r s . The Court of \J Cont' d 1968); Rol fe v . County Board o f Educ. o f Lincoln County , 391 F.2d 77 ( 6th C i r . 1968) ; Moore v . Board o f Educ. o f Chidester School D i s t r i c t , 448 F . 2d 709 ( 8th C ir . 1971); Jackson v . Wheatley School D i s t . No. 28, 430 F.2d 1359 ( 8 th C i r . 1970) ; Haney v . County Board o f Educ. o f Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364 ( 8th Cir . 1970). See also, Keyes v . S ch o o l D i s t . No. 1 Denver C o lo ra d o , 413 U.S. 109 (1973). 12 Appeals did not disturb the t r i a l court 's f ind ings as to the occurrence and de ta i l s o f events. The t r i a l court included in i t s f indings many conclusions in te rp re t ing these events. The Court o f Appea ls ove r turned the D i s t r i c t C ou r t ' s f indings only to the extent that they held that the dec is ion not to renew these experienced but black teachers was based upon a d is t r i c t -w id e comparison and that no in tent iona l r a c ia l d is cr imination had occurred - the ult imate question 2/posed by the lawsuit.— In l i g h t o f the over whelming evidence, the Court o f Appeals found the D i s t r i c t Court 's " f ind ings " on these ult imate questions to be c l e a r l y erroneous and reversed in favor o f the p l a i n t i f f s on the merits. 2/ In the appea l , respondents adopted the " t r u e f a c t s " found by the d i s t r i c t court but chal lenged i t s in te rp re ta t ion of those fac ts . Respondents argued that those were tantamount to conc lus ions o f law and not e n t i t l e d to the p r o t e c t i o n o f Rule 52. The Court o f Appea ls , however, decided i t need not address this issue since i t found the t r i a l court to be erroneous under the s t r i c t e r s tandard . (A 7 , f o o tn o t e 6). 13 - 2. P l a i n t i f f s ' Or ig inal Complaint Set Forth A Cause o f Action Under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and Justice Requir ed that P l a i n t i f f s Be Al lowed to Invoke the Court 's Jur isd ic t ion Pursuant to that Statute Pe t i t ioners argue that the Court o f Appeals e r r e d in d i r e c t i n g the t r i a l cou r t to a l l o w p l a i n t i f f s ' Motion to Amend. They base the i r argument on two contentions: (1 ) that 42 U.S.C. §1981 is not a ju r i s d i c t i o n a l s ta tute , and (2) that §1981 is separate from §1983 and ava i lab le to a narrower c la s s o f p l a i n t i f f s . P e t i t i o n e r s ' argument, however, apparently overlooks three important factors which the Court o f Appeals took into cons ideration : ( 1) the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of §1981 to respondents' claims, (2) the in t e r r e l a t ionship between 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. §1981, and (3) the combined force o f Rule 15(a) and 28 U.S.C. §1653. The essence o f p e t i t i o n e r s ' argument is that p l a i n t i f f s should be barred from obtain ing f u l l r e l i e f f o r the d iscriminat ion suf fe red by them in 1966 because they did not c i t e 42 U.S.C. §1981 in th e i r o r i g in a l complaint even though they pled and proved a v i o l a t i o n o f the s ta tute . In th e i r o r i g in a l complaint, p l a i n t i f f s set for th a l l the necessary facts to support a cause 14 - o f act ion under 42 U.S.C. §1981. P l a i n t i f f s have always claimed that they were denied continued employment on account o f th e i r race. I t is true that "§1981 is ava i lab le to a much narrower class o f po ten t ia l l i t i g a n t s than §1983", Campbell v . Gadsden County D i s t r i c t School Board, 534 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir. 1976), but p l a i n t i f f s are without a doubt members o f that narrower class of vict ims o f r a c ia l discriminat ion. P l a i n t i f f s ' Motion to Amend sought to include this addit ional 3/cause o f act ion s ta tu te .— No new a l lega t ions o f fac t or prayers for r e l i e f were necessary since as the Court o f Appeals stated: For eleven years p l a i n t i f f s , a l l e g ing the same f a c t s , have sought the same r e l i e f from the same defendants. (A. 15) 3/ I t is hornbook law that the ju r i sd i c t i o n o f a f e d e r a l cour t may not be d e f ea ted mere ly because the pleadings f a i l to c i t e the court to a par t icu lar ju r i s d i c t i o n a l sta tute. See Wright & M i l l e r , Federal P ract ice and Procedure (1969) §1206, pp. 37-78. S im i lar ly the Courts have long held that a p l a i n t i f f is not required to s ta te under what law he b r ings h is a c t i o n but only to p lead f a c t s which under any law e n t i t l e him to r e c o v e r . Newberry v. Central o f Georgia Railway, 276 F.2d. 337 (5 th C i r . 1921) c e r t . den. 257 U.S. 662. 15 In a comparable s i tua t ion , this Court has stated: F o l l o w in g the s imple guide o f Rule 8 ( f ) tha t " a l l p l ea d in g s s h a l l be so construed as to do substantia l j u s t i c e , " we have no doubt tha t p e t i t i o n e r s * complaint adequately set for th a claim and gave the respondents f a i r not ice of i t s b a s i s . The F e d e ra l Rules r e j e c t the approach tha t p l e a d in g i s a game o f s k i l l in which one misstep by counsel may be d e c i s i v e to the outcome and accept the p r in c ip le that the purpose o f p l e a d in g i s to f a c i l i t a t e a proper dec is ion on the mer i ts " . Conley v . Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,48 (1957). From the commencement o f this ac tion, the par t ies and the D i s t r i c t Court have known that i t was a suit to remedy employment d iscriminat ion on account of race. The purpose o f 28 U.S.C. §1653 is to al low the curing o f d e f e c t i v e a l l e ga t ions o f ju r i s d i c t i o n . While §1981 i s not a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l sta tute in the s t r i c t e s t sense, i t is as a cause o f a c t i o n s t a t u t e a n ecessary component o f assert ing ju r i s d i c t i o n under 28 U.S.C. §1343 ( 4 ) . Moreover, assert ing a cause o f act ion under §1981 a f f e c t s the c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n to grant a remedy. The Court o f Appeals properly recognized the ju r i s d i c t i o n a l nature of §1981, pa r t i cu la r l y 16 - in combination with §1343(4) . I t was correct in applying §1653 to the s i tua t ion at bar. The Court o f Appeals also found Rule 15(a) o f the Federal Rules o f C i v i l Procedure to be applicable to the instant matter. Under Rule 15(a) alone, p l a i n t i f f s ' motion should have been granted. In the instant case, the p reva i l ing l e ga l authority at the time o f f i l i n g was that adequate j u r i s d i c t i o n e x i s t e d under §1983 to grant a l l the requ es ted r e l i e f . I t was seven years a f t e r th is suit was f i l e d that the defec t became known. The mandate o f Rule 15(a) that l e a v e to amend "should be f r e e l y g i v en when ju s t i c e so requ ires " is to be heeded. Foman v . Dav is , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In the instant matter, ju s t i c e c l ea r ly required that p l a i n t i f f s who were vict ims o f employment discr iminat ion be al lowed to invoke the f u l l ju r i s id c t ion o f the d i s t r i c t court to obtain the remedies they had been praying f o r since 1966. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the P e t i t i o n fo r a 17 Writ of C e r t i o ra r i should be denied. Respect fu l ly submitted, WELDON S. BERRY 711 Main Street Suite 620 Houston, Texas 77002 JACK GREENBERG JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I JAMES C. GRAY, JR. 10 Columbus C irc le Suite 2030 New York, New York 10019 Counsel for Respondents ME11EN PRESS INC — N. Y. C. <*£S3<" 219