Sumter County Board of Education v. Alabama State Tenure Commission Court Opinion
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December 9, 1977

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Case Files, Bozeman v. Pickens County Board of Education. Overton v. Goldsboro City Board of Education Court Opinion, 1981. 5b492c4c-f192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/807dae57-2166-4f85-a1dc-d6e9644aeb06/overton-v-goldsboro-city-board-of-education-court-opinion. Accessed June 02, 2025.
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458 276 SOUTH EASTERN so taken, obtained or withheld, r. e., know- ing at the time he received it that another person had taken. obtained or withheld the card lrom the person, possession, custody or ,lontrol of another without the cardholder's consent and with the intent to use it. Thus, the necessary implication from the use of the qualifier "so" is that when a defendant is eharged with a violation of the receiuing portion of the statute, he must have re- ceived a card from a lhird party who also intenrled to use it. -{lthough this interpre- tation hinges upon a linguistic technicality, criminal larvs must be strictly construed in fr',',rr ,rl the 'lcfenriant. .State r.. Ross, ZiZ N.C. 6?, i57 S.E.2d 712 r1967): State v. Brcrtn.:6f N.C. 191, 1{1 S.E.?t Blt (196i); State r'. Martin, T N.C.App. 532, 1?3 S.E.2cl {7 ( I9?0). Justice Huskins' pronouncement remains true-the itatute almost rlefies analysis. [5, 6l The indictment herein a[tempts to charge rlefendant under the receiving por- tion of the subsection. In order to charge receiving under the present wording of the statute, it must he alleged, among orher elements, that at the time of receipt the defendant knew that the financial transac- tion card had been taken, obtained or with- held from the person, possession, custody or control of another without the cardholder's consent and with the intent to use it. The present indictment alleges: "At the time of receiving the credit card, the defendant knew that a person had unlawfully, wilful- ly, and feloniously taken, obtained, and withheld the credit card from the percon, possession, custody, and control of J. V. Turner without [the] consent of J. V. Turn- er." The indictment fails to allege that the defendant knew that the card had been taken, obtained or withheld with the intent to use it, an essential element of the crime for which defendant was tried. The indict- ment thus fails to charge a crime, and de- fendant's motion to dismiss should have been allowed. N.C.Gen.Stat. tSA-9%(aXb) and (e). See a/so State v. Morgan,226 N.C. 414, 38 S.E.zd f66 (1946). The sfate may, if it so elects, proceed against defendant upon a sufficient bill of indictment. Statc v. Ingram, ffl N.C. 138, 15? S.E.% 119 (196?). REPORTER, 2d SERIES We find it unnecessary to discuss defend- ant's remaining arguments. Judgment arrested. CLARK and ARNOLD, JJ.. concur. -lN Paut OVERTON, Jr. v. MLDSBORO CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION. No. E08SC756. Court of Appeals of North Carolina. April 7, 1981. OVERTON v without PaY was not resPonded t"-ii.ri*"a for neglect of dutit .uo*tt"a bY substantial evide l{'tis-uz, 115-14(n), 15oA- In APril 19?9, Plaintiff' a car' *iitt tno." than fifteen Year:l' e:i il"'-S".,t Carolina Public sctr' *^ .ttu.g"a in a bill of indic f"ionv diug charges' At the i"ai.i*"ntl Plaintiff was emPlr 'f'eJunt as a PhYsical educatior ili;;i; School South' From tt ,oo"u^ that Plaintiff first lea indi.tment through a radio neu ,"nt on TuesdaY morning' 24 eii"i.utting his minister' Plain telephone call to Bill Charlton' "i liiJar" School South' to tell *"s in trouble and would not that daY and that, indeed' he t how long it would be before able to Ltrtn to work' Late ins, Ptin.iP"l Charlton telePh JJhnson, tire SuPerintendent Uo- CiiV Schools, and infor plaintiff's message' During t son and the rest of the scho' heard the news of the indicl plaintiff. Plaintiff did not return to v week or, indeed, for the res On 26 APril, two daYs after learned of hi. indittrnent' Plai SuPerintendent Johnson to ' the charges against him' to P ."n"u, "nd to review the s with teacher disntissals' On or about 3 MaY 1979' Johnson called Plaintiff to requested his resignation ef than 8 MaY. Plaintiff refur ter dated -S U"Y requested sence without PaY. On 1 received no resignation lettr cially recommended to I Plaintiff be susPended with< aPProPriate dismissal Proce ed for neglect of dutY. De a resolution susPending P Career teacher appealed from city's board of education's order dismissing teach- er. The Superior Court, Wayne C,ounty, Elbert S. Peel, Jr., J., reversed board's deci- sion, and board appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hill, J., held that board's decision that such teacher, who, with acquiescence of principal and superintendent of schools, remained away from school for 16 days after he was indicted for felony drug of- fenses, should be dismissed for neglect of duties was not supported by substantial evi- dence. Affirmed. Hedrick, J., dissented and filed opinion. Schools 6l4l(5) In proceeding in which city board of education ordered dismissal of career tcach' er, decision that such teacher, who, with acquiescence of principal and superintend' ent of schools, remained away frcm school for 16 days after he was indicted for felony drug offenses and whose request for lesve ;RIES ssar!' to discuss defend- guments. rd. INOLD, JJ., concur. )VERTON' Jr. Y. O CITY BOARD OF )UCATION. r. 808SC756. eals of North Carolina' pril 7, 1981. :her apPealed fr"om cit1"s on's order dismissing teach- ior Court, WaYne CountY, r., J., reversed board's deci- t appealed. The Court of ,, held that board's decision er, who, with acquiescence I superintendent of schools, from school for 16 daYs rdicted for felonY drug of' be dismissed for neglect of rupported bY substantial evi- , dissented and filed oPinion v" L v' cne as' n'c'epp" 276 s'E'2d'158 without pa]. was not respon<red to, should ;;;;;;"r"0' :1 i:?1"" or dutv' Super- be dismisse. to," n"gr".i-'oi drti", wa^s l1t 'intlna"it Johnson notified plaintiff of this iTT[:i,l,,il:;pt"i,iltrHi "sr t..T;i*** t'1,",?,|rJ*li:}iiq$i ovERroN v' GoLDSBoIg-t:'::..'D' oF ED' N' c' 459 IELvrrrrrrlr'...'- :ct of duty and inadequate (5) ling in which citY board of rea"dismissal of carcer teach- rat such teacher, who, with i princiPal and suPerintend- remained awaY frtm school :er he was indicted for felonY and whose rcquest for leave tn April le?e, plaintirr," :"i:-":-,T:^'::: ,T';#;;:; entitled to a review berore a with more than fifteen ''""'*' "*p"'iencein ffi;;il; fanel'of .the Professional Re- Ti lill"f # * l'l *';'l* Jl',I.:ff ffi Til':n' fi . .'"H'J[""J" !H y, :i felonv drug charges' ei tt't time of his ffi; ;;;"rties stipulated that the charge fi';i,;;;: p]uinrlri *u' "'ptov"d bl de- ;;"'i;ilfi;i" p"iro''nu"' had been fendant as a physica'J'*tion-teacher at ;"#;"";*t the hearing' the panel con' Midtlle School South. f.o, the record'. it ctra"a tnat thc charge of neglecr of duty il;:;.1il'piuinr'iir first learned of his ;;:'r;i;;,e and substantiated'" i::1tx"l':::::i'#:H:il!lli$i"1 Nevertheress' superintendent Johnson Ar re r cau i ng h i, *i' i#'J:*pr ^?'i ii pi"*a " fi :ffii*l1 I i:t:l-f'li"'B1:fl#' l"i.nn"". "iu to Bill Charlton' the prtnctpat lf#'"ii",ri"tirr:. t"qr"tt, defendant held a [:"$ illiil.JllT':ffi ::l f 4 i;,i lLli,lJ':'"'li:ii'',?iii"' i' f i'" "a ""'' that da1. and that, ird;;;: i" dia not rnn, ll;;ffi.;;iJ"-. i rt"' hearing evidence hou long it u'ould ;;i;;; ..i' on'l'l u" ;ffi' ;;;';n' charlton' and plaintiff' the able to t€turn to *otft Later that-m'orn- ;"f;il;;; ;""1''' Reoort and Order find- i,i-,,,, ". *; ; ^., rtl,Tfru ilml F ^' rj.;;t* "i*.lrHr',ffi '1'T fi 'Jil'tl;,ltli:ffi:ffi:;''J'i'i', "i ii'i""a rrom emprovment plaintiff's message , il"'* tlt &t' '11:- From defendant's order' piaintiff appeal- son and the rest o, Ii,. ..io,,r communitv ",r',;",;"-'a\javne. countl' Superior court heard the news of tit t'iiti"tt againsi "lt-'iti *"taered the transcript of the hear- plaintiff . LIr( rrrur\""-' , - ."^, ;ru,;;;i t"i:.. and concluded that the piaintiff did not return to work later that ;;:;t l8ainsl lrlaintiff were not substan- week or, indeed' i"'' tit rest of the -vear' ;ffi Fiom the court's order reversing its on 26 April' '*" u"''l'"r* pi"intlri i'"a a"tition' defendant appeals' ieaft-;i his indictmlnt' plaintiff met with chambers, .r"'r, li:fi;il,t"ffifiti;l5il;;,d""i.1:lliil ;",*::L l'il""l, #i1' . ^.,, r", I i, I:911? ii',lilJ* ";; ';;';;' dearing appeilee with teacher dismissals. Taylor, Ivarren, Kerr & walker by Lind- on or about e ru"r' rgzg' Superintendent t"'At';;;; i" "ia Gordon c woodruff' Johnson called pt#trii'i" ttrl "rfice'and tiatu"t"' for defendant-appellant' .""r".,"a his resignation effective -n9 lu't"t |[H=*fi";' Plaintrff refused' and bi let- HILL' Judge' **}*ir,u.:;* .*I#,pi,,i:*: '*rsrdt[h#ffi[i*ffi1[iilTrf,S#;;:'#,1 F fiilt}.fiii:i';;;;;i'r'n" p"'. appropriate ai"ni*l"i;;;-#; u" init''1: ;;;;"i R'*l"o: committee' the court edrorneglectri',i,r"'i"i""i"11*.g,1'o;;";i'1g.':i!.:l"argumentsofcounsel' a resolution "'*"'l't"*"''"1'iiri witirout Judge Peel stated: 460 N.c. 276 SOUTH EASTERN Upon a full review of the whole record of the case, and having given independent consideration to the Report of the Profes- sional Review Committee, the court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the charges brought by the Superintendent against the petitioner/appellant are not substan- tiated. ' lt is to this finding that defendant excepted and assigned error, arguing that the deci' sion by the Board of Education was sup ported by substantial evidence and should have been upheld. At the outset, we note that the trial judge's order did not track the language of G.S. 150A-51, the statute which requires the judge to set forth the reasons for re- versing the Board's decision. We have, however, read his order to mean, in the applicable statutory language, that the de- cision by the Board of Education was un- supported by substantial evidence, G.S. 150A-51(5). Appellant has also read the order to state this. Our review of the trial court's action is limited, therefore, to the question of whether the trial court erred in finding that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. This Court, having reviewed the whole record concerning plaintiff's alleged neglect of duty, agreed with the lower court and holds that the deeision of the Board was not supported by substantial evidence and that plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement to his teaching position with the Goldsboro City Schools. In reaching this result, we first review the pmper role of the lower court in this case. Plaintiff, in appealing to superior court for a review of defendant's decision to ter- minate his employment, was acting pursu' ant to G.S. 1f5-142(n). The applicable scope of judicial review of defendant's ac' tions is set forth in G.S. 150A-51 which allows the lower court to revenrc a school board decision if: [t]he substantial rights of the petitioners [here the plaintiffl may have been preju- diced because the agency findings, infer- ences, eonclusions, or decisions are: REPORTER, 2d SERIES (5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150A-29(a) or G.S. 150A-30 in view of the entire record as submitted; The predecessor statute to G.S. 150A-51, G.S. 14iI-315, was analyzed in a context analogous to the situation before us in the Supreme Court,lecisiotf?hrrp"o, v. Board of &lucation 292 N.C. .106, 233 S.E.2d 538 (197?). In Thompson, Justice Copeland wrote: This standard of judicial review is known as the 'whole record' test and must be distinguished from both de novo review and the'any competent evidence' standard of review. [Citations omitted.] The 'whole record' test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Board's judgment as between two reasonably con- flicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo . .. [Citation omitted.]. On the oth- er hand, the 'whole record' rule requires the court, in determining the substantiali- ty of evidence supporting the Board's de' cision, to take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Board's evidence. Under the whole evidence rule, the court may not consider the evidence which in and of itself justifies the Board's result, without taking into account contradictory evi' dence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn. [Citation omitted.l Id. at 410,233 S.E,2d at 541. In reviewing the whole record b€for€ us' it is important to note that the allegations plaintiff neglected his academic duties re- volve solely around the events which oc' curred aftar ?lL April 19?9, the date plain' tiff heard about the criminal chargfs against him. The recotd, which contained plaintiff's personnel file, showed that prior to the period in question, plaintiffs per' formance in every cat€gory had consist€ntly been rated satisfactory, apparently th€ highest rating available on the "prinsipal t OYERl Evaluation of Teachers" fr 1972, his supervising princip was doing a "commendable , was a "conscientious teache academic year 19?2-19?3, I pal found his work "alwa; Nothing in the record indi< evaluation until plaintiff er lems in the spring of l9?9. Superintendent Johnson's cerning plaintiff's neglect r therefore, on the issue of pl ing away from school fror until the Board's suspens without pay on 10 May l9?! its 12 December i979 ordr that neither the principal r tendent gave plaintiff pern himself from his teaching him to stay at school. Th found that plaintiff's decisi to his teaching duties wai constituted neglect of duty In addition to being com to plaintiff's prior "commer ance, these findings of fat any weight to the followin eontroverted evidence: Du of time from 24 April to 1 Principal of Middle School Perintendent Johnson were the plaintiff. Neither of esked or told plaintiff to Neither advised him that lxing considered neglect o1 duties. It appears that quiesced in plaintiff's decisi to the classroom. Furtherr cipal Charlton and Suoerin admitted at the hearing thz may not have told olaintifl that it would be in the Plaintiff's students that pla to the classroom while cha tng against him. The rcc, lhat plaintiff's continued r to his concern for what r rtudents. . There was also uncontn thet plaintiff requested lei rmm the rreeord, it appearattaa OYERTON y. GOLDSBORO CITY BD. OF ED. Clte &s, N.C.APP.,276 S.Ezd '158 N.c. 461iERIES d by substantial evidence er G.S. l50A-29(a) or G.S. 'w of the entire raecord as statute to G.S. 150A-Sl, rs analyzed in a context situation before us in the )cision, Thompson v. Board I N.C. 406, 233 S.E.2d 538 mpson, Justice Copeland 'd of judicial review is 'whole record' test and rrished from both de novo 'any competent evidence' ;iew. [Citations omitted.] ,rd' test does not allow the t to replace the Board's tween two reasonably con- even though the eourt ; have reached a different matter been before it de ion omitted.l. On the oth- 'hole reeord' rule requires ermining the substantiali- ,upporting the Board's de- into account whatever in irly detracls from the Board's evidence. Under ence rule, the court may evidenee which in and of he Board's result, without count contradictoq' evi- ce from which conflieting d be drawn. [Citation l.Zt at 541. e whole record before us, note that the allegations I his academic duties rne- nd the events which oc- pril f9?9, the date plain- : the criminal charges record, which contained el file, showed that prior question, plaintiffs per- category had consistently factory, apparently the 'ilable on the "Principal's Evaluation of Teachers" form. In March never resPonded to this reguest, but, in- 19?2, his supervising principal found that he stead, sought plaintiff's dismissal. In this was doing a "commendable job" and that he regard, the case before us is clearly distin- was a "c;nscientious teacher." During thc guishable from two cases cited by defend- academic year 19?2-1973, the same princi- ant. Miller v. Noe, 432 S.W.2d 818 (Ky., pal found his work "always satisfactor.v." 1968), and Mitler v. Board of Education of l,Jothing in the record indicated a contrary Je{fercon County, Ky., il FRD 393 (1971)' evaluation until plaintiff encounlered protr aff'd. per curiam 452 F.%J.894 (Sixth Cir. lems in the spring of l9?9. 19?i), both dealing with the same teacher Superintendent Johnson's allegation con- dismissal' The Miller cases dealt with a cerning plaintiff's neglect of duty focused, teacher's taking a leave of absence despite therefore, on the issue of plaintifi's remain- the fact that he had requested' but had ing away from schtxl] from 24 April 1979 been denied, ieave by the Board of Educa. until the Board,s suspension of plaintiff tion. The courts held that this action con- without pa), on 10 May 19?9. The Board, in stituted a vacation of the teacher's position its 12 December 1g?g order found as fact and that the teacher was not entitled to that neither the principal nor the superin- reinstatement' ln the case sub judice' tendent gave plaintiff permission to absent thert' was no evidence that the Board de- himself from his teaching position or told nied plaintiff's request for leave or' indeed' him to sta] a1, school. The Board further that it ever acted on it' found that plaintiff's decision not Lo return The case of Board of Mucation v. Math' to his teaching duties was volunLari' and es--q, 149 Cal.App.?t 265, 308 P.zd 449 constituted neglect of dutl'. (195?), is also inapposite. The teacher in In addition to being completell' silent as Mathert's was dismissed trecause she failed to plaintiff,-" prior .,commendabk." lrcrform- on several occasions to return to the class- ance, these findings of fact failed to gire room after having lxen ordered to do so' an1' weight to the following clear and un- Plarntiff in this case' was never told to contro*erted evidence: Duiing the. period return to the classroom' Furthermore' Su' oftimefrom}AApriltol0Mal''lroththeperintendentJohnsontestifiedthatitwas Principal of Middie School South and Su- normal practice to give an employee an perintendent Johnson werc in contact u'ith opportunitl' to correct a situation before the plaintiff. Neither of these twc, men seeking a dismissal' Plaintiff never had asked or told plaintiff to return t(, '{'o.}, that opportunitl' Neither advised hin, that his absence'uas \4'hile we agree with defendant that the being considered neglect of his contractual re;rc,r'. of the panel of the Professional Re- duries. It appears that both men ac- r'ieu Committee should not have been solell' quiesced in ptaintifi's decision noi to return determinative of the issue of plaintiff's ne- to the classroom. Furthermore, both Prin- glect, we find that the record before us cipal charlton and Superintendent Johnson suppo!'ls its conclusion that: admitted at the hearing that, although rhei' Mr. Overton made good faith efforf m ma1. not have told plaintiff so, thel agreed communicate with his superintendent and thai it would be in the besr interesr. of principal and to cooperate with them. plaintiff's students that plaintiff not relurn He was,not told that he should return to t6 the classroom whiie charges were pend- the classroom under these circumstances. ing against him. The record also is ciear A reasonable man could assume that his that plaintiff's continued absence was due continued absence was approved until he to his concern for what was besr for his was instructed otherwise' students. In reviewing the facts of this case, this There was also uncontroverted evidence Court has been acutely aware of the prob- that plaintiff requested leave without pal'. lems presented to a local school board by Frorn the record, it appears that defendant the events surrounding plaintiffs indict- 462 Alfirmed. WEBB, J., concurs. HEDRICK.,I., HEDRICK, Judge, rlissenting: I disagree with the majority that, 'Iutige Peel's statement that "the charges itrought by the Sup€rintendent against t.he petition- erlappellant are not substantiated" is ihe same as the "tlecision of the Board of Edu- cation is unsupported by substantiai evi- dence...." G.S. S 150A-51 requires the reviewing court, if it reverses the ilecision of the Board, to set down in writing its reasons therefor. My reading of that por- tion of the opinion in Thompson v'. Wake County Board of Education, 292 N.C. -106, 233 S.E.zt 538 (1977), quoted by the majori- ty is that if, upon review, the "whole rec- ord" presents reasonably conflicting views, and the Board's decision represents one of those views, it is the duty of the reviewing court to affirm. Otherwise, the reviewing court would merely be substituting its own decision for that of the Board. In my opin- ion, Judge Peel merely substituted his own decision for that of the Board when he stated that "the charges brought by the Superiniendent against the petitioner/ap pellant are not substantiated." If Judge Peel, after reviewing the "whole record," had concluded that the Board's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence and re- versed, the Board would be informed wherein and how it erred, and we could study the "whole recotd" and determine 276 SOUTH E.{STERN REPORTER. 2d SERIES ment. It is, at best, a difficult situalion for whether the reviewing court erred. In er. school officials, teachers, and students. It sence, Jutige Peel conducted a r/e novo hear- wnuldappear* hSl'gisl thl't plai4tiff's ac- rng t'rom '-he i'ecord and made his own tigI_il iqq!9*L!g_q_]qaue1! 4b 9g199_un1il ,lecision rrased upon the evidence in thet he could be cleared of criminai--c,h4rgeg was record. irnd the ma.lority has reviewed the rnglqJ1[deLt_loufie ef a!-tion. In light Judge Peel's ,le novo decision and affirmed of all the evidence concerning plaintiff's I v,lte to vaca.,e t-he ,;njer from which :he general performance and, more particular- appeal was ,,aken to this Crrurt, and .,o ly, concerning his performcnce, fr,rm ?l remand the case io the superior court for r April to 10 )Iay 19?9, this Court finds that review of the whole record to rletermine delgndanrs-decisis+-to rlismiss plaintiff was whether that record presents reasonably not sgpported -lry subsl-aUi-al evirience. conflicting views and whether the rlecision The decisioi of the lorver ,-'ourt is. there- ,rf rhe Board represents one of those views. rnd if it does, affirm, but if it does not. !"everse and set down in writing whenein t,he Boarrl erred within the parameters of (1.s. \ 1;0.\ 51. l,arry W. COLEY and Judy B. Coley. his wife v. Curtis R. EUDY, Sr. and Elizabeth W. Eudy, his wife. No. 8019SC658. Court of .A,ppeals of North Carolina April 7, 1981. Purchasers of new home brought sutt against vendors for breach of confact o/ sale agreement, and for breach of exprer and imptied warranties with respect to coo- dition of the home. The Superior Court Cabarrus County, Thomas W. Seay, Jr' J' entered judgment for purchasen on t! breach of contract theory, and wife t:f appealed. The Court of Appeals. Arnoto' e-' held that: (1) where ,uii'*as tlecided '' favor of purchasers on the breach of coat tract theory, facts that evidence pt*'"nf by pureha-sers tlid not support alleg'atior tl ourchasen' comPlirint with re' orv of breach of exPress and onti"., end that Purchir'sers ' their comPlaint to conform tc *hich suPPorted onlY the brer theor-v, ,iid not require a dil r!) purchasers were entitled en rmount equal to t'he 'lt forcclosure ol their ncw homt equity in the home the1" cor ,lon. and not the rlifference chasers'cost for the new hot narket ualue, as instructerl and (3) although ihere "ras rupport recover)' for Purehas rl' breach ,rf imPlierl antl e' '.ts.,:virl€ncc',1ils .-tuifit'ent 'r)!('rv fr)r 1;urchlsers ()n t ''l )f ,r{)ntruct bv vcnrl,lrs ,lf !h. Trake mortgage paYmenis :''lrmer home: thereiore, '' 'v:ts lr Party t-o t"he (:r)nLrac "1'n(ior, she iva-s iiable ior ' 'rv the brcach of thet ':t-intr: New trial orderetl. l. Pleadins e237(1) Better practice is to a to that they actually refler rccovery raised by the evid 1 Pleading *237(2\ Where suit by purchas ,lorr was decided in favor r r breach of contract theor ,hnce presented by purcha: Pon allegations in purct Itth respect to a theory t rod implied warranties, anr ,lirl not amend complaint t, rvidence, which supported of eontract theory, did not eot rt'sult. Rules of Civil rtb). c.S. S lA_1. I Drmeges Fl20(l) A party who was injur of r eontract is entitled to iajuries sustained and ir