Supplemental Brief to Motion and in Response to Answer to Emergency Motion

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

)
RONALD BRADLEY, et al, )

)
Plaintiffs, )

)
v. )

)
WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al, )

)
Defendants, )

)
and )) Civil Action
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL ) No. 35257
231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, )
AFL-CIO, )

)Defendant-Intervenor, )
)

and )
)

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al, )
)

Defendants-Intervenor. )
)

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
OF DEFENDANTS BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, IN VIEW OF 
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE FILING OF THIS 
MOTION AND IN RESPONSE TO ANSWER TO. EMERGENCY 

MOTION OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
CITY OF DETROIT ___________

RILEY AND ROUMELL
George T. Roumell, Jr. 
Louis D. Beer 
Jane Keller Souris 
Russ E. Boltz 
720 Ford Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

Attorneys for Defendant 
Board of Education of the 
School District of the 
City of Detroit



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

)RONALD BRADLEY, et al, )
)Plaintiffs, )
)v. )
)WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al, )
)Defendants, )
)and )
)DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL )

231, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, )
AFL-CIO, )

)Defendant-Intervenor, )
)and )
)DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al, )
)Defendants-Intervenor. )

________ _________________________ __________________)

Civil Action 
No. 35257

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
OF DEFENDANTS BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, IN VIEW OF 
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE FILING OF THIS 
MOTION AND IN RESPONSE TO ANSWER TO EMERGENCY 

MOTION OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
CITY OF DETROIT

INTRODUCTION
Events occurring since the Detroit Board filed its Motion 

on November 22, 1972, compel your Movant to further brief the 
issues before this Court. Furthermore, repeated and gross mis­
statements of the law contained in the Response of the Attorney 
General also mandate reply.

It should be noted at the outset that much of the thrust 
of the Attorney General's pleadings has been rendered moot by



action of the Detroit Board on December 5, 1972, at which time 
the Detroit Board rescinded its Motion to close on December 22, 
1972. Although not filed until Thursday, December 7, 1972, the 
Attorney General's pleading was apparentlv written before Tues­
day, for it is largely devoted to an argument against such a 
closing which is now moot. The Detroit Board, in view of some 
indication of legislative support, does intend to remain open as 
long as it can.

Much of the rest of the pleadings of the Attorney General 
are devoted to issues which are substantially irrelevant; namely, 
an attempt to assess blame for the current financial predicament 
of the Detroit schools. In the eyes of the Attorney General, 
apparently the School Board is spendthrift, the electors are 
miserly, and the employees are venal. It is apparently the fault 
of everybody handy that the Detroit schools are threatened with 
closing except the officers of the State of Michigan, even though 
it is the State which is charged with providing a system of 
education.

The fact that the State audit,surrounded with so much 
innuendo in the Attorney General's pleading,showed no wrongdoing 
and almost minimal waste in the Detroit schools, except as 
necessary to decentralization programs mandated by State statute; 
the fact that Detroit teachers received some pay raises in the 
past five years pursuant to the State statute which requires 
collective bargaining, and the facts of poverty and old age 
which doomed to failure the monumental efforts of the Detroit 
Board to pass millage, are not really important here. Nor, in 
view of the many denigrations of the Detroit Board attempted 
by State Defendants throughout this litigation is another one 
very painful. What is relevant here is the Constitutional



rights of school children. Detroit school children were not 
on the Attorney General's list of those to be assigned blame, 
yet it is their Constitutional rights which will be destroyed 
if no relief is forthcoming. That is what is imoortant,

Vnot bickering about blame among the parties.

Similarly not in point are the arguments of the Attorney 
General which assume that the Detroit Board is attempting to 
immediately rip Eighty Million Dollars off of the general funds 
of the State. This is not the case, nor has it ever been the 
case. The Board wishes that its schools be operated in a fashion 
consistent with the Constitution and the previous Order of this 
Court on July 7, 1972. The Board has asked by this motion only 
that the Court order State Defendants to come forward with a plan 
for Constitutional operation of the schools, in the event that 
the legislature fails to do so. If, as the Attorney General 
tells us, it is certainly the case that the legislature will act, 
then that plan will never be used and State Defendants will not 
be harmed at all. However, if the legislature fails in its 
responsibility, then this Court will be in a posture, by granting

i .

this relief to insure that Detroit school children receive
their Constitutional rights and that the previous mandate of
this Court will be obeyed. Amazing as it seems so late in
this litigation, the pleadings of the Attorney General make it
obvious that it is necessary for this Court to make clear to
State officials that it has the power and the duty and the will
to' enforce the Constitution of the United States of America,
1/ Perhaps these arguments of the Attorney General are

of some significance, though, in that they indicate the 
tenor of thought of State Defendants toward Detroit 
school children and the Constitutional jeopardy they 
face. If/ indeed, this is the position of State 
Defendants that it is all Detroit's fault, it casts 
a definite pall on the rosy predictions of the Attorney 
General that it is a sure thing that the legislature 
will respond in a positive fashion.



and that no exception to the Supremacy Clause exists for 
elected officials of the State of Michigan. This is all we ask.

I.
THIS COURT HAS THE POWER TO ACT TO ENFORCE THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Throughout the pleadings of the Attorney General is 
a constant theme with several variations; he says that this 
Court does not have the power to prevent the flouting of its 
own previous Order of July 7, 1972 (which the Attorney General 
never appealed),nor to prevent a Constitutional and educational 
catastrophy in the City of Detroit. This is simply not so. 
Perhaps it would be simplest to deal seriatim with the several 
variations of this theme.

A. The Argument That None But The Legislature 
Can Prevent A Violation Of The Constitution 
In This Matter Is Patently False Under Both 
State and Federal Law.

The Attorney General repeats here an argument made 
throughout the trial of this case, as well as at the hearings 
on the July 7, 1372, Order. The consistency with which it has 
been made is equaled only by the consistency with which it has 
been rejected. In his Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
issued on June 14, 1972, Judge Roth, speaking of State Defendants, 
noted,

"...their stubborn insistence that under 
their self-serving and therefore, self­
limiting view of their powers, they were 
free to ignore the clear Order of this Court 
and abdicate their responsibility vested in 
them by both the Michigan and Federal 
Constitution for supervision of public educa­
tion and equal protection for all citizens."
June 14, 1972, Findings of Fact, p.5.

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As it appears from his pleadings, the Attorney General 
is still unwilling to cooperate with the Court, and that State 
Defendants care more about denying their responsibilities than 
the Constitutional rights of the school children citizens of the State. 
It would perhaps be helpful to suggest several remedies which 
even under their "self-serving and therefore, self-limiting 
view of their power" are well within the authority of State agents 
to carry out. We hasten to add in listing these possible remedies, 
that many of them are as a practical matter repugnant to the 
Detroit Board. We do not advocate them as the best solution.
We offer them only to show that remedies do exist well within 
the power of these Defendants and other State agents available 
to the jurisdiction of this Court. Certainly State Defendants, 
whose knowledge and wisdom regarding the implementation of State 
government is presumably second to none, can do better.

1. This Court could order, failing action of the 
State legislature, that all schools in the State of 
Michigan be closed at the same time the Detroit 
schools are forced to close. This solution has 
nothing whatsoever to recommend it, except that it 
does provide equal protection of the law and 
facilitates the solution of practical problems of 
implementation of the desegregation remedy of the 
Court. It clearly does provide a Constitutional 
remedy. The application of the State statute 
providing for 180 days of instruction would clearly 
be applied in an unconstitutional fashion if it 
were not to be enforced with regard to the State's 
largest school system, which contains more than 
one-eighth of the public school students of the 
State. Once the State undertakes to provide

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f #
education, it must provide it evenhandedly to all.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 
US 483 (1954); Hall v. St.Helena Parish School
Board, 197 F .Supp 649 (Ed La 1961),_______affd. 287

F.2d ___376 (CA 5 1961).
Furthermore, this remedy meets every objection 

and protestation of lack of authority made by the 
Attorney General, even if they are accepted at face 
value. It requires no expenditures of additional 
public funds. It orders no State officials to do 
anything; instead, it is merely a prohibitive 
injunction against local school districts which are 
without question within the jurisdiction of this 
Court. It is not in any way a suit against the 
State; it is simply a prohibition against the 
operation of a law which would be unconstitutional 
if applied in the event that Detroit schools are 
closed.

Even under the most stringently "self­
limiting" view of the powers of State officials, 
they surely are capable of refraining from action.

2. This Court could order, failing legislative 
action, that the various school districts of the 
State, or perhaps those within the metropolitan 
desegregation area, pay over to the State Treasurer 
sufficient State aid funds to fund the Detroit 
school district for the remainder of the school 
year. The Attorney General is correct in pointing 
out that Michigan law does not specifreally 
provide for the Governor, the State Board of Education,

-6-



or the Attorney General, to expend funds for direct 
educational purposes. However, the curious con­
clusion which he infers from this point is that 
nobody may expend such funds. Yet, obviously, the 
funds are expended, and not by the legislature; no 
school teacher in Michigan receives a pay check signed 
by legislators.

Obviously, these State agents which expend State 
funds for public education are local school districts 
which the Attorney General admits at page 28 of his 
Brief,are agents of the State. As these districts 
act under color of State law, performing a State 
function, they may be ordered to do so in a Constitu­
tional fashion; that is, in a fashion which provides 
for equal protection for all school children. Indeed, 
in the long line of cases cited by the Detroit Board 
in its initial brief at page 10, and in the same cases 
as cited by the Court (June 14, 1972, Conclusions of 
Law, p.32) that is exactly what courts have routinely 
done when closings of school were threatened.

The major argument advanced against such action 
by the Attorney General is that it would be disruptive, 
and would produce chaos and inequity. How it would 
be more chaotic, disruptive and inequitable to provide 
that all school children receive the same number of 
days of schooling rather than that one-eighth of the 
children be totally deprived of education after 
mid-March, is beyond the comprehension of the Detroit 
Board. Admittedly, such a remedy is highly undesirable; 
Defendant Detroit Board in no way seeks to have the 
rights of Detroit school children vindicated at the

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expense of the educational opportunities of other 
school children. Yet, such a result would meet the 
Constitutional mandate of equal protection and the 
responsibility for the fact that it was bad public 
policy would not rest with this Court, but the State 
legislature which condoned the Constitutional 
violation in the first place and failed to remedy it.

3. State Defendants,under existing State statute, 
may provide for the dissolution of the Detroit School 
District and the attachment of its several parts to 
adjacent school districts. In his litany of various 
previous legislative remedies for financial problems, 
the Attorney General neglected to mention that several 
of these statutes provided for the dissolution of 
insolvent school districts, with their territory 
being attached to adjacent districts. See particu­
larly Section 6a of 1968 PA 32, MSA 15.1916 (106a),

yet seq.
While the Attorney General is correct in noting 

that that statute has expired, the statute at M.C.L.A. 
340.461, et; seq, MSA 15.3461 has not. That statute 
provides that the Intermediate Board of Education may 
detach up to ten per cent of the territory of any 
school district and attach it to another contiguous 
district, without vote of either the attaching or

2/ Note also Section 15a of that Act which mandated
the State Board of Education to re-organize such 
districts, "so as to provide the most equitable 
educational opportunity for all of the students 
of the re-organized district."

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detaching district. M.C.L .A. 340.467 provides that 
such action may be appealed to the State Board of 
Education and "the State Board of Education is 
hereby empowered to consider such appeals and to 
confirm, modify or set aside the order of the 
county Board of Education or the joint boards and 
its action on any such appeal shall be final."
See School District No. 3, Mt. Haley Tp. v. State 
Board of Education, 364 Mich. 160, and School 
District of City of Lansing v. State Board of 
Education, 367 Mich. 591.

Thus, it is within the power of State Defen­
dants, if the legislature defaults, to dismember the 
Detroit district and attach its severed parts to 
ten or more contiguous and solvent districts, thus 
providing sufficient revenue to continue the operation 
of schools for Detroit children. Once again, the 
Detroit Board advocates no such remedy, but the power 
to affect it is there.

The above schemes, distasteful as they may be, vividly 
demonstrate that even an unreguired slavish adherence to Michigan 
statutes, and an equally dedicated ignorance of the Federal law 
which does allow the contravention of such statutes to meet 
Constitutional purposes will not prevent the State agents from 
acting to prevent the violation of the clear order of this Court. 
These horribles are not necessary, for the law does allow the 
simple direct order which does make sense in the absence of 
legislative action; namely, ordering the State Treasurer to 
disburse the funds necessary to operate the Detroit schools, 
absent fulfillment of this responsibility by the State legis­
lature.

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The argument of the Attorney General assumes that powers 
must be exercised here which simply do not need to be exercised. 
All that is required is that the Treasurer issue his warrant.
He does not have to revamp appropriations; he need not tamper 
with the State Budget; he has no responsibility to realign other 
State priorities to cover this shortage. As the Attorney General 
points out, none of that is his job.

What, then, of other State programs for which money was 
allocated? The answer is, of course, that these decisions should 
be made by the legislature. The situation would be precisely 
that created if the State Treasurer's estimate of the revenues 
he expects to receive for a given year proved to be incorrect.
The State Treasurer need only report to the legislature and the 
Bureau of the Budget that the revenues in the general fund are 
not sufficient to cover the budgetary appropriations made by 
the legislature, and the legislature may respond by either, in 
its judgment, modifying appropriations to cover this shortfall, 
or levying taxes to raise new revenue. Those decisions are, 
of course, legislative decisions that need not be the concern 
of this Court as long as they are made in a Constitutional fashion

We need go no further than this District and this year 
to find a case which forms a striking parallel. In Dunnell v. 
Austin,344 F Supp 210 (ED Mich.1972), Judge Keith considered 
the Constitutionality of Michigan's Congressional districts.
It was determined by stipulation of the parties that the current 
districts were unconstitutional, and the parties further 
stipulated that, "A reasonable time by which the State legis­
lature shall have completed a valid Congressional Redistricting 
Act [would be] February 29, 1972!" 344 F Supp at 212. The
legislature having failed to act by that date, or thereafter,

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the Court considered various districting plans, and ordered 
the Secretary of State to conduct an election pursuant to the 
plan ordered by the Court. 344 F Supp at 217.

The Secretary of State has no more authority under 
Michigan law to determine Congressional districts than the 
Treasurer has to make appropriations. He does, however, have 
the power to conduct elections, just as the Treasurer has the 
power to issue warrants on the Treasury. The Court, quite 
properly, and without a whimper of protest from the Attorney 
General, ordered the Secretary of State to carry out his 
function in such a fashion as to preserve the Constitutional 
rights of Michigan citizens inspite of the fact that only the 
legislature is empowered to create Congressional districts 
under Michigan law. That is precisely what we ask here, and 
in precisely the same fashion, even insofar as allowing the 
legislature a reasonable time to act before the Court implements 
its order. The only difference discernible in the exercise of 
State powers by State officers between the two cases is that 
there the Attorney General favored the substantive relief 
requested and here he does not. The power of State officers 
to act under order of the Court to prevent Constitutional 
violations does not depend on whether the officers favor the 
relief requested. •

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B. It Has Been the_Lav; For The Last Sixty- 
Four Years That Motions Such As That 
Brought Here Are Not Barred By The
Eleventh Amendment. ■

The Attorney General, in citing Smith v Reeves, properly 
states the rule of law that pertained to actions such as this in 
1900 (In fact, that rule was established by In Re Avers,8 S.Ct. 
164, 123 U.S. 443, 31 L. Ed. 216 (1887). However, in 1908, this 
line of cases was reversed in Ex Parte Young ,209 U.S. 123, 28 
S.Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714. The rule has been followed ever since, 
that State officials,acting in their official capacity,may be 
sued to prevent Constitutional violations by them, the use of 
the name of the State to effect a Constitutional wrong against 
complainants not being a proceeding which affects the State in 
its sovereign capacity. While the Eleventh Amendment does bar 
direct money judgments against the State, it does not bar orders 
requiring State officials to expend additional State Funds for 
established State purposes if such funds are being spent in an 
unconstitutional manner. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394, U.S. 618 (1969) 
How firmly settled this principle of law is vividly illustrated 
in the case of Rothstein v. Wyman, 41 USLW 2169 (CA 2, Sept.7,1972), 
decided by the Second Circuit on September 7, 1972, and to the 
knowledge of counself the latest significant case involving the 
Eleventh Amendment. In that case, the Court, having previously 
ordered the expenditure of State funds to rectify Constitutional 
inequities in the Mew York State Welfare program, refused on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds to provide retroactive payments. In
doing so, it noted that this was perhaps the minority view among



the Circuits, the majority permitting even such retroactive 
payments by order of the Federal Courts. The Court mentioned 
in passing that there was no longer any question that prospective 
expenditures such as those at issue here could be required. There 
is no need to belabor the point; this case simply does present 

an Eleventh Amendment problem, any more than did Dunnell v 
Austin, supra.

C. The July 7 Order Of This Court Is Still Vital.

State Defendants presume too much when they suggest that 
the Stay of Desegregation Proceedings ordered by the Sixth Circuit 
saps the vitality of this Order. Their presumption is that, 
should this District Court be affirmed, no desegregation order 
need be effected for the rest of the 1972 school year. Given 
the clear command of Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) that a finding of such a viola­
tion as has been found here requires desegregation now, which has 
in a legion of.cases been interpreted to mean within a matter 
of days, their casual assumption that we can all just forget 
about school desegregation until next year is nothing more than 
wishful thinking. To be sure, the Sixth Circuit might extend its 
Stay, and to be sure, it might reverse. But there is no precedent 
cited, and the Detroit Board believes none exists, for the curious 
assertion that the District Court which has made a ruling should 
act on the presumption that it is going to be reversed. Judge 
Roth issued the July 7th Order for the primary purpose of pre­
serving the status quo ante litem so as not to make even more 
difficult the task of school desegregation. There is no event

-13



which has intervened which makes that purpose any less important.

D. There Is No Serious Question Of The Standing 
Of The Detroit Board Of Education To Bring..
This Motion.

The Detroit Board of Education is itself a Defendant in 
this cause, and is required to obey the order of this Court to 
provide a full year school program. Apparently unlike the State 
Defendants, it has a keen desire to insure that it is capable 
of doing exactly that. It desires to avoid any contempt, and 
further desires that it not be forced to plead impossibility to 
a charge of contempt. While this is basis enough for its stand­
ing to bring this motion (now concurred in by the original maker 
of the Motion which resulted in the July 7 Order), the Board 
must insist that it does have a legitimate interest in the preser­
vation of the Constitutional rights of its students. It is 
empowered by statute to do "anything whatever that may advance 
the interests of education, the good government and prosperity 
of the free schools in said city, and the welfare of the public 
concerning same." M.S.A. 15.3192, M.C.L.A. 340.192) Attempting 
to insure that it can keep its schools open, and that the Con­
stitutional rights of its students will remain inviolate would 
seem to fall well within that grant of authority.

In sum, there is very little room for State Defendants' 
argument that there simply is not an agent of the State, within 
the jurisdiction of this Court, who is empowered to take action 
that will insure the preservation of Constitutional rights, and 
obedience to the previous order of the Courts. The law is clear, 
the Constitutional violation is upon us, and there is no deterrent 
to the jurisdiction of the Court.

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#

II
THE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THIS COURT TO ACT IS NOW

The Attorney General argues for State Defendants with 
some passion that the legislature should be allowed the oppor­
tunity to act, that if we will all be patient they will come 
through and the problem will go away. The difficulty with the 
argument is that nothing in the order requested by the Detroit 
Board will in any way harm the chance that this will happen, 

atlndeed, it is the fondest desire of the Detroit Board that thisrircr 
Court not have to implement its Order because the legislature 
has acted to uphold the Constitution.

The Order requested here requires State Defendants to 
do nothing now except plan for the/eventuality that the legis­
lature will not act. The Detroit Board knows of no reason why 
this activity would in any way interfere with the legislative 
process, and no such reason is given by State Defendants. Quite 
the contrary, the Detroit Board would submit that the certain 
knowledge that this Court will provide for the funding of the 
Detroit schools in a mandatory fashion if the legislature does 
not act first should, if it has any effect, spur the legislature 
to prompt action.

What the Detroit Board proposes is nothing more than 
was done in Dunnell v. Austin: first an unequivocal statement
that this Court will act if the legislature does not, a require­
ment that responsible parties come forward in timely fashion with 
plans to preserve Constitutional rights in the absence of

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#

legislative action, and hearings leading to the adoption of 
such a plan in the event of legislative default.

This in no way conflicts with any legislative timetable, 
and it is devoutly hoped that legislative deliberations will be 
successful.

However, there is no reason, simply because all parties 
hope the legislature will act, for the Court to assume with cer­
tainty that they will, simply based on the predictions of the 
Attorney General. The fact of the matter is that to date, they 
have not. -

There is ample precedent for the course suggested here 
by the Detroit Board. In effect, what is suggested is an Order 
of the Court made to enforce and protect the previous Order of 
the Court. The Court would then be staying its own mandate pend­
ing the action of the legislature. Dunnell v. Austin, supra., 
Standard Oil v. Standard Oil, 239 F Supp 97 (ED Mo 1966);
Ely V Klahr, 403 US 108 (1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio, 337 
F Supp 280 (WD Tex 1971) prob juris noted, 32 L. Ed. 2nd 665 
(1972). These latter two cases were cited in our initial brief 
not because the Detroit Board views this as a school finance case, 
as the Attorney General suggests, but for the procedure used in 
those cases by which the Court stayed its mandate to allow state 
legislatures a reasonable period of time in which to act. Clearly 
this is not a school finance case based on arguments of educational 
needs or of any other variety. The Detroit Board raises no

-16-



issues whatsoever here as to how the schools are funded, leaving 
that question in the first instance to the legislature, and in 
the second instance to the State Defendants. Our sole concern, 
in this forum at this time, is that the schools be funded by 
whatever Constitutional means the State may provide. Should 
the legislature fail to act, then and only then the mandate of 
the Court would have to be enforced.

The overriding practical reasons why this Order should
issue now and planning begin forthwith are found in a cursory

\examination of State Defendant's Brief. The hostility to any 
requirement that the State fund the Detroit schools is abundantly 
evident. Should such hostility exist in the legislature it does 
not augur well for the ability of the legislative leadership to 
keep their commitment to pass the needed legislation.

Furthermore, consistent with their "self-serving and 
therefore self-limiting view of their powers", it is quite likely 
that the plan State Defendants come forward with will require 
substantial modification through objections from other- parties. 
Judge Roth described their performance with regard to a previous 
planning function. "Put bluntly, State Defendants in this hearing 
deliberately chose not to assist the Court in choosing an appro­
priate area for effective desegregation of the Detroit public 
schools. Their resistance and abdiction of responsibility through­
out has been consistent with the other failures to meet their 
obliations noted in the Court's earlier rulings". June 14 Findings 
of Fact pp 6-7. Such an attitude here will require time for 
hearing on plans if they are filed.



Finally, should the State Defendants elect to advocate 

one of the more elaborate remedies which adhere slavishly to 
their interpretation of state statute, such as dissection of the 
District, or the diversion of funds from other State agents, 
the effectuation of such a remedy will itself require some little 
time.

There is one additional reason for the immediate action 
of the Court, one which does not relate to the attitude of State 
Defendants. It relates to the deleterious effect on the educa­
tional process of the inherent uncertainty created by the finan­
cial crisis which now surrounds Detroit schools. It cannot help 
but have an enervating effect on student and staff morale, and 
therefore, on the education the children of the District receive, 
simply not to know whether school will continue through the 
normal calendar or whether there will be an abrupt and disruptive 
termination in mid-March. The students of this District not 
only need their Constitutional rights to education, they need 
to know that those rights are secure so that they may be fully 
enjoyed, and so that the maximum benefit from the educational 
program the district offers can be attained. At this juncture 
only this Court can provide that security.

. Finally, a fact of the matter is though the State claims 
that there were numerous meetings concerning, the financial crisis 
of the Detroit Board of Education, those meetings produced zero. 
They were pleasant conversation. The Board, was told to go back 
for more millage. We did in May, August and November of 1972.
The millage was defeated. We were asked to support Proposition 
C on the November 7, 1972 ballot. We did. Our President and

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Superintendent went on the air urging the passage of the propo­
sition. The fact of the matter is that until the Detroit Board 
of Education, through its attorneys, announced that it would seek 
to enforce the July 7, 1972 Order in Court and the announcement 
by the Board that it would close schools on December 21, 1972 
for an eight-week period that the State Defendants began taking 
some concrete action. The action of the administrative board came 
only after the announcement of the litigation and closing. The 
statement of the legislative leaders came after the legal litiga­
tion and announcement of closing. We still only have promises 
and conversation. School children are entitled to action. The 
Order proposed by the Detroit Board of Education would give the 
State Defendants the incentive that apparently they need in order 
to act to protect the Constitutional rights of the children of ' 
Detroit.



C O N C L U S I O N

There is an old Kikuyu saying popularized by the current

President of Kenya which translates roughly as "When elephants 
fight, the grass dies." As Plaintiffs, State Defendants,
Suburban Defendants and the Detroit Board thrash through the 
weighty and ponderous issues which have been present throughout 
this case, it is crucial that we not stomp too heavily on the 
real subject of all this dispute, the tender young minds of the 
school children of this city. What more tragic result is imagin­
able than for this litigation, in which so many have striven so 
hard to preserve and protect Constitutional rights to education 
as each saw them, to culminate in a situation in which there 
was no education at all. It cannot be allowed to happen. This 
Court has the power to .prevent it, and it should exercise that
power, so that all will know that those most previous rights 
are secure.

Respectfully submitted,
RILEY AND ROUMELL

George T. Roumdll, Jr.
Louis D.Beer
Jane Keller Souris
Russ E. Boltz

Attorneys for Defendant Board 
of Education of the School 
District of the City of Detroit

December 8, 1972.

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Supplemental 
Brief of Defendants Board of Education of the School District of 
the City of Detroit, in view of Changed Circumstances Since The 
Filing of This Motion and in Response to Answer to Emergency 
Motion of the Board of Education of the City of Detroit has been 
served upon counsel of record by United States Mail, postage pre­
paid, addressed as follows:

LOUIS R. LUCAS 
WILLIAM E. CALDWELL 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
NATHANIEL R.; JONES 
General Counsel, NAACP 
1790 Broadway 
New York, New York 10019
E. WINTHER MC CROOM 
3245 Woodburn Avenue 
Cincinnati, Ohio 45207
JACK GREENBERG 
NORMAN J. CKACKKIN 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019
J. HAROLD FLANNERY 
PAUL R. DIMOND 
ROBERT PRESSMAN 
Center for Lav; £ Education 
Harvard University 
Cambridge, Massachusetts 

02138
DAVID L. NORMAN . •
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20530
ROBERT J. LORD
8388 Dixie Highway
Fair Haven, Michigan 48023
RALPH GUY
United States Attorney 
Federal Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
DOUGLAS H. WEST 
ROBERT B. WEBSTER 
3700 Penobscot Building 
Detroit, Michigan 43226

WILLIAM M. SAXTON
1881 First National Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226
EUGENE KRASICKY
Assistant Attorney General "' 
Lav; Building; .
525 West Ottawa Street 
Lansing, Michigan 48913
THEODORE SACHS 
1000 Farmer .
Detroit, Michigan 48226
ALEXANDER B. RITCHIE 
1930 Buhl Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
BRUCE A. MILLER .
LUCILLE WATTS ■
2460 First National Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226
RICHARD P. CONDIT '
Long Lake Building
860 West Long Lake Road
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013
KENNETH B. MC CONNELL .
74 West Long Lake Road •
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48013
DONALD F. SUGERMAN . '
2460 First National Building 
Detroit,Michigan 48226
THEODORE. W. SWIFT
900 American Bank & Trust Rldrr
Lansing, Michigan 48933 ’
FRED W. FREEMAN '
CHARLES F. CLIPPERT 
1700 N. Woodward Avenue 
F. O. Box 509
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 4S013



+
* *'

JOHN F. SHANTZ
222 Washington Square Building 
Royal Oak, Michigan 48067

December 8, 1972 Repsectfully submitted,
RILEY AND RQUMELL

f S/•Russ E. Boltz
■ &

720 Ford Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

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