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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Rackley v. Board of Trustees of Orangeburg Regional Hospital Brief and Appendix for Appellees, 1962. 873725c4-c19a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/eeb4e6b5-2d67-4909-8bd7-8c51094a4549/rackley-v-board-of-trustees-of-orangeburg-regional-hospital-brief-and-appendix-for-appellees. Accessed May 17, 2025.
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IN THE United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 8731 JAMELLE RACKLEY, a Minor, by her Mother and next friend, Gloria Rackley, and Gloria Rackley, Appellants, BOARD OF TRUSTEES of the Orangeburg Regional Hos pital, a body public, and H. F. Mabry, Director of the Orangeburg Regional Hospital, BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR APPELLEES versus Appellees. FILED C h arlto n B. H orger Orangeburg, South CarolinaSEP 17 1962 l M. F. WILLIAMS, JR. D avid W. R obinson Columbia, South Carolina Attorneys for AppelleesCLERK INDEX Page STATEMENT __________________________________ 1 I. Did the District Court Err in Denying a Preliminary Injunction? __________________ 3 II. The Motions to Strike____________ 7 III. Appealability of Order Striking Allegations ... 7 CONCLUSION __________________________________ 7 APPENDIX Excerpts from Disposition of Gloria Rackley____ 52a TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases: Page Brotherhood v. Missouri, 363 U.S. 528 _____________ 3, 4 Heyward v. Public Housing Adm., 238 F. 2d 689 ---- 6 Kenneday v. Mason, 334 U.S. 249 --------------------------- 6 Markham v. Casper, 152 F. 2d 270 ------------------------- 7 Meiselman v. Paramount, 180 F. 2d 9 4 _____________ 3 Metropolitan v. Banion, 86 F. 2d 886 ______________ 7 Schultz v. Manufacturers & Traders, 103 F. 2d 771 „ 7 Warner v. Gittone, 110 F. 2d 292 -------------------------- 3 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 — ----------------- 3 Constitution of the United States Fourteenth Amendment________________________ 1, 6 Statutes 28 U.S.C.A. 1291 _______________________________ 7 42 U.S.C.A. 291 ( f ) (Hill Burton Act) ___________ 6, 7 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983 _________________________ 1 United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 8731 JAMELLE RACKLEY, a Minor, by her Mother and next friend, Gloria Rackley, and Gloria Rackley, Appellants, versus BOARD OF TRUSTEES of the Orangeburg Regional Hos pital, a body public, and H. F. Mabry, Director of the Orangeburg Regional Hospital, Appellees. BRIEF FOR APPELLEES Jamelle Rackley, a minor, and her mother Gloria Rack- ley instituted this suit against the Trustees of the Orange burg Regional Hospital (Hospital) claiming a violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Statutes (42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983). They ask for temporary and permanent injunctive relief. From the order of the District Court denying a temporary injunction and granting the motion of the defendants to strike two allegations of the Complaint, the plaintiffs have appealed to this Court. STATEMENT As developed by the Complaint, by the affidavit of Gloria Rackley and by her deposition, the claims of the plaintiffs 2 Rackley v. Board that they have been denied the equal protection of the law because of race may be thus summarized: (2a-8a) On October 12, 1961 the minor plaintiff suffered a dis located or broken finger at play. She was brought to the Hospital by the playground supervisor and placed under the care of Dr. Brabham and of Dr. Frierson, then on duty at the Hospital. They treated the patient in the emergency room, in the X-ray room and in surgery. The finger was put in a cast and the patient and her mother asked to re turn in two weeks for the removal of the cast. No bed facility at the Hospital was requested. On October 26, 1961 the plaintiffs returned to the Hospital, the cast was re moved, X-rays were taken, and the patient discharged. There is no claim that Jamelle’s medical and surgical treatment was inferior. The results of the treatment have been satisfactory to the plaintiffs. There is no claim of racial segregation in surgery, in the X-ray room, or in the emergency room. These were the only parts of the Hospital in which Jamelle was treated. Neither she nor any one for her requested bed, room or ward facilities. However, the plaintiff Gloria Rackley claims that on October 12, 1961 after she had reached the Hospital and had checked on her daughter’s condition, she seated her self in the Hospital’s public waiting room to await the completion of her daughter’s treatment. While there one of the Hospital attendants asked her to go to another wait ing room, which she declined to do. Thereafter, upon orders of the Police Chief, she left the waiting room. She also claims that when she returned to the Hospital on October 26, 1961 for the removal of the cast on her daughter’s finger she stayed with her daughter in the emergency room while the doctor removed the cast as Ja melle was upset and almost fainted when the cast was re moved. Jamelle was then taken to X-ray across the hall from the emergency room for the customary X-ray check. Her mother, though requested by the doctor so to do, de- Rackley v. Board 3 dined to go into the X-ray room with her daughter and seated herself in the public waiting room where she re mained until her daughter was brought to her by the doc tor who advised her that the patient had been discharged. The plaintiffs continued to remain in the waiting room. Gloria Rackley was requested by the Hospital Director to leave. She declined. Thereafter a police officer arrested the plaintiff Gloria Rackley for trespass. I Did the District Court Err in, Denying a Preliminary Injunction? The general law with reference to the issuance of a tem porary injunction is thus stated by the Supreme Court in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440: The award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity has never been regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though irreparable injury may other wise result to the plaintiff. Compare Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 US 4, 10, 86 L ed 1229, 1234, 62 S. Ct 875 and cases cited. Even in suits in which only private interests are involved the award is a matter of sound judicial discretion, in the exercise of which the court balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction. Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 US 136, 141, 64 L ed 822, 826, 40 S Ct 463; Rice & A. Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 US 509, 514, 73 L Ed 480, 482, 49 S Ct 330. Accord: Brotherhood v. Missouri, 363 U.S. 528, 532. This Court in Meiselman v. Paramount, 180 F. 2d 94, 96, (4th Cir.) quoting from Warner v. Gittone, 110 F. 2d 292, 293, (3rd Cir.), thus expressed the rule: “ The granting of a preliminary injunction is an exercise of a very far-reach 4 Rackley v. Board ing power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.” Since the denial of a temporary injunction is within the discretion of the trial court, review here is limited to a determination as to whether the discretion has been abused. Brotherhood v. Missouri, 363 U.S. 528, 535. In support of the motion for a preliminary injunction, Gloria Rackley’s affidavit says in pertinent part, “ . . . that plaintiff and her minor daughter have made use of the facilities of said hospital and it is likely that they shall make future use thereof. . . .” (18a) Nowhere else in the affidavit is there any reference to the future use of hos pital facilities. We submit that this possibility of future use does not show any necessity for temporary injunctive relief. The plaintiff has made no showing that any Negro citizen other than the Rackleys has attempted to use the “white” waiting room at the hospital. The affidavit of hospital director Mabry establishes that since he became director on December 1, 1961 no complaint as to discrim ination at the hospital from either white or Negro resident has come to his attention. (46a) Paragraphs seven and nine of the Answer put in issue the plaintiffs’ version of the occurrences with reference to the use of the waiting room by the plaintiff Gloria Rack- ley (39a). The Answer, supported in part by the deposi tion of Gloria Rackley, pleads that Glora Rackley’s busi ness at the Hospital had been completed when she was arrested (39a). The determination of that issue and its bearing on the case can only be resolved after testimony is taken. A careful reading of the deposition of Gloria Rackley leaves the impression that she invited the arrest about which she complains. She thus describes the removal of the cast and its effect on her daughter: . . . some Orderly I suppose, was supposed to be doing this but Frierson came up and did it himself, and as Rackley v. Board 5 I said before, she’s timid and sensitive and afraid of pain, so she made a production of it, you know, hold ing onto me and everything, but I don’t think it hurt very much and we got through it all right, and then she almost fainted when she saw it was bruised and if you know how your skin looks when it has been in a cast for a week, and she almost got hysterical over this and they were still stiff and twisted, and she thought she would be deformed, so we got her settled down and he said he would like for her to go for X- rays. (29a) After the removal of the cast the doctor said he would like to take X-rays in the room across the hall from emer gency (30a). This was done but Gloria Rackley refused to leave the waiting room in response to the doctor’s re quest that she go with Jamelle while the child was in X- ray. This is her language. Dr. Frierson, the young doctor, came to the door (of the waiting room), on, I had not been there very long, he just put his head in the door and told me that my daughter was in X-ray and that she was alone, he wanted me to come to X-ray so I told him I would wait there for her, so he said: “ She’s alone and she needs you” and I told him I felt sure she would be all right, I had seen other Negroes in the hallway and I felt if she really needed me someone would come for me if she couldn’t. I didn’t tell him all of this. I told him I felt she would be all right and I would wait there for her, so he said: “ I don’t think you care anything about your daughter” and since I was not interested in his appraisal of me as a mother, I only was interested in his medical opinion of her finger, I just said: “ Oh you don’t?” . . . (31a) When this testimony is viewed in the light of the plaint iffs’ consultations with the Field Secretary of NAACP be tween the two visits to the Hospital, the immediate avail 6 Rackley v. Board ability of bond money when she was arrested, and the fact that she is not paying the expenses of this litigation, the conclusion that she went to the Hospital to precipitate the incident causing her arrest seems logical (53a, 55a, 57a). The powers of the chancellor should not be exercised under such conditions, certainly not until the facts are developed fully. As we see the record now before the Court, the constitu tional issue of whether a county owned hospital may pro vide separate waiting rooms for members of the two races is not reached. However in view of the language of the Hill-Burton Act (42 U.S.C.A. 291 ( f ) ) authorizing fed eral aid for hospitals: . . . where separate hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan makes equit able provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of like quality for each such group; . . . we do not believe that separate but equal facilities are out lawed under either the equal protection or the due process clause. The Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the Con gress to enact laws to carry into effect the commands of the Amendment. In the field of hospital aid the Congress has said that separate but equal facilities are appropriate. A patient’s recovery is influenced by the composure and serenity of his visiting family. It may well be that there is sound medical thinking that in geographical areas where the races live apart that they should not be mixed in hos pital facilities. Apparently the Congress was of that view. This determination of constitutionality by a coordinate branch of government should not be lightly disregarded by the Court. The constitutionality of an Act of Congress should not be decided on a preliminary motion. Kenneday v. Mason, 334 U.S. 249, 257; cf Heyward v. Public Housing Admin istration, 238 F. 2d 689, 698 (5th Cir.) cited by appellants. Rackley v. Board 7 Unless the Court is prepared to declare this part of the Hill-Burton Act unconstitutional, it is difficult to see how the plaintiffs can prevail. II The Motions to Strike On motion of the defendants the District Court struck from paragraph VII of the Complaint the allegation that the hospital maintained on the basis of race . . separate ward and room facilities for patients.” Since neither plaint iff had requested ward or room facilities and none had been furnished, the question of whether the Hospital places mem bers of the Negro and white race in the same ward or in adjacent rooms is irrelevant to any issue here. Therefore the allegation was properly stricken. The Court also struck from the Complaint paragraph VI which alleges that the Hospital has received construc tion and expansion funds from the United States. These allegations have no relevancy on the issue of whether the defendants have denied plaintiffs due process or the equal protection of the laws. No federal agency is a defendant here. Therefore they were properly stricken. III Appealability of Order Striking Allegations That portion of the order of the District Court striking from the complaint allegations as irrelevant to the issue is not a final judgment subject to review under 28 U.S.C.A. 1291. Metropolitan v. Banion, 86 F. 2d 886, (10th Cir.) ; Schultz v. Manufacturers & Traders, 103 F. 2d 771 (2nd Cir.) ; Markham v. Casper, 152 F. 2d 270, (7th Cir.). CONCLUSION We submit that the order of the District Court denying temporary injunctive relief should be affirmed and that the 8 Rackley v. Board appeal from the order striking portions of the complaint dismissed. CHARLTON B. HORGER DAVID W. ROBINSON Attorneys for the Appellees September 1962 APPENDIX 52a Rackley v. Board DEPOSITION OF GLORIA RACKLEY (Filed May 14, 1962) Excerpts in addition to those in Appellants’ Appendix (21a-33a) : Mr, Robinson: Q. Now let’s go back a minute. I believe you said, after you seated yourself, that Dr. Frierson came and asked you to go to the X-ray room with your daughter? A. Yes. Q. You declined to do it? A. Yes. Q. He was the physician in charge? A. Yes. Q. And then he came back a second time and reported to you that they had concluded working with your daughter? A. Yes. Q. Your daughter never was a hospital patient? She was an out patient? A. Yes. Q. And so she was discharged at that time? A. I don’t know the ways of hospitals. Q. Insofar as whatever the hospital was to do for her that day, it had been completed? A. I suppose so. Nothing else has been done since. Q. That’s what Dr. Frierson told you? A. Yes, he just told me they had finished with her. Q. And it was after that that Mr. Roach went to see you and after Mr. Roach went to see you, Mr. Judy came in? A. At the same time. I can say that this was simulta neous. Q. Now when did you first contact anybody connected with the NAACP about this? A. This is a difficult question to answer. I have always been in contact with persons with the NAACP. Q. What is your connection with it? A. Pm a member. A ppendix 53a Q. You are more than that aren’t you? A. I don’t know. Could I say an ardent member? Q. Are you a Committeeman? A. What is a Committeeman? Do you mean, do I have some office? Q. Yes? A. Do I? I might. Q. I’m asking you. I haven’t the slightest idea. I’m try ing to find out. A. I’m trying to think if I hold an office right now. I don’t. Q. Well, between October 16th and October 26th, did you take up this matter with anybody connected with the NAACP? A. Yes. Q. With whom? A. With Rev. Newman. Q. He’s the Field Secretary for the National Organiza tion? A. Yes. He is more than this. To me he is our friend. Q. I was trying to get his connection with the NAACP. Counsel and I know about it but we have to get it in the record here. You did get in touch with him? A. Yes. Q. Did you tell him that you were going back on the 26th of October? A. They knew that we had another appointment. Q. Did he advise you what to do when you went back? A. No. There was nothing to do but to go back. Q, I understand, but did he advise you what to do in the hospital after you went back? Pm not talking about the medical angle. I realize he didn’t advise you about that. Did he advise you to go back to the same waiting room? A. No, I have never understood that there is another waiting room. Q. But I’m just trying to see what Rev. Newman advised you? 54a Rackley v. Board A. No. This was never a question. Q. You did not discuss this matter with Rev. Newman? A. The matter of the incident in the hospital? Certainly yes, but as to where I would sit should I need to sit in the hospital, has never been a question. Q. My point is, whether it’s a question or not, did you discuss it with Rev. Newman? A. I discussed the incident as I have told you, yes, Q. Did you discuss with him what would happen the next time you went to the hospital? A. That something might happen should I go back do you mean? Q. In other words, you had a conversation with Rev. Newman? A. Yes, and we talked about all of this. Q. You at that time had an appointment to go back two weeks later? A. Yes. Q. Now did you discuss with Rev. Newman what you should do if you had a similar experience? A. I didn’t ask what I should do. It was understood that I would go back. We discussed this. We discussed the inci dent as I have told it to you. We couldn’t discuss the next one because it hadn’t happened yet, but it was understood that I would go back. Q. And he understood you were going back to the same waiting room? A. Knowing me, he probably understood this, but he didn’t tell me to go back, if this is what you are saying, because it was not asked. Q. What did pass between you and Rev. Newman? What conversation did you have with him? A. We talked about it, not simply as Field Secretary for the NAACP but as my friend. He was the Pastor of my church for ever so many years, he christened my daughters and helped bury my dead daughter and he’s my friend and A ppendix 55a I was upset over this and we talked, and I cannot say what we said. We just talked about it. Q. When you say you were upset over this, you were not upset over your child’s condition? A. They told me that she would be all right and I felt that I could rely on them. I was not sure. They are not my doctors, I had no dealings with them before but she was not having sleepless nights or crying any longer and I felt that I could rely on their judgment. Q. Did you discuss with Rev. Newman the bringing of this suit? A. For the first time it happened? Q. Between the two trips that you made to the hospital? A. Yes, I wanted to know if I had a suit, the first time. This had nothing to do with the second time. Q. What did he tell you? A. He felt that maybe I did. Q. Did you discuss what you would do on the second trip? A. No, I’m saying no. It was just understood that I would go. I don’t want to say anything wrong but there was no direction. Q. I’m just trying to get the facts today. A. There was no direction as to what would be done but it was understood that I would return. Q. Did you arrange to have bond before you went back on the 26th of October? Did you have somebody arrange to put up bond if you were arrested on the 26th, or did you put up bond on the 26th? A. Yes, bond was put up for me, if that’s what you mean. 4^ Q. Did you talk to Rev. Newman about it? A. Oh sure. Q. Did you talk with anybody outside the State who is connected with the NAACP? A. No I don’t think so. 56a Rackley v. Board Q. I notice you have an attorney named James M. Na- breth, III. Do you know him? A. I have met him. Q. Also Michael Meltsner. Have you met him? A. No. Q. Jack Greenberg. Have you met him? A. No but I know about him. Q. You know they are all in the New York office of the NAACP? A. Oh yes. Q. And you know Mr. Greenberg is now General Counsel? A. Yes. This was with my consent. Mr. Perry is my lawyer. He’s representing me. Q. And you consented— A. The rest of this is left to him. Q. So the association of additional counsel is his sug gestion? A. I don’t know if this is the way to say it but it is with my consent. Q. Now have you paid any counsel fees to anybody? A. No. Q. Have you been billed for any? A. No. Q. Do you expect to be billed for any? A. No I haven’t thought about it. Q. Do you expect the NAACP to pick up any bill for counsel fees? A. I suppose they will. Q. Do you know whether any part of the NAACP has taken any action with reference to this case, with reference to approve the bringing of it or not? A. Ask that again? Q. Are you a member of the Orangeburg Chapter? A. Oh yes. Q. Have they taken any action with reference to ap proving the bringing of this suit? A ppendix 57a A. Yes. Wouldn’t we say yes? Q. What about the State convention? Has it approved it? A. I suppose so. Q. Has Rev. Newman approved it? A. Yes. Q. What about the State Chairman, J. Arthur Brown? A. You are asking these things and I’m having to give you what I assume to be true. Q. I’m trying to get what you know? A. Well, I haven’t asked Mr. Brown. Q. What about Rev. Newman, have you asked him? A. I don’t know if I’ve asked him in those words. Q. Do you have his approval for the bringing of this suit? A. Yes I think so. Q. And I believe you said the Orangeburg Chapter has approved of it? A. Yes. Q. Are you a member of the Committee F-63? A. Yes. Q. What does that mean? A. Freedom by ’63. Q. Are you Secretary of that organization? A. In our local Chapter? Q. Yes? A. Maybe so. Q. I’m just trying to find out? A. Am I Secretary of the F-63 ?