United States' First Set of Requests for Admission

    IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
No. 20619

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL.,

Appellants,

- v .  -

ALLEN THOMPSON, ET AL.,
Appellees.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL

JACK H. YOUNG
CARSIE A. HALL

115^ North Farish Street 
Jackson, Mississippi

ROBERT L. CARTER
BARBARA A. MORRIS

20 West 40th Street 
New York 18, New York

R. JESS BROWN
125^ North Farish Street 
Jackson, Mississippi

JACK GREENBERG
LEROY D. CLARK
DERRICK A. BELL

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

FRANK D. REEVES
508 Fifth Street, N. W. 
Washington 1, D. C.

WILLIAM R. MING, JR.
123 West Madison Street 
Chicago, Illinois

Attorneys for Appellants



Index
Page

Statement of the Case----------------------------------  1
Argument

I, This Court Has Jurisdiction to Both Hear 
This Motion and Grant the Injunctive
Relief Sought by Appellants------------------ - 5
A. The Order of the Court Below is Appealable

Under 28 U.S.C., Section I292(l)---------  5
B. The Relief Urgently Sought By Appellants

Is Well Within the Power of This Court---  9
C. 28 U.S.C., Section 2283 Is No Bar to

Appellants’ Requested Relief-------------  11
II. Appellees, By Enforcing Racial Segregation 

Required By State Law, Have Abridged
Appellants’ Constitutionally Protected Freedoms 
of Expression and Assembly and Have Thereby,
Created an Emergent Situation Necessitating 
Interim Injunctive Relief by This Court------  15
A. Consistent with State Policy, Appellees 

Have Violated Appellants' Constitutional
Rights By the Enforcement of Racial 
Segregation------------------------------  16

B. Appellants’ Protest Activities Are Pro­
tected By Their Constitutional Right of 
Freedom of Expression and Assembly--------  19

C. The Urgent Relief Sought By Appellants 
Is Justified By the Circumstances of
this Case--------------------------------  22

Conclusion--------------------------------------------  24



Table of Cases

American Optometric Ass'n. v. Ritholz,
101 F.2d 883, 887 (7th Cir. 1939)..... ................. 13

Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961)
368 U.S. 346, 369 U.S. 31 (1962)................... 5,11,14

Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516..................   15,19
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497......................... . 16
Browder v. Gayle, 352 U.S. 903....... ................... 15
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)...... 10,15,17
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)..........   7,10
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296............    19,21
Clark v. Thompson, 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir., 1963).......  5
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).............   10,16,19
Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir., 1950)......... 12
CORE v. C. H. Douglas,___F.2d___, (5th Cir., May 15, 1963). 10
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile

County, ___F.2d___(5th Cir., May 24, 1963).............  10
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353....... ............ . 21
Denton v. City of Carrollton, Ga., 235 F.2d 481

(5th Cir. 1956)................... ................... 12,13
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157

235 F.2d at ...................................... . 13,14
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229................... 6,20
Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School

District No.____ (S.D. Miss. 1963).....................  6
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315................. ......... 20
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67.................. . 20
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)..................  5
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903......... ..................15,16
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative

Committee, 342 U.S. 539.................... ............ 15
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339............ .......... 15
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293.........................  15
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 279 U.S. 233.............. 19
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 296..... ......................19,21
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460.....................  20

ii

Page



Table Of Cases
(Continued) Page

Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)...... .............. 10
Jamison v. Alliance Ins. Co. of Philadelphia,

87 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1937)........ ................ 13
Kunz v. New York 340 U.S. 299........................ 20,21
Lombard v. State of Louisiana, 31 U.S.L. Week 4476 (1963)... 20
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141................. . 19
Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir., 1962).......  5
Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadow Moor Dairies,

321 U.S. 287........................... ................  20
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167.............     16
Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir., 1958),

cert, denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958).................. . 13
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 458......... .................. 15,19
NAACP v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry„ Co.,

297 I.C.C. 355........................ ................  15
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697......... ............... 21
Nelson v. Grooms, 307 F.2d 76 (5th Cir., 1962)..... . 10
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,

303 U.S. 552........ ................................... • 20
People v. Barkel, 36 N.Y.S. 2d 1011 (1942)...........   20
People v. Kiernan, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (1940)................  20
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 31 U.S.L. Week 4475(1963).. 6,20
Plumbers Union v, Graham, 345 U.S. 192............ . 20
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47................... . 19
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147........................ . 21
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91.......... .......... 16
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir., 1947).........  10,19
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1......................... 16
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 40...........................  15
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649....................  15
Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274..,..........    13
Stell v. Savannab-Chatham County Board of Education,

___F.2d___ (5th Cir., May 24, 1963).... ................. 10
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359................ «...... 19

iii



Table Of Cases 
(Continued)

Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629..... ..................... 15
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284........ ......... 20
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 86. „... .................. 19,21
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.,

314 U.S. 118................................ ........ 12
United States v. City of Jackson, ___F.2d___,

(5th Cir., May 13, 1963)........ .................... 5
United.States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir., 1962)..... 7,9
United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir., 1961).. 7,11,13
Watchtower and Bible Tract Society v. Dougherty,

337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147.............................  20
Watson v. City of Memphis, ___U.S.____(May 27, 1963)....  10
Wells Fargo 8. Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175..... .......... 13
Woods v. Wright, ____F.2d____(May 22, 1963).............  10

iv

Page

Statutes. Regulations. Rules and Other Authorities 
U.S.C. Sections

28 U.S.C. ,§1292(1)...................................  5,8
22 U.S.C.,§1651......................   9,12
28 U.S.C.,§1335..............     12
28 U.S.C.,§2283.....     11,12,13
42 U.S.C.,§1983...................     11

Mississippi Constitution
Mississippi Constitution, §225...... ...... ........... 17
* ' ■ ' '

Mississippi Code, Sections
Code of Mississippi, §2056.7...........................   17
Code of Mississippi, §2339................   17
Code of Mississippi, §2351.5...........................  17
Code of Mississippi, §3499...................    17
Code of Mississippi, §4065.3.............   5,14,16,17
Code of Mississippi, §4259................     17
Code of Mississippi, §6882.....    17
Code of Mississippi, §6883..................   17
Code of Mississippi, §7913......       17
Code of Mississippi, §7965,......     17
Code of Mississippi, §7971......   17
Code of Mississippi, §7786.............    17
Code of Mississippi, §7787.5....,........     17



V

Statutes. Regulations. Rules and Other Authorities
(Continued)

Page

Rules
F.R.C.P. 62 (9)............................... .......... 9

Other Authorities
Moore, Commentary On Judicial Code.....................  12



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 20610

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF COLORED PEOPLE, ET AL.,

Appellants, 
v.

ALLEN THOMPSON, ET AL.,
Appellees.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING APPEAL 

Statement Of The Case

Commencing on approximately May 28, 1963, appellants, members 
of their class, and supporters of equal rights for all citizens 
began a series of peaceful protest demonstrations protesting en­
forced segregation in the City of Jackson. All of their subsequent 
activities have been conducted in a peaceful manner. Any violations 
or threats have come from members of the public who disagree with 
their views. The officials named as defendants in Count One of the 
complaint, have used all the processes of law available to them, 
including arrests, convictions, requirement of cash bail bonds, 
and court actions to frustrate or prevent the registering of any 
expression by appellants and members of their class inconsistent 
with the segregation laws and policies in the State of Mississippi. 
Appellants have been constantly and violently threatened, intimidated, 
and arrested by appellees in their attempts to express their 
opposition to the action of Jackson police officials to maintain 
and enforce rigid racial segregation as provided by the laws of the



State of Mississippi.
On June 7, 1963, plaintiffs, Negro and white citizens of 

the United States, residents and non-residents of Mississippi, 
and a non-profit member corporation filed a verified complaint 
together with motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary 
injunction supported by affidavits in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

Count One of that verified complaint is involved in this 
motion. The complaint reflects that city, county, and state 
officials of Jackson, Hinds County, and Mississippi have embarked 
on a program, under color of law, to enforce and maintain racial 
segregation in the State of Mississippi by means of unlawful arrests,, 
prosecutions, and convictions of appellants and the class they 
represent for peacefully protesting racial segregation and dis­
crimination in Jackson, Mississippi, in places of public accommodatiu 
and in the use of public facilities.

The motion, originally returnable on June 7, was adjourned 
to June 8, on which date the appellees appeared and filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint. Argument on the motion was heard on 
June 8, 1963, and on June 10th testimony was taken in support of 
appellants' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction. Immediately prior to the hearing on June 10, the 
appellants, named as defendants in Count One, served copies of 
affidavits upon counsel for appellees, which affidavits have been 
made a part of the record of this proceeding.

In the course of the hearing, testimony was taken from Allen 
Thompson, Mayor of the City of Jackson, W. B. Rayfield, Chief of 
Police of Jackson, and J. R. Gilfoy, Sheriff of Hinds County.

Chief of Police Rayfield testified that prior to May 25, 1963, 
arrangements had been made to hold large numbers of persons in 
custody. [Tr. 13],

Mayor Thompson confirmed this fact • that the plans were 
made in anticipation of restricting rights of plaintiffs protesting 
racial segregation in the City of Jackson, and explained how exhibit

-  2 -



buildings on the county fair grounds had been accommodated for use 
as prison facilities as early as May 12, 1963. [Tr. 30 and 37]. 
Mayor Thompson testified that the "instant arrest" policy utilized 
by appellees to suppress and restrict appellants' rights to protest 
was in accordance with his instructions and his policy of "main­
taining law and order." [Tr. 59].

Mayor Thompson further testified that demands were made by 
members of the Negro community to discuss the segregation policies 
with him to the end of effecting their termination. [Tr. 72]. He 
admitted that segregation existed in Jackson in restaurants and 
other places of public accommodation, was vague on details of 
arrestsof adults and juveniles and of the disposition of the arrest 
but stated that all actions of the police were in accordance with 
his policies or instructions. [Tr. 93; 95; 61-62; 65; 96],

Sheriff Gilfoy testified that part of his county personnel 
had been assigned to work with the Jackson police in their efforts 
to attenuate the peaceful protests of appellants and that county 
officers had assisted the Jackson police on three occasions. [Tr. 9 
100].

Following the conclusion of testimony from the above three 
witnesses, Judge Cox reminded counsel of his intention to leave the 
following day for a long planned vacation, whereupon counsel for 
all parties agreed to submit the motion to the Court on the pleadin 
affidavits filed, testimony, and argument of counsel and upon con­
formed copies of certain proceedings in the Chancery Court of Hines 
County. [Tr. 108-109].

On June 6, 1963, the City of Jackson obtained a writ of 
injunction restraining, without hearing or notice, some of appellan 
and the class they represent from engaging in peaceful protests 
against racial discrimination and segregation, including parading, 
picketing, and seeking of nonsegregated service in public estab­
lishments, all of which were termed unlawful. No prior hearing was 
accorded appellants; a hearing on that temporary injunction will 
not be accorded before September 9, 1963. Appellants' motion to

3



dissolve or stay execution of the temporary injunction was denied 
by the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds 
County on June 7, 1963, and by the Supreme Court of Mississippi 
on June 10, 1963. No hearing was accorded prior to determination 
of either motion. On June 13, 1963, appellantsfiled a petition and 
a motion to dissolve or to stay the execution of the temporary 
injunction of the Hinds County Court in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The motion was denied on June 14, 1963.

On June 11, 1963, Judge Harold Cox entered an order refusing 
the temporary injunction or a temporary restraining order and di­
recting appellants, at peril of their right to federal injunctive 
relief, to obey the ex parte temporary injunction of the Hinds 
County Chancery Court.

The facts upon which appellants base their request for in­
terim relief from this Court are set forth in affidavits of the 
following persons filed heretofore with the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: appellants Willie B. Ludden; Rev.
Ralph Edwin King; Doris Allison; Doris Erskine; Medgar Evers and 
Langston Mitchell, Jr.; Mary Lee Veal, John Clifton Young, Tommie 
Jean Levy, John Salter, Frankie Adams, Alphonso Lewis and those 
affidavits which will be presented to the Court prior to oral argu­
ment of this motion.

On June 12, 1963, appellants filed a Notice of Appeal re­
questing entry of a temporary injunction pending appeal of this 
cnuse together with a Statement of Points and Designation of the 
Contents of the Record on Appeal. By order of this Court entered co. 
June 14, 1963, argument on the aforesaid motion was set down for 
June 26, 1963.

4



A R G U M E N T

I
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO BOTH HEAR THIS MOTION
AND GRANT THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPELLANTS

A. The Order Of The Court Below Is Appealable 
Under 28 U.S.C., Section 1292(1).

The failure of the court below to rule on appellants' motion 
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and 
its ruling that the state court injunction is "not void, and 
should be respected," constitutes an appealable order as defined 
in 28 U.S.C., Section 1292(1), which section gives this court 
jurisdiction of appeals from: "Interlocutory orders of the district 
courts of the United States...granting, continuing, modifying, 
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or 
modify injunctions,..."

Appellants have suffered serious violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights by reason of the appellees' determination 
to maintain segregation, and have detailed the history of incidents 
leading to this action in their complaint. Affidavits filed in 
response by appellees have not contravened these allegations, and 
from the record, it is clear that there is no basic dispute as to 
the facts.

The urgency and necessity for immediate action is obvious.
For a long period of time, appellants have been denied rights and 
privileges freely exercised by white citizens in the State of 
Mississippi because of the firmly fixed policy of racial segregation 
existing in that State. 17 Miss. Code Ann. § 4065.3; Meredith.v. 
Fair. 298 F.2d 696, 701 (5th Cir., 1962). Appellees have followed 
this policy and have defended it in the courts. See, Bailey v... 
Patterson. 199 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961), 368 U.S. 346, 369 
U.S. 31 (1962), segregated public travel facilities; Clark v. 
Thompson. 313 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1963), segregated public recre­
ational and library facilities; United States v. City of Jackson. 
____F.2d____, (5th Cir., May 13, 1963), segregation signs in public

- 5 -



travel terminals; Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District
No._____ (S.D. Miss. 1963), segregated public schools.

Now, appellants and members of their class seek by peaceful
protests and demonstrations to convey publicly their strong desire
that racial segregation be ended in Jackson. In response, appellees
have adopted policies and practices aimed at suppressing these
peaceful expressions, which policies and practices are both in

1/violation of appellants®constitutional rights, and are contributing 
to an increase in bitterness, racial tension and the probability 
of violence. Concluding that appellees intend to continue their 
policy of censoring all peaceful protests against racial dis­
crimination with arrests and harassment, and fearful that the 
brutal suppression of clearly constitutional rights would lead 
to further violence by whites and possible retaliation by Negroes, 
appellants sought to forestall such conflict, and turned to the 
federal court for relief against the policies of appellees and 
for vindication of their constitutional rights.

In response, Judge Cox found in his order of June 11, 1963, 
from which appellants appeal, that there is "no crisis at hand; 
and no necessity or urgency for any immediate actionc" He further 
found that the case "is extremely complicated and involves many 
intricate legal facets which would entail further intensive 
examination and study." For these reasons, Judge Cox "ordered 
that this matter will be taken under advisement by the Court for 
study and later decision at the proper time."

Since, as indicated in paragraph 7 of the appellants’ Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal, Judge Cox will be absent

1/ earner v. Louisiana. 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Edwards v. .South
Carolina. ___U.S.___, 9 L.Ed. 2d 697 (1963); PetersoQ,_y;.
City of Greenville. U.S. (May 20, 1963).

- 6 -



on vacation for a period of three weeks from June 11, 1963, it 
is unlikely that further orders in this case will be forthcoming 
from the court below for some time.

Thus, the situation here is similar to that in U.S. v. Lynd, 
301 F.2d 818 (5th Cir., 1962) where Judge Cox declined either to 
grant or refuse a temporary injunction requested by the government 
in a suit to enjoin discriminatory voting practices, and granted 
a recess of 30 days to permit the defendants to file an answer 
and to prepare for proving their defensive case. This action was 
taken in litigation brought to remedy obvious deprivations of 
voting rights.

Under these circumstances, as this Court indicated in 
U.S. v. Lvnd. supra, appellants were clearly entitled to have a 
ruling from the trial judge, and since he did not grant the order, 
his action in declining to do so was in all respects a "refusal", 
so as to satisfy the requirements of §1292. Cf. U.S. v. Wood.
295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir., 1961).

True, in the Lvnd case, the government's motion for injunctive
relief had been pending for eight months and efforts to obtain
voting records had been frustrated for eleven months before that,
but the decision to grant relief pending appeal appears to pivot
not on the amount of time the government's motion had been pending,
but on Judge Cox's failure to act affirmatively on the motion for
injunctive relief. Thus, the Court concluded:

Where, however, as is here the case, the 
plaintiff made a clear showing that rights 
which it sought to vindicate were being 
violated, and that no response or counter­
proof would be available for some con­
siderable period after these rights should 
have been, but had not been, taken under 
consideration by the trial court, the 
plaintiff has satisfied every requirement 
for the granting of temporary relief pending 
a final adjudication of the appeal.

(301 F.2d at 823.)

Here, no less than in Lvnd. relief was requested of Judge 
Cox to protect constitutional rights of Negroes from violation 
by state officials intent on maintaining racial segregation. But 
in addition, there is here an urgency borne out of a fear of 
violence that has subsequently been realized with the murder of

7



one of the plaintiffs in this cause. Judge Cox failed to give 
that relief in circumstances where it is urgently needed, con­
cluded that no crisis exists, stated that further intensive 
examination and study is needed, and departed for a three week 
vacation.

A further indication that the court below*s order of June 11th 
effectively denies the relief requested by appellants in their 
motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
is found in the final paragraph. Here, Judge Cox refers to an 
ex parte temporary injunction obtained by appellants on June 6,
1963 from the Chancery Court of Hinds County, which injunction, 
without notice or opportunity to be heard, enjoined some of the 
appellants and other persons from a whole series of acts and 
practices designated by the injunction as illegal and unlawful. 
Appellants alleged that the ex parte injunction was one more 
illustration of appellees’ willingness to utilize all the powers 
of government to maintain racial segregation, but sought no 
specific relief with reference to this injunction. Judge Cox 
ruled however, that:

The injunction issued by the state court against 
the plaintiffs is not void, and should be respected 
by the parties and their attorneys until vacated 
or reversed, whether it be to the liking of such 
parties or not; and further inquiry will be made 
later by this Court on that question for a 
determination of the status of the parties in 
a federal court of equity before a decree is 
entered here.

Thus, the court below, on its own motion, engrossed the 
state court injunction into its order, "granting" an injunction 
in the terms of §1292(1), that the state court injunction was 
"not void" and was in fact sufficiently valid to require that it 
"be respected by the parties and their attorneys until vacated 
or reversed." To obtain compliance of its order, the court in­
dicated that unless the state court injunction were obeyed, "whether 
it be to the liking of such parties or not," the appellants' stand­
ing to obtain equitable relief in a federal court would be 
jeopardized.

-  8 -



Appellants submit that this action by the court below was, 
in the circumstances of this case, a clear abuse of his discretion 
of so important a nature as to fully warrant protection of appellant! 
rights pending a decision on this issue by this Court, U. S. v.

Lvnd. supra,

B. The Relief Urgently Sought By Appellants Is 
Well Within The Power Of This Court,

The injunctive relief sought by appellants pending appeal 
is necessary to protect their rights during the appeal of this 
case, and is necessary to preserve the effectiveness of any judg­
ment subsequently to be entered, for unless appellees are immediately 
enjoined from suppressing appellants’ efforts to end racial segre­
gation by peaceful debate and demonstration such peaceful programs 
will be stifled beyond resuscitation.

This court has the power to grant the injunction requested. 
This power is conferred by the following provisions of Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 1651:

(a) The Supreme Court and all courts established 
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or 
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions 
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.

(b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be 
issued by a justice or judge ofacourt which has 
jurisdiction.
And this power remains expressly unfettered by Rule 62(g), 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides as follows:
(g) POWER OF APPELLATE COURT NOT LIMITED. The 

provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an 
appellate court or of a judge or justice thereof to 
stay proceedings during the pendency of an appeal or 
to suspend, modify, restore, ot grant an injunction 
during the pendency of an appeal or to make any order 
appropriate to preserve the status quo or the 
effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be 
entered.
When this case is heard on appeal, appellants will contend 

that the policy of instantly arresting all persons seeking to 
peacefully protest against racial discrimination is violative of 
fundamental constitutional rights. This Court has recently acted

-  9 -



>to protect similar rights, CORE v. C. H. Douglas. ____F.2d
(5th Cir., May 15, 1963). However, unless an injunction pending 
appeal is granted, appellants will be denied such rights for a 
long, and during a critical period in their struggle for full 
citizenship in Mississippi. If, as they firmly believe, appellants1 
contentions are correct, they will have suffered an irreparable 
injury to their rights.

On the other hand, appellees can hardly contend that they 
will suffer injury if they are required to protect and not deprive 
appellants of their right to protest racial discrimination. The 
public peace may not be maintained by depriving Negroes of their 
constitutional rights. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); 
Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 (1958); CORE v, Douglas, supra;
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (8th Cir., 1947).

Clearly, the public interest is involved here due to the 
national interest in the elimination of state enforced racial 
segregation, Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 
the elimination of racial discrimination generally, Hurd v. Hodge, 
334 U.S. 24 (1948). Lengthy delay in desegregation progress is 
viewed with increasing disfavor by the Supreme Court, Watson v.
City of Memphis. ____U.S.____ (May 27, 1963).

Indeed, this Court has recently admonished lower courts to 
more speedily cut through delaying tactics utilized in civil rights 
litigation, see Nelson v. Grooms. 307 F.2d 76 (5th Cir., 1962), 
concurring opinion, and Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County. ____F.2d____ (5th Cir., May 24, 1963). In St ell v._
Savannah-Chatham Countv Board of Education. __ F.2d___ (5th Cir.,
May 24, 1963), this Court granted an injunction pending appeal from 
the denial of a preliminary injunction to initiate school desegre­
gation, citing as authority, 28 U.S.C.A., §165l(a). Citing the 
same section, the Chief Judge of this Court granted an injunction 
pending appeal in Woods v» Wright. ___F.2d___(May 22, 1963), re­
quiring the Birmingham Board of Education to reinstate 1,000 Negro 
students expelled from school for protesting racial discrimination.

The rationale of these decisions is entirely appropriate here, 
and the urgently sought relief by appellants pending appeal should 
be granted. 10 -



C. 28 U.S.C., Section 2283 Is No Bar To Appellants’ 
Requested Relief.

Appellees’ utilize not only legislative and executive powers, 
but judicial authority via state court prosecutions to deprive 
appellants of their constitutional right to protest against the 
state enforced policy of racial segregation. Therefore, appellants' 
motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal seeks to enjoin 
prosecution of appellants who have been arrested but not tried or 
convicted for participating in peaceful demonstrations against

racial segregation (paragraph (h)).
This relief, in the circumstances of this case, is necessary 

to prevent the irreparable harm which will be suffered by appellant 
as a result of exposure to prosecution in the State of Mississippi 
for defiance of the policy of enforced racial segregation, see 
United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (1961); Bailey v. Patterson,
199 F. Supp. 595, 612, 616 (S.D. Miss. 1961)(dissenting opinion)?

Such relief is not barred by reason of 28 U.S.C., Section 2283

which provides;
A court of the United States may not grant an 

injunction to stay proceedings in a State court 
except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, 
or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or 
to protect or effectuate its judgments.
Appellants submit that this case, which seeks relief under 

the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, constitutes an 
exception "expressly authorized by Act of Congress,..." Section 

1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory, subjects, or^causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

2/ The Supreme Court refused to enjoin prosecution of the "Freedom 
Riders" under Mississippi’s breach-of-peace statutes because 
the appellants did not allege that they had been prosecuted or 
threatened with prosecution, and therefore lacked standing to 
seek such relief. Bailey v. Patterson, 368 U.S. 34 ; 369 U.S. 
31 (1962). No such standing problems exist here. Each of the 
individual appellants have been arrested, prosecuted or face 
prosecution.

11



immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
This is the view of the Third Circuit which held in Cooper v.

Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1950), that an injunction could
issue against a state court murder prosecution unless the defendant

3/
were permitted counsel of his choice.

This Court appears in accord with the Third Circuit, for in 
Denton v. City of Carrollton. Ga., 235 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1956), the 
Court reversed a district court’s refusal to enjoin a municipality 
from bringing criminal proceedings against a union under an ordi­
nance requiring labor organizers to pay a license tax of $1,000 
plus $100 a day thereafter. The district court had based its

3/ The first exception to 28 U.S.C., §2283 permitting injunctions 
where "expressly authorized by act of Congress" is expressly 
applicable only to one statute, the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 
U.S.C., §1335, which Act specifically authorizes injunctions 
against state court proceedings. However, the wording of other 
federal statutes has been said by the courts to imply an excep­
tion to §2283. These cases are gathered in Toucey v. New York 
Life Insurance Co., 314 U.S. 118. The Civil Rights statute is 
an implied exception. Cooper v. Hutchinson, supra.
The second exception which permits federal court injunctions 
"where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" was originally 
intended to enact into law the theory of the "res" cases (ena­
bling federal courts to protect property which is the subject 
of a federal suit from seizure by the state). But the Section, 
according to Moore, Commentary on Judicial Code, p. 412, indicate 
that the exception provides '• sufficient flexibTlity that a 
federal court, as a court of equity, may mould its processes to 
deal adequately with the situation at hand."
The third exception permitting a federal court to enjoin state 
proceedings "to protect or effectuate its judgmentsis intended 
to permit the federal courts to prevent the relitigation in state 
courts of rights already adjudicated in an earlier federal court 
decision. Moore, supra, p. 410.
Appellants suggest that exceptions two and three are also appli­
cable to the case at bar in that the arts of appellees_complained 
of here deprive appellants of constitutional rights which this 
Court has clearly*hold they possess, because the exceptions are 
intended to insure that federal courts will be able to maintain 
control over matters in its jurisdiction. Section 2283 takes 
on its true prospective when, as suggested by Moore, supra, p. 
407, it is read in conjunction with the all writs statute, 22 
U.S.C., §1651.

12 -



refusal to grant relief on 28 U.S.C., Section 2283, and the doctrine 

of comity.
As in the instant case, a high degree of harm was threatened 

to appellant, and it is the measure of this prospective harm which 
appears as the controlling factor for entitlement to this form of 
relief. Thus, the Court in the Denton case, supra, found that the 
rule of Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, "envisages 
itself the necessity, under circumstances of genuine and irretriev­
able damage, for affording equitable relief even though the result 
is to forbid criminal prosecution or other legal proceedings." 235 
F.2d at 485. See also, American Optometric Ass’n. v. Ritholz, 101 
F.2d 883, 887 (7th Cir. 1939); Jamison v. Alliance Ins. Co. of 
Philadelphia, 87 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1937).

This Court has subsequently indicated that the doctrine of
comity, which is the basis for Section 2283, is not applicable in

4/ , ,
civil rights cases. In Morrison v. Davis, 252 F.2d 102, 103 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert, denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958), the Court said:

This is not such a case as requires the withholding 
of federal court action for reasons of comity, since for 
the protection of civil rights of the kind asserted 
Congress has created a separate and distinct federal 
cause of action. * * * Whatever may be the rule as
to other threatened prosecutions, the Supreme Court in 
a case presenting an identical factual issue affirmed 
the judgment of the trial court in the Browder esse 
[Browder v. Gayle, D.C.M.D.Ala., 142 F. Supp. 707, 
affirmed 1956, 352 U.S. 903, 77 S.Ct. 145, 1 L.ed. 2d 
114] in which the same contention was advanced. To 
the extent that this is inconsistent with Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, Pa., 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877,
87 L.ed. 1324 we must consider the earlier case modified.
This language was repeated in U.S. v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772,

784 (1961) where this Court at the request of the United States,
enjoined the prosecution of a Negro charged with breach of the
peace as a result of voter registration activities. The Court there.
finding that the prosecution would intimidate qualified Negroes
from attempting to register and vote, held that Section 2283 did
not bar injunction requests made by the government, and that under

4/ Section 2283 does not go to the jurisdiction of a federal court, 
but is an affirmation of the rules of comity, Smith v. Appfre, 
264 U.S. 274; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175.

13



the circumstances of the case, the comity rule of Douglas v. City 
of Jeannette, supra. was inapplicable.

Judge Rives of this Court, dissenting in Bailey v. Patterson.
199 F. Supp. 595, 616 (S.D. Miss, 1961), observed that enjoining
prosecutions similar to those involved here "is not so much an
exception as a practical application of the Jeannette requirement of
• adequacy.1" The alternative to this suit, as Judge Rives stated:

...is that a great number of individual Negroes 
would have to raise and protect constitutional 
rights through the myriad procedure of local 
police courts, county courts and state appellate 
courts, with little prospect of relief before 
they reach the United States Supreme Court.

Appellees, moreover, are hardly on firm ground in throwing 
up the shield of comity as a defense against the relief sought by 
appellants. They have shown little respect for the decisions of 
federal courts invalidating racial segregation in public facilities, 
and indeed have been enjoined by state statute, 17 Miss. Code Ann. 
§4065.3:

...to prohibit by any lawful, peaceful and 
constitutional means, the implementation of 
or the compliance with the Integration 
Decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court...

Appellees have assumed this obligation wholeheartedly, and without 
regard to either the constitutional rights of appellants and the 
class they represent, or the respect for the doctine of comity, 
which here they seek to invoke as a bar to relief made necessary 
by their illegal activity.

In such a situation, it is appropriate, proper, and 
necessary that the relief sought by appellants be granted.

14



II
APPELLEES, BY ENFORCING RACIAL SEGREGATION REQUIRED 
BY STATE LAW, HAVE ABRIDGED APPELLANTS’ CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROTECTED FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY AND HAVE,
THEREBY, CREATED AN EMERGENT SITUATION NECESSITATING 
INTERIM INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BY THIS COURT.

Appellants seek here this Court’s aid in vindication of their 
constitutional right to peacefully protest the refusal of appellees 
and other officials of the State of Mississippi to abandon their 
policy of racial segregation.

Each of the individual appellants have been arrested by 
appellees while attempting to peacefully exercise their right to 
protest, and some have been enjoined by a state court at the request 
of appellees from participating in protest demonstrations against 
racial segregation.

The corporate appellant asserts the rights of its members,
NAACP v. Alabama. 357 U.S. 458, to associate together and to
advocate, in concert, their right to equal treatment under the law,
their right to be free of segregation and racial discrimination and
their right to espouse their convictions through litigation and all
peaceful means. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516; Gremillion v.
NAACP. 366 U.S. 293; NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415; Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigative Committee. 342 U.S. 539.

It represents its members, supporters and like-minded people,
and seeks in this action to end racial intolerance and discrimination
rampant in the State of Mississippi, and obtain judicial relief from
the onerous sanctions of the State which restrict activity to secure

6/
rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.

5/ Appellant National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People is a non-profit membership corporation of the State of New 
York that functions through chartered unincorporated affiliates 
designated as branches. Its aims and purposes are to eliminate 
racial discrimination and segregation from the pattern of American 
life through peaceful and lawful means.
6/ The corporate appellant has, through litigation, vindicated the 
rights of Negroes to vote, Smith v. Allwright. 321 U.S. 649, 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 364 U.S. 339; to equal educational oppor­
tunities, Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, Sweatt v. 
Painter. 339 U.S. 629; to serve on grand and petit juries,
Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 40; and to unsegregated interstate 
travel, NAACP v. St. Louis & San Francisco Rv. Co.. 297 I.C.C. 335; 
and intrastate travel, Browder v. Gayle. 352 U.S. 903.

15 -



A. Consistent With State Policy, Appellees Have 
Violated Appellants' Constitutional Rights 
By The Enforcement Of Racial Segregation.

It is now settled that state action which enforces racial 
segregation offends the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment whether accomplished through the judiciary, Shelley v. 
Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1; the executive and administrative arm, Monroe v. 
Pape. 365 U.S. 167; Screws v. United States. 325 U.S. 91; or the 
legislature, Gayle v- Browder. 352 U.S. 903. Racial discrimination 
can bear no rational relationship to any permissable governmental 
functions, and its enforcement by governmental officials, therefore, 
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1, and the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. 
Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497. This constitutional proscription extends to 
the use of trespass and breach of the peace laws to maintain 
segregation and to the enforcement of ordinances to render con­
stitutionally protected peaceful protests "crimes."

But, despite the United States Constitution, decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, and decisions of this Court, the laws 
of Mississippi requiring and compelling racial segregation are 
affirmatively and aggressively maintained. The Mis sissippi policy 
of defiance is accurately reflected in § 4065.3 of the Mississippi 
Code of 1942, Ann., which directs the entire executive branch of 
government of the State of Mississippi, and all of its sub-divisions, 
and all persons responsible thereto in state and local government, 
to prohibit compliance with the "Integration Decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court" of May 17, 1954 (347 U.S. 483) and of 
May 31, 1955 (349 U.S. 294) to prohibit integration of Negroes and 
whites in all public places of amusement, recreation or assembly 
according to the Resolution of Interposition, Senate Concurrent 
Resolution No. 125, adopted by the Mississippi Legislature on 
February 29, 1956. This section further promises that the statute 
itself shall be a defense to any civil or criminal suit brought 
against state officers or agents by any person or by the Federal 
Government of the United States. The trespass statute employed to

16 -



effect arrests, §2409.7, Mississippi Code of 1942 Ann., is one of 
the "segregation laws: adopted in 1956 as a part of a program of 
resistance to the desegregation decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education. 347 U.S. 483, and as reaffirmation of racial segregation 
as part of the law, customs and policies of Mississippi.

Segregation is required by Mississippi Constitution, §225; 
and by the following sections of the Code of Mississippi: §7786 
(segregation of races on streetcars and buses); §§ 4259, 7913, 7965, 
7971 (segregation of races in prisons); §§ 6882, 6883 (separate 
mental wards); §2351.5 (separate rest rooms in railroad and bus 
station waiting rooms for interstate passengers); §2056(7) (punishes 
any conspiracy to violate the segregation laws of the state);
§3499 (unlawful for taxicabs to transport whites and Negroes 
together); §7787.5 (requires construction of separate waiting 
rooms by all common carriers for intrastate passengers); §2339 
(misdemeanor to publish or advocate the social equality of the 
races); §4065.3 (requires all state officers to utilize their 
office to maintain segregation of the races.)

Although couched in innocuous terms, application of the 
ordinances and statutes to appellants and to the members of the 
class they represent under the circumstances of this case, effectuate 
segregation. The arresting officers are public officials of the 
State of Mississippi purporting to act within the scope of their 
authority. Although the Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield 
against private discrimination, by making the arrests complained of 
by appellants, officials of the State have interposed themselves 
between private prejudice and actual suppression of constitutional 
rights, and have thereby, become the agent whereby racial segregation 
is enforced. Thus is the proscription of the equal protection 
clause offended.

In the course of his testimony, Mayor Thompson testified 
that the City of Jackson would "protect" the "right" of places of 
public accommodation to discriminate against Negro patrons [Tr. 67].

17



Adherence to historical patterns of segregation established 
by the state cannot be dismissed as private discrimination or 
obedience to custom unrelated to the State. Although segregation 
laws may no longer be enforced, as such, the policies they dictate 
are compelled by arrests, by the statements of intention to perpetua 
segregation by the Governor of Mississippi and by prosecution and 
convictions for breach of the peace, parading without a permit and 
similar apparently innocuous laws achieved through a cooperative 
judiciary. Absent these factors, proprietors of places of public 
accommodation have no material private interest in the maintenance 
of segregation. It is the power of the State which supports these 
customs, enunciates policy and in fine, fosters and enforces 
segregation of the races.

18

c r



B. Appellants’ Protest Activities Are Protected 
By Their Constitutional Right of Freedom Of 
Expression and Assembly

Appellants seek to protect from interference by appellee 
authorities, those activities delineated in paragraph 6 a,b,c, and 
d of the verified complaint which include peaceful picketing, 
requests for service at lunch counters and restaurants, orderly 
protest processions and public prayer services, all of which may 
be characterized as public protests against the customs, practices, 
and laws compelling racial segregation in Jackson, Mississippi,
All of these activities are embraced within constitutionally pro­
tected rights to freedom of speech, to freedom of assembly or to 
petition for redress of grievances.

Appellants espouse a lawful cause. Their picketing was 
peaceful, their requests for service, orderly, their protest 
procession without violence or interference with municipal func­
tions, and their public prayer, tranquil. Neither violence nor 
interruption of the public peace can be attributed to appellants. 

The fundamental rights guaranteed by the First Amendment 
include peaceful picketing, Thornhill v, Alabama. 310 U.S. 86, dis­
seminate m  of handbills, Martin v. Struthers. 319 U.S. 141, group 
rights to associate, NAACP v. A labama, supra. and to advocate 
dissident views Bates v. Little Rock, supra . solicitation of 
political allies, Herndon y, Lowry. 301 U.S. 242, freedom to 
proselytise, Cantwell v. Connecticut. 310 U.S. 296, unrestrained 
publication, Grosjean v. American Press Co.. 279 U.S. 233, and 
silent displays of personal convictions, Stromberq v, California.
283 U.S. 359.

The stateb power to limit freedom of expression must be 
exercised within the "clear and present danger of substantive evil" 
doctrine, Schenck v. U.S.. 249 U.S. 47, Protest against municipal 
and state racial segregation policies is not within the "substan­
tive evil" which the state may suppress. Cooper v, Aaron, 358 
u*s * 1; Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F„2d 877 (8th Cir. 1957). There

19 -



is absent, in the circumstances before this Court, any clear and 
present danger of riot or disturbance which would invite preventive 
action on the part of the City of Jackson. Compare, Edwards v. 
South Carolina. 372 U.S. 229 and Feiner v. New York. 340 U.S.
315.

Within the rational of these cases and of well-settled law, 
falls the right of appellants to peacefully picket places of 
public accommodation and to carry placards protesting the exclu­
sion of Negroes, People v. Kiernan. 26 N.Y.S. 2d 291 (1940);
People v. Barkel. 36 N.Y.S. 2d 1011 (1942); Milk Wagon Drivers 
v. Meadow Moor Dairies. 321 U.S. 287; Plumbers Union v„ Graham.
345 U.S. 192; Hughes v. Superior Court. 339 U.S. 460; Teamsters 
Union v. Vogt. 354 U.S. 284; Watchtower and Bible Tract Society 
v. Dougherty. 337 Pa. 286, 11 A. 2d 147; New Negro Alliance v. 
Sanitary Grocery Co.. 303 U.S. 552; the right to participate in 
orderly protest marches and to carry signs advocating the end of 
racial segregation, Edwards v„ South Carolina, supra; the right 
to enter places of public accomodation to request food service on 
a racially integrated basis and to remain on the premises follow­
ing a refusal of service to silently protest segregation; Peterson
v._City of Greenville, 31 U.S.L, Week 4475 (1963); Lombard v.
State of Louisiana. 31 U.S.L. Week 4476 (1963); and the right to 
participate in orderly public prayer services as a means of ex­
pressing their dissatisfaction with a segregated social order. 
Fowler v. Rhode Island. 345 U.S. 67; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
299, cf, Edwards v. South Carolina, supra.

The record reflects that on May 13, 1963, approximately 
three weeks prior to and in anticipation of the commencement of 
protests by appellants and the class they represent, appellees 
converted exhibit buildings on the county fairgrounds into addi­
tional prison facilities. Immediately upon their appearance on 
public streets to exercise their right to freedom of expression, 
appellees and their agents abruptly quelled the attempts of 
appellants and members of their class to communicate and publicize

20



their discontent with enforced segregation in Jackson and in 
Mississippi by arrest and incarceration. After instituting this 
program whereby the right of free speech was effectively abolished, 
appellees proudly denominated it as "instant arrest."

The "instant arrest" policy of the Jackson police belies 
any motivation other than to intimidate and extinguish attempts 
of Negro citizens to disagree openly with practices of segregation,, 
Although First Amendment rights may be balanced against legitimate 
interests of the State, these rights become absolute when weighed 
against the state’s attempts to maintain a segregated way of life. 
"A State may not unduly suppress free communication of views... 
under the guise of conserving desirable conditions." Cantwell y. 
Connecticut, supra. The arrests in the instant case cannot escape 
the condemnation meted out to legislation in Thornhill v..Alabama. 
supra; Schneider v» State f wsaim J1 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290. 
They constitute an invalid prior restraint upon the exercise of 
freedom of expression and assembly guaranteed by the constitution. 
Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697; Herndon v. Lowry, supra: DeJonge 
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353.

21



C. The Urgent Relief Sought By Appellants Is
Justified By The Circumstances Of This Case.

Events, since the desegregation decision of 1954, have shown 
that when the officials or executive officers of a state act in 
arrogant disregard of the law, there is evoked on the part of the 
populace, violently aggressive acts of hostility to any change in 
the social order to which they have become conditioned. Conversely, 
in those instances where the state has acted responsibly, in com­
pliance with the law, orderly changeovers have been effected and 

accepted by the public.
Appellees and other officials of the State of Mississippi 

have failed to follow or to initiate compliance with the desegre­
gation decisions of the courts, have actively dexied tnese decisions 
and have formulated and effectuated policies purposed to stifle 
even peaceful expressions of opposition to racial segregation. The 
Negro in Mississippi has endured racial segregation and discriminate r 
although those practices have been declared to be unconstitutional. 
Appellees, through arrests, harassment and intimidation, have sought 
to and have succeeded in suppressing even the right of the Negro to 
object to his political and social servitude.

Abdication of appellee authorities from enforcement of the 
law has created a climate of lawlessness which has already resulted 
in the murder of one of the plaintiffs and which will continue unless 
this Court acts to restrain and enjoin appellees abuse of criminal 

and civil process.
It is incumbent upon this Court to weigh preservation of 

appellants’ constitutionally protected rights in an emergent situ­
ation against the interest of the state in preserving and protecting 
an unlawful social order by violent, threatening and intimidating 
harassment which creates that emergency. The daily attrition of 
appellants’ fundamental rights is coerced by the use of state power 
to quench peaceful pretests against racial segregation. Whereas 
appellants will be amenable to state process following determination 
of an appeal on the merits, appellants' rig’nt to protest, stifled 
today, cannot be recovered tomorrow. Whereas the state sustains no 
injury through cessation of the arrests and prosecution* Inflicted

22 -



on appellants, the impairment of their rights and the burden cast 
upon them through use of the civil and criminal process of the state 
is irremediable. A temporary injunction is essential to the preser­
vation of clear, settled fundamental rights of appellants and to 
an end to the critical period of violence and suppression precipitated 
by state authorities.

Appellees have summoned all available means to maintain rigid 
racial segregation in the City of Jackson, the State of Mississippi. 
They have adopted laws which convert attempts of Negroes to eliminate 
segregation into crimes and have prosecuted those "criminal" 
activities. They have instituted and pursued a policy of "instant 
arrest" to suppress appellants’ constitutionally protected right 
to protest segregation. They have utilized the criminal machinery 
of the State to penalize advocation of equal rights for Negroes.
In short, they have perverted the orderly forces of law and order 
and converted them into weapons for the suppression of constitutional 
rights and the enforcement of an archaic and unlawful social order. 
They have abrogated the right to be free of racial segregation by 
the abridgement of the right to speak, to inform and to protest and 
have done severe violence and damage to the United States Constitution 
from which flows those inalienable rights guaranteed by the founders 
of this country to all peoples without regard to the color of their 
skin. They have, by oppression and tactics of terror, produced an 
atmosphere of suppression of human rights worthy of the dark ages.

Appellants seek no more than that which has been promised and 
guaranteed to them for the last hundred years. They seek, from this 
Court, the only available remedy which will vindicate and preserve 
their fundamental rights.

23 -



Conclusion
For the reasons advanced herein, it is respectfully submitted 

that, pending appeal of this cause, appellees be temporarily 
enjoined from abrogating appellants' constitutional rights in order 
to enforce racial segregation in Jackson, Mississippi.

Respectfully submitted,

Jack H, Young
Carsie A. Hail

115^ North Farish Street 
Jackson, Mississippi

Robert L. Carter
Barbara A. Morris

20 West 40th Street 
New York 18, New York

R. Jess Brown
125^ North Farish Street 
Jackson, Mississippi

Jack Greenberg
Leroy D. Clark
Derrick A. Bell

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, New York

Frank D. Reeves
508 Fifth Street, N. W. 
Washington 1, D. C.

William R. Ming, Jr.
123 West Madison Street 
Chicago, Illinois

Attorneys for Appellants

By:

Dated: June 24, 1963.

24