McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Percy Green Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae

Public Court Documents
January 1, 1972

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Percy Green Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae preview

Amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America. Date is approximate.

Cite this item

  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Percy Green Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, 1972. 1f9fe85f-bc9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c45995eb-413e-4387-8820-e4ba0fda3c61/mcdonnell-douglas-corporation-v-percy-green-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed May 08, 2025.

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    INDEX.
--------- PAGE

Motion For Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae on 
Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States of America ........................................................ 1

Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of A m erica ..........

Interest of the Amicus Curiae............. ...................
Argument .................................................................... G

I. The Court Below Misinterpreted Griggs 
v. Duke Power Company, 401 U. S. 424 
( io n )  ............................: ............................  G

II. The Decision Below Creates a Required 
Preference for Classes Covered by the Act 11

Conclusion..........j ] .............................................................  13

Table of Cases.

Cases.
American Ship Building Co. v. N. L. R. B., 380 IT. S.

300 (1965) ...................................................   8

Boys Markets, Inc, v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S. 235
(1970).................................................................    10

Cooper Hospital, The, G5-2 ARB 8703............................. 10
E. E. O. C. 11. Kessler and Company, No. 71-1082........ 3
Ft. Smith Broadcasting Co. v. N. L. R. B., 341 F. 2d 874 

(8th Cir. 1965).................................................................. 6
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U. S. 424 (1971)

........................................................................ 2,3, 6, 7, 11,12
Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 66-2 ARB 854G.........................  10
Hoover Co. v. N. L. R. B., 191 F. 2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951) 9
Huff v. N. D. Cass Company, No. 71-2842.....................  3

C
D

 
C

l



•Tones v. Mayer, 392 U. S. 402 (1968)............................. 10
Kirkliill Rubber Company, 65-2 ARB 8440.....................  10
National Packing Co. v. N. L. R, B., 352 F. 2d 482 

(10th Cir. 1965) .............................................................. 10
N. L. R, B. v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 145 F. 2d 66 (4th 

Cir. 1914)................................................ ........................ 9

N. L. R. B. v. Electrical Workers, 346 U. S. 464 (1953) 9
N. L. R. B. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221 (1963) 8
N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S.

240 (1939) .......................................................................  9
N. L. R. B. v. Great Pane Trailers, 388 IT. S. 26 (1967) 8
N. L. R. B. v. McGahey, 233 F. 2d 406 (6th Cir. 1956).. 6
N. L. R. B. v. Perfect. Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 566 (7th 

Cir. 1947) .......................................................................  9

N. L. R. B. v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates 
Co., Inc., 130 F. 2d 503 (2nd Cir. 1942) .................  9

Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F. 2d 
998 (5th Cir. 1969) ..........................................................  n

Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co.......... F. 2d ....... , 5 FEP
Cases (5th Cir. 1972) .....................................................  iq

Tims v. Board of Education, ct al., 452 F. 2d 551 (8th 
Cir. 1971) ........................................................................... 6

Truck Drivers and Helpers, Local 568 v. N. L. R. B.,
379 F. 2d 137 D. C. Cir. 1967) ......................................... 10

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 (1967) .............................  10

Miscellaneous.
Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing under Fair 

Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objec­
tive Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv. L.
Rev. 1598 (1969) ............................................................  c



Cox, the Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26
Ind. L. J. 319 (1951) ................................................

Note, Developments in the Law—Employment Dis­
crimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 84 Ilarv. L. Rev. 1109, 1166 (1971) .................

Statutes.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. L.

No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (March 24, 1974 ).................
Executive Order 11246, 3 CFR § 402 (1970 ).................
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. 0. §151 et

scq



IN THE

Supreme Court of tfje 3Hmteb States
O ctober T erm , 1972.

__________

No. 72-490

McDo n n e l l  d o u g l a s  c o r p o r a t io n ,
Petitioner,

vs.

PERCY GREEN,
Respondent.

ON WRIT 01' CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEARS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS 
CURIAE ON BEHALF OF THE CHAMBER OF 

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA

4
i ----------
<

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of 
America respectfully moves for leave to file a brief amicus 
curiae in the present case.1 In support of this motion, the 
Chamber states as follows:
—

1. Pursuant to Rule 42(2) of the Rules of this Court, the 
Chamber requested consents from all parties to the filing of a 
brief amicus curiae. Counsel for respondent gave such consent. 
Counsel for the petitioner, however, declined to consent.



2

1. The Chamber is a federation with a membership of 
more than 3,700 state and local chambers of commerce and 
trade associations, and an underlying membership of more 
than five million businessmen and business firms. It is the 
largest association of business and professional organiza­
tions in the United States.

2. The basic issue involved in this case—the prohibi­
tions imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
in a nondiscriminatory employment situation—is a mat­
ter of significant national concern. In Griggs v. Duke 
Poiver Company, 401 IT. S. 424, 431 (1971), this Court held 
that Title VII necessitated “ the removal of artificial, 
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when 
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the 
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”  In 
the instant case, however, such Congressional intent has 
been seriously perverted. Title VII has been applied to an 
isolated refusal to hire which neither operates invidiously 
against those protected by the Act nor involves arbitrary 
or unnecessary job qualifications. The result is that, con­
trary to the objectives of Title VII, the Court of Appeals 
has required that the Company extend a discriminatory 
preference to certain groups; that it provide a black em­
ployee, as stated by the dissent, not merely with “ the same 
opportunity as a white, but . . . one of a different and 
greater degree.”  App. to Pet., p. A37. This unprecedented 
interpretation of the law, the Chamber believes, will vitiate, 
rather than foster, the cause of eliminating employment 
discrimination.

3. The interest of the Chamber, accordingly, is based 
on the dangerous and fhr-reaching consequence that af-

jagg! ■vnr



t f

5

firmancc of the decision below will have for American in­
dustry. 11 is for Ibis reason that the Chamber respectfully 
submits its views.2

Respectfully submitted,

Milton A. Smith 
General Counsel 

Otto F. W enzler 
Labor Relations Counsel 
Chamber of Commerce of the United 

States of America 
1615 It Street, N. W.
(Washington, 1). C. 20006

\  Olka an C. Smetana
925 South Homan Avenue 
Chicago, Illinois 60607 

Lawrence M. Cohen 
S. Richard Pincus 

Lederer, Fox and Grove 
111 AYest AYashington Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60602 
Attorneys for The Chamber of Com­

merce of the United States of 
America

2. The Chamber submitted a brief, and participated in the oral 
argument, as an amicus, in Griggs. It also recently submitted 
amicus briefs in two important Title YU cases now pending before 
the Fifth Circuit cn banc: lluff v. N. 1). Cass Company, No. 71- 
2842, and E. E. O. C. v. II. Kessler and Company, No. 71-1082.

i
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IN THE

Supreme Court of tfje ^Jntteb States
October Term, 1972.

No. 72-490

McDo n n e l l  d o u g l a s  c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Petitioner,

vs.

PERCY GREEN,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE ON BEHALF OF THE 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED 

STATES OF AMERICA

This brief is filed oil behalf of The Chamber of Com­
merce of the United States of America contingent upon 
the Court’s granting the annexed motion for leave to file a 
brief amicus curiae.

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE.

The interest of the Chamber is set forth in the annexed 
motion for leave to file a brief amicus curiae.



iCtessfe'C

6

ARGUMENT

I.

The Court Below Misinterpreted Griggs v. Duke Power' 
Company, 401 U. S. 424 (1971).

The crux of Griggs is that when an employer disquali­
fies those persons protected by the Act at a substantially 
higher rate than other individuals, and his conduct has 
no significant relationship to the employment in ques­
tion, such conduct then constitutes forbidden employ­
ment discrimination. In the instant case, however, neither 
oi these two critical prerequisites of Griggs are present. 
Accordingly, as under analogous provisions of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 [J. S. C. §151, et sec/., manage­
ment is free to effectuate any employment act it chooses; 
if may, for example, take personnel action “ for good cause, 
or bad cause, or no cause at all. It has, as the master of its 
own business affairs, complete freedom with but one specific, 
definite qualification: it may not [take such action] when the 
real motivating purpose is to do that which [the Act] 
forbids.” 1

A. As counsel for the petitioners in Griggs acknowl­
edged, an employer’s conduct may not be found discrimi­
natory “ merely because it disadvantages an individual 
black in some isolated situation. A practice should be 
found discriminatory only where it consistently and 
systematically prefers whites over blacks.” 2 The per­
sonnel action must, in other words, operate as “ a serious

1- See, e.g., Ft. Smith Broadcasting Co. v. X. L. R. It.. 84] F. 
2d 874 (8th Cir. 19C5) ; X. L. R. B. v. ilcGohcy, 233 F. 2d 400, 412- 
413 (6th Cir. 1956) ; and Tims v. Board of Education, et at., 452 
F. 2d 551 (8th Cir. 1971).

2. Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Em­
ployment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of 
Hiring and Promotion, 82 Ilarv. L. Rev. 1598, 1671 (1969) (Em­
phasis added).



fiSiSr.: -r. w... ■ >EE®5Sair :-tw  ■

barrier”  to minority employment; if there is no such 
barrier, the case ‘ ‘ need be subjected to little, if any, ex­
amination under fair employment laws.” 3 Indeed, in a 
colloquy during the oral argument in Griggs between Mr. 
Chief Justice Burger and counsel for Griggs, counsel ad­
mitted that “ the key to [his] case”  was that the employ­
ment act there at issue “ disproportionately screen[ed] 
out members of a particular race or national group.”  It 
was recognized that,, if the Griggs hiring requirements had 
been applied in a situation where there was a virtual all- 
white population, there would have been no violation of 
the Act.4 In sum, as Griggs itself teaches, the “ conse­
quences of [the] employment practices”  in question must 
operate as “ built-in headwinds”  to the equal employment 
opportunities of minority groups. 401 U. S. at 432.

3. Brief for the petitioner in Griggs at n. 1.8 and p. 30.
4. Transcript of oral argument in Griggs at pp. 15 17:

Q. [Mr. Chief Justice Burger] Well would it be a vio­
lation of the act if an employer had a general policy that he 
would not hire anyone, in any capacity if they didn’t meet 
certain potential promotibility qualifications?

A. [Mr. Jack Greenberg for Petitioner Griggs] That 
would not be a violation of the job if he could demonstrate 
that that kind of a capacity is necessary to do the job. And 
necessary for the operation of his plant. It then might not 
be a violation either if it did not disproportionately screen 
out members of a protected race or national group or—

Q. Well now that’s the key to—
A. That’s the key.
Q. To your case, isn’t it?
A. That’s the key. * <5 *
Q. Then if a power plant in let us say the state of Maine 

on the assumption that there would be an almost all white 
population there, if a power plant in the state of Maine had 
a high school or other aptitude test that was directed at 
promotibility, and it did not have any adverse impact on any 
racial group or national origin group, it would not be—

A. That would be an industrial problem. I would suggest 
that they might be depriving themselves of people who could 
do the job very well, but that would not.be the problem—

Q. No violation problem? \
A. No violation problem. * * * \

I
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it should be noted, is also well-established m industrial 
jurisprudence.7

This standard should likewise prevail under Title VII. 
That Act, like the Labor Act, also seeks the peaceful reso­
lution of disputes. It is for this reason that persons of­
fended by conduct alleged to be unlawful under title \ II 
are afforded a wide arsenal of legal weapons to redress 
their grievances.8 They are also specifically guaranteed . 
under See, 701(a) of llio Act, absolute protection against 
reprisals ivhcrc they express, lawful means, opposition 
to practices “ made unlawful" under Title V II; a protec­
tion which even extends to the filing of false or baseless
TTT r , ,, liim will be unheld oven where the em-
p C : L » r <  lias been provoked by 'the employer's 0,™ sever, 
f f i r  labor practices. See, « ,  A o / .W  t. » .  / -
Tt. B., 352 P. 2d 482, 48a (10th On. 1 JGo).

7 The serious acts of misconduct committed by Green in the 
instant case, for example, would deprive him ofemployment right 

. “ inct aaum1 standard applied by arbitraiois. 
V ^K irkhill Rubber Company, 65-2 ARM 8440 (production “ slow-

Clerks, 398 U. S. 235 (19(0).
s. In addition to private s n . s j h b  V » .  r H i S

or' classes allegedly aggrieved and ad­
ditionally permits, in appropriate rases,Jim vnti^of « m p » » b

92-261, 86 
L) and (2).

m  U. s, 102, 100 <1968)_), Attorney General^pattem .nd^prae-

“ S i v i S e S T e o ^ m l  provisions, and s,am fair cm
, s- o . r Tnlck Drivers and Helpers, Local >6i>

* l “ r  2d m  OAC. Cir 1007); Vora v. g,„vs, 280 U R  

§ 402 (1970). . \

10

ditionally permits, in appropriate cases, the entry ot 
injunctive relief pending Anal disposition of a case. 1 
ployment Opportunity Act of 19j4, 1 uh. L. - .
Stat 103 (March 24, 1974), Sec. /06(e), and (f ) (1)

v _ . . . . l ___ ,i. a,,. M n u f  rn  i n f  flVfl

R. I



A*l. .m.mij i A k

11

cliarges with the Commission. Pettway v. American Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F. 2d 998 (5th Cir. 1969). The underlying 
puipose of the Act is thus “ to protect the employee who 
utilizes the tool[s] provided by Congress to protect his 
rights.”  Id. at 1005. There was no intent, any more than 
under the Labor Act, to channel allegations of employment 
discrimination away from the established legal machinery 
into stall-ins” , “ sit-ins”  or similarly unprotected ac­
tivities. The decision below, if affirmed by this Court, 
would, however, have precisely that result.

The Decision Below Creates a Itequired Preference for 
Classes Covered by the Act.

_ VII does not “ command that any person be hired 
simply because lie was formerly the subject of discrimina­
tion, or because he is a member of a minority group.”  
Griggs, 401 U. S. at 431. Such a requirement would, as this 
Court recognized in Griggs, fly in the face of the Act’s 
anti-pi eferential provisions forbidding an employer from 
showing discriminatory preference for any group, min­
ority or majority . . . ”  Ibid. The decision below, however, 
disregards this basic principle.

Under the Court of Appeals’ view, an employer is re­
quired to have one rule for minority applicants—-they may 
not be disqualified from employment for engaging in un­
lawful actions against their prospective employer—and a 
different one for non-minority persons who admittedly 
would not have been hired for engaging in similar conduct. 
Wheie, as in this case, there is no showing that such 
inconsistent treatment is required either to remove 
discriminatory employment barriers or to rectify past 
misconduct, such reverse discrimination cannot, be justi­
fied. In Title VII, Congress sought only “ to aid minority

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