Franklin v. Giles County, VA School Board Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1965

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Franklin v. Giles County, VA School Board Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant, 1965. 82c83153-b29a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c2550611-62a8-4f9a-88a9-67534f465e31/franklin-v-giles-county-va-school-board-brief-and-appendix-on-behalf-of-appellant. Accessed October 09, 2025.
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BRIEF AND APPENDIX ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT IN TH E United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit No. 10,214 MARY A. FRANKLIN, et a l , Appellants, v. COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, ETAL, Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia S. W. T ucker H enry L. M arsh, II I 214 East Clay Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Attorneys for Appellants Page St a t e m e n t of t h e C a s e ....................................................................................... 1 T h e Q u e s t io n P r e s e n t e d ................................................................................ 3i St a t e m e n t o f F a c t s .............................................................................................. 3 A. The Dismissal of Plaintiffs..................................... - ................ 3 B. The Hiring of New Teachers.................................................. 4 A r g u m e n t ............................................................................................ 10 I. The Pleadings and the Evidence Require A Finding That Plaintiffs Were Denied Re-employment Solely Because of Their Race........................... -.................................................. 10 II. Nothing Short of Reinstatement Will Redress the Depriva tion of the Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights............................... 12 C o n c l u s io n ............................................................................................................... 15 TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Corbin v. County School Board, 177 F. 924 (4th Cir. 1949) ......... 13 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218.................................................................................................. 14 State ex. rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) ..................... 14 Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Steel Workers of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963) ................................ 14 Watson v. Burnett, 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E. (2d) 420 (1939) ........... 14 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ...................................... 14 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 28 United States Code 1343 ............................................................... 13 29 United States Code 160 ........................... .......... ..... ........... ....... 15 42 United States Code 1983 ........................................................ ..... . 12 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 604 ..................................... .......... 15 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 706 .......................... ................... 15 INDEX TO APPENDIX Complaint....................... 1 Request for Admissions.............................................................. 7 Answer to Request for Admissions ................................................... 8 Excerpts from Transcript of Trial Proceedings.......................... ..... 9 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 4 ..................................................... ............... 13 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ........... 14 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 6 ........................... ............................... ......... 21 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 7 ......... ................................. .................. ....... 23 Statement of Position of Plaintiffs .................................................. . 24 Opinion of District Court ................................................................. 25 Order of District Court..... ......... ........... .................................. ......... 37 Notice of Appeal.... ............................................................................ 39 Other Authorities IN THE United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit No. 10,214 MARY A. FRANKLIN, e t a l ., v. Appellants, COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD OF GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, ET AL., Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS STATEMENT OF THE CASE This litigation was commenced on July 29, 1964, by the complaint of the seven Negro teachers who, until the close of the 1963-64 school session, had constituted the faculties of the Negro elementary and high schools of Giles County, Virigina, which schools were then and thereafter to be terminated. Joined as plaintiff, and seeking relief on behalf of its constituents, was the Virginia Teachers Association, Incorporated, which is composed of those members of the teaching profession residing in the State of Virginia who are Negroes. Alleging that the defendants, the County 2 School Board of Giles County and its Division Superin tendent of Schools, had elected to dispense with the services of the plaintiff teachers solely because of their race, the individual plaintiffs sought a mandate requiring their rein statement as teachers in the public school system of Giles County during the 1964-65 session and other and general relief. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment and mo tion to dismiss, filed on August 3, were denied at a pre-trial conference held on October 3, 1964. The case was heard on its merits on December 28, 1964, and, in response to the request of the Court, counsel for the respective parties filed briefs on February 15, and presented oral argument on M arch 11, 1965. On June 7, the District Judge filed his opinion dated June 3, 1965, finding that the action of the Superintendent “deprived these teachers of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” By a “Statement of Position of Plaintiffs” filed on June 22, counsel urged that “the Court should place these plaintiffs as nearly as possible in the position they would have held but for the School Board’s unconstitutional action” and that “ [ijnasmuch as the normal relief would be reinstatement, the burden should be placed on the defendants to demonstrate that such relief should not now be given.” (App. 25.) The order of the District Court, entered June 23, 1965, does not direct the reinstatement of the plaintiff teachers or afford them any certainty that they or any of them will ever again be employed as teachers in the Giles County school system. Relief to them as individuals was limited to an assurance of an opportunity to make application for any teaching position which may become vacant during the next two years and the further opportunity, in this action, to obtain judicial review of the Superintendent’s decision with respect to the several applications for such position. (App. 38.) 3 On July 23, 1965, the plaintiffs filed notice of their appeal to this Court from the order of the District Court insofar as it fails to require the school board to employ the individ ual plaintiffs as teachers in the public school system of Giles County, Virginia. (App. 40.) THE QUESTION PRESENTED Does the “Act To Enforce The Provisions Of The Four teenth Amendment” contemplate the reinstatement of a teacher whom the school board refused to reemploy solely because of race? STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The Dismissal of Plaintiffs As the 1963-64 school session drew to a close, all of Giles County’s approximately 125 Negro children of public school age were attending the Bluff City Elementary School or the Bluff City High School, the faculties of which consisted of the seven individual plaintiff teachers. Never had Negro children attended public school with white children; neither had any Negro been employed to teach white children in the public schools. However, between M arch 15 and April 30, 1964, twenty- three Negro children had made application to the state’s Pupil Placement Board that they be assigned to the Giles County High School. Thus faced with the ominous prospect that white and colored children would attend the same school, the School Board at its meeting of May 5, 1964, ordered the discontinuance of the Bluff City schools for Negroes and directed the Division Superintendent to notify each of the seven Negro teachers that his services would not be needed after the close of the 1963-64 session. The discontinuance of one or more public schools was not a new experience. But the abrupt termination of the 4 employment of the teachers at a school so discontinued was without precedent. These facts and their significance are discussed in the opinion of the District Court, viz.: “ [T ]he record shows that on a number of occasions throughout the period preceding the closing of the Negro schools consolidations of white schools were carried out and in each instance the white teachers whose schools had been closed were retained in the school system. The earlied aban donments indicate to me that the Superintendent had fol lowed a policy of using teachers from the abandoned schools in other schools in the system because he viewed the system as basically homogeneous, by which I mean that in normal circumstances he would transfer teachers between the var ious schools to suit the needs of the system rather than con sidering the teachers in the abandoned schools as unem ployed and potentially available for any openings that might occur in the other schools. There are other indications of this policy in the record. Teachers have been shifted from school to school when and as needed. This system of shifting faculty personnel must have been used widely in the school years immediately prior to and following the 1962-63 school year when thirteen elementary teachers were eliminated to remedy the overstaffing in the elementary schools which had resulted from the series of consolidations. In order to adjust to an overstaffed condition and then to readjust fol lowing the elimination of that problem the system and the faculty must have had a great deal of flexibility in assign ments.” (App. 30.) B. The Hiring of New Teachers At least four elementary teachers, three high school teachers of English and/or Social Sciences, and one high school science teacher were employed effective with the commencement of the 1964-65 session. All of these new 5 employees were white. The qualifications of six of these newly employed teachers and the contrasting qualifications of the seven plaintiff teachers, as revealed by the evidence, will be next shown. Carolyn Chaffin Johnston, race white, age 25, was em ployed in September, 1964 to teach the third grade. She was not a college graduate and had no previous teaching experience. She merely held a Special License, having been certified by the State Board to teach specific area subjects. (App. 14, PL Ex. 5.) Concerning her, the Superintendent testified: “Carolyn Johnston did her practice teaching at Pearis- burg Elementary School in the immediate preceding school year 1963-64. At the time she made applica tion she listed that she would be a graduate from Radford College in the summer of 1964. I, as I recall, had interviewed her as I had interviewed a number of teachers previous to the actual close of the Negro schools and had made a commitment to Carolyn Johnston for employment. The observation of her principal, her supervising teacher and my supervisor indicated that she would be a very good teacher. . . . She is listed as not a graduate because she had dif ficulty with biology, a subject that is not at all kin to the elementary work she is teaching. She ended up with passing biology but she ended up with not enough quality points to be a graduate. * * 1 * “. . . I made a commitment to this lady for employ ment. * * * “ [T ]he lady was at work two weeks before I knew she wasn’t a college graduate when I got into the matter of getting a certificate for her.” (Tr. 66, 67.) * * * 6 “We made commitments for employment when we believed that she would be a degreed person.” (Tr. 92.) By way of contrast, the evidence (A. 13, PI. Ex. 4) shows that each of the individual plaintiffs had a Collegiate Pro fessional Certificate, four of them being endorsed for Ele mentary Education, and that the teaching experience of the four having Elementary Education ranged from four to forty years. Dorothy Harvey, race white, age 23, was employed in September, 1964, to teach the third grade. She held a Collegiate Professional Certificate endorsed for History and English, and had no previous teaching experience. (App. 14, PI. Ex. 5.) Concerning her, the Superintendent testified: “Mrs. Dorothy Harvey had been promised work in January of 1964. * * * “I made a commitment to her. I finally did not place her in the area of certification but in an area in which she is doing a satisfactory job.” (Tr. 90, 91.) * * * “The understanding that I had with Mrs. Harvey was that she would be considered for such vacancies as occurred.” (Tr. 99.) Four of the plaintiffs had Collegiate Professional Cer tificates endorsed for Elementary Education and had pre vious teaching experiences which ranged from four to forty years. Moreover, the plaintiff Sylvia J. Harvey, whose Col legiate Professional Certificate was endorsed for Social Science had five years’ experience and the plaintiff, Spivey, whose Collegiate Professional Certificate was endorsed for Business Education and Social Studies, had completed one 7 year of employment in the system when Dorothy Harvey was employed. (App. 13, PI. Ex. 4.) Grover DeHart, race white, age 30, sex male, was em ployed in September 1964 to teach the seventh grade. He had no previous teaching experience and did not hold a Collegiate Professional Certificate. His Collegiate Certifi cate was endorsed for Elementary Education, Sixth and Seventh Grades. (App. 14, PI. Ex. 5.) The Superintendent testified: “Grover DeHart has lived all the time in the county and a former employee of industry who made himself available early in the school year of 1963-64, went to summer school and is well qualified in his area of in struction having been a personnel—having worked with personnel with a major in sociology.” (Tr. 92.) The vacancy which Grover DeHart was employed to fill would not have occurred except for the decision not to re employ any of the seven Negro teachers, four of whom had objective qualifications for teaching elementary education which were superior to those of Grover DeHart. Nancy Morgan, race white, age 33, was employed in September 1964 to teach the first grade. She held a Col legiate Professional Certificate, the subject endorsement on which was Art. She had had two years’ previous teaching experience. (App. 14, PI. Ex. 5.) The Superintendent testi fied: “Nancy’s Morgan’s home has always been in Narrows. Her teaching experience has been in eastern Virginia and I am not certain whether it was in the City of Norfolk, Norfolk County, or Princess Anne. She had the misfortune of having her home broken up and she came home. She wanted an assignment the previous school year but I had none for her.” (Tr. 77, 78.) * * * 8 “Mrs. Nancy Morgan although she was certified in art had done all of her teaching in eastern Virginia as a primary teacher in the area in which I placed her. I had made a commitment to her as early as July in the pre vious year but did not find a job for her the previous year and she served as a substitute during that year, the year previous to this year.” (Tr. 91.) No objective consideration was suggested for withholding preference for this position from either of the four Negro teachers who were certified in Elementary Education and who had teaching experience which ranged from four to forty years. (App. 13, PL Ex. 4.) Ann Shelton, race white, age 43, was employed in Sep tember 1964 to teach English at Giles High School. She had three years’ previous experience. Her Collegiate Professional Certificate was endorsed for English, History, Social Studies and Latin. (App. 22, PI. Ex. 6.) As to her the Superin tendent testified: “Mrs. Ann Shelton had not worked under my super vision. She had done extensive substitute work in my period of time in the county and had been promised an assignment. I might mention that she and her husband had run a variety store and they had made the decision to close the business and it made her available for sub stitute and full time teaching.” (Tr. 89.) The plaintiff Franklin was certified in English and Social Science in high school and had forty years’ teaching experience. The plaintiff Leftwich was certified in English and had eighteen years’ experience which included the teaching of English in Giles County. The plaintiff Woodliff was certified in English and had four years’ teaching ex perience which included the teaching of English in Giles County. (App. 13, PI. Ex. 4.) 9 Helen Blankenship, race white, age 23, was employed in September 1964 to teach Mathematics and General Science in the eighth grade at Narrows High School. Her Collegiate Professional Certificate was endorsed for Biology and Chem istry. She had no previous teaching experience. (App. 24, PI. Ex. 7.) The Superintendent had this to say concerning her: “I feel that in fairness since I was questioned about Helen Blankenship that I would like to make a state ment about her status. I committed myself to her as early as last January but actually she was placed the day before school opened after a principal at Narrows High School resigned and after it was necessary for me to reshuffle my faculty there and I had no math person at that time who was available. She was certified in Science. She was a graduate of Narrows High School and as a student had done an outstanding job in math. We had no hesitancy that she would not do a good job in m ath.” (Tr. 71.) * * * “Her mother is a teacher. * * * “She is not certified in mathematics. * * * “She is teaching eighth grade general math which is arithmetic.” (Tr. 77.) Two of the seven Negro teachers (Leftwich and Woodliff) were teaching Mathematics when the School Board decided not to reemploy them. Two others (Montgomery and Austin) had certification similar to that of Helen Blanken ship and, in addition, had eight years’ and three years’ teach ing experience, respectively. (App. 13, PL Ex. 4.) The fail ure to retain the Negro teachers (as earlier the thirteen white elementary teachers had been retained (Tr. 72-77, 102- 10 103)) created the occasion for the last minute employment of Helen Blankenship. ARGUMENT I The Pleadings And The Evidence Require A Finding That Plaintiffs Were Denied Re-employment Solely Because Of Their Race The District Court erroneously perceived the question before it as being whether, in reaching the conclusion that the seven Negro teachers were less suitable for re-employ ment than any of the 179 white teachers, “the Superintend ent exercised his discretion in such an arbitrary, capricious or unlawful manner as to violate these teachers’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” (App. 29, 30.) By considering that as the question (and painstakingly concluding “that the scope and nature of the Superintendent’s evaluation of these teachers was arbitrary and resulted in a discrimination against them” (App. 31 )), the District Court avoided de cision of the factual issue tendered by the pleadings which, at the outset of the opinion, had been correctly assessed, viz.: “The gist of the complaint is the allegation that the seven individual plaintiffs were denied re-employment as teachers by the defendants for the 1964-65 school session because of their race.” (App. 26.) Neither by their motion to dismiss nor by their answer did the defendants suggest that the Superintendent made any evaluation of the plaintiff teachers at any time. The District Court’s opinion (App. 31) notes that “the Superintendent did not explain why these teachers were not evaluated and compared with all of the other teachers in the system who taught in areas in which the plaintiffs could teach in ac cordance with his prior practice in making these decisions.” Further, there was “evidence offered by the plaintiffs that 11 in fact there never was a real evaluation of teaching qualifi cations and that in deciding to discharge all seven of these teachers the Superintendent considered only the closing of the Negro schools.” The opinion continues: “There is evi dence from which such a conclusion could be inferred. The letter sent to the individual plaintiffs refers solely to the abo lition of their jobs because of the closing of the Bluff City schools without any reference to an evaluation or to any possibility that they could be employed in the previously all-white schools.” (App. 31, 32.) To avoid meeting the crucial factual issue in the case, the District Court undertook to discuss the adequacy of an “evaluation” which the pleadings do not mention and which, according to the evidence, simply did not occur. The allegation of Paragraph 12 of the Complaint that “ [t]he defendants elected to dispense with the services of [the individual plaintiffs] . . . solely because they are Negroes . . .” (App. 5), although formally denied in the answer, was clearly established. The affidavit of the Super intendent of Schools, filed August 19, 1964 in support of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concludes in these words: “When the relatively few Negro children being taught by these plaintiffs in separate schools were assigned to the previously all-white schools, availability of teaching positions for the plaintiffs no longer existed in a school system which has been employing fewer teachers each year for the past five years.” (App. R. 11.) The plaintiffs’ request for admissions established that on May 15, 1964, the Superintendent of Schools notified each of these teachers that the closing of the Bluff City schools and the placement of the Negro children in other schools 12 “make it necessary to abolish your job.” The letters of notification concluded with these words: “May I take this opportunity to thank you for the years of service rendered the School Board of Giles County and the children of your race.” (App. 7.) The opinion of the District Court points out that, in view of the Superintendent’s awareness that there would be vacancies for the 1964-65 session, “his abrupt termination of the employment of these plaintiffs is suspect. It certainly must be contrasted with the termination of the thirteen white elementary teachers in 1962-63 who defendants stated in their brief then formed a ‘pool’ against future needs. * * * It does appear that several of the individual plaintiffs were better qualified considering only their certification and experience than some of the people who were subsequently hired.” (App. 32.) The complaint and the evidence require the unequivocal statement of an unavoidable finding of fact, viz.: that the defendant School Board terminated the employment of the plaintiff teachers and declined to reemploy them in the Giles County school system solely because of race and color. It is that actual occurrence (not the imagined but nonexistent “evaluation” ) which the Court is called upon to redress. II Nothing Short Of Reinstatement Will Redress The Deprivation Of The Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Right Unquestionably, a state may not refuse to employ any individual solely because of his race. The District Court’s opinion observed that “ [t]he defendants, while denying that they discriminated against these individuals, acknowl edge that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids discrimination on account of 13 race by a public school system with respect to the employ ment of teachers.” (App. 26, 27.) If, as has been shown, the School Board did in fact refuse to re-employ the plaintiff teachers solely because of their race, then the only question of law confronting the Court is the measure of relief to which they are entitled. When, in 1871, the Congress passed “An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con stitution of the United States” (42 U.S.C. 1983), it ordained that if a person under color of state law, custom or usage subjected any person to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution, the person so offending shall be liable to the party injured in a “proper proceeding for redress.” The district courts have original jurisdiction to “redress the deprivation” under color of state law, custom and usage, of any right, privilege or im munity secured by the Constitution (28 U.S.C. 1343). This Court has succinctly stated the intent of the Congress, viz.: “Whenever the forbidden racial discrimination rears its head, a solemn duty to strike it down is imposed upon the Court” (Corbin v. County School Board, 111 F. 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1949)). Forbidden racial discrimination reared its head in the Giles County school system on May 14, 1964, when the School Board decided to dispense with the services of the seven Negro teachers pursuant to its custom which pre cluded the employment of Negroes as teachers for white children. Because she is a Negro, the plaintiff Franklin, a resident of Pearisburg in Giles County, must travel to Bedford County (at least 75 miles) for professional em ployment (Tr. 4, 6). Because they are Negroes the other plaintiffs are denied professional employment in Giles County. That forbidden racial discrimination continues be cause the District Court failed to grant the only relief by 14 which the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights could be effectively redressed. The propriety of a mandatory injunction directing rein statement of a teacher whose statutory protection against the denial of re-employment was breached is discussed in Watson v. Burnett, 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E. (2d) 420 (1939). There, as here, the invasion of the right would not sustain an action for compensatory damages. There the court stated and followed the rule which has been applicable in this case ever since August 19, 1964, when the defendants filed the affidavit of the Superintendent of schools (R. 10) in dicating that availability of teaching positions for Negroes ceased to exist upon the assignment of the Negro children to previously all white schools, viz.: “Where the rights of a party are clear and where ac tion rather than inaction is essential to maintain the status quo of the parties and to avoid irreparable in jury, a court of equity may properly issue a temporary mandatory injunction.” (23 N.E. (2d) at 424) In State ex rel Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) the Supreme Court reviewed the Indiana court’s refusal of a writ of mandamus to compel reinstatement of a teacher and held that the repeal of the Teacher’s Tenure Law was an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of con tracts. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the Court reversed the denial of the school teachers’ prayer for a mandatory injunction directing state officers to pay their salaries notwithstanding the teachers’ failure to take a loyalty oath, the Court having determined that the require ment of such oath violated Fourteenth Amendment rights. In Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Steel Workers of Chicago, 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. 111. 1963), a 15 mandatory injunction issued to require that Negroes be admitted to an apprenticeship program and be employed, the court having found that governmental involvement in their exclusion brought the plaintiffs within the protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In recent years the Congress has directed that persons wrongfully discharged from employment in certain indus tries be reinstated. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), authorizing the National Labor Relations Board “to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or with out back pay, as will effectuate the policies” of Subchapter II of the Labor Managament Relations Act. See also the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 706 (42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5 (g))> where judicial authority to order reinstatement is preserved if the individual was “expelled or was refused employment or advancement . . . on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” If ever there was justification for reluctance on the part of a Federal court to enter a mandatory injunction when nothing else would effectively redress the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution, that justification ceased to exist when the Supreme Court delivered its May 25, 1964, opinion in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218. CONCLUSION It is fairly predictable that as more and more school boards adopt “freedom of choice” plans for racial desegre gation in efforts to satisfy the requirements of the Depart ment of Health, Education and Welfare, an increasing number of localities will be faced with the transfer of Negro children from all-Negro schools. By virtue of Section 604 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department of Health, 16 Education and Welfare considers itself powerless to pro tect Negro teachers against unwarranted loss of employ ment upon the desegregation of students. Any failure of the federal courts to effectively curb racial discrimination in the employment policies of school boards, as and when the children obtain racially nondiscriminatory school as signments, is likely to be viewed by some Negro teachers as a practical justification for them to discourage the transfer of Negro students from all-Negro schools. The courts can enlist all elements of the school com munity in an effort to desegregate schools—but only by a display of firmness, affording prompt and adequate redress against racially discriminatory hiring practices. This case should be remanded with direction that the School Board be ordered to offer reemployment to each of the plaintiff teachers. Respectfully submitted, S. W. T ucker H enry L. M arsh, III 214 East Clay Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Attorneys for Plaintiffs A P P E N D I X I n T he U nited States D istrict Court For T he Western D istrict of V irginia ROANOKE DIVISION Civil Action N o. 64-c-73-r Mary A. Franklin, Lawrence H. Leftwich, Mary F. M ont gomery, Sylvia J. Harvey, Hugh D. Woodliff, Sylvia D. Austin, Alma G. Spivey and Virginia Teachers Association, Incorporated, Plaintiffs, vs. County School Board of Giles County and P. E. Ahalt, Division Superintendent of Schools of Giles County, Defendants. COMPLAINT [Filed July 29, 1964] 1(a) Jurisdiction is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343. This is a suit in equity, authorized by law (42 USC §1983) to be brought to redress the depriva tion under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus tom or usage, of rights, privileges and immunities secured by Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con stitution of the United States and Title 42, United States Code, Section 1981. 1 (b) Jurisdiction is invoked under Title 28, United States Code, Section 1331. This action arises under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Section 1, and under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, as hereafter more fully appears. The matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds the value of Ten Thousand Dollars. 2. This action is a proceeding under Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2201 and 2202 for a declaratory judg ment that racial discrimination in the employment and as signment of teachers in a public school system is forbidden by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and by Title 42, USC §1981, for relief by injunction restraining the defend ants from refusing to employ the individual plaintiffs for and during the 1964-65 school session, and for relief by injunction restraining the defendants from discriminating on a basis of race with respect to employment of teachers in the public school system. 3. Plaintiffs bring this action in behalf of the individual plaintiffs and, pursuant to Rule 23(a) (3) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, as an action in behalf of persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all before the court; the character of the rights sought to be enforced for the class being several, and there being common questions of law affecting the several rights of the individual plaintiffs and other members of the class, and a common relief being sought. 4. The defendant County School Board of Giles County is a body corporate discharging governmental functions, existing pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the Com monwealth of Virginia. Said school board is empowered and required to establish, maintain, control and supervise an efficient system of public free schools in said county. Among the duties of said board is that of employing teachers and assigning them individually to specified schools. (Con stitution of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133; Code of V ir ginia, 1950, as amended, Title 22.) App. 2 App. 3 5. The defendant P. E. Ahalt is sued in his capacity as Division Superintendent of Schools for Giles County. He holds such office pursuant to the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia as an administrative officer of the public free school system of Virginia. (Constitution of Virginia, Article IX, Section 133; Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, Title 22.) He is under the authority, super vision and control of, and acts pursuant to the orders, policies, customs and usage of, the defendant school board. 6. The plaintiff Virginia Teachers Association, Incor porated, is an association chiefly composed of those mem bers of the teaching profession residing in the State of Vir ginia who are Negroes. Over 8000 of the estimated 8,533 Negroes teaching in public schools in Virginia are members of the Virginia Teachers Association, Incorporated, in good standing. Solely because of race, Negroes are excluded from membership and participation in the Virginia Educational Association which is composed of those members of the teaching profession residing in the State of Virginia who are not Negroes. The purpose of the plaintiff association is to use all means in its power to protect the interest of edu cation in general and to raise the standards of the teaching profession. 7. One interest herein asserted by the plaintiff association is the interest of those of its members who have not hereto fore been employed by the defendant school board but now desire or hereafter may desire employment by the defendant school board. The experience of the plaintiff association and its members is and has been such that it believes, and here alleges, that a school board is unlikely to consider favorably an application for employment from an individual who by prosecuting litigation against the board concerning its em ployment policies might thereby characterize himself as undesirable. The plaintiff association asserts the interest of App. 4 such member or members because the right not to have his application for employment denied on racial grounds might well be lost to the now anonymous member by his mere act of asserting it. 8. Another interest herein asserted by the plaintiff as sociation is the interest of the general class represented by the individual plaintiffs, i. e., Negroes who are qualified to teach in the public schools in Virginia. For the benefit of that class and every person thereof, the plaintiff association here asserts that a school board may not, for reasons of race, discriminate against Negroes in the employment and assign ment of public school teachers. 9. During the 1963-64 school session, each of the in dividual plaintiffs was employed by the defendant school board as a teacher in the Bluff City Elementary School or the Bluff City High School which that board had set apart and maintained for the separate education of all of the Negro children of Giles County. The only Negroes who as teachers were employed by the defendant school board at the close of that session and the total number of years of such em ployment of each were: Mary A. Franklin............................... 30 years Lawrence H. Leftwich 19 years Mary F. Montgomery........................ 8 years Sylvia J. Harvey................................... 5 years Hugh D. Wood li IT............................... 4 years Sylvia D. Austin................................... 3 years Alma G. Spivey................................... 1 year 10. Following action by the Pupil Placement Board of Virginia by which several Negro children living in Giles County were assigned to Giles High School for the 1964-65 session, the defendant school board, on May 5, 1964, directed that operation of Bluff City Elementary School and Bluff City High School be discontinued after the close of the 1963- App. 5 64 school session. By letters from the defendant Division Superintendent of Schools dated May 15, 1964, each of the persons named in the next preceding paragraph was notified that his services would not be needed after the close of the 1963-64 school session. 11. Under and by virtue of a long standing policy, prac tice, custom and usage prevailing through the Common wealth of Virginia (unbroken except in Arlington County and the City of Alexandria within recent years), and par ticularly in the County of Giles, Negroes (regardless what the individual qualifications may be) are not and have not been assigned to teach in public schools which white children attend. 12. The defendants elected to dispense with the services of all of the persons who had previously taught at the Bluff City Elementary and High Schools solely because they are Negroes and because the defendants have had, have, and unless enjoined from so doing will continue to have and to follow, the above mentioned policy, practice, custom and usage which precludes the employment and assignment of any Negro to teach in a public school which white children attend. 13. The said policy, practice, custom and usage of the defendants constitutes an arbitrary denial of the property right of each person of the class represented by the plain tiffs to fair and proper consideration for professional em ployment and a denial of the right of each such person to the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and contrary to Section 1981 of Title 42 of the United States Code. 14. The individual plaintiffs and all persons of the class represented by the plaintiffs are suffering irreparable injury and are threatened with irreparable injury in the future by App. 6 reason of the policy, practice, custom and usage and the actions of the defendants herein complained of. They have no plain, adequate or complete remedy to redress the wrongs and illegal acts herein complained of other than as is herein pursued. Any other remedy to which they could be remitted would be attended by such uncertainties and delays as would deny substantial relief, would involve a multiplicity of suits, and would cause further irreparable injury and damage, vexation and inconvenience. W herefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray: 1. That this cause be advanced on the docket and that a hearing on the prayer for an interlocutory injunction be held as soon as practical. 2. That the court enter a judgment, declaratory of the rights of the individual plaintiffs and the members of the class here represented and of the corresponding obligations of the defendants, that the defendants may not permit con siderations of race to affect the selection and employment or the assignment of persons as teachers in the public school system. 3. That the court enter an interlocutory injunction re straining the defendants from refusing to employ the in dividual plaintiffs, or either of them, as teachers in the public school system of Giles County, Virginia, during the 1964-65 session. 4. That the defendants be permanently restrained and enjoined from failing or refusing to select and hire any per son in any position of employment under the defendants’ control, or otherwise to discriminate against any person with respect to compensation, terms, job assignment, or con ditions or privileges of employment, because of the person’s race or color. App. 7 5. That the defendants pay the costs of this action in cluding a fee for the plaintiffs’ attorneys in such amount as to the court may appear reasonable and proper. 6. That the plaintiffs have such other and further relief as is just. / s / S. W. T ucker Of Counsel for Plaintiffs REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS Under provisions of Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs request that, on or before the 26th day of November, 1964, the defendants make admission of the matters of fact hereinafter set forth : One That under date of May 15, 1964, the defendant Division Superintendent of Schools sent a letter over his signature to each of the individual plaintiffs and that the body of the letter was as follows: “The Giles County School Board on May 5, 1964, by an [sic] unanimous vote, took action to close both the Bluff City Elementary School and the Bluff City High School at the close of the 1963-64 school session. In a special School Board meeting on May 14, 1964, children presently attending these schools were placed by the School Board for the 1964-65 session. “These two actions make it necessary to abolish your job. Please accept this letter as your notification that your services will not be needed after the close of this school session. I shall be glad to discuss this problem with you should you care for a conference. “May I take this opportunity to thank you for the years of service rendered the School Board of Giles County and the children of your race.” * * * App. 8 Three That the factual matter contained in paragraph 9 of the complaint is true. Four That the factual matter contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint is true. H enry L. M arsh, III Of Counsel for Plaintiffs ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS [Served November 24, 1964] For answer to the plaintiffs’ request for admissions under Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, de fendants state as follows: (1) Defendants admit the letter of May 15, 1964 was sent and that the body of the letter as set forth in the request for admissions is correct. * * * (3) Defendants admit that the factual matters contained in paragraph 9 of the complaint are true. (4) Defendants admit that the factual matters contained in paragraph 10 of the complaint are true. Respectfully, County School Board of Giles County and P. E. A halt, Divi sion Superintendent of Schools for Giles County By John H . T hornton, Jr . Of Counsel App. 9 EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL PROCEEDINGS OF DECEMBER 28, 1964 * * * [ t r . p . 6 ] Paul E. A h a l t , called as an adverse witness by and on behalf of plaintiffs having been duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION By: M r. Marsh Q Would you state your name, address and occupation please sir? A My name is Paul Edwin Ahalt. My address is Box 493, Pearisburg, Virginia. My occupation is Division Super intendent of School, Giles County, Pearisburg, Virginia. * * * [ t r . p p . 12-14] Q Mr. Ahalt I noticed that on the forms submitted and answers to interrogatories, I notice a listing of the various Virginia certificates held by your teachers. Would you explain the order of priority of these certificates and what the various certificates signify—I mean collegiate and pro fessional? A If I understand your question you are asking me now to enumerate for the Court the various kinds of certificates issued by the State of Virginia. Q Yes and held by the teachers in Giles County in order of their priority? A I would like for you to isolate those two questions if you would please sir. When you say in the order of priority that is where I would like to comment secondly if I may explain further. Q Go ahead. App. 10 A The highest type teacher so far as paper qualifica tion is concerned would be the post graduate professional. This is a certificate issued for holders of masters degrees who have had as I recall five successful years of teaching. We have a collegiate professional certificate which is issued to college graduates who had during their preparation for teaching either practice teaching or over paying this de ficiency by two years of successful teaching. Then we have the collegiate certificate which is issued to college graduates for those who have had the required hours and preparation in practice teaching in specified areas. Then we have a certificate that has not been issued since 1942 known as the Normal Professional Certificate. This is issued originally to persons who have had two years of college preparation and these persons have kept their certificate active over the years. Then there is another classification of elementary and this is my understanding is a certificate that has been a number of years since it has been issued. I cannot tell you the number but those were issued originally by persons who took a teacher’s examination and these persons will date back forty years or more. And then there is a special certificate and I would like to note this separate from special license. I am frank to tell you that I don’t know what a special certificate is. We have had as far as I know only one of them in my period of Superintendent of Schools. The original conditions under which that certificate was issued I could not say. I would assume that that was one who had had more than the one who had been issued the elementary but not as much as the one who had been issued a normal pro fessional certificate. That is my projection. I could not sustain that. I have never seen that in writing. Then we have a certificate which is known as a special license. This is a certificate issued to persons since in the vicinity of 1955 — I would not give you that as a positive date but it is a App. 11 certificate that has come into being during the time I have been a superintendent of schools, issued to persons who in 1942 would not have had the equivalent of two years of college preparation but it may be well that when the cer tificate was issued to the person could have completed all but the degree requirements, special license means that the person has been certified to teach specific area subjects by the State Board of Certification in Richmond. As I recall that would be the full number. Now in addition to that certain endorsements but they all come under types of certificates which I have outlined. * * * [ t r . p . 26] E v e l y n W. S h a d e , called as a witness by and on behalf of the plaintiffs having been duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION By: M r . M a r s h Q Would you state your name and occupation please? A Evelyn W. Shade. I am presently employed as a secretary of the law firm of Tucker and Marsh in Richmond, Virginia. Q Mrs. Shade have you had any experience as a statis tician? A Yes I have. I have been doing statistical work in various teacher, salary cases and equal facility school cases and other civil rights cases since 1950, in addition to other work in accounting and other statistical work prior to 1950. * * * [ t r . p . 32] Q Did you make a compilation of the total number of white teachers appointed to teach in Giles County in each of the years 1960-1961 to 1964-1965? A Yes I did. App. 12 Q Will you explain it to us please? A This was taken from the individual summary sheets supplied by the superintendent of schools. In 1964-1965 there were thirteen teachers whose beginning year with the Giles County School System was 1964-1965 and there were four such white elementary teachers. In 1963-1964 there were six such teachers in the high school, and none in the elementary school. In 1962-1963 there were seven teachers appointed to the Giles County system for the first time in the high school and one in the elementary school. In 1961- 1962 six white teachers were appointed to the high school and two to the elementary school and in 1960-1961 there were two appointments to the high school and one ap pointment to the elementary school. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 4 NEGRO TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS—SCHOOL YEAR 1963-64 T o ta l N a m e and School T ear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm en ts Mary A. Franklin Bluff City Elementary 1923 CP 40 yrs. Elementary; Soc. Sci.,* English* Building Teacher; 5th, 6th & 7th grades Laurence Leftwich Bluff City High 1949 CP 18 Elementary; English, Soc. Science Math, English, History, Music, Guidance; Principal Mary F. Montgomery Bluff City Elementary 1956 CP 8 Elementary; Gen. Sci.,* Biology* 1st & 2nd grades Sylvia J. Harvey Bluff City High 1959 CP 5 Soc. Sci. (not including History) Home Econ., M ath, Science, History, Phy. Ed. Hugh D. Woodliff Bluff City High 1960 CP 4 Elementary 4-7; English, History, Soc. Studies Math, Government, Geography, English, Biology, Phy. Ed. Sylvia D. Austin Bluff City Elementary 1961 CP 3 Gen. Sci., Biology, Chemistry 3rd & 4th grades Alma G. Spivey Bluff City High 1963 CP 1 Business Education, Soc. Studies English, Soc. Studies, Business Typing *Information furnished by respective plaintiff’s. Answer to interrogatory indicated that information was not available to Superin tendent of Schools. CP—Collegiate Professional. A pp. 13 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS—1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR T otal N a m e a n d Schoo l Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t Nancy Morgan—Narrows 1964 CP 2 yrs. Art 1st Grade Carolyn Johnston— Pearisburg 1964 SL 0 — 3rd Grade Dorothy Harvey—King Johnston 1964 CP 0 History, English 6th Grade Grover DeHart— Pembroke 1964 Coll. 0 Elem. 6 & 7; English, History, Social Studies 7th Grade Nancy Boens— Pembroke 1962 CP 2 Biology (High & Jr. High) 6th Grade Goldie Auvil—Rich Creek 1961 CP 9 Elem. grades 1 thru 7 2nd Grade Mildred Miller-—Pembroke 1961 CP 8 Elementary 2nd & 3rd Grades Florence Mandeville— Glen Lyn 1960 CP 8 Elementary; English, Social Science 1st and 2nd Grades Inez Richards— Pearisburg 1959 CP 12 Elementary; English 5th Grade Maurice Witten—-Newport 1959 CP 7 Gr. 4 thru 7; English, Social Studies 7th Grade William Forrestal— Pembroke 1958 pp 11 Social Studies, History, French, Basic Business, Distributive Educ. Diversified Occupations Principal; 3rd Grade part-time Duane Billups— Pearisburg 1957 CP 7 Social Studies, History 5th Grade Robert Taylor—King Johnston 1957 CP 8 Health, Phy. Ed., History, Social Studies Principal; 7th Grade Ronald Whitehead—Rich Creek 1957 pp 7 History, Social Studies, Basic Principal; 7th Grade Business A pp. 14 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued) WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR T otal N a m e a n d School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E n dorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t Irene Copen— Pearisburg 1956 CP 19 Elementary 1 st Grade Louise Miller—Pearisburg 1956 CP 23 Elementary; English, Soc. Studies 2nd Grade Nannie Muncy—Narrows 1956 CP 35 Elementary 3rd Grade John H. Webb—Narrows 1956 SL 44 — 6th Grade Mary Whitehead— Pearisburg 1955 CP 9 Social Studies 1st Grade Shirley Ramsey— Pearisburg 1955 CP 8 Elementary; English 2nd Grade Frances B. Coburn—Rich Creek 1954 CP 14 English, Social Studies 4th Grade Betty Coffman—Rich Creek 1954 CP 12 Gr. 1 thru 7; English, Biology, Social Studies 7th Grade Alice Mustard—King Johnston 1954 CP 12 Gr. 6 & 7; Home Econ., English History, Chemistry 7 th Grade Pauline Williams—Narrows 1954 CP 22 Elementary; English 3rd Grade Howard Houchins—Narrows 1953 NP 19 Elementary 6th Grade Nona Eisel— Penvir 1953 SL 14 — 1st & 2nd Grades Sarah Ragsdale— Penvir 1953 SL 11 — 3rd & 4th Grades Hazel Armbrister— Pearisburg 1952 CP 9 Elementary 5 th Grade Edith H. Lewey—King Johnston 1952 SL 8 — 7th Grade Dan M. Huffman—Narrows 1952 PP 12 Gr. 6 & 7; Spanish, Accounting, History, English, Social Studies Principal A pp. 15 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 (continued) WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR T otal N a m e and School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b jec t E n dorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t Glenn Cruise—JPearisburg fc; C sJL..-., ,M. i *.f. i. At-.. 1951 p p 13 Gr. 6 & 7; English, Social Studies, History, Spanish Principal Iris Williams—Narrows 1950 CP 17 Elementary; Biology, Chemistry, English, Home Economics 1st Grade Lavinia Bogess—Rich Creek 1950 CP 18 Gr. 6 & 7; Physical Ed., Biology 6th Grade Bessie Price— Rich Creek 1949 Elem. 29 Elementary 1st Grade Gladys Johnson—Narrows 1948 NP 17 Elementary 4th Grade Emma Steele—Newport 1948 CP 10 Elementary, English, History, Social Studies, Art, Music 4th & 5th M artha W. Britts—Kimballton 1948 CP 16 Gr. 1 thru 7; English, History, Social Studies Head teacher; 7th Grade Alva Lucas—Newport 1946 CP 10 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 1st & 2nd Grades Mary Allen—King Johnston 1946 CP 12 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 6th Grade Elizabeth Graves—Narrows 1946 NP 25 Elementary 4th Grade Hazel Lester— Pearisburg 1946 CP 26 Elementary; Geography 5 th Grade Margaret Whittaker—Eggleston 1946 CP 18 Gr. 6 & 7; English, Social Science, Chemistry, General Science, Art 5th & 6th Grades Florine McCrady—Narrows 1945 CP 17 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 2nd Grade A pp. 16 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued) WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR Total N a m e a n d School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E n dorsem en t S u b je c t A ssignm en t Elizabeth Johnston— Pearisburg 1945 CP 19 Elementary, English 4th Grade Virginia M. Ward—King Johnston 1945 CP 27 Gr. 1 thru 7; History, Social Studies 6th Grade Maereen Whitt— Eggleston 1945 CP 22 Elementary; English Head Teacher; 2nd & 3rd Grades Loma Lowe— Pearisburg 1944 CP 34 Elementary; Biology, English, History, Social Studies 4th Grade Virginia Martin—Kimballton 1943 SL 23 — 1st & 2nd Grades Eleanor Snapp— Pearisburg 1943 CP 35 Elementary; English, History 2nd Grade Lucille Meadows—Rich Creek 1943 NP 18 Elementary 5th Grade Beulah Fox—Glen Lyn 1942 PP 12 Elementary Head Teacher; 3rd, 4th, 5th Grades Lucy W. Miller—White Gate 1941 CP 20 Elementary; English, Latin, French, History, Social Studies Head Teacher; 4th, 5th, 6th Grades Frances Montague— Penvir 1940 CP 27 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies Head Teacher; 5th, 6th Grades Constance Thompson—Narrows 1940 CP 23 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 1st Grade Gladys Jamison— Pembroke 1940 CP 24 Elementary; English 1st Grade Vivian M. Akers—Bane 1939 CP 23 Elementary; English, History Head Teacher; 1st & 2nd Grades A pp. 17 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued) WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR Total N a m e a n d S choo l T ear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm en ts Rosalinda F arrier—Kimball ton 1938 CP 20 Elementary; English, Geography, History, Social Science 5th & 6th Grades Violet Philpott— Pearisburg 1936 CP 28 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 2nd Grade Myrtle Guynn—Rich Creek 1936 CP 17 Elementary; Biology, English Social Science, History 3rd Grade Pauline Frazier—Narrows 1935 CP 12 Elementary Grades 4 to 7 7th Grade Anne Hendrickson— Pembroke 1935 NP 19 Elementary 2nd Grade Mary Morrison— Pembroke 1935 NP 19 Elementary 7th Grade Inez Miller—Newport 1934 NP 13 Elementary 2nd & 3rd Grades Myrtle Whittaker—Eggleston 1934 NP 15 Elementary 4th & 5th Grades Edna G. Thompson— Pearisburg 1934 CP 40 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 4th Grade Virginia Houchins—Narrows 1933 NP 17 Elementary 4th Grade Jocelle Saunders—Narrows 1933 NP 28 Elementary 6th Grade Ella Williams—Pembroke 1931 CP 22 Gr. 1 thru 7; English 2nd Grade Ruth J. Perdue— Eggleston 1931 CP 26 Elementary; English 6 th & 7 th Grades Jessie B. Givens—Narrows 1930 CP 34 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 2nd & 3rd Grades A pp. 18 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued) WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR Total N a m e a n d School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem ents S u b je c t A ssignm ents Eliza Miller—Pearisburg 1928 CP 27 Elementary; Biology, English, Soc. Studies, History, Math 3rd Grade Ruby Herbert—Narrows 1928 CP 39 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies, Art 5th Grade Clara Patteson—Narrows 1928 CP 36 Elementary; English, History 7th Grade Olive Williams— Pearisburg 1928 NP 28 Elementary 1st Grade Hester Beamer—Narrows 1927 NP 26 Elementary 7th Grade Margaret Straley—Eggleston 1927 CP 33 Elementary, English, History, Biology, Social Science 1st & 2nd Grades Annie Munsey— Pearisburg 1926 CP 17 Elementary 3rd Grade Mattie Guthrie— Pearisburg 1926 CP 38 Elementary; Biology, English, Soc. Science, History 1st Grade Emily Eaton—Bane 1925 CP 39 Grades 1 thru 7 2nd & 3rd Grades Nancy Allen— Pembroke 1924 CP 40 Elementary, Music, English, History 1st Grade Nancy Dobyns—White Gate 1924 CP 32 Elementary, English, French, History, Social Studies 1st, 2nd, 3rd Grades Nellie V. Wheeler—Narrows 1924 CP 40 Elementary; English, History, Social Studies 5th Grade Mary Carman— Pembroke 1923 CP 29 Elementary; English, History 5th Grade 61 ' 44 v Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 5 ( continued) WHITE ELEMENTARY TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS— 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR Total N a m e a n d School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem ents S u b je c t A ssignm ents Greye Lovall—Narrows 1922 CP 41 Elementary; English 2nd Grade Margaret Caldwell—Kimballton 1921 CP 17 Elementary 3rd & 4th Grades Anne Hale— Pembroke 1919 NP 34 Elementary 3rd Grade Lila J. Guthrie— Pearisburg 1919 CP 45 Elementary; Biology, English Social Studies 4th Grade Marguerite Williamson— Pembroke 1919 CP 41 Elementary; English, History 4th Grade Hollie P. Stowers—Bane 1918 CP 29 Grades 4 thru 7; English, Social Studies 4th & 5th Grades Type of Certificate: CP— Collegiate Professional NP—-Normal Professional PP— Postgraduate Professional SL— Special License C oll— Collegiate Elem.— Elementary A pp. 20 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 6 T otal WHITE HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS OF ENGLISH AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR N a m e and School T ear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm ents Ann Shelton—Giles 1964 CP 3 yrs. English, History, Soc. Studies, Latin English Larry Greer—Narrows 1964 CP 5 History, Soc. Science, Health, Physical Educ. Amer. History, Soc. Studies, assistant football, basketball, spring sports Susan von Peachy— Giles 1964 CP 12 English English 10; Developmental Reading Pamela Croy— Giles 1963 CP 1 History, Social Science English 11, World History Arvenie Shutt— Giles 1963 pp 18 Health Educ., History, Soc. Stud. U. S. History, Sociology Jewell Francis—Giles 1962 CP 2 English, Vocational Health Educ. English 11 Grace Glenn—Giles 1962 CP 9 English, History, Social Science; Elementary grades 1-7 English 12 Donald Brookman—Narrows 1962 CP 2 Spanish, Social Studies (not including History) Economics, Sociology; Soc. Studies; World Geography Sybil Kountz— Narrows 1961 CP 2 Art English 8, Art Joseph Coleman— Giles 1961 pp 7 History & Soc. Science, Gen. Science, Basic Business World History, Government Robert Richards—Giles 1961 PP 10 Music, English, Speech, Sociology, English, Speech Bioiogy A pp. 21 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 6 (continued) T otal WHITE HIGH SCHOOL TEACHERS OF ENGLISH AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR N a m e a n d School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem en ts S u b je c t A ssignm ents Ruby Hylton— Giles 1959 CP 18 English, History, Soc. Science; Elementary grades 1-7 English 9 Thomas Ballard—Narrows 1959 pp 16 Health, Phy. Educ., History, Biology, Soc. Studies Government 12 Nancy Taylor— Giles 1958 CP 7 English English 8, Reading Carnell Hype—Giles 1957 CP 33 Biology, English, History, Latin, Soc. Science; all elementary English 9 Norene Harding— Giles 1957 CP 30 Biology, English, French, History, Soc. Science; all elementary English 8 Glorena Rader—Narrows 1955 CP 18 English English 9 Grace Robertson—Giles 1954 pp 11 English, French, History, Soc. Studies U. S. History Claude Goodwin— Giles 1949 CP 8 English, History, Soc. Studies; Grades 6 & 7 Government, Economics Jewell Ballard—Narrows 1947 CP 10 English, Soc. Science (not including History), Gen. Science English 8 & 10; Reading Cuba Hardwick—Narrows 1943 CP 33 Biology, English, History English 12 Katheryn Ring—Narrows 1930 CP 19 English, History, Social Studies U. S. History, English 10 A pp. 22 Plaintiffs’ Exhibit No. 7 T o ta l WHITE HIGH SCHOOL SCIENCE TEACHERS IN GILES COUNTY, VIRGINIA, PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR N a m e a n d School Tear A p p o in te d C ertifi cate E xp eri ence S u b je c t E ndorsem ents S u b je c t A ssignm ents Helen Blankenship—Narrows 1964 CP 0 yrs. Biology, Chemistry M ath, Gen. Science Jacquelyn Cantley—Giles 1963 CP 6 Biology, Gen. Science Gen. Sci. 8 & 9 William Copley, Jr.—Narrows 1962 Coll. 2 Chemistry, M ath, Physics, Mech. Drawing Chemistry, Physics, Mech. Drawing Dorothy Johnson— Giles 1962 CP 4 Vocational Home Economics, Biology, General Science Gen. Science, Biology Bobby D. Wilburn— Giles 1960 CP 4 Health, Phy. Educ., Biology Biology Robert Price—Narrows 1960 pp 4 Biology, Health & Phy. Educ., Gen. Sci., Driver Education Biology, Phy. Educ., head football coach, assistant spring sports Cornelius Burgess—Narrows 1958 CP 9 History, Soc. Sci., Chemistry, Biology, Physics, Gen. Science Gen. Sci. 9, Biology Panco Cantley—Giles 1954 CP 12 Social Studies, History, Biology, Gen. Science World Geography, Physics Clotilde Ballard 1948 pp 40 Chemistry, Biology, Home Economics, English Chemistry, Biology A pp. 23 App. 24 STATEMENT OF POSITION OF PLAINTIFFS [Filed June 22, 1965] The position of the plaintiffs with respect to the relief which the Court should grant pursuant to the factual find ings and legal conclusions reached in its opinion filed on June 3, 1965, is: 1. Having found that the school board failed to renew the contracts of the individual plaintiffs for reasons for bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court should place these plaintiffs as nearly as possible in the position they would have held but for the school board’s uncon stitutional action. To do less is to fail to accord these plain tiffs the protection which the constitution requires that they have. From the evidence in this case, it appears that if these plaintiffs had been white they would have been reemployed for the 1963-64 session and, on a competitive basis with other teachers in the system, they would have had a chance for continued employment thereafter. 2. Inasmuch as the normal relief would be reinstate ment, the burden should be placed on defendants to demon strate that such relief should not now be given. Plaintiffs are informed that the defendants have vacancies in several of the areas in which some of them are certified and that the defendants have been actively recruiting in an effort to fill these vacancies. 3. One of the individual plaintiffs is available and anxious to teach in Giles County in September 1965. Because the Court’s opinion was handed down after the time for signing contracts for the 1965-66 school year had passed, the other six individual plaintiffs have already contracted to teach elsewhere during the 1965-66 school term. The Court having found that the seven teachers were discharged because of App. 25 their race, equitable principles require that the one teacher now available to work in September be reinstated forthwith and that the remaining six now under employment with other school divisions be given an early opportunity to accept reemployment in the Giles County school system, 4. Being aware that Negro teachers in five counties in the Western District of Virginia have suffered termination of employment following the abandonment of special school facilities for Negro children for the 1965-66 session, the plaintiff Virginia Teachers Association urges that anything less than reinstatement or opportunity for reinstatement in the instant case will fail to deter other school boards from similar unconstitutional action. / s / H enry L. Marsh, III Of Counsel for Plaintiffs OPINION [Filed June 3, 1965] This action was brought by seven Negro teachers and the Virginia Teachers Association, Inc., an organization repre senting Negro teachers throughout the state, against the County School Board of Giles County, Virginia (herein after referred to as the School Board) and the Division Superintendent of Schools of Giles County, Mr. P. E. Ahalt. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Sections 1331, 1343, 2201 and 2202 of Title 28 and Sections 1981 and 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. The gist of the complaint is the allegation that the seven individual plaintiffs were denied re-employment as teachers by the defendants for the 1964-65 school session because of their race. The defendants, while denying that they dis criminated against these individuals, acknowledge that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United App. 26 States forbids discrimination on account of race by a public school system with respect to the employment of teachers. Defendants on their part moved for summary judgment on the ground that the decision to refuse these teachers re-employment was wholly within the discretion of the school authorities. This motion was denied and an evi dentiary hearing held at which the facts hereinafter stated were developed. Giles County lies in the mountains of Appalachia on the Virginia-West Virginia line to the north and west of R ad ford, Virginia. Over the last fifteen years the County has experienced a gradual decline in population, recently con tributed to by cut-backs in the work force of the Celanese Corporation, its principal employer, resulting from automa tion of the Celanese plant. The overall decline in population was matched by a leveling off and decline in the number of school age children. P. E. Ahalt, the Superintendent, was appointed to his present position in 1953. The evidence shows that through out the decade 1953-63 Mr. Ahalt was faced with a con siderable challenge in his efforts to upgrade and improve the quality of education for all of Giles County’s children. A program of consolidation of the white schools was carried out and completed in 1962. Bond issues were fought, de feated and later passed, with many of the citizens in the remoter areas apparently resisting the closing of their local schools. Also throughout this period efforts were made to upgrade the quality of the schools which were provided for the County’s approximately 125 Negro students. The evi dence shows that during Superintendent Ahalt’s term Giles for the first time provided facilities for the education of Negro high school students beyond the tenth grade, and that school building conditions were greatly improved. How ever, the evidence also shows that the County’s facilities for App.27 Negro students, the so-called Bluff City Schools, were never sufficiently satisfactory to warrant accreditation and that the faculty was, by the Superintendent’s own admission, below the standard of the other schools. Because of the very small Negro population of the County (some 400 out of a total of 17,000), Mr. Ahalt recruited actively, but experienced great difficulty in attracting teachers to staff the Negro schools. He testified that his standards for accepting teachers for these positions were somewhat lower than the standards he used in screening new white applicants. This dual school system with all of its difficulties was ended when in May, 1964, the School Board voted to abandon the Bluff City Negro schools as the result of the application of approximately twenty of the Negro high school students for transfer to the formerly all white high schools. Following the Board’s decision, the individual plain tiffs were notified by letters from the Superintendent dated May 15, 1964 that their jobs had been abolished and that their services would no longer be needed. It is this dismissal which plaintiffs complain of, arguing that the decision of the Superintendent was motivated by considerations for bidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Ahalt has accepted full responsibility for the decision to discharge these teachers. He acknowledges that the decision was made only after ‘‘hours of meditation” and that he “had a lot of misgivings” as to what his procedure should be. No one can look into a man’s mind and examine his thought processes. However, in the view which I take of this case, such delving is unnecessary. Mr. Ahalt has testified before me and appeared to be an excellent ad ministrator dedicated to the best interests of the Giles County school system. However, while I do not question his allegiance, I am satisfied that his action deprived these teachers of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. App. 28 Although I sympathize with a school administrator who has had this very thorny problem thrown upon him after what appears to have been a long and bitter battle over con solidation, my duty to assist in the transition from seg regated to integrated schools requires that I direct him to re-examine his decision. This case bears a definite factual and legal relationship to the case of Brooks, et al. v. School District of City of Moberly, Missouri, 267 F. 2d 733 (8th C ir.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959), which involved the discharge of eleven Negro teachers following the closing of the Negro schools in Moberly. The Court of Appeals there charac terized as “unusual and somewhat startling” the school board’s conclusion that of the 109 teachers in the school system before the closing of the Negro school (98 white and 11 Negro) all of the eleven Negro teachers were less qualified than any but four of the white teachers and that these 15 should be discharged. The court went on to uphold the district court’s determination that the complaint should be dismissed saying: . . . we cannot say with certainty here that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding and conclusion that the Board acted honestly pursuant to its rule in awarding the teacher contracts. Brooks, et al. v. School District of City of Moberly, supra, at 739. The instant case involves a determination by the Super- intendant of the Giles County School System that of the 186 teachers in the system prior to the closing of the Negro schools seven were less suitable for re-employment than the remaining 179 and that those seven were the seven Negroes. The question before me is whether in reaching this con clusion the Superintendent exercised his discretion in such App. 29 an unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or unlawful manner as to violate these teachers’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In reviewing Mr. Ahalt’s decision, the crucial period was between early M arch of 1964 when it first became known that transfers would be applied for and May 15, 1964 when the formal decision to discharge these teachers was an nounced. However, the actions taken as the result of the decision to close the Bluff City schools must be contrasted with the evidence in the record of prior policy in similar situations. In particular, the record shows that on a number of occasions throughout the period preceding the closing of the Negro schools consolidations of white schools were carried out and in each instance the white teachers whose schools had been closed were retained in the school system. The earlier abandonments indicate to me that the Super intendent had followed a policy of using teachers from the abandoned schools in other schools in the system because he viewed the system as basically homogeneous, by which I mean that in normal circumstances he would transfer teachers between the various schools to suit the needs of the system rather than considering the teachers in the abandoned schools as unemployed and potentially available for any openings that might occur in the other schools. There are other indications of this policy in the record. Teachers have been shifted from school to school when and as needed. This system of shifting faculty personnel must have been used widely in the school years immediately prior to and following the 1962-63 school year when thirteen elementary teachers were eliminated to remedy the overstaffing in the elementary schools which had resulted from the series of consolidations. In order to adjust to an overstaffed condition and then to readjust following the elimination of that problem the sys tem and the faculty must have had a great deal of flexibility in assignments. App. 30 In view of this pre-existing policy, I believe that the Superintendent’s stated policy with regard to these plain tiffs, i.e., to evaluate their right to continued employment in terms of the vacancies then existing in the other schools in the system rather than by comparison of their effectiveness with the other teachers in the system was too restrictive and its use in this particular instance resulted in a discrimina tion against these individuals. This is not to say that it is constitutionally required under all circumstances to make such an overall re-evaluation. However, the making of such an evaluation is strong evidence of good faith, see Brooks, et al., supra, at 736, and where, as here, the school board has carried on a policy of retaining teachers (although the result in one instance was admitted over-staffing) and has eliminated teachers only after evaluation of their qualifica tions in comparison with those of all of the other teachers in the system, it is extremely difficult to justify the standard used in this case in the absence of any evidence in the record which would justify a change of policy on other than racial grounds. The evidence established that the closing of the Negro schools necessitated a reduction in the teaching staff. Accepting the defendants’ contention that the individual plaintiffs were not qualified for any of the positions opening up as the result of turnover, the Superintendent did not explain why these teachers were not evaluated and com pared with all of the other teachers in the system who taught in areas in which the plaintiffs could teach in accordance with his prior practice in making these decisions. My conclusion that the scope and nature of the Superin tendent’s evaluation of these teachers was arbitrary and re sulted in a discrimination against them makes it unnecessary for me to review at any length the evidence offered by the plaintiff that in fact there was never a real evaluation of teaching qualifications and that in deciding to discharge all App. 31 seven of these teachers the Superintendent considered only the closing of the Negro schools. There is evidence from which such a conclusion could be inferred. The letter sent to the individual plaintiffs refers solely to the abolition of their jobs because of the closing of the Bluff city schools without any reference to an evaluation or to any possibility that they could be employed in the previously all-white schools. As the Superintendent must have been aware that there would be vacancies before the opening of the school year and as he could not then know exactly who would be available to fill these vacancies, his abrupt termination of the employment of these plaintiffs is suspect. It certainly must be contrasted with the termination of the thirteen white elementary teachers in 1962-63 who defendants stated in their brief then formed a “pool” against future needs. Similarly, I will not review at length the parties’ attempts to compare the respective qualifications of the individual plaintiffs and the fifteen new teachers hired by the Superin tendent for the 1964-65 school year. It does appear that several of the individual plaintiffs were better qualified con sidering only their certifications and experience than some of the people who were subsequently hired. However, these new people were hired at various times both before and after the termination of the employment of the individual plain tiffs and there is no indication that the Superintendent ever made a comparison of the qualifications of all of these teachers before asked to do so at the hearing in this matter by his attorney. In this factual posture there is nothing to be gained by the court’s speculating upon the subjective qualifications of the individuals involved, except to note again that the finality with which the individual plaintiffs employment was terminated, in light of the Superintendent s obvious knowledge that new teachers would have to be hired, reflects badly upon the basis for that decision. App. 32 Perhaps the most difficult problem to be solved in this litigation is how to remedy the discrimination against the individual plaintiffs. Involved is the difficult problem of weighing the interests of the teachers, all of whom have found other employment, against the possible detrimental effects of an order re-employing them upon the adminis tration of the schools and the efficiency of their staffs. The problem of the Negro teacher in the predominantly white classroom has always been in the background in this litiga tion. The Superintendent’s decision purportedly was not based upon a consideration of potential difficulties arising from this situation but only upon the qualifications of the individuals involved. Therefore, there could be no justifica tion of his initial decision on these grounds. However, as some further action will have to be taken by him regarding these individuals because of the court’s order in this matter, some discussion will help to serve as a guideline to his future decisions. The courts of the fourth circuit have dealt before with the very closely related problem of integrating the teaching staffs of larger school systems as a proper means of putting an end to the operation of schools on a racially segregated basis. See, e.g., Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 339 F. 2d 486 (4th Gir. 1964), Jackson v. School Board of City of Lynchburg, 321 F. 2d 230 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Christmas v. Board of Education of Elarford County, 231 F. Supp. 331 (D. Md. 1964). This court has in the past approved plans calling for the desegregation of teaching staffs as in the plan finally adopted by the Lynchburg City School Board on M arch 10, 1964. The court of appeals has commended action designed to eliminate considerations of race in personnel actions of school systems. See Brooks v. County School Board of Arlington County, 324 F. 2d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1963). However, this court, in approving App. 33 plans aiming at the eventual desegregation of teaching staffs, has been mindful of the problems to be overcome be fore a totally color-blind assignment policy can be put into effect and has left preliminary consideration of this matter to the school authorities. In its recent opinion in Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond,—F. 2d— (4th Cir. 1965), the Court of Appeals supports a cautious ap proach to this problem. The court at page— laid down the following guidelines for the district courts: When all direct discrimination in the assignment of pupils has been eliminated, assignment of teachers may be expected to follow the racial patterns established in the schools. An earlier judicial requirement of general reassignment of all teaching and administrative per sonnel need not be considered until the possible detri mental effects of such an order upon the administration of the schools and the efficiency of their staffs can be appraised along with the need for such an order in aid of protection of the constitutional rights of pupils. Potentially the reinstatement of these plaintiffs poses very similar problems to those raised in the Bradley opinion. Possible detrimental effects should be considered by the school authorities in the first instance before any decision is made to integrate teaching staffs. On the record before me this has not been done by the Giles County authorities and the remedy will afford them an opportunity to make this evaluation. However, mere possibilities of difficulty should not be used as an excuse to disregard the rights of the Negro teachers. The burden of integration must not be shifted to their backs alone.* *By letter to counsel dated June 17, 1965, the District Court revised this sentence to read, “The burden of integration must not be shifted to them. App. 34 W hat is required is an intelligent appraisal of the capacity of the individuals involved to perform their true function— to educate their pupils. The rights of the pupils to the best possible educational opportunity are of paramount im portance. Bald assertions of incompetency to perform this function, however, are not substitutes for reasoned analysis of the individual situations and an unwillingness to experi ment to test the validity of a conclusion may well be con sidered as an admission of the weakness of that conclusion. Turning to the specific relief which will be ordered to remedy the discrimination practiced against these seven teachers this court is mindful of the admonition of the Su preme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) that courts are to be guided by equitable principles and that equity has been characterized by a prac tical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. The interests of the individual plaintiffs in this litigation would be best served by placing them as nearly as possible in the positions that they occupied immediately before their dis charge. In this instance that would require that the Superin tendent re-evaluate the teaching qualifications of these in dividuals in comparison with all of the other teachers in the school system. However, these individuals have all ac cepted other teaching employment and the record is by no means clear as to how many of these people would now accept jobs in the Giles County school system were they offered. Furthermore, for the Superintendent to attempt to reconstruct an entirely hypothetical situation as of the date of the discrimination or in the alternative to involve people employed since that date in a complete evaluation would result in a great burden upon him and the school system be cause of its unsettling effect on the present faculty who would be potentially in danger of losing their jobs. I will not order App. 35 such a review under these facts and the plaintiffs very rea sonably have not insisted upon it. W hat seems appropriate under the facts of this case is a general injunction against further discrimination in carry ing out personnel practices by the school system coupled with a system of preferential hiring to protect the interests of the individual teachers. I will order the defendants to carry out the following procedure in employing new teachers for a period of one year from the date of the entry of the final order in this case. Upon the occurrence of any vacancy in the teaching staff within this period the Superintendent will write to each of the individual plaintiffs who are certified or experienced in the area of the vacancy inquiring whether that individual would be available to fill the vacant position and would like to be considered for it. Should any affirmative replies be received, the Superintendent will be directed to consider the qualifications of that individual or individuals together with the qualifications of any other persons who have applied for the position. Should his decision be to offer the position to an applicant other than one of the individual plaintiffs, he is to notify the plaintiffs who have applied of his decision and submit a written statement of his reasons to this court as soon as possible. The court will then review his decision on the basis of his statement and either affirm his decision, in, which case an offer may be made to the applicant selected, or will ask him to reconsider if it appears that his action was arbitrary. Any such statement will of course remain completely confidential for the protection of the individuals involved. However, should this court affirm a decision of the Superintendent to employ someone other than one of the individual plaintiffs based upon such a statement, any plaintiff who has been denied re-employment may request a copy of the statement and a formal hearing at which to App. 36 challenge the Superintendent’s decision before this court. This procedure, although involved, should prove little burden to the Superintendent in practice because of the few individuals involved and its short duration. By this pro cedure those of the individual plaintiffs who are interested in teaching in the Giles County school system will have the opportunity of receiving a re-evaluation of their teaching ability. They will not, however, be guaranteed a position if there are other teachers available who are better quali fied. This variance from the plaintiffs’ requested injunction seems clearly warranted in order to protect the interests of the pupils who are also innocent parties in this litigation. Nothing heretofore said has attempted to distinguish the cases of Mary A. Franklin or Sylvia D. Austin from the other five individual plaintiffs. There was some testimony taken as to each of these individuals regarding their possible un suitability for employment. However, as the Superintendent is being asked to review his conclusions as to five of the teachers should they express their interest in re-employment, there can be no harm in treating these individuals similarly. The record developed thus far as to the reliability of plaintiff Mary A. Franklin is not sufficiently detailed for the court to rule that she was not discriminated against. The Superin tendent may have a different view of the importance of her indiscretion against a different background. There is also evidence that the plaintiff Sylvia D. Austin was notified as early as M arch of 1964 that her work was unsatisfactory and that her contract would not be renewed. However, there is nothing in the record before me to indicate how deeply the Superintendent was embroiled in the overall con troversy when this decision was made and there seems no harm in directing him to reconsider her qualifications if she requests it by applying for a position which he has notified her is vacant. App. 37 The final prayer of the complaint is that the defendants be required to pay the plaintiffs’ counsel fees incurred in this litigation. Suffice it to say that this school board has not been unreasonable or obdurately obstinate. See Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, supra, at p. 10. Quite the contrary, the school board has been extremely reasonable in its handling of this novel and difficult legal problem as has been its counsel. It follows, therefore, that no allowance for attorneys’ fees should be made. / s / T homas J. M ichie United States District Judge June 3, 1965. ORDER [Entered June 23, 1965] For the reasons set forth in the opinion of this court ren dered in the above-styled case on June 3, 1965, it is Ordered that the defendants and their successors be permanently re strained and enjoined from discriminating on the basis of race in the selection or retention of teachers for the Giles County School System, and further Ordered that the defendants and their successors be restrained and enjoined for a period of two years from the entry of this order from employing any teacher in the Giles County School System who is not presently on the payroll unless the following preliminary procedures are carried ou t: (1) Upon the occurrence of any faculty vacancy in the Giles County School System the Superintendent will write App. 38 by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to those of the individual plaintiffs in this action who are certi fied or experienced in the area of the vacancy inquiring whether that individual or individuals would be interested in being considered by him for that position under the pro cedures set forth in this order; (2) A plaintiff, upon receipt of such an inquiry from the Superintendent, shall have ten (10) days within which to reply if said plaintiff wishes to be considered for the vacancy; (3) Upon the receipt of an affirmative reply or replies to any such inquiry, the Superintendent will evaluate the qualifications of each of the plaintiffs who have expressed their desire to be considered together with those of any other teachers who have applied for the position to be filled and shall make his decision as to which of the applicants is better qualified for the position following his normal pro cedures ; (4) Should the Superintendent decide that an applicant other than one of the individual plaintiffs has superior quali fications he shall forthwith prepare and send to the court a written statement of his reasons for so deciding together with a copy of a letter to be sent to the individual plaintiffs involved informing them of the decision not to re-employ them; (5) Upon receipt of such a statement, the court will forthwith either affirm the decision of the Superintendent in which case an offer may be made to the individual to be hired, or, should the court conclude from the statement that the Superintendent’s decision was arbitrary, the matter will be remanded to the Superintendent for further considera tion; (6) Any individual plaintiff aggrieved by a decision of App. 39 the Superintendent not to re-employ him may by letter inform this court of his objection. Upon being informed of an objection the court will supply the objecting plaintiff with a copy of the Superintendent’s statement. A date may- then be set for a hearing at which the plaintiff and the Superintendent may present material evidence; (7) Following any hearing held the court will enter a formal order either affirming the decision of the Superin tendent or ordering the hiring of the individual plaintiff who was denied re-employment for racially discriminatory reasons. Enter: June 23, 1965. / s / T homas J. M ichie United States District Judge NOTICE OF APPEAL Notice is hereby given that Mary A. Franklin and all others of the plaintiffs in this case, Hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from so much of the order of this Court, entered June 23, 1965, as fails (1) to grant prayers num bered 3 and 5 of the complaint or (2) to otherwise require the defendants to employ the individual plaintiffs as teachers in the public school system of Giles County, Virginia, at some future time and to award to the plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees. H enry L. M arsh, III Of Counsel for Plaintiffs S. W. T ucker H enry L. Marsh , III 214 East Clay Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Counsel for Plaintiffs Printed Letterpress by L E W I S P R I N T I N G C O M P A N Y R I C H M O N D , V I R G I N I A