Traynham v. County School Board of Halifax County, Virginia Brief for Appellees
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1969

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Veteran v. Greenberg Petition for a Writ Mandamus, 1989. a011920a-c89a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/08a4358d-c41a-4542-a11d-464de322ef4e/veteran-v-greenberg-petition-for-a-writ-mandamus. Accessed August 28, 2025.
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89 In The United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit In re A nthony F. V eteran and Susan T olchin, Petitioners. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Paul A gresta Town Attorney Town of Greenburgh P.O, Box 205 Elmsford, New York 10523 (914) 993-1546 Attorney for Petitioners Table of Contents Page Preliminary Statement...................................... 1 Statement of the Case...................................... 5 The West Help Shelter......... 5 The NIMBY Response............ 6 The Proposed Village................ 7 The Town Supervisor's Decision....................... 9 The Remand Order..................................... 12 Issue Presented and Relief Sought........................ 13 Reasons Why the Writ Should Issue......................... 13 I - MANDAMUS IS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO REVIEW THECOURT'S FAILURE TO ASSUME FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION......................................... 14 II - THE COURT BELOW INCORRECTLY INVOKED THE BURFORD DOCTRINE............................................. 16 Conclusion 25 Table of Authorities Cases: Page Alliance of American Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F. 2d 591 (2d Cir. 1988)......................18, 22, 23 B.A.M. Brokerage Corp. v. State of New York, 700 F. Supp 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).......................... 20 Burford v. Sun Oil Co. , 319 U.S. 315 (1943)..........passim CBS Inc, v. State Human Rights Appeal Board. 54 N.Y.2d 921 (1981).................................. 24 Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. 424 U.S. 800 (1976)................... 16, 17 Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F. 2d 31 (2d Cir. 1988)............................ 15 Heritage Farms. Inc, v. Soleburv Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.),cert, denied, 456 U.S. 990 (1982)..................... 23 Kontokosta v . Village of Greenport, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13584 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)........... 20 Lake Carriers1 Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972)............................... . 16 Law Enforcement Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987) ........................ 18 Levy v. Lewis, 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980)............ 21 LILCO v. Cuomo,666 F. Supp. 370 (N.D.N.Y. 1987)...................... 18 Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.57 U.S.L.W. 4487 (U.S. May 1, 1989)................... 14 McRedmond v. Wilson,533 F. 2d 757 (2d Cir. 1976)........................... 23 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).................................... 16 i Cases: Page Railroad Conmt'n of Texas v. Pullman Co. , 312 U.S. 496 (1941)............................3, 5, 12, 15 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943)..................................... 15 Schlaaenhauf v. Holder. 379 U.S. 104 (1964) ........... 16 Zablocki v. Redhail. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).................................... 23 Statutes and Rules: Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P................................ 1 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).............................. 3, 11, 12 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2)............................... 3 , 4, 11 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (d) . . ................................. 4, 13 28 U.S.C. § 1651...................................... 1 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3)..... 9 New York Village Law Art. 2........................................... 19 § 2-206.......................................... 19 § 2-208.......................................... 19 § 2-212.......................................... 8 § 2-232 .......................................... 21 § 2-234.......................................... 21 ii UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT--------------------- .----- ------- x In re ANTHONY F. VETERAN and : SUSAN TOLCHIN, : Petitioners. : ---------------------------------- x Docket No. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651 and Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P., petitioners Anthony F. Veteran, the Supervisor of the Town of Greenburgh, N.Y., and Susan Tolchin, the Town Clerk, submit this petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to assume jurisdiction of the matter entitled In re Greenberg et ano. v. Veteran et al.. Index No. 18286/88 (West. Co. Sup. Ct.), which the court below erroneously remanded after removal from the state court. ^ Preliminary Statement "[T]his case," the court below (Goettel, J.) explained, "is unmistakably a product of the 'NIMBY Syndrome' 1/ Town Clerk Tolchin is a nominal party in this matter. For simplicity's sake, we refer to both petitioners as "the Town Supervisor." 2 . . . 'Not In My Back Yard.'" (A 99-100; emphasis in origi nal)-^ Here, the NIMBY syndrome is a reaction to a proposed shelter for homeless families with children — overwhelmingly families from racial minorities. Community resistance — fueled by racism — includes an effort to assert control over the proposed shelter by incorporating a new village. As a leading proponent of the new village has said: "You're taking a piece of a ghetto and dumping it somewhere else to get another ghetto started. . . . We'll go ahead with secession and take a nice piece of taxable property with us." (A 142) Before the secession could proceed, however, state law required the Town Supervisor to consider the village incorporation petition. After doing so, he concluded that "[i]n the entire 30 years during which I have held elective office I have never seen such a blatant and calculated attempt to discriminate" on the basis of race. (A 51) For this and other reasons, the Town Supervisor rejected the attempt to secede. Two secessionists responded by filing this proceed ing in the Westchester County Supreme Court to overturn the 2y References to "A ___" are to pages of Petitioner's Appendix in Support of Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. 3 Town Supervisor's decision. Among other claims, the two secessionists allege that the New York Village Law does not permit the Town Supervisor to reject an incorporation effort on grounds of invidious discrimination. Thus, they argue, the Town Supervisor supposedly failed to follow the state statutory scheme when he relied on unconstitutional race discrimination as a basis for his decision. The Town Supervisor removed the suit to the South ern District of New York. He relied on the "refusal clause" of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2), a removal provision applicable to civil rights actions. He also invoked federal question removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), based on the secessionists' claim that he had violated their First Amend ment rights. The secessionists did not seek to remand. The district court, however, raised removal and Pullman absten- . 3 /tion issues sua sponte. After the parties' submissions, the court below rejected removal under § 1443(2). Moreover, while the court upheld federal question removal jurisdiction under § 1441(b), it nonetheless abstained under the Burford doctrine -- a different abstention doctrine than the one the 3/ See Railroad Comm1n of Texas v. Pullman Co.. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 4 court had instructed the parties to brief.-7 Having decided to abstain, the court remanded the case to state court. There is sad irony in the ruling of the court below. A generation ago, the federal courts intervened often in the struggle for equality to remind state and local officials of their duty to uphold the United States Consti tution, even in the face of conflicting state law and com munity pressure. Heeding the lessons of that era, the Town Supervisor upheld the supremacy of federal law and, when sued for doing so, came to a federal courthouse for confirmation of his action. The court below, however, closed the court house doors — despite the congressional promise to keep them open in these circumstances. The Town Supervisor has appealed the district court's rejection of § 1443(2) refusal clause jurisdiction. Greenberg v. Veteran, Docket No. 89-7476.̂ By this peti tion, the Town Supervisor further seeks a writ of mandamus because the court below also misapplied the Burford 4 / 4/ See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 5/ Unlike a typical remand order, this part of the order below is appealable under an exception applicable to removal of civil rights actions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443 and 1447(d). 5 abstention doctrine in declining to exercise its federal question removal jurisdiction. The Burford doctrine is intended to avoid undue federal court interference with specialized state regulatory systems. This case, however, does not involve any such system. It concerns only a local effort to form a new village. The absence of any basis for Burford abstention is highlighted by the district court's decision to reach for this doctrine after first directing briefing on the Pullman doctrine. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus should issue to remedy this clear abuse of discretion. Statement of the Case The West HELP Shelter Westchester County is teeming with homeless fami lies, many of whom are quartered at great public expense in often squalid motel rooms. Typically, a single room houses a parent and a number of children. The vast majority of the County's homeless are members of racial minorities. (A 133-34, 139, 141) In January 1988, the Town of Greenburgh proposed to build housing for 108 homeless families with children on land within the Town owned by Westchester County. The proposed developer is West H.E.L.P., Inc. ("West HELP"), a not-for- profit corporation that constructs housing for the homeless. The intent of the West HELP development is to provide safe, 6 convenient and humane emergency (or "transitional") shelter for homeless families with children. It is part of a joint County/West HELP proposal to establish a number of such facilities. (A 139-40) The NIMBY Response Announcement of the West HELP shelter galvanized neighborhood resistance. In February 1988, an organization called Coalition of United Peoples, Inc. ("COUP") was formed to stop the project. Around the same time, COUP proponents publicly announced their intent to stop the West HELP shelter by incorporating a new village — later named "Mayfair Knollwood" — pursuant to the New York Village Law. (A 141- 42) COUP proponents seek to use the new governmental unit of Mayfair Knollwood to block the West HELP development. As COUP president, Laurence Deutsch, has said: We'll go ahead with secession and take a nice piece of taxable property with us. (A 142) The "secession" plan is racially motivated. As Deutsch stated in opposing the West HELP development: You're taking a piece of a ghetto and dumping it some where else to get another ghetto started. (A 142) Thereafter, Deutsch and others prepared and circu lated a petition to incorporate Mayfair Knollwood. (A 142) The secessionist scheme was underway. 7 The Proposed Village The map of Mayfair Knollwood, reproduced below, is ugly indeed. The boundary of the proposed village is irregu lar and ungeometric; it has more than 30 sides. The proposed village would exclude all the black and multi-racial housing surrounding it. The tortured shape of the village can be explained only by the purpose of its creators — to exclude racial minorities. (A 51-52, 143, 155) 8 Within the proposed village is the West HELP development site — so that the newly formed government will be able to seize control and try to halt construction. The proposed village also includes a disproportionate amount of the Town's tax base and recreational facilities. Moreover, the boundary extends outward to include all the undeveloped land that borders the excluded surrounding minority neighbor hoods — thus assuring the power to create a buffer zone against possible encroachment from excluded communities through control of land use. (A 52-53, 143) In September 1988, after hundreds of residents had signed the incorporation petition, the secessionists pre sented it to the Town Supervisor. Under state law, the Town Supervisor then had the responsibility of calling a hearing, receiving objections and rendering a decision on whether the incorporation procedure could move ahead. A favorable decision would clear the way for a vote by the Mayfair Knollwood residents on whether to secede. (A 144-45; N.Y. Village L. § 2-212 (McKinney 1973)) Because of the proposed village's composition — resulting, of course, from its gerrymandered borders — the outcome of such a vote was a foregone conclusion. Thus, COUP president Deutsch trium phantly announced that "[t]he incorporation is a fact. . . . The town may delay us, but it won't stop us." (A 144) 9 On November 1, 1988, an alliance of black residents of the area, homeless persons with families, the White Plains/Greenburgh branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. and the National Coali tion for the Homeless filed suit in the Southern District of New York against several proponents of the secession, naming the Town Supervisor as a defendant as well. Jones v. Deutsch. 88 Civ. 7738 (GLG). (A 132) That action alleges civil rights conspiracy claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and also seeks a declaratory judgment affirming the Town Supervisor's right and obligation to reject the Mayfair Knollwood incorporation petition. Upon its filing, the case was assigned to Judge Goettel. The Town Supervisor's Decision On the same day as the filing of the Jones action, the Town Supervisor convened the hearing required by the New York Village Law. On December 6, 1988, he filed his decision rejecting the incorporation petition on several grounds. (A 50) One ground for rejection was race discrimination. The Town Supervisor found that the Mayfair Knollwood boundaries "were gerrymandered in a manner to exclude black persons from the proposed village." (A 51) In his own words: In the entire 30 years during which I have held elective office I have never seen such a blatant and calculated attempt to discriminate. The boundaries repeatedly deviate from a natural course solely to exclude 10 individual properties where blacks live. Within the boundaries of the proposed village there is not a single unit of multi-family housing, housing which historically has been more accessible to minority groups because of its lower cost. (A 51-52) Recognizing that "[t]he procedures for the forma tion of a new village cannot be used to accomplish an unlaw ful end," the Town Supervisor concluded that his obligation was "to defend the constitution and to reject the petition . . . ." (A 53) The Town Supervisor also rejected the petition because "the new village was proposed for the sole purpose of preventing the construction of transitional housing for homeless families near the neighborhood of Mayfair Knollwood." (A 53) Again, he concluded that his duty to defend the constitution dictated that he reject the petition because "its purpose is to deny homeless persons needed services, to exclude homeless persons, and to racially discriminate against homeless persons who are predominantly black." (A 56)^ Two secessionists (respondents here, but referred to as the "Article 78 petitioners") then filed this suit in the Westchester County Supreme Court pursuant to Article 78 6/ The Town Supervisor also found that the petition breached the Village Law in several respects and rejected it on those grounds as well. (A 50-51, 56) 11 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules in an effort to overturn the decision. (A3, 34) Among the claims pleaded are that: (1) the Town Supervisor failed to follow the Village Law when he rejected the incorporation petition on the ground of racial discrimination; and (2) in finding that the new village proponents sought to discriminate, the Town Supervisor committed a First Amendment violation. (A 45-48) The Article 78 petitioners also attacked the procedure used at the incorporation hearing and in connection with the Town Supervisor's decision. The Town Supervisor, joined by other Article 78 proceeding respondents (including the Jones plaintiffs), removed the suit to the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(b) and 1443(2). (A 79, 82-83)-^ 7/ in pertinent part, these statutes provide as follows: r § 1441(b)1 Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. r § 1443X11] Any of the following civil actions . . . may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: * * * (Continued) 12 The Article 78 proceeding was assigned to Judge Goettel as a Jones-related case. The Remand Order The Article 78 petitioners did not seek a remand to state court. The court below, however, sua sponte directed the parties to address whether removal was appropriate and whether the court should abstain under the doctrine of Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 4S6 (1941). After a conference and written submissions, the court below issued its decision directing a remand. (A 96) The district court agreed that federal question removal was appropriate under § 1441(b). But, it decided to abstain based on the Burford doctrine — despite its instruc tion that the parties brief the propriety of Pullman absten tion. (A 121-28) Thus, the court erroneously embraced Burford without giving the Town Supervisor an opportunity to present his views on its application — and despite the clear absence of any state regulatory system of the type envisioned * 2 (Continued) (2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law. 13 by Burford. In any event, having decided to abstain, the court below remanded the case to the state court. The Town Supervisor seeks review by mandamus of this part of the order below.-7 Issue Presented and Relief Sought This petition presents one basic question for review: Does the Burford abstention doctrine preclude the district court from hearing this proceeding, brought pursuant to state law, to review the Town Supervisor's refusal to approve for a vote a petition to incorporate a new village? The court below erroneously answered this question "yes." Thus, this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to assume jurisdiction of this Article 78 proceeding. Reasons Whv the Writ Should Issue The district court's decision to abstain on Burford grounds is a clear abuse of discretion. Burford abstention 8/ The court also rejected jurisdiction under the refusal clause of § 1443(2), the civil rights removal provision. The Town Supervisor has appealed from that part of the order below. (A 129) See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 14 is intended to avoid federal interference in detailed state regulatory systems, where special expertise is needed and where substantial state policies make federal interference undesirable. This simply is not a Burford case. There is no state regulatory system here. The Village Law merely details a procedure for local incorpora tion. Moreover, there is no substantial state policy impli cated by incorporation. At bottom, incorporation raises matters of local concern. Finally, unlike Burford, there was no possible interference with any other state review proceed ing because this removed case is the only state vehicle for reviewing official action in the incorporation process. In abstaining, the court below simply refused to accept the removal jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress — a refusal that just cannot stand under the controlling authorities. Hence, a writ of mandamus should issue direct ing the district court to accept jurisdiction. I MANDAMUS IS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO REVIEW THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ASSUME FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION A writ of mandamus is proper "to confine an inferi or court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Mallard v. United States District Court for the 15 Southern District of Iowa, 57 U.S.L.W. 4487, 4491 (U.S. May 1, 1989), emoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). This Court has held that mandamus review is available where the district court has removal jurisdiction, but declines to exercise it and instead remands the case on abstention grounds. Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1988). Although the Corcoran court declined to issue the writ, here, relief is compelled. With all respect, the district court seemed to search for a ground to avoid its duty to adjudicate. Most typically, state or local officials are the ones who urge federal court abstention. In contrast, by filing a removal petition, the Town Supervisor affirmatively tried to present his case to the district court. Upon removal, the Article 78 petitioners did not raise an issue of abstention. The court below itself did so by soliciting argument on application of Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 315 (1943) — not Burford. After we had briefed that doctrine — and, we suggest, had demonstrated that there was no basis for Pullman abstention — the court, without further notice, abstained on a different theory altogether. Thus, the district court abstained on grounds not urged by any party, without giving the Town Supervisor an opportunity to oppose Burford abstention. And, as we demon strate below, Burford is manifestly inapplicable. 16 By abdicating its duty to hear this case, the court below committed a clear abuse of discretion. Issuance of a writ of mandamus is the necessary remedy. See Schlaqenhauf v. Holder. 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964). II THE COURT BELOW INCORRECTLY INVOKED THE BURFORD DOCTRINE The federal courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them." Colorado River Water Conservation Dist, v. United States. 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). Accordingly, abstention — the excep tion, not the rule -— is limited to "special circumstances." Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan. 406 U.S. 498, 509 (1972). See also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc tion Coro.. 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (in resolving issues of abstention, the balance is "heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction"). Burford v. Sun Oil Co.. 319 U.S. 315 (1943), represents one of those exceptions. But this action does not implicate the Burford doctrine — far from it, as a review of the case discloses. The animating concern in Burford — inter ference with a complex state regulatory system — simply is not present here. Burford arose from a Texas statutory scheme that author ized the Railroad Commission, a state agency, to administer a 17 complex system of conserving and controlling oil and gas drilling in the state. The Commission issued drilling permits to private operators, applied drilling spacing standards to promote conserva tion, and participated in a production control program. As the Supreme Court explained: The standards applied by the Commission in a given case necessarily affect the entire state conservation sys tem. . . . [T]he overall plan of regulation, as well as each of its case by case manifestations, is of vital interest to the general public which must be assured that the speculative interests of individual tract owners will be put aside when necessary to prevent the irretrievable loss of oil in other parts of the field. 319 U.S. at 324. State law also provided for review of Commission orders in a single trial level court, thus enabling "the state courts, like the Railroad Commission itself, to acquire a specialized knowledge which is useful in shaping the policy of regulation of the ever-changing demands in this field." Id. at 327. Finally, there was a pattern of federal court disruption of the state regulatory scheme. Id. at 327-30. In this factual setting, the Supreme Court held that federal court abstention was appropriate. As the Court later explained, Burford applies where federal review "would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern." Colorado River. 424 U.S. at 814. 18 This Court has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the Burford doctrine. For instance, in Law Enforce ment Ins. Co. v. Corcoran, 807 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987), this Court noted: The Supreme Court [in Burford! held that the case was one for abstention because: (1) the order under attack was part of a unified regulatory scheme on a complex subject matter of special state interest, a scheme in which the state administrative agency and the state courts cooperated closely to safeguard the values of uniformity, expertise, and due process; (2) the state had expressed its interest in unified decision making by creating a system on the state level to avoid multiple inconsistent adjudications, a system that would be disrupted by the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal courts; and (3) the issues .sought to be adjudicated in federal court were largely ones of state law. Put another way, Burford is intended for cases "relating to complex state regulations where the federal court decision may disrupt important state policies," and where federal resolution "will have a significant impact on important state policies and for which the state has provided a comprehensive regulatory system with channels for review by state courts or agencies." Alliance of American Insurers v. Cuomo, 854 F.2d 591, 599 (2d Cir. 1988). See also Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Burford is designed to avoid federal court interference with specialized state regulatory schemes"); LILCO v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 398-99 (N.D.N.Y. 1987). The court below recognized the general principles governing Burford abstention, but misapplied them. No 19 specialized state regulatory scheme exists here. No state agency or official oversees or administers the Village Law — because there is nothing to regulate. No unique system for judicial review exists to assure uniformity of decision or promotion of an important state policy. The New York Village Law merely sets forth a procedure for forming a new village. N.Y. Village Law art. 2 (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1989). Moreover, while the Town Supervisor (a local official) plays a role in the incorporation process, his statutorily defined authority is limited to convening and presiding over a hearing, and rendering a decision on the incorporation petition. Village Law §§ 2-206, 2-208 (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1989). This is not the sort of detailed administration necessary to trigger Burford considerations. Indeed, the Article 78 petitioners sued the Town Supervisor in part on a theory that his role is ministerial. (Article 78 Petition, A 45-48) Hence, they cannot be heard to argue that he has extensive regulatory authority under state law, . . 9 /which the federal courts must refrain from disrupting.-7 9J We do not, by this discussion, mean to suggest that theTown Supervisor has no authority beyond that expressly granted in the Village Law. We contend, at the very least, that the Town Supervisor has the overarching duty to uphold the constitution. That, of course, is one of the very issues in this case. The salient point is(Continued) 20 The Burford doctrine, moreover, presupposes the existence of an alternative state forum that is better suited to resolve the controversy. In Burford, that state forum was a specific court, before which all review had to be brought. Here, by contrast, there not only is no special review court, there also is no actual or potential state proceeding capable of being disrupted by federal court adjudication. Unlike Burford, this Article 78 proceeding is not a collateral litigation brought to avoid the review mechanisms created by state law. Rather, this case is the state means to secure judicial review of the Town Supervisor's action. To apply Burford in these circumstances would simply enable the district court to avoid its duty to adjudicate, despite proper invocation of § 1441(b) removal jurisdiction. Cf. B.A.M. Brokerage Coro, v. State of New York, 700 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Burford inapplicable to action challenging disciplinary proceedings by Insurance Superintendent); Kontokosta v. Village of Greenport, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13584 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Burford inapplicable to challenge to village's refusal to supply water and sewer services). (Continued)that, unlike the Burford situation, the statutory scheme here does not confer administrative authority because there is no regulatory role to be assumed. 21 Although the court below analogized the Village Law to the regulatory system in Levy v. Lewis. 635 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1980), that analysis was incorrect. (See A 124-25) Lew arose from efforts to liquidate an insurer. New York law committed insurer liquidation to a state official, the Insurance Superintendent. As this Court also recognized, liquidation required special expertise, and the process would suffer if federal interference were permitted. Id. at 963-64. The facts here are not comparable. Village incor poration is largely a local matter. While the state may have an interest in establishing a uniform incorporation proce dure, whether or not a new village is formed generally is of no state concern. For that very reason, the Village Law does not even provide for the involvement of state officials in the process, except at its conclusion where a state officer confers legal status on the new village, Village Law §§ 2-232, 2-234; similarly, as noted above, the Town Supervisor has no significant regulatory authority. Thus, no state or local official plays any role comparable to that of the Insurance Superintendent in the liquidation proceedings central to Levy. Moreover, unlike liquidation, local incorporation is not an area requiring regulation of recurring patterns of activity, and certainly no special expertise is either necessary or developed. 22 Accordingly, Levy is inapplicable. On the other hand, another insurance regulatory case — Alliance of American Insurers, supra. 854 F.2d 591 — cited (but not discussed) by the district court, counsels strongly against Burford abstention. Alliance of American Insurers arose from amendments to the New York Insurance Law, which barred the Insurance Superintendent from declaring the State's two major medical malpractice carriers insolvent until 1990, and imposed a cap on premium surcharges. Plaintiffs consisted of non-medical malpractice carriers whom New York law required to participate in a back-up fund to protect against insurer insolvency. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the two statutory amendments. They alleged, in substance, that the State's two malpractice insurers were currently insolvent, as a result of which plaintiffs eventually would be assessed to recoup the malpractice insurers' deficits. The district court dismissed, relying in part on the Burford doctrine. This Court reversed, finding Burford abstention unwarranted. The action did not "involve the federal courts in disrupting any ongoing state judicial or administrative proceedings." 854 F.2d at 600. The Court emphasized that a possible effect on state policy was alone insufficient to require abstention: 23 While the resolution of this case could have a broad impact on important state policy, ''there is, of course, no doctrine requiring abstention merely because resolu tion of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy." Id. at 601, quoting Zablocki v. Redhail. 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978). Accordingly, the Court rejected Burford absten tion as "neither necessary nor proper." Id. at 601. The considerations in Alliance of American Insur ance — the State's interest in the statewide availability of medical malpractice coverage and insurer financial responsi bility — were far more significant than the interest in the local incorporation. And the insurance regulatory framework was far more pervasive than the Village Law procedural provisions. This Court nevertheless rejected Burford absten tion when the Insurance Superintendent sought to invoke the doctrine. It necessarily follows that Burford does not apply to the claims here — where no state or local official urges abstention at all. To be sure, issues arising under state law may need to be resolved in this case. But as Alliance of Ameri can Insurers. 854 F.2d at 601, makes clear, Burford absten tion does not turn on a possible impact on state law or policy. See also McRedmond v. Wilson. 533 F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1976) . Rather, the doctrine seeks to avoid federal interference with a state regulatory system, and there is no such system here. Cf. Heritage Farms. Inc, v. Soleburv 24 Township, 671 F.2d 743 (3d Cir.), cert, denied. 456 U.S. 990 (1982) (local land use laws did not constitute the type of regulatory system required for Burford abstention) In sum, the court below abstained on the basis of an inapplicable doctrine, which neither side urged, and which the Town Supervisor did not even know was under considera tion. A writ of mandamus is proper to review this clear abuse of discretion. 10/ Moreover, the state questions presented in this proceed ing go largely to the procedure used at the incorpora tion hearing. Although New York state courts may not have considered the issues raised in the precise context of incorporation, there is a developed body of state law concerning procedure in nonadjudicatory forums. See. e.q.. CBS Inc, v. State Human Rights Appeal Board. 54 N.Y.2d 921, 923 (1981) ("[d]ue process does not requireall the accoutrements of an adversarial trial at every stage of an administrative proceeding"). 25 Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to hear and decide this Article 78 proceeding. Dated: Elmsford, New York June 14, 1989 PAUL AGRESTA, ESQ. Town Attorney- Town of Greenburgh P.0. Box 205 Elmsford, New York 10525 (914) 993-1546 Attorney for Petitioners Anthony F. Veteran and Susan Tolchin