Franklin v. Giles County, VA School Board Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1965
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Franklin v. Giles County, VA School Board Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant, 1965. 82c83153-b29a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c2550611-62a8-4f9a-88a9-67534f465e31/franklin-v-giles-county-va-school-board-brief-and-appendix-on-behalf-of-appellant. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
IN TH E
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
No. 10,214
MARY A. FRANKLIN, et a l ,
Appellants,
v.
COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF GILES COUNTY,
VIRGINIA, ETAL,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia
S. W. T ucker
H enry L. M arsh, II I
214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Attorneys for Appellants
Page
St a t e m e n t of t h e C a s e ....................................................................................... 1
T h e Q u e s t io n P r e s e n t e d ................................................................................ 3i
St a t e m e n t o f F a c t s .............................................................................................. 3
A. The Dismissal of Plaintiffs..................................... - ................ 3
B. The Hiring of New Teachers.................................................. 4
A r g u m e n t ............................................................................................ 10
I. The Pleadings and the Evidence Require A Finding That
Plaintiffs Were Denied Re-employment Solely Because of
Their Race........................... -.................................................. 10
II. Nothing Short of Reinstatement Will Redress the Depriva
tion of the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights............................... 12
C o n c l u s io n ............................................................................................................... 15
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases
Corbin v. County School Board, 177 F. 924 (4th Cir. 1949) ......... 13
Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
218.................................................................................................. 14
State ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) ..................... 14
Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Steel Workers of
Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963) ................................ 14
Watson v. Burnett, 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E. (2d) 420 (1939) ........... 14
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ...................................... 14
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
28 United States Code 1343 ............................................................... 13
29 United States Code 160 ........................... .......... ..... ........... ....... 15
42 United States Code 1983 ........................................................ ..... . 12
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 604 ..................................... .......... 15
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 706 .......................... ................... 15
INDEX TO APPENDIX
Complaint....................... 1
Request for Admissions.............................................................. 7
Answer to Request for Admissions ................................................... 8
Excerpts from Transcript of Trial Proceedings.......................... ..... 9
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 4 ..................................................... ............... 13
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ........... 14
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 6 ........................... ............................... ......... 21
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 7 ......... ................................. .................. ....... 23
Statement of Position of Plaintiffs .................................................. . 24
Opinion of District Court ................................................................. 25
Order of District Court..... ......... ........... .................................. ......... 37
Notice of Appeal.... ............................................................................ 39
Other Authorities
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
No. 10,214
MARY A. FRANKLIN, e t a l .,
v.
Appellants,
COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF GILES COUNTY,
VIRGINIA, ET AL.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This litigation was commenced on July 29, 1964, by the
complaint of the seven Negro teachers who, until the close
of the 1963-64 school session, had constituted the faculties
of the Negro elementary and high schools of Giles County,
Virigina, which schools were then and thereafter to be
terminated. Joined as plaintiff, and seeking relief on behalf
of its constituents, was the Virginia Teachers Association,
Incorporated, which is composed of those members of the
teaching profession residing in the State of Virginia who
are Negroes. Alleging that the defendants, the County
2
School Board of Giles County and its Division Superin
tendent of Schools, had elected to dispense with the services
of the plaintiff teachers solely because of their race, the
individual plaintiffs sought a mandate requiring their rein
statement as teachers in the public school system of Giles
County during the 1964-65 session and other and general
relief.
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment and mo
tion to dismiss, filed on August 3, were denied at a pre-trial
conference held on October 3, 1964. The case was heard on
its merits on December 28, 1964, and, in response to the
request of the Court, counsel for the respective parties filed
briefs on February 15, and presented oral argument on
M arch 11, 1965. On June 7, the District Judge filed his
opinion dated June 3, 1965, finding that the action of the
Superintendent “deprived these teachers of their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.” By a “Statement of
Position of Plaintiffs” filed on June 22, counsel urged that
“the Court should place these plaintiffs as nearly as possible
in the position they would have held but for the School
Board’s unconstitutional action” and that “ [ijnasmuch as
the normal relief would be reinstatement, the burden should
be placed on the defendants to demonstrate that such relief
should not now be given.” (App. 25.)
The order of the District Court, entered June 23, 1965,
does not direct the reinstatement of the plaintiff teachers
or afford them any certainty that they or any of them will
ever again be employed as teachers in the Giles County
school system. Relief to them as individuals was limited to
an assurance of an opportunity to make application for
any teaching position which may become vacant during
the next two years and the further opportunity, in this
action, to obtain judicial review of the Superintendent’s
decision with respect to the several applications for such
position. (App. 38.)
3
On July 23, 1965, the plaintiffs filed notice of their appeal
to this Court from the order of the District Court insofar
as it fails to require the school board to employ the individ
ual plaintiffs as teachers in the public school system of Giles
County, Virginia. (App. 40.)
THE QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the “Act To Enforce The Provisions Of The Four
teenth Amendment” contemplate the reinstatement of a
teacher whom the school board refused to reemploy solely
because of race?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. The Dismissal of Plaintiffs
As the 1963-64 school session drew to a close, all of Giles
County’s approximately 125 Negro children of public school
age were attending the Bluff City Elementary School or the
Bluff City High School, the faculties of which consisted of
the seven individual plaintiff teachers. Never had Negro
children attended public school with white children; neither
had any Negro been employed to teach white children in
the public schools.
However, between M arch 15 and April 30, 1964, twenty-
three Negro children had made application to the state’s
Pupil Placement Board that they be assigned to the Giles
County High School. Thus faced with the ominous prospect
that white and colored children would attend the same
school, the School Board at its meeting of May 5, 1964,
ordered the discontinuance of the Bluff City schools for
Negroes and directed the Division Superintendent to notify
each of the seven Negro teachers that his services would
not be needed after the close of the 1963-64 session.
The discontinuance of one or more public schools was
not a new experience. But the abrupt termination of the
4
employment of the teachers at a school so discontinued was
without precedent. These facts and their significance are
discussed in the opinion of the District Court, viz.:
“ [T ]he record shows that on a number of occasions
throughout the period preceding the closing of the Negro
schools consolidations of white schools were carried out and
in each instance the white teachers whose schools had been
closed were retained in the school system. The earlied aban
donments indicate to me that the Superintendent had fol
lowed a policy of using teachers from the abandoned schools
in other schools in the system because he viewed the system
as basically homogeneous, by which I mean that in normal
circumstances he would transfer teachers between the var
ious schools to suit the needs of the system rather than con
sidering the teachers in the abandoned schools as unem
ployed and potentially available for any openings that might
occur in the other schools. There are other indications of
this policy in the record. Teachers have been shifted from
school to school when and as needed. This system of shifting
faculty personnel must have been used widely in the school
years immediately prior to and following the 1962-63 school
year when thirteen elementary teachers were eliminated
to remedy the overstaffing in the elementary schools which
had resulted from the series of consolidations. In order to
adjust to an overstaffed condition and then to readjust fol
lowing the elimination of that problem the system and the
faculty must have had a great deal of flexibility in assign
ments.” (App. 30.)
B. The Hiring of New Teachers
At least four elementary teachers, three high school
teachers of English and/or Social Sciences, and one high
school science teacher were employed effective with the
commencement of the 1964-65 session. All of these new
5
employees were white. The qualifications of six of these
newly employed teachers and the contrasting qualifications
of the seven plaintiff teachers, as revealed by the evidence,
will be next shown.
Carolyn Chaffin Johnston, race white, age 25, was em
ployed in September, 1964 to teach the third grade. She
was not a college graduate and had no previous teaching
experience. She merely held a Special License, having been
certified by the State Board to teach specific area subjects.
(App. 14, PL Ex. 5.) Concerning her, the Superintendent
testified:
“Carolyn Johnston did her practice teaching at Pearis-
burg Elementary School in the immediate preceding
school year 1963-64. At the time she made applica
tion she listed that she would be a graduate from
Radford College in the summer of 1964. I, as I recall,
had interviewed her as I had interviewed a number
of teachers previous to the actual close of the Negro
schools and had made a commitment to Carolyn
Johnston for employment. The observation of her
principal, her supervising teacher and my supervisor
indicated that she would be a very good teacher. . . .
She is listed as not a graduate because she had dif
ficulty with biology, a subject that is not at all kin
to the elementary work she is teaching. She ended up
with passing biology but she ended up with not
enough quality points to be a graduate.
* * 1 *
“. . . I made a commitment to this lady for employ
ment.
* * *
“ [T ]he lady was at work two weeks before I knew
she wasn’t a college graduate when I got into the
matter of getting a certificate for her.” (Tr. 66, 67.)
* * *
6
“We made commitments for employment when we
believed that she would be a degreed person.” (Tr.
92.)
By way of contrast, the evidence (A. 13, PI. Ex. 4) shows
that each of the individual plaintiffs had a Collegiate Pro
fessional Certificate, four of them being endorsed for Ele
mentary Education, and that the teaching experience of the
four having Elementary Education ranged from four to
forty years.
Dorothy Harvey, race white, age 23, was employed in
September, 1964, to teach the third grade. She held a
Collegiate Professional Certificate endorsed for History and
English, and had no previous teaching experience. (App. 14,
PI. Ex. 5.) Concerning her, the Superintendent testified:
“Mrs. Dorothy Harvey had been promised work in
January of 1964.
* * *
“I made a commitment to her. I finally did not place
her in the area of certification but in an area in which
she is doing a satisfactory job.” (Tr. 90, 91.)
* * *
“The understanding that I had with Mrs. Harvey was
that she would be considered for such vacancies as
occurred.” (Tr. 99.)
Four of the plaintiffs had Collegiate Professional Cer
tificates endorsed for Elementary Education and had pre
vious teaching experiences which ranged from four to forty
years. Moreover, the plaintiff Sylvia J. Harvey, whose Col
legiate Professional Certificate was endorsed for Social
Science had five years’ experience and the plaintiff, Spivey,
whose Collegiate Professional Certificate was endorsed for
Business Education and Social Studies, had completed one
7
year of employment in the system when Dorothy Harvey
was employed. (App. 13, PI. Ex. 4.)
Grover DeHart, race white, age 30, sex male, was em
ployed in September 1964 to teach the seventh grade. He
had no previous teaching experience and did not hold a
Collegiate Professional Certificate. His Collegiate Certifi
cate was endorsed for Elementary Education, Sixth and
Seventh Grades. (App. 14, PI. Ex. 5.) The Superintendent
testified:
“Grover DeHart has lived all the time in the county
and a former employee of industry who made himself
available early in the school year of 1963-64, went to
summer school and is well qualified in his area of in
struction having been a personnel—having worked with
personnel with a major in sociology.” (Tr. 92.)
The vacancy which Grover DeHart was employed to fill
would not have occurred except for the decision not to re
employ any of the seven Negro teachers, four of whom had
objective qualifications for teaching elementary education
which were superior to those of Grover DeHart.
Nancy Morgan, race white, age 33, was employed in
September 1964 to teach the first grade. She held a Col
legiate Professional Certificate, the subject endorsement
on which was Art. She had had two years’ previous teaching
experience. (App. 14, PI. Ex. 5.) The Superintendent testi
fied:
“Nancy’s Morgan’s home has always been in Narrows.
Her teaching experience has been in eastern Virginia
and I am not certain whether it was in the City of
Norfolk, Norfolk County, or Princess Anne. She had the
misfortune of having her home broken up and she came
home. She wanted an assignment the previous school
year but I had none for her.” (Tr. 77, 78.)
* * *
8
“Mrs. Nancy Morgan although she was certified in art
had done all of her teaching in eastern Virginia as a
primary teacher in the area in which I placed her. I had
made a commitment to her as early as July in the pre
vious year but did not find a job for her the previous
year and she served as a substitute during that year, the
year previous to this year.” (Tr. 91.)
No objective consideration was suggested for withholding
preference for this position from either of the four Negro
teachers who were certified in Elementary Education and
who had teaching experience which ranged from four to
forty years. (App. 13, PL Ex. 4.)
Ann Shelton, race white, age 43, was employed in Sep
tember 1964 to teach English at Giles High School. She had
three years’ previous experience. Her Collegiate Professional
Certificate was endorsed for English, History, Social Studies
and Latin. (App. 22, PI. Ex. 6.) As to her the Superin
tendent testified:
“Mrs. Ann Shelton had not worked under my super
vision. She had done extensive substitute work in my
period of time in the county and had been promised an
assignment. I might mention that she and her husband
had run a variety store and they had made the decision
to close the business and it made her available for sub
stitute and full time teaching.” (Tr. 89.)
The plaintiff Franklin was certified in English and Social
Science in high school and had forty years’ teaching
experience. The plaintiff Leftwich was certified in English
and had eighteen years’ experience which included the
teaching of English in Giles County. The plaintiff Woodliff
was certified in English and had four years’ teaching ex
perience which included the teaching of English in Giles
County. (App. 13, PI. Ex. 4.)
9
Helen Blankenship, race white, age 23, was employed in
September 1964 to teach Mathematics and General Science
in the eighth grade at Narrows High School. Her Collegiate
Professional Certificate was endorsed for Biology and Chem
istry. She had no previous teaching experience. (App. 24,
PI. Ex. 7.) The Superintendent had this to say concerning
her:
“I feel that in fairness since I was questioned about
Helen Blankenship that I would like to make a state
ment about her status. I committed myself to her as
early as last January but actually she was placed the
day before school opened after a principal at Narrows
High School resigned and after it was necessary for me
to reshuffle my faculty there and I had no math person
at that time who was available. She was certified in
Science. She was a graduate of Narrows High School
and as a student had done an outstanding job in math.
We had no hesitancy that she would not do a good job
in m ath.” (Tr. 71.)
* * *
“Her mother is a teacher.
* * *
“She is not certified in mathematics.
* * *
“She is teaching eighth grade general math which is
arithmetic.” (Tr. 77.)
Two of the seven Negro teachers (Leftwich and Woodliff)
were teaching Mathematics when the School Board decided
not to reemploy them. Two others (Montgomery and
Austin) had certification similar to that of Helen Blanken
ship and, in addition, had eight years’ and three years’ teach
ing experience, respectively. (App. 13, PL Ex. 4.) The fail
ure to retain the Negro teachers (as earlier the thirteen white
elementary teachers had been retained (Tr. 72-77, 102-
10
103)) created the occasion for the last minute employment
of Helen Blankenship.
ARGUMENT
I
The Pleadings And The Evidence Require A Finding That Plaintiffs
Were Denied Re-employment Solely Because Of Their Race
The District Court erroneously perceived the question
before it as being whether, in reaching the conclusion that
the seven Negro teachers were less suitable for re-employ
ment than any of the 179 white teachers, “the Superintend
ent exercised his discretion in such an arbitrary, capricious or
unlawful manner as to violate these teachers’ rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment.” (App. 29, 30.) By considering
that as the question (and painstakingly concluding “that the
scope and nature of the Superintendent’s evaluation of these
teachers was arbitrary and resulted in a discrimination
against them” (App. 31 )), the District Court avoided de
cision of the factual issue tendered by the pleadings which,
at the outset of the opinion, had been correctly assessed,
viz.: “The gist of the complaint is the allegation that the
seven individual plaintiffs were denied re-employment as
teachers by the defendants for the 1964-65 school session
because of their race.” (App. 26.)
Neither by their motion to dismiss nor by their answer
did the defendants suggest that the Superintendent made any
evaluation of the plaintiff teachers at any time. The District
Court’s opinion (App. 31) notes that “the Superintendent
did not explain why these teachers were not evaluated and
compared with all of the other teachers in the system who
taught in areas in which the plaintiffs could teach in ac
cordance with his prior practice in making these decisions.”
Further, there was “evidence offered by the plaintiffs that
11
in fact there never was a real evaluation of teaching qualifi
cations and that in deciding to discharge all seven of these
teachers the Superintendent considered only the closing of
the Negro schools.” The opinion continues: “There is evi
dence from which such a conclusion could be inferred. The
letter sent to the individual plaintiffs refers solely to the abo
lition of their jobs because of the closing of the Bluff City
schools without any reference to an evaluation or to any
possibility that they could be employed in the previously
all-white schools.” (App. 31, 32.)
To avoid meeting the crucial factual issue in the case,
the District Court undertook to discuss the adequacy of an
“evaluation” which the pleadings do not mention and which,
according to the evidence, simply did not occur.
The allegation of Paragraph 12 of the Complaint that
“ [t]he defendants elected to dispense with the services of
[the individual plaintiffs] . . . solely because they are
Negroes . . .” (App. 5), although formally denied in the
answer, was clearly established. The affidavit of the Super
intendent of Schools, filed August 19, 1964 in support of the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concludes in
these words:
“When the relatively few Negro children being taught
by these plaintiffs in separate schools were assigned to
the previously all-white schools, availability of teaching
positions for the plaintiffs no longer existed in a school
system which has been employing fewer teachers each
year for the past five years.” (App. R. 11.)
The plaintiffs’ request for admissions established that on
May 15, 1964, the Superintendent of Schools notified each
of these teachers that the closing of the Bluff City schools
and the placement of the Negro children in other schools
12
“make it necessary to abolish your job.” The letters of
notification concluded with these words: “May I take this
opportunity to thank you for the years of service rendered
the School Board of Giles County and the children of your
race.” (App. 7.)
The opinion of the District Court points out that, in view
of the Superintendent’s awareness that there would be
vacancies for the 1964-65 session, “his abrupt termination
of the employment of these plaintiffs is suspect. It certainly
must be contrasted with the termination of the thirteen
white elementary teachers in 1962-63 who defendants stated
in their brief then formed a ‘pool’ against future needs.
* * * It does appear that several of the individual plaintiffs
were better qualified considering only their certification and
experience than some of the people who were subsequently
hired.” (App. 32.)
The complaint and the evidence require the unequivocal
statement of an unavoidable finding of fact, viz.: that the
defendant School Board terminated the employment of
the plaintiff teachers and declined to reemploy them in the
Giles County school system solely because of race and
color. It is that actual occurrence (not the imagined but
nonexistent “evaluation” ) which the Court is called upon
to redress.
II
Nothing Short Of Reinstatement Will Redress The Deprivation Of
The Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Right
Unquestionably, a state may not refuse to employ any
individual solely because of his race. The District Court’s
opinion observed that “ [t]he defendants, while denying
that they discriminated against these individuals, acknowl
edge that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States forbids discrimination on account of
13
race by a public school system with respect to the employ
ment of teachers.” (App. 26, 27.) If, as has been shown, the
School Board did in fact refuse to re-employ the plaintiff
teachers solely because of their race, then the only question
of law confronting the Court is the measure of relief to
which they are entitled.
When, in 1871, the Congress passed “An Act to Enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States” (42 U.S.C. 1983), it ordained
that if a person under color of state law, custom or usage
subjected any person to the deprivation of rights, privileges
and immunities secured by the Constitution, the person so
offending shall be liable to the party injured in a “proper
proceeding for redress.” The district courts have original
jurisdiction to “redress the deprivation” under color of
state law, custom and usage, of any right, privilege or im
munity secured by the Constitution (28 U.S.C. 1343). This
Court has succinctly stated the intent of the Congress, viz.:
“Whenever the forbidden racial discrimination rears its
head, a solemn duty to strike it down is imposed upon the
Court” (Corbin v. County School Board, 111 F. 924, 928
(4th Cir. 1949)).
Forbidden racial discrimination reared its head in the
Giles County school system on May 14, 1964, when the
School Board decided to dispense with the services of the
seven Negro teachers pursuant to its custom which pre
cluded the employment of Negroes as teachers for white
children. Because she is a Negro, the plaintiff Franklin, a
resident of Pearisburg in Giles County, must travel to
Bedford County (at least 75 miles) for professional em
ployment (Tr. 4, 6). Because they are Negroes the other
plaintiffs are denied professional employment in Giles
County. That forbidden racial discrimination continues be
cause the District Court failed to grant the only relief by
14
which the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights could be
effectively redressed.
The propriety of a mandatory injunction directing rein
statement of a teacher whose statutory protection against
the denial of re-employment was breached is discussed in
Watson v. Burnett, 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E. (2d) 420 (1939).
There, as here, the invasion of the right would not sustain
an action for compensatory damages. There the court stated
and followed the rule which has been applicable in this
case ever since August 19, 1964, when the defendants filed
the affidavit of the Superintendent of schools (R. 10) in
dicating that availability of teaching positions for Negroes
ceased to exist upon the assignment of the Negro children
to previously all white schools, viz.:
“Where the rights of a party are clear and where ac
tion rather than inaction is essential to maintain the
status quo of the parties and to avoid irreparable in
jury, a court of equity may properly issue a temporary
mandatory injunction.” (23 N.E. (2d) at 424)
In State ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)
the Supreme Court reviewed the Indiana court’s refusal of
a writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement of a teacher
and held that the repeal of the Teacher’s Tenure Law was
an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of con
tracts. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the
Court reversed the denial of the school teachers’ prayer for
a mandatory injunction directing state officers to pay their
salaries notwithstanding the teachers’ failure to take a
loyalty oath, the Court having determined that the require
ment of such oath violated Fourteenth Amendment rights. In
Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Steel
Workers of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963), a
15
mandatory injunction issued to require that Negroes be
admitted to an apprenticeship program and be employed,
the court having found that governmental involvement in
their exclusion brought the plaintiffs within the protection
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In recent years the Congress has directed that persons
wrongfully discharged from employment in certain indus
tries be reinstated. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), authorizing the
National Labor Relations Board “to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or with
out back pay, as will effectuate the policies” of Subchapter
II of the Labor Managament Relations Act. See also the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 706 (42 U.S.C. § 2000
e-5 (g))> where judicial authority to order reinstatement
is preserved if the individual was “expelled or was refused
employment or advancement . . . on account of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.”
If ever there was justification for reluctance on the part
of a Federal court to enter a mandatory injunction when
nothing else would effectively redress the deprivation of
rights secured by the Constitution, that justification ceased
to exist when the Supreme Court delivered its May 25, 1964,
opinion in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218.
CONCLUSION
It is fairly predictable that as more and more school
boards adopt “freedom of choice” plans for racial desegre
gation in efforts to satisfy the requirements of the Depart
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, an increasing
number of localities will be faced with the transfer of Negro
children from all-Negro schools. By virtue of Section 604
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department of Health,
16
Education and Welfare considers itself powerless to pro
tect Negro teachers against unwarranted loss of employ
ment upon the desegregation of students. Any failure of
the federal courts to effectively curb racial discrimination
in the employment policies of school boards, as and when
the children obtain racially nondiscriminatory school as
signments, is likely to be viewed by some Negro teachers
as a practical justification for them to discourage the transfer
of Negro students from all-Negro schools.
The courts can enlist all elements of the school com
munity in an effort to desegregate schools—but only by a
display of firmness, affording prompt and adequate redress
against racially discriminatory hiring practices. This case
should be remanded with direction that the School Board
be ordered to offer reemployment to each of the plaintiff
teachers.
Respectfully submitted,
S. W. T ucker
H enry L. M arsh, III
214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
A P P E N D I X
I n T he U nited States D istrict Court
For T he Western D istrict of V irginia
ROANOKE DIVISION
Civil Action N o. 64-c-73-r
Mary A. Franklin, Lawrence H. Leftwich, Mary F. M ont
gomery, Sylvia J. Harvey, Hugh D. Woodliff, Sylvia D.
Austin, Alma G. Spivey and Virginia Teachers Association,
Incorporated,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
County School Board of Giles County
and P. E. Ahalt, Division Superintendent
of Schools of Giles County,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT
[Filed July 29, 1964]
1(a) Jurisdiction is invoked under Title 28, United States
Code, Section 1343. This is a suit in equity, authorized by
law (42 USC §1983) to be brought to redress the depriva
tion under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus
tom or usage, of rights, privileges and immunities secured
by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States and Title 42, United States
Code, Section 1981.
1 (b) Jurisdiction is invoked under Title 28, United States
Code, Section 1331. This action arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Section
1, and under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983,
as hereafter more fully appears. The matter in controversy,
exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the value of Ten
Thousand Dollars.
2. This action is a proceeding under Title 28, United
States Code, Sections 2201 and 2202 for a declaratory judg
ment that racial discrimination in the employment and as
signment of teachers in a public school system is forbidden
by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and by Title 42,
USC §1981, for relief by injunction restraining the defend
ants from refusing to employ the individual plaintiffs for and
during the 1964-65 school session, and for relief by injunction
restraining the defendants from discriminating on a basis of
race with respect to employment of teachers in the public
school system.
3. Plaintiffs bring this action in behalf of the individual
plaintiffs and, pursuant to Rule 23(a) (3) of the Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure, as an action in behalf of persons
constituting a class so numerous as to make it impractical
to bring them all before the court; the character of the
rights sought to be enforced for the class being several, and
there being common questions of law affecting the several
rights of the individual plaintiffs and other members of the
class, and a common relief being sought.
4. The defendant County School Board of Giles County
is a body corporate discharging governmental functions,
existing pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the Com
monwealth of Virginia. Said school board is empowered
and required to establish, maintain, control and supervise
an efficient system of public free schools in said county.
Among the duties of said board is that of employing teachers
and assigning them individually to specified schools. (Con
stitution of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133; Code of V ir
ginia, 1950, as amended, Title 22.)
App. 2
App. 3
5. The defendant P. E. Ahalt is sued in his capacity as
Division Superintendent of Schools for Giles County. He
holds such office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of
the Commonwealth of Virginia as an administrative officer
of the public free school system of Virginia. (Constitution
of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133; Code of Virginia, 1950,
as amended, Title 22.) He is under the authority, super
vision and control of, and acts pursuant to the orders,
policies, customs and usage of, the defendant school board.
6. The plaintiff Virginia Teachers Association, Incor
porated, is an association chiefly composed of those mem
bers of the teaching profession residing in the State of Vir
ginia who are Negroes. Over 8000 of the estimated 8,533
Negroes teaching in public schools in Virginia are members
of the Virginia Teachers Association, Incorporated, in good
standing. Solely because of race, Negroes are excluded from
membership and participation in the Virginia Educational
Association which is composed of those members of the
teaching profession residing in the State of Virginia who are
not Negroes. The purpose of the plaintiff association is to
use all means in its power to protect the interest of edu
cation in general and to raise the standards of the teaching
profession.
7. One interest herein asserted by the plaintiff association
is the interest of those of its members who have not hereto
fore been employed by the defendant school board but now
desire or hereafter may desire employment by the defendant
school board. The experience of the plaintiff association and
its members is and has been such that it believes, and here
alleges, that a school board is unlikely to consider favorably
an application for employment from an individual who by
prosecuting litigation against the board concerning its em
ployment policies might thereby characterize himself as
undesirable. The plaintiff association asserts the interest of
App. 4
such member or members because the right not to have his
application for employment denied on racial grounds might
well be lost to the now anonymous member by his mere act
of asserting it.
8. Another interest herein asserted by the plaintiff as
sociation is the interest of the general class represented by the
individual plaintiffs, i. e., Negroes who are qualified to teach
in the public schools in Virginia. For the benefit of that
class and every person thereof, the plaintiff association here
asserts that a school board may not, for reasons of race,
discriminate against Negroes in the employment and assign
ment of public school teachers.
9. During the 1963-64 school session, each of the in
dividual plaintiffs was employed by the defendant school
board as a teacher in the Bluff City Elementary School or
the Bluff City High School which that board had set apart
and maintained for the separate education of all of the Negro
children of Giles County. The only Negroes who as teachers
were employed by the defendant school board at the close
of that session and the total number of years of such em
ployment of each were:
Mary A. Franklin............................... 30 years
Lawrence H. Leftwich 19 years
Mary F. Montgomery........................ 8 years
Sylvia J. Harvey................................... 5 years
Hugh D. Wood li IT............................... 4 years
Sylvia D. Austin................................... 3 years
Alma G. Spivey................................... 1 year
10. Following action by the Pupil Placement Board of
Virginia by which several Negro children living in Giles
County were assigned to Giles High School for the 1964-65
session, the defendant school board, on May 5, 1964, directed
that operation of Bluff City Elementary School and Bluff
City High School be discontinued after the close of the 1963-
App. 5
64 school session. By letters from the defendant Division
Superintendent of Schools dated May 15, 1964, each of the
persons named in the next preceding paragraph was
notified that his services would not be needed after the close
of the 1963-64 school session.
11. Under and by virtue of a long standing policy, prac
tice, custom and usage prevailing through the Common
wealth of Virginia (unbroken except in Arlington County
and the City of Alexandria within recent years), and par
ticularly in the County of Giles, Negroes (regardless what
the individual qualifications may be) are not and have not
been assigned to teach in public schools which white children
attend.
12. The defendants elected to dispense with the services
of all of the persons who had previously taught at the Bluff
City Elementary and High Schools solely because they are
Negroes and because the defendants have had, have, and
unless enjoined from so doing will continue to have and to
follow, the above mentioned policy, practice, custom and
usage which precludes the employment and assignment of
any Negro to teach in a public school which white children
attend.
13. The said policy, practice, custom and usage of the
defendants constitutes an arbitrary denial of the property
right of each person of the class represented by the plain
tiffs to fair and proper consideration for professional em
ployment and a denial of the right of each such person to
the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the provisions
of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and contrary
to Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
14. The individual plaintiffs and all persons of the class
represented by the plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury
and are threatened with irreparable injury in the future by
App. 6
reason of the policy, practice, custom and usage and the
actions of the defendants herein complained of. They have
no plain, adequate or complete remedy to redress the wrongs
and illegal acts herein complained of other than as is herein
pursued. Any other remedy to which they could be remitted
would be attended by such uncertainties and delays as would
deny substantial relief, would involve a multiplicity of suits,
and would cause further irreparable injury and damage,
vexation and inconvenience.
W herefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray:
1. That this cause be advanced on the docket and that a
hearing on the prayer for an interlocutory injunction be
held as soon as practical.
2. That the court enter a judgment, declaratory of the
rights of the individual plaintiffs and the members of the
class here represented and of the corresponding obligations
of the defendants, that the defendants may not permit con
siderations of race to affect the selection and employment or
the assignment of persons as teachers in the public school
system.
3. That the court enter an interlocutory injunction re
straining the defendants from refusing to employ the in
dividual plaintiffs, or either of them, as teachers in the public
school system of Giles County, Virginia, during the 1964-65
session.
4. That the defendants be permanently restrained and
enjoined from failing or refusing to select and hire any per
son in any position of employment under the defendants’
control, or otherwise to discriminate against any person with
respect to compensation, terms, job assignment, or con
ditions or privileges of employment, because of the person’s
race or color.
App. 7
5. That the defendants pay the costs of this action in
cluding a fee for the plaintiffs’ attorneys in such amount as
to the court may appear reasonable and proper.
6. That the plaintiffs have such other and further relief
as is just.
/ s / S. W. T ucker
Of Counsel for Plaintiffs
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
Under provisions of Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiffs request that, on or before the 26th
day of November, 1964, the defendants make admission of
the matters of fact hereinafter set forth :
One
That under date of May 15, 1964, the defendant Division
Superintendent of Schools sent a letter over his signature to
each of the individual plaintiffs and that the body of the
letter was as follows:
“The Giles County School Board on May 5, 1964, by
an [sic] unanimous vote, took action to close both the
Bluff City Elementary School and the Bluff City High
School at the close of the 1963-64 school session. In a
special School Board meeting on May 14, 1964, children
presently attending these schools were placed by the
School Board for the 1964-65 session.
“These two actions make it necessary to abolish your
job. Please accept this letter as your notification that
your services will not be needed after the close of this
school session. I shall be glad to discuss this problem
with you should you care for a conference.
“May I take this opportunity to thank you for the
years of service rendered the School Board of Giles
County and the children of your race.”
* * *
App. 8
Three
That the factual matter contained in paragraph 9 of the
complaint is true.
Four
That the factual matter contained in paragraph 10 of the
complaint is true.
H enry L. M arsh, III
Of Counsel for Plaintiffs
ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
[Served November 24, 1964]
For answer to the plaintiffs’ request for admissions under
Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, de
fendants state as follows:
(1) Defendants admit the letter of May 15, 1964 was
sent and that the body of the letter as set forth in the request
for admissions is correct.
* * *
(3) Defendants admit that the factual matters contained
in paragraph 9 of the complaint are true.
(4) Defendants admit that the factual matters contained
in paragraph 10 of the complaint are true.
Respectfully,
County School Board of Giles
County and P. E. A halt, Divi
sion Superintendent of Schools for
Giles County
By John H . T hornton, Jr .
Of Counsel
App. 9
EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL PROCEEDINGS OF
DECEMBER 28, 1964
* * *
[ t r . p . 6 ]
Paul E. A h a l t , called as an adverse witness by and on
behalf of plaintiffs having been duly sworn, testified as
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By: M r. Marsh
Q Would you state your name, address and occupation
please sir?
A My name is Paul Edwin Ahalt. My address is Box
493, Pearisburg, Virginia. My occupation is Division Super
intendent of School, Giles County, Pearisburg, Virginia.
* * *
[ t r . p p . 12-14]
Q Mr. Ahalt I noticed that on the forms submitted and
answers to interrogatories, I notice a listing of the various
Virginia certificates held by your teachers. Would you
explain the order of priority of these certificates and what
the various certificates signify—I mean collegiate and pro
fessional?
A If I understand your question you are asking me now
to enumerate for the Court the various kinds of certificates
issued by the State of Virginia.
Q Yes and held by the teachers in Giles County in order
of their priority?
A I would like for you to isolate those two questions
if you would please sir. When you say in the order of priority
that is where I would like to comment secondly if I may
explain further.
Q Go ahead.
App. 10
A The highest type teacher so far as paper qualifica
tion is concerned would be the post graduate professional.
This is a certificate issued for holders of masters degrees
who have had as I recall five successful years of teaching.
We have a collegiate professional certificate which is issued
to college graduates who had during their preparation for
teaching either practice teaching or over paying this de
ficiency by two years of successful teaching. Then we have
the collegiate certificate which is issued to college graduates
for those who have had the required hours and preparation
in practice teaching in specified areas. Then we have a
certificate that has not been issued since 1942 known as the
Normal Professional Certificate. This is issued originally
to persons who have had two years of college preparation
and these persons have kept their certificate active over the
years. Then there is another classification of elementary
and this is my understanding is a certificate that has been a
number of years since it has been issued. I cannot tell you the
number but those were issued originally by persons who took
a teacher’s examination and these persons will date back
forty years or more. And then there is a special certificate
and I would like to note this separate from special license.
I am frank to tell you that I don’t know what a special
certificate is. We have had as far as I know only one of
them in my period of Superintendent of Schools. The original
conditions under which that certificate was issued I could
not say. I would assume that that was one who had had
more than the one who had been issued the elementary but
not as much as the one who had been issued a normal pro
fessional certificate. That is my projection. I could not
sustain that. I have never seen that in writing. Then we
have a certificate which is known as a special license. This
is a certificate issued to persons since in the vicinity of 1955
— I would not give you that as a positive date but it is a
App. 11
certificate that has come into being during the time I have
been a superintendent of schools, issued to persons who in
1942 would not have had the equivalent of two years of
college preparation but it may be well that when the cer
tificate was issued to the person could have completed all
but the degree requirements, special license means that the
person has been certified to teach specific area subjects
by the State Board of Certification in Richmond. As I
recall that would be the full number. Now in addition to
that certain endorsements but they all come under types of
certificates which I have outlined.
* * *
[ t r . p . 26]
E v e l y n W. S h a d e , called as a witness by and on behalf
of the plaintiffs having been duly sworn, testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
By: M r . M a r s h
Q Would you state your name and occupation please?
A Evelyn W. Shade. I am presently employed as a
secretary of the law firm of Tucker and Marsh in Richmond,
Virginia.
Q Mrs. Shade have you had any experience as a statis
tician?
A Yes I have. I have been doing statistical work in
various teacher, salary cases and equal facility school cases
and other civil rights cases since 1950, in addition to other
work in accounting and other statistical work prior to 1950.
* * *
[ t r . p . 32]
Q Did you make a compilation of the total number of
white teachers appointed to teach in Giles County in each of
the years 1960-1961 to 1964-1965?
A Yes I did.
App. 12
Q Will you explain it to us please?
A This was taken from the individual summary sheets
supplied by the superintendent of schools. In 1964-1965
there were thirteen teachers whose beginning year with the
Giles County School System was 1964-1965 and there were
four such white elementary teachers. In 1963-1964 there
were six such teachers in the high school, and none in the
elementary school. In 1962-1963 there were seven teachers
appointed to the Giles County system for the first time in
the high school and one in the elementary school. In 1961-
1962 six white teachers were appointed to the high school
and two to the elementary school and in 1960-1961 there
were two appointments to the high school and one ap
pointment to the elementary school.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 4
NEGRO TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS—SCHOOL YEAR 1963-64
T o ta l
N a m e and School
T ear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm en ts
Mary A. Franklin
Bluff City Elementary
1923 CP 40 yrs. Elementary; Soc. Sci.,* English* Building Teacher; 5th, 6th
& 7th grades
Laurence Leftwich
Bluff City High
1949 CP 18 Elementary; English, Soc. Science Math, English, History,
Music, Guidance;
Principal
Mary F. Montgomery
Bluff City Elementary
1956 CP 8 Elementary; Gen. Sci.,* Biology* 1st & 2nd grades
Sylvia J. Harvey
Bluff City High
1959 CP 5 Soc. Sci. (not including History) Home Econ., M ath, Science,
History, Phy. Ed.
Hugh D. Woodliff
Bluff City High
1960 CP 4 Elementary 4-7; English, History,
Soc. Studies
Math, Government,
Geography, English,
Biology, Phy. Ed.
Sylvia D. Austin
Bluff City Elementary
1961 CP 3 Gen. Sci., Biology, Chemistry 3rd & 4th grades
Alma G. Spivey
Bluff City High
1963 CP 1 Business Education, Soc. Studies English, Soc. Studies,
Business Typing
*Information furnished by respective plaintiff’s. Answer to interrogatory indicated that information was not available to Superin
tendent of Schools.
CP—Collegiate Professional.
A
pp. 13
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS—1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
T otal
N a m e a n d Schoo l
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t
Nancy Morgan—Narrows 1964 CP 2 yrs. Art 1st Grade
Carolyn Johnston— Pearisburg 1964 SL 0 — 3rd Grade
Dorothy Harvey—King Johnston 1964 CP 0 History, English 6th Grade
Grover DeHart— Pembroke 1964 Coll. 0 Elem. 6 & 7; English, History,
Social Studies
7th Grade
Nancy Boens— Pembroke 1962 CP 2 Biology (High & Jr. High) 6th Grade
Goldie Auvil—Rich Creek 1961 CP 9 Elem. grades 1 thru 7 2nd Grade
Mildred Miller-—Pembroke 1961 CP 8 Elementary 2nd & 3rd Grades
Florence Mandeville— Glen Lyn 1960 CP 8 Elementary; English, Social Science 1st and 2nd Grades
Inez Richards— Pearisburg 1959 CP 12 Elementary; English 5th Grade
Maurice Witten—-Newport 1959 CP 7 Gr. 4 thru 7; English, Social
Studies
7th Grade
William Forrestal— Pembroke 1958 pp 11 Social Studies, History, French,
Basic Business, Distributive Educ.
Diversified Occupations
Principal; 3rd Grade
part-time
Duane Billups— Pearisburg 1957 CP 7 Social Studies, History 5th Grade
Robert Taylor—King Johnston 1957 CP 8 Health, Phy. Ed., History, Social
Studies
Principal; 7th Grade
Ronald Whitehead—Rich Creek 1957 pp 7 History, Social Studies, Basic Principal; 7th Grade
Business
A
pp. 14
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued)
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
T otal
N a m e a n d School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E n dorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t
Irene Copen— Pearisburg 1956 CP 19 Elementary 1 st Grade
Louise Miller—Pearisburg 1956 CP 23 Elementary; English, Soc. Studies 2nd Grade
Nannie Muncy—Narrows 1956 CP 35 Elementary 3rd Grade
John H. Webb—Narrows 1956 SL 44 — 6th Grade
Mary Whitehead— Pearisburg 1955 CP 9 Social Studies 1st Grade
Shirley Ramsey— Pearisburg 1955 CP 8 Elementary; English 2nd Grade
Frances B. Coburn—Rich Creek 1954 CP 14 English, Social Studies 4th Grade
Betty Coffman—Rich Creek 1954 CP 12 Gr. 1 thru 7; English, Biology,
Social Studies
7th Grade
Alice Mustard—King Johnston 1954 CP 12 Gr. 6 & 7; Home Econ., English
History, Chemistry
7 th Grade
Pauline Williams—Narrows 1954 CP 22 Elementary; English 3rd Grade
Howard Houchins—Narrows 1953 NP 19 Elementary 6th Grade
Nona Eisel— Penvir 1953 SL 14 — 1st & 2nd Grades
Sarah Ragsdale— Penvir 1953 SL 11 — 3rd & 4th Grades
Hazel Armbrister— Pearisburg 1952 CP 9 Elementary 5 th Grade
Edith H. Lewey—King Johnston 1952 SL 8 — 7th Grade
Dan M. Huffman—Narrows 1952 PP 12 Gr. 6 & 7; Spanish, Accounting,
History, English, Social Studies
Principal
A
pp. 15
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 (continued)
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
T otal
N a m e and School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b jec t E n dorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t
Glenn Cruise—JPearisburg
fc; C sJL..-., ,M. i *.f. i. At-..
1951 p p 13 Gr. 6 & 7; English, Social Studies,
History, Spanish
Principal
Iris Williams—Narrows 1950 CP 17 Elementary; Biology, Chemistry,
English, Home Economics
1st Grade
Lavinia Bogess—Rich Creek 1950 CP 18 Gr. 6 & 7; Physical Ed., Biology 6th Grade
Bessie Price— Rich Creek 1949 Elem. 29 Elementary 1st Grade
Gladys Johnson—Narrows 1948 NP 17 Elementary 4th Grade
Emma Steele—Newport 1948 CP 10 Elementary, English, History,
Social Studies, Art, Music
4th & 5th
M artha W. Britts—Kimballton 1948 CP 16 Gr. 1 thru 7; English, History,
Social Studies
Head teacher; 7th Grade
Alva Lucas—Newport 1946 CP 10 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
1st & 2nd Grades
Mary Allen—King Johnston 1946 CP 12 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
6th Grade
Elizabeth Graves—Narrows 1946 NP 25 Elementary 4th Grade
Hazel Lester— Pearisburg 1946 CP 26 Elementary; Geography 5 th Grade
Margaret Whittaker—Eggleston 1946 CP 18 Gr. 6 & 7; English, Social Science,
Chemistry, General Science, Art
5th & 6th Grades
Florine McCrady—Narrows 1945 CP 17 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
2nd Grade
A
pp. 16
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued)
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
Total
N a m e a n d School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E n dorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t
Elizabeth Johnston— Pearisburg 1945 CP 19 Elementary, English 4th Grade
Virginia M. Ward—King Johnston 1945 CP 27 Gr. 1 thru 7; History, Social
Studies
6th Grade
Maereen Whitt— Eggleston 1945 CP 22 Elementary; English Head Teacher; 2nd & 3rd
Grades
Loma Lowe— Pearisburg 1944 CP 34 Elementary; Biology, English,
History, Social Studies
4th Grade
Virginia Martin—Kimballton 1943 SL 23 — 1st & 2nd Grades
Eleanor Snapp— Pearisburg 1943 CP 35 Elementary; English, History 2nd Grade
Lucille Meadows—Rich Creek 1943 NP 18 Elementary 5th Grade
Beulah Fox—Glen Lyn 1942 PP 12 Elementary Head Teacher; 3rd, 4th,
5th Grades
Lucy W. Miller—White Gate 1941 CP 20 Elementary; English, Latin, French,
History, Social Studies
Head Teacher; 4th, 5th,
6th Grades
Frances Montague— Penvir 1940 CP 27 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
Head Teacher;
5th, 6th Grades
Constance Thompson—Narrows 1940 CP 23 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
1st Grade
Gladys Jamison— Pembroke 1940 CP 24 Elementary; English 1st Grade
Vivian M. Akers—Bane 1939 CP 23 Elementary; English, History Head Teacher; 1st & 2nd
Grades
A
pp. 17
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued)
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
Total
N a m e a n d S choo l
T ear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm en ts
Rosalinda F arrier—Kimball ton 1938 CP 20 Elementary; English, Geography,
History, Social Science
5th & 6th Grades
Violet Philpott— Pearisburg 1936 CP 28 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
2nd Grade
Myrtle Guynn—Rich Creek 1936 CP 17 Elementary; Biology, English
Social Science, History
3rd Grade
Pauline Frazier—Narrows 1935 CP 12 Elementary Grades 4 to 7 7th Grade
Anne Hendrickson— Pembroke 1935 NP 19 Elementary 2nd Grade
Mary Morrison— Pembroke 1935 NP 19 Elementary 7th Grade
Inez Miller—Newport 1934 NP 13 Elementary 2nd & 3rd Grades
Myrtle Whittaker—Eggleston 1934 NP 15 Elementary 4th & 5th Grades
Edna G. Thompson— Pearisburg 1934 CP 40 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
4th Grade
Virginia Houchins—Narrows 1933 NP 17 Elementary 4th Grade
Jocelle Saunders—Narrows 1933 NP 28 Elementary 6th Grade
Ella Williams—Pembroke 1931 CP 22 Gr. 1 thru 7; English 2nd Grade
Ruth J. Perdue— Eggleston 1931 CP 26 Elementary; English 6 th & 7 th Grades
Jessie B. Givens—Narrows 1930 CP 34 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
2nd & 3rd Grades
A
pp. 18
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued)
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
Total
N a m e a n d School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem ents S u b je c t A ssignm ents
Eliza Miller—Pearisburg 1928 CP 27 Elementary; Biology, English, Soc.
Studies, History, Math
3rd Grade
Ruby Herbert—Narrows 1928 CP 39 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies, Art
5th Grade
Clara Patteson—Narrows 1928 CP 36 Elementary; English, History 7th Grade
Olive Williams— Pearisburg 1928 NP 28 Elementary 1st Grade
Hester Beamer—Narrows 1927 NP 26 Elementary 7th Grade
Margaret Straley—Eggleston 1927 CP 33 Elementary, English, History,
Biology, Social Science
1st & 2nd Grades
Annie Munsey— Pearisburg 1926 CP 17 Elementary 3rd Grade
Mattie Guthrie— Pearisburg 1926 CP 38 Elementary; Biology, English,
Soc. Science, History
1st Grade
Emily Eaton—Bane 1925 CP 39 Grades 1 thru 7 2nd & 3rd Grades
Nancy Allen— Pembroke 1924 CP 40 Elementary, Music, English, History 1st Grade
Nancy Dobyns—White Gate 1924 CP 32 Elementary, English, French,
History, Social Studies
1st, 2nd, 3rd Grades
Nellie V. Wheeler—Narrows 1924 CP 40 Elementary; English, History,
Social Studies
5th Grade
Mary Carman— Pembroke 1923 CP 29 Elementary; English, History 5th Grade
61
'
44
v
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued)
WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
Total
N a m e a n d School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem ents S u b je c t A ssignm ents
Greye Lovall—Narrows 1922 CP 41 Elementary; English 2nd Grade
Margaret Caldwell—Kimballton 1921 CP 17 Elementary 3rd & 4th Grades
Anne Hale— Pembroke 1919 NP 34 Elementary 3rd Grade
Lila J. Guthrie— Pearisburg 1919 CP 45 Elementary; Biology, English
Social Studies
4th Grade
Marguerite Williamson— Pembroke 1919 CP 41 Elementary; English, History 4th Grade
Hollie P. Stowers—Bane 1918 CP 29 Grades 4 thru 7; English,
Social Studies
4th & 5th Grades
Type of Certificate: CP— Collegiate Professional NP—-Normal Professional
PP— Postgraduate Professional SL— Special License
C oll— Collegiate Elem.— Elementary
A
pp. 20
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 6
T otal
WHITE HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS OF ENGLISH AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
N a m e and School
T ear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm ents
Ann Shelton—Giles 1964 CP 3 yrs. English, History, Soc. Studies,
Latin
English
Larry Greer—Narrows 1964 CP 5 History, Soc. Science, Health,
Physical Educ.
Amer. History, Soc. Studies,
assistant football,
basketball, spring sports
Susan von Peachy— Giles 1964 CP 12 English English 10; Developmental
Reading
Pamela Croy— Giles 1963 CP 1 History, Social Science English 11, World History
Arvenie Shutt— Giles 1963 pp 18 Health Educ., History, Soc. Stud. U. S. History, Sociology
Jewell Francis—Giles 1962 CP 2 English, Vocational Health Educ. English 11
Grace Glenn—Giles 1962 CP 9 English, History, Social Science;
Elementary grades 1-7
English 12
Donald Brookman—Narrows 1962 CP 2 Spanish, Social Studies (not
including History)
Economics, Sociology; Soc.
Studies; World Geography
Sybil Kountz— Narrows 1961 CP 2 Art English 8, Art
Joseph Coleman— Giles 1961 pp 7 History & Soc. Science, Gen.
Science, Basic Business
World History, Government
Robert Richards—Giles 1961 PP 10 Music, English, Speech, Sociology, English, Speech
Bioiogy
A
pp. 21
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 6 (continued)
T otal
WHITE HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS OF ENGLISH AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
N a m e a n d School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm ents
Ruby Hylton— Giles 1959 CP 18 English, History, Soc. Science;
Elementary grades 1-7
English 9
Thomas Ballard—Narrows 1959 pp 16 Health, Phy. Educ., History,
Biology, Soc. Studies
Government 12
Nancy Taylor— Giles 1958 CP 7 English English 8, Reading
Carnell Hype—Giles 1957 CP 33 Biology, English, History, Latin,
Soc. Science; all elementary
English 9
Norene Harding— Giles 1957 CP 30 Biology, English, French, History,
Soc. Science; all elementary
English 8
Glorena Rader—Narrows 1955 CP 18 English English 9
Grace Robertson—Giles 1954 pp 11 English, French, History, Soc.
Studies
U. S. History
Claude Goodwin— Giles 1949 CP 8 English, History, Soc. Studies;
Grades 6 & 7
Government, Economics
Jewell Ballard—Narrows 1947 CP 10 English, Soc. Science (not including
History), Gen. Science
English 8 & 10; Reading
Cuba Hardwick—Narrows 1943 CP 33 Biology, English, History English 12
Katheryn Ring—Narrows 1930 CP 19 English, History, Social Studies U. S. History, English 10
A
pp. 22
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 7
T o ta l
WHITE HIGH SCHOOL SCIENCE TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS
1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR
N a m e a n d School
Tear
A p p o in te d
C ertifi
cate
E xp eri
ence S u b je c t E ndorsem ents S u b je c t A ssignm ents
Helen Blankenship—Narrows 1964 CP 0 yrs. Biology, Chemistry M ath, Gen. Science
Jacquelyn Cantley—Giles 1963 CP 6 Biology, Gen. Science Gen. Sci. 8 & 9
William Copley, Jr.—Narrows 1962 Coll. 2 Chemistry, M ath, Physics, Mech.
Drawing
Chemistry, Physics, Mech.
Drawing
Dorothy Johnson— Giles 1962 CP 4 Vocational Home Economics,
Biology, General Science
Gen. Science, Biology
Bobby D. Wilburn— Giles 1960 CP 4 Health, Phy. Educ., Biology Biology
Robert Price—Narrows 1960 pp 4 Biology, Health & Phy. Educ.,
Gen. Sci., Driver Education
Biology, Phy. Educ., head
football coach, assistant
spring sports
Cornelius Burgess—Narrows 1958 CP 9 History, Soc. Sci., Chemistry,
Biology, Physics, Gen. Science
Gen. Sci. 9, Biology
Panco Cantley—Giles 1954 CP 12 Social Studies, History, Biology,
Gen. Science
World Geography, Physics
Clotilde Ballard 1948 pp 40 Chemistry, Biology, Home
Economics, English
Chemistry, Biology
A
pp. 23
App. 24
STATEMENT OF POSITION OF PLAINTIFFS
[Filed June 22, 1965]
The position of the plaintiffs with respect to the relief
which the Court should grant pursuant to the factual find
ings and legal conclusions reached in its opinion filed on
June 3, 1965, is:
1. Having found that the school board failed to renew
the contracts of the individual plaintiffs for reasons for
bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should
place these plaintiffs as nearly as possible in the position
they would have held but for the school board’s uncon
stitutional action. To do less is to fail to accord these plain
tiffs the protection which the constitution requires that
they have. From the evidence in this case, it appears that if
these plaintiffs had been white they would have been
reemployed for the 1963-64 session and, on a competitive
basis with other teachers in the system, they would have
had a chance for continued employment thereafter.
2. Inasmuch as the normal relief would be reinstate
ment, the burden should be placed on defendants to demon
strate that such relief should not now be given. Plaintiffs
are informed that the defendants have vacancies in several
of the areas in which some of them are certified and that
the defendants have been actively recruiting in an effort to
fill these vacancies.
3. One of the individual plaintiffs is available and anxious
to teach in Giles County in September 1965. Because the
Court’s opinion was handed down after the time for signing
contracts for the 1965-66 school year had passed, the other
six individual plaintiffs have already contracted to teach
elsewhere during the 1965-66 school term. The Court having
found that the seven teachers were discharged because of
App. 25
their race, equitable principles require that the one teacher
now available to work in September be reinstated forthwith
and that the remaining six now under employment with
other school divisions be given an early opportunity to accept
reemployment in the Giles County school system,
4. Being aware that Negro teachers in five counties in
the Western District of Virginia have suffered termination
of employment following the abandonment of special school
facilities for Negro children for the 1965-66 session, the
plaintiff Virginia Teachers Association urges that anything
less than reinstatement or opportunity for reinstatement in
the instant case will fail to deter other school boards from
similar unconstitutional action.
/ s / H enry L. Marsh, III
Of Counsel for Plaintiffs
OPINION
[Filed June 3, 1965]
This action was brought by seven Negro teachers and the
Virginia Teachers Association, Inc., an organization repre
senting Negro teachers throughout the state, against the
County School Board of Giles County, Virginia (herein
after referred to as the School Board) and the Division
Superintendent of Schools of Giles County, Mr. P. E. Ahalt.
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Sections
1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202 of Title 28 and Sections 1981
and 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.
The gist of the complaint is the allegation that the seven
individual plaintiffs were denied re-employment as teachers
by the defendants for the 1964-65 school session because of
their race. The defendants, while denying that they dis
criminated against these individuals, acknowledge that the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
App. 26
States forbids discrimination on account of race by a public
school system with respect to the employment of teachers.
Defendants on their part moved for summary judgment
on the ground that the decision to refuse these teachers
re-employment was wholly within the discretion of the
school authorities. This motion was denied and an evi
dentiary hearing held at which the facts hereinafter stated
were developed.
Giles County lies in the mountains of Appalachia on the
Virginia-West Virginia line to the north and west of R ad
ford, Virginia. Over the last fifteen years the County has
experienced a gradual decline in population, recently con
tributed to by cut-backs in the work force of the Celanese
Corporation, its principal employer, resulting from automa
tion of the Celanese plant. The overall decline in population
was matched by a leveling off and decline in the number of
school age children.
P. E. Ahalt, the Superintendent, was appointed to his
present position in 1953. The evidence shows that through
out the decade 1953-63 Mr. Ahalt was faced with a con
siderable challenge in his efforts to upgrade and improve the
quality of education for all of Giles County’s children. A
program of consolidation of the white schools was carried
out and completed in 1962. Bond issues were fought, de
feated and later passed, with many of the citizens in the
remoter areas apparently resisting the closing of their local
schools. Also throughout this period efforts were made to
upgrade the quality of the schools which were provided for
the County’s approximately 125 Negro students. The evi
dence shows that during Superintendent Ahalt’s term Giles
for the first time provided facilities for the education of
Negro high school students beyond the tenth grade, and
that school building conditions were greatly improved. How
ever, the evidence also shows that the County’s facilities for
App.27
Negro students, the so-called Bluff City Schools, were never
sufficiently satisfactory to warrant accreditation and that the
faculty was, by the Superintendent’s own admission, below
the standard of the other schools. Because of the very small
Negro population of the County (some 400 out of a total
of 17,000), Mr. Ahalt recruited actively, but experienced
great difficulty in attracting teachers to staff the Negro
schools. He testified that his standards for accepting teachers
for these positions were somewhat lower than the standards
he used in screening new white applicants.
This dual school system with all of its difficulties was
ended when in May, 1964, the School Board voted to
abandon the Bluff City Negro schools as the result of the
application of approximately twenty of the Negro high
school students for transfer to the formerly all white high
schools. Following the Board’s decision, the individual plain
tiffs were notified by letters from the Superintendent dated
May 15, 1964 that their jobs had been abolished and that
their services would no longer be needed. It is this dismissal
which plaintiffs complain of, arguing that the decision of
the Superintendent was motivated by considerations for
bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Ahalt has accepted full responsibility for the decision
to discharge these teachers. He acknowledges that the
decision was made only after ‘‘hours of meditation” and
that he “had a lot of misgivings” as to what his procedure
should be. No one can look into a man’s mind and examine
his thought processes. However, in the view which I take
of this case, such delving is unnecessary. Mr. Ahalt has
testified before me and appeared to be an excellent ad
ministrator dedicated to the best interests of the Giles
County school system. However, while I do not question his
allegiance, I am satisfied that his action deprived these
teachers of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
App. 28
Although I sympathize with a school administrator who has
had this very thorny problem thrown upon him after what
appears to have been a long and bitter battle over con
solidation, my duty to assist in the transition from seg
regated to integrated schools requires that I direct him to
re-examine his decision.
This case bears a definite factual and legal relationship to
the case of Brooks, et al. v. School District of City of
Moberly, Missouri, 267 F. 2d 733 (8th C ir.), cert, denied,
361 U.S. 894 (1959), which involved the discharge of
eleven Negro teachers following the closing of the Negro
schools in Moberly. The Court of Appeals there charac
terized as “unusual and somewhat startling” the school
board’s conclusion that of the 109 teachers in the school
system before the closing of the Negro school (98 white and
11 Negro) all of the eleven Negro teachers were less
qualified than any but four of the white teachers and that
these 15 should be discharged. The court went on to uphold
the district court’s determination that the complaint should
be dismissed saying:
. . . we cannot say with certainty here that there was no
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding
and conclusion that the Board acted honestly pursuant
to its rule in awarding the teacher contracts. Brooks,
et al. v. School District of City of Moberly, supra, at
739.
The instant case involves a determination by the Super-
intendant of the Giles County School System that of the
186 teachers in the system prior to the closing of the Negro
schools seven were less suitable for re-employment than the
remaining 179 and that those seven were the seven Negroes.
The question before me is whether in reaching this con
clusion the Superintendent exercised his discretion in such
App. 29
an unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or unlawful manner
as to violate these teachers’ rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In reviewing Mr. Ahalt’s decision, the crucial period was
between early M arch of 1964 when it first became known
that transfers would be applied for and May 15, 1964 when
the formal decision to discharge these teachers was an
nounced. However, the actions taken as the result of the
decision to close the Bluff City schools must be contrasted
with the evidence in the record of prior policy in similar
situations. In particular, the record shows that on a number
of occasions throughout the period preceding the closing
of the Negro schools consolidations of white schools were
carried out and in each instance the white teachers whose
schools had been closed were retained in the school system.
The earlier abandonments indicate to me that the Super
intendent had followed a policy of using teachers from the
abandoned schools in other schools in the system because he
viewed the system as basically homogeneous, by which I
mean that in normal circumstances he would transfer
teachers between the various schools to suit the needs of the
system rather than considering the teachers in the abandoned
schools as unemployed and potentially available for any
openings that might occur in the other schools. There are
other indications of this policy in the record. Teachers have
been shifted from school to school when and as needed.
This system of shifting faculty personnel must have been used
widely in the school years immediately prior to and following
the 1962-63 school year when thirteen elementary teachers
were eliminated to remedy the overstaffing in the elementary
schools which had resulted from the series of consolidations.
In order to adjust to an overstaffed condition and then to
readjust following the elimination of that problem the sys
tem and the faculty must have had a great deal of flexibility
in assignments.
App. 30
In view of this pre-existing policy, I believe that the
Superintendent’s stated policy with regard to these plain
tiffs, i.e., to evaluate their right to continued employment
in terms of the vacancies then existing in the other schools in
the system rather than by comparison of their effectiveness
with the other teachers in the system was too restrictive
and its use in this particular instance resulted in a discrimina
tion against these individuals. This is not to say that it is
constitutionally required under all circumstances to make
such an overall re-evaluation. However, the making of such
an evaluation is strong evidence of good faith, see Brooks,
et al., supra, at 736, and where, as here, the school board
has carried on a policy of retaining teachers (although the
result in one instance was admitted over-staffing) and has
eliminated teachers only after evaluation of their qualifica
tions in comparison with those of all of the other teachers in
the system, it is extremely difficult to justify the standard
used in this case in the absence of any evidence in the record
which would justify a change of policy on other than racial
grounds. The evidence established that the closing of the
Negro schools necessitated a reduction in the teaching staff.
Accepting the defendants’ contention that the individual
plaintiffs were not qualified for any of the positions opening
up as the result of turnover, the Superintendent did not
explain why these teachers were not evaluated and com
pared with all of the other teachers in the system who taught
in areas in which the plaintiffs could teach in accordance
with his prior practice in making these decisions.
My conclusion that the scope and nature of the Superin
tendent’s evaluation of these teachers was arbitrary and re
sulted in a discrimination against them makes it unnecessary
for me to review at any length the evidence offered by the
plaintiff that in fact there was never a real evaluation of
teaching qualifications and that in deciding to discharge all
App. 31
seven of these teachers the Superintendent considered only
the closing of the Negro schools. There is evidence from
which such a conclusion could be inferred. The letter sent
to the individual plaintiffs refers solely to the abolition of their
jobs because of the closing of the Bluff city schools without
any reference to an evaluation or to any possibility that they
could be employed in the previously all-white schools. As
the Superintendent must have been aware that there would
be vacancies before the opening of the school year and as he
could not then know exactly who would be available to fill
these vacancies, his abrupt termination of the employment
of these plaintiffs is suspect. It certainly must be contrasted
with the termination of the thirteen white elementary
teachers in 1962-63 who defendants stated in their brief
then formed a “pool” against future needs.
Similarly, I will not review at length the parties’ attempts
to compare the respective qualifications of the individual
plaintiffs and the fifteen new teachers hired by the Superin
tendent for the 1964-65 school year. It does appear that
several of the individual plaintiffs were better qualified con
sidering only their certifications and experience than some
of the people who were subsequently hired. However, these
new people were hired at various times both before and after
the termination of the employment of the individual plain
tiffs and there is no indication that the Superintendent ever
made a comparison of the qualifications of all of these
teachers before asked to do so at the hearing in this matter
by his attorney. In this factual posture there is nothing to
be gained by the court’s speculating upon the subjective
qualifications of the individuals involved, except to note
again that the finality with which the individual plaintiffs
employment was terminated, in light of the Superintendent s
obvious knowledge that new teachers would have to be hired,
reflects badly upon the basis for that decision.
App. 32
Perhaps the most difficult problem to be solved in this
litigation is how to remedy the discrimination against the
individual plaintiffs. Involved is the difficult problem of
weighing the interests of the teachers, all of whom have
found other employment, against the possible detrimental
effects of an order re-employing them upon the adminis
tration of the schools and the efficiency of their staffs. The
problem of the Negro teacher in the predominantly white
classroom has always been in the background in this litiga
tion. The Superintendent’s decision purportedly was not
based upon a consideration of potential difficulties arising
from this situation but only upon the qualifications of the
individuals involved. Therefore, there could be no justifica
tion of his initial decision on these grounds. However, as
some further action will have to be taken by him regarding
these individuals because of the court’s order in this matter,
some discussion will help to serve as a guideline to his future
decisions.
The courts of the fourth circuit have dealt before with
the very closely related problem of integrating the teaching
staffs of larger school systems as a proper means of putting an
end to the operation of schools on a racially segregated basis.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward
County, 339 F. 2d 486 (4th Gir. 1964), Jackson v. School
Board of City of Lynchburg, 321 F. 2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963) ;
Christmas v. Board of Education of Elarford County, 231
F. Supp. 331 (D. Md. 1964). This court has in the past
approved plans calling for the desegregation of teaching
staffs as in the plan finally adopted by the Lynchburg City
School Board on M arch 10, 1964. The court of appeals has
commended action designed to eliminate considerations of
race in personnel actions of school systems. See Brooks v.
County School Board of Arlington County, 324 F. 2d 303,
306 (4th Cir. 1963). However, this court, in approving
App. 33
plans aiming at the eventual desegregation of teaching
staffs, has been mindful of the problems to be overcome be
fore a totally color-blind assignment policy can be put into
effect and has left preliminary consideration of this matter to
the school authorities. In its recent opinion in Bradley v.
School Board of the City of Richmond,—F. 2d— (4th
Cir. 1965), the Court of Appeals supports a cautious ap
proach to this problem. The court at page— laid down the
following guidelines for the district courts:
When all direct discrimination in the assignment of
pupils has been eliminated, assignment of teachers may
be expected to follow the racial patterns established in
the schools. An earlier judicial requirement of general
reassignment of all teaching and administrative per
sonnel need not be considered until the possible detri
mental effects of such an order upon the administration
of the schools and the efficiency of their staffs can be
appraised along with the need for such an order in aid
of protection of the constitutional rights of pupils.
Potentially the reinstatement of these plaintiffs poses very
similar problems to those raised in the Bradley opinion.
Possible detrimental effects should be considered by the
school authorities in the first instance before any decision
is made to integrate teaching staffs. On the record before
me this has not been done by the Giles County authorities
and the remedy will afford them an opportunity to make
this evaluation. However, mere possibilities of difficulty
should not be used as an excuse to disregard the rights of
the Negro teachers. The burden of integration must not be
shifted to their backs alone.*
*By letter to counsel dated June 17, 1965, the District Court revised
this sentence to read, “The burden of integration must not be shifted
to them.
App. 34
W hat is required is an intelligent appraisal of the capacity
of the individuals involved to perform their true function—
to educate their pupils. The rights of the pupils to the best
possible educational opportunity are of paramount im
portance. Bald assertions of incompetency to perform this
function, however, are not substitutes for reasoned analysis
of the individual situations and an unwillingness to experi
ment to test the validity of a conclusion may well be con
sidered as an admission of the weakness of that conclusion.
Turning to the specific relief which will be ordered to
remedy the discrimination practiced against these seven
teachers this court is mindful of the admonition of the Su
preme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S.
294, 300 (1955) that courts are to be guided by equitable
principles and that equity has been characterized by a prac
tical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. The
interests of the individual plaintiffs in this litigation would
be best served by placing them as nearly as possible in the
positions that they occupied immediately before their dis
charge. In this instance that would require that the Superin
tendent re-evaluate the teaching qualifications of these in
dividuals in comparison with all of the other teachers in
the school system. However, these individuals have all ac
cepted other teaching employment and the record is by no
means clear as to how many of these people would now
accept jobs in the Giles County school system were they
offered. Furthermore, for the Superintendent to attempt to
reconstruct an entirely hypothetical situation as of the date
of the discrimination or in the alternative to involve people
employed since that date in a complete evaluation would
result in a great burden upon him and the school system be
cause of its unsettling effect on the present faculty who would
be potentially in danger of losing their jobs. I will not order
App. 35
such a review under these facts and the plaintiffs very rea
sonably have not insisted upon it.
W hat seems appropriate under the facts of this case is
a general injunction against further discrimination in carry
ing out personnel practices by the school system coupled
with a system of preferential hiring to protect the interests
of the individual teachers. I will order the defendants to
carry out the following procedure in employing new teachers
for a period of one year from the date of the entry of the
final order in this case.
Upon the occurrence of any vacancy in the teaching staff
within this period the Superintendent will write to each of
the individual plaintiffs who are certified or experienced in
the area of the vacancy inquiring whether that individual
would be available to fill the vacant position and would like
to be considered for it. Should any affirmative replies be
received, the Superintendent will be directed to consider
the qualifications of that individual or individuals together
with the qualifications of any other persons who have applied
for the position. Should his decision be to offer the position
to an applicant other than one of the individual plaintiffs,
he is to notify the plaintiffs who have applied of his decision
and submit a written statement of his reasons to this court as
soon as possible. The court will then review his decision on
the basis of his statement and either affirm his decision, in,
which case an offer may be made to the applicant selected,
or will ask him to reconsider if it appears that his action
was arbitrary. Any such statement will of course remain
completely confidential for the protection of the individuals
involved. However, should this court affirm a decision of
the Superintendent to employ someone other than one of
the individual plaintiffs based upon such a statement, any
plaintiff who has been denied re-employment may request
a copy of the statement and a formal hearing at which to
App. 36
challenge the Superintendent’s decision before this court.
This procedure, although involved, should prove little
burden to the Superintendent in practice because of the few
individuals involved and its short duration. By this pro
cedure those of the individual plaintiffs who are interested
in teaching in the Giles County school system will have the
opportunity of receiving a re-evaluation of their teaching
ability. They will not, however, be guaranteed a position
if there are other teachers available who are better quali
fied. This variance from the plaintiffs’ requested injunction
seems clearly warranted in order to protect the interests of
the pupils who are also innocent parties in this litigation.
Nothing heretofore said has attempted to distinguish the
cases of Mary A. Franklin or Sylvia D. Austin from the other
five individual plaintiffs. There was some testimony taken
as to each of these individuals regarding their possible un
suitability for employment. However, as the Superintendent
is being asked to review his conclusions as to five of the
teachers should they express their interest in re-employment,
there can be no harm in treating these individuals similarly.
The record developed thus far as to the reliability of plaintiff
Mary A. Franklin is not sufficiently detailed for the court
to rule that she was not discriminated against. The Superin
tendent may have a different view of the importance of her
indiscretion against a different background. There is also
evidence that the plaintiff Sylvia D. Austin was notified
as early as M arch of 1964 that her work was unsatisfactory
and that her contract would not be renewed. However,
there is nothing in the record before me to indicate how
deeply the Superintendent was embroiled in the overall con
troversy when this decision was made and there seems no
harm in directing him to reconsider her qualifications if she
requests it by applying for a position which he has notified
her is vacant.
App. 37
The final prayer of the complaint is that the defendants
be required to pay the plaintiffs’ counsel fees incurred in this
litigation. Suffice it to say that this school board has not
been unreasonable or obdurately obstinate. See Bradley v.
School Board of the City of Richmond, supra, at p. 10.
Quite the contrary, the school board has been extremely
reasonable in its handling of this novel and difficult legal
problem as has been its counsel. It follows, therefore, that
no allowance for attorneys’ fees should be made.
/ s / T homas J. M ichie
United States District Judge
June 3, 1965.
ORDER
[Entered June 23, 1965]
For the reasons set forth in the opinion of this court ren
dered in the above-styled case on June 3, 1965, it is
Ordered
that the defendants and their successors be permanently re
strained and enjoined from discriminating on the basis of
race in the selection or retention of teachers for the Giles
County School System, and further
Ordered
that the defendants and their successors be restrained and
enjoined for a period of two years from the entry of this
order from employing any teacher in the Giles County
School System who is not presently on the payroll unless
the following preliminary procedures are carried ou t:
(1) Upon the occurrence of any faculty vacancy in the
Giles County School System the Superintendent will write
App. 38
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to
those of the individual plaintiffs in this action who are certi
fied or experienced in the area of the vacancy inquiring
whether that individual or individuals would be interested
in being considered by him for that position under the pro
cedures set forth in this order;
(2) A plaintiff, upon receipt of such an inquiry from the
Superintendent, shall have ten (10) days within which to
reply if said plaintiff wishes to be considered for the vacancy;
(3) Upon the receipt of an affirmative reply or replies
to any such inquiry, the Superintendent will evaluate the
qualifications of each of the plaintiffs who have expressed
their desire to be considered together with those of any
other teachers who have applied for the position to be filled
and shall make his decision as to which of the applicants is
better qualified for the position following his normal pro
cedures ;
(4) Should the Superintendent decide that an applicant
other than one of the individual plaintiffs has superior quali
fications he shall forthwith prepare and send to the court
a written statement of his reasons for so deciding together
with a copy of a letter to be sent to the individual plaintiffs
involved informing them of the decision not to re-employ
them;
(5) Upon receipt of such a statement, the court will
forthwith either affirm the decision of the Superintendent
in which case an offer may be made to the individual to be
hired, or, should the court conclude from the statement that
the Superintendent’s decision was arbitrary, the matter will
be remanded to the Superintendent for further considera
tion;
(6) Any individual plaintiff aggrieved by a decision of
App. 39
the Superintendent not to re-employ him may by letter
inform this court of his objection. Upon being informed of
an objection the court will supply the objecting plaintiff
with a copy of the Superintendent’s statement. A date may-
then be set for a hearing at which the plaintiff and the
Superintendent may present material evidence;
(7) Following any hearing held the court will enter a
formal order either affirming the decision of the Superin
tendent or ordering the hiring of the individual plaintiff who
was denied re-employment for racially discriminatory
reasons.
Enter: June 23, 1965.
/ s / T homas J. M ichie
United States District Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that Mary A. Franklin and all
others of the plaintiffs in this case,
Hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit from so much of the order of this Court,
entered June 23, 1965, as fails (1) to grant prayers num
bered 3 and 5 of the complaint or (2) to otherwise require
the defendants to employ the individual plaintiffs as teachers
in the public school system of Giles County, Virginia, at
some future time and to award to the plaintiffs reasonable
attorney fees.
H enry L. M arsh, III
Of Counsel for Plaintiffs
S. W. T ucker
H enry L. Marsh , III
214 East Clay Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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