Wilder v. Lambert Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Public Court Documents
August 9, 1983

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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Wilder v. Lambert Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, 1983. 67e3bedc-f092-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/caccbe13-6dfa-49aa-90e4-8949340047d3/wilder-v-lambert-response-to-respondents-motion-to-dismiss. Accessed April 06, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE !{IDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABA!,IA NORTHERN DIVISION JULIA P. WILDER, Peti tioner, vs. EALON !,1. LA!4BERT, €t €tI., CIVIL ACTION NO. 83-H-580-N Respondents. RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' IIOTION TO DISMISS Petitioner, through her attorneys, hereby asks the Court to deny respondents, motlon, filed on July I8, 1983, to dis- miss petitioner's habeas corpus petltion (hereinafter, Petition). Respondents, in their motion, claim to raise three grounds on which the Petition should be dismissed. Each ground, however, is hinged uPon 28 U.S.C. S 2254(b) , (c ), wherein the requirement that state remedies be exhausted prior to commenc- ing federal habeas proceedings is codified- The first step in resolving the issue of exhaustion of state remedies must be to determine whether "there is an absence of available State corrective process," 28 U.S-C. S 225'4 (b). Only if it is determined that at the time the Petition was filed there was a State process available in Alabama for the consideration of petitioner's claims, does it become appo- site under 28 U-s.c. S 2254(b), (c) to determine whether those claims vrere presented previously to the Alabama courts. See, e9_., Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 286-287 (5th Cir. 1971). It is notable that respondents, in alleging that certain of petitioner's claims rrere not fairly presented to the State courts, avoid mentioning how those claims could be presented in the Alabarna courts at the present time. In fact, it is clear that petitioner is utterly foreclosed as a matter of Alabama law from presenting any of the claims in her Petition through either of Alabama's two post-conviction relief Proces- L/ses.=' The Courts of the United States, through the federal writ of habeas corpus, are the only remaining forum in which petitioner may challenge the unconstitutional restraint to which she is now subject. Not a single one of petitioner's claims fits within the narrow class of claims that may be heard under the Alabama writ of error coram nobis. Convictions may be challenged under coram nobis only on the basis of 'an error of fact, unknown to the court or the affected party at the time of trial, which had it been known, would have prevented the judgment chal- lenged," Ex parte Vaughn, 395 So.2d 95, 95 (ela. 1979). None of petitioner's claims fits that description. Each of petitioner's claims is based on asserted viola- tions of the United States Constitution rather than newly Because there is no state remedy presently available to , it is not necessary for petitioner to respond to the other ims raised by respondents. Petitioner, however, does not it any of the allegations in respondents' Motion to Dismiss. L/ her cIa adm 2 discovered evidence. Constitutional challenges have been allowed under coram nobis only in the limited area of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Summers v. State, 366 So.2d 336 (AIa. Crim. ApP. 1978). It is well established that coram nobis "does not lie to enable the defendant to question the merits of the case.r Butler v. State, 184 So.2d 823, 824 (Ala. 1965). This is no less the case when the defendant raises constitutional objections to her conviction. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 150 So.2d 387 (Ala. 1963); Ex parte Banks, 1 178 So.2d 98 (AIa. App. 1965); Ex parte Ellis, 159 So.2d 862 (AIa. App. 1964). As a result, federal courtsr on petitions of habeas corpus, have found Alabama remedies exhausted on the basis of the unavailability of coram nobis for the presentation of constitutional claims. See, e.9., Piazzola v. Watkins, supra; Rice v. Simpson , 27I F. Supp . 267 (M.D. AIa. 1957 ) , aff'd, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1958), aff'd on other srounds sub nom., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 7tI (1969). The Alabama writ of habeas corpus, AIa. Code SS 15-21-l et ses. (1975), is foreclosed to petitioner because she has been released from prison as a parolee. In Williams v. State, I55 So.2d 322 (AIa. App. ), cert. denied, 155 So.2d 323 (AIa. 1953), it was held that Alabama habeas corpus is not available to parolees. Petitioner, were she to attempt to proceed under Alabama habeas corpus, would thus have to do so under the bleak hope that Williams would be overruled for her case. Petitioner need 3- not attempt to maintain a State habeas proceeding where the prospects for success are so speculative; State habeas is, therefore, exhausted on grounds of unavailability. See Wilwordinq v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971). Even if petitioner's status as a parolee did not bar her from proceeding under Alabama habeas corPus, with one minor exception, none of her claims are of the sort which will be heard under Alabama habeas. Ilabeas corPus may be used under Alabama law only to challenge a conviction which is void on its face because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce judgment. See, e.g._, Piazzola v. Watkins, supra; Edwards v. State, I5O So.2d 70.9 (ela. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 882 (1953). Within the Petition only the claims in paragraphs L9-2L -- because they attack the indictment for defects associated with an essential element of the offense -- allege what may be denominated as a void judgment under Alabama law. See, .U.., Barbee v. State ' 4L7 So.2d 611 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) - Those claims have been "fairly present€dr" Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (I97I), to the Alabama courts in satisfaction of the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 2254(bl, (c). Contrary to respondents' unsupported assertions, the indictment filed against petitioner was exhaustively challenged at trial and at every stage of petitioner's direct appeal. In petitioner's p1ea, the indictment was attacked on numer- ous grounds, including, in plea number 2' that "the indictment 4- fails to state an offense under the laws of the State of Alabamar" and, in plea number 3, that the indictment "fails to reasonably apprise the defendant of what it is she is called upon to defend, " in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At least once during her trial, peti- tioner's counsel renewed all of the objections raised in her plea. Tr. 220 (Pickens County Circuit Court, l{eiY 29-3L, L979). Before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, the objec- tions made in the plea were reiterated and elaborated upon. See Respondentsr Exhibit 'B' at 25-29. As in claims L9-2L, petitioner's objections were focused on the failure of the indictment to "identify the accusations or charger" id. at 26, as weII as the "particular act or acts" of petitioner's which were alleged to have been criminal, id. at 27. Petitioner, in her brief requesting a rehearing before the Alabama Court of Criminal Appea1s, ResPondents' Exhibit rrErr at 5-6, and in her brief in support of her Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Alabama Supreme Court, Respondents' Exhibit rcn at 31-33, restated the argument against the indictment made in her initial brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Through these repeated and futile prayers to the Alabama courts, petitioner has provided those courts with a fair and adequate opportunity to pass upon the "substantial equivalent," Lambert v. Wainwright, 513 F.2d 277,282 (5th Cir. L975), of claims 19-21. 5- CONCLUSION Respondentsr motion to dismiss the cause ehould be denied. Petitioner has exhausted all state remedies presently available to her. Respectful Iy submitted, JACK GREENBERG I,ANI GUINIER SIEGFRIED KNOPF Suite 2030 l0 Columbus Cirle New York, New York 10019 VANZETTA PENN DT'RA}{T 539 Martha Street Montgomery, Alabama 35108 ATTORNEYS TOR PETITIONER Of Counsel: AMEO}IY G. N,TSTERDAIT{ New York University School of Law Room 327, 40 Washington Square South New York, New York 10012 5 , CERAIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been served upon Jean Wllliams Brmn, Esq., Assistant Attorney Gen- eral, by mailing the same to her by first class United States mail, postage prepaidr on this 9th day of August, 1983, addressed as follows: Jean williams Brotrn, Esg. Assistant Attorney General 250 Administrative Building 64 North Union Street Montgonrery, Alabarna 36130 ATTORNEY FOR PEEIEIOIIER 7-