Sweeny Independent School District v. Harkless Brief for Respondents in Opposition
Public Court Documents
October 31, 1977
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Sweeny Independent School District v. Harkless Brief for Respondents in Opposition, 1977. eb8540a3-c59a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c0a29bcd-0f4d-4e65-a13b-ef5b14029031/sweeny-independent-school-district-v-harkless-brief-for-respondents-in-opposition. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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I n the
G l m t r t o f % l l m t t b S t a t e s
October Term, 1977
No. 77—392
Sweeny I ndependent School D istrict, et al.,
v.
M ildred H arkless, et al.
on petition for a w rit oe certiorari to
the united states court of appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
W eldon S. Berry
711 Main Stret
Suite 620
Houston, Texas 77002
Jack Greenberg
James M. N abrit, III
James C. Gray, Jr.
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019
Counsel for Respondents
October 1977
I N D E X
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Proceedings Below On the
Merits 1
B. Procedural History o f the
Jur isd ic t ion Issue 7
ARGUMENT
1. The Record On Appeal Was Adequate
And A Remand On The Merits Un
necessary 8
2. P l a i n t i f f s ' Or ig ina l Complaint Set
Forth A Cause Of Action Under 42
U.S.C. §1981 And Justice Required
That P l a i n t i f f s Be Al lowed To
Invoke The Court 's Jur isd ic t ion
Pursuant To That Statute 13
CONCLUSION 16
Page
Table o f Authori t ies
Cases:
Campbell v. Gadsden County D is t . School
Board, 534 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976) 14
Chambers v. Hendersonvil le Ci ty Board of
Educ., 364 F .2d 189 (4th C ir . 1966) 10
City o f Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S 507 (1973) 7
Conley v . Gibson, 355 U.S 41 (1957) 15
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S 178 (1962) 16
- l i -
Page
Haney v. County Board o f Educ. o f
Sevier County, 429 F.2d 364 ( 8th Cir.1970) 11
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School
D i s t . , 300 F.Supp. 794 (S.D.Tex.
1969) 7
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School
D i s t . , 427 F.2d 319 (5th C ir . 1970) 7
Jackson v. Wheatley School Dis t. No.28,
430 F.2d 1359 ( 8th C ir . 1970) 11
Keyes v . School D is t . N o . l , Denver
Colorado, 413 U.S. 109 (1973) 11
Moore v. Board o f Educ. o f Chidester
School D i s t . , 448 F.2d 709 ( 8th C ir .
1971) 11
Newberry v . Central o f Georgia Railway,
276 F.2d 337 (5th C ir. 1921) c e rt,
den. 257 H.S 662
Jorrii Cara Lina. Teachers Assn. v . As i c e r c
C irr 3aam nr Educ. . 3a 3 F .Id ~3b
< —t±i d m ISftfc) m
h '. r s - Imrnry I i m rsi ILfiac* c i in s e t '.i
Emnrty, 391 WJ2&A 77 fittSi 'Cir. U t t ) 11
U.S. v. Je f ferson County Board o f Educ.,
372 F.2d 836 (5th C ir . 1966) 10
U.S. v . National Assn, o f Real Estate ,
Boards, 339 U.S 485 (1950) 11
-11 1 -
Page
V i l l a g e o f Ar l ington Heights v.Metro
po l i tan Housing Development Corp . ,
_ U.S ____, 95 S.Ct.555, 50 L.Ed.
2d 450 (1977)
Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure:
Rule 15
Rule 52
8,9,10
7,13,16
11,12
Sta tutes :
28 U.S.C. §1343
28 U.S.C. §1653
42 U.S.C. §1981
42 U.S.C. §1983
Other Au thor i t ies :
Wright & M i l l e r , Federal P ractice
and Procedure (1969)
7,8,13,15,16
7,13,15,16
7 > O t i 4 , b
J*
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1977
NO. 77 - 392
SWEENY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
et a l . ,
v.
MILDRED HARKLESS, et a l .
On P e t i t i o n For a Writ of C e r t i o ra r i to
The United States Court o f Appeals for
The F i f th C ircu i t
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Proceedings Below On the Merits
This a c t i o n was brought in May o f 1966 by
twelve black teachers whose contracts with the
I v eeu 7 Independent Schoo l D i s t r i c t were not
r s i e s s : f o r the 1966-67 sch oo l y e a r . Respon
dents are tew o f the o r i g i n a l p l a i n t i f f s , the
remetadrg two having withdrawn p r io r to the 1' r~
dxnsl. P l a i n t i f f s sought to br ing th is action, as a
class action on behal f o f thews e lves and the f i v e
o t t e r black teachers who were discharged, bet the
- 2 -
D i s t r i c t Court denied c la s s a c t i o n s t a tu s .
P l a i n t i f f s charged in th e i r complaint that defen
dants, p e t i t i on e rs here, had refused to re ta in
them because o f th e i r race and sought re in s ta te
ment, back pay and l o s t a l low ances , and t h e i r
cos ts in c lu d in g reasonab le a t t o r n e y s ' f e e s .
P r io r to the 1966-67 school year, the Sweeny
Independent School D i s t r i c t mainta ined a dual
school system with r a c i a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e student
bodies and f a c u l t i e s . P e t i t ioners operated four
w h i t e schoo ls and one b lack s ch oo l . In 1966,
pe t i t i on e rs dismantled this dual school system and
in the process determined not to renew the con
t rac ts o f seventeen (17) teachers, a l l o f whom
were black. In doing so, pe t i t ioners dismissed on
the eve o f desegregation 70% o f the black facu l ty
in the d i s t r i c t . With the e x c ep t ion o f one
teacher who substituted fo r a year and a h a l f ,
respondents had each taught at leas t f i v e years in
the d i s t r i c t and had on the average f ou r te en
years experience with the d i s t r i c t .
At issue in th is case was whether the dec i
s ion to d ismiss 7 0% o f the d i s t r i c t ' s b lac k
facu l ty and re ta in 100% o f i t s white faculty was
r a c i a l l y based. In the appea l , the D i s t r i c t
Court 's account o f the actual occurence o f events
was not disputed; rather i t s analysis and in t e r
pretat ion o f those events were at issue.
The school board had a study prepared which
showed that twelve (12) fewer teachers would be
needed fo r the 1966-67 school year when the system
would be desegregated. This s t a f f in g requirements
study a l l e ged ly provided the ra t iona le f o r d i s
cha rg ing s even teen (17 ) b lack t e a c h e r s . In
a c tu a l i t y , only four fewer teachers were employed
and the d i s t r i c t h i r e d at l e a s t s e v en teen new
teachers to f i l l the vacancies l e f t by the non—re
newed hlack teachers and by retained, v inca caacn—
ars wtlc l e f t the system. ALL o f the new caacrters
h ired were m i t e . Ob-4, t—-t-1— . i—i i—ri „
The super in tenden t d in n e t retcnnmenc the
seventeen black teachers f o r renewal a t a meeting
o f the Board o f Trustees held on March 8, 1966.
~e recommended a l l whites f o r renewal. Between
—■£tch 1 and March 7, three o f the white pr inc ipals
and the black p r inc ipa l prepared the annual Steck
corn; evaluations o f th e i r teachers. The pr inc ipals
cct the f i r s t time also rated the teachers on a
a rroB "2 to 10". The sup er in t en d en t and
i-i - ~. . .m d i r e c t o r a lso rated a l l o f the teach
ers , including those at the white school where the
p r inc ipa l was absent, on this "2 to 10" scale.
- 3 -
- 4 -
At the t r i a l o f th i s m at te r , p e t i t i o n e r s
defended th e i r dismissal o f 70% o f th e i r black
facu l ty claiming that i t resulted from a r a c i a l l y
neutra l eva luat ion based on the Steck form/rating
system by which a l l the teachers in the d i s t r i c t
were compared against the i r counterparts. The
Steck form/ratings were due from the pr incipals on
March 7, and the recommendations f o r renewal were
made the very next day.
I t was undisputed, however, that p r io r to
the March 8th recommendation to the Bo-are. t i e
black teachers — only s ix o f who® along wisth m e
black p r in c ipa l were re ta ined — had beea snotyett
ed to two forms o f " e v a l u a t i o n " which wh i t e
teachers did not have to undergo. The superinten
dent and curriculum d i r e c to r , e i th e r o f whom could
contro l the outcome o f the o v e ra l l ra t ing system,
also were the ind iv iduals who subjected the black
teachers to th is spec ia l treatment.
F i r s t , only the black teachers were sub jec t
ed to an "anecdotal eva luat ion" by the curriculum
d i rec to r prepared at the request o f the superinten
den t . This " e v a l u a t i o n " focused on p e rso n a l
cha rac te r i s t i c s and emphasized r a c i a l considera
t ions . (A-5, A-53).
5
Second, the b lack teachers were ranked
a g a in s t each o the r on the bas is o f p e r c e i v e d
competence by the superintendent, the curriculum
d i r e c to r and the black p r inc ipa l . Of the s ix black
teachers retained along with the demoted black
p r in c ipa l , f i v e o f them were the teachers ranked
one to f i v e by this ranking process and the sixth
was the black p r in c ip a l ' s w i f e . The white teachers
were not ranked against each other. (A 5-6,A-55) .
The worksheet upon which this b lack-aga inst-b lack
ranking was performed shows e ight teachers r e
c e i v i n g f i n a l s c o r e s . These e i g h t ranked from
one t o seven w i th two t i e d f o r seventh p l a c e .
So at tempt was made to rank above seven . Only
seven black teachers were reh ired . ( A - 5 ) .
On these undisputed f a c t s , the D i s t r i c t
Court ru led in f a v o r o f the d e f en dan ts . The
d i s t r i c t court "reconstructed" a comparison o f the
teachers on a system-wide basis using the ratings
given by the superintendent, curriculum d i r e c to r
and various p r inc ipa ls . Based upon i t s "recon
s t r u c t i o n " , the D i s t r i c t Court h e ld tha t tha t
process had been used to se le c t the teachers who
would not be r e t a i n e d . (A55-56) The D i s t r i c t
Court in i t s f i n d in g s d iscounted the ev idence
showing that the Board dismissed f i v e more teach
ers than needed according to i t s a l le ged requ ire
ments study, that only blacks were non-renewed and
whites were subsequently hired to replace them,
that only blacks were subjected to the curriculum
d i r e c t o r ' s " a n ec d o ta l e v a l u a t i o n " and ranked
against each other f o r the seven "most competent".
I t also discounted the sub jec t iv e nature o f the
o v e ra l l ra t ing system and the c lear a b i l i t y o f the
superintendent and curriculum d i rec to r to control
the outcome o f any comparat ive r a t in g s by the
s cores they gave , which s cores in f a c t were
c o n s id e r a b l y lower f o r the non-renewed b lack
teachers than those given by the pr inc ipa l who
worked with them.
The Court o f Appeals, a f t e r reviewing the
r e c o r d , r e v e r s e d as " c l e a r l y e rroneous" the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d in g s that the employment
dec isions were based on a d i s t r i c t wide eonipai i~
son using the Steck form evaluations and ovum I!
r a t i n g s . The Court o f Appeals found Chn ■>.:
evidence in the record showed inter-t w u a n *
d iscr iminat ion . (A7, A - l l )
- 6 -
7
B. Procedural History o f the Jur isd ic t ion
Issue
In 1966, when this action was f i l e d , p la in
t i f f s invoked the court 's ju r i s d i c t i o n pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1343, charging a v i o l a t i o n o f 42 U.S.C.
§1983. A f te r a jury t r i a l which resu lted in a
l imited f ind ing in p l a i n t i f f s ' favor , the D is t r i c t
Court, i n t e r a l i a , d ism issed the a c t i o n f o r
f a i lu r e to s ta te a claim under §1983. 300 F.Supp.
794 (S .D . Tex. 1969) . The Court o f Appea ls
r e ve r s ed the d i s t r i c t court on t h i s and o th e r
grounds and remanded for further proceedings. 427
F.2d 319 (5th Cir . 1970). A f t e r further proceed
ings the case was submitted t o the D i s t r i c t
Court for dec ision in June 1972. In June 1973,
this Court decided City o f Kenosha v . Bruno, 412
U.S. 507 (1973), dea l ing with the scope o f j u r i s
d ic t ion under §1983. The D i s t r i c t Court asked the
part ies to b r i e f the e f f e c t o f Ci ty o f Kenosha on
the ju r i sd i c t i o n a l issue. P l a i n t i f f s did so and
a l s o moved to amend t h e i r compla int to a l l e g e
addit ional bases o f ju r i s d i c t i o n .
‘ he D i s t r i c t Court in i t s January 1975
dec is ion denied p l a i n t i f f s ' motion in a l l respects.
(A-36) The Court o f Appeals reversed, holding
that in l i gh t o f 28 U.S.C. §1653 and Rule 15 of
- 8 -
the Federal Rules o f C i v i l Procedure, the t r i a l
court abused i t s d isc re t ion in re fusing to grant
the por t ion o f the motion to amend r e la t in g to 28
U.S.C. §1343(4) and 42 U.S.C. §1981. (A. 15).
ARGUMENT
This P e t i t i o n does not present any issues
which j u s t i f y the granting o f c e r t i o r a r i under
Rule 19. There i s no c la im o f a c a n f L i c t a£
c i r c u i t s , no issue o f public importance jmt to
p laus ib le claim that the F i f th Circuit; tea '-er
to f o l l o w any app l icab le dec is ion o f th is Court,
1. The Record On Appeal Was Adequate
And A Remand On The Mer its Un
necessary
The Court o f Appeals held that the D i s t r i c t
Court 's f ind ing as to the decision-making process
was c l e a r l y erroneous and overturned i t s conclu
s ion tha t th e re was no r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
against p l a i n t i f f s . The Court o f Appeals dec is ion
applied V i l l a g e o f Ar l ing ton Heights v . Metropo l i
tan Housing Development Corp. . _____ U.S. _____ , 9 5
S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). P e t i t i on e rs
argue that the Court o f Appeals should be fau lted
because i t appl ied Ar l ing ton Heights to the record
- 9 -
before i t , instead o f remanding to the D is t r i c t
Court fo r further consideration. The P e t i t i o n
does not contend tha t the Court o f Appea ls
in co r r ec t l y applied Ar l ington Heights , but only
that the matter should have been remanded. We
submit that the Court o f Appeals was correct in
avoiding s t i l l another delay in the d ispos i t ion o f
this eleven year old case which was already before
i t f o r the second time.
Pe t i t ione rs assert the broad proposit ion
that an appe l la te court must always remand to the
the d i s t r i c t court when an inte rvening dec is ion
has implications for reso lv ing the issue at bar.
P e t i t i on e rs r e l y on three cases where remands
occurred. In each o f the cases, i t is apparent
that the court o f appeals decided that the d i s t r i c t
court was in a b e t t e r pos i t ion than i t i t s e l f to
take add i t iona l evidence or arguments or otherwise
to consider the issues or questions ra ised. These
cases, however, do not stand for a broad requ ire
ment o f d e f e r r i n g to the lower courts on a l l
appl ications o f intervening law as urged here by
p e t i t i o n e r s .
The record on appeal was fu l l y developed and
the issue o f whether discriminat ion had occurred
10 -
ex tens ive ly b r ie fed and argued.—̂ There were no
undeveloped facts or issues that required further
fa c t - f in d in g or presentation o f evidence.
The Court o f Appeals had no need to remand
since i t was in as good a pos i t ion to analyze the
evidence as the D i s t r i c t Court and the D is t r i c t
Court had been " c l e a r l y erroneous" in i t s past
analyses. Reviewing the fac ts before i t , the
court came to the unanimous conclusion that the
D i s t r i c t Court "was c l e a r l y in error in f ind ing
that no in ten t iona l r a c ia l d iscriminat ion occurred
in the non-renewal o f p l a i n t i f f s ' teaching con
trac ts and in f ind ing that the Steck Form/overall
ra t ing process was the method ac tua l ly used to
eva luate the teachers to a r r i v e at the employment
dec is ion on March 8 . " (A. 11)
_1/ The c l ea r guidance provided by Ar l ington
Heights in analyzing the record made i t unneces
sary f o r the Court o f Appea ls to r e l y on the
developed case law on teacher dismissals during
d e s e g r e g a t i o n in o rd e r to reach th is c o r r e c t
r esu l t . The D i s t r i c t Court was in c lear error in
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n o f the p r i o r case law. See,
U.S. v , J e f f e r s o n County Board o f Educ. , 372
F.2d 836 (5th C ir . 1966); Chambers v. Henderson
v i l l e Ci ty Board o f Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir .
1966) ; Worth Carol ina Ttach«r » A o n , v. Ashboro
C i t y Board o f Educ. . 393 F.2d 736 (4 th C i r .
11 -
P e t i t i o n e r s ' argument at page 8 o f t h e i r
P e t i t i o n that the appeals court 's dec is ion under
mines the i n t e g r i t y o f Rule 52 o f the Fede ra l
Rules o f C i v i l Procedure i s based on a f a u l t y
p rem ise . P e t i t i o n e r s quote from t h i s C o u r t ' s
dec is ion in U.S. v. National Assn, o f Real Estate
Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950), to the e f f e c t that
f indings o f fac t should not be disturbed because
they might be construed d i f f e r e n t l y , unless they
are c l e a r l y e rroneous . The Court o f Appea ls
unquestionably found the t r i a l court to be " c l e a r
ly erroneous". Since th is basic requirement of
Rule 52 was met, the dec ision in no way undermines
the in t e g r i t y o f the Rule.
M oreover , the Court o f Appea ls d id not
d ismiss e x t e n s i v e f i n d in g s made by the t r i a l
court, as suggested by p e t i t i o n e r s . The Court of
\J Cont' d
1968); Rol fe v . County Board o f Educ. o f Lincoln
County , 391 F.2d 77 ( 6th C i r . 1968) ; Moore v .
Board o f Educ. o f Chidester School D i s t r i c t , 448
F . 2d 709 ( 8th C ir . 1971); Jackson v . Wheatley
School D i s t . No. 28, 430 F.2d 1359 ( 8 th C i r .
1970) ; Haney v . County Board o f Educ. o f Sevier
County, 429 F.2d 364 ( 8th Cir . 1970). See also,
Keyes v . S ch o o l D i s t . No. 1 Denver C o lo ra d o ,
413 U.S. 109 (1973).
12
Appeals did not disturb the t r i a l court 's f ind
ings as to the occurrence and de ta i l s o f events.
The t r i a l court included in i t s f indings many
conclusions in te rp re t ing these events. The Court
o f Appea ls ove r turned the D i s t r i c t C ou r t ' s
f indings only to the extent that they held that
the dec is ion not to renew these experienced but
black teachers was based upon a d is t r i c t -w id e
comparison and that no in tent iona l r a c ia l d is
cr imination had occurred - the ult imate question
2/posed by the lawsuit.— In l i g h t o f the over
whelming evidence, the Court o f Appeals found the
D i s t r i c t Court 's " f ind ings " on these ult imate
questions to be c l e a r l y erroneous and reversed in
favor o f the p l a i n t i f f s on the merits.
2/ In the appea l , respondents adopted the
" t r u e f a c t s " found by the d i s t r i c t court but
chal lenged i t s in te rp re ta t ion of those fac ts .
Respondents argued that those were tantamount to
conc lus ions o f law and not e n t i t l e d to the
p r o t e c t i o n o f Rule 52. The Court o f Appea ls ,
however, decided i t need not address this issue
since i t found the t r i a l court to be erroneous
under the s t r i c t e r s tandard . (A 7 , f o o tn o t e
6).
13 -
2. P l a i n t i f f s ' Or ig inal Complaint
Set Forth A Cause o f Action Under
42 U.S.C. §1981 and Justice Requir
ed that P l a i n t i f f s Be Al lowed to
Invoke the Court 's Jur isd ic t ion
Pursuant to that Statute
Pe t i t ioners argue that the Court o f Appeals
e r r e d in d i r e c t i n g the t r i a l cou r t to a l l o w
p l a i n t i f f s ' Motion to Amend. They base the i r
argument on two contentions: (1 ) that 42 U.S.C.
§1981 is not a ju r i s d i c t i o n a l s ta tute , and (2)
that §1981 is separate from §1983 and ava i lab le to
a narrower c la s s o f p l a i n t i f f s . P e t i t i o n e r s '
argument, however, apparently overlooks three
important factors which the Court o f Appeals took
into cons ideration : ( 1) the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of
§1981 to respondents' claims, (2) the in t e r r e l a
t ionship between 28 U.S.C. §1343(4) and 42 U.S.C.
§1981, and (3) the combined force o f Rule 15(a)
and 28 U.S.C. §1653.
The essence o f p e t i t i o n e r s ' argument is that
p l a i n t i f f s should be barred from obtain ing f u l l
r e l i e f f o r the d iscriminat ion suf fe red by them in
1966 because they did not c i t e 42 U.S.C. §1981 in
th e i r o r i g in a l complaint even though they pled and
proved a v i o l a t i o n o f the s ta tute .
In th e i r o r i g in a l complaint, p l a i n t i f f s set
for th a l l the necessary facts to support a cause
14 -
o f act ion under 42 U.S.C. §1981. P l a i n t i f f s have
always claimed that they were denied continued
employment on account o f th e i r race. I t is true
that "§1981 is ava i lab le to a much narrower class
o f po ten t ia l l i t i g a n t s than §1983", Campbell v .
Gadsden County D i s t r i c t School Board, 534 F.2d
650, 654 (5th Cir. 1976), but p l a i n t i f f s are
without a doubt members o f that narrower class of
vict ims o f r a c ia l discriminat ion. P l a i n t i f f s '
Motion to Amend sought to include this addit ional
3/cause o f act ion s ta tu te .— No new a l lega t ions o f
fac t or prayers for r e l i e f were necessary since
as the Court o f Appeals stated:
For eleven years p l a i n t i f f s , a l l e g ing
the same f a c t s , have sought the same
r e l i e f from the same defendants.
(A. 15)
3/ I t is hornbook law that the ju r i sd i c t i o n o f
a f e d e r a l cour t may not be d e f ea ted mere ly
because the pleadings f a i l to c i t e the court to a
par t icu lar ju r i s d i c t i o n a l sta tute. See Wright &
M i l l e r , Federal P ract ice and Procedure (1969)
§1206, pp. 37-78.
S im i lar ly the Courts have long held that a
p l a i n t i f f is not required to s ta te under what law
he b r ings h is a c t i o n but only to p lead f a c t s
which under any law e n t i t l e him to r e c o v e r .
Newberry v. Central o f Georgia Railway, 276 F.2d.
337 (5 th C i r . 1921) c e r t . den. 257 U.S. 662.
15
In a comparable s i tua t ion , this Court has stated:
F o l l o w in g the s imple guide o f Rule
8 ( f ) tha t " a l l p l ea d in g s s h a l l be so
construed as to do substantia l j u s t i c e , "
we have no doubt tha t p e t i t i o n e r s *
complaint adequately set for th a claim
and gave the respondents f a i r not ice of
i t s b a s i s . The F e d e ra l Rules r e j e c t
the approach tha t p l e a d in g i s a game
o f s k i l l in which one misstep by counsel
may be d e c i s i v e to the outcome and
accept the p r in c ip le that the purpose o f
p l e a d in g i s to f a c i l i t a t e a proper
dec is ion on the mer i ts " .
Conley v . Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,48 (1957). From
the commencement o f this ac tion, the par t ies and
the D i s t r i c t Court have known that i t was a suit
to remedy employment d iscriminat ion on account of
race.
The purpose o f 28 U.S.C. §1653 is to al low
the curing o f d e f e c t i v e a l l e ga t ions o f ju r i s d i c
t i o n . While §1981 i s not a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
sta tute in the s t r i c t e s t sense, i t is as a cause
o f a c t i o n s t a t u t e a n ecessary component o f
assert ing ju r i s d i c t i o n under 28 U.S.C. §1343 ( 4 ) .
Moreover, assert ing a cause o f act ion under §1981
a f f e c t s the c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n to grant a
remedy. The Court o f Appeals properly recognized
the ju r i s d i c t i o n a l nature of §1981, pa r t i cu la r l y
16 -
in combination with §1343(4) . I t was correct in
applying §1653 to the s i tua t ion at bar.
The Court o f Appeals also found Rule 15(a)
o f the Federal Rules o f C i v i l Procedure to be
applicable to the instant matter. Under Rule
15(a) alone, p l a i n t i f f s ' motion should have been
granted. In the instant case, the p reva i l ing
l e ga l authority at the time o f f i l i n g was that
adequate j u r i s d i c t i o n e x i s t e d under §1983 to
grant a l l the requ es ted r e l i e f . I t was seven
years a f t e r th is suit was f i l e d that the defec t
became known. The mandate o f Rule 15(a) that
l e a v e to amend "should be f r e e l y g i v en when
ju s t i c e so requ ires " is to be heeded. Foman v .
Dav is , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In the instant
matter, ju s t i c e c l ea r ly required that p l a i n t i f f s
who were vict ims o f employment discr iminat ion be
al lowed to invoke the f u l l ju r i s id c t ion o f the
d i s t r i c t court to obtain the remedies they had
been praying f o r since 1966.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the P e t i t i o n fo r a
17
Writ of C e r t i o ra r i should be denied.
Respect fu l ly submitted,
WELDON S. BERRY
711 Main Street
Suite 620
Houston, Texas 77002
JACK GREENBERG
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I
JAMES C. GRAY, JR.
10 Columbus C irc le
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019
Counsel for Respondents
ME11EN PRESS INC — N. Y. C. <*£S3<" 219