Copy of Plaintiff-Appellees' Petition for Rehearing and Chachkin Expenses
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May 21, 2001

48 pages
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North Carolina, Case Files, Cromartie Hardbacks. Copy of Plaintiff-Appellees' Petition for Rehearing and Chachkin Expenses, 2001. 9e4612dd-d90e-f011-9989-002248226c06. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c1f8774b-c89b-4419-8e7a-620a532c319b/copy-of-plaintiff-appellees-petition-for-rehearing-and-chachkin-expenses. Accessed September 09, 2025.
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*MAY 21 2801 1:84 PM FR TO 12122287592 v20 NAACP Lec/® DEFENSE & eOUCATIRAL FUND, INC 1444 | Street 10" Floor Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 682-1300 Fax: (202) 682-1312 FAX o: wo Company: Fax #: NC Men ChatlbEn 2s2 AYA - "OAL 2iLr22C~17% 2 Jaaai N Sp ; Sa From: Subject: Date: Time: Pages: Original: Will Will Not Follow this transmission Message: Confidentiality Note: The information transmitted in this facsimile message is intended to be confidential and for the use of only the individual or entity named above. If the recipient is a client, this message may also be for the purpose of rendering legal advice and thereby privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any retention, distribution or copy of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you receive this facsimile in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the address above via the mail service (we will reimburse postage). Thank you. vo A rein Cour 7 LF: EASLEY, etal E i v Pre - d Smallwood, et al: : wna ay SE - Appelat-lniarvenors, a Ta a 7 0 hs on he, Gaited: States District Court gr iA [3 0 “y w BINSON 0. EVERETT* DOUGLAS E. MARKHAM ETHANEYHARTS® © P.0.Box 130923. CRIT EVERETT Houston, TXII09 +» 000 35 20 FBO yy (713) 655-8700 ham; NC 27703. SE vats i SNE *Attorney of Record z EL TABLE OF CONTENTS i TABLE BECONIENTS 0, Sl, wk vo i TABLE OF AUTHORINES 5.00, ou nh ml ii + : PEHFION FORREREARING ..... io i a I : R : INTRODUCTION cic B soli Ar 0 i ] : Wek I. TIE COURT IGNORED PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE . | “II. THE COURT'S OPINION AND THE TBST IT AN NS WILL PRODUCE CONFUSION AND - UNINTENDED RESUL TS, RATHER THAN PROVIDE "GUIDANCE FOR R13 DISTRICTING TR SRR a A 6 " CONCLUSION 10 Shien SE LE RTT Tr aE iy P . B 8 3 - 0 8 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 7 5 3 8 2 , 7 0 0 TO 20 81 1: 85 PM FR M A Y 21 -if- : TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Bush v. Vera, 5170.8. 952 (1996) (O'Connor, J., a oo SONNE deg ll Ol 8 Easley v. Cromartie, im U8. S1IFB.0L 1452 5 Se eae ed 1,2,6,7,9 Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist, 319 US. 415 (1943) . 6 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) wid eA 4,6 Shanwv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (996)... is i 8,9 : Shawv. Reno, 509 U.S, O00 eh 4,10 | STATUTES AND RULES | Fed. R Civ, P. SA a a 1,6 PAC RE SS a l Eta Roce ERRRT MLE ee 3 bie en ETE Bi de al Bt 3 NEO MEIN ae 0 a A 3 5 - mm m a N d gr e disco predc Plan’ annot somc racial theret major past ol I. TH persia. finding clear th the pla - em t an ge l PETITION FOR REH EARING Pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, plain fF-appellees hereby respectfully petition the Court for a rehearing as to its decision on the merits in the above captioned cases. In support of their petition, they show the Court: INTRODUCTION The opinion of the Court involves the factual review of the findings made by the District Court on remand, The standard purportedly applied is that prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides that findings be set aside only if “clear error” js found and requires the reviewing court {o give weight (o the circumstances that the lower court heard the evidence and determined (he credibility of the witnesses. However, in its “extensive review” of the District Court’s findings for clear error, Easley v, Cromanrije, t= ALS. —» 121 S.Ct. 1452, 1459 (2001), the Court overlooked and discounted the significance of important evidence of the predominant racial intent behind the formation of the 1997 Plan's Twelfth District, Furthenmore, the Court created confusion by announcing a new test which is unclear and seems to undercut some of the Court's well-established precedents concerning racial gerrymandering, even while claiming to be faithfy] thereto. [ndecd, under the most plausible reading of the majority opinion, no North Carolina congressional district - past or present - could be successfully challenged. I. THE COURT IGNORED PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE In applying Rule 52(a), the key issue is whether persuasive evidence is present in the record to sustain the findings of the court below. The opinion of the Court makes clear that the extensive “voter registration” evidence offered by the plaintiff-appellees and the expert testimony based thereon P. 04 -, 08 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 8 7 5 8 2 4 7 0 0 TO 2 8 0 1 1 1 0 8 “P M FR ‘ M A Y 21 2 WC Nol persuasive in its view. Indeed, the opinion criticizes the District Court for relying on evidence which “focuses upon pany registration, not upou voting behavior,” and notes that “registration figures do not accurately predict performance at registration data includes race, then the information that a regitered voler js an African-American does “accurately primary. Thus, voter registration dala enables legislators to form predictable districts hat will provide a desired racial their contention that the racial gemymandering of the Twelfh District was especially evident in relation to the Demacratic party primaries in North Carolina. It was also called to the Appellees’ Brief at 26-7. Nonetheless, the Court's opinion does not mention party primasies - which are state action subject to equal protection. According to plaintiff~appeltees® fucnal contention 3(c) in the Final Pre-Trial Onder, “[t}he challenged dismicts are overly safe for Democratic candidates, but are instead constructed so that blacks predompale in the Democratic primary electorale, ond so that nomination and elelion of African-Americans to Congress is assured.” This contention was repeated by Dr. Weber at trial, ser, eg, Jt. App. at 754 apd thus wai adopled by the District Court in its references to Dr. Weber's entire tedimony. Appellants’ J.S.App. af 26a. may A V( N.C man how parti are perc the b reaso purst nomi Acco; distri that n as a | comfc other mentic {0 cons minori gerrym solidly Senato Comm candidal if an Af aggregate less thar independ Zes yon hat > at A voter of that party or, in some instances, as an independent, N.C.G.S. § 163-59. Thus, voter registration data reveals how If the incumbent, Representative Watt, had for some reason decided not to run for reelection, the district, as created pursuant to the registration data, would nonetheless have nominated and elected an African American to Congress, According lo Rep. McMahan spcaking on the House floor, the district “la]bsolutely without any question” was designed so as a minority 10 run in that District should feel very, very comfortable . . . that they could win.” Jt. App. at 470. In its opinion, the Court also ignored or brushed aside other persuasive evidence. For example, the Court did not even mention the finding of the District Court that “a motive existed (0 compose a new Twelfth District with just under maj ority- minority in order for jt not 10 present a prima facie racial gerrymander.” Appellants’ J.S. App. at 28. This finding is solidly based on a number of statements in the record by Senator Roy Cooper, the chair of the Senate Redistricting Committee, and other legislators. See Appellees’ Briefat 35- North Carolina also provides for second primaries if the leading candidate receives less than 40% of Ihe vote. N.C.G.S. § 163-111. Thus, if an African-American is to be nominated it also js important that the aggregate number of white Democrats and independents in this district be less than 40% of ihe total number of registered Democrats and independents. : P e I A A T I A m a m a N i a r e r r R v P H a T T P . B 8 5 - 0 8 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 7 3 5 3 9 2 , 7 0 0 TO 2 0 0 1 1 : 8 6 P M F R ‘ M A Y 21 4 40. The goal of keeping the population of A frican-Americans just below 50% in the Twelfth Disirict in order to avoid the limitations imposed by Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was clearly race based. As the District Court noled, “using a Computer to achieve a district that is just under 50% minority is mo less a predominant use of race than using it to achieve a district that is just over S0% minority.” Appellants’ J.S. App. al 28a.’ Although the Court acknowledged that the E-majl from Getty Cohen to Senator Cooper about moving “the Greensboro black community” had some weight as evidence, ! it failed (o comment on the fact that by the move 1eferred to in the message “a significant number” of black voters had been placed within the Twelfth District. Adifle) v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). Nor did the Coust acknowledge that in the }997 plan 90.2% of the African-American population of its Twelfth District had also resided in the unconstitutional race-based Twelkh Distric( of the [992 plan, but only 48.8% of the white population had done so. Jt. App. at 78. This statistic suggests thal a"“significant number” of persons -in this instance white - had been moved because of their race, and correspondingly a “significant number” of African-Americans had been retained because of their race, Cf. Miller, Supra. Moreover, these figures suggest that references in the legislative record to Al the same time, as evidenced by the E-tnai) fiom Gerry Cohen to Senior Caoper, the General Assembly was sceking to assure that the First District would be just over 50% African-American; and the District Court pioperly found that race was the Genera) Assembly's predominant molive in forming that district. Appellants’ J.S App. at 31a. ‘That weight would have been even more apparent had the majoritynofed that Cohen, who authored the E-mail, was the draftsman of the 1921, 1992, 1997, and 1998 congressional redistricting plans for North Carolin: and that Senator Cooper, the addresses, was chair of the Senate Redistriding Commitice. Nt. App. a1 372, 588.89. ref: Dis 77¢ con 199 of } disn plan then 199¢ Asse judg insle cont; coun 1998 prede Amer plan. drawi legis) Sechio not ing from before Twelft the bau, three lar JS. App Rowan ( 0a. 5 refaining the “core” of the unconstitutional 1992 Twelfth District mean retaining the “iacial core » See also It. App. at 779 (Senator Winner describing how the varions black communities of cities were considered to be the core of the 1992 Twelfih District). The Court also ignored the testimony of legislators that the Twelfih District was race-based, and disregarded the history that led to the replacement of the 1992 judgment against use of the 1997 plan. In that alternative plan, inslead of severing all six of its counties, the Twelfth District contained all of Rowan County and divided only four other counties. As is obvious from the maps filed with the Court, the 1998 plan is far more geographically compact than its 1997 predecessor. Jt. App. at 501-2. [rs percentage of African- Americans is only around 36% - instead of 47% as in the 1997 plan. Moreover, the goals stated by the General Assembly in drawing this plan were the Same as those set forth by the same legislators in drawing the 1997 Plan. See Ex. [46 (1998 Section § Submission). Additionally, the 1998 plan, which did not include Greensboro in the Twelfth District, is not dissimilar from some models that the General Assembly had considereq before moving the “Greensboro black community” into the Twelfth District jn February 1997, See Ex. 126-129, The 1998 plan and others bad been relied on by Dr. *These legislators - Horton, Waod, snd Weatherly - testified that the boundaries of (he Twelfth District were race-based in (he Districl’s P . B 6 - 0 8 8 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 7 5 3 9 2 , 78 08 TO 2 B e 1 1 : 8 6 PM FR M A Y 21 6 Weber, the expert for plaintiff-appeltees, in testifying that if the Twelfih District had not been predominantly race-based, the General Assembly would have considere] favorably such an altemative plan. The Court, however, brushes aside Dr. Weber's well-founded expert testimony and disregards the 1998 plan because the “District Court did not rely upon the existence of the 1998 plan (0 Support its ultimate conclusion. * Lasley, —USat 1218.01 a 1462 (citing Kelley v, Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 4 15, 420, 422 (1 943)). However, this comment - used to justify ignoring imporiant evidence - manifests a unique interpretation of “rely” and of Kelley, because the district court did “rely” on the testimony of Dr. merely to apply ex isting precedents. II. THE COURT'S OPINION AND THE TEST IT ANNOUNCES WILL PRODUCE CONFUSION AND The Court's failure to give weight to the persuasive evidenre offered by plaintiff-appellees and js setting aside of 3 the fin 52(a), would annour guidan prove ¢ district going Howeve cormrelat the legi the Jegi objectiv with trac 121 S.C show th: about sig 1 is direct direct ev meaning Cooper i and in tha the Repre term may racial balz M objectives objectives or at the t plan? Is it person ele incumbent racial gerry 7 the findings of the court below create confusion because Rule 52(a), when viewed in the light of the Court’s precedents, would seem to dictate a different result. Moreover, the Court announces a tes! which is inconsistent with and destroys the guidance provided by its earlier precedents. In Miller v. Johnson, he Court allowed plaintiffs 10 prove their case “either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose.” 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). However, now the Court states that “where racial identification correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the Jeast that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in altemative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional districting principles.” Easley, US. al es 121 S.Ct. at 1466 (2001). Additionally, the plaintiffs must show that “those districting allematives would have brought about significantly greater racial balance.” Jd This lest raises many questions, Does if apply if there is direct evidence of motive or if the plaintiffs rely on both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence? What is the meaning of “racial balance?” That term was used by Senator Cooper in addressing the North Carolina General Assembly; and in that context it apparently meant “racial balance” among the Representatives in Congress. [n the Court's opinion, the erm may have a quite different intent. Moreover, what greater racial balance would be “significant” is also no specified, More fundamentally, wha are “legitimate political objectives” in this context, and who defines them? Can those objectives be defined post hoc or must they be set forth before or at the time the General Assembly enacts the redistricting plan? Is it a “legitimate political objective” (0 assure that the person elected will be of a particular racial origin or is an incumbent of a district previously held unconstitutional as ga racial gerrymander? For many activities “diversity” is cited as L1 17 WI J3 dS 90 ON £9 £9 91 46 76 : Xe 10 . 1Z he y Zr : T 1 90 d —— 3 1 10 D 0 (1 07 § WF 10, Fr en T v — y Qa ca na l, E N E Y I A A T ( / T r N W 1a" ) | mm m my w e e n ve . ea TZ A o l TM ZiT 7) if Be d P . 2 7 / @ 8 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 7 5 9 2 , 7 8 0 TO 1: 87 PM FR 2 8 0 1 M A Y 21 10 CONCLUSION In determining whether there was factual error in the district court's findings, the Court eroneously disregarded persussive evidence firmly supporting those findings, Moreover, the Court’s opinion js al odds with its prior gerrymander, including those districts previously found unconstitutional. North Carolina redistricting has been the Respectfully submitied, ll 0. Be Robinson O. Evere(t, Attome y of Record om — — — — — 11 CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH ARGUMENT: L a t Le an g Pursuant 10 Rule 44(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, the undersigned counsel of record hereby certifies that the above submitted Petition for Rehearing is presented to the Court in good faith and not for delay or any improper purpose. | P o y m y m m m A A a This the 10" day of May, 2001. lity Coin Robinson O. Everett Appellees’ Attormey of Record Everett & Everett P.O. Box 586 Durham, NC 27702 (919) 682-5691 M r V C wv > = O A N O Y A Y 17 /7 T r o N E C R St a 0 ar p o o 1 a TT ? F t T T C T T r y a Q ~ a (\N} Q- 1 2 1 2 2 2 6 8 7 5 9 2 , 7 0 0 TO 2 0 0 1 1 : 8 7 P M ' F R M A Y 21 < ina. Finally, if the North Carolina without regard 10 race - it was pleased with the resus reached under {he tic district necessarily entails having as many African-Americans as possible in that + USC of race is the most certain means for achitving the “political objective” of the “safe” Democratic district, as well as (he “political objective” distrit represented by an African-American. The reference in Bushv. Vera io the use of race as a “proxy’ Seem to preclude (his approach. 517 ys. 952, 968 (1996)(0’ Connor, J., plurality Opinion). On the other hand, the opinion of the Court now seems objeclives” as legitimate, U.S. 859, 907 (1996). Now, however, assuming the {est would apply 0 all cases where E¢rymandering is aflacked, if defendmts in Shay had claimed that they adopted the 199> Twelfth District in order to maximize the Democrat strength in that aves of North Carolina, that district could not successfully Africa) distric! district candid withou District Democ candida Accor racial « praclain 9 be challenged, despite the direct evidence of the Justice Department's involvement and the District Court’s finding of a specific racial target. fd at 90S. Because of the high correlation between race and party data, the Shaw plaintiffs could not have come up with any hypothetical alternative district which “would have better satisfied the legislature's other noaracial political goals as well as traditional nonracial districting principles.” Easley, U.S. at S121 8.Ciat 1462, and their challenge to that district would have failed.® As a result, no district dravm anywhere in North Carolina, past, present, or future, including the 1992 North Carolina Congressional Twelfth Distdct, could be successfully challenged under the Conrt’s new test as the Court applies il. Plaintiff-appellees see no reason for the Court to reject the arguments of the state defendants in Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), only to adopt them wholesale in this case when their consistent application would have rendered the 1992 Twelfth District imme from challenge. See Appellants’ Brief at 38-40. Also in the other southern states which have, similar SThus, ifthe defendants stated as a defense that they were adopling the nonracial traditional redistricting goal of having a “super safe” district with voting performance ofl over 70% for the Democratic candidate in the 1990 Senate Race, no other district besides one very similar to the 1992 Congressional District would be able to pesform (his task in the Piedmont area of North Carolina - which coincedenlally would be sure to elect an African-American. However, iCthe purported political goal is a “very safe” district that is confined to the six counties in which the 1997 Twelfth district is located and has a voling performance of 65% (or the Democratic candidale in the 1990 Senate Race, il is not possible to accomplish this without a district soniewhal similar in shape to the 1997 Plan’s Twelfth District. Bui, if the purported political goal is just to have a safe Democratic district with a voling performance of 60% for the Democratic candidalc in the 1990 Senate race, the 1998 Plan would accomplish the task. Accordingly, the state defendants would be able to justify their desired racial concentration, 55%, 47%, or 36%, respectively, merely by praclaiming aller the fact the political resull they wanted for the district.” C A N A A T I F T ~~ ll T O T A L P R G E . B B Xx | T e m m y = a, am y Ao l T Z Z I : 17 TN A N A 2881 1:44 PM FR TO 12122132852, 788 P.all, Ai NAACP eca®erense & epucaTio®L FUND, INC 1444 | Street 10" Floor Washington, DC 20005 Tel: (202) 682-1300 Fax: (202) 682-1312 0: Sees Company: Fax #: NC (Men Chaotic 2r2 RLY Re IL Cedinvas Aeon 2 LiL <129 2 —— hy p * ‘ v Jana [ ; From: Subject: Date: Time: Pages: Original: will Will Not Follow this transmission Message: Confidentiality Note: The information transmitted in this facsimile message is intended to be confidential and for the use of only the individual or entity named above. If the recipient is a client. this message may also be far the purpose of rendering legal advice and thereby privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any retention, distribution or copy of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you receive this facsimile in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return the original message to us at the address above via the mail service (we will reimburse postage). Thank you. MARTIN CROMARTIE, et ol, 13 CER 1 TRAY Wn ny 08 Aine APPELLEES PETITION FOR 3 : REHEARING DOUGLAS E. MARKHAM H £ °° . P.0.Box 130923. Sg EVERETT Houston; TX 77219 20; Box.586 (713) 655-8700 ? uch; ne 27702 ida £2 C1976: *Attorney of Record ga l N e is R A T y i eT L# F y pe l Se . e — TABLE OF CONTENTS : VYABLEOPCONIENTS ,.».. 0 8p, of i 8 i i: be WTR ARE medi al a i : PETITION POR RESEARING:. ov ais os oy INTRODUCTION: Sat. if a oA, I. TIIE COURT IGNORED PERSUASIVE CVIDENCE .1 II. THE COURT'S OPINION AND THE TEST IT © ANNOUNCES WILL, PRODUCE CONFUSION AND UNINTENDED RESULTS, RATHER TIAN PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR REDISTRICTING oo oa 6 ~ CONCLUSION siti ES Rl SEA SIE RE REC TO Ok TR a rea ha 0, GRE NS AE TE SH RRS RD OE a “I nd 0 hy Yi li , | 0 de vo BR F E ou OY O O I O T J E T T E D : T7 A O I iis TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Bush v. Vera, S17 U.S. 957 (1996) (0’ Connor, J, plurlity opinion) AEE Son ET 8 Lasky v. Cromartie, U.S. , 121 S.Ct. 1452 (200) oes Aes a a ae 1,2,6,7,9 Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist, 319 U.S. 415 (1943) . 6 Miller v. Johnson, S15 U.S. 900 (1995) 5. co Tur aes 4, 6 Shawv. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (O96)... ued ii 8,9 Shavsv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (OO). in aR 4,10 STATUTES AND RULES Ped DC Pisa 0 oe eR 1,6 Sup CGR 44 or Ll aa ok 8h 1 NC.OS S163-90 0 a 3 NCO. 8163-8040.) an 3 NOG SIehIll Le nh el Ph 3 — — — of peti in th show the f stand of Ci aside court heard wine Court disco predo Plan's annou some racial theretc major] past or I. TH persua: finding clear th the pla — — — — — BAR PETITION FOR REHEARING Pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United Stafes, plaintiff-appellees hereby respectfully petition the Court for a rehearing as to its decision on tle merits in the above captioned cases. In support of their petition, they show the Court: INTRODUCTION The opinion of the Court involves the factual review of the findings made by the District Court on remand. The standard purportedly applied is that prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides that findings be set aside only if “clear error” is found and requires the reviewing court fo give weight to the circumstances that the lower court heard the evidence and determined (he credibility of the witnesses. However, in its “extensive review” of the District Court's findings for clear error, Easley v. Cromartie, U.S. os 1218.Ct 1452. 3459 (2001), the Court overlooked and discounted the significance of important evidence of the predominant racial intent behind the formation of the (997 Plan’s Twelfth District. Furthennore, the Cour created confusion by announcing a new test which is unclear and seems to undercut some of the Court’s well-established precedents concerning racial gerrymandering, even while claiming (0 be faithful thereto. Indecd, under the most plausible reading of the majority opinion, no North Carolina congressional district - past or present - could be successfully challenged. I. THE COURT IGNORED PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE In applying Rule 52(a), the key issue is whether persuasive evidence is present in the record lo sustain the findings of the court below. The opinion of the Court makes clear that the extensive "voter registration” evidence offered by the plaintiff-appellces and the expert testimony based thereon “h d P g Wh t 9 b y f i e EV i aT Tag C Q I a n T IE TE YO J C h a n d i a o 2 20 Co Fi e, T T > t y T C TH -T T FR 1 d 4 PM 1 Wei lot persuasive in ils view. [ndeed, the opinion criticizes the District Court for relying on evidence which “focuses upon pary registration, not upou voting behavior,” and notes that “registration figures do not accurately predict performance at thepolls.” Easley, U.S. at __» 1452 5.ClL. at 1460. This stalement, however, is at adds with the Court's ensuing reference to (he undisputed testimony thal in North Carolina African-Americans “register and vote Democratic between 95% and 97% of the time.” Jd If, as im Norh Carolina, voter registration data includes race, then the information that a registered voler is an African-American does “accurately predict” that he or she will vote Democratic. Also, in light of the cohesiveness of blacks in voting for black candidates, J. App. at S89, the registration information as to race does “accurately predict” that a black Democratic voter will vote for a bleck candidate against a white candidate in a Democratic primmry. Thus, voter registration data enables legislators to form predictable districts that will provide a desired racial oulcome in Democratic party primaries. From the outsei of the trial, plaitifi-appellecs presented their contention that the racial gemymandenng of the Twelfth District was especially evident in relation fo the Democratic party primaries in North Cacolina.! 1 was also called to the Court's attention on appeal. Appellees’ Brief at 26-7. Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion does nof mention party primaies - which are state action subject to equal protection. According to plaintiff-appelices* factual contention 3(c) in the Final Pie-Trial Order, “Ihe challenged diswicls are overly safe for Denmooslic candidates, but are instead copsfiucted so that blacks predomnate in the Democratic primary eleclorsie, and so that nomination and elation of African-Americans to Congress is assured.” This contention was repeated by Dr. Weber at trial, ser, eg. Jt App. at 754 and thus waj adopted by the District Court jn its references fo Dr. Weber's enlire tedimony. Appellants’ J.S.App. al 26a. may a vo N.C. man) how partic are « perce the bl reaso) pursu Nomi Accor distric that ne as ar confo other mentic to com minori germym solidly Senato Comm candidal if an Af aggregat less tha independ Under North Carolina's closed primary system, a voter indy vote in a party primary only if he or she has registered as a voter of that party or, in some instances, as an independent. N.C.G.S. § 163-509, Thus, voter registration data reveals how Adny persons may vote in the primary of each major party and how muny of those eligible to vote in a party primary are of a particular race. N.C.G.S. § 163-82.4. Since African-Americans are cohesive in voting for a candidate of their race, the percenlage of registered voters who are black Democrats give the black Democratic candidate a solid bloc of suppon.? lf the incumbent, Representative Watt, had for some reason decided not to run for reelection, the district, as created pursuant to the registration dala, ould nonetheless have nominated and elected an African Arerican to Congress. According lo Rep. McMahan speaking on the House floor, the district “[a]bsolutely without any question” was designed so that not only Mel Wait but also “anyone elsc that might choose as a minority to run in that District should feel very, very comfortable . . . that they could win.” Jt. App. at 470. In its opinion, the Court also ignored or brushed aside other persuasive evidence. For example, the Court did not even mention the finding of the District Court that “a motive existed to compose a new Twelfth District with just under a majority- minority in order for it not to present a prima facie racial germymander.” Appellants’ J.S. App. at 28e. This finding is solidly based on a number of statements in the record by Senator Roy Cooper, the chair of (he Senate Redistricting Committee, and other legislators. See Appellees’ Briefat 35- "North Carolina also provides for second primaries if the leading candidsle receives less than 40% of the vole. N.C.G.S. § 163-111. Thus, if an African-American is to be nominated it also is important that the aggregate number of white Democrats and independents in this district be less than 40% of the total number of registered Democrats and independents. “I N IT TH TY 3A S OH CO QU T AF TA : XE 4 m C o — m — Fp :T T T n . 17 AE N A 2 8 5 2 , 78 08 a 1 2 1 2 2 ] YO FR 1 4 4 PH M 1 407 The goul'of keeping the population of A frican-Americans Just below 50% in the Twelfih Disirict in order to avoid the limitations imposed by Shaw v. Reno,509 U.S. 630 (1993), was clexly race based. As the District Court noted, “using a computer lo achieve a district that is just under 50% minority is no less a predominant use of race than using it to achieve a district that is just over S0% minority.” Appellants’ J.S. App. al 28a.’ Although the Court acknowledged that the E-mail from Gerry Cohen to Senator Cooper about moving “the Greensboro black community” had some weight as evidence,’ it failed 10 comment on the fact that by the move referred to in the message “a significant number” of black voters had been placed within the Twelfth District. Miller v Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). Nor did the Court acknowledge that in the 1997 plan 90.2% of the African-American population of its Twelfth District had also resided in the unconstitutional race-based Twellth District of the 1992 plan, bu( only 48.8% of the white popuhtion had done so. Jt. App. at 78. This statistic suggests thal a“significant number” of persons - in this instance white - had been moved because of their race, and correspondingly a “significant number” of African-Americans had been retained because of their race. Cf, Miller, supra. Moreover, these figures suggest that references in fle legislative record to Al Ihe same time, as evidenced by the E-mail from Gerry Cohen to Sensor Cooper, the General Assembly was seeking 10 assure that the First District would be just over 50% African-American; and the District Court pioperly found that race was the General Assembly's predominant motive n forming that district. Appellants’ ).S App. al Jia. ‘That weight would have been even more apparent had the nmizjoritynoted thai Cohen, who authored the E-mail, was the drafisman of the 1991, 1992, 1997, and 1998 congressional redistricting plans for North Caroliniand that Senator Cooper, the addressee, was chair of the Senate Redistriding Commitice. Ji. App. a1 372, 588.59. rela Dist 779 com 199: of k disc plan then 1998 Asse judg inste conig coun 1998 prede Amer plan. drawi legis Sectio not jn from before Twelf the bay three tai 1S. Apg Rowan | On. ns ~ F e i a n B d E “retaining the “core” of the unconstitntional 1992 Twelfth District meant retaining the “racial core.” See also N. App. at 779 (Senator Winner describing how the various black communities of cities were considered to be the core of the 1992 Twelfih District). The Court also ignored the testimony of legislators that the Twelfth District was race-based ,®* and disregarded the history that led to the replacement of the 1992 plan’s Twelfth District by the 1997 plan’s Twelfih District and then by the 1998 plan's Twelfth District. Finally, the Court dismisses the probative force of the 1998 redistricting plan enacted by the North Carolina Genera] Assembly after the District Court had granted summary Judgment against use of the 1997 plan. In that altemotive plan, instead of severing all six of its counties, the Twelfth District contained all of Rowan County and divide only four other counties. As is obvious from the maps filed with the Court, the 1998 plan is far more geographically compact than its 1997 predecessor. Jt. App. at 501-2. Us percentage of African- Amencans is only ground 36% - instead of 47% as in the 1997 plan. Moreover, the goals stated by the General Assembly in drawing this plan were the same as those set forth by the same legislators in drawing the 1997 plan. See Ex. 146 (1998 Section 5 Submission). Additionally, the 1998 plan, which did not include Greensboro in the Twelfth District, is not dissimilar from some models that the General Assembly had considered before moving the “Greensboro black community” into the Twelfth District in February 1997, See Ex. 126-129, The 1998 plan and others had been relied on by Dr. “These legislators - Horton, Wood, snd Weatherly - testified that the boundaries of the Twelfth District were race-based in the District's three largest counties - Forsyth, Guilford, and Mecklenburg, Appeliants’ J.S. App. at 53-68. Another witness, R. O. Everetl, described in detail how Rowan County was divided along racial - rather than political lines. Id a1 Oa. a br id I T T " W T A O N A m e P a r A Lh Lal A , we a A O r e s e t e . 7 A o l V O | Web Dwetfih District had not been predominantly race-based, the General Assembly would have considered favorably such an altemative plan. The Court, however, brushes aside Dr. Weber's well-founded expert testimony and disregards the | 998 plan because the “District Court did not rely upon the existence of the 1998 plan (0 support its ultimate conclusion.® Easley, US. 80 12) 8.01. a1 1463 (citing Kelley v, Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 4] 3, 420, 422 (1943). However, this comment - used to justify ignoring imporiant evidence - manifesis a unique interpretation of “rely” and of Kelley, because the district court did “rely” on the testimony of Dr. Weber, who, in tan, “relied” on - and cited - the alternative, less race-based [998 plan. See, e.g, Ji. App. at 108, 157. More significantly, the Coun rejected the 1998 plan, even though that plan satisfies in many respects the fest set forthin the last paragraph of the Court’s opinion. Jt fulfilled the purported political objectives onginally announced by the General Assembly of reelecting a Democrat (sometimes stated as reelecting the incumbent); it conformed more to traditional districting principles than did its 1997 predecessor: and - at least in one sensc - it achieved “significantly greater racial balance.” By disregarding the 1998 plan, as well as in many otheraspects of its opinion, the Court made clear that it had usurpxd the task of the factfinders in determining weight of evideoce and credibility of wimesses; and by so doing it violated Rule 52(a) and created new law while purporting merely to apply existing precedents. II. THE COURT’S OPINION AND THE TEST IT ANNOUNCES WILL PRODUCE CONFUSION AND UNINTENDED RESULTS, RATHER THAN PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR REDISTRICTING, The Court's failure to give weight 10 the persuasive evidence offered by plaintiff-appellecs and iis setting aside of B e T S 1 — t h abou is di direc nean Coop and ir the R erm r racial object object or at t plan? persor incum racial B a T V 1 a — _ t t a pie Sodings ofthe court below create ‘confusion because Rul 52(a), when viewed in the light of the Court's precedents, would seem to dictate a different result. Moreover, the Court announces a lest which is inconsistent with and destroys the guidance provided by its earlier precedents. In Miller v. Johnson, the Cow allowed plaintiffs to prove their case “either through circumstantial evidence of a district's shape and demographics or more direct evidence going (o legislative purpose.” 515 U.S. 900, 9i6 (1995), However, now the Court states that “where racial identification correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the Jeast (hat the legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in altemative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional districting ponciples.” Easley, US.at | 121 S.Ct. at 1466 (2001). Additionally, the plaintiffs must show that “those districting alternatives would have brought about significantly greater racial balance.” Jd. This fest raises many questions. Does it apply if there is direct evidence of motive or if the plaintiffs rely on both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence? What is the meaning of “racial balance?” That term was used by Senator Cooper in addressing the Norlh Carolina General Assembly; and in that context it apparently meant “racial balance” among the Representatives in Congress. In the Court's opinion, the lerm may bave a quite different intent. Moreover, what greater racial balance would be “significant” is also not specified. More fundamentally, what are “legitimate political objectives” in this contex!, and who defines them? Can those objectives be defined post hoc or must they be set forth before or at the time the General Assembly enacts the redistricting plan? ls il a “legitimate political objective” to assure that the person elected will be of a particular racial origin or is an incumbent of a district previously held unconstitutional as g racial gerrymander? For many activities “diversity” is cited as IT T H T R A S OH 7 $ 9 4 Q T F T Fl . x e 4 17 h e Yl . 1 2 1 2 2 1 3 2 0 5 2 , 72 80 8 +o erate districts thar: whe because of their racial composition, are almost certain to elect a prescribed number of African- Americans from North Carolina. Finally, if the North Carolina legislature had announced in 1997 that - without regard {o race - it was pleased with the results reached under the Unconstitutional 1992 Twelfth District and reenacted the 199 Plan verbatim so that the same Represcntatives would be elected, would that be 5 “legitimate political objective?” Plaintiff-appellecs are unaware of any other group in North Carolina that votes as cohesively gs Afncan-Americans. Thus, creating the “safest” Democratic district necessarily entails having as many African-Amercans ss possible in that distiict. In short, use of race Is lhe most certain means for achitving the “political objective” of the “safe” Democratic district, as well as the “political objective” of a Democratic district represented by an African-American, The reference in Bushy. Fera to the use of race as a “proxy” for politics would seem (0 preclude this approach. 517 U.S. 952, 968 (1996)(0’ Connor, 1., plurality opinion). On the other hand, the opinion of the Court now SEEMS lo real these “political objeciives” as legitimate. Thus, blacks are used 10 create certan types of districts in a way that no other group can be. The manner in which (he Court’s opinion deals with the 95% 10 97% affiliation of African- Americans in North Carolina with the Democratic Party is fundamentally different than its approsch in Shaw v. Hunt, where it rejected similar claims of politicd objectives for the formation of the 1992 Plan's Tweldh District on the basis of direct evidence of racial intent. 517 U.S. 89, 907 (1996). Now, however, asswming the (est would apply to all cases where gerrymandering is attacked, if defendmts in Shenae had claimed that they adopted the 1992 TwelfthDistrict in order to maxnnize the Democrat Strength in that ares of North Carolina, (hat district could not successfully 0 aves unclear * ly” the legislature is free to GF the n with 1990 Cong arca Afric distri distri candi witho Distr Denic candi Acce racial procly the direct” evidence of the Justice ® epartment’s involvement and the District Court's finding of a specific racial larget. [dat 90S. Because of the high correlation between race and party data, the Shan plaintiffs could not have come up with any hypothetical altemative district which “would have better satisfied the legislature's other nonracial political goals as weil as traditional nonracial districting principles.” Easley, U.S. at L121 80H 1462, and their challenge to that district vould have failed ® As a resulf, no district drawn anywhere in North Carolina, past, present, or future, including the 1992 North Carolina Congressional Twelfth District, could be successfully challenged under the Conrt’s new fest as the Court applies it. Plaintiff-appellees see no reason for the Court (o reject the arguments of the state defendants in Shaw v. Hunr, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), only to adopt them wholesale in this case when their consistent application would have rendered the 1992 Twelfih District immune from challenge. See Appellants’ Brief at 38-40. Also in the other southem states which have, similar ®Thus, ifthe defendants stated as a defense (hat they were adopting the nonracial traditional redistricting goal of having a “super safe” district with voting performance of over 70% for the Democratic candidate in the 1990 Senate Race, no other district besides one very similar to the 1992 Congressional Disteict would be able to pesform this task in the Piedmont arca of North Carolina - which coincedentally would be sure to elect an African-American. However, i( the purported political goal is a “very safe” district that is confined to the six counlies in which the 1997 Twelfth district is located and has a voting performance of 65% for the Democratic candidale in the 1990 Scnale Race, it is not possible to accomplish this without a district somewhat similar in shape to Ihe 1997 Plan's Twelfth District. Bw, il the purported political geal is just ta have a sate Democralic district with a voting performance of 60% for the Democratic candidate in the 990 Senate race, the 1998 plan would accomplish the task. Accordingly, the state defendants would be able to justify Lheir desired racial concentration, S5%, 479%, or 36%, respectively, merely by proclaiming aftes the fact the political result they wanted for the district. C Q / G A T / A T A : Fe ld 1 7 A in . oh oll 2 0 ° d The conceptual problem with the Court’s new fest is thal it seers to allow the state defendants to dictate after the factwhat its purported goals were and keep raising the bar. Cf, Appellees’ Briefat 161.15 (detailing the changing nature of the purported goals for the Twelfth District as advanced by the defeadant-appellants), Eventually, the state could easily assert enough criteria, real or fictional, that only one plan could satisfy all of them, i.e. the plan under assault, no matter what its racial purpose or resuit. Thus, in North Carolina, anyway, districts that are blatant racjal gerrymanders and cause the hams described in Show v, Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), would be rendeaed immune from challenge. CONCLUSION In determining whether there was actual error in the district court's findings, the Court croneously disregarded persuisive evidence firmly supporting those findings. Moreover, the Court's opinion is al odds with its prior precedents and proposes a test that seers designed to preclude almosl any challenge in the federsl courts to a racial gertymander, including those districts previously found unconstitutional. North Carolina redistricting has been the subject of four appeals: and the Court will undoubtedly be pleased lo turn to other matlers, However, before doing so, the Court should assure that a sound result is reached. Therefore, a rehearing should be granted. Respectfully submitted, 5 ll Loin Robinson O. Evercit, Attorney of Record Cou here IS pr impr Pursuant to Rule 44(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, the undersigned counsel of record hereby certifies (hat the above submitted Petition for Rehearing is presented to the Court in good faith and not for delay or any improper purpose. This the 10™ day of May, 2001. AS T E T O E D IY 71 H T od EO) . om Robinson O. Everett Appellees’ Attorney of Record Everett & Everett P.O. Box 586 Durham, NC 27702 (919) 682-5691 A r e e A LH A T E G e EX LR S e e P s aA qv CU IG AT IE TA : XE 1 N.A.A.C.P. LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 59117 Payee NORMAN "CHACHKIN 55112 Vendor ID NORMAN C. 12/4/00 Invoice Description Discount E. idmount ; 120100NC CROMARTIE V. HUNT $0.00 $1,016.92 120100NOR CROMARTIE V. HUNT $0.00 A832, 99 Total: $0.00 $1,049.21 N.AAA.C.P. LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. THE CHASE MAHATIAN SA N.A. 99 HUDSON: STREET, 16th FLOOR NEW Y ap id 55112 NEW YORK, NY 10013 ****One Thousand Forty Nine and 21/100 Dollars : DATE AMOUNT 12/04/2000 $1,049.21 NORMAN CHACHKIN 31 EDGAR PLACE NUTLEY, NJ 07110-1748 NOT VALID SIX MONTHS BEYOND re ISSUE 4 Th! C AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE *O55 442 1202300002418 eid } 37317085 NAACP Legal Defense Educational Fund, Inc. Request for Payment Invoiced Date 11/28/00 Date November 29, 2000 Vendor Name Norman J Chachkin Check # Case Name Cromartie v. 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Day Explanation Registration Train Travel Air Travel Car Rental Total Totals T REIMBURSEMENT REQUESTED (Total of (1) and TOTAL EXPENSES OF TRIP (Total of (1) and (2) (2) from other side and (3) from this side): $ \O ( b * QI from other side and (3) and (4) from this side): $ \0 { b 9 ~ binge of Business Travel: Moot Couvt ( Uu / 21) aqud Suprame Court Are Cu | 1) Date: U [ 2 go Approved by: vethod or Payment: Fare Rules: American EXpress AXAAAAAAAAATUUS Additional charges may apply for changes in addition to any fare rules listed. NON-REFUNDABLE Greenleaf’s Grille Anton Airfood Inc. 215 JHAJANA 1 Soup SUBTOTAL TAX TOTAL PAID CASH CHANGE DUE Continental 3 Continental Airlines Travel Itinerary and Receipt Airlines 2) Day Date Flight Depart Time Arrive Time Equip Meal MON 27NOV00 CO301Y NEWARK 645AM 'WASHINGTON/NATL 800AM 737-300 MON 27NOV0O0 CO1923Y WASHINGTON/NATL 330PM NEWARK 449PM 737 Pattn of (1) Seat(s] Ticket Number recuan? Elyer CHACHKIN/NORMANJMR 18C/ 9D 0051023059889 ACS522404 Base: 437.22 Tax: 43.78 Per Person: 481.00 E-Ticket Total: 481.00 Method of Payment: American Express 372034903191004 Fare Rules: Additional charges may apply for changes in addition to any fare rules listed. NON-REFUNDABLE £ ~ Taxi Cab Receipts 50 iy es ; 05.p-1.96 (102) "ON [aL ak 1120 Kesiap maN SJemeN d L 9-501 Buipling D TE f ; 7 2/< TIME: Bupyjied weisAs oodwy 0} salinbu| ssalppy TRIP ORIGIN: Hunt v. Cromartie Press Briefing Talking Points Development of the 1997 Plan Race was not the predominant factor in the creation of Congressional District 12 of the 1997 Reapportionment Plan and that the General Assembly did not subordinate traditional redistricting criteria to racial considerations in creating Congressional District 12 of the 1997 Plan. Rather, the North Carolina General Assembly had two primary redistricting goals in 1997: First-Remedy constitutional defects found by the Supreme Court in the 1992 Plan, including the predominance of racial considerations underlying the shape and location of District 12, by 1) avoiding any division of precincts and of counties to the extent possible; 2) avoiding use of narrow corridors to connect concentrations of minority voters; 3) striving for geographical compactness without use of artificial devices such as double Cross-overs or point contiguity; 4) pursuing functional compactness by grouping together citizens with similar interests and needs; and 5) seeking to create districts that provide easy communication among voters and their representatives. Second-Preserve the even (six Republican and six Democratic members) partisan balance in North Carolina’s then-existing congressional delegation. With the State House of Representatives controlled by Republicans and the State Senate controlled by Democrats, preserving the same partisan balance in the congressional delegation was essential to ensure that the General Assembly would be able to agree on a remedial plan. The General Assembly succeeded in reaching its stated redistricting goals: . While the 1992 Plan divided 80 precincts and 44 counties, the 1997 Plan only divides two precincts and 22 counties. . District 12 in the 1997 Plan is significantly more compact geographically than it was in the 1992 Plan. -The new District 12 contains parts of six counties, rather than ten. -Does not have any areas of only “point contiguity” and does not contain any “cross-overs” or “double-cross-overs” as it did in the 1992 Plan. -In the 1992 plan, District 12’s boundaries divided 48 precincts, while District 12 in the 1997 Plan divides only one. . The boundaries of the new District 12 were determined by partisan considerations and a desire to have an essentially urban, Democratic district in the Piedmont region. . District 12’s African-American total population was reduced from the original 56.63 percent in the 1992 Plan to 46.67 percent and the voting-age population was reduced from the original 53.34 percent in the 1992 plan to 43.36 percent. . District 12 encompasses a distinct community of interest. District 12 is a largely urban district and the residents share common economic interests in areas, including manufacturing, research, banking and higher education. The residents are largely employed in blue collar, suburban, and urban employment, rather than in agricultural businesses. The interests of the residents of District 12 are those of a largely urban populous, including mass transportation, urban crime problems, unemployment, and housing and economic development concerns. District 12 was drawn specifically to create a Democratic performing district with no intent to have a particular African-American percentage. The configuration of District 12 reflects a strong correlation between the racial composition of the precincts and party preference of African-Americans in the district. The Applicable Legal Standard Appellees’ heavy evidentiary burden in this case is to “prove that District 12 was drawn with an impermissible racial motive — in this context, strict scrutiny applies if race was the ‘predominant factor’ motivating the legislature’s districting decision.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999). Appellees must show that “race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines,” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995)), and “that other, legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to race.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 958. It is not sufficient to show that the State of North Carolina conducted the redistricting process with some “consciousness of race.” See Bush, 517 U.S. at 1051. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the reality that a state “‘always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors” but held that “[this] sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination’ United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Bush, 517 U.S. at 993 (“States may intentionally create majority-minority districts and may otherwise take race into consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny. Only if traditional districting criteria are neglected, and that neglect is predominantly due to the misuse of race, does strict scrutiny apply”) (O’ Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). While the configuration of District 12 reflects a strong correlation between the racial composition of the precincts and party preference and the General Assembly’s goal of creating a partisan Democratic District 12, this fact does not make the 1997 constitutionally suspect. The General Assembly may create a plurality strong partisan Democratic district “even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact.” Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 542 (emphasis in the original). “Evidence that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one congressional district while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was motivated by race in drawing its district lines when the evidence also shows a high correlation between race and party preference.” Cromartie, 526 U.S. at 542. Sample Record Misrepresentations by Appellees I. African Americans Can Control the District 12 Dem. Primary The Assertion: Appellees assert for the first time in this case: “The Twelfth District is gerrymandered so that African-Americans make up about 60% of the persons eligible to vote in a Democratic primary.” Br. at 26. Appellees argue without record support that District 12 was gerrymandered to have a Black “super-majority” in Democratic primary elections sufficient to overcome “single- shot” voting in favor of white candidates. Appellees’ calculations in their brief are based on estimated registration rates by race in “urban areas” of North Carolina and were never presented to the trial court. Br. at 27 n.24. The Record: Dr. Weber did not claim that District 12 was gerrymandered to affect primary election results, but that District 12 was an “overly safe” district in general elections. II. More African Americans than Whites Participate in the Disrict 12 Dem. Primary The Assertion: Appellees assert that more African American than white Democrats would participate in primary elections in the Twelfth District and could therefore determine the nominee. The Record: This is based upon Weber’s methodologically flawed analysis: In North Carolina, only Democrats and unaffiliated voters may participate in the Democratic primary; Republicans are ineligible to participate. Trial Transcript, November 30, 1999 at 312-313. Weber was unable to separate registered voters by party, since Weber's registration data did not include information about the voters’ party affiliation. Trial Transcript, November 30, 1999 at 313-314. Therefore, Weber's participation percentages for white voters in Democratic primary elections were based upon all white registered voters, including those who might be Republican and, therefore, ineligible to vote in the Democratic primary. Trial Transcript, November 30, 1999 at 313-314. As a result, Weber's analysis artificially deflates the participation of white voters in the Democratic primary, since some proportion of those voters would not be eligible to participate in the Democratic primary in any event. Trial Transcript, November 30, 1999 at 314. III. Watt Only Targetted African Americans in His Campaigns The Assertion: Rep. Watt’s campaign “defined [potential voters for Watt] on the basis of race” and “targeted [these] African-American voters through direct mail, African-American newspapers, and radio stations chosen because of their predominantly African-American audience.” Br. at 46, citing Jt. App. at 578-83. The Record: Rep. Watt’s campaign identified and sought the support of diverse groups of voters. Rep. Watt’s District Director, Don Baker, testified: “We have worked for many affiliated organizations. We have worked for women, senior citizens, African Americans, the Hispanic community. In the campaigns that I have been involved with that is kind of the target groups that we were working towards, keeping them involved.” Jt. App. 581. “We did polling to see exactly what the issues were that was on people’s minds. We in turn developed mail towards target groups. Seniors was one of the target groups that we sent direct mail to. Women was a targeted direct mail. African Americans was a targeted direct mail. And we sent smaller mailers to other individual groups, organizations.” Jt. App. 582. NAACP ‘ Lp Defense Educational Fund, WE. Request for Payment b Invoiced Date 11/14/00 Date November 15, 2000 Vendor Name Norman J Chachkin Check # Case Name Cromartie v. Hunt Check Date Description Meals F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount 1 100 6430 20 10 20 0834012 9x 9x 17.01 Description Taxi, subway F117 Fund G/L# Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount [1 100 6415 20 10 20 0834012 Ox 9x 9.10 | Description Parking F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount 1 100 6450 20 10 20 0834012 9x 9x 18.00 | Description Train expense F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount [1 100 6400 20 10 20 0834012 9x 9x 390.00 | Description F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount 1 100 | Description F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount 1 100 | Description F117 Fund G/L# Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount 1 100 | Description F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount K 100 | Description F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount [1 100 Description F117 Fund G/L # Dept Off Func Case # Grant # Project Amount 1 00 Requested By: Norman J Chachkin Total Amount/s Payable 434.11 Coding/Amount Checked By: Approved By: Effective 1/1/97 - The normal processing time for a requisition is 5-7 working days. Attach receipts for all expenses. Recelpts are mandatory for train and air travel, car rental, court costs, office supplies, and conference registration fees. STAFF TRAVEL EXPENSE REPORT NAME CASE TO BE CHARGED: Dept. No. Function No. Name: Grant No. Project No. LDF Case No.: Office No. Date Dally Expenses Taxl, Exp. Mall, Parking, Hotel Bus, Tele- Copy- a UPS, Post- Tolls, Office Court Mo. Day || Room Explanation Meals Subway | phone ing Fax FedEx" age’ Mileage | Supplies | Costs Total @ IE cab Gow Unjon Sy fi J. oo (dd sulow ay to Umens { \O 1%. 00 [+lO J 1 \Y Pon letva- New ic | 00 J Mm Totals Aq. \0 \R.00 a7, lo G/L Acct. # 6425 6430" 6415 6220 6230 6250 6210 6200 6450 6600 5400 SS ————————— Leeme————— : : , sn] » Date Trip Expenses (not charged to LDF's account) Conference Mo Day Explanation Registration Train Travel Air Travel Car Rental Other Total WoW 390.00 2350.00 Totals i 390.00 390.00 G/L Acct. # 6110 6400 6410 6420 See other side for Business Meeting Expense, items charged to LDF’'s account, and for Summary of Expenditures and Request for Reimbursement. “Paid by staff member (not charged to LDF account) ‘Do not include Business Meeting Expenses In this column. See other side. DETAIL OF BUSINESS MEETING EXPENSE (attach all bills or itemized receipts) Total No. Of People Name of Meeting Place Name, Firm and Occupation (Include Business Description of Mo. | Day (Restaurant, etc.) of Persons Present yourself) Purpose Expense Amount Wy [Arsene Heke oi) 0ac | Adam stein, WMeotcourt © 7 | |umda oY do ogEnaliiie. nlc; o\ S CL a rquinent™ oy s Xm CA voll’? 1 Dy. “Include with Meals total from first page In G/L Acct. # 6430 on request for reimbursement. Date Trip Expenses (charged to LDF's account) Conference Mo. | Day Explanation : Registration Train Travel Alr Travel Car Rental Total Totals REIMBURSEMENT REQUESTED (Total of (1) and TOTAL EXPENSES OF TRIP (Total of (1) and (2) v| 3 (2) from other side and (3) from this side): $ Y 34 A from other side and (3) and (4) from this side): $ | al Purpose of Business Travel: Moot Curt for Qua rere (our t or qumaut Munk V. Coins He \ J opm pg fa Signatyre of Staff Memhé mm Date: fut] oo Approved by: Riders. 2. TY FES E=11% | Name of L. Lr NORMAN MR From NEWARK, NJ - WASHINGTON, we 57 Train Space/ Car METRO FIRST "Form of Payment AP 3131537208746 AX $122.00" $73.00 Rail Fare iin 103 14NOV00 | ; \ | Code # __ Shift # Riders VRE. 5 es Po | fay ger ™ bo RACHEL N/ NORMAN MR WASHINGTON, DC NEWARK, MJ, | 126 14NOVOO METRO FIRST CAP 3131537208746 AX $122. 06™" "$73.00