Texas's Reply to Response to its Motion to Dismiss Judge Wood for Lack of Standing

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HAN REATTOX 
November 8, 1990 

ATTEN EY GRIN BRIER AH. 

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS 

Gilbert Ganucheau, Clerk 

Fifth Circuit 

600 Camp Street 

  

New Orleans, Louisiana 70130 

Re: LULAC v. Mattox, No. 90-8014 

Dear Mr. Ganucheau: 

Enclosed for filing in the above-referenced matter are the 

original and three copies of Texas's Reply to Response to Its Motion to 
Dismiss Judge Wood for Lack of Standing. 

Y {NLA 
J 

“Reneda Hicks 

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 
(512) 463-2085 

Encl. 

cc: Counsel of Record 

ThE 4333 = 22D SUPRERME COURT IBUILIEING AUSTIN, TEXAS  



  

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FIFTH CIRCUIT 

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN 

AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

VS. No. 90-8014 

JIM MATTOX, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. on

 
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TEXAS'S REPLY TO RESPONSE TO ITS MOTION TO DISMISS JUDGE 

WOOD FOR LACK OF STANDING 

The Attorney General of Texas, on behalf of the State of Texas 

("Texas"), submits the following reply to Judge Wood's response to its 

Motion to Dismiss Judge Wood for Lack of Standing, which motion is 

Part IV of Texas's filing of November 4, 1990" 

In addition to being wrong for the practical reason that Texas 

was not adverse to her until now, Judge Wood's argument that Texas is 

barred here from questioning her standing is wrong because of the 

nature of the standing issue in federal courts. Party standing is a 

quasi-jurisdictional issue that may be raised by the parties or the Court 

on its own at the appellate phase of a case even if never raised at the 

trial phase. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977); United States v. 

  

* 

Judge Wood's standing response is in 4 5, pp.4-5 of her filing of November 7, 

1990. Except for the following point, this reply by the state will not respond to other 

matters discussed in the November 7th filing. In 92, p. 2, of the November 7th filing, 

Judge Wood claims that her district court pleadings requested attorney fees without 

directing the request toward any particular party. That assertion is flatly contradicted 

by the record. Both the excerpt contained in Judge Wood's Exhibit A to her November 

7th filing (which was superseded by a later amended complaint) and the second 

amended answer and counterclaim (which is the only relevant one) seek fees only from 

the plaintiffs. Had she intended actually to put the state on notice of her misbegotten 

quest to take money from it, she should have specified it or filed a cross-claim (labeled 

as such) against it. She did neither. She was careful to label herself a counterplaintiff, 

not a crossplaintiff, in the attorney fee portion of her counterclaim. 

 



  

One Eighteenth Century Colombian Monstrance, 797 F.2d 1370, 1374 

(5th Cir. 1986). Thus, either Texas or the Court on its own motion 

may raise the issue. 

Very recent authority supports the proposition that Judge Wood 

in her personal capacity lacks standing in this case. Within the last 

week, a three-judge district court in this circuit issued an opinion in a 

voting rights case brought under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act 

and involving the creation of numerous Louisiana judgeships. Clark v. 

Roemer, . F.2d M.D. La.) {Civ. Action No. 88-435-A) (Oct. 31, 

1990). The opinion notes that the three-judge court a week earlier 

had denied an intervention effort by a judicial candidate for one of the 

challenged positions. Clark, slip. op. at 9. This holding is consistent 

with the holding of another circuit in a voting rights case that 

candidates for political office lack standing under Section 2. Roberts 

v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989). Judge Wood's posture before 

this Court is no different than that of a candidate for a targeted office 

in a Section 2 case, and she too lacks standing to be a party in such a 

case. 

 



Respectfully submitted, 

JIM MATTOX 
Attorney General of Texas 

MARY F. KELLER 
First Assistant Attorney General 

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RENEA HICKS 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
First Assistant Attorney General 

  

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P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station 
Austin, Texas 78711-2548 

(512) 463-2085 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that on this 8th day of November, 1990, I sent a copy of 
the foregoing document by first class United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to each of the following: William L. Garrett, Garrett, 
Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75225; 
Rolando Rios, Southwest Voter Registration & Education Project, 201 
N. St. Mary's, Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas 78205; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 
16th Floor, New York, New York 10013; Gabrielle K. McDonald, 301 
Congress Avenue, Suite 2050, Austin, Texas 78701; Edward B. 
Cloutman, III, Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm 
Street, Dallas, Texas 75226-1637; J. Eugene Clements, Porter & 
Clements, 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500, Houston, Texas 77002-2730; 
Robert H. Mow, Jr., Hughes & Luce, 2800 Momentum Place, 1717 
Main Street, Dallas, Texas 75201; John L. Hill, Jr., Liddell, Sapp, 
Zivley, Hill & LaBoon, 3300 Texas Commerce Tower, Houston, Texas 
77002 ; Walter L. Irvin, 5787 South Hampton Road, Suite 210, Lock 
Box 122, Dallas, Texas 75232-2255; Susan Finkelstein, Texas Rural 
Legal Aid, Inc., 201 N. St. Mary's # 600, San Antonio, Texas 78205; 
and Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & 
Wheatley, Inc., 711 Navarro, Sixth Floor mm Antonio, Texas 78205. , 

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