Brief in Support of Judge Wood’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Public Court Documents
January 4, 1990
230 pages
Cite this item
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Case Files, LULAC and Houston Lawyers Association v. Attorney General of Texas Hardbacks, Briefs, and Trial Transcript. Brief in Support of Judge Wood’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, 1990. 18ead0c4-1b7c-f011-b4cc-7c1e52467ee8. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ce3d4138-f446-405e-bec4-b857b5570033/brief-in-support-of-judge-wood-s-motion-for-attorneys-fees. Accessed November 08, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 90-8014 and
NO. 90-9003
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
versus
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants,
JUDGE SHAROLYN wWoOoD, “ETC 0 |
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Midland Division
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF JUDGE
WOOD’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
PORTER & CLEMENTS
J. Eugene Clements
Evelyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
Phone: (713) 226-0600
Fax: (713) 228-1331
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/
INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT JUDGE WOOD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. HISTORY OF THE CASE o fe ile 4 ilae lets Seilogt tet cerita Elli, oy
A. Judge Wood Defended Harris County in the District
Court and Participated Integrally in Shaping the
Defense. oi gi hy "kg HE Tg gh 1 gli, yp Agr ngs Gi Lesa a iy BL Te Tl
B. Judge Wood Forestalled the State’s Settlement with
II,
the Plaintiffs’ on the Plaintiffs’ Terms and the
Immediate Dismantling of Texas’ State District
Judge Election System Without Appellate Review. . .
C. Judge Wood Advanced and Argued the Issues on Which
Defendants Prevailed in This Court.
AUTHORITIES
III.
The Supreme Court has Interpreted the Status of
Intervenors Under Civil Rights Fee Statutes as
Similar to that of Plaintiffs Rather than Defendants.
As A Prevailing Defendant-Intervenor Whose
Intervention Was Important to the Outcome,
Judge Wood Is Entitled to Attornevs! Fees. . « + + +i
Judge Wood Should Be Awarded Her Attornevs’
Fees From The State of Texas. Ne ea ee ie ee
Judge Wood is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees at Harris
County, Texas Rates.
CONCLUSION
10
14
18
oi
24
26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
Alabama Power Co. Vv. Gorsuch, 672 F.24 1, 3
(D.C. Cir. 1883) vial suid oo eiiales wi, Lil, oT Te, 22
Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850
(E.D. Mich. 1980), aff’q 704 F.2d 878 {6th Cir,
1983), on rehearing 712 F.2d 222, cert. denied,
(464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 703) ) oe WEL ey Cl Ty Ne 102
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 {5th Cir. 1988) odie 2) 32,13
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EFOC, 454 U.S. 412,
217, 421,:98 S.Ct, 694, 698, 700 (1978) oi 0. 18, "17
Commissioners Court of Medina City,
Tex. v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 440, n.é6
(D.C Cir. 21882), i... of i i, ET A Ny 14, 19
Copper Liquors v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575,
583. (5th Cir. 1980) oie. Be Tu Be TRAE WE ot Pathe ie ak ie 25
Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 {D.C..Cir.,
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204, 103"°S.Ct.
1380 (15933) a anie te vs he me hE 19-22, 25
Ford Motor Co. wv. EFOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239-240,
102 -8.Ct..3057, 3069-3070, 73 L.Fd.2d 721 (3982) a. ai 17
Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
546 F.Supp. 1357, 1360 (DD. C.- 1982) = vo Salis Lu . 21
Geler v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310, 1311, v1313
(6th Cir. 1989) oe. TRL 22
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes,
U.S. rv 103. 8.Ct, 2732, 2735 at n. 2 (1885) wii Rm a ta, a SN 14-18, 24, 26
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d
714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) s wie el ees ae wl i24 0 28
Posada v. Lamb County, Tex., 716 F.2d 1066, 1074-75
And. N,13 (Sth Cir. 1983) 1. uv vive: own ta "oth 18,20, 22
Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 545 F.Supp.
252, 255 (S.D. Miss. 1982) (on repand) soa, wel, 0, Ni, 28
ii
Riddell v. National Democratic i 624 F.2d 539,
543 (5th Cir. 1980) « ‘
Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir, 1930), aff'd, 458 U.S. 457,
102 .85.Ct. 3187 (1982) site. oo
Silberman v. Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 65 (3rd Cir. 1982)
Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 19731 (e) . .
42 U.S.C. § 319731
42 V.8.C. § 1983 oven a Re Lieb ae I ale) ai
42 U.S.C. § 1988: . ool i. ah, TES a EP 1
43 U.S.C. '§:1973 oi a
Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (4)
S$ 2 of the Voting Rights Act
§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act
§ 2(b) of the Voting Rights. Act ., iwc Pai 2,
Miscellaneous
Civil: Rights Act of 1882
Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
iii
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21
19
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ‘FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 90-8014 and
NO. 90-9003
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS,
COUNCIL NO. 4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents 4
versus
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE
OF TEXAS, et al.,
Defendants,
JUDGE SHAROLYN wooh, ETC . A
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Midland Division
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF JUDGE
WOOD’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood ("Judge Wood")
files this Brief in Support of her Motion for Attorneys’ Fees in
the above referenced case to show the court that she played a vital
role in the defense of this important Voting Rights Act case and,
therefore, should be awarded her costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant
to 42 U.85.C. 86 19731 (e) and 1988.
I. HISTORY OF THE CASE
Judge Wood Defended Harris County in the District
Court and Participated Integqrally in Shaping the
Defense.
This case was brought in Midland, Texas by the League of
United Latin American Citizens ("LULAC") and certain named
individuals in the summer of 1988. The Plaintiffs claimed that the
election of state district judges on a county-wide basis in certain
populous Texas counties diluted the votes of blacks and/or
Hispanics in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1864, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and § 2 of the Voting Rights ACt, 43 U.S.C. § 1973.
The original Defendants .ere named Texas officials charged with the
responsibility of upholding and enforcing Texas’ constitutional and
statutory election system. As state officials, the Defendants were
represented by Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox.
Although trial was set for June, 1989, with a discovery cut-
off ‘date of April,’ 1989 Attorney General Mattox initiated no
discovery prior to moving for a stay in October, 1988, pending
action by the United States Supreme Court on a petition for writ of
certiorari filed in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir.
1988). In Chisom, a panel of this Circuit had held that § 2(b) of
the Voting Rights Act--which prohibits the illegal dilution of the
votes of protected minorities--applied to the state judiciary. 1In
December, 1988, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Nevertheless,
the State still failed to initiate any discovery in this case.
Fearing that her interests as a Texas voter and as a sitting
Texas State District Judge were not being adequately represented in
this crucial Case, Judge Wood moved to intervene as a Defendant on
the side of the State of Texas on February 21, 1989. Attorney
General Mattox opposed her intervention in her official capacity on
the ground that he alone had the right to represent State
officials, although he did not oppose Judge Wood’s intervention in
her personal capacity. Following a hearing on February 27, 1989,
Judge Bunton permitted Judge Wood to intervene as a Defendant in
her personal Capacity along with Dallas County District Judge
Harold Ent:z ("Judge Entz"). He also permitted the Houston Lawyers’
Association ("HLA"), an organization of black attorneys in Harris
County, Texas, and certain named individuals from Harris and Dallas
Counties to intervene as Plaintiffs.
From the day of her intervention Judge Wood bore the primary
responsibility for the defense of Harris County, the most populous
Texas County whose judicial election system was challenged in this
litigation.! As her first step, the day after her intervention
was permitted Judge wood initiated discovery attempts against the
Harris County intervenors and the original plaintiffs. She also
filed numerous pre-trial motions, assembled demographic data, hired
expert witnesses, conducted depositions, Prepared a pre-trial order
and motion in limine, and in e€very way prepared the defense of
The suit originally targeted 47 Texas counties. trial, the Plaintiffs retained alle Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar,
and Midland.
By the time of
gations against ten counties:
Travis, Jefferson, Lubbock, Hector
Harris County while contributing at the same time to the general
defense effort. Because of her actions, the State was spared
considerable expense and attorney time in preparation of its
defense in general while receiving the benefit of counsel
intimately familiar with electoral conditions in Harris County.
At trial, Judge Wood presented virtually the entire defense of
Harris County. She put on witnesses live and by videotape and
cross-examined the plaintiffs’ witnesses with respect to Harris
County and general issues. The State was thus spared a major
portion of the trial expenses it would otherwise have borne. After
the trial, Judge Wood submitted a post-trial brief and reply brief
detailing the legal and factual deficiencies in the Plaintiffs’
proof regarding Harris County in particular and in the plaintiffs’
challenge to the State of Texas’ Judicial election system in
general. Thus Judge Wood relieved the State of Texas of a large
part of its defense burden at her own considerable personal
sacrifice and expense in order to ensure a full airing of the
extremely important public issues at stake.
B. Judge Wood Forestalled the State’s Settlement with
the Plaintiffs’ on the Plaintiffs’ Terms and the
Immediate Dismantling of Texas’ State District
Judge Election System Without Appellate Review.
On November 8, 1989, the District Court issued its Memorandum
Opinion and Order on the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims (the
"District Court Opinion"). 1In that Opinion, Judge Bunton held that
the Plaintiffs failed to prove that Texas’ system of electing state
district judges was unconstitutional. Slip Op. at 91. Judge
Bunton also held, however, that Texas’ county-wide district judge
4
election system diluted the votes of minorities in all challenged
counties in violation of § 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act. Slip Op.
at ‘sl. Finally, Judge Bunton indicated that he might enjoin
further elections under Texas statutory election system if no
remedy was reached in the special session, but that he might also
consider permitting an interlocutory appeal. Slip Op. at 93-94.
He gave the Texas Legislature six weeks to devise a new election
system at a special session previously called to address another
matter.
On December 11, 1989, Governor Clements reported to Judge
Bunton that no consensus could be reached by the Texas Legislature
regarding a remedy in the affected counties. Apparently at that
meeting (to which neither Judge Wood nor Dallas County Defendant-
Intervenor Judge Entz was invited) Judge Bunton asked the
Plaintiffs to submit a remedial plan to him by December 15, 1989.
Having heard rumors that an agreed plan was being devised by the
Texas Attorney General and the Plaintiffs, counsel for Judge Wood
telephoned the clerk of the district court. The clerk informed
counsel that no notice of proceedings had gone out but that the
court had requested that the Plaintiffs submit an interim remedial
plan by December 19 and that the Plaintiffs had indicated to the
court that they were working on such a plan with Texas Attorney
General Mattox, and expected to file it by December 22, 1989. The
clerk also informed counsel that if any parties had objections to
the agreed plan, those objections should also be filed by
December 22, that is, simultaneously with the remedial plan itself.
Upon confirmation of the rumors concerning the negotiations between
the Plaintiffs and the Texas Attorney General, Judge Wood filed a
motion to stay all further proceedings in the district court and a
motion for certification of the District Court’s opinion for
interlocutory appeal, setting out controversial controlling issues
of law at stake in this case. A copy of that motion is attached
hereto as Exhibit "anv.?
On December 19, 1989, Attorney General Mattox sent Judge Wood
an agreed "Proposed Interim Plan" signed by himself and the
Plaintiffs, and on December 22, 1989, the Plaintiffs filed an
identical "Interim Plan for 1990 Elections. * and Mattox and the
Plaintiffs filed a "Joint Motion for Entry of Proposed Interim
Plan". Copies of the Plaintiffs’ Plan and the Plaintiffs/Mattox
Joint Motion are attached as Exhibit "B". On December 22, 1989,
Judge Wood filed her Objections to the Plaintiffs and Mattox'’s
Plan, as required by the court. A copy 1s attached hereto as
Exhibit "cn,
In her Objections to the Plaintiffs/Mattox Plan, Judge Wood
voiced fears of the court’s adoption of an "interim plan" for the
election of district Sutiges which had been promulgated in haste
without any input from the Texas legislature or officials and in
direct opposition to her own express concerns and interests and
those of many of the named Defendants represented by Attorney
General Mattox. She pointed out that the proposed plan would
Judge Entz, likewise filed a Motion for Certification Statement, a s did the State. However, the State continued at the same time to pursue settlement on the Plaintiffs’ terms.
6
require the immediate dismantling and restructuring of Texas’
judicial election system without any appellate review of the many
vital controversial issues of law set out in her Motion for
Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and Motion for Stay. She
also listed numerous violations of federal and state law on the
face of the Proposed Interim Plan.
On January 2, 1990, in spite of Judge Wood's Objections, Judge
Bunton enjoined the election of Texas state district judges under
Texas’ statutory election system in the target counties and ordered
immediate implementation of his own plan--which was nothing more
than the Mattox/Plaintiffs’ Interim Plan with the exception that
races were made non-par.isan rather than partisan, as Mattox and
the Plaintiffs had sought and special election and run-off dates
were established. In that same Order Judge Bunton certified the
November 8 Opinion for expedited interlocutory appeal and denied
Judge Wood’s motion for stay of proceedings in the district court.
Following Judge Bunton’s certification of this case for
interlocutory appeal, Judge Wood’s actions diverged radically from
those of the state." While Judge Wood pursued a stay of the
district court’s Plan pending review of the unresolved legal issues
by this Court, Texas Attorney General Mattox tried to get Judge
Bunton to reinstate partisan elections while retaining the other
features of the Interim Plan. On January 2, 1990 both Judge Wood
and Dallas County Defendant-Intervenor Judge Entz filed notices of
appeal with this court. on January 4, 1990 Judge Wood filed in
this Court an emergency application. for stay of Judge Bunton’s
Order of January 2 and a petition for expedited interlocutory
appeal, setting out for this Court the same controversial
controlling issues of law she had recited for the district court.
On the same day that Judge Wood filed her application for stay
and petition for interlocutory review with this Court, Attorney
General Mattox filed a Motion to Alter the Order of January 2, 1990
in the district court, seeking partisan elections in place of non-
partisan elections. The State denominated its motion a "Rule 59 (e)
Motion.” Had this genuinely been a Rule 59{(e) motion, it would
have had the effect of destroying the jurisdiction in this Court
granted by the Defendant-Intervenors’ previously filed notices of
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (4) and Harris County District
Judge Sharolyn Wood’s Response to Mattox’s Motion to Alter the
Order of January 2, 1990, attached hereto as Exhibit wpv,
The State also filed in this Court an Emergency Motion to Stay
Final Order Pending Appeal, attached hereto as Exhibit "E". The
State’s Motion for stay differed radically from Judge Wood’s motion
in that it sought to stay implementation of the district court’s
"Interim Plan" for Judicial elections essentially until the
district court could rule on the State’s Motion to Alter the
Judgment to require partisan elections and until the Texas
Legislature could meet to consider a permanent remedial plan. See
Exhibit "E". Thus, the State effectively renounced any attempt to
seek review of the controversial controlling issue of law decided
by Judge Bunton if Judge Bunton would agree to keep Texas judicial
elections partisan. It also indicated no interest in forestalling
the extremely costly and wholesale destruction of Texas’ judicial
election system until (a) it was finally determined that such
dismantling was actually required by law and (b) the patent
illegalities of the district court’s Interim Plan could be
removed--so long as the wholesale changes were made on Mattox’s and
the Plaintiffs’ terns.
The next day, January 5, 1990, George S. Bayoud, Jr., Texas’s
Secretary of State and one of the defendants purportedly
represented by Attorney General Mattox, filed his Notice of
Designation of Independent Counsel on the ground that Mattox had
breached his duty to him as his client and was, in fact,
representing his own personal views rather than those of the State
Defendants. Judge Wood herself had already written Attorney
General Mattox protesting his claim to represent her in her
official capacity as a state digtrict Judge,
All of the evidence compels the conclusion that Texas Attorney
General Jim Mattox failed to represent the interests of the Texas
State Defendants in general or of Judge Wood in particular in this
Case. That same evidence compels the conclusion that, had it not
been for the actions of Judge Wood and Judge Entz, this case would
never have been appealed, Texas'’s judicial election system would
have been summarily dismantled without any objection from the State
except as to the partisanship or non-partisanship of the
dismantling, and the State judicial election code, along with the
elaborately detailed Provisions in the Texas Constitution and
statutes for the election of state district judges and the
administration of judicial districts would have been scuttled,
casting the system into chaos.
Thus, there can be no question that Judge Wood played an
essential role in the defense of this suit by urging the State’s
interest in maintaining a fair and efficient judicial election
system and by seeking a definitive interpretation of the crucially
important and extremely controversial legal issues at stake in this
case, while the State itself was retreating from these goals. In
sum, Judge Wood at her own expense and personal sacrifice, acted in
this case as a private attorney general in furtherance of the
public interest while the State was failing to seek the review by
this Court which ultimately reversed the district court’s opinion
on the merits and rendered judgment for the defense, en banc,
twelve to one.
C. Judge Wood Advanced and Argued the Issues on Which
Defendants Prevailed in This Court.
On January 11, 1990, this Court granted Judge Wood’s petition
for leave to appeal from Judge Bunton’s November 8 Opinion.? The
same day, this Court granted Appellants’ Motions for Stay. A copy
of the January 11 Order is attached as Exhibit "F".* On the same
day, January 11, Attorney General Mattox finally filed a notice of
On January 11, 1990, Judge Entz and Secretary of State Bayoud also
filed petitions for Permission to Appeal incorporating Judge Wood’
& Petition by reference. The Court granted their petitions on
January 12, 1990.
The January 11 Order granting Appellants’ motions for stay observe
d that the State’s "Rule 59(e) Motion" was without effect since th
e notice of appeal filed by Judge Wood and Entz had vested
jurisdiction over the district court’s Order of January 2 in this
Court. "Exhibit “Fr.
10
appeal, attached hereto as Exhibit "G," and a form for appearance
of counsel. Attorney General Mattox never filed a petition for
interlocutory appeal within the ten-day Jurisdictional window
provided by the district court’s Order of January 2. Thus it is
absolutely certain that Judge Wood’s actions--together with those
of Judge Entz--were essential to the reversal of this case and that
the State did not timely initiate adequate steps to seek reversal
of Judge Bunton’s November 8 Opinion.’
Following this Court’s grant of her petition for interlocutory
appeal and stay of the district court’s "Interim Plan" for the
election of State District Judges, Judge Wood moved, with Judge
Entz, for an expedited briefing schedule, briefed the merits of the
appeal, and presented her arguments orally, before a three-judge
panel of this Court on April 30, 1990. Counsel for Judge Entz,
counsel for the State, and counsel for Secretary of State Bayoud,
all likewise briefed and argued the merits of the appeal.
Judge Wood’s briefs and oral arguments set out arguments and
cited authorities relied on by no other parties, and her arguments
were, therefore, at least an integral part of the defense effort at
the appellate stage. In addition, Judge Wood, alone among the
Defendants, filed a Post-Submission Brief on May 5, 1990, which
addressed issues raised by the panel at oral argument. Those
In accordance with its interpretation of the November Opinion as a final judgment, the State filed a notice of appeal on December 21, two days after filing its Joint Motion for Interim Plan with the district court. Since the November 8 Opinion was not a final orde r, however and since no appeal lay as of right from any Order of t he district court at that time that notice was entirely without effect. See Exhibit "G" at 2 n.1.
11
issues--principally the relationship between §§ 5 and 2 of the
Voting Rights Act--proved crucial to both the majority opinion and
the dissenting opinion handed down by the panel five days later--
although the short time frame the panel allowed itself did not
permit thorough consideration of Judge Wood’s arguments. (The same
arguments were subsequently raised at en banc review.)
The panel’s opinion was handed down on May 10, :1990. The
majority opinion (the "Panel Opinion") reversed the district
court’s November 8 Opinion and rendered judgment for Defendants on
the ground that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act--which prohibits
dilution of minority votes within multi-member election districts--
cannot apply to state district Judges, who are elected from
overlapping single-member districts in which each judge exercises
plenary power. This argument had been developed and strongly
argued by Judge Wood both in her district court motions and briefs
and before this Court. The Panel majority, however, rejected Judge
Wood's primary argument, which she was the first to raise in this
case and which she argued at every opportunity: § 2(b) cannot
apply to the judiciary at all because § 2(b) applies only to
"representatives," and Yudves are not "representatives" but
servants of the people.
Within days of the Panel’s Opinion reversing the district
court, this Court moved sua sponte for en banc review of the case.
Oral argument was held on June 16, 1990. The En Banc Opinion was
handed down on September 28, 1990. The Court ruled overwhelmingly
in favor of the defense, overruling Chisom v. Roemer and holding
12
for the first time in any federal court of appeals that § 2(b) of
the Voting Rights Act does not apply to the judiciary.
Seven members of the Court joined in Judge Gee'’s opinion,
which held that § 2(b) does not apply to any state judicial
elections because judges are not "representatives" within the
meaning of the Act--the principal conclusion for which Judge Wood
had argued from her entry into the case and for which she had
persistently urged en banc review. Five members joined in Judge
Higginbotham’s opinion, which held that § 2(b) does not apply to
the election of state trial judges because each district is a
separate county-wide judicial district in which the trial judge
enjoys plenary power, and there can be no dilution in the election
of ‘a candidate to fill ‘a single-menber office--likewise, a
conclusion which Judge Wood had consistently urged. Only Judge
Johnson--the author of Chisom--dissented.
Since the En Banc Court ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the
defense as a matter of law jt did not reach Judge Wood’s final
argument that the standard of proof of illegal vote dilution
employed by Judge Bunton was clearly erroneous. Nor, a fortiori,
did it reach Judge Wood's argument that the Plaintiffs had
presented insufficient proof of vote dilution in Harris County.
Judge Wood was thus a Prevailing Defendant-Intervenor on all
The Plaintiffs had strongly argued that this Court was compelled ( if not by law then by the overwhelming weight of precedent) to follow the numerous district courts, its own prior holding in Chisom, and the Sixth Circuit in holding that §2 does apply to the judiciary. Only Judge Wood opposed that argument from precedent b
13
issues, and one whose contribution was essential to the result
obtained. She is therefore entitled by law and equity to recover
her attorneys’ fees from the State of Texas, the party charged by
law with the defense of this suit.
IT. AUTHORITIES
The award of Attorneys’ fees in this case is governed by 42
U.S.C. §§ 19731(e) and 1988. Section 19731 (e) provides,
(e) In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the Prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
+5.C. § 18731. Similarly, § 1988 provides in relevant part,
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title
we. Lhe court, "in ‘its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1938. Sections 19731 and 1988 are construed alike.
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, U.S,
ye 109 S.Ct." 2732... 2735 at npn. 2 (1989); Donnell v. United
States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
, Cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204,
103 S.Ct. 1190 (1983); Commissioners Court of Medina City, Tex. v.
United States, 683 F.2d 435, 440, n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982): Riddell v.
National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Supreme Court has Interpreted the Status of
Intervenors Under Civil Rights Fee Statutes as
Similar to that of Plaintiffs Rather than Defendants.
Neither § 19731(e) nor § 1988 draws a distinction between the
rights of prevailing plaintiffs and those of prevailing defendants.
However, both statutes fall within a group of civil rights fee
14
statutes which the United States Supreme Court has interpreted as
requiring that attorneys’ fees must be awarded to prevailing
plaintiffs in the absence of special circumstances but may be
recovered by prevailing defendants only if the plaintiffs’ cause of
action is without foundation. Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S.Ct. at 2736; Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC, 454 U.S. 412, 417, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 698, 700 (1978).
The rationale for the distinction is that Congress has cast the
plaintiffs in civil rights cases in the role of private attorneys
general, vindicating a policy which Congress considers of the
highest priority; and, moreover, fees awarded to a prevailing
plaintiff are by definition awarded against a violator of federal
law. Christiansburg Garment, 434 U.S. at 418, 98 S.Ct. at 699.
However, Congress did not intend to distort the adversary judicial
process by giving private plaintiffs substantial incentives to sue
while foreclosing to defendants all possibility of recovering their
expenses. id. at 432 U.8."419, 98. 8.ct. 699. Therefore,
prevailing defendants may recover their costs and attorneys’ fees
when the plaintiffs’ action is without foundation, even if it is
not brought in bad faith. Id.
In Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, the
only attorneys’ fee case concerning defendant-intervenors to reach
the Supreme Court, the court significantly drew an express line
between defendants under the civil rights fee statutes and
defendant-intervenors--one which places a defendant-intervenor in
a position much more analogous to that of a plaintiff in such cases
than to that of a defendant. Addressing the issue whether losing
defendant-intervenors should be held liable for the plaintiff’s
attorneys’ fees, the Court held that they should not be held
liable. 109 S.Ct. at 2736. The Court reasoned that, unlike losing
defendants, losing defendant-intervenors have not been found to
have violated anyone’s civil rights, and awarding attorneys’ fees
against them would further neither the aim of deterrence nor the
general policy that wrongdoers make whole those they have harmed.
Id. at 2737. Finally, the Court warned of the undesirable and
inequitable consequences of treating defendant-intervenors like
defendants in civil rights litigation:
The regime proposed by respondent--that those who
intervene in a [civil rights] suit are presumptively
liable for fees, while those who take the alternative
course of becoming plaintiffs in independent lawsuits
attacking provisions of the decree are presumptively
shielded from liability--would encourage interested
parties to await the entry of judgment and collaterally
attack remedial schemes. This would serve the interests
©f no one: not. plaintiffs, not defendants, not
intervenors.
Intervention that is in good faith is by definition
not a means of prolonging litigation, but rather of
protecting legal rights--ranging from contract-based
right ... to statutory rights ... to constitutional
rights ... =--which are entitled to no less respect than
the rights asserted by plaintiffs in the subject suit.
109 S.Ct. at 2737 (citations omitted).
While recognizing that innocent intervenors are not "the
chosen instrument of Congress," the Supreme Court stated that
neither are they disfavored participants in civil rights
proceedings. 109 S.Ct. at 2737. Indeed, the Court went out of its
16
play in civil rights proceedings, noting,
The dissent repeatedly implies that intervenors are
no more than intermeddlers who get in the way of tidy
settlement agreements between [civil rights] plaintiffs
and wrongdoers.... That characterization might be
understandable if our opinion addressed intervenors who
are not themselves affected by the outcome of the
lawsuit; but it does not.... What is at issue here is
only the liability of intervenors who enter lawsuits to
defend their own constitutional or Statutory rights. It
seems to us that the dissent dismisses out of hand the
legitimate claims of these people, not because they are
intermeddlers, but rather because the dissenters have
established a judge-made ranking of rights, authorizing
[civil rights] claims to prevail over all others. That
is the essential difference between us. Whereas we think
that the fee-award provision is subject to "the competing
equities that Congress normally takes into account,"
supra, at 2736, the dissent believes that we "must be
guided first and foremost by the interests of the
prevailing party" (so long as that it is [the civil
rights] plaintiff and not the defendant, see
Christiansburg Garment, supra), post, at 2741, and that
the only criterion of our decision is that it "respect
the objectives of [the civil rights statute)," post, at
2742. Those objectives must of course be respected. But
nothing in the statute gives them hegemony over all the
other rights and equities that exist in the world. Here
as elsewhere, the judicial role is to reconcile competing
rights that Congress has established and competing
interests that it normally takes into account. See,
e.g., FordaMotor Co. v. EZOC, 458 U.8. 219, 239-240, :102
S.Ct. 3057, 3069-3070, “73 .L.Ed.24 721 (1282). When
Congress wishes [civil] rights to sweep away all others
it will say so.
plaintiffs in a civil rights suit may not recover attorneys’
17
way to recognize the vital function that a defendant-intervenor can
109 S.Ct. at 237-38 n.4. The Court thereupon held that prevailing
fees
from losing defendant-intervenors unless--exactly like losing
plaintiffs--the intervenors’ action was "frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation." Id. at 2736.7
As A Prevailing Defendant-Intervenor Whose
Intervention Was Important to the Outcome,
Judge Wood Is Entitled to Attorneys’ Fees.
The Supreme Court in Zipes did not address the issue of
recovery of attorneys’ fees by prevailing defendant-intervenors.
Nor, a fortiori, did it address the issue of which party should be
held liable for the attorneys’ fees of prevailing intervenors.
However, the Court not only makes it clear that it views the
activities of defendant-intervenors not as disfavored
"intermeddlers who get in the way of tidy settlement agreements"
between civil rights plaintiffs and defendants, but as vindicators
of rights on the same level as the rights sought to be vindicated
by plaintiffs, and it emphasized that it reached its conclusion by
interpreting the fee statute "in light of the competing equities
that Congress normally takes into account." 109"Ss.Ct.. at 2736,
2737-38, n.4.
So that equity may prevail, the lower federal courts,
including this Circuit--in the absence of Supreme Court directive--
have determined that prevailing defendant-intervenors on the side
of the government can recover their attorneys’ fees in appropriate
The District Court for the District of Columbia had previously tak
en the same position, holding that environmental organizations whi
ch prevailed against the EPA and intervening industrial groups in
litigation brought under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
were not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees against the
intervenors, who, like the plaintiffs themselves, were advancing
non-frivolous views of the Act and were seeking to ensure that the
EPA properly implemented and administered the Act. Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Administrator, EPA, 585 F.Supp. 65, 6
9-70 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 801 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
18
circumstances. To that end, the courts have devised a rigorous
test, which is succinctly expressed in Posada Vv. Lamb County, Tex.,
716 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 and n.13 {5th Cir. 1883):
fees may be awarded only if [1] the governmental litigant
did not adequately represent the intervenors’ interest,
[2] if the intervenors proposed different theories and
arguments for the court’s consideration, and (3] if the
work the intervenor performed was of important value to
the court. Donnell, at 248-49; accord, Alabama Power Co. V. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Silberman v.
Bogle, 683 F.2d 62, 65 {3rd Cir. 1982).
Posada, 716 F.2d at 1075. The test is tailor-made for this case.
The test set out in Posada is, as far as Judge Wood knows,
this Circuit’s only pronouncement on the standards for awarding
attorneys’ fees to defendant-intervenors, and it is dictum, since
the appropriate circumstances for such an award were not present in
that case. However, Posada is fully in line with the traditional
interpretation of §§ 19731 (e) and 1988 by other courts--including
the United States Supreme Court--which have consistently stressed
equity over procedural posture in making awards of attorneys’ fees
in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Commissioners Court of Medina
County, Texas v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 439-440 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (quoting Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850
{E.D. Mich. 1280), aff’d 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), en rehearing
712 F.2d 222, cert. denied, (464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 703)) (the
attorneys’ fee statute "is to be liberally construed to effectuate
its purposes.... The procedural posture of the case should not be
dispositive").
Several courts have explained at length--if not as succinctly
as this court in Posada--the factors that determine whether a
19
defendant-intervenor in a civil rights suit should be awarded
attorneys fees. In Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204, 103 S.Ct. 1190 (1983),
expressly relied on by this Circuit in Posada, the Board of
Supervisors of Warren County, Mississippi, brought suit against the
United States seeking a declaratory judgment that a new
redistricting plan was non-discriminatory. Several individuals
intervened on the side of the United States. The United States
prevailed, and the Defendant-Intervenors sought their attorneys’
fees from the Board of Supervisors. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing the district court’s grant of
attorneys’ fees to the defendant-intervenors, held that, in
considering an intervenor’s request for attorneys’ fees, the Court
must examine the particular role played by the intervenor. It
concluded:
Where Congress has charged a governmental entity to
enforce a statutory provisidn, and the entity
successfully does so, an intervenor should be awarded
attorneys’ fees only if it contributed substantially to
the success of the litigation. This inquiry primarily
entails determining whether the governmental litigant
adequately represented the intervenors’ interests by
diligently defending the suit. It also entails
considering both whether the intervenors proposed
different theories and arguments for the court’s
consideration and whether the work performed was of
important value to the court.
682 F.2d at 248-49.
The Donnell Court buttressed its holding by reference to
similar holdings in similar cases, Baker v. City of Detroit, 504
F.Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (defendant-intervenors black police
officers recovered attorneys’ fees for their role in successful
20
defense of affirmative action plan where city’s reluctance to admit
past discrimination might have impaired the defense); Seattle
School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980),
aff'd, 458 U.S. 457, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (1982) (intervenors on the side
of the school district in declaratory judgment action entitled to
fees on constitutional issue which the district would not have
raised). Donnell, 682 F.2d at 246, n.12. The Donnell holding was,
in turn, followed in Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 546 F.Supp. 13587, 1360 (D.D.C. 1982) (an award is appropriate
if a party has substantially contributed to the goals of the Act
and served the public interest).
Judge Wood Should Be Awarded
Her Attorneys’ Fees From The State of Texas.
In those cases where the award of attorneys’ fees to
defendant-intervenors has been at issue, the courts seem, again, to
have based their decisions as to who should pay on equity. For
example, in Baker, the court awarded the prevailing intervening
defendant police officers their attorneys’ fees from the losing
plaintiff police officers’ union, reasoning, "[T]he Intervenors
have vindicated their rights, and this Court believes it is just
and reasonable for the union to pay their attorneys’ fees." 504
F. Supp. at 840-51. By contrast, the Sixth Circuit ordered the
United States, which had intervened in a civil rights suit as a
plaintiff, to pay attorneys fees to its prevailing fellow
plaintiffs on the ground that it had reversed its original posture
and actually acted solely to challenge a validly and judicially
approved consent decree entered into by the original plaintiffs.
21
Geler v. Richardson, 271 F.2d 1310, 1311, 1113 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Court declared,
The United States cannot undermine a clearly stated
congressional purpose by clinging to its nominal status
as a plaintiff and shifting the financial burden to the
original private plaintiffs and the State of Tennessee,
who in good faith agreed upon and entered into a consent
decree. Regardless of the labels placed upon the
parties, to bear the financial burden of litigating to
protect a consent decree against governmental attack
would chill citizens in the assertion of the civil
rights.
Id. at 1314. Finally, the D.C. Circuit (which ordered the losing
plaintiff to pay attorneys’ fees to the prevailing defendant-
intervenor in Donnell) has also stated:
If ever an intervenor can recover attorneys’ fees from a
party on whose side it participated--a question we do not
here reach--the justification would have to be a clear
showing of some unique contribution of the intervenor to
the strength of that party’s legal position.
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 4 (quoted at Donnell, 682
F.24 at 248). All of these cases compel the conclusion that a
prevailing defendant-intervenors’ attorneys’ fees should be paid by
that party whose actions necessitated the intervention, whether
plaintiff or fellow defendant.
In most cases equity demands that defendant-intervenors on the
side of the government recover their attorneys’ fees from the
government, if at all, since under the generally accepted test for
recovery of fees by defendant-intervenors, an intervenor can
recover only if the government did not adequately represent the
intervenor’s interest; the intervenor proposed different theories
and arguments to the court; and the intervenor’s work was valuable
to the court. Posada, 716 F.2d at 1075, supra at 19. Therefore,
22
it is the government’s failure to adequately bear its own burden of
proof that necessitates the intervention, and not any action of the
plaintiffs. In such a case, equity requires that the governmental
entity that benefits from the intervention repay the intervenor
those fees which the intervenor would have been spared had the
government adequately defended the case itself.
In the instant case, equity clearly requires the State of
Texas to assume the expenses of Judge Wood's intervention. In the
first place, her intervention relieved the State of Texas of
virtually all litigation expenses relative to the defense of Harris
County, the most populous Texas County challenged in the
litigation. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, had Judge
Wood not appealed, Judge Bunton’s Interim Plan would have been
implemented, effectively carrying out the Plaintiffs’ and Attorney
General Mattox’s settlement. That Interim Plan was patently
unconstitutional, yet it would have effectively destroyed Texas’
Judicial election system prior to any review of the extremely
important legal issues which this Court has now resolved in the
defendants’ favor. It would be bitterly ironic if Judge Wood--who
obtained an injunction against the Interim Plan and appellate
review of the district court opinion--were to be denied attorneys’
fees simply because of her status as defendant-intervenor, whereas
if she had led a successful collateral attack on the Interim Plan
as a plaintiff, she would automatically have been entitled to her
costs from the state under §§ 19731(e) and 1988. This is exactly
the paradoxical situation envisioned by the United States Supreme
23
Court in Zipes when that Court distinguished defendant-intervenors
from defendants on equitable grounds.®
Judge Wood is Entitled to Attorneys’
Fees at Harris County, Texas Rates.
In awarding Judge Wood her attorneys’ fees the Court must
follow the guidelines first set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). These require
that the Court assess twelve factors:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty of the questions; (3) the skills requisite to
perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of
the case; (5) the Customary fee; (6) whether the fee is
fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the
client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and
the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and
ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases.
There is one serious respect in which Zipes appears to run counter to Judge Wood’‘s motion to recover attorneys’ fees from the State. Zipes held, following Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985), that the party who loses on the merits should also bear fee liability under § 1988. Zipes, 109 s.Ct. at 2737. However, Zipes is distinguishable on the issue of the liability of the state for the attorneys’ fees of prevailing intervenors on the same side. In Zipes the Court was supporting the role of Defendant-Intervenors who intervene and shorten litigation. It found it inequitable to hold such defendant-intervenors liable for wrongs they have not committed. Conversely, it would be inequitable to deny recovery of attorneys’ fees to prevailing defendant-intervenors who do the work of the State. Zipes contemplates a situation where the state is blameless, not one, as here, where a Defendant-Intervenor plays a role which the State should have played but did not. In precisely similar circumstances involving intervenors’ claims for attorneys’ fees from a governmental entity on the same side, the D.C. Circuit expressly distinguished Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985) (the predecessor to Zipes in holding that a party successful on the merits cannot be held liable for attorneys’ fees), holding that it was "specific to the facts of Graham and is not fairly interpreted as a definitive statement of § 1988 liability in factually distinguishable cases." Geiet, 871 F.2d at 1315.
24
Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 545 F.Supp. 252, 255 (S.D.
Miss. 1982) (on remand) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19). The
key factors among these are the
(1) time and labor involved; (5) the customary fee; (8)
the amount involved and the results obtained; and (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of counsel.
Riddell, 545 F.Supp. at 255, n.1l; gee also Copper Liquors v. Adolph
Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 583 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Johnson factors alone, however, cannot guarantee a
rational, reasonable fee-setting. Riddell, 545 F.Supp. at 255.
Therefore, the Courts in this Circuit have looked to other circuits
to amplify the mandatory guidelines and, in. particular, to
establish the "lodestar," which is calculated by multiplying a
reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended
on the lawsuit. Id. at 256. The "lodestar" may then be adjusted
to reflect other factors like the delay in receipt of payment and
the quality of the representation. Id. The key to establishing
the lodestar is to determine the reasonable hourly rate for similar
work prevailing in the community. Riddell, 545 F.Supp. at 256.
The relevant community is that in which the district court sits,
unless a particular attorney’s services are necessary and no
attorney with the requisite skill is available within the local
court’s jurisdiction. Riddell, 545 F.Supp. at 256; Donnell, 240
F.24 at 252,
In a case such as this, where intimate familiarity with Harris
County judicial elections and processes and with the witnesses for
both the plaintiffs and the defense was crucial to a successful
defense of the case, the relevant community for assessing Judge
Wood’s attorneys’ fees is Harris County. Moreover, in this case
the rationale for establishing attorneys’ fees at the rate
prevailing in Midland, Texas, where the district court sits, is
particularly weak since Midland was chosen by the plaintiffs for
their own strategic purposes and not for any nexus that Midland
County has with this litigation that otherwise makes it a suitable
forum. The cost of the litigation was therefore enhanced for the
defense in general by the choice of a community which lacked
attorneys with the requisite local knowledge and expertise to
defend Texas’ specialized judicial election system as it exists in
Texas’ most populous couiities.?
IIT. CONCLUSION
The foregoing interpretation of the requirements of §§ 1973
and 1988 is the only one consistent with the law as interpreted by
the United States Supreme court in Zipes--law which favors
defendant-intervenors who defend their own constitutional and
statutory rights, especially when the State failed to do so, and
who shorten complex litigation by intervening in a civil rights
controversy in which they have a personal stake rather than
awaiting the outcome and collaterally attacking the remedial
scheme. 109 S.Ct. at 2738. It is also the only interpretation
that can reconcile the status of both Plaintiffs and innocent
For example, while Harris County has 59 sitting state district judges divided among civil, criminal, family, and probate benches, Midland County has few state district judges and no specialized court system. Counsel's acquaintance with the realities of a specialized court system was essential to the preparation of a
strong defense.
26
prevailing Defendant-Intervenors in civil rights litigation.
Finally, it is fully consistent with the lower federal courts--
including this Circuit’s--standards for awarding fees to prevailing
defendant-intervenors in civil rights litigation.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Intervenor
Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood respectfully requests
that the Court award her costs and attorneys’ fees in the instant
litigation and grant her such other and further relief to which she
may show herself justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
PORTER & CLEMENTS
aw Sl Clirmints) eof
J./ Eugene ‘Clements lg a
Evelyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
Phone: (713) 226-0600
Fax: (713) 228-1331
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/
INTERVENOR/DEFENDANT JUDGE WOOD
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this / A day of October, 1990, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been mailed to all counsel of record by first class United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
440 Louisiana, Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
27
Mr. David C. Godbey, Jr.
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
Mr. John L. Hill, Jr.
Mr. Andy Taylor
Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & Laboon
3300 Texas Tower
Houston, Texas 77002
Mr. Seagal V. Wheatley
Mr. Donald R. Philbin, Jr.
Oppenheimer, Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley
711 Navarro Street, 6th Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Mark H. Dettman
Attorney at Law
Post Office Bax 2559
Midland, Texas 79702
Mr. Gerald H. Goldstein
Goldstein, Goldstein & Hilley
29th Floor, Tower Life Bldg.
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Joel H. Pullen
Kaufman, Becker, Pullen & Reibach
2300 NCNB Plaza
300 Convent Street
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. R. James George
Mr. John M. Harmon
Ms. Margaret H. Taylor
Graves, Dougherty, et al.
P. O. Box 98
Austin, Texas 78767
Mr. William L. Garrett
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
8300 Douglas, #800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Mr. Rolando L. Rios
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Attorneys at Law
201 N. St. Mary’s st., #521
San Antonio, Texas 78250
28
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress Ave., #2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Renea Hicks
Mr. Javier Guajardo
Special Asst. Atty. Generals
P. O. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, II
Mullinas, Wells, Baab & Cloutman
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
Ms, Sherrilyn aA. Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham
Attorney at Law
777 South R. L. Thornton Frwy., Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
Mr. Michael Ramsey
Ramsey & Tyson
2120 Welch
Houston, Texas 77019
Mr. Daniel J. Popeo
Mr. Paul D. Kamenar
Mr. Alan M. Slobodin
1705 N. Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Mr. Paul Strohl
Attorney at Law
100 Founders Square
900 Jackson Street
Dallas, Texas 75202
29
Mr. Daniel M. Ogden
Attorney at Law
900 Chateau Plaza
2515 McKinney Avenue
Dallas, Texas 75201
Ll, wl, Vt
EVELYN V./ REYES >
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Defendant-Appellants, 5
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Harris County District Judge S
SHAROLYN WOOD, S
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Defendant-Appellant. §
DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR HARRIS COUNTY
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD'S MOTION
FOR CERTIFICATION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
AND MOTION FOR STAY
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
Purstant io Ped. RR. Civ. P75 7(b), Defencant-Intervenor
Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood ("Judge Wood") files
this Motion requesting that the Court amend its Memorandum
Opinion and Order of November B, 198% ("Opinion"), to ‘include =a
Statement certifying this case for interlocutory appeal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) and that it stay all further proceedings
in this Court pending interlocutory appeal. In support of her
Motion, Judge Wood respectfully shows the Court the following:
1 l. Interlocutory appeal of an order not otherwise appealable is
appropriate under § 1292(b) when the following criteria are met:
(1) the order involves a controlling question of law;
£2) as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion; and
(3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.—
The Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November B, 1989, irs
not appealable at this time as of right since that Order is not a
final judgment; the Court has merely Zound liability; fit ‘must now
proceed from the liability phase +o ‘the remedy phase of the
litigation. However, the criteria for certification for inter-
locutory appeal under § 1292(b) are amply met in this case,
A. The Court's Declaratory Judgment
Involves Controlling Questions Of Law.
2. This case involves a challenge under §2 of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973, to the existing system of electing state
1/ Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil
action an order not otherwise appealable under
this section, shall be of the opinion that such
order involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals
which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such
action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application
is made to it within ten days after the entry of
the order: Provided, however, That application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings
in the district court unless the district judge or
the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so
order.
{Footnote Cont'd)
district Zudges from countv-wide districts in Texas. In its
Opinion, the Court held that the Present svstem violates Section
2.0f the Voting Rights Act by diluting the votes of blacks and/or
Hispanics in all target counties, including Harris County.
3. The United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit hold
that the appropriate test of vote dilution claims under the
Voting Rights Act is a "totality of the circumstances" test based
upon a practical, intensely local inquiry peculiarly dependent
upon the facts of the case. Thornburg v. Gingles, 473 U.S. 20,
106 8.Ct. 2782, 2781 (1986); Overton v, Citv of Austin, 321 .F.24
529, 532 (%th .Cir. . 1988). That test employs as a threshold
inquiry three factors set forth in Gingles: (1) demonstration by
the minority that it is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district
(Gingles 1); (2) political cohesiveness of the minority (Ginales
2); and (3) sufficient white bloc voting to enable the white
majority usually to defeat the minority's candidate of choice
(Gingles 3). Gingles, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. These factors are then
augmented by a searching, practical inquiry into typical local
2
factors. Gingles, 106 8.Ct. at 3763. =32/
(Footnote Cont'd)
28 U.S.C. §:1292(b).
7 4 These typical factors in proving vote dilution are often
referred to as the "Zimmer factors" after the case of Zimmer
V. NMcKeithen, 485 F.28 1297 (8th Cir. 1973), in which they
were first set forth in detail.
4. Essentially, the Court rested its declaratory judgment on
the fellowing conclusions of law:
l. Bection 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to the
judiciary. Opinion at 81 (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 839
F.24 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert, denied SUD nom Chisom
Vv. Edwards, 109 s.Ct.- 310 (1389).).,.7.3/
2. Section 2 applies equally as well to the election of
state "district judges who serve as independent
decision-makers, as it does to the election of appel-
late judges, who serve in a collegial body; Chisom's
extension of § 2 to judicial elections was rot meant to
be limited to collegial judicial bodies. Opinion at 81
and n. 32.
3. Political cohesiveness of the minority (Gingles 2) and
the ability of the white majority usually to defeat the
minority's preferred candidates (Gingles 3) are usually
established by statistical evidence of racially
polarized voting. Opinion at 85.
4. Racial bloc voting can be established by a type of
abstract statistical inquiry called "bivariate
regression analysis." Opinion.at 28 n. 4.
5. Party affiliation is irrelevant under the controlling
law. Opinion at 80.
6. The addition of irrelevant variables to regression and
statistical analysis distorts the equation and vields
results that are indisputably incorrect under $ 2.
Opinion at 80.
~J
Unopposed minority candidate election contests and
white versus white contests are not germane in this
Circuit to the statistical analysis cf Voting Rights
Act violations. Opinion at 80-81.
8. The concept of "one man, one vote" does not apply to
judicial elections. Opinion at 15.
The Court had previously held that the Voting Rights Act is
constitutional as applied to judicial elections and violates
neither the principle of separation of powers nor the
fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection of the
laws. Order entered May 3, 1989.
The eligible spool of minority lawvers, rather than
eligible minority voters, 7 is not the appropriate
reference point for evaluating the extent of electoral
success. Oplnion at 74-75.
Specific to Harris County, the Court held:
10. The data set relied upon by Plaintiffs’ expert
Dr. Richard Engstrom £0 analyze Harris County
elections, consisting in 1980 census counts of total
black population by precinct and computer printouts of
1982, 1984, 1986, and 198s precinct voter registration
estimates supplied Dr. Engstrom by Dr. Richard Murray,
a non-testifying expert (Opinion at 22), which had been
written over, struck out or crossed through, and
contained pencil notations and other marks was reliable
data on which to base statistical analvsis of racially
polarized voting and racial bloc voting. Oplnion at
27.
Testimony fron PlaintiZ?Z’s expert, Dr. Engstrom, that
(1) primary elections in Harris County need not be
addressed because they do filter out the candidate of
choice of black voters; (2) that uncontested races do
not assist researchers in their analysis; (3) that the
appropriate comparison in Voting Rights cases is black
and non-black; (4) that, although not controlled for,
the votes of Asian-Americans would be included in the
percentages of non-black votes; and (5) that the range
of absentee votes in Harris County never rose above
13.6% was adequate to address Defendant Wood's concerns
about absentee voting, the influx of Vietnamese
population into Harris County and traditionally black
precincts and failure of Dr. Engstrom's analysis to
reflect black candidate successes in primary elections
and uncontested races. ‘Opinion at 27.
Dr. Engstrom's testimony regarding correlation and
regression analysis of 17 selected races proves that
white bloc voting exists in Harris County and is
sufficiently strong generally to defeat the choice of
the black community. Opinion at 28-30.
The testimony of Judge Wood's witness, Judge Mark
Davidson, that race and ethnicity are irrelevant to
voting behavior as it relates to the judiciary .in
Harris County, while credible, is irrelevant under
controlling law. Opinion at 31.
Defendant Wood's contention that black referred
candidates lost their judicial races because of failure
to win the Harris County bar or preference poll or
obtain the Gay Political Caucus endorsement is legally
incompetent. Opinion at 21
5 The questions of law listed above are controlling in that
they provide the conceptual basis for the Court's determination
that the present system of electing state district judges dilutes
the votes of minorities in the targeted counties, and, in
particular, in Harris County, in violation of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.
B. There Are Substantial Grounds For Difference
Of Opinion To The Contrclling Law.
5, in sum, the controlling conclusions of law raise at least
the following questions of law for which <%here are substantial
grounds for difference of opinion:
1." Whether '§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to the
Judiciary; and, if so, whether it is constitutional?
2. Whether § 2 applies to independent overlapping countvy-
wide election districts?
3-6. Whether Gingles 2 and 3 are proved by abstract statig-
tical inquiry with all other inquiry being irrelevant?
~J
Whether unopposed election contests and white versus
white contests are germane to the statistical analysis
of vote dilution claims?
8. Whether the concept of one-man, one-vote applies to
judicial elections?
9. Whether the eligible pool of minority lawyers or that
Of minority voters is the appropriate reference point
for measuring minority success in judicial elections?
10-14. Whether the court's holding that illegal vote dilution
exists in Harris County, Texas judicial races is
clearly erroneous?
2. As the Court acknowledged in its Opinion, "This area of law
is not. an icy certainty.” Opinion at 093. Indeed, the Court
- 5 -
implies that the questions involved are "difficult legal
questions” on which "the most distinguished experts" may dis-
agree. Opinion at 93 (quoting Chief Judge Charles Evans Hughes
1936 address to the American Law Institute). Clearly, the Court
acknowledges by its language that there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion as to that law.
C. An Immediate Appeal Will Materiallv Advance
The Ultimate Termination Of This Litigation.
3. Interlocutory appeal would very materially advance the
ultimate determination of this litigation with rctentially great
savings of expense and disruption for both the parties and the
people of. Texas as a “whole, Agia result of the Court's
declaratory judgment in this case, all further elections for
state ‘district judge in the target counties are subject to
immediate injunction; and the Court has indicated that it will
consider such an injunction. Opinion at. 93. Moreover, in‘ the
remedy rhase the parties and the State will inevitably be
subjected to an immensely expensive and protracted process which
will predictably be enormously disruptive of the Texas electoral
process, and of the stability of the state judicial system.
0% Federal law requires that the state legislature must first
be given a reasonable opportunity to redress the violations.
Should it reach consensus on a plan it must submit that plan to
the Justice Department under §5 of the Voting Rights act. The
Justice Department has previously indicated in a similar case
that 1t will approve no judicial redistricting plans until 1990
census data 1s available. Any remedy devised by the legislature
will also require a constitutional amendment which must be
approved by the voters of the State of Texas, who only four vears
ago overwhelmingly approved an amendment “oo the Texas constitu-
tion forbidding the creaticn of udicial districts smaller than a
county without majority approval.
10. + Failing a legislative remedv, as seems all too predictable,
the Court must devise its own remedy. At the trial of this case
there was little if any testimonv or evidence Yelating *o such a
remedy. FOr example, 1% the Court were +o 4dmpose ‘a remedy
requiring the election of state district judges Zrcm legislative
districts in the affected counties, there is no evidence that
such" judicial districts would satisfy the Gingles criteria, nor
1s there any evidence as to the population or. racial makeup of
such potential districts. Even such evidence as was introduced
at trial regarding demographics - which was never related to
legislative dlstricts ~ is entirely extrapolated from 1980 census
cata and ls thus ten years out of date, Moreover, in Harris
County, there is no reason *o order single member districts for
any areas of the county other than black areas in that no
evidence of vote dilution was presented on behalf of anyone other
than blacks. Any such Court-imposed remedy will have
far-reaching. implications for the future of the state judiciary
and will necessarily lack voter approval and indeed, voter input.
It will also result in tremendous upheaval in the administration
of Justice and expense to the State and ultimately to the
citizens themselves. The impact of any such plan on numerous
laws affected by judicial redistricting or racial lines--such as
venue and jurisdiction--is entirely unpredictable.
11. During all of the time spent in devising and implementing a
remedy for the vote dilution found by the Court in its Opinion
and Order, the ultimate resolution of the controlling questions
of law in the case must remain in doubt with the attendant
possibility that the massive litigation, disruption, expense, and
instability dncurred will (all have been for naught should the
appellate court ultimately reverse *+he district court on the
merits: of this ‘case. There can be no doubt, therefore, that 0)
swift decision on the troublesome questions of law in this
exceptionally complex and important case will very materially
advance the ultimate termination of this litigation in the manner
which is most just, orderly, efficient, and sound.
WHEREFORE, for +the foregoing reasons, Defendant-Intervenor
Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood requests that the
Court amend its Memorandum ané Order of November 85,1989, hv
including a statement certifying this case for immediate
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 12924b)., that “ie
devise no remedy for vote dilution and that it impose a stav on
all further proceedings in this Court pending interlocutory
appeal.
Respectiully submitted,
PORTER & CLEMENTS
2 2. By: = i ALE A Ga LR Z REI =
J //Eugene( Clements 7 i
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500 TY
Houston, Texas 77002-2730 ye
(713) 226-0600 /
ATTORNEY FOR HARRIS COUNTY 7 Vii es.
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
OF COUNSEL:
PORTER & CLEMENTS
Evelyn V. Keyes
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002-2730
{713) 226-0600
Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
440 Louisiana, Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 228-5105
i
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on the 14th day of December, 1989, a
true and ‘correct: .copy of the above and foregoing Defendant-
intervenor Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Motion
for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and Motion for Stay
was mailed to counsel of record in this case by first class
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. William L. Garrett
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
Attorneys at Law
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Mr. Rolando lL. Rios
Southwest Voter Registration &
Education Project
201 N. St. Marv's, Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers
Ms. Sherrilyn A, Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress 2Ave., Suite 2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
P.."O. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Edward 'B. Cloutman, III
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C.
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham
777 80. R.1L. Thornton Freeway
Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
br
lA
Evelyn V./Keyes
WO0004:47:br
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS (LULAC), et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Vv.
JIM MATTOX, Attorney General
Of the State of Texzs, et al,, NO. MO-88-CA-154
Defendant-Appellants,
and
Harris County District Judge
SHAROLYN WOOD,
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Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Came on for consideration Defendant/Intervenor Harris County
District Judge Sharolyn Wood's ("Judge Wood's) Motion for
Certification for Interlocutory Appeal of the Court's Memorandum
Opinion and Order of November 8, 1989 (the "Order") in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), and Judge Wood's Motion for Stay. Upon
consideration of Judge Wood's Motion, the arguments contained
therein, and the trial and record in this action, the "Court is of
the opinion that the Motion should be GRANTED. The Court
therefore hereby finds and ORDERS as follows:
1. The Court is of the opinion and finds that its Memoran-
dum Opinion and Order of November 8, 1989 involves controlling
questions of law regarding the application §2 of the Voting
Rights Act to the election of state district judges in Texas, as
to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal <£from the Order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.
2 The Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 8,
1989, as amended, is further amended to incorporate the findings
in the first paragraph of this Order.
3. All ‘further proceedings in this Court are stayed
pending interlocutory appeal of the Court's amended Memorandum
Opinion and Order of November 8, 1989, as amended by this Order.
ENTERED this day of December, 1989.
LUCIUS D. BUNTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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DOF TREX.\S
JI MM ATTOX
ATTORNEY GENERAL
December 22. 1989
U.S. District Clerk
P.O. Box 10708
Midland, Texas 79702
Re: LULAC #4434, et al. v. Mattox, et al.
Civil Action, No. MO-88-CA-154
Dear Sir or Madam:
Although it was in the original, the enclosed sheet
inadvertantly was omitted in the copy of the Joint Motion for Entry
of Proposed Interim Plan filed with the Court today. It should be
attached as the second page of Attachment A to the joint motion. I
apologize for the oversight.
Sincerely,
ow TET, ye J ) \ $/ \ —— a ok | / \ :
N 8 Fy by NA y : y Fa 5
te” i PN 9 Ak rR
Renea Hicks :
Special Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
CC: Counsel of Record
$12.16 = 2100 SUPREME COURT IBTTILIING AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2308
le
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A PALE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND/ODESSA DIVISION
LULAC COUNCIL #4434, et al
Plaintiffs,
.y
VS. Civil Action No.
MO-88-CA-154
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants.
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JOINT MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROPOSED INTERIM PLAN
The plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenors. and the Attorney
General of Texas on behalf of the State of Texas hereby jointly move
the Court to enter an order adopting and implementing the Proposed
Interim Plan which they have filed today with the Court. The
grounds follow:
3h The Court's memorandum opinion and order of November
8, 1989, as modified by the order of November 27, 1989 ("November
8th order"), declared that the current system for electing judges to
the district courts in the Texas counties of Harris, Dallas, Tarrant,
Bexar, Travis, Jefferson. Lubbock, Ector. and Midland violated Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, by illegally diluting
minority voting strength.
2: Pursuant to the Court's directive that any proposed
remedial plans be submitted to the Court no later than December 22
1989. the below-signed counsel have prepared and submitted to the
Court a Proposed Interim Plan ("Plan"). We urge the Court's adoption
of the Plan.
[249
i The Plan harmonizes the current method for electing
district judges in Texas with the Court's November 8th order insofar
as possible. In this way, the Plan's objective is to provide an interim
remedy to those whose voting rights the Court declared are violated
by the current system and, within the confines of that declaration. to
otherwise minimize the disruption of the current electoral system for
district judges in the nine affected counties. To that end. the Plan:
a. Limits the terms of office of those elected under its
terms to two years instead of the four years provided under the
Texas Constitution, in an effort to give the State Legislature the
maximum flexibility to devise a permanent remedial plan in its next
regular session in 1991;
b. Retains countywide residency requirements but
waives electoral subdistrict residency requirements:
C. Retains countywide jurisdiction and venue:
d. Retains the system of electing judges by party
primary and general election;
8. Permits incumbent judges running for district
judgeships in 1990 to choose the electoral subdistrict in which they
will run and permits them, if reelected:, to retain their current
district court number and their current docket-type specialization;
and
f. Permits a limited, one time per party right of
recusal of an assigned judge elected under the interim plan, modeled
Ste f i Gedo fr 2 . - Wily 2 . Aller 4 lexas statute concerning recusal of visiting trial judges.
Q)
4. The Plan remedies for the 1990 elections the voting
rights violations found by the Court on November 8th in the
following manner:
a. Eliminates countywide district judge elections in the
nine affected counties, substituting in their place elections from
subdistricts. The subdistricts are created using existing state
legislative district, justice of the peace precinct, and county
commissioner precinct lines, all of which have received preclearance
from the United States Department of Justice under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act; and
b. Allocates the places for which judicial candidates
may run according to the percentage of combined minority voting
age population in the election subdistrict as reported in the 1980
Census. The subdistricts are ranked by county in descending order
of combined minority voting age population, and the places are
allocated in that descending order until all have been allocated. In
this way, those voters whose rights the Court determined have been
violated receive first preference.
5; The Plan also attempts to reflect the policy choice of the
State Legislature. Attachment A to this motion is a statement signed
by a majority (16 ot 31 members) of the Texas Senate supporting the
Plan's concept and its adoption. Attachment B to this motion is a list
showing 71 of 150 members of the Texas House of Representatives
(with more anticipated) supporting the Plan's concept and its
adopuon.
Based upon the foregoing matters, the plaintiffs, the plaintiff-
intervenors, and the Attorney General of Texas on behalf of the State
of Texas urge the Court to grant this joint motion and adopt their
Proposed Interim Plan for the 1990 judicial elections in the nine
affected counties.
Respectfully submitted,
foot
JIM MATTOX
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
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WILLIAM C. GARRETT Conf 4 LUAAMAA fm
ROLANDO L. RIOS Sh WM (3 #
SUSAN FINKELSTEIN
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND. FOR
THIS MOTION, ON BEHALF OF THE
ATTORNEYS FOR DALLAS PLAINTIFF-
INTERVENORS AND THE ATTORNEYS FOR
HARRIS PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[ certify that on this 21st day of December, 1989, I sent a copy
of the foregoing document by overnight courier to each of the
following: ~~ William L. Garrett, Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300
Douglas, Suite 800, Dallas, Texas 75225; Rolando Rios, Southwest
Voter Registration & Education Project, 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521,
San Antonio, Texas 78205; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund. Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New York.
New York 10013; Gabrielle K. McDonald, 301 Congress Avenue. Suite
2050, Austin, Texas 78701; Edward B. Cloutman. III, Mullinax, Wells.
Baab & Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm Street, Dallas. Texas 75226-1637: 1.
Eugene Clements, Porter & Clements. 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500.
Houston, Texas 77002-2730; and Robert H. Mow. Jr. Hughes & Luce,
2800 Momentum Place. 1717 Main Street, Dallas. Texas 75201.
“Renea Hicks Si
= goEIvEY
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON : 5 % zr EA HICKS CAPITOL OFFICE. SENATOR : Chr ~2RIIr 03 REN P.O. Box 12068 DISTRICT 22 ’ Austin Texas 78711
i : 512/463-0123 ' Nf Ay Comiiete: Lip Stutr 54 Trxus
EDUCATION 3
DISTRICT OFFICE: FINANCE ; 400 S. Zana Blvd. Subcommittes: December 8 ’ 1989 Dallas. Texas 75208 Chair: Health ano
4/94201723 Human Services
214/942 “ HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
To Whom It May Concern:
We, the undersigned members of the Texas Legislature,
support the concept outlined in S.B. 42, 71st Legislature,
2nd Called Session, a common-sense interim solution to the
LULAC, et al v. Mattox decision on selection of district
juages 1n nine Texas counties. This legislation offers an
interim plan using existing district lines for only those
judges up for election in 1990. A final plan would be
developed in 1293 wing redistricring,
2
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ATTACHMENT B
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Che Stare of Texas
' N ; - Rajph B Waliseeslll House of Wepresentanves Committees:
Austin. Texas Soltpesl& novice Rutourned
Chairman, Arman
Democratic Caucus Financial Institutions
December 21, 1989
The Honorable Jim Mattox
Attorney General, State of Texas
Attorney General's Office
Austin, Texas 78701
Dear General Mattox: ‘
In conjunction with several members of the Texas House of
Representatives, my staff and others have been polling members of the
Texas House to determine support for H.B. 113 and your proposed
interim plan for selecting district judges in nine Texas counties, as
represented by the proposal endorsed by LULAC and other plaintiffs.
. The undersigned House members believe this plan represents a
viable, interim plan although it may not reflect each member,s exact
preference for a final, long-term solution.
Despite the difficulty finding House members due to the holiday
season, each of the members listed below has either co-authored H.B.
113, signed a letter supporting that legislation, or made a verbal
commitment to support the interim plan. In addition six House members
expressed support but wished not to be listed for political reasons or
because they have cases pending before affected district judges.
The total number of members, listed and unlisted, is 71, and I
am confident that at least 76 members, a majority of the House, will
express support for the interim plan when we are able to reach them
after the Christmas holiday. We will provide additional names at a
later date should you neeed them.
Sincerely,
——— a
St. Rep. Ralph Wallace
Attachement: List of House Members
apitol Ottice: 12.0). Box 2910 « Austin, Texas 78768-2910. 512-463-0732
District Office: I>.O. Box 12667 « Houston, Texas 77217 + 713-644-2359
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
plan
Ralph R. Wallace, III
District 145
Chairman,
Democratic Caucus
Alexander
Beauchamp
Berlanga
Blair
Cain
Cavazos
Chisum
-Colbert
Collazo
Conley
Counts
Cuellar, H.
Cuellar, R.
Delco
Denton
Dutton
Earley
Edge
Edwards
Evans
Garcia
Gavin
Glossbrenner
Granoff
Guerrero
Harrison
Hightower
Hinojosa
Hudson, D.
Hudson, S.
Johnson, J.
Junell
Laney
Larry
Lewis, R.
In addition,
do not want their na
Austin, Texas
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
Rep.
House of Representatives
Linebarger
Lucio
Luna, A.
Madla
Martinez
Luna, G.
McDonald
McKinney
Melton
Morales
Moreno, A.
Moreno, P.
Oakley
Parker
Patterson
Perez
Rangel
Rodriguez
Russell
Saunders
Seidlits
Swift
Telford
Thompson, G.
Thompson, 8S.
Wallace
Warner
Willis
Wilson
Wolens
Committees:
Cultural & Historical Resources
Chairman
Financial Institutions
we have positive commitments from six members who
mes listed at this time.
Further, two house members endorsed the major aspects of the interim plan but
at this time
Capitol Office: P.O. Box 2910 « Austin,
District Office: P.O. Box 12667 « Hous
Texas 78768-2910. 512-463-0732
ton, Texas 77217 « 713-644-2359
refused to be counted as supporting this specific
|
UNITED STATES DISIRICT COURT | I
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS yo
MIDLAND/OQDESSA DIVISION
LULAC COUNCIL #44234, ¢1 al. 3
Plaintiffs, $
§
vs § Civil Action No.
N MO 88 CA 154
HAM MaAUTUX ef af, §
Defendants. §
INTERIM PLAN FOR 1090 ELECTIONS
Below 1s a proposed election plan that the attomeys for the plaintiffs submit as
a possible remedy that addresses the Voting Rights Act violation found by this
Court.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The following considerations were used as guidelines in the design of this
plan:
I) Remedying the violation found by the Court -- restoring the full and
effective voting franchise that is guaranticed to the minority community by
fedural law. The plan emphasizes the use of election subdistricts in which the
minonty community will elect candidates of their choice.
2) dinintizing the disruption of the 1990 elections by using existing districting
aud voting precinct lines and avoiding, as much as possible, any changes that
may conflict with the Texas Constitution or Statutes.
3) Allowing for the orderly transition from a completely at large system to a
form of single member district elections.
4) Providing a remedy that will most likely withstand the scrutiny of the
United States Department of Justice. All clection subdistricts used in this plan
have already been approved by the Departinent of Justice.
5) Previously enunciated state policies: Equality of population, maintenance of
communtiies of interest, respect for existing political boundaries, compactness
and contiguity. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 761, 37 L.Ed. 314 (1973),
Graves v. Barnes, 408 F. Supp. 1050, 1053 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
. DESIGN OF THE PLAN
Generally, the plan will use the existing State Representative District, Justice
of the Peace Precinct or County Commisioner Precinct Lines. In Harris, Dallas,
Tarrant and Bexar Counties, the existing State legislative House District Lincs
shall be used. If any of the districts are not wholly within their respective
>
1
county, then only that part that is within the county shall be used. In Travis
County, the existing Justice of the Peace Precinct Lines shall be used. In
Jefferson, Lubbock, Midland, and Ector Counties, the existing County
Commissioner Precinct Lines shall be used.
F.ach county shall be designated a District Number and cach election unit --
state representative district, justice of the peace or commissioner precinct --
shail he designated a Subdistrict Number.
ELECTION METHOD AND RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
In accordence with current provisions of the Texas Constitutions, each
candidate for District Judge shall run within the designated subdistrict and be
ciccted by those voters in the subdistrict. Each candidate shall be a resident of
his/her designated district (county) but need not be a residen of the clection
subdistrict. :
COURT DESIGNATION
Each candidate shall sclect the election subdistrict in which they will be
running. Those candidates who have already filed for candidacy, must now
designate for which subdistrict they wish to run. Or, if they wish, they may
withdraw and their filing fec will be refunded.
FILING FEE AND PETITION
For purposes of this election only, due to the shortness of time, the [filing
petition shall be waived: the filing fee shall remain as set by state law.
COURT SPECIALITY
After the election, the successful candidates shall collectively designate the
court of speciality and thc court numbers that were used before this litigation,
Successful incumbents shall have preference on. the designation of the courts.
TERMS OF OFFICE
All terms of office shall be for two (2) years so that thc Legislature can address
this issue at it rcgulariiy scheduled session in 1991,
THE PLAN
For the 1990 Elections, according to the Secretary of States Office for the State
of ‘Texas, the following number of District Courts are up for clection by
respective county:
jotal civil ' 2: criminal - family juv.
HARRIS- 36 11 13 9 3
DAI LAS- 32 11 12 9 NA
ECTOR- 3 NA NA NA NA
TARRANT- 14 NA NA NA NA
2
MIDLAND-
THFFERSON-
I URBOCK-
REXXAR.
TRAYIS:
Total Judges-
1
1
NA
NA
NA
(source: clerk in charge of ballot sclection, Texas Sec. of State, RO0-252-568 1)
They shall be elected by Subdistrict as follows:
HARRIS COUNTY
(District ))
DISTRICT
NUMBER CQUNTY
Harris
— ia : Harris
SUBDIST *
NUMBER
HD-125
HD-126
C; Harris
WCE J 1. wollareis
F Harris
bib EE ATRIA ange
Harris
Harris
Harris
Se ———larries
Harris
Harris
HD-127
nr ia ne D2 108 |
HD-129
SIME Ta TRAE - LCR
HD-131
Sh ca HD.13
HD-133
11D-134,
Harris
Harris
HD-115 |
HD-136 3 :
HD-137
HD-138
Harris
Harris
Zo Rarns
IHD-139
HD-140
Harris
Hams
Harris
HD-141
HD-143
BD-144
Harris
Harris
HD-145 -
~HD-146
HD-147
HD-148
Harris
Harris
" -HD-1491
HD-1501
Harris
_Harrig
HD-132
HD-139
Harris
Harris
HD-147
HD-148
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DALLAS COUNTY
(District 2)
DISTRICT SUBDIST.*
CURL NUMBER COUNTY NUMBLR
A > Dallas HD-98
: ro —_—— Dillas HD-99 fe
C 2 Dallas HD-100
TaN S Ye Dallas HD-101
E 2 Dallas HD-102
AE hE ARE —— Dallas HD-103 NAN 5
GC 2 Dallas HD-104
I i 2 Dallas HD-105
1 2 Dallas HD-106
We hy 5 2 Dallas 1HD-107
K 2 Dallas HD-108
Ta ME POR en Ll Dallas HD-109
M 2 Dallas HD-110
Sion i ORR hdl a Dallas HD-111_ —
0 2 Dallas HD-112
DUTHRS OY RANE ARR STA Dallas HnD-113 rr
Q 2 Dallas HD-114
“8 ic hic Tg Dallas HD-100 a
S 2 Dallas HD-112
Tr. os = Dallas HD-111
8) 2 Dallas HD-110
Vv oh Ha a Dallas ___HD-102
W 2 Dallas HD-108
ee ine 2 a Dallas HD-107
Y 2 Dallas HD-106
A AORN Re Dallas HD-1035
AA 2 Dallas HD-104
SRR Beer co Dallas: 11D-103 =
a 2 Dallas HD-98
RE 4) 0 3g .. fy’ _Dallas HD-99
EE 2 Dallas HD-101
[T rt 2 Dallas . HD-109
ECTOR COUNTY
(District 9)
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DISTRICT SUBDIST.~
SOUR, NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER
A 9 Ector CC-2
B 9 Ector cC-3
C 9 Ector CC4
TARRANT COUNTY
(Distinct 4)
DISTRICT SUBDIST *
COURT, NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER
A 4 Tarrant HD-89
B 3 4 an I arrant HD-90 LIAB I
4 Tarrant HD.9!
#1y hd md Xarraont: oo or HD-92 Roane
I: A Tarrant HD-93
A en, Se _Tarrant RDS yea
G 4 Tarrant HD-95
1 a it Tarrant HD-96 a
l 4 Tarrant HD-97
J 4 Tarrant HD-00 a ee
K 4 Tarrant HD-95
NE he 4. = Tarrant : HD-94
MN 4 Tarrant HD-93
N 4 Tarrant HD-92
MIDLAND COUNTY
(District 8)
DISTRICT SUBDIST.*
LOURT, NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER
A R Midland CC-3
B 8 Midland CC4
TRAVIS COUNTY
(Disuict 5)
t DISTRICT SUBDIST.*
COURT, NUMBER NTY NUMBER
A 5 Travis JP-1
CCIE | 2 A PLA h! soa ravi Rl? in L000 rR eo
L 5 Travis Jp.3
“IY SER aa Travis ad IB ah vrmr——
¥ 5 Travis JP-5
y 5 Travis Jp-4
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JEFFERSON COUNTY
(District 6)
DISTRICT SUBDIST .* | LOURT, NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER
; A 6 Jefferson CC-1 : | 6 3 Jefferson CC-2 bh
C 6 Jefferson CC-3
i i wand) 6 Jefferson CC.4
E 6 Jefferson CC4 i F 6 Jefferson CC-3
| LUBBOCK COUNTY
i (District 7)
| DISTRICT SUBDIST.*
LOURL NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER
A 7 Lubbock CC-3
B 7 Lubbock CC4
| C Lubbock CC-2
BEXAR COUNTY
| (District 3)
; DISTRICT SURDIST .*
COURT, NUMBER COUNTY NUMBER
A 3 Bexar HD-115
—— 3. Bexar ee HD-120
1M 3 Bexar HD-116
. 3 Bexar. HD-124
E 3 Bexar HD-123
Rae po aa Joma on Bexar HD-122 oF
(i 3 Bexar HD-121
ATI | LR La Bexar HD-118 ==
I 3 Bexar HD-124
sy 3 Bexar . HD-117 o
K 3 Bexar HD-11Y
SM ne oak RR 0 CERIN | 1 a RAB HD-]118 i = NM 3 HD-120
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*HIY House District
CC-County Commissioner Precinct
JP Justice of the Peace Precinct
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
A ar -— NS
rmTyT TT mre ™ ™T7T M™ TANT AT MIURA ~
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TrYAS
0 FI ATI, i, TE 8 Th ul en 10 5 oe ds 80 ef 1
i em IT SNL BWP TV S im op 9 (1 NG A Ee TS ON
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS (LULAC), et al.
IM MATTOX, Attorney General
of the State of Texas, et al.
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DEFENDANT WOOD'S
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Wood ("Judge Wood") files these Objections to the Proposed
™ OM ME £4) Pl asrnts ££ AE ah rr WE en ~ 3, Remedial Plan of the Plaintiffs ang ‘tne Aciorney General
Judce Wood has received no notice from =he Court regarding
settlement discussions cor any proceedings since =the Court issued
its Memorandum Opinion and Order on November 20, 1989 (the
"Opinion"). Having been provided, however, with a copy of the
roposed Interim Plan (the "Plan") apparently agreed upon by
€xas attorney General Jim Mattox ("Mattox") and the Plaintiffs,
Judge Wood would first observe that the purported settlement has
been entered by Mattox, apparently on his own, without conference
with and in direct defiance of the wishes of his clients,
including the Secretary of State, and all administrative judges.
See attached Exhibit "a."
In proposing what Judge Wood perceives to re a disastrous
interim "solution," Mattox has acted solely on his own behalf
and, apparently, on behalf of his political aspirations. The
| BBY
Jost covious and cynical example is the assignment of “he "extra"
. oS wb H — 5 7 be = xv 3 = -— . 1x8. Since there are only <C.svale ledgls:iative districts
and 36 udgeships at stake, 10 of the judgeships are "extra." On
wn
of the Plan, Judicial Places Z7=36 are assiconed to the
heavily Democratic Eouse Distric+s in Harris County (i131,
,adl, 142,343, 1456,
A —- AS a slitting state district judge (not up for re-election in -
1990), ‘Cudge Wood im ostensibly represented in her official
capacity by the Texas Attorney General. i/- In that capacity,
Judge Wocd cbjects that Mattox dces not speak for her Or for any
of <he, cther sitting Texas s=tate district or administrative
udces vio would be affected rv “=he remedy Mattox and =he
Const
inter
1
Srie velieve that he is acting in the best interest of Texas
S The current settlement discussions, insofar ‘as -udge
has been given the courtesy of even brief descriptions of
discussions, appear to go far beyond the authority of <+he
ney General and affirmatively =o violate the statutes and
itution of the State of Texas.
There is no reason for the Court to adopt a Jjerry-rigged
im plan with far-reaching consequences for the long term
health of the Texas judicial system just because unfortunate
37 Judge Wood was allowed to intervene only in her individual
Capacity as a sitting state district judge. Order signed
and entered March 1, 1989.
November 20,
As the Court if : the underlying
guestion in this least, "not
of
No the Court
address workers
aerermine YReL er wou vy aS
was properly made.
Judge understands har sovernor, the Lieutenant
Governor, A Speaker of i m with“ the Court on
December J i889 to express } Lm ibility of the Texas
reachin agreement complete dismantling
the Texas :udici election system in the
(which includ ' most populous urban
within the time
established by the oreits certification of
is case for interlocutory appeal--namely serious consideration
legislature and the Governor--has been
ripe. for LES For
interlocutory appeal.
On December 1989, Judge Wood and Dallas County District
Defendant/Intervenor Judge Harold Entz ("Judge Entz"), having “a
a
p=
Ate ~N 3 - QA y+ + abide «The State's, +h eXas legislature's and +<he Governor's
~ pm ~ -— — ~ y ~ : : responses ~o The Court's Opind
~ An am — —~ 3 la = ~13 appropriate neXt step in this cau Cada oO 0 @ cf action. Lest her motives
ce misunderstood, Judge Wood wishes to make clear that she rh
disagrees with the Court's opinion and will prosecute the appeal
the Court has invited. Judge Wood urges that the case be
-mmeciately certified for expedited appeal and that, pending such
appeal, «0 ‘interim: plan. proposed Dy partial agreement or
cromulgated at the Court's own initiative should be ordered.
AS these objections are being filed, Ther are: Just four
ousiness days before the filing deadline for running for district
judge. The proposed interim plan will add seven business days to
that deadline to permit judges and judicial candidates to sort
out and act upon a plan the implementation of which will, as
{ cescribed below, create an electoral circus. Judge Wood respect-
Uily urges that this Eonorable Court has =a higher duty than
imposing a hastily cobbled-together, new judicial election and p
e
t
administrative scheme solely to increase minority voting strength
at an imminent election and that duty is to maintain an orderly,
effective, fair judicial ‘system. Qhisom vv. ‘Roemer, 853 F.2d
1186, 2189 (5th Cir. 1988}, In connection with the maintenance
of such a system, Judge Wood cbserves that, the Voting Rights Act
~-tself makes no provision for the imposition of any interim
remedial plan. However, even fithe Court were to insist upon an
-
] -—
interim plan but were to defer imposing a new scheme until after
$0 lmpose only a minimal election plan, e.g. single member
districts “sclely Zor ‘the peri=ionin minorities, solely in
sub=districts as to which evidence has been heard, and held
concurrently with the November general election, while leaving
intact the county-wide election system as to all seats except the
number allotted to The proven minority/majority districts, the
court's goal "of maximized minority voting would be delayed bry
“nly two years or, at worst, fulfilled immediately with minimized
~ Ee -— ~~ + ~ ~~ i - - - J = bel of sik ihe Court. acts Frecipitusiy ~~ DyYoadly anc 03 udiciously
if the appeal proves the Court
This Court, with the advice cf only Plaintiffs' counsel and
now, Or even if, the parts fit together properly This creation
nay Create tragic ripples for years. Good Incumpent judges may
be frustrated into retirement or defeated by caprice; good candi-
dates may be deterred from running; candidates of questionable
credentials and experience may be catapulted into seats of
responsiplliity; «and thousands of civil and ‘criminzgl verdicts and
Judgments may be subject to statutory and constitutional attack.
Even ‘federal judges may feel the effects of a tidal wave of
habeas ccrpus petitions.
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defined court with a known specialty nd all on less than one
The Flan proposed by the PJ 5 and ‘Mattox violates =a
Rrra NL nr AC om 4 Tazo : Tv1A4 3 = -1 . 1 Cf Federal and State laws including, at the very least, the
nave only two year terms and run agaln
Sniy viclates art. "5, 3 7 fil
ich provides that judges shall have four year terms,
ut it will deprive those judges of due process in that
e oe iz tenure In office will Bb terminated sooner than
i constitutionally permitted and sooner than that of
othe a
lh di
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en allowed to run its
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fil ro 353 in gr ha = pe, - : : (2) sandlicateg file. for Speci icC CCUTrLS with statultorli Ye
Ss S mposed specialtie
Comment: See “Texas Constitution Article 'V,. 8 1; Texas
Zlection Code § 141.031; and Local Rules of the Board u
of Judges of the Second Administrative District.
(3) Election petitions are filed for specific courts with
identified specialties.
(4) Administrative judges are not now statutorily
authorized to assign courts to successful candidates
for public office, as the Plan proposes.
Comment: Eee Government Code § 74.092 (1988).
{5.) Sub=district courts are not. now authorized by law,
creating potential conflicts between current law and
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such: districts are deemed
(2) -udces are reguired "fo ide iin "th district d res inth
which they serve and perhaps in the sub-district
Irom which the 1
(b) Judges are required =o hold court in their
district, subject to "visiting judge” ceptions,
and perhaps in their sub-district.
{C) Juries must be drawn from the court's district
which might be construed to be sub-districts
(Gd) Venue lies in the
be 1n the sub-distr
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since Texas law requires that a candidate for
yffice designate On his petition the court for
is a. candidate), judicial re
S the assignment of candidates f
judges to new districts, and the determination
he court for which the candidate should file his
fee. None of these practical considerations can
adequately addressed within the next two weeks.
tead, any remedial plan designed to affect the 1990
3 numerous Bobet of compliance
complicated provisions of the Texas Election Code
h would have to be dealt with willy-nilly in th
rior to the filing deadline.
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() Plan proposes broad relief not sought or proved at
lal, e.g. or [ikereios for all parts "of Harris
Nty rather th those specific sub-districts proved
meet Gingles i for black voters. F
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comment: The proposed an reassigns all. glstrict
ludgeships "to legislativ Gistricts wn Harris "Cou ta
rather than fo specifically drawn judicial districts
with known black and majority populations. The
evidence presented at trial (solely as toc black voters)
is ignored, and the proposed county-wide Plan is pro-
mulgated in ignorance as to whether th lew districts
serve any Voting Rights Act purpose at al , much less
whether they bear any semblance of compliance with the
standards of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106
S.Ct. 2752 (1986), the seminal Supreme Court case under
which the liabilify phase ‘cf the instant action was
Jecided NO evidence was presented at trial gs to the
deémograpnic maxKe-up or UoTing patterns in legislative
dlstricts--even con the basis of the out-dated census
materials from 1980 on which the Plaintiffs reliede~-nor
d Sucn districts Degln tC approximate the size and
number oF geographically distinct single-member
judicial districts which would be required to accom-
mocdate the legislatively prescribed number of judicial
Qiscrices in the affected counties. Random assignment
of "extra" judgeships by =zhis Court and subsequent
designation of eoure number and specialty by a newly-
ensconced administrative judge goes far beyond any
evidence or any Lid sought "inthis case, violates
the principal of one-man, one-~vote 2/ and, ‘for no good
reason, permits some voters to vote for two judges and
others ITO vote for only one--all in ignorance of <*he
Type of cour 2 which they are voting. There is no
evidence that ‘the creation ff such judicial districts
would achieve the purpose of elimina ing the dilution
of black and/or Hispanic votes in the election of state
district judges which the Court has found to be present
in the target counties. Indeed, ‘in. Harris ‘County,
there was no proof that Hispanic votes were diluted at
all
(7) Sub-district courts, as prorosed, violate Article ¥;
§ 7 of the Texas Constitution
Comment: The Court itself has acknowledged that the
Texas State Constitution would have to be amended to
authorize the elect ion of state district judges from
gingle-member districts smaller than a county without a
majority vote of the citirens of the affected county.
See srt. 5877 of the Texas Constitution of 18785,
adopted November 5, 885, Nevertheless, in ‘utter
[8
Judge Wood relieves that under <the plan devised by the
Plaintiffs and Mattox, voter <urnout is dramatically higher
in ‘the districts assigned one judge than in those assigned
two Judges ‘and ‘that, if this plan were to be implemented,
the actual voting power of voters in the arbitrarily favored
districts would exceed that of <wvoters in the disfavored
districts by’ more than 3 to 1, a result which “is
unconstitutional “on its face. -ucdge Wood is prepared to
present evidence on this and other claims she makes in these
cbjections which ‘are. without evidentiary support in the
record if the Court permits an evidentiary hearing on
remedy.
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H-
dge Wood's view,
constitutional
~
voters of all races.
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The Judicial Redis stricting Board
the Texas Constitutien in
together with all: Texas statutes providin
tionment that will serve the purpose of prompt and
efficient administration of justice.
Comment: The
policy "that
subchapter
various ‘4
H O 3 Oo 0 MD Q.
D plan ignores the express state
apportionment shall be as provided by
the Texas Government Code
are nearly equal
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Comment: Judicia Places 2
assigned to heavily Democratic
legislative districts 131, 132,
143, 146, 147 and 148. A } tily conceived and
implemented program with } 1akedly self-serving
1 si designed to Sopevas the: rights of non-
non-Lemocratic voters selecting judges,
vied solely as .an rroposal, neces-
fundamental Lon S$ To whether the
Ually complies wi ch standards of the
S Act'itself, wi it can survive strict
scrutiny, and whether it unjustly and
bitrarily deprives the judges and voters of Texas of
process and equal protection of the law and
specific statutory safeguards.
~~ Ea :Z any of the sweeping changes from current Texas
Constitutional ‘and statutory requirements are deemed
invalid--despite the federal constitutional supremacy
clause--thousands of civil judgments and riminal
convictions may be tainted with potentially horrendous
cnseguences for the State. —ad
The proposed Plan raises substantial questions with no good
answers:
2)
08
)
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i - 3 = . % : - - Wny alter the judicial election system as it relates to -- - -
Other ‘than petitioning nincorities? csudge Wood cites
i, RE BEE al RR 2 eR > 3 ! EW mt id Chie clg maxim sala @ElINl T Droxe, con = fi it
Why not leave county-wide districts and races for those
voters (and judges) who have not complained, who have
nts Not proved a Voting Right Act violation and who
require no relief? If the appezl is successful and/or
the interim Plan proves defective, at least the adverse
consequences are limited t 0 the number of ‘courts the
Flaintiffs put at issue, not all the courts in nine
counties.
Since roughly one-half of Harris County judges are up
for election, why now create six single-member
SSuniese in 1990 and seven in 1992 with the boundaries
suggested by the Houstcn Lawyers Association with the
hope that open Lenches can £ill these guotas, thus
minimizing disruption
Why assign judicial candidates to districts which may
themseives violate the Voting Rights Act?
How, does a specific incumbent judge or judicial
candidate assure himself that he is ramming... fora
specialized court for which he is qualified when
specialized courts are assigned after the election?
How does a judicial candidate campaign if he does not
Know whether he is running for a civil, criminal
How do voters evaluate a candidate's exper:
redentials if the wvorers do not know what ‘kind of
ri the candidate is running for?
What 1s the rationale or authority for vesting virtual-
ly absolute discretion in the administrative judge to
assign courts (and specialized functions) to successful
candidates?
ITAL - 1 A +a = GES EEEE Sp
O0W would “hii S rw alo Jo LC ify assigning oy fiat "extra
Judicial: benches only to those State legislative
districts hand-picked by Plaintiffs' counsel and Mattox
for their Democratic (and la argely minority) history?
What if this Court is wr
to veside in: their dj :
"district," or pick duries fro
held to mean sub-district? Will all criminal convic-
tions and ‘civil 3 ts oe subject to being set
aside? In'sithis context, the Court might profitably
ng and requirements for judges
ct Or hold court in Their
m their "district! “is
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read Williams v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countv
781 P.2d'S37 (Calif. 198%), Ree attacned ~xnibit TET.
Why are judges elected inn 1990 =o be Prejudiced by
receiving only two year =erms?
Why will all judges run in a single vear = 1892 = when
we know from historical experience that the vicissi-
tudes of politics may give ‘one Party or.the other =he
vantage in tha iS precisely to provide
WS pr
t year? =r
yi ovide that not
pom
¥
adva
stability and continuity “ha
all judges run in any given ye
Why do away with the requirement for filing a petition
in 1980 when we know the rerition regquirement--again
from historical experience--is a desirable mechanism
for avoiding the candidacies of kooks and cracRkpots of
all races and persuasicns who cannot muster enough
friends "and supporters to meat =h Minimal petition
reguirements?
Why «do some voters get To "vote for wo judges and
others only cone?
Why d the Flaintiffs and lattox select which voters
will be thus favored?
S assigned
i3 There a danger that assigning politically naive
jucge 0 districts where ' state legislators have
existing political organizations in place will simply
make judges the patronage pawns of state legislators?
Phy ois «th Plan's recusal right only available to
Plaintiffs, since Defendants will not have been served
or filed their appearance within fifteen days of the
case being filed and the court assigned?
Why “is. an interim election plan to cure purported
Viclations of the Veotin Rights Act entering the
complex thickets of cours administration, trial
procedure and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure?
Why not hold an evidentiary hearing on any proposed
interim vemedy? Surely what is done to our fudicisl
Tem" ls: as important +o =the Court ‘as the Court's
finding that something needs doing.
I
4
—
I
- The "gravity of the Court's implementing any hastily con-
trived, politically oriented remedial deal cannot be overstated.
O and who individually
have on average more than ten years experience, and it would
crejudice candidates who propose to run for district judge. Any
clan prorosed at this time would wreak havoc with the ability of
Tie se uoges. To L850 thelr .ves, not mowin what district they
candidates who seek to run for election in 1280, all cof whom will
have to run again in 1992, should not be so cavalierly affected
DY a court-imposed hastily negotiated interim plan without input
From all parties to this suit, without input from the Judges
themselves, whose interests the Texas Attorney General is bound
Py law to represent, and without input from the Texas legisla-
Ture.
8.ly, the «census data on which the Court and those
carties which have been invited to participate in constructing a
remedial plan are relying is “ten years old and therefore
dramatically out of date. There is no assurance that that data
would permit a remedy bearing any resemblance to actual -
[\S
) |
ne Ei fry Circuit in Chisom vv Roemer, supra at 1189, cuoted
Justice Black in Oden vv Britssain, 3968: U.S 123 (1869) as
In awarding or withholding immediate relief, 'a court is
entitled to and should consider the proximity of a
forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities
Ir state election laws, and should act and re
e 8l ‘equitable principles. With respect to ‘the
iming of relief, ‘a court: can reasonably endeavor to
aveld a disruption of the election process which might
<
&
a
e
and implemented. A more adequate
result -“»om regquirin precipitate changes tha could
maxKe Unreasonable or embarrassing cemancs on a State. in ale
—~ - . ~ 2QIUSTing to the requirements of the court's decree.
FT} = = . IN A RE 5 -~ < Jy a - Tit ha 3 <flele _. 8 no Tegquirement that this Court act immediately. Again,
We consider significant the Supreme Court's acti
in jWhiccomb v.} Chavis. 3
I staying’ the reapportio
ment plan ordered by =a three-judge court, the Supreme
Court permitted the conduct of an election under the
old scheme which had been found constitutionally
inZirm. In dissenting from the refusal to vacate their
Stay order, Justice Douglas pointedly stated: "The
State contends that without a stay it will be forced to
conduct the forthcoming election under the reapportion-
ment pian cfithe District Cour: By granting The =tay,
aowever, This Court has equally forced the appellees to
ge through the election under the present scheme which
wags neld unconstitutional by the District Court." 396
U.8, 1064,80 S.Ct. 761, 24 L.Ed.2d 757. Nonetheless
the court permitted the election to proceed.
In sum, the proposed interim Plan crucially affects the
lives of judges who currently hold the office of state district
will fila. *0o runt for office: Chief ‘Justics Phillips
udge as well as the lives of those candidates who have filed or
indicated that the affected incumbent judges collectively have Q
more than 800 years of judicial experience which is put at ri
()
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it also ‘fundamentally affects the rights of voters ‘in the
counties for whic The remedy S pyrecposed The result would
inevitably be a system in total Slsarray uniquely calculated to
squander cone of Texas great resources--half of
experienced judges--and to interfere with =the rights of judges,
the rights of candidates: and the rights of voters to elect state
district judges in the target counties in elections which are
consistent with the fundamental requirements of due process,
Sm Fa ot y Pn . alt 3 WREALZOURE, Or all of the Ioregoing reasons, Judge Wood
-rges That no interim plan be approved, pending interlocutory
appeal cf the Court's Declaratory cudgment.
I § !
B ; : L babi 2 eee mei a = i
J. Eugene Clements
3500 NCNB Center
r Box 4744
— do ~ —— ~ AA H or; exas ]210=4744
FOR HARRIS COUNTY
JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
CF COUNSEL:
FORTER & CLEMENTS
Evelyn V. Keyes
2500 NCNB Center
P 4744
A:
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I hereby certify
true and
malled to
States mai
correct copy of
counsel of record
l, postage prepaid,
C
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Texas Rural
201iN. "St,
Antonio,
that on the
the above and
in this case by
day of December,
nile
+ = 4a
JE Sp
addressed as follows:
Julius Levonne Chambers
Aglelinm A.
oe Byer Detens
ga 95
10013
Ms.
Mat
301 Congress ave. ,
Austin, Texas 7870
Gabrielle K.
Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
My.
P.O, bs
Jim Mattox,
Mary F. Rell
Renea Hicks,
Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
Javier Guajardo,
McDonald
Puews & Zransaoubd
i889.,; a
foregoing document was
st class United
nev General -
crThey General
tant A t ror ney General
Edward B. Clo
inax, Wells,
oli Elim Street
Texas 75226-
Brice Cunningham
R.L. Thornton Freeway
|
BR
8s, Texas 75203
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
i es —
mugene Clements,
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Citation Rank
263 Cal.Rptr. E23 Fi
¥81 P.2d £37
Edwarc
The SUPERIOR COURT
The PEQPL
Suprem
During trial of defengant for
venlre on ground that Diack par
unconstitutiorally underreprese
Superior Court, Los Angeles Cou
“ot10n ang cefengant filed pet:
The court of Aspeal Wo T3 Cal. fp
24 Cal.Rogtr 208 I Bod 137
court icf Appeals Lilie, FP, J..
grant of review, the Supreme Co
definition of "community" for ¢
and (2) representation of blact
not unfalr eng unreasonable in
community
Affirmeo
Kaufman, J ww filed concurring
Eroussara, .filea ocpamion ¢
which Most, ©., jolned
” = yo -~ -
Aeprecentallion oT Community.
mad 190 cal, 138%
No litigant has right to jury t
population, or necessarily incl
any particular individual; lit
that is near approximation of i
random draw permits. U.3.C.A.
ig,
Williams Superior Court
b> Cal. .Rpwr. 203, 781.24 5
K. Representation of community,
Cal. 1888
There 1s no constitutional limitation on legislature to crea
community from which jurors are
J.S5. L.A Cone . Amand. &.
Williams Superior Court Peo
cba Cal. Retr. S03, 781 P.D4 £2
COPR
E
Const .Amena. &;
WILLIAMS, Petitioner,
Y
of Los Angeles County,
E, Reali Party in Intere
No, 58@2131.
e Court or California,
In Bank
a
Dot. 32 :
rirst-degree murder, Je
SONS On jury paneis in
ntativ cf bilsck popuis
nty, Jacauei:ne L. Weis
AY ra Et Es Te
bon wth - wi. - i -
Tr 720. ZemieEg pet LT
Sy transfarreg Cause fo
=oB Lal Bogyr. 488, aga:
grt, Bane llae Jide]
ross section analysis w
E 1n venire from which
pelalion to number or gh
Som
hat mirrors demographic
udes members of his own
1gant is constitutional
deal cross section of c
West =
drawn for cross section analys:
XHIBIT "pm"
Respondent;
gt.
fengant moved to quash
district were
Yon ans county The
ES. J... Oenled defencant s
ition Enosor mangate
on Tne cupreme Court,
r reconsideration The
D.Jdenled. petition, on
that l) appropr:ate
&s Judyicaal district,
Juris wens sslecyi ec was
lack persons 1n
issenting i1n part :n
composition of
group, or 1s composed of
ly entitled to petit Jury
ommunity as process of
Ann. Cal, Const, Art. 1, =
purposes.
Ig)
1) ¥ a E oO
0
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wm
£3 Lal. mpur. 233
SBKIZc
JRY
Representation cf community, in general.
ai. 13ET,
“ppropriate definition of “community £ -
ar purposes of drawing jury
representative cf cross section of community is a judicial district:
legislature intended that courts of district serve population within its
vonst.Amend. 5. Cf C aounaaries. whe
~1lliams v. Zuperior Court (People)
~23 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 PP, 24 63
~ 4
ng dui du
JJRY
“ace
21. SEY,
~epresentation of blacks .n venires
.nrair ang unreasonable :n rejation to
of court 2
deprived cof
zefined as judicial district
thus, defendant was not
rom
number of blacks in
fair
selectea was
community
Wwnicnh juries were
which
cross section of community in
ejection of jurors. U.S5.C.A.tConst.Amend. 5.
Jl1lliams zuperior Court (Feople)
~53 Ca pir. S93. 21 P.od 57
Madelynn rcOple, “rank CU. Bell, ir., State Fuplic Cefender. ana Donal
erson, oseput tate Fublic Jefenger, ‘zr ~eti:ticner
~anWwiCh, avis w@g1., Mitchell Zimmerman ang Sall SET EE DE SR
AM1C1 Curise on penaif of petitioner
!0 appearance T:-r respondent.
Nt .2. zcheicegger ang Lharles UL. Hopson, tacramentd, as amici curia
zenalf -r resgconogent
a Reimar. “ist Srtvi.. Harry B. Sopomeim. Donald rapian and seor
Eimer, Jsdutya ist. Altys,, for real zarty interesst
3 dpe LE od ER OY DO Ten. , cary +. Aan, Jonn =S Sorey., Thun
_2Du mite, can. ecil Hicks, “List tty. range, ichael =, _&api:z
List. y iwilliam Ww, Sedsworth, Franclain ov. Carrc:l. Deputy Dist. =
ang Chrisicpner MN. Hearag, San Jose, as amici: curiae on behalf of real
interest
Je Witt Ww. Clinton, County Counsel, ana Richarc E. Townsena. Deputy
-oungel, Los Angeles, as amicl curiae.
~ANELL CZ, lst =a.
"Me 133uUe In Tnls case 15 whether jury selection procedures in Los
*ngeles Lounty violate a criminal defenpant s ~ight 2 an impartial ju
18, 8 Jury renresentative of a cross-section of the community. Ep
1
”
J@ must gecide
defined as the county,
axtending 20 miles from the courthouse.
that the appropriate
judicial distract, [FNL]
for purposes of
dati
i ps
SOPR. CJ) WEST
the superior court
11tion of community
cross-section analysis,
(Judicial) district,
As explained hereafter,
for cross-section analysis
defengant was being tried;
wn
[RH
[¢]
0
ecifically,
community”
or an area
we conclude
Sistrict
—dward Williams
Norton. Defencant
21 the outset ‘nat this cEse
PF aiiury ocfithe wacinage. In
Ti, unacainsl Teaget 0 2808 we
S47) we nola trat bouncaries
(defendant)
is Black;
a Comba
ot ay) Bl.
SAGE I
1 - - y
+e oT vNl1s
5S LalRpar
SEI a Tine ne
is charged with the first degree murder of Bruce
Horton was White. The
Superior Court District of Los Angeles County (West District);
scheduled for that district s superior court, located in Santa Monica.
crime occurred in the West
trial was
[FN2]
FN2. Pursuant to the provisions of Government Code sections 53640-53650,
Los Angeles County has been oivideo into ii
d1siricis,
~efengant moved to quash the
=anels
veninpe son the gro
super.
ung tha
er coury
ry .
Y misCk OD
or judicial
ersons on jury
in the west [istrict were unconstitutionaily unacerrenresentative of the
clack population of Los Angeies County. Defendant sougnt transfer of the case
0 either the (Central District in downtown Los Angeles or tne South Central
in Compt
sxpecled to appea
1
«
+
+
Y m y (b
(u
5 eo J
nn
[§
ba
_efendant did not
on, where a greater number of
rin the venire.
cathe motid
argue that the
COPR. 12)
s, Ierfencant ca
§ County, wn
eg voters an
pl
. Bnrosat
r
¢1
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3 nl
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percentage of
WEST 1389 NO
Blacks
computer ro
or may
could rea
I 1 ~~
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1)
5 oO
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£ 2;
m (R
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Blacks on nis jury panels was
CLAI
-——- pm — m
Cl
1 ) J
® =
a
th
3 + M [X1
}
Pe
ct
Dy the county
virtually
fe that court
courthouse
1s residence,
-d3. he nas =
repealed former
we Du COUT, WORKS
AGE
unfair in relation to the percentage of Blacks within the West District or
41thin a ZQ0-mile radius of its courthouse. He argued only that Blacks were
<naerrepresented on the panels in relation to the percentage of Blacks within
the entire county.
The trial court denied defendant s motions. The court found county s jury
telecticn procedure to be "fair and reasonable" and further A
il
, OD
m [27
] 3 EZ La. that LosifAnpgeies County is m Q & reaso nable
ne constitutional
significant
presented here.’
Li
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,
en
J
be.
|
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fo
I
(
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w
om
a petition for writ of prohibition
Th “opeal denied
wOMMUTILT Yi.
, the art to trial by a8 Jury drawn from a representative
section oft community 1s guaranteed equally and independently by
Amendmen he federal Constitution {Taylor v. Louisiana 13875) 41
23 F..58c. B87, 42. L.Ed. 2d B30) and 3 BY article I, section 16
y - =
— Nt M . i Sn JE do [ y ug
California Constitution. Feopie vv. Wheel 1 La,
381 .Rptr., 8 83a F. od 748.
Representative cross-section analysis deveioped as a response to the
oernicious practice of eliminating identifiable groups from the jury pool
areventing
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groups.
. 15 well settled that no litigant has the right to a jury that mirrors
emographic composition of the population, or necessarily includes members
§ Cwn group, or 1ndeed 1s composed of any particular individuals. ‘People
oe Cal. 2d at ip. 277.0248: Cal .Rpotr. 580, SBT F.24 745;
43 Cal.od at pg. 749, 7B P.23 8; Feopie v. Hinas
- What the representative cross-section
mean, however, .s that a litigant "is constitutionally
t1t Jury that 1s as near an approximation of the ideal cross-
ommunity as the process of random draw permits.’
ot tdi rad at on 77 18 Cal.Rptr. B88@, 583
CORR. 10) HW 1383 NO CLAIM TO ORI
~N5. The fair cross-section principles set forth in Wheeler were codified
by the Legislature in 1980. As amended in 1988, :zection 187, subdivision
‘a), requires 1n part that jurors be selected "at ranaom, from a source or
sources inclusive of a representative cross section of the population ~f
the area served by the court.” Section 224 former zsctiion 197.10
Zroniblts exclusion from jury service ‘by reason of cccupation. race,
toior. religion, sex, national origin, Or =CONOMIC status, or Tor any other
ra8sin.
Oefendant argues that his right to a jury panel crawn from a representative
€Clicn Cr ine community 1s abricged by the jury selection procedures in
C vy. Defencant cities the = mony zT Raymond frce ‘ante, p.
, F.-S) tnat Blacks comprise 11.4
percent of the countywide, juror-eligible population. Defendant did not argue
that the jurors called in his case were rot representative of the juror-
2l1gible tlack population of the West District, which Arce testified averaged
=.b percent in the three months preceding gcefengant trial, In fact, Blacks
omprisea 8.5 percent cf the jurors appearing for cefengant s case.
Under Duren v. Missouri, supra, 438 U.S, 357, 989 S.Ct. 664, in order to
2stablish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, "the
cefendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded 1s a
J
«t
ot
J ——— -— -———— —~- sls)
oy [SS (A
distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
sroup in venires from wnich juries are selected 1s not fair and reasonable 1n
~alation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
“nderrepresentation 1s due to systematic exclusion cof the group nithe jury-
selection process” tlc. svg. 84, 38 S.Ct. at co. BaE; Feople v. Harr:s.
idpra, 2B Lal.S0 Z6, CF, 001 Cal .Rotr. 782, E78 P.243 433.)
~4& are not concerned with the first prong of the Duren test for the People
concede that Blacks are a cognizable, distinctive group tor purposes of fair
cross-section analysis. Feople vv, Harrie ©1884 3°38 cal. 2d 35. 51. 2p}
-al.hotr. TE2. ETBE.Cg A330; “imovey v. upsrior Court 18880 22 Cal.zd {2
Be oy Es Re LR eg rR i Nea BY EO
© meet ihe secono prong of the Duren test, cefendant must show that Blacks
were underrepresented in jury venires in relation to the number of such persons
in the community. Before this court can evaluate the statistical showing of
inderrepresentation made by defendant, however, we must first determine what
community the jury venire must fairly represent. it 13 here that we confront
the central issue of this case.
Defendant argues that community is defined as the entire county. The People
argue that community means the judicial district. As noted, the Court of
~ppeal rejected both definitions, preferring instead a provocative compromise
‘that defines community as that area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse.
ENB] TInasmucrn as the pasis for the decision of ne -ourt ft Appeal has been
g2liMminsieqg, nC OUrPOSe 15 ssrved by an sxtenceg discussion of the propriety of
JEIiNg Ine SJ=-mile-rS0ius CoMMUnLtY In cetermining Tne population far cross~-
3@Cctlion anslysie, [FN7) Je turn, instesg, is ithe srouments cor the Feoplie ana
zefengant who. ~2:5p jqglcial ogreirict and county. We
J
Clively, Jropose the
t erves the constitutional ang
termination of the appropriate
c =
ude that ihe judicial district bes
I’ =
BS NO CLAIM 70 ORIG. U.S. BOUT. WORKS
one Ss
statutory considerations at issue in the d
2OFR. ALY WEST
ia) me —y
i - Fi af Ir Es J =O
=AsE =
community for cross-section analysis as weil as the practical problems posed by
a far-flung megapolis--Los Angeles County.
tl
w 0]
1
® urt, anc shall oe seiecteg po
Of more than one court loca n H
gistance traveled by juror
ureor shall te required tc serve at
5S. Or her rasigdence.”’ Sasction 2
y Selection anc Management Act. ta
3 ' iy
t os
|
wm
s
nacly minimize the
T Los Angeles no
er than 20 miles fro
r 18g ln nna gnlal si au
J
+0
0
0 on
9
o
r
3 0 m
( L + 5 m ”-
c
t
Q
on
(u
~Z
+ oe,
[07
]
t
+ J
m uy
0
fi
41]
bo
s
+ [07
]
p=
m ) {3
C 2 ot
t)
iJ
4 os
a th
< }~
£1
wm
J 0 m
wm
“OY C3W 1h ’
i b 01
} 3 In}
C [41
]
0 m (@
] + + J
( (q1
]
a
4
fu
4 £:
ot
m
J
E ¢]
< m ™y
pS w
ot
3
()
0
£
4
C =
4 1
ow
L 3 3 of
+
T =
a
| S
—
ty inp matter what. it I's) ezvanlis
; .
J
Mm
3
oO
+
(b
—
mw
0 c
t
nm
w
) )
4 hs a
d
iy
oO 8 mn ¢] 1 « 0 fu
c
t
to 0)
3 on
{1 = a tS + t
Ney resis iN. ANS CcouUNIY, nom
8. Coes nOotaEEoOm ly
85 tne relevant Immunity for Ccatermination
0)
3
(2] Defendant contends that the relevant community 1s the county. In 0 Hare
v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86, 233 Cal.Rptr. 332, 729 P.2d 766, we
addressed the 1ssue whether the Sixth Amendment entitled a defengant to a
venire drawn from, and representative of, the entire county. We squarely held
that it does not.
J Hare was to De tried on a felony charge 1n the North County Eranch of the
an Liege superior Lourt, which drew 1ts jurors from an area i:mited by the
zounagari:2s 7 tne North County Municipal Court Judicial District J Hare
‘
o
p
3)
cmplainec that the limiteg venire contained a significantly lower oercentage
2t jury=-eligitle Blache than did the county as a whole.
Je held that "the constitutional cross-section requirement is a procedural and
not a substantive reguirement” (0 Hare, zupra, 43 Cai.Zd at po. 100, 233
~&8}l.Fpir, 232, 728 P.2d 766) and found no constitutional limitation on the
government s power to define the "community" against which the demographics of
the venire 1s measured. The drafters of the Sixth Amendment intended there
COPR. (LC) WEST 1888 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. uU.5. GOUT. WORKS
SJ.
a
e
6
T
e
B
R
Se
,
H
E
5
BE
T
2
B
Y
q]
= 8
-
0
Florida (1872) 3989 U. 5, 78, 85, 90 5.Ct. 1893,
=¥
, tionality of juries drawn
“0st signirticantly, as stated in OU Hare. the federal courts ha
rom subdivisions of d
PAGE 7
should be no limitation on the legislative power toc define the boundaries of
the federal district from which jurors in criminal trials are drawn. See
s1lliams 1803, 28 L.Ed.2d
gail e nat ne venire aig not match the cemograpnics cf t
l1sirici-uwige community. (United States v. Gottfriea (2d Cir.1348) IE5 F.2d
80. 254; united States v. Florence (4th Cir.1872) 456 F.2d 46. 49.) Based on
ne foregecing authorities, we concluded in 0 H hat the n
3
-—
oses nc limitation on the legislative gef 0
Nn requirement: "What the Sixth Amenamen 0
ant, regaraless of his personal characterist
mmu y
m a
ire from which no member of the local community was aro
ecessar:ly excluged." 5 Cal. 20 atvp, 238, =F Lal.Rp
~lbeit in another context, in People vv. Harris, Justice M
Eikanilel mature of Los Angeles County snootre ‘significa
=8 LEE IF Iountywics statistical dats 5. c2l.la sep
HR BR a ur core uses the term area served
i FrOD, NE (BT) rotate county aniunicn the court 1s
Mly & cursory rnowieage of the cemograpny ci Southern Cal
Nat Long Seach courts serve an area completely oistinct 1
naracier:istice from the totality of [os Angeies County...
ntire _ounty of Los Angeles are not cniv irrelevant but
as Community.
L2J maving concluded that there 1s no constitutional lim:
re to create a relevant community for cross-secti
: :
C
a =
0 =
71
—
her in creating Superior court tor
ngeles Lcunty, the Legislature i1ntendeag to gefine commun:
he Judicial district where the case 18 tried.
BR a pe CE Dh pm ay z fae ” aS - <CLVvLwnd TToaWY-SCoooY OT the povernment cde, =nactec I i
Ligelirnas forma creation of ERLE IC Cour astra ots ain
- = - EN = - = - = = = - = ie nll WE Carticu.a aigvance IC thas case are ‘ssctions ohcdle
- —- —_ x ——- - — - 5
“4544 iT lel ang £5645, [FN12)]
n 63641 reads: ‘The beard cf supervisors
o
ng census taken unger the authority of
ordinance may divige such county into
e rt districts within which one cr more se
court znall be heid."”
£83643 reads:
t
E2c=1oNn8 Of tha superior cou
Cis, 11 may make such chang
21
] hl D ct
4 0
s Dy.Ccrdinance.
FN1l. t2ction 69644 reads: “Ar nce creating or
%
n of community for th
es guarantee to every
1
Sixth Amendme
®
a jury crawn from a
bh al AM \ ~ 1trar:ly o
Fay ——— m—ony LS -
1 a —- —
- —- = +
Pah nGLeq e
yr ~~ Cia hs = -* I JecCepllveness -
Sn ee an Tee
- a Fo A SE OD SE [=
— a - #
FY ANS Jour wile
tation
on purposes, we must
LI al i re LCS
avo Ee wm
ot
3
XIyi in that county 8S
fr po ANE RR
LIE mNoelegiLounty,
—_aim ale] a) avy onl A 0 MT, Bi
FRG eS ed sy, CEN
of any county, which
f not less than 4,000,200 as c=termined upon the basis of
the Congress or the
nct more than nine
icns of the superior
cn ‘Whenever the board of supervisors finds that
population make necessary or expedient the change ¢
rict, ihe change of, aadition of, or elimination of
te neld, cr the creation of
CT boungoaries
any location
n o! na ;
COPR. «C) WEST 1583 NO CLAIM TD ORIG. U.S, GOUT, WORKS
)
panels,
lace--the practical realities o
cal expanse, ana the need for
Ny ZJlslricl =nail not ras 8 fio 2 2 res
= i Mm 3 dy, aiticn St less than 2E2.80
25545 ~aAanes a ~mEYran “ob 4 Tesls in Crgins
consigerations that orompted the ls=gisi
10 De achieved. Following Worlg War
1a, in 1357 ithe Legislature created
istration orf Justice (Joint Commit:
udicial efficiency 1n the Los Angel
CQ of cases in Los Angeles County 3
aving aoubled from 65,300 cases :n [8
perios from 1323 through 1887. & se
court” hails) nad enapleg cities t
feraticon of Los rngeies County one-
rein 1E83.anp again In (357 cassen
J1E1ANCE CelWeEn & Drojecten ew Co
Nearest L.ty 1N8l nag an existing oo
Sf tne 1357 legisistion was hold:
ZOUrts in the .os Angeles area
t Committee Cid not encounter zoje
ther, objections focused On the le
The branch court system, the Joi
Dy & system of Courts located by o
nience, -egargless of city Doundgar:
ngeles County Eoard of Supervisors
Perior court operations “according
ge and sconomy.
1 Committee, :n turn, recommenced
1Zing the Board of Supervisors of Lo
15.5 or 13 superior court district
zt the ugpes. cne or more locatio
sess10NsS wSint Lom, Fep.. .&t pD.
ng the creation of such districts i
lature in 18580, The kill was cogif
t Lod Stars, 1968 cn, 1371, =
€ Legislature gid not explicitly d
cts as communities for ithe purpose cf
the considerations that prom pt
f the
Juo)
intenged that the cistricts
Jury impartiality. In
entity==t1he Los Ange
inefficient as a s
i
0D
S
e
b
i
0)
ropolitan ar
5
>
a)
Im
(1
)
districts
J
re
0
O
n
[10
8 n [o
N ot
+ 0 is
[81
]
—
shed some iignht on the goal
the popuiation explosion i
int Judiciary Committee on
geal with the urgent need
RA BY
Court wa
Less ans Tne manoaliory
noStherwise 2ligiplie cot
iret - al -r 1 / rma i d
2 y GN - tld Y = ? oi
The 1.008 Of Crhneryise
~ —-
om Neh. Cea Da
t0 1Ne Srafncnsccurts as
28 TOrMUlas Tor thalir
ti1ee was 1o0id, Zhoulg he
velopment cf
the 1nterest
=.40
Daseq Cn population, need,
on n
e
€ County 15 divide the
cower > gesignate, with the
CH gigsIrIcy for ihe moioin
gnate Ell No, 282,
ngeles, unanimously passed
sections 535640-£5650 or tn
542. ;
the superior: court
ng the respresentativeness
ion of the districts in tne
s unique demographics, its
ency--convince us that
the community for
1
unmistakabl
+
owl thy Lt Nis visu,
p
SMMUNIItY CIN LO8 HANGS
PS
0)
0)
.
In
tn
Angel
Jury paneis 1n tne
in the jury elig
ndant has rfaileg t:
i
Re
l
s
FO
o
e
SUCh DEerso
ot
the Court
1)
ise cr the =u
their se
the instant c
r definition oc
county,
juries a
i:
al
l
and EAGLESON, YAUFMAN
a
Co
.
wm
th
om
ct
31
]
hn
wn
(D
“
t
a
mn
nm
om
1)
of Appeal
he cause to the We
wn
th
E
S
~
~
—
pr
L
i
)
a
Ap -
rA0E 3
as the
court juries,
res S~S8ct ion
reasonable 1n
nevis esour yt,
the Black
the percentage
relation to an
District.
n. of Elacks in
e 1n relation
ng under
1.8. SOUT, WORKS
wholly unwort
and Ba v. Municipal Court (1888
Cal.Rkptr. 513, 731 P.2Zd 547 ang the other zZecisions criti
are not and net based on racial consigerations at all, much
scrimination. They represent reasoned and reasonable resolutions
sroblems, adopting rules th \ l afford trial courts the
y require to operate the j rt system and conduct criminal
1 r vet expeditious manner Ln f ot CEec1ls basically
ject arguments based con
1
4
y
i rosecutors of (rr
] standaras
-
ZySiematc
whnoerrapre
-omMmmunil
Memneres
squally
|
-
NO memper
e Lgnorant
lsagreement on
lsadvaniage r=
Sackgrounag.
souniry ~egaral
L48 should siimi
mrrQcegures
onstrate invidious or
group, a& showing of some
s.given iime 1 ( Neither tne venire nor
racial. ethmic, or relig composition of The
ury has peen fairly ti 5 umes that 1ts
white, Hispanic ig od Lh Wks are
representing the ent: ty. I} pio trial cbhy’a
- gefendant 1s
defenoant
a crime
ang no thoughtful p in. this -co VY 1.0
‘he powerful and corrosive f of racism. Nor 1s there any
the goal we all seek: = ty 1n which no advantage or
sults from an individual s race, religion, zex, cr ethnic
1s, however, an emotiocnally-charged debate raging in this
the best means to reacn this common goal. According to some,
1 forms of racial criteria ana use only race-neutral
sccordlng to others, past wrongs can be redressed and subtle forms
ion rooted out only by the use of racial preferences and a
consciousness, hopefully, benign.
O0nal view that heighteneg race consciousness snd
criteria preferring one race cver another, ~o matter how well
.n the long run be counterproductive to tne common goal and
eruate racial bias ang hostiiaty. Sut as justices 11
cial aecisions to tax 1 tn1s 1monious agebate,
tS time we are p ith 1mMplnge on some
COFR, (CT) } R1G, U.S... GOVT. WORKS
w
th
J
L
B
0
o
n
w
and
that each
-
L
+
1”
ot
lnguisnes
gliquaette
wm
0
Q
<
(4
Y
e
s
cne s cclleagues
cf an appellate cou
to the rule
indeed every judge
the United
as equally
e
8 Jury .
as the
means
n
.
0
Jdevoteg
£3
wm
oi
<
<
m ig [11
] fs
PAGE. ii
vw TOTVICTIONS OM
ncminem attacks and
Judiciary, Refraining
Surt: 11 pains me
t aside.
ful and reasoned
ne law. But attacks
oy the collegiality
0g undermine the
W. It would be
this state, ifook an
the State of
fulfilling that cath as
ce that the
me case 15 finally
nclude the place
-d. ante, the
ng superior court
gislature 1ntended
1rict where the case
analysis, none of
me was committed and
nclude that use of
te community in Los
F. SOB of 283
inion never Zirectly
al gistrict wnere
fe
m
tb
representative
~epresentative of
This conclusion
Aplvaraao
near Chignik,
ut 450 miles
from people
not excluage
exclude almost
ntiy asitering the r
es that reliance on
10 ang Brown was cross-section representation.
neir proper place,
represent a community
«
-
+
- v
--
1
wn
the communit
fings support
residing with
Native Rmerican
wm
Jeterminyy
Q
0
the community PY
ot
gid not viol
ct
ot
these precedents
on that a
the crime,
ow
)
mh
ng reasoning toe 8
ne
communiiy
itutionai
m
De representative
county which
*t
entative of the
Ce changed to
8 court. ZTuch
more than a right
hirg judicial
In Anchorage. The jury
Anchorage. This selection
lived in Anchorage,
PDintsrisang, thus
Stive jury, ithe
ining the
the zileged
J
i [K
1]
giver Jury
«+e must adhere to
or the alleged
that the Jury
lected only from
Jury must
ne ~lvarado Jury
of =ny defined
ies :zuperior
ire county, or
~ cefendant S
£.. S0VUT. WORKS
=F
Oy
«+
0
J
0
ot
wm
m
(D
O
O
Ul
peremptory
character
Mn
3
Lr
)
W
R
X
)
«
1b
>
.
3
o
r
C
j
L-
3
5
RE
w
il
J
E
N
X
O
)
TY
ee
u
w
excluging
m
8
glspropor
fo
ns
y correlates with
lusion of Blacks.
8) 49 Cal.3d £92,
al ana continuous
ufficient even
oresentation.
missible
i cause of
aspect
Jor
£1
w /
~ac
county to the
Oo
the practice results 1n
ative jury must mean ry renresentative. cf the community
ccmmittedg, not some other zommunlty selected for the
nience or the =
cf a series of recent sions an which this court has
1c 8 representative jury, and thus a suitable time to
ns as a whole.
led was Feople v. Jonnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 11S yes
cd 1047, which concerned the prosecution s use of
§ 10 remove minority members from the jury. Prosecutors
Pt to Justify such challenges by pointing to individual
Ne challenged jurors. Jur prior geclsions recognizea that
ay 10 test the truth those statements is to see if the
iengedg nonmin Ju with similar individual
eople v. Trevino (128 Cal. 23667, 17 Tal.Rpir. +852,
nson. however, il evino., Iepriving the appellate
rfective way vie mi1&1 ju0Qe & Cecision upnoioing
E1ate in Qict at @ Door To not constitute a
£al.ld at po. Sig 1.7ptr,. EB TB Pad 3047).
ne that the or Pps y systematically exclude Door
That conclus see be contrary to the Unitedg States
ton in Thiel v the cific Co, {184567 328 U.5. 717, 55
i181) which hel nat state could not ystematicailly
ups. from jury 1c hen, 1n an astonishing footnote,
rat although Blacks ang panics cannot Se excluded from
ews can, (47 5 5 Jal. fn, 3, EE Cal JRoir. EBR3,
a prosecutor wants =a century Jury of Christian
cnstitution, :f interpreted as suggested in Johnson. 13 no
ple v. Morales g 81.3027, 2E7 Cal ,Rotr. B4, 770
g«<clusion of 1% om tHE jury venire ne majority
Cal zample cof ) w@g rooasmal lic crove
«even though 1s Experts testifieg without Zispute
sufficient to e th o1nt with a risk of error of Only
578-573, 25 Ro1r. B40 :7%Q0 F.2d 244, O3 SOT OF
les further =t ti defenaant could not =nhow a
tion by proving that tally neutral practice haa the
a cognizable class. Ne. S4B 257 Cal .Rotr. £4, 778
S means 1385 that the s e cannot expressly exclude Blacks,
all persons of charact lic "=" (low income, for sxample),
8 holds =
from =a
of
g a ccgnizabie group, —
dnravorably of
and
10 present
less than
Hernanage:z
an obligation
none
of a defendant
mmunity ana the vicinage cof
Conscious. or
Shou
a predominately
judges,
racial bias.
prove subtle
trines wnicn hn
agree 1n
PAGE 14
ithe holding 1tself assumes that the county. confronted with a showing
ils method of selecting jurcrs is having the effect of
has no duty to investigate and correct the
11 may continue to exclude minorities until someone 1s able 10 'nrove
the problem.
speak favorably of the “absolute disparity’ test for
defendant has made & prima facie showing of exclusion, and
other tests. (48 Cal.3d at p. B27, fn. 14, 252 Cal.Rptr. at
8 P.2d-at p. 142, fn. 12.3 Tha absclute-aoisparity test
measures the disparity as a percentage
100 percent,
a prima facie
L3uUrt,
Cal Rptr.,
The
vi. Municipal
py
p=
these
+0
of
cbtain a
the
LUNCONSC1l0Us,
any sensitivity
White jury.
Jurors,
~
-
iO
jury
They erect pr
forms of
ave pDeen cre
pr
COPR. «03
19 percent or so of
cage
consider the practica
decisions
Jul y
“i
com
[01
]
nciple with the
of total population. (1.8... 1F Blacks
constitute B percent of county populaticn. and all are excluded, this 1s "only"
exclus
in practical effect
ion. it 1s the most restrictive of the
will make 1t impossible for a
showing on behalf cf a minority group which
the community.
EUoré. Ente,
*-
i
consequences of it
f their impact on
representative of
reccgnition that
iter of concern
facing trial
simply seem
lack any
difficult
tep by step,
make the right 13
nave dissenteg ti
cnQolng process
y io a truly “A
1 s
show any awaren
which 15
me, None
or ever was a
the minority
\/ In
~~ "
now
in
-
=
+
oO!
EXHIBIT
D
TQMD TAM AATTD
ISTRICT COURT
TY OAT ITVS”
T..0OF TEA
DIVISION
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN
CITIZENS (LULAC), et al.
V.
NO. MO-88-CA-154
JIM MATTOX, Attorney General
Of the State of Texas, et al.
HARRIS 1 AR N
TO MATTCX [] LTER THE i JANUARY 2, 1990 -— a
arolyn Wood ("Judge Wood")
General Jim Matt "$s ("Mattox''s) -
Order of January 2, 1990 (the "January 2
and respectfully shows the Court the following:
JUDGES WOOD AND ENTZ HAVE FILED INTERLOCUTORY
o
“od
APPEALS WHICH DIVEST THIS COURT OF JURISDIC-
TION OVER THE MATTERS ADDRESSED IN MATTOX'S
MOTION
Mattox comes before this Court complaining of the Court's
January 2 Order. The "January 2 Order the Court's
Memorandum Cpinion and Order of November 8, 1989 (the "November 8
Opinion") for certification for expedited interlocutory appeal to
the Fifth ; denied the Motions of Judge Wood and Dallas
Judge NF. E ("Judge Entz")
enjoined all elections of state district judges
under Texas' constitutionally and statutorily authorized judicial
election system in the nine counties targeted ‘by the Plaintiffs
sult; and imposed an Interim Plan for the election of
ln those target counties.
Following this Court's entr < Cf the January 2 Order, Judges
Zntz and Wood promptly filed Notices of Appeal with this Court on
January 2 and January 3, respectively. Copies of those Notices
of Appeal are attached hereto as Exhibit "A"." Both judges also
immediately filed Emergency Applicaticns for Stay with the Fifth
Circuit “on January 4, 1990. In addition, on January 4, Judge
Wood filed a Petition with the Fifth Circuit: for "Expedited
Permission to Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. 8. 1282(bY With the TFTifth
Circuit. Copies of Judge Wood's Emergency Application for Stay
and her Fetition for IXpedited Permission to Appeal Under
TAA AN $ 1l2S2(b) are attached hereto as Exhibits "RB" and "Cc."
As Judge Wood observed in her Pefition,"she not only has the
right to petition the Fifth Circuit for expedited interlocutory
appeal, which she has done, but she also has the right to appeal
directly from ‘the Order of January 2, 1990 because of its
injunction against elections under . Texas' statutorily and
onstitutionally imposed system of electing state district
—~
Nr
Judges. Title 28, § 1292(a) éXpressly provides that: ~
The Courts of Appeals shall have jurisdiction «of
appeals from
(i) ~ Interlocutory orders of the
district courts of the United States
granting... injunctions.
28.U.8.C. §.1292¢(a)(1)"
An interlocutory order is _mmediately appealable under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l) if the appeal will serve § 1292's purpose of
permitting litigants to effectually challenge interlocutory
orders of serious and perhaps irreparable consequence. Carson Vv.
DC... 2500.5. 508 Bd, "101 S.0ft..993. 5 006.97
(1881). The Fifth Circuit has made i+% Crystal clear that
immediate appeal of an order such as the Order of January 2, 1990
28 proper under 28 U.S.C... 1292(a)(l). See Black Ass'n of New
Orleans Firefighters (Eanoff) v, City of New Orleans, La., 853
F.2d 347, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1988) (District court's order denying
firefighters' union's motion to vacate order restraining city
from promotin Q firefighters to rank of captain 9
(D 3 Q.
-
3 Q
judgment
on black firefighters' civil rights suit was appealable in view
—
of serious consequences to firefighters represented by union),
Therefore Judge Wood has properly filed both her Notice of Appeal
and her Petition for Permission to Appeal under § 1292(b).
An order granting a preliminary. injunction can be recon-
sidered by the district court if an ebpeal is not taken, since a
district judge always has the power to modify or overturn an
interlocutory order or decision while it remains interlocutory.
Tanner Motor Livery,» Ltds .v. Avis, inc. , “316 rr
] .2zd 804, 809-810
~ .
(9th Clr. 1963), “cert. denied. 375 U.8. 821,84 S.Ct, 59(1963);
see gnlgo, Fed. FR. Civ. P. 24(»). Thus, this Court would ordie
narily retain jurisdiction over motions to alter or amend its
interlocutory Order of January 2, 1990. It is well established,
however, that,
The filing of a notice of appeal is’ an event of
Jurisdictional significance--it confers jurisdiction on
the Court of Appeals and divests the district court of
its control over those aspects of the case involved in
the appeal.
Criggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 259 U.S. 58, 58, +103
5.Ct. 200, 402 (1982); United States v Hifchmon, «587. £r.24 1357
{Sth Cir, 1979): After the filing of a timely and sufficient
notice of appeal, the district court has no jurisdiction to take
any action with regard to any matter involved in the appeal “dd
except in aid of the appeal. Willle, 746 F.2¢d at 1045.
Since Judges Wood and Entz both filed timely and sufficient
Notices of Appeal on January 2 and 3, 1990, jurisdiction over all
matters involved in their appeals has been transferred from this
~ourt To the Court of Appeals anda this Court is divested of
jurisdiction to" take any action with regard to the matters
addressed in those appeals except in aid of the appeal. Willie,
746 F.2d at 10486, Obviously, the matters addressed include the o
nterim Plan, which dis "not onal: part of the subject of Judge
Wood's Petition for Permission to Appeal but is also the subject
Of her and Judge Entz's Emergency Applic
Mattox 1s not asking this Court to take "any action which
would aid the matters involved in the appeal. He has not asked
the Court to reconsider its injunction against district judge
elections under Texas' Statutory election plan; nor does his
Motion suspend the effectiveness of the Interim Plan; nor does he
ask Or Or even contemplate 2 stay. of thie Court's Surther
remedial proceedings pending appeal. Instead, he only asks this
Court to reconsider making district judge elections partisan.
Any action this Court could’ take regarding partisanship or
non-partisanship under its Interim Plan would be entirely
in no way depends
upon whether elections are Fartisan:<or non-partisan. Judge Wood
has cbjected in earlier Pleadings both to this Court's Interim
Plan and to the Plaintiffs' znd Mattox's Proposed Remedial Plan
which included partisan elections, and she incorporates those
objections herein by this reference.
In fact, Mattos is counting on what he believes is this
Court's continued jurisdiction over this case and his "Rule 59(e)
Motion" to invalidate Judge Wood's and Judge Entz' a ppeals, since
Fed. 'R. app. P. '4(bi(4) provices zITnat a notice of appeal filed
must Pe refiled after the Motion is adjudicated. Ted. R. App. P.
2(b)(4); Criggs, 459.U.% at 28, #303 ,53.Ct., at 402. Thus, if
Mattox's Motion achieved its true purpose, 1t would frustrate the
appeal by invalidating the Notices of Appeal and Petition for
Expedited CrFermission to Appeal a }
—
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Circuit--thereby staving off review of the Interim Plan and
lg 1T tO gain a greater foothold in the judicial election
system with each passing day as one filing deadline after another
passed under the election system which Judges Wood seeks to
reinstate in her Emergency Application for Stay and Petition for
HJ
ermlssicn to Appeal with the Fifth Circuit
Mattox's confidence in his ability to frustrate Judge Wood's
appeal 1s, however, misplaced. Rule S9(e) motions are designed
to address an entirely different set of circumstances from those
: pn ag , present. in this case. Filing a Rule 59(e) motion suspends the
finality of a judgment. Federal Communications Comm'n v. League
cf Women Voters of Cetifornia, <68 U.S. 1205 104 +8S.Ct. 3574
(1984); Willie v. Continental Oil Co., 746 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 PoE
(5th Cir. 1984). No such effect is either sought or achieved by
Mattox's Motion, which merely seeks +o ensure that the Plain-
tiffs, having secured an injunction prohibiting elections under
Texas' statutory judicia election system are assured that
elections can remain partisan under the Court-imposed Interim
Plan.
Since NMaftox'!s Motion is ‘not properly a Rule 5%(e) motion
and does not suspend this Court's injunction or its remedial
plan, it does not toll the time for filing an appeal. See FCC v.
League of Viomen Voters at n. 10. Aofortiori, it does not
invalidate the Notices of Appeal and the Petition for Expedited
>
Lo
Interlocutory Appea | 0) 0 \) 0) 1]
=
— Previously filed in th
i In such case it makes no difference whether or not he stvles his Motion a 1" - \ ‘ 184 ‘ . Il ¥} . 1 Rule 59(e) Motion," since neither the courts nor the parties are bound
by the title given to a motion. Willie v. Continental 0il Co., 746 F.2d
1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984).
ro
In this regard, the Court also should recall that Fed. sR. App. P.. 5
allows an Appellant under § 1292(b) only ten days from the date of the
interlocutory order certifying the appeal to file a Petition for
Permission to Appeal. Failure to file such an Application’ is a
jurisdictional defect that deprives the appellate court of power to
entertain the appeal. Aparicio v. Swan Lake, 643 F.2d 1109, 1111 (5th
Cir. Unit A 1981). Obviously the Federal Rules do not contemplate giving
parties the right to frustrate appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals by the mere filing of motions self-styled as Rule 59(e) motions,
thereby destroying the right of interlocutory appellants to appeal within
the only 10 days open to them.
MATTOX INVITED ERROR WITH HIS PROPOSED REMEDIAL PLAN AND HIS PROPOSALS DO NOT MERIT RECONSIDERATION
Even i this Court did retain jurisdiction over matters
relevant to Judge Wood's and Judge Entz' appeals--as it clearly
does not--Mattox's proposals would not merit reconsideration. By
agreeing with the Plaintiffs to submit to this Court a Proposed
Interim Plan agreed upon between them without a hearing and in
the express wishes of the state officials
purportedly represents in this case, Mattox invited error.
nterim Plan he sought but To implement each and every
SE]
detail <hat suited Mattox. furthermore, I
ES lattox's Motion does not
bring any new considerations to bear on this case. All Mattox
has really done i to come back to the Court to ask it to give
him the =» the Proposed Remedial Plan which he and the
Plaintiffs devised.
X. ls really savy] t} while he
for’: the "rejecting
century-old state election law! 8 the fruits of those
intrusions benefit him and his new-found political allies, the
Plaintiffs, he is not willing to have the Court intrude into any
lists with the
Interim plan--its imposition without conducting an evidentiary
hearing and in direct contravention of state law (which did not
previously raise a peep of protest from Mattox); its character as
judicial reform; and its resolution of contentious issues without
debate in the Texas legislature and by the people of Texas=--are
NOt new issues. These supposed flaws in the Interim -
tute only the veneer to coat
of urgency the Attorney General's i5.t0 deliver to
tlffs the deal he negotiated with tI v1 1] act the urgency
in this case proves the contrary: wisest and most judicious
course would be the imposition of no 11,
Indeed, whether the 1990 - elections are
partisan or not is important only } who wish to
partisan election schme)
which they and v 1 together. The obvious
displeasure cof the victors i: hi with the Interim
he number of cbjections whi h raise underscore
po
have imposed an
As for ‘a bijection by Mat P the Interim -
Court should be under no delusion that Mattox speaks for anyone
but himself, unless he speaks for the Plaintiffs. The Court is -—
well aware of the numerous protests entered by the State Defen~-
dants and various state districs judges to Matton's aims +o
this case. Judge Wood cited numerous examples
Such protests in her Response to Attorney General Mattox's
Statement Concerning Non-Partisan Elections and Supplement, filed ade
with the Court on December ~989=-~-a document which explored
in calling for partisan
whose observations are
Judge Wood reiterated her concerns about Mattox's preten-
sions to represent the defense in =his case and his efforts to
keep any Defendants from mounting an effective defense on their
own behalf in her Petition for Permission to Appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, attached hereto as Exhibit "C." One of her exhibits to
~nat appeal, Exhibit "d3," includes sample letters and alterna-
+ 3 1a <3 J {+h =] 3 ir ; Daf J ;
-=VE pPiB8NS Illed with =his LCUrt Dy ‘various Defendants. Since
1, Secretary of State George Bayoud
Chief Election Official of the State © H
Texas and has hired other
counsel, a move vigorously opposed, as usual Ly Mattox, even as
he reiterates his insistence that he and only he represents the
tate in this Court. Mattom's Motion to Strike at's
The audacity of Mattox's Position ‘in. the face of all
evidence to the contrary is perhaps most clearly delineated when
it is set against his Statement Regarding State Defendants, filed
with this Court by the Attorney General on December 21, 1989, and
which states in full as follows:
Statement 1s submitted on behalf of all the
state defendants in this case other than the Attorney
of Texas, Jim Mattox. None of them has joined
in the Attorney General's submission to: the Court today
of a Proposed Interim Plan and a joint motion urging
the interim plan's adoption. Some have submitted their
own remedial proposals directly’ to "the Court. Chief
Justice Phillips’ December 15th submission in his
personal capacity is an example of this approach.
That Mattox should now reTurn fo this Court urging it once
f)
gain £3 ‘accept the Snly. remaining details of a proposal he
concocted with the Plaintiffs, in defiance of the wishes of all
the state officials he claims so insistently to represent (except
when he claims that he has never represented them), is but a
further example of his total flaunting of the Texas' Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure regarding conflict of interest and
settling against the wishes of =he client which, as Judge Wood
argued in her Response tO Mattox's Statement Concerning
Non-Fartisan Elections and Supr.ement, constitute grounds for
disqualifying him from Fgpresenting the State of Texas in this
case. Iti is. also a further attempt at the very collusion and
non-feasance which belie any claim that Mattox might make that he
represents the State of Texas in this action.
It is outrageous that under the foregoing circumstances
Mattox should see fit to quote and indeed to urge upon this Court awd
the Fifth Circuit's "staunch admonition" in recent cases involv=-
in =h application "of. the Yoting Rights Act. to judicial
a federal court should jealously guard and sparingly
use it awesome powers To ignore or brush aside
long-standing state constitutional provisions, stat-
utes, and practices.
Mattox's Motion to Alter the Order of January 2 1890 at 3
(quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1988).
The point is proper, even if the spirit in which it ‘is argued: is
not. This Court should not have entered any Interim Plan in this
case. Since it “has .done SO, it should now exercise the
-el ie
Jurisdiction remaining to it to take action in aid of
Wood's appeal by vacating its Interim Plan and allowing the 1990
election of state district Judges to proceed in the ''t
counties under Texas' statutory election system.
Therefore, Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood urges
this Court <o take judicial notic that it lacks jurisdiction
over the matters addressed in Mattox's Motion to Alter the Order
of January 2 1990 he a ; and she further requests that this Court
disqualify Attorney General Jim Mattox from any purported
representation of any state offi
NRelr orticial or any ioilner capacity.
Respectfully submitted
—SQRTER & CLEMENTS
—FEee-
’/
~~
Boi, : J. Eugene Clements
ER ET NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas “77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEY FOR HARRIS COUNTY
ISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
OF COUNSEL:
PORTER & CLEMENTS
Evelyn V. Keves
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas
(713) 226=0600
/210=-4744
Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
230 Louisiana, Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 228-5105
I hereby cer \ hat ] January, .1%90, a
True and correct t] 1 egoing document was
mailed to counsel § hi First class United
States mail, postage prepaid,
Mr. William L. Garrett
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
Attorneys at Law
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 7522S
Mr. Rolando L. Rios
Southwest Voter Registration &
Education Project
201 MN. St.''}M rhe, By
San
Ms.
Texas Rura
<O1:Nv St.
Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers
Ms. Sherrilym a. Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and Educaticnal
9S Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Ms. Gabrie
Matthews
S01 Cong
Austin,
Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
F. O. Box 12543
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III
Mullinax, Wells, Baab &Cloutman., P.C.
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75228-1637
777-80. R.L. Thornton Freeway
O A} — +
ol n D Xas 75203
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
yi
By /
ove, llr, Ls
Evelyn V7 Keyes of
by
-—
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F L E D FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION JAN 1930
U. S. DISTRICT COURT LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN § BY. CLERK'S OFFicE CITIZENS (LULAC), et al,, § Seto. DEPUTY
§
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
MO-88-CA-154
Vv.
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants.
Notice 1s hereby given that Defendant-Intervenor Dallas
County District Judge F. Harold Entz nereby appeals to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the
Court's Order of January 2, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,
(de trny
bert H. "Mow,
oy C. ae
Bobby M. Rubarts
Esther R. Rosenblum
of HUGHES & LUCE
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 939-5500
ATTORNEYS FOR DALLAS
COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE
F. HAROLD ENTZ
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was served upon all counsel of record in acgordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce ure this _s~4¢ day of January, 1990.
GTI,
NOTICE OF APPEAI Soir BXHIBIT "A" Pd
- -—
— -
4
k
LEAGUE OF UNITE
CITIZENS (LULAC
Ve.
JIM MATTOX, Att
of the State of
Notice is
County District
States Court of
Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 8, 1989,
modified for clerical corrections on November 27,.: 198%
December 26, 1
pursuant to 28
At" —"
RECEIVED |
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS JAN 3 19%0
MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION
CHARLES W. VAGHER, Clerk |
By ( Deputy
v
D LATIN AMERICAN
yy ek al.
NO. MO-88-CA-154
orney General
Texas, et al. D
h
»
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE
SHAROLYN WOOD'S NOTICE OF APPFAL
hereby given that Defendant/Intervenor Barris
Judge Sharolyn Wood hereby appeals to the United
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the District
as
989 and as certified for Interlocutory Appeal
U.S.C. § 1292(b) by the District Court's Order of
January 2, .1990,
Respectfully submitted,
a & CLEMENTS
\
-
Ee ——————
= i
By: -~ S he ue. TN
JJ Eugene Clements is.
00 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEY FOR HARRIS COUNTY
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
(713)
{713
rp
-
wh
Houston,
hereby certify that on the
true and correct copy of the above and
mailed to counsel of record in this case
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as
OF COUNSEL:
PORTER & CLEMENTS
Evelyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
226-0600
Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
440 Louisiana, Suite 200
Texas 77002
228-5105
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mr. William L. Garrett
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
Attorneys at law
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Mr. Rolando L. Rios
Southwest Voter Registration &
Education Project
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers
Ms. Sherrilyn A. Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
2nd day of January,
foregoing document was
by first class United
follows:
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
P..O. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
O
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway
Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
Mr. Robert H. Mow,.Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
on, ME =
J. Eugene Clements
I
/
J
- —
WO005/07/cdf
| /
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR "THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS {LOLAC), et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Defendants,
and HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT
JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD'S EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY . a in
PORTER & CLEMENTS
J. Eugene Clements
Evelyn V. Keves
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEYS FOR HARRIS COUNTY
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
EXuib1iT "Bp"
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO.
JIM MATTOX, Attorney Genera [S
0 H
y
t
= {)]
mn
(t
fu
ct
{ O th
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(D
4 fu
nn
D t
0}
=
L]
Defendants,
and HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
DEFENDANT-INTERVENOR HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT
JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD'S EMERGENCY APPLICATION FOR STAY
Defendant/Appellant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn
Wood ("Judge Wood") files this Emergency Application for Stay
pending appeal pursuant +o Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8
and 28 U.S.C. 8S 1292(a)(l) and 1292(b}), and in support of her
Application shows the Court the following:
I. BACKGROUND
This Voting Rights Act case was brought by the League of
United Latin .American Citizens ("LULAC") and named black and
Hispanic individuals challenging the system of electing state
district judges in certain target counties in Texas. In its
Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 8, 1989 (the "Opinion"),
the district court declared that Texas system of electing state
hb
district judges from county-wide districts illegally dilutes th
votes of blacks and/or Hispanics in all nine counties targeted by
| >
the Plaintiffs. & [2 copy of the Opinion with subsequent amendments
to correct for clerical errors is filed herewith as Exhibit "c"
1 / In that Opinion the district court took under advisement the
possible injunction against future district judge
elections in the target counties under the system 1t had declared
illegal. The court also indicated that it would consider
granting an expedited appeal on controlling issues of law
addressed in the Opinion if the Texas legislature failed to
produce a remedy in a special session previcusly called for
November, 1989 to address another matter. Opinion at 93-94.
The Governor of Texas reported to the Court on December 11,
1989 that no consensus could be reached in the Texas legislature
on a remedial plan. Subsequently, Judge Wood filed a motion for
stay of all further proceedings in the district court together
with a motion for certification for interlocutory appeal. A copy
of Defendant-Intervenor Harris County District Judge Sharolyn
Wood's Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and
1/ Copies of all relevant documents filed with the district court are filed
} lth under separate cover, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 8 and loc.
R. 8.
Motion for Stay is filed herewith as Exhibit "el." By its Order
of January 2, 1990 (the "Order") the district court certified the
Opinion for expedited interlocutory appeal but denied Judge
Wood's motion for stay. A copy of the Order of January 2, 1990 “ g
is filed herewith as Exhibit "£". By that Order the district
court also enjoined the
calling, holding, supervising and certifying elections
for State District Court Judges in ‘Harris, Dallas,
Tarr ‘arrant, Bexar, Travis, Jefferson, Lubbock, Ector og
A ana
Midland Counties under the current at-large scheme.
II. GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO THE DISTRICT cCcoupm's
INJUNCTION AND REMEDIAL PLAN
In general, Judge Wood cbiects to “he distric court's Ce
injunction prohibiting any future elections under Texas’ consti-
+11 tutionally and statutorily authorized judicial election system in ~f
the nine target counties and its imposition of its remedial plan
T= 11 y Sy 3 = Fg} £3 : 3 37 = = + = 4 I ay
~-~-€ra..y on the date of the 1L.1lng deadllne for state district
judge races. The district court took these actions without a
hearing, less than eight weeks after the court's November 8, 1989
Opinion finding liability, and without any prior opportunity for
the Defendants to appeal the serious and controversial issues of
law decided by the district court. Moreover, Judge Wood believes
“A
and has argued repeatedly that any "interim" plan is de facto a
final remedial plan since it effectively partially dismantles the
state's judicial election system.
In addition, Judge Wood is uvnable to find any authority to
support the district court's imposition of any interim remedial
plan. The district court cites ct
ne Court's opinion in Chisom v.
™ |», loemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir.
1988), as authority for
this unprecedented action. Judge Wood's reading of Chisom is
exactly the opposite of the district court's. For example, at
the very page cited by the district court as support for imposi-
tlon of an Interim plan, Chisom mandates that, in the event a
district court finds a Voting Rights Act violation, the responsi-
ble state authorities [in this case the Texas legislature and/or
State Districting Board] be given an opportunity to correct any
draft a remedial plan. Chisom continues,
In the interim we are convinced that +h system in
place for the election of the subject judicial office
should be left undisturbed.
H
853 F.2d at 1192.
111. SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO THE DISTRICT CourT's
INTERIM PLAN
The district court's remedial plan adopts most of the
essential features of a "Proposed Remedial Plan" agreed upon by
the Plaintiffs and Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox ("Mattox"),
a Defendant in this case and counsel for the State Defendants. A
copy of the Proposed Remedial Plan is filed herewith as Exhibit
"d." This proposed Plan was vigorously opposed by Judge Wood and
other Defendants. See Exhibits "d2"-"d3". Judge Wood's objec-
tions to the Plaintiffs' and Mattox's Plan and her objections to
Mattox's collusion with the Plaintiffs and his conflicts of
interest in preparing that Plan are more fully discussed in her
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal at 6 through 5 and ‘are -
incorporated herein by this reference
objections to the Plaintiffs' and Mattox's
which apply to the Interim Plan adopted by
are fully set out in Exhibit "d2" and are i
this reference.
In addition to its injunction against
supervising and certifying elections in the
the district court's Interim emedial Plan
Harris County, provides as follows:
1 mh
‘ Judge Wood's specific
Plan itself--mcst of
the district court--
incorporated herein by
the calling, holding,
nine target counties,
‘ Th entire county shall be divided into sub-
districts.
Comment: AE to Harris ‘County,
violation alleged or proof adduc
there was no
ed except as to
black voters. There is therefore no reason to
devise a "remedy" that cures no ill for areas of
Harris County other than those areas which satis® BX ae
Gingles I criteria for one or more black electoral
districts.
Comment: The assignment of judges to legislative
districts was proposed by the
adepted by the district court.
already objected to this feature
Plaintiffs and
Judge Wood has
of the Plan on
numerous grounds. Sea Exhibi+ "42." Among he PAR Sh
objections are the following: the assignment of
Judges to legislative districts blatantly allots
legislators patronage power over Judges and bears
no relationship to any proof presented at trial
regarding the demographic makeup of potential
minority districts. Specifically, it bears no
relationship whatsoever +o the maps of majority
black neighborhoods relied on by the Plaintiffs to
prove vote dilution in Harris County.
Ww
. Thirty-six (36) [out of 59] Harris
Judge seats are up for election
District will receive one or two
out in Attachment A to the Interim
County District
in 1390. Each
judges, as set
Plan,
ha
w
n
Comment: Attachment A was adopted “rom the
Plaintiffs' Plan. It assigns two district judges
to Judicial districts selected by the Plaintiffs
for their heavily Democratic partisan history and
their large minority populations. Republican and
Anglo House Districts are allotted one judge. The
result is that minority areas of Harris County are
allotted 61% of the total judgeships=--a gross
departure from equity, from equal protection of
the laws, from due process, and from the principle
of one-man, one-vote. The blatant uncenstitution-
ality of such a provision was pointed out by Judge
Wood in Exhibit "a2."
Each candidate shall run within a design
subdistrict and be elected by the voters within
the subdistri
protection of the laws under the Interim Plan
since they are deprived by court fiat of the right
to elect 34 or 35 judges (depending on whether
they reside in heavily Democratic and minority
legislative districts or not) out of 36 judges who
have Jurisdiction over them. If this is found
unconstitutional, hundreds oF judgments and
criminal convictions may become invalid, causing
chaos.
Elections shall be non-partisan. Each candidate
shall select the election subdistrict in which he
Or she will run by designated place and shall file
an application for a place on the ballot with the
appropriate court officer.
Comment: This provision invokes a remedy--non-
partisan elections--not Sought by any party to
this suit and bitterly opposed by the Plaintiffs
and Mattox. See "Statement Concerning Non-
Partisan Elections as an Aspect oF an Interim
Remedy" and Letter from Plaintiff Jesse Oliver +o
Judge Bunton, dated December 28, 1989, attached
thereto, filed herewith as Exhibit "il." This
opposition to non-partisan elections by . the
Plaintiffs is especially ironic since they argued
throughout trial that partisanship was irrelevant
to claims of vote dilution under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act and the court agreed. See Opinion
at 80.
Judge Wood, of course, has argued from the
day she was allowed to intervene that partisanship
and not race explains state district judge
election results in Harris County (a position
given support by the Plaintiffs’ voluble objec-
tions to non-partisan elections). However, Judge
Wood has also argued that, under the authority of
Whitcomb v, Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 sS.Cv. 1858
(1971), the inability of a minority group to elect
representatives of its chosen political party does
not support a valid vote dilution claim. Thus, if
partisanship, and not race, explains Harris County
district judge elections, the Plaintiffs have no
finding. of liability under § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act was error. For a fuller discussion of hi
this issue, see Defendant Wood's Post Trial Brief,
file herewith as Exhibit "bl" at 34-39, and
Exhibi+ 74i2" at 47.
Moreover, no claim was ever made in this case
for non-partisan election districts and no showing
was ever made that such a "remedy" for vote
dilution would improve the lot of minority voters.
To the contrary, in the Attachment to Exhibit
"il," Plaintiff Jesse Oliver argues that non-
partisan elections dilute minority voting
strength.
In addition, under this provision of the
ict court's plan, candidates are forced to
or office without any knowledge of how--if at
all--Harris County's specialized court system will
function under the court's plan. Thus, either
(1) 2a candidate will file for offic in one
istrict only to discover later that he has filed
in a family court district [since voters in, savy,
HD 149 will turn out to be assigned a family court
Judge] while he is a sitting criminal district
judge or (2) a sitting criminal district judge
will file for office as such only to discover
later that ‘the court-imposed plan silently
abolishes all specialized courts, in direct
violation of Texas law.
Moreover, imposition of a non-partisan
election scheme in mini-districts is certain . to
result in the development of control over judges
by organized special interest groups. The removal
of party identification deprives most voters
(demonstratively at least 80% in Harris County) of
their only previous means of choosing judges,
~J
party identification, without putting any way of identifying candidates in its place, even as it
deprives candidates of the party identification
and support on which they have previously relied
to fund their campaigns. The inevitable result
will be control over 3udicial selection by special
interest factions with sufficient interest and a sufficient budget to blanket their preferred mini-districts with advertisements or direct
appeals for their slates. This feature of the Interim Plan also provides an incentive for
factions to introduce racism into campaigns where
there is no evidence whatsoever that it previously
existed, since race can provide a means of
identifying with otherwise unknown Judicial
candidates.
All terms of office shall be for four (4) vears.
Comment: This provision contradicts the express
desire of the Plaintiffs for two vear terms for
judges elected under the Interim Plan. See
Exhibit "d1." In Judge Wood's view it ensures
maximum disruption of the present system of
electing judges by Providing that half of all
state district judges elected under the plan
cannot be removed from office for four years.
Thus, for four years, legislative districts must
remain as judicial districts regardless of
attempts by the Texas Legislature or Judicial
Districts Board to devise a an that would
1sTy the district court. Any attempt to do
away with these districts would subject the state
t0 charges of unconstitutionally depriving those
judges of their property interest in their
continued tenure in the offices to which they were
elected. See Williams v. State Board of Elec-
tions, 696 F, supp. 263, 1572 (N.D. 1% 1988). when ®
§ Le
) a
Elections shall take place the first Saturday of
May, 1990, with Run-off Elections +o take place
the first Saturday of June, 1990.
Comment: The district court's Interim Plan
tequlres a special election for district court
judges, in contrast to the plan proposed by the
Plaintiffs and Mattox. Thus it provides a remedy
no one sought and which has no support in the
record as a vehicle for maximizing minority voting
strength. This provision of the Plan has at least
the additional legal and practical defects of
(1) requiring voters to go to the polls five times
to elect judges--twice to pick district court
judges, twice to pick other county and appellate
Judicial candidates and finally to vote in the
general election; (2) requiring a special election
for which there is no provision in any county's
budget (See Appendix "3") and which Jettisons the
entire legislative machinery for organizing and
financing of primary elections set out in Title 10
of the Tex. Elec. Code, subtitles B and C, and the
tabulation of results of election, Tex. Elec. Code
§ 68.001: and (3) requiring a run-off one month
later, thus leaving too little time for the county
to comply with Texas Election Code requirements
regarding canvassing of votes. §$67.812.
Moreover, under the Texas Election Code, the
pelitical parties bear hese expenses. See Title
10, Tex. Elec, Codes, S$ 173.001, et." sed, The
district court's plan blithely ignores th
questio of who pays. If ‘also ignores the
question of when the Judges elected under th
Interim Plan take office. If immediately, their
election unconstitutionally deprives the incumbent
judges of a half-year in office to which they have
been duly elected. See Williams, 696 F.Supp. at
1572.
1 An: application for a place on the non-partisan
election ballot must be filed by 6:00 p.m. March
26, 1990. Except as modified by the district
court's plan, all provisions of the Texas Election
-ode rz=main applicable.
Comment: It is impossible to determine which, 1
any, provisions of the Texas Election Code
actually remain applicable under +his plan sinc
it tramples on so many of them. For example, the
Plan leaves entirely unclear whether any filing
fee (previously paid to the county party chairman)
will be required or whether any petition will
suffice to obtain a place on the ballot and
whether previous filings of fees and petitions
with the appropriate authorities under Texas law
will count, See. Tex. Elec. Code 88 172.021
(Application Required): 162.022 (Authority wit}
Whom Application Filed); 141.062 (Validity of
Petition); 172.025, These problems can be
expected to generate litigation regarding the
proper filing of candidates for office.
In 1991, the Administrative Judge of the county-
wide district shall designate any courts of
specialization and the district court numbers in
10.
use prior to. the Interim Plan's adoption.
Successful incumbents shall have preference in the
designation.
Comment: This provision of the plan allows the
Administrative Judge, apparantly at his sole
discretion, to make any arbitrary decision he
wishes as to which judges are assigned to which
specialized courts, heedless of Texas Statutes
providing specifically for such designated
courts--and to make that decision in 1991, aftey
the newly elected judges take Cffice, thus
ensuring maximum administrative chaos and venue
and jurisdictional disputes of horrendous propor-
tions. The provision also blatantly violates the
Court Administration Act, Chp. 74, Tex. Gov't
Code, which provides, among other pertinent
things, that the Texas Supreme Court shall have
supervisory and administrative control over the
judicial branch (§ 74.021); that the Supreme Court
may adopt rules for the operation and management
Of the court system (§ 74.024); and that the state
is divided into nine multi-county administrative
regions (§ 74.042). That Act minutely prescribes
the duties of the presiding judge of each adminis-
trative region (§ 74.046). It also sets out in
detail which judges are subject to assignment by
the presiding judge of the administrative region
(§ 74.054). All of these provisions suffer gross
abuse under the district court's Interim Plan.
See also Comment to provision 5 -~ ®
Current jurisdiction and venue remain unaffected
subject to modification by the Supreme Court of we
Lexas LJ
Comment: For: the jurisdictional and venue
problems raised by the Interim Plan, see Comment
to provision 4 supra. In addition, the Interim
Plan creates grave jury selection problems. See
Williams v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
283 Cal, Rptr. 203, J8: 2.338 375 (1989) (In Banc)
(for purposes of the sixth amendment right to a
Jury drawn from a cross-section of the community,
the relevant community is the judicial district).
Under Williams (apparently the only case decided
on the subject), the court's Interim Plan creates
an ambiguity as to whether the "Judicial district”
is the mini-election district or the county-wide
jurisdictional district, hence whether the
relevant community for jury selection purposes is
the mini-district or the county-wide district.
Williams raises the specter that mini-communities
drawn on racial ines are perhaps the only
appropriate community for jury selection under che
district court's Interim Plan.
There .shall be no right of recu 1sal of Judges
elected under this plan, since "such a measure
would be extremely disruptive to District Court
dockets, administratively costly and could be the
source of abuse by attorneys attempting to gain
continuance of their cases."
Comment: The district court, which departs from
the Plaintiffs’ and Mattox's Proposed Interim Plan
on this issue, ignores the real fzar that such a
Plan as this without a right of recusal ensures
that litigants from outside the mini-districts
facing opponents from the mini-district will have
to trust to the impartiality of a judge who is
indebted for his office to the favor of his few
constituents and is, in a real sense, the "rep-
resentative" of their interests. Judge Wood has
argued since her intervention into this case that
this precise danger follows naturally on the
proposition that judges are "representatives" of
their constituents and that subdistricts should
therefore be drawn so that the votes of those
constituents in support of their own interests can
have maximum impact, a view hitherto enthusias-
tically embraced by the Plaintiffs — — — ®
IV. GROUNDS FOR INJUNCTION AND STAY
obtain a stay pending appeal under Fed. XR. App. P.
moving party must demonstrate
that it is likely to succeed on the merits,
that it would suffer irreparable injury if the
stay were not granted,
that grantin th stay would not substantially
harm the other parties, and
that granting the stay would serve <+he public
interest.
National Treasurv Emplovees Union <=. Von Raab, "808 v.24 1057,
Cir. 1987). However, when a serious legal question
-
involved, the movant "need only present a substantial case on the
merits ... and show that the balance of equities weighs heavily
in favor of granting the stay." Id. (quoting Bavlor Univ. Med.
center, 711 F.2&8 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1383), cert, denied, 469 U.S.
1189,-:105 S.Ct. 958. (1988)). The criteria for an injunction
prohibiting operation of the district court's Interim Remedial
Plan and for a stay of all further district court proceedings
-
34 TITS = £4971 RI J 3 - = Eo h hal pending apreal are fully met in this case, as set forth below.
A. Judge Wood Presents A Substantial Case Which
Is Likely To Succeed On The Merits. PASS we 8
In her Petition for Permission +o Appeal fo this Court,
filed simultaneously with this Motion and incorporated herein by
this reference, Judge Wood states more fully the grounds for her
contention that the lower court's decision was clearly erroneous
on numerous points of law, both with respect to Texas' judicial
election system in general and with respect to Harris County in
particular. In Judge Wood's view, 54
he lower court erred in at
least the following ways: (1)-.i: unconstitutionally applied the
Voting Rights Act to state Judicial elections in violation of the
constitutional principles of the separation of powers and the
{9
QQ
(@]
fv
=
0
5 otection clause of the fourteenth amendment: (2) it found
wide Judicial districts constituted election from "at-large"
districts with no supporting authority and despite authority to
the contrary; (3) it held that illegal vote dilution was proved
by statistical evidence (which itself was improperly admitted) in
selected races and that all other inquiry was "legally
incompetent" in defiance of both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit
controlling authority directly to the contr vi: (4) it held that
the principle of one-man, one-vote did not apply to judicial
elections despite Supreme Court authority that the principle of
one-man, one-vote applies to the election of all "representa-
tives"; (5) it determined the measure of "electoral success" of de
Protected classes according to their percentage of population,
> J - ~ 1! 1 ~ = -1 aq £4 ~ y oy
rather than using Ward's Cove's percentage of qualified candi-
dates as the standard, thus implementing proportional Ht epresenta-
tion in direct contravention of the Proviso of § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act; and (6), in Harris County, it ‘found illegal vote
ilution without pragmatic proof of unequal opportunity for black
voters to participate in judicial elections and *o elect judges
orf their choice, finding vote dilution instead solely through its
reliance on unverified, unauthenticated and thoroughly unreliable
al data derived from census tract figures a decade old.
Moreover, as an interim remedy for the vote dilution it had
found in this case, the district court adopted for the most part
a remedial plan which was urged in the utmost cynicism by
Plaintiffs eager to implement affirmative action and restructure
Texas' judicial election system before this Court could rule on
the many grave disputed issues of law. Judge Wood has objected
to Mattox's and the Plaintiffs’ Proposed Interim Plan and to the
aspects of the district court's Plan not adopted from the
Plaintiffs and Mattox's Plan on numerous constitutional, statu-
tory and practical grounds as set forth above in Exhibit "42" and
above.
If this Court finds that the lower court's decision was
clearly erroneous with respect to even one of the questions of
law cited by Defendant Wood, the lower court's decision must be
reversed. Judge Wood's arguments and citations provide over-
whelming grounds for finding that the lower court's opinion was
clearly erroneous and that its remedial plan is similarly riddled
with error.
B. Judge Wood Will Suffer Irreparable Harm Tf
Her Motion Is Not Cr nted, Whereas A Stav
Will Not Substantially Harm The Plaintifes,
The timing of the district court's injunction prohibiting
elections in the target counties under Texas constitutionally
and statutorily mandated election system and its imposition of a
radically different scheme which violates numerous laws and
constitutional principles within six hours of the filing deadline
for state district judge positions presents an imminent threat of
irreparable harm to Judge Wood bv its precipitate irremediable
destruction of the Judicial election system she defends. By
contrast, should the 1990 judicial elections be allowed to
proceed as they have for a century, no significant damage will
have been done to the Plaintiffs in this suit, even should the
district court's opinion ultimately be upheld, and the stability
of the judicial system will be protected pending appeal.
Under very similar circumstances, this Court has held that
irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs is not automatically
established merely by a showing that a challenged electoral
standard, practice, or procedure results in a denial or ho
abridgement of a minority group's right +o vote. Chisom vv.
Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1188-39 (5th Cir. 1988) (vacating injunc-
tion prohibiting election of justices to the Louisiana Supreme
Court under election system found by the dist
violate the Voting Rights Act). In refusing to
tion in Chisom, the Court quoted Justice Black
Brittain, 396. U.S. 12310 (1969) as follows:
a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities
election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles. With respect +o the timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in
n awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the proximity of a
td
adjusting to the requirements of the court's decree.
The only possible injury--if it is an injury--to the
Plaintiffs from this Court's vacating the
injunction and imposition of the remedial plan and staying
further proceedings in that court is that judges will be elected
P > y :
for one more election under a 100-year old system which the
district court has found to be statutorily, but not constitution-
ally, infirm. The Chisom court, facing §ust such a situation, ———
-
stated:
We consider significant the Supreme Court's action in [Whitcomb v.] Chavis [403 U.S. 124, 91 s.Ct. 1358
(1971)]. In staying the reapportionment plan ordered by a three-judge court, the Supreme Court permitted the conduct of an election under the old scheme which had been found constitutionally infirm. In dissenting from the refusal to vacate their stay order, Justice Douglas pointedly stated: "The State contends that without a = stay 1t will be forced to conduct the forthcoming
election under the reapportionment plan of the District
Court. By granting the stay, however, this Court has
equally forced the appellees to go through the election
under the present scheme which was held unconstitu- tional by the District Court.” 396 U.S. 1064, 90 S. Ck.
761,24 L.Fd.24a 757. Nonetheless the court permitted
the election to proceed.
chigsom, 883 F.2d at 1189. For the same reasons, this Court
should vacate the district court's injunction against furth
elections under Texas' present system of electing State district
Judges from county-wide districts and i= should stay all further
proceedings in the district court, including the promulgation or
implementation of any remedial plan, pending appeal.
C. A Stav Will Serve The Public Interest.
A stay barring implementation of the district court-ordered
remedial plan and all further proceedings in the district court
pending appeal is essential in order that the public interest be
truly served. In the short time since the district court's
declaratory Judgment was entered- -six weeks=--thi case has
generated immense controversy both in the halls of government and
in the press, Numerous interested Persons--including the
Governor, the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court, Tarrant
and certain Bexar County Judges, and various legislators and
district Jjudges--have come forward with their own hastily
conceived proposals, each designed to protect interests the
designer perceives as paramount. None of these many proposals
has had an opportunity to generate any popular support beyond the
promulgators themselves. All will be rendered unnecessary should
this Court determine that the illegal vote dilution perceived by
the district court does not, in fact, exist, that that court's
Judgment was improper and that Texas system of electing state
district judges violates no laws--a decision which Judge Wood
4 - -
pelieves, and has argued, is fully supported by the law.
Should this Court eventually uphold the district court's
ruling, the public interest would still be served by protecting
an orderly and stable judiciary and judicial system while
permitting time for rational debate on the crucial issues of Ao oo
state government involved and bv permitting time for the people
€Xas to consider the proposals presented to them and to vote
on the constitutional amendment which would then be required.
The public interest is only disserved--and in the most grievous
fashion--by permitting the implementation of a radical, hastily
conceived, self-serving plan designed to "remedy" vote dilution
(which this Court may well find does not exist) at the expense of
f
10 risa A Ys TTS : ™ i : vy 1 FI. ++ VOTErs and Judges 1n Texas nine most populous countles.
isastrous effects of the district court's Interim Plan
on judicial selection in the State of Texas cannot be overstated.
That Plan was issued and took immediate effect only six hours
before the filing deadline for the office of state istrict
judges on January 2, 1990. The judicial candidates had therefore
iled for election before the district court's order became
public. nN effect, the district court is altering an election
already in progress. Among the many reasons for this Court to
- enjoin the imposition of the district court's Interim Plan and to
require that state district Judge elections go forward as
previously scheduled are the following:
(1) Time is of the essence in determining whether
Texas' statutory judicial election system shall
apply. The primary election of state district
judges under Texas’ statutorily decreed election
System is March 13, 1990. Under the Texas
Election Code absentee voting must begin on the
twentieth day before the election, Tex. Elec. Code
§ 85.001(a). Therefore, ballots must be prepared
and ready for absentee voting to begin on or
before January 12, 1990--a date less than ten days
awav.
(2) The Texas Election Code § 142.010 requires the
certification of candidates for Judicial office
not later than the 55th day before election day,
i.e., under Texas’ statutory system of electing
state district judges, not later than January 12,
1990.
(3) If any candidates request a refund of his regis-
tration fee for filing in the old districts
outlawed under the district court's Plan and then
this Circuit orders a stay those candidates may be
ineligible to run for state district judge at all
because of improper registration. See Tex. Elec.
Code § 141.062.
(4) The chaos which would be created by the Court's
untried interim plan may well frustrate experi-
enced judges into early retirement or cause fluke
election victories where judges with many years of
service are cavalierly sacrificed to newcomers
with dubious reputations and credentials.
In addition, the pragmatic nuts-and-bolts problems of
adjusting Texas' and Harris County's electoral machinery to the
Court's unique and unprecedented interim plan, within three
months of a new filing deadline, four months of an election, and
five months of a run-off are underscored by the obstacles
presented in the letter of the Texas Secretary of State attached
hereto as Appendix A, the affidavit of Harris County Judge Jon
| [
CG
) |
Lindsay attached hereto as Appendix B, and the affidavit of
Harris County Clerk Anita Rodeheaver attached hereto as
Appendix C.
These immediate results of the district court's injunction
prohibiting elections under Texas’ constitutionally and statuto-
rily authorized judicial district election system and its
imposition of a hastily devised, unsought and untested remedy
approved by no one but itself do not by any means exhaust the
reasons for this Court to act swiftly--the overriding reason
being, Qf course, th inevitable day-by-day accumulation of
disastrous consequences and uncertainties from this shot scat-
tered at the Texas judicial election system by the district
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant Harris
County District Judge Sharolyn Wood requests that this Court
vacate the district court's order enjoining the election of
Texas' state district judges under the present system in the nine
target counties at issue in this suit, including Harris County;
that it stay the implementation of the Interim Plan adopted by
the district court; and that it stay all further proceedings in
the district court, including without limitation the promulgation
or implementation of any other remedial plan, pending appeal of
the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 8,
1989 as amended.
Respectfully submitted,
PORTER & CLEMENTS
a me nS
Ji. Eugene Clements =
Evelyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
O. "Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
TORNEYS FOR HARRIS CCUNTY
STRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
-
JAN
™
-
AT
I
Darrell Smith
Attorney at Law
10999 Interstate Hwy. 10, #905
San Antonio, Texas 78230
(512) 641-9944
Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
440 Louisiana, Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 228-5105
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on the YH aay of January, 1990, a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was
mailed to counsel of record in this case by first class United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Mr. William L. Garrett
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
Attorneys at Law
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
~~
PR
WO005/03/c¢
Mr. Rolando L. Rios
Southwest Voter Registration &
Education Project
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc.
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers
Ms. Sherrilyn A, Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
99 Hudson Street
16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress Ave., Suite 2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas
Ms. Mary F. Keller, First Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec. Assistant Attorney Gener
P. O.. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P.C.
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham
777 So. R.L. Thornton Freeway
Suite 121
Dallas, Texas 75203
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
acnes & Luce
300 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
2 til Vl pr
Inc,
Evetygn V. Keyes
af
Ra a
TATE peel Sm QT is 2 ge =F
EXECUTIVE DIVISION
P.O. Box 12697
Ausun, Texas 78711-2697
(512) 463-5701
ELECTIONS DIVISION
P.O. Box 12060
Austin, Texas 78711-2060
(512) 463-5650
Disclosure Filings
P.O. Bax 12070
Ausun, Texas 78711-2070
(512) 463-5704
DATA SERVICES
DIVISION
P.O. Box 128%7
Ausun, Texas 78711.2887
(512) 463-5609
SUPPORT SERVICES
DIVISION
Financiai Management
P.O. Bax 12887
Austin, Texas 78711-2887
(512) 463-5600
Safi Services
P.O. Bax 12887
Austin, Texas 78711-2887
(512) 463-5600
STATUTORY FILINGS
DIVISION
Corporations
P.O. Bax 13697
Ausun, Texas 78711-3697
(512) 463-5555
Sistmory Documerss
P.O. Box 12887
Austin, Texas 78711-2887
(512) 463-5654
Texas Register
P.O. Bax 13824
Austin, Texas 78711-3824
(512) 463.5561
Uniform Commerciai Code
P.O. Box 13193
Ausun, Texas 78711-3193
(512) 475-2708
Office of the
SECRETARY OF STATE
George S. Bavoud, Jr.
SECRETARY OF STATE
Mm graoosw 2
January 4, 1990
The Honorable Jim Mattox
Attorney General
State of Texas
Supreme Court Building
Austin, Texas 78711
ULA UN v
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION
Dear General Mattox:
As I told you in my letter to you of December 21, 1989, I opposed the Proposed agreed order which you were negotiating with the plaintiffs. Among the réasons were that it would be difficult to ad- minister; some citizens may effectively be dig enfranchised in elections under the proposed plan; and my belief that judicial selection is a matter for the Texas Legislature to address. None-the-less, you submitted the plan and the court in great part adopted the plan. Therefore, as a named defendant in the referenced Cause, I am instructing you as my legal counsel to immediately file a Motion for a Stay of the entire Order dated January 2, 1990. This stay should be sought to be maintained until full appel- late review on the merits. I further instruct you to make an interlocutory appeal on all available issues from such Order. The problems mentioned in that December 21st letter continue to exist under Judge Bunteon's Order.
As Chief Elections Officer of the State, I am en- trusted with the duty of advising and assisting
operation, and interpretation of the Election Code and election matters generally. There are numerous problems in implementing the nonpartisan judicial
elections in nine counties in Texas brief list of only some of these problems is as follows:
The Honorable Jim Mattox
Page 2
as set out in the crdsr. A
(1) Which authority is actually ordering the elections? It appears that Judge Bunton is ordering the elections as his order cites on page 7, Item 6:
Section 41.001(b)(5) of the Texas Election Code which refers to "an election held under an order of a court or other tribunal..,..*
(2) There are numerous other questions r the answer to Question (1) above, e.g., who gives notice of the elections; who authorizes the voting systems to be used in the elections; whe is the custodian of the election rg- cords; and so forth.
evolving around
{3) Which election precincts are to be used for the elections?
(4) Who appoints the election judges?
(35) As the elections do not fall within the definition of a “primary election” in Section 1.005(14) of the Election Code, is it to be assumed that there will be no filing fees paid by candidates, no petitions in lieu of filing fees, and no judicial petitions as required in certain counties?
(6) How will the canvass be conducted? Under the Election Code, the Governor is to canvass the returns for a district office. Under Section 67.012 ©f the Election Code, this state canvass may not be held earlier than the 13th day after the election, i.e., May 20. Absentee voting for the runoff is to begin on May 14 under the Provisions of the Elec tion Code. There is not
(7) Who will be the absentee voting clerks in Ector, Lubbock, and Midland Counties as the elections will net Le countywide in those counties?
(8) What will be the procedure to be used if a judge whose term is not on the ballot in 1990 resigns or dies? will the unexpired term be on the ballot in May?
(9) There could be a problem in pre a results from the primary runoff in that absentee voting for the May 5 election will begin on April 16 while the runoff is April 10.
vi CLV i avivo~ 0000: :® 3
The Honorable Jim Mattox Page 3
(10) There is no Provision in the Or declaration of write-in candidacy; thus, unlimited number of write-in candidates in all write-in votes will have to be counted.
der for a filing of
there wil} be an
the elections and
(11) Which political subdivision will Pay the costs of conducting the elections? Harris County will have no other elections on May 5 and the County Clerk estimates the the election will be some $1 million i
There are numerous other questions and Problems wit tation of Judge Bunton's Order which I will not est cf brevity. I am concerned, however, Order Judge Bunton says:
h the implemen-
list in the inter- that on Page 4 of the
+++ An Agreed Settlement was entered into by and between the Plaintiffs and Defendants in this matter, but was not approved by some of the Intervenocors.
I would refer you to my letter of December 21, 1989, in which I objected to that Proposed settlement and "request{ed] that you refrain from entering into such plan and that You refrain from entering into any other such settlement or Plan without my prior written consent."
As you know, unless the court's order is stayed by mid-January 19%0, when candidates have been certifi ed and ballots are being
- Furthermore, it ig impor- onable period of time to
I look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely,
7 A
ete d\ Jr. AN Secxetary of S
GSB:TH/blltrs
Cc: Judge Lucius D. Bunton, III, Judge, United States District Court, Western District, Midland-Odessa Division
IONS=- 0a00:= 2
The Honorable Jim Mattox
Page 4
Clerk, United States District Court, Midland-Odessa Divisicn
Ms. Mary F. Keller
First Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Renea Hicks
Special Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Javier Guajardo
Assistant Attorney General
P. 0. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Mr. William L. Garrett
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Mr. Rolando Rios
Southwest Voter Registration &
Education Project
201 North St. Mary's, Suite 521
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Ms. Sherrilyn A, Ifill
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2050 Austin, Texas 78701 :
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, III
Mullinax, Wells, Baab § Cloutman, Pp.C. 3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
Mr. J. Eugene Clements
Porter & Clements
700 Louisiana, Suite 3500
Houston, Texas 77002-2730
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Hughes & Luce
2800 Momentum Place
1717 Main Street
Dallas, Texas 75201
Western
0000:= §
District,
felwnN i An AJ - Imi M —
The Honorable Jim Mattox
Page 5
The Honorable William Pp. Clements,
Governor, State of Texas
The Honorable William P. Hobby
Lieutenant Governor, State of Texas
The Honorable Gibson D. Lewis
Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives
The Honorable Thomas R. Phillips Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Texas
ocQ00:® 6
TATE .0
COUNTY CF
A FPA DavIT
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared JON LINDSAY, known to me, who upon being by me duly sworn deposed and said as follows:
My name is Jon Lindsay - am the County Judge
Harris County, Texas, which office T have held sinc January, . 19785, I have reviewed the Order of
“nited States District Court Zor the Western Cistricet Of Texas in Cause No. 38-CA-154, styled LULAC Council 4434, et al v. Jim Mattox, et al, signed and entered by the Court on January 2, -290, and am familiar with
its terms.
m extremely concerned, as the chief administrative icer of Harris County, about the elections ordered
held for thirty-six (26) district Judges on May 290, with run-off elections ordered to be held on
» 1990. Mv concerns involve two primary areas.
Vv - axperiance, ty=-wide
Countv, Texas, costs tween
1,200,000. Harris County
above-described action, an
menticn of who is to cay
source of funds. IZ the run-off election is
the cost will be between $30,000 and $40,000
district included in the run-off. Because of
extreme shortness of time Letween the second primary
election, to be held on April 110, 1990, the first
election ordered on May =, 1990, and the second
election ordered on June 2, 1990, the costs will be
higher than usual. In order to comply with the
numerous tasks necessary +o hold +he elections,
overtime personnel will be necessary, and +he cost
will be closer to the high end of the range I have
described. Harris County has no money buageted or
available to hold these addi*ional elections.
Affidavit of Jon Lindsay, January 3, 1990, Page Two ’
Secondly, the turn out that may be expected in an
unusual, off-date election, will be at most 5% of the registered voters in each district. This estimate is based on numerous experiences with county-wide bond elections held during my time in office as County
Judge, A 5% turn out translates to less than 2,000
votes per legislative district, which means that a winning judge will be elected with very few more than 1,000 votes. Obviously, special interest groups will
be in a position to seize district court benches bv
producing a turn out of "one cause" voters. As
County Judge, I fear for the administration of
“ustice in civil and criminal matters, in a system
where judges with county-wide authority, in a county
with 1.3 million registered voters, are selected by
no more than 1,000 voters.
URTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
-~ reyes
~— 1 |», SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO befor
this 3rd day of January, 1990,
undersigned authority,
NLL
\ 1
25 RO :
con iy 1
3 Ig A A Y P Us» yu 2 7 : 2
Flash 22 NOTARY PUPLIC, State of /TgXkas
id ; ilo AT Z
- : Wl : >
- Pe AN Cy -
. 4 ~~ A Fong
= . 2s ne < 3
% RE STI iy >
9% 3 132%
Vv
ATTTTIT IL
—
h
2
0
2TT FFIDA\
FilvRAY LY
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority,
Yodsneavary Known to me, who being by me duly sworn, deposed
follows
My name is
personally appeared Anita
and said as
Texas,
Anita Rodenheaver. [ am the County Clerk of Harris County,
which office I have held since Janiary 1.51978, Jursuant to \ fit
AI TC
ol 3 tlection Board OFT
e 51.U02(c) of the Texas Election Code, [ am tne Ch
Harris ond Texas.
nave reviewed the Order of
western gistrict of
~ause io. M0-38-CA-134 style ULAC Coun N :
Mattox, et al and am familiar with its t rms. My review
Serious questions and problems with respect to the electri
thirty-six (36) district judges, ordered to be held on M
followed by runoff elections orderea to be heid on June
will list my concerns, but not necessarily in order orf t
significance.
Ll. A number of routine procedures. which are establisn
Known in the primary elections and general ej
7 extremely uncertain under the Urder. Is a ing feo r —
®
0
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o
.
3
J
MD
ou
dD
1rman
tay 7 he
2 L240
neir gre
of the
vim
nas raised
d and weil
/@ become V
aquired? iS a
tv,
oO wiil
norma i
1S extremely
petition, ordinarily required for ~istric judges in Harris Cou
50 required? What form of application will be util “EQ ana
oromulgate that ‘orm? Aho wiil certify the correctness and
compieteness of those apptications? The applicapiiity or tne
orovisions of the Texas Election Ccge to these Jjuestions
NCyear,
2. Various provisions of the Texas lection Code, too numerous
nere, deter many decisions concerning the noiding of an electio
autnority calling the election. 4ho is the authority calling
election on May 3, 1990 and on June 2.4990, Until thar. is ae
3S an elections officer, [ am not aven able to select 3 voting
0 De utilized in an election.
2. The Texas Legislature estaplisned the date for the regular
as Marcn 12, 1990 and the runoff is April 10, 1990, Under tne
Code, Section 35.001, absentee voting tor the May 5, 1990 distr
Juade election must begin on April 23, 1990, less than two week
the primary runoff. [ have held more than fifty countywide ele
In my term of office as County Clerx and I believe it will be
1mpossidble to recail all voting equipment utilized in tne primary
“unori, nave new baliots printed, ~ave the equipment reac T!
redeliverea to remote voting locations in time for absente
“=. In my experience. the cos
3750,000.00 ana could exceed
in vune, the cost would appro
These estimates are minimum.
me to utilize temporary ana
tasks.The budget of my office
used to hold these new specia
>. The Texas
t of z countywide
000,000.uU. 51. I
ach 330,000.00 per
oecause
vertime personnel
includes n
| elections.
od
0 surplus funds available
election is at least
d runotf is necessary
legislative district.
tne shortness of time will require
CO accomplish the
led by
clection Code provides for a canvass of the vote to be perrormed not before the 15th day arter the election nor after the 30th day arter the election by the governor of the state. Until the canvass 1s performed, arawing for positions on the ballot cannot be done nor an the ballots be printed. The t'ming of the specially ordered election and runoff election is sucn tnat apsentee voting for the secona election must begin on May .-, 1390 wnile the canvass cannot be perrormea until May 20, 1990.
15€Q On my experience with of -2ate specia 2lections, [ would 2Slimate & voter turnout in the range of 5% to an absolute maximum of 10%. In my opinion, some district -uages may be elected by as few as 50 voters while other districts juages would be elected by no more than 2000 voters. The position of S1STrict juage in a county with more than. 1.3.mi 13 ion registered voters is f C00 1mportant to be fi
of a the vote of tha
ris 4)
a VQ@rtud ry, PEP *
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EA ~ BEOT™ LRN =
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small a number i
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Ay i a
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ANITA RUDEHEAVER
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L
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPTALS
FOR.THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO.
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC), et al.,
-—
JIM MATTOX, Attornev General of the State cf Texas, et
ané HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHARCLYN WOOD,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN KOOD'S
PETITION FOR EXPEDITED PERMISSION 0
APPEAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. 8 1292(b)
PORTER & CLEMENTS
J. Eugene Clements
Evelyn V. Keves
3500 NCNB Center
P.O." Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE
SHAROLYN WOOD
Egan "cm
' rg
UO
[R3
)
I3BlE Ogr"'cofr
STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING ISSUES
The Standard
SSS ele ee 0.0 8 FW 4.0/0 8 6.6 0 eV.n eee ie ea.
® © © © oo oo © 9° oo eo
of
Claims Under Thor
00f of Vote Dil
OES VN. CinglIeE. . cov uinivsinnrids
The District Court Controlling
Conclusions of i=
Disputed Questions of Law Raised
bv the District Court's Conclusions
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS EXISTS FO
CPINION ON THE QUESTIONS ©
2 Cf The Voting Richts Act Does
din,
pplvy To The Judiciary And Would Db
Cnconstitutionayl “f It Dic E00.
2 Does Not Apply To Independent
S
Qverlapping Countv-Wice Judicial
j ip lection Districts
~~
pes Ginalercs
9's eo 0 8 00 90 86 9 VP 0 6.0 8.0 8 8 ese ese S00 6s
And 3 Are Not Proved By
Abstract Statistical Inouirv With
All Other Inguiry Being Irrelevant
nopposed Election C
White Versus White C
Germane To The St
kati
Of Yore Diluticn Cia
The Concert Of One-Man, One-Vote
Applies To Judicial Elections.....
The Pool Of Minoritv Class Members
Eligible To Hold Judicial Office
Rather Than The Pool OF Minority
Is The Appropriate Reference Ser
For Measuring Minority Success In
Judicial Elections
The Court's Holding That Illegal
® © © 9 © © © ° © °° 0 Oo ® 0 ° © ®@ © © © O° O° © © © O° e 0 0 @
Vote Dilution Exists In Harris County,
Texas Judicial Races 1s Clearly Err oneOUS.. vvitie vies
-
-
Page
10
11
14
p
t
wn
15
17
30
3}
34
S
IV. AN IMMEDIATE APP EAL MAY MATERIALLY ADVANCE
THE TERMINATION OF THIS GA I ON vt vivian te a niiiiis sine 28
Vv. RN CE ON ate eld se laniin ls Ti en ES TREO 42
4
TAY MITE ev * — - > ~ ) — IINT TRY N ord my -d -—eaes UdNd LL 2 _— a -—
NATIT AT { j
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TOR TUT TT TTT
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hdd be mem maa aN UL 4
TTM MATT AY
A GG WR - JAN,
ntervenor-Def
dated January
9390 1 S Memorandum Pini and Order of
aT ) Th pol . . 1" Sd November nion’y.,
November A amended include certification
The Opinion was Previously amended to correct for clerical errors on November 14 and 27, 1989 and December 28, 1989.
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Exhibits.
5
Pron its voraing Practices wihilch Jenny JTemcers Cr prctected
~ ~ — - + - ~n —_ -— - -— 1 = - 3 CLa3388 ine opportunity fo particirate In ‘oh Folitical process
nS = oH, 1 = <r hey ~ 3 = rv uly BR iF and to elacT representatives of Their choice. ine PiadintazIss,
who Ultimately reguced The number a target counties to nine
including Harris County, sought a declaratory judgment that
Texas' system of electing state district judges illegally diluted
the votes of blacks and/or Hispanics in each of th counties, an
injunction against all further district court elections in those
counties under the present system, implementation of a remedial
electoral system, costs and &tiorney’' 5s fees, EY Order of the
Court dated March 1, 1889, the Court Ppermitied <The Houston
A [ Hyver nif -— - “= -w —- ~~ bi) ~ = -- &&
Lawyers ASSOClation (th ELA =o intervene as gag Plaintiff on
Dehall of blacks “in Harris County; 1t permitted certain named
34 (8) No veering qualification or Prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political ‘subdivision in. a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any. citizen of the Unired States to
Vote on account of race or color. b,
(DD) A violation of subsection (8) Of this section is ‘established
if, based on the totality of Circumstances, it .is shown that the
political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members cI the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: provided, That nothing in this section establishes a
right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population.
2 “+ U.S.C. § 1973 (West Supp. 1989).
}
(
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’
DLAECK 1hdividuals to niervene —-— aa v
And it irermittad Judge Wood and Dallas Countv District. Judge
A group of named Travis County Judges were also permitted to
appear in their individual capacities only, while intervention of
Midland County and a group of Midland County Judges was denied.
Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox ("Mattox"), a named Defendant
] c 3 Re, / " ~ — Nips ame IY il Defendants {the State Defendants ),
- =~ xs :
=TT 11001 1 Lr ~~ a J - | = iE JP NECA ~ x maa NY mam - ~ re Ge
STIrenuous.y SpProseq S41 erl_0orrs ZY ESTEE A 10 SL ai Ug diy adres Oo
- be r- -~ =~ di = Nm ym = a + = ~~ ~~~ a t—- o ~~ + 1a
~~ =-S8rvaene =S Yelendants = ier Cid dcial capacities cn =a
intervention. Mattox's efforts to prevent defense of this case
l F
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intervention in their official capacities only, .a change which
would increase the likelihood of insulation from possible
personal liability for Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees.
The case was tried to the bench in Midland, Texas beginning
September 18, 1989, At trial the HLA PUft ion the Plaintiffs
entire case challenging the Present judicia F
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40
Harris County, LULAC having dropped all claims on behalf of
’
» ~~ -— — po. a | -— - - Cy - ~ da ve -
based 11s Case on Statistical 2nalyses. of =arris Lounty voting -
Judge Wood defended the Present system of. electing state
district judges in Harris County. She relied upon exhibits and
the testimony of live, videotaped, and deposition witnesses which
showed that judicial elections in Harris County are primarily
determined by straight-ticket Party voting and secondarily by a
Tm} ~ « 5 ~ - Fo S le WU i TC ~Ao ol Smal. Jiumber’ ‘cf. discretionary: ‘udicial Oters (15-20%) whose
votes are _nf.uenced by =the experience and credentials of the
~ {I s+ ~ 3S a — = a ve \® S A ) (
candicartes, Saxo ral Frere rence DoLLE Rewspaper ang other
endorsements, publicity given the gualifications of the candi-
dates, and successful county-wide campalgn strategies. She also
ES
introduced evidence that racism plays no part whatsoever in
1 November 8, 188¢ the Clstrict court ae
Memorandum Opinion and Order including a declaratory judgment
aolding that Texas' system of electing state district Judges
illegally dilutes the votes of blacks and/or Hispanics: in all
Targex counties. In that Cpinion the court took under
advisement the question cf a possible injunction against future
Judicial elections in the target counties. It also granted the
State the opportunity to devise a remedial plan ¢f its own in the
November 13, 1989, special session of the Texas legislature
expedited interlocutory appeal
December 1 1989, Governor Clements the ‘court that
NO consensus could be reached by the
& remedy in
condition precedent to th
on December 15,
had gone cut but that the court
submit
that the
working on
file by
that
those
should also December
vv with the remedial plan itsel
ee
Upon confirmation of the rumors concerning the negotiations
between the Plaintiffs and the Attorney General, who is charged
ith the task of representing the State Defendants,
including all state district judges in their official capacities,
Judge Wood filed a motion To stay all "Fy
QlSIriCT Court ‘and. a notion Sor certification of the Jgistrice
+! : > y
- < : A court's Opinion for interlocutory appeal
~\ i -— a im 1 o 2 3 A 3 ~
On December 19, the attorney General sent Judge Wood an
agreed Proposed Interim Plan signed by himself and the
tiffs. Aicopy of that plan, which was subsequently filed with
t 5
(1)
{Y
.
-
0 ct
H p
H
0 ct
0 O H ct and adopted almost in *oto py the Court, is
iled herewith as Exhibit "41." Judge Wood asks this Court to
ignatures of all Defendants who
Yl yo +H. the. cCefense of this suit, including
—~ — ~ 3 !
=
-—Y FE - —~
“iCse attorneys whe presented =he State —efendants case, are
cudge Wood filed
her Objections to the: Plaint 3 and Matrtox's Flan on Decem-
A copy of those objections
8' and Mat:tox's "Remedial"
entered without notice 0 ner--gespilte Mattox's repeated
~si13tence, That ne alone represented her and all other state
it was In direct opposition to her
H
-
3 ct
{ H 0 Sts, which, as her counsel, he was sworn to uchold.
i k 3 n M —
Hy
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D = O H
any of the State Defendants, and
Attorney General Mattox's Statement Concerning Non-Partisan
Election and Supplement filed herewith as Exhibit "i2.% In that
’
AR
< /
/
Xesponse Juage Wood &41S0 JQocumenteqg numercus other nistances cof
Ls b-
~Y = -~ mE a -— mam with N _ = 11 rmA ra ~ + Aa [~ ~ + + 1 ~~ a = v= ~
Llssz ou SB [SEER wl wi Matto PRIDOX -2C gerense . Lh1sS case: aQlid
Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically rules 1.02(a)(2)
{settling against the wishes of the client) and. rule 1.086
(conflict of interest). Judge Wood has received no response to
- - -— -— — id T LN ~ wlge wood. 2lso argued taac DUP AlliCrney oeneral's gover
-~ - ~~ - ve. . - -— . ~~ - 3 J - ho 3: 2Nn0C overt -activiries in"1n.s"Case, as cdocumented ir her ~esponse,
constituted the very "collusion, nonfeasance or adversity of
interest” deemed by the district court and by this Circuit to
constitute grounds for holding that Mattox does not adequately
represent the interests of Texas' state district “udges. Exhibit
i2 at .5. Zven as Judge Wood prepared to fi
Mattox himself was announcin to the press that he had never
~~ mvp
, £1led herewith as Exhibit "J.
Despite the vociferous opposition of numerous Defendants to
“WX 2 .Cilains "Zo their —Sepresentacion , veXamples of which “are
Mattox's statements were made in response to a non-suit taken in a state
district court case filed by two Harris County district judges protesting
Mattox s betrayal of their interests in this case.
P
’ - i ~ 11 wil a : 1 IEP 1"
— - a ~ ay re +n ~~ TN YT NN ~ ! =~ ~~ ~~ = da -—- Teh ins += - reLet TorawlitThias EaDlIoI — gaat aS exh. oa Ts — EB a 0 kp I ery
—% Aa (NS Ey ne r~ANTT Vv i a r oi. IY yn i on ~ ow Wy YY iy ~ ARE ha ve Lidl RL BS TI CLE CUE Staten Add Le nT Oern mol iw aDUary 2, 3 Agreed
= i is : sm pong iq
~ : i a Bs ~ a Il oT ole ry 2 T - ™ ia)! = bo? Fay yy yy ar
s>elt..ement was Late raag “nto oY anc cetTween RES. TD de a re ae SD anc
efendants in this matter, but was not approved by some of the
- ~ ntervenors.” Order of January 2, ‘1990 at 4. Judge Wood submits
that ne "Agreed Settlement" was reached because nc one who
genuinely represented th defense of this suit was consultsd
about any agreement with the Plaintiffs and that Mattox indeed
represented only himself in this "Agreed Settlement" with the
— ~ g -- . - . - ~ =
A, eo Sl 15 a 5 “v= ~V~ ~~ = pm ~~ i BB FEYYIT™ ON _- py b 1 {le ial -
Plaintisss -i CI'CES CCOnI. CT With his duties as Attornev General
1 ™ — : | -— —~— og ~ :
=~ be Ms ino J, 0 ~ - = ah al Een an 4 19 ~~ Aa TAY (Army ~— hh Wd Add -_1e lavas YisScC ini inary Y i vies A a — rar essS Tonos. rudd AN
The Interim Fila ih as nN essence Jevised bt the
-—- PGB Bh SN A | “ a, whRlCZh had [= -—-- ~ ad =, — — I, —a
trial, has Deen hastily foisted upon the State after secret
oe He = ph 3 t= 4 ™ wg 3 vy v = 3 negotiations: to which +h genuine bDefencannts were not Privy, anda
A pt a mil " 3 m™ ! a z < Fh += 2 roCcTs eLy Alsmantles Texas Iyscem oY electing Eilate glscraict
Select judges while disregarding the most fundamental interests
of due process, equal protection of the laws, the requirements
vy
Voting Rights Act itself, the Constitution and
3 A ah
and purrcse or tne
statutes of the State of Texas, and the rights and interests of
The specifics of the Interim Plan acdcpted by the District
court are set forth in Defendant-Intervenor Harris "County
’
note ‘nere that *his destructive and unconst
court even though that court admitted in
pur; of this appeal that
this case contains extremely important controlling issues of law
48 TO which there is a substantial basis for difference of
opinion. Opinion at 93.
11. STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING ISSUES OF LAW
The ‘district court's “Plnlcn ralses Iundamental cuestions
POUL, "Tag applicability of the Voting Rights Act 22 B.8%C
§71873, 2 to. judicial elect ons, <The constituticnality cf such
application, the proper standard of proof for Voting Rights Act
x:= Proof “of vote
n my Cd ~ - i = ty | -—- YY A -Ne standard of Proof cf Vote Pilution Claims
T mm 3 v Fai 1 = Under Thornburg v GCingles
T Thy +a Con SEIU Him» TAT ~ - a I al a C= yr += hold
sne 0 ced i No Ces DY eme er Nd LR and CLT — a dod dE 44
lia 3 = oe ~ iw Vis yee PO, rd
-ar ae appropriate TEST oI Cte giiuToon C-21msS hder le
TF ™ Py 5 % 0a. “ Eas : 1" a PET |
LING Rights Act is otality Cl The clrcumstances test based
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upon the facts of the case. Thornburg Vv. Oingles, 478 U.S. 30,
106. S§.0%. 2752 somal (1986); Overton ww, City of Austin, 871 F.2d
52%, WS3Z- ASthy Civ 198%). That test employs as a threshold
inquiry three factors set forth in Gingles: (1) demonstration by
the minority ‘that it is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district
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2 applies
judges,
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who serve
to the
election of state
i ndent decision-
n of appellate judges,
Chisom's extension of
t to be limited
and nn. 32.
endian BE SP SS —
aadition of irrelevant variables to regression and
tistical analysis distorts the equation and yields
ults that are indisputably incorrect under § 2.
nion‘atr 80.
PPosed mincority candidate election contests and
*e versus white contests are not germane in this
CULT XO The statistical analysis of Voting Rights
Violations. Opinion at 80-81.
concept of
judicial elections.
| O
n
/ The Court:
powers nor
laws.
and
discussing these issues are filed herewith as Exhibit 'h
had previously
judicial elections and violates neither the principle of separation
the
*~
-
fourteenth amendment
Order entered May 3, 1989,
Motion
one vote!" does not
Opinion at 15.
"one man, apply to
held that the Voting to
of
guarantee orf equal protection of the
denying Judge Wood's Motion to Dismiss
Statement. The relevant documents
114 1"
Rights Act applies
More Definite
il.
QO
=
NS
)
Th eligible pool of mInNority voters, rather" than
eilgible minority lawyers, is the apprecriate reference
point Ior evaluating the extent cf minority electoral
Success. Opinion at 74-75
The data set relied upon by Plaintiffs’ expert
Dr. Richard Engstrom To analyze Harris County elec-
tions, consisting in 1980 census counts of total black
population by precinct and computer printouts of 1982
1984, 1986, and 1988 precinct voter registration
estimates supplied Dr. Engstrom by Dr. Richard Murray,
a non-testifying expert whose data was rot authenticat-
ed in any way (Opinicn at 22) and which had been
Written ‘cver, ETXUChk cut or crossed through, Nas
reliable data con which =o Lase statistical analysis of
racially polarized voting and racial bloc voting
Cpinionat 27
Testimony! from Flaintifs's expert, Dr. Engstrom, that
a primary §iections “nn. Barris County need not be
filter cut the candidate
Of “Choice iof o (2) that uncontested races
d no in Y 1. $3Y That
cases 1is
(4) that, although not controlled
2nesnepigons would be included in
n votes; and (5) that the
a
assist rTesearchey
range JOotes in Harris County never rose
above 13.6% was adequate to address Defendant Wood's
Concerns about absentee “voting, the influx of Vietnam-
®85¢ ‘population’ intoe Harris County and Traditionally
flack precincts and failure of Dr. Engstrom's analysis
to reflect lack candidate successes in primary
elections and uncontested races Opinion at 27.
Dr. Engstrom's ny regarding correlation and o
regression analysis of 17 selected races proves that
white Dloc voting exists in Harris -ounty "and "is
sufficiently strong generally to defeat the choice of
the black community. Opinion at 28-30
The testimony of Judge Wood's witness, Judge Mark
Davidson, <that race and ethnicity are irrelevant to
actual voting behavior as it relates to the judiciary
in Harris County, while credible, is irrelevant under
controlling law. Cpinion at 31.
|
}—
Ww
) |]
2 Defendant Wood's contention: tha clack preferred
candidates lost their -udicial races because of failure
£0 win the 'Earris County rar ior Preference poll or
obtain the Gay Political Caucus endorsement is iegally
incompetent Opinicn at 31
i5 In addition, 'inai*ts brief survey of =h nine Zimmer
factors, the district court concluded that among eight
factors typical of racial discrimination in voting,
Harris County exhibited only three: (1) historical
discrimination, ‘which on Urt considered indisputable
"enhancement" of the
, which the court held was
lng and the fact of county-
arce. County: and’ (3) lack of black
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Toral. success in iudicial elections, which was
established by the fact that of 17 black candidates for
the Office of state digctrice judge in races selectively
dna.yzed by the plaintiffs’ expert blacks won only 2.
Opinion at 69-77 The court found no ‘evidence of dig.
criminatory slating,.: Eppeals in campaigns, or
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sons IO0r county-wide judicial election districts are
: -— M - J = . . —- T neither tenuous nor intentiona ly dlscriminatory I
{The ninth.limmer factor, raciaily polarized voting, is
~ 3 3 + q Pe = 3 Frog ~~ 7 3 poe Supsumed uncer the Gingles factors and was held by the ~ } 35% =} -— ihe - Tr om LOUrT tobe proved by abstract statistical analysis.)
mm - A 1 3 ~ ~ = ~ 3:13 2 The questions of law listed above are controlling «in that
Rl 1 = [= q De y Rl TY > !
- » eo - : z - og ; - they provide th conceptual «Dasis.. ford the district court's
3 ~ - on —_ — wp -— a. ~ vm - ~ ~ - = = —— RY Seéterm.raticn that the present system cof giecting state district
and, in particular, in Harris County, inwioclation of § 2.0f the
rt = Vy yom ce i ~ rm 0, 3 , JY - - Lisputeg ME SELIOnNSs or maw rhalsed ov ne
™ = a La - YisStricE Court s Conciusinsns.
rm “
The controlling conclusions of law stated by the district
court raise the following questions of law for which there are
substantial grounds for differences of opinion, and which Judge
e § | : GALS ACT applies to tha > > ~ * - - ~ -—- — 3 = JuCicliary; and, 18 so, whether iv is cehsticutional if
- hi
thus applied?
" : Li ee Lend n LE Se Ly . <. Whether § 2 applies tc inderendenz overlapping county- oe ; ; = 5 wide election districts?
n
4. Whether unopposed election contest and white versus
white contests are germane to the statistical analysis
of vote dilution claims?
>. Whether the concept of one-man, one-vote applies to
judicial elections?
2 Whether the pool of mincrity class members eligible to
hold judicial office or that of RDCTrity voters is —he
appropriate reference point for measuring minority
Success 1n judicizl elections?
ether the court's holding that illegal
ists 'in. Harvis “Count: Texas
early erroneous?
111.5% A SUBSTANTIAL “BASIS EXIST Fag YE
c
OF CFINION ON THE QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVE]
n = x - -, 2 : . , "~ . — a - - > - Ea 0 1 YN 9 TA 5 - AS Lhe. court itself acCRnowledged nn its pinion, ~ail 3S area
4] : a 3p ~ . ig : A ana To - of +aW- BS Nol san asic certainty CpPenlioen 8 isd «ceed the
Jues
agre
1936
view, each of =he issues
The
tions" on which "ths ‘mest distinguished experts" may dis-
. : an
Td jing 3 ! €. Opinion at 23 (quoting Chief Judge Charles Evans Hughes
address to the American Law Insti
cf law listed above was wrongly decided
the following reasons:
=
iclarv And Would Be Unconsti
2 Of The Voting Rights Act Does Not Apply To The
di t 1d
The Court holds that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to
Judiciary. Opinion at 81. While Defendant Wood acknowledges
§ 4
un
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“raaiticonel .egal ‘thinking snd 13 consistent with “thoss princi-
ples.
; : iP 2 ” Ty inthe instan™ casa. “he gpplication cf the Voting Rights
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representatives” of racial groups would have .t}
Potential effect of outlawing
appointed judiciary, since an appointed
satisfy the Voting Rights Act's requirement that protected
Classes oe ensured the right "to elect representatives of their
choice.” 42 U.S.C. 8 187315) (emphasis added) 2 Thus, if the
Voting: Rights act is gpplied to wre Jdiciary, the entitlement of
protected classes to "representative! officials, even judges, is
Litutional: rights and duaran-
whether the. Voting Rights Act applies to the judiciary and
whether, 18i< does so, it is constitutional
BE. } 2 Does Not Apply To Indevendent Cverlapping tounty-
Wide Election Districts
The. district court holds thr 2 WY)
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election of state district judges, who serve as
laintiffs and Mattox have already indicated that they would not
accept & merit appointment plan as a remedy for dilution of minority
votes in this case, and the question has been raised whether any such
could receive Justice Department approval if passed by the
Texas legislature. (Texas is subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C... '8 1973, . ;which requires such scrutiny of State-pronuigated
redistricting plans.)
4
~ ac Eo - -~ - -— ~ ~ -— - - y -
-2Li5.00 "Makers, as IT does 0 =he election of abpbelL_.ate judges, IS8 g
Sa rer - ~ i 1% 3 £ ~ ~~ m™ wRO 28rve ny a CoOllagial body Opinion ‘at El” and n. 32. The
~~ + ~ 1 - og - ~ 3 y hie T 3 4% 3
~OUrt C.tes no authority for its conclusion. acwever, Judge Wood
single-member districts are not subject to the Voting Rights Act.
The election of independent sudges from single-member
in form and purpose from the
a) an lL ~ = + m= y “ ~ =~ = A ER Io cs T
SLecTion or representatives Jnger an aL= Large EysStenm. i an
el ca PIR JE NE Vy Stree —- To om yy pn ny pe a npg" a mT YY ~~ ~~ N -—
at-large Cém representatives tf interest groups, or constity-
SET oc =r a) ~~ ~ -— - - ~~ 11 5 =~ NANT = “~~ — ~~ ~\NY) Ri
aac, are elec -=2d Neri = Collect = 1 ASIN Y aa Wils dai a=) coliapora-
- y ~ahRata 3. a % 3 3 1) 3 -1 1 ; ~ : --=On: aNd 'denate So rresumed To result = Le" oes compromlse
aval.able to accommodate <+h iiffering interests that they
~ ot 1 1 pe - : : : Ce Single-member districts when protected minorities are
Sry oo - 3 ~ Pay 3 d " : S = 1 i Sx mBo Ly mpPrONlOoITed" Dy ‘racial discrimination from electing
OAYY PY = Ea ell wd - ee - - 3 -Y Te -Spresentatives 2 their choice to at-large collegial bodies
Noti only is the rationale of promoting the compromise of
conflicting group interests alien to the concept ¢f the judicia-
istricts serves 2.
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in
ingle-member
fundamental principles which are irrelevant to the election of
representatives of interest groups. The county-wide single-
member judicial election system--and that system alone--insures
oS -y - -— i Aa = 3 -
Rat each Jude nas JRrrisdictlion over all "suits 2rougnt in the
county &na —har each Judge +5 elactect Jy every citizen in the
~ my rg - 3 To . jo ] Ja) - pa
county -ne applicaticn of the Voting Rights Act +o chat system
Stricts or sub=
districts drawn on racial lines entails one of two things:
either (1) the courts whose judges are elected from mini-
Jurisdiction and proper venue over parties
resident in all parts of the county other than the mini-district
-~
.
1 2) Lne Courts must retain J=T13Q.CT13n ana venue over ne entire
—~ Ri - Ri
— = he r~ - ~
county, aL.taoudan only. .a.smali percentage of The citizens CT The
r those judges, <thereby ensuring
Citizens in The
maj ty ¢Z the judges who have plenary
~aUSE The contusion of over.aprring Clunty=-wlide Slngle-member
- - - - —- 3 - - 3
jualclal districts with at-large districts and the consequent
judicial districts nas the necessary
a 2 oh : : : : LX ner (l) a jurisdictional nightmare in which
equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment and
th right to a jury drawn from the entire community under the
rights of certain protected minorities ore .{2) a flagrantly
- - unconstitutional system under which +he constitutional rights of
the vast majority are sacrificed to the statutory rights of the
th
ew.
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aq vin ny -— AES — MOreOVery While no authority? t ) H
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City of New York, 7179 F.24 141,149 (28 Cir. 1985), ‘+the Second
We cannot .... take ‘the concept of 2 class’ impaired
opportunity for equal representation and uncriticallv
transfer it from the context cof elections for multi-
member ‘bodies to that of electicns #or csincle-member
OfZiceas. There can be no egual opportunity Zor
“épresentation withir an office filled bv one person.
Judge Wood agrees with the Sececnd Circuit's holding and urges
three "Ginglees factors" relied on +r establish vote dilution =-
Political cohesiveness of the minority {Ginglegs i J). and’ the
ability of the white majority u wallvito'defeat the minority's
3 wid 8 ‘ 3 . / Sg : 2 prererred canalcate (Gingles 3)—' =--are usually established by
statistical evidence of racially polarized voting. Opinion at
85. The district court further held hat Gingles 3° can 'be
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~Bo%, 4872-1878 (1871), which Justice White himsslf haa authored.
he district court Justice White's reference to Whitcemb is
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strict court acknowledged, "{Tlhe majority which agreed with
rennan [in Gingles] that voter dilution was demonstrated by the impact or results of the Zimmer factors and the Gingies threshold
analysis deserted him when he came to the proor of the second and third Gingles factors.” Opinion at 8, n.7
As the di
Justice B
io
Gingles is the only Supreme Court opinion that has interpreted the Act as
amended. The Act was amended, as Justice 0’ Connor observed in her
1 n - 1 . dissenting opinion in Gingles to codify the esults test empioyea in
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S 124, 91.°S.Cc. 1858"(1971) and White v,.
Regester, %12'U.S. 755, 93 8.0. 2337 (1973). ~1086 S.Ct. ar 2796, 2783.
’
candidate and (in contrast +o Eavri
Whitcomb, the Supreme Court held that invidious
does not result from the loss cof elections by Democrats favored
by blacks absent evidence that blacks are denied access to the
vaio ; - mead l/ political system. Whitcomb, 91 S.Ct. at 1874-76 .—
Justice O'Connor, writing for four members of the Court,
also expressly rejected Justice Brennan's test for vote dilution.
106 S.C, mae I0GH Unlike "Justice White, however, Justice
Prospects for electoral
. at 2293. However, she aid reject Justice
w ~ M 13 33)
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voting patterns is irrelevant. . In her view, such evidence
would seem clearly relevant in answering the gquesticn whether
bloc voting by white voters will consistently defeat minority
candid fv
iy "n + - } ry 3 =~ 4 VI, SH +} }
tes. IE. In. other words, assuming that he three
ingles factors are used zg part of the proof o Hh
vote dllution
under the ‘totality of the circumstances test, Justice O'Connor
would allow the results of bivariate regression analvsis to be
ft
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The district court also observed that the issue of partisan voting was
before the Supreme Court in Gineles and that the Court had no difficulty
concluding that voting polarized along racial, not partisan, lines.
Opinion at 80 d(citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 61-62). The district court
is. incorrect. its citation is to: Part I11i-C. of Gingles, Justice
Brennan's minority opinion which was rejected by the majoritv of the
Court as argued in this section.
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discriminatory enhancement
las repeatedly held that countv-wide mul+i-no
lection schemes are not constitution 44
124,.. 81
Finally, the district court held that
electoral success in Harris County shows discrimination despite
2(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which
minorities have ’ entitlement tO
representation, and Cove and
qualifications are required
of minority success is the pool
in sum, there are "obviously. solid disputing
whether "proof" ..é&f vote entirely on
bivariate
have been Zourd and those which have been found themselves
disputable under sound legal authority; hen” ‘the . court
accepted as proof of vote dilution the Plaintiffs" bivariate
regression analysis which deliberately ignored as irrelevant
almost all races in which minority voters--at least in Harris
Assuming, without admitting, that overlapping single-member judicial
districts are actually disguised multi-member districts.
»
O eC > a
I [ J o
r
(D ( 4 'O
H (V mn mn () 2 f»
all races’ in which blacks van “opposed, all races run in 1978
(when two blacks ran for
successfully, only to run uncrposed--hence not to count--ever
since) and all races in which blacks ran as Republicans (which
wére counted as anomalies); and (2) when the court counted as
3 ify ws 34% ve 1] re i ie Ps 2 . om 1 Ti n a ,
Legally lnccmpetent ~€stimony which, though "credible tended
tO prove that, in fact, under practical local conditions, racism,
1 ~ T a ow
- I= . - vy ~ rE we YS we TTi2 OY ino part in QIlSTTrLET judge races
i ot
4)
on
‘0
MD
0 |
?
(E
N
[3
] 0)
conclusions
9 =arris County may reasonably be disputed under the
arguments set Iorth above, substantial grounds exist for disput-
ing the district court's holding that illegal vote dilution
MATERIALLY ADVANCE
In the absence of immediate interlocutory appeal designed to
settle the numerous contro —
p
t
}4
-
3 0
issues of law which ‘are in
dispute, the litigation of this and related cases, as well as
4
9
1 - of 0 vv} y.}
’ Promises to OCCUPY ‘The courtsiifor Years while
1 : 3 : mT nn PE 1 5 SX < 33
Leaving tn enctlr +eXas 3juQic.z: election System: nn alsarray
When the court below cert ied this case for expedited inter-
locutory appeal it sim 9 =
ct
f)
3 {)]
oO cs
n +
mn
[
=
]
Q
5 {1}
n f»
of
"3
ct
MD
H im plan enjoin-
ing all elections under the system it had declared illegal and
imposing a judicial election system devised in most of its
essential respects by the Plaintiffs and Texas Attorney General
Jim Mattox without any "input from Judge Wood, Defendant/
Intervencr Judge Entz, the Secretary of State, the administrative
juages cor the state district _udges wnose interests Attorney
General Mattox was bound by law to represent That Interim Plan
+ k 3 Ji + Er 3 3 ~E 1 £4515 mw 3 37 3 f - at
LOOK lmmedlate effect on the day cf the filing deadline for state
districe judgeships. Judge Wood has ' filed Objections to the
Plaintiffs’ and Mattox's "Remedia Plan" which point out its
violations of numerous Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution,
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, *the due
Process clause of the 14t} Amendment, and the right to precpor-
, 8&8 well as its irrevocable and immediate
effect of destroying Texas' judicial election system. firtually vi
all of these objections apply to the court-ordered remedial plan.
Judge Wood's Application for Stay, filed herewith, .states
additional objections to the district court's plan. The litiga-
tion of the issues raised by the district court's Interim Plan,
as well as the issues generated Dy the district ‘court's
Declaratory Judgment, could take years if this Court'refuses to
hear Judge Wood's interlocutory appeal and she must await final
judgment.
| Ww
XO
) |
A
remains unclear and <the standard of Froof accepted by the
district court stands, suits challenging each cf Texas! "courts
can be expected to proliferate. On December 22, 1989, the date
Of submission ‘of ‘the Plaintiffs’! and Mattck's plan to rhe
district court in this case, the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Education Fund ("MALDEF") filed suit in fsderal court in
Brownsville, Texas, challenging the election of judges to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the same formulaic grounds as
Ss have already
in this suit they expect
, Challenging county-wide
regional and statewide elections to all branches of the judiciary
all over the State of Texas.
Moreover, a permanent Plan has yet to be devised. Either
iterim Plan has
been--in which case it can be expected to generate numerous other
BUllSs=-~-Cr it will involve a drawn out and very expensive re-
assessment of the state judicial election system, requiring
evidentiary hearings by the district court, consideration by the
Texas legislature and =the Judicial Districts Board of various
alternatives, amendment =o the Texas Constitution, ratification
oy the voters o Hy
Texas, and. scrutiny and approval by the Justice
Department under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Thus, if +he
district court's Declaratory Judgment stands, Protracted and
expensive litigation and
MD
nsue over a period of years.
In the meantime, should Judge Wood be forced to endure
and/or any
Ft
5.
H ct
YY
MD H "3
roceedings designed to provide a "remedy" for the vote
=a
dilution found by the district court before the Propriety of that
court's judgment is reviewed, any right she has to elect or be
elected in. an independent state judiciary under the present
electoral system mav be irretrievably lost Also should this
- 23 4 B, Ed — hn de de he Ee - - 7 ~~
~Ourt caeny Judge Wood's retition for expedited interlocutory
inal judgment in the district
court, only to have that final _udgment ultimately overturned by
+8 New: round of. chaos will necessarily ensue as the
state attempts to reconstruce Humpty Dumpty.
On the other hand, should this Court grant this petition for
expedited interlocutory appeal pursuant to 3: 1292(b)y all
questions of law regarding the district court's basis for its
Jeclaratcory Judgment can be expediticusly ‘decided, thereby
inging this case to an end in =a more orderly and just fashion
and allowing future Voting Rights Act litigation =o proceed on a
more certain footing. Nor will any of the Plaintiffs be prej-
udiced by any such a 0 ie)
(Y f | To the contrary, they, like Defen-
dants, benefit from the swift resolution of the extremely
significant disputed legal questions at issue in this case.
H
3 ally, the resolution of <+he controlling legal issues in this
*
Case can only benefit the public
TO undergo grievous and perhaps tctally unnecessary suffering.
Via CONCLUSION
rr
WHEREFORE, ‘for the foregoing reasons, Harris ~ » TY mr nS ad YOUNLTY District
Judge Sharolyn Wood requests that this Court grant her petition
for expedited interlocutory appeal of the district court's
Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 8, 1989, as amended, and
that it grant her such other and further relief in law and in
equity to which she may show hersels justly entitled.
=espectfully submitted,
FCRTER & CLEMENTS
= oy
J. Eugene Clements
Evelyn V. Keyes
A Srar NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEYS FOR BARRIS COUNTY
DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD
OF COUNSEL
Darrell Smith
Attorney at Law
10999 Interstate Hwy. 10, #905
San Antonio, Texas 78230
(512) 641-2944
Michael J. Wood
Attorney at Law
440 Louisiana, Suite 200
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 228-5105
1 hereby certify that on the FY da
and correct copy of the above ‘and £
l1ct Judge Sharolyn Wood's Petition
Appeal Under 28 U.
nn
P|
this case by
addressed as follows:
Mr. William L. Garrett
Ms. Brenda Hall Thompson
Garrett, Thompson & Chang
Attorneys at Law
8300 Douglas, Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
Ms. Susan Finkelstein
Texas Rural Legal Aid. Inc.
201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 800
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Mr. Julius Levonne Chambers
Ms. Sherrilyn A.
NAACF Legal Defense and =ducational
99 Hudson Street
Ms. Gabrielle K. McDonald
Matthews & Branscomb
301 Congress Ave. , Suite 2050
Austin, Texas 78701
Oo
Mr. Jim Mattox, Attorney General
Ms. Mary F. Keller, T Assi
Mr. Renea Hicks, Spec. Assi
Mr. Javier Guajardo, Spec
P.O. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78701
cl
Mr. Edward B. Cloutman, 111
Mullinax, Wells, Baab & Cloutman, P -~
3301 Elm Street
Pallas, Texas 75226-1837
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO.
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC) , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
JIM MATTOX, Attornev General of the State of Texas, etial,,
Defendants,
and HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGE WOOD'S EXHIBITS
VOLUME I
(Exhibits A - B)
PORTER & CLEMENTS
J. Eugene Clements
Evelyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE
SHAROLYN WOOD
F
a
[O
))
a a
[J
4%
JUDGE WOOD'S EXHIBITS - VOLUME I
EXhibie "avr
[Houston Lawyers' Association's] Complaint in Intervention
Defendant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's
Original Answer to Houston Lawyers' Association
Plaintiff-Intervenor Houston Lawyers' Association et al's
Original Answer to Defendant-Intervenor Wood's Counterclaim
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint
Dallas County District Judge F. Harold Entz's First Amended
Answer to LULAC's Second Amended Complaint
State Defendants' Original Answer to Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint
Harris County District Judge Sharolvn Wood's Second Amended
Original Answer and Counterclaim to Plaintiffs LULAC et al.
Plaintiffs’ Answer to Defendant-Intervenor Wood's Second
Amended Counterclaim
Exhibice "np"
Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief
Plaintiff-Intervenors Houston Lawyers' Association's Post
Trial Brief
Defendant-Intervenor Wood's Post-Trial Brief
Defendant-Intervenor Dallas County Judge F. Harold Entz's
Post~Trial Brief
State Defendants' Post-Trial Reply Brief
Plaintiffs' Response to Post-Trial Briefs
Defendant Wood's Reply to Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Inter-
venors Houston Lawyers' Association's Post-Trial Brief
Plaintiff-Intervenors Houston Lawyers Association's Reply to
Post~Trial Briefs
Defendant Wood's Response to Houston Lawyers' Association's
Reply Brief
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FORTHE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO.
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS (LULAC), et al.,
versus
JIM MATTOX, Attorney General cZ the State of Texas, et al
and HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGE WOOD'S EXHIBITS
VOLUME II
(Exhibits C - J)
PORTER & CLEMENTS
J. Eugene Clements
Evelyn V. Keyes
3500 NCNB Center
P.O. Box 4744
Houston, Texas 77210-4744
(713) 226-0600
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
HARRIS COUNTY DISTRICT JUDGE
SHAROLYN WOOD
Do
JUDGE WOOD'S EXHIBITS - VOLUME II
Memorandum Opinion and Order signed and entered November 8,
1989,
Order signed November 14, 1989.
Order signed and entered November 27, 1989,
Order to Correct Clerical Errors, entered December 23, 1989.
Defendant Wood's Objections to Plaintiffs' and Mattox's
"Remedial" Plan
Sample letters and Alternative Plans Filed with the District
Court by Defendants.
Exhibit nz"
Defendant-Intervenor Harris County District Judge Sharolyn
Wood's Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal and
Motion for Stay
Order signed and entered January 2, 1989.
Eghibit "go"
Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's Notice of
Appeal
Exhibit "a"
Defendant Harris County District Judge Sharolyn Wood's
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement
Brief in Support of Defendant Wood's Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for More Definite Statement
>
F
s
Plaintiffs' Response to the Motion to Dismiss or for More
Definite Statement of Defendant-Intervenor Wood of Harris
Countv
Defendants' Statement Regarding Disposition of Motion to
Dismiss and for More Definite Statement of Defendant-
Intervenor Wood
Order entered May 3, 1989.
Exhibie "I?
[Mattox's] Statement Concerning Non-Partisan Elections as an
Aspect of An Interim Remedy; Supplement to the Joint Motion
for Entry of Proposed Interim Plan
Defendant-Intervenor Harris County District Judge <Sharolyn
Wood's Response to Attorney General Mattox's Statement
Concerning Non-Partisan Elections and Supplement
Exhible 2)
Makei, "Judicial flap spawns oratory, not decision," Houston
Chronicle, December 20, 1989 at 211A, Cols. 5-6,
METROPOLITAN
Local & State
Oeatns, 26A
‘Weather. 27K :
Bureau s political acuon committec
— Ag Fund — paid the $18.000 filing 8ee HIGHTOWER on Page 27A.
Judicial flap spawns
oratory, not decision
By JOMN MAKEIG
Houston Chromcie
No decision will be made before
DEXt week on a judicial redistricting plan for Texas. but the oratory about
Who represents
whom In the ac-
tion was flowing
fast Friday.
Two Harris
County judges
dropped their
lawsuit against
Texas Attornev Er #5
General Jim
“We win — that's the bottom line.” Announced state District Judge Ted Poe. “He doesn't represent us or any
other juage in Texas. He oniv repre
sents nimseif."
Poe said he dropped the lawsuit
use an assistant attorney gen-
erai admitted in a hearing last week
that Mattox did not represent the
judges.
In Ausun. Mattox spokesman Ron
Dusek responded by saving. “Whats
the beef? Of course we don't repre.
sent them: thev weren't defengants
We never ciaimed to represer:
Whether anvone actualiv won or
lost 1n the Harris Couns fiz: 1a;
matter of interpretation. but Foe
said the path is now oper for mm to
become an official intervenor in the
federal acuon. Bevona that. Poe
-- said. he can appeai anv decision
-made by U.S. District Court Judge
Lucius Bunton.
Bunton found last month that the
current at-large svstem of electing
See JUDGES on Page 27A.
KEY TC CONDITIONS: C=Cloudv: ar=cnzzie: f=tair h=hazv- oc SN=3SNnow: Is=thunaersnowers: w=winay.
=Dartiy cious =tac- r=:
Judges
Continued from Page 21A.
state district judges in Texas iile-
gaily dilutes the voting strength of
minoriues. The League of United
Latin American Citizens and the
National Association for the Aag-
vancement of Colored Peopie had
sued Mattox and other officials in
hopes of Increasing their representa-
tion on state benches.
A settlement reached bv Mattox and LULAC cailed for Harris County
judges to be eiected from the coun-
tv's 26 legislative districts. Most
State district judges in the county
strongly oppose that proposal. sav- INg 1t would create judiciai “chaos
In major Texas counues.
To let Bunton know they disagreed with the proposed settlement, Poe and state District Judge Charles Hearn sued the attorney general.
Their now-defunct lawsuit savs
Mattox doesnt represent Texas’
juages in the federai court action,
oniy himseif.
“I think 1t opened Bunton’s eves to
the real situation 1n Harris County.
Hearn said. “If Mattox had his way. it wouid have been cnaos here.
Bevond the plan agreed on bv LULAC and Mattox. several others
Hearn Bunton
also have been presenteq to Bun:-
for consideration. Whether he wr
select one of them. combine pars ¢
various pians or chose one whouv ni:
OWN remains unknown.
In Midland. a clerk for Bunton said
the judge won't Sign any orders Ir: the
case “until Tuesday at the soones:
The last words in the clerk's state
ment — “at the soonest” — brougnt
JOY to some judges hearts. The fiiinc
deadline for state judgeship races is
Tuesday. and if nothing 1s signec hx -
Dm. that dav the next eieclic...
presumably wiil proceed unaffecteq.
Also Tuesdav. all 36 Harris County
state district judges facing re-esec-
ton in 1990 are to meet in state
District Judge Miron Love's court to
hold a bipartisan meeting to divide
up the county.
EXHIBIT
E
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN
AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
VS. No. 90-8014
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants. on
Go
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Ao
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Go
n
Ao
n
Ao
n
Ao
n
un
EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY FINAL ORDER PENDING APPEAL
Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 8(a), the Attorney General of Texas. on
behalf of the State of Texas and certain State Officials in their official
capacities! who were among the defendants below, move the Court to
stay, during the pendency of the appeal of this matter, the injunction
in the district court's order of January 2, 1990. Rather than burden
the Court with duplicate filings, the State Officials incorporate by
reference the exhibits accompanying the Emergency Application for
Stay filed on January 4, 1990, by Appellant Entz ("Entz Stay
Application"). The reasons for this stay application follow the
introduction:
INTRODUCTION
Because of extreme time pressures, see 1 11, this motion has
been written and quite likely will be filed before the district court acts
on an important motion, see 4 8, that might affect the nature of the
district court's remedy as to which a stay is being sought herein.
1 They are the Attorney General of Texas (Jim Mattox), the Secretary of State
(George S. Bayoud, Jr.), and the members of the Texas Judicial Districts Board Judges
Thomas R. Phillips, Mike McCormick. Ron Chapman, Thomas J. Stovall, Jr.. James F.
Clawson, Jr., John Cornyn, Robert Blackmon. Sam B. Paxson, Weldon Kirk. Jeff
Walker, Ray D. Anderson, and Joe Spuriock II and Mr. Leonard E. Davis).
Counsel for the State Officials will notify the Court immediately upon
the disposition of the pending district court motion.
The Court also should be aware that yesterday, January 9th, the
Governor of Texas called a special session of the 71st Texas
Legislature to convene at 2:00 p.m. on February 27, 1990. One of the
two purposes identified by the Governor's call is "to consider
legislation relating to the system for electing state appellate court
judges, state district court judges and statutory county court judges."
In light of its two recent orders (dated December 5, 1989. and
January 3, 1990), in the pending case of Rangel v. Mattox, No. 89-
6226, the Court should be aware of the Governor's action.
BACKGROUND
Qutline of Proceedings Before the District Court
19, On July 11, 1988, the plaintiffs filed their complaint,
challenging the system of electing state district court judges in
targeted Texas counties. They claimed that it diluted the voting
strength of minority voters in violation of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, as amended, and the United States Constitution.
2. By the time trial commenced on September 18, 1989,
others were parties to the lawsuit: (a) two sets of plaintiff-intervenors,
one from Harris County and one from Dallas County; (b) Sharolyn
Wood, an incumbent state district judge in Harris County, in her
personal capacity; and (c) Harold Entz, an incumbent state district
judge in Dallas County, in his personal capacity.
3. Also by the time of trial, the targeted counties had been
narrowed to nine: Harris (with 59 sitting state district judges); Dallas
(37); Tarrant (23); Bexar (19); Travis (13); Jefferson (8); Lubbock (6,
.3.
including 1 serving an additional county); Ector (4); and Midland (3).
The claim was on behalf of Black voters only in Harris, Dallas, Tarrant,
and Jefferson counties; on behalf of Mexican-American voters only in
Bexar and Travis counties; and on behalf of Black and Mexican-
American voters combined in Lubbock, Ector, and Midland counties.
4. The trial was conducted from September 18-22, 1989.
5. On November 8, 1989, the district court entered an order
that the system of electing state district judges in all nine targeted
counties violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The district
court found no constitutional violation. The district court has issued
subsequent orders correcting clerical mistakes and otherwise
modifying in certain technical respects its November 8th order.2
6. On January 2, 1990, the district court issued an order
enjoining further state district court elections in the nine counties
under the challenged state system and directing implementation of a
court-ordered interim remedial plan for the 1990 state district court
elections in the nine counties. A total of 115 judicial elections are
affected by the court-ordered interim plan. No permanent plan has
been ordered to be developed or implemented.
7. At page 8 of its January 2nd Order, the district court
denied to the State Officials any further stay of district court
proceedings.
8. On January 4, 1990, the Attorney General on behalf of the
State of Texas filed a Motion to Alter the Order of January 2, 1990. As
2 - The State Officials filed a protective Notice of Appeal of the November Sth
liability determination on December 22, 1989.
3.
explained in the Introduction, at the time of writing, the district court
has not yet ruled on the motion.
9. A Notice of Appeal on behalf of the State Officials was
mailed today by overnight courier service for filing tomorrow with the
district court.
QUTLINE OF THE COURT-ORDERED INTERIM REMEDIAL PLAN
10. The district court's interim remedy requires that state
district judges in the nine affected counties be elected in non-partisan
elections to full four year terms. There will be an initial election and,
if no one receives a majority of the votes, a run-off election. Instead of
the elections being countywide (as they are under the challenged
system), they will be conducted in sub-districts within the counties.
The following list shows the number of judicial elections affected by
the interim plan and the number and type of sub-district in which the
elections will take place by county: Harris (36 judges from 26 state
legislative districts); Dallas (32 from 17 state legislative districts);
Tarrant (14 from 9 state legislative districts); Bexar (13 from 10 state
legislative districts); Travis (6 from 5 justice of the peace precincts);
Jefferson (6 from 4 county commissioner precincts); Lubbock (3 from
4 county commissioner precincts); Ector (3 from 4 county
commissioner precincts); and Midland (2 from 4 county
commissioner precincts).
EMERGENCY NATURE OF MOTION
11. If the 1990 elections in the nine affected counties are to
go forward under the challenged system instead of the one ordered by
the district court, the state must know by Friday, January 12, 1990. It
Is by*that date that state law, 1 Tex. Adm. Code § 81.113, and practical
od.
necessity dictate that the list of candidates to appear on the party
primary ballots on March 13, 1990, be completed.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE STAY
Four Basic Factors in Stay Consideration
12. This stay request requires the Court to consider four basic
factors: (a) whether the State Officials can show a likelihood of
success on the merits; (b) whether they can show irreparable injury if
the stay is not granted; (c) whether granting the stay would
substantially harm the plaintiff-appellees: and (d) whether granting
the stay would serve the public interest. Hilton v. Braunskill. 107 S.Ct.
2113, 2119 (1987). Individualized judgments are required in each
case, thereby precluding rigid application of these rules of thumb. Id.
These same principles apply to stay requests in vote dilution cases
such as this one. See, e.g., Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 917 (5th
Cir. 1984).
Likelihood of success on the merits is not an invariable
requirement and gives way if the other three factors heavily favor the
State Officials and the legal issue is substantially meritorious. Ruiz v.
Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1042 (1983).
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
13. With regard to the November 8th liability determination,
the State Officials are likely to prevail for two basic reasons: (a)
contrary to the district court's dismissal of its principles as irrelevant,
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), remains viable law which
requires that the district court's vote dilution finding be overturned
because voting along partisan preference lines better describes the
-5-
outcome of the analyzed elections that bloc voting along racial lines;
and (b) Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is inapplicable to judicial
elections in which the office being sought by the candidates is one
involving essentially no collegial decisionmaking. These arguments
are more fully explored in the State Defendants' Post-Trial Brief,
which is Exhibit B-3 of the Entz Stay Application.
14. With regard to the provisions of the interim remedy
contained in the January 2nd order, the State Officials are likely to
prevail because there is no legal basis for the district court's order that
the interim sub-district elections be conducted on a non-partisan
basis. This remedy is wholly unrelated to any issue before the district
court and has nothing to do with remedying the vote dilution which
the district court determined existed in the nine affected counties. In
short, it is reform, not remedy. Reform is for the Texas legislature
and the people of Texas through state constitutional amendment. The
district court's order is a massive incursion into the state legislative
domain. These arguments are more fully explored in the
Memorandum Supporting Motion to Alter the Order of January 2,
1990, and the Statement Concerning Non-Partisan Elections As An
Aspect Of An Election Remedy, both of which were filed with the
district court. The former document is attached hereto and
incorporated herein as Exhibit A to State Officials’ Stay Request. The
latter document is the first part of Exhibit I-1 in volume II of
Appellant Wood's Stay Application and is incorporated herein.
Qther Equitable Factors
15. The district court's order to conduct non-partisan
electfons constitutes a major. unwarranted upheaval of a century-old
«6+
system of partisan elections in Texas. It is such a major disruption of
the scheme of things in the Texas judicial system that it runs afoul of
the Court's directive in Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir.
1988) (Chisom II), that federal courts should be especially wary of
intruding into state election systems and policy choices when the
state judiciary is concerned. The reason for this admonition is the
delicacy of the judicial task:
The core value of the law and its implementing
judicial system is stability -- the ability
reasonably to anticipate the results of actions
and proceedings, by individuals and by legal
institutions.
853 F.2d at 1190: cf. Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City
of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1989) (reemphasizing in
non-judicial setting the "potential for serious interference with state
functions" in voting rights decisions).
16. There is no real countervailing interest on the plaintiffs’
side which would warrant keeping the district court's January 2nd
order in place during the pendency of this appeal. Although the
district court permitted no evidence on the point, the apparent fact is
that non-partisan elections typically disadvantage minority voters as
compared to partisan elections. At any rate, the plaintiffs asked the
district court not to impose such a requirement as part of the interim
remedy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons further developed
in the incorporated exhibits, the State Officials urge the Court to grant
this emergency stay application before January 12, 1990, and to keep
ge 3
the stay in place during the pendency of this appeal. At least the 1990
elections should be allowed to go forward under the century-old
system rather than be displaced on ten days' notice by a new system
hitherto wholly foreign to the state and its policymakers.
Respectfully submitted,
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY F. KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
HICKS hy. J
Special Assistant Attorney General
JAVIER GUAJARDO
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE
OFFICIALS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[ certify that on this 10th day of January, 1990, I sent a copy of
the foregoing document by overnight courier to each of the following:
William L. Garrett, Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas, Suite
800, Dallas, Texas 75225; Rolando Rios, Southwest Voter Registration
& Education Project, 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521, San Antonio, Texas
78205; Sherrilyn A. Ifill, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New York, New York 10013:
Gabrielle K. McDonald, 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 2050, Austin,
Texas 78701; Edward B. Cloutman, III, Mullinax, Wells, Baab &
Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm Street, Dallas, Texas 75226-1637: J. Eugene
Clements, Porter & Clements, 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500, Houston.
Texas 77002-2730: Robert H. Mow, Jr., Hughes & Luce, 2800
Momentum Place, 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas 75201: John L.
Hill, Jr., Liddell, Sapp, Zivley, Hill & LaBoon, 3300 Texas Commerce
Tower, Houston, Texas 77002; and Seagal V. Wheatley, Oppenheimer,
Rosenberg, Kelleher & Wheatley, Inc., 711 Navarro, Sixth Floor, San
Antonio, Texas 78205.
gi WN
Vor
EXHIBIT A TO STATE OFFICIALS' STAY REQUEST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND /ODESSA DIVISION
LULAC COUNCIL #4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs.
VS. Civil Action No.
MO-88-CA-:54
JIM MATTOX, et al..
Defendants. Un
Wo
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Wo
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MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING MOTION TO ALTER THE ORDER OF
JANUARY 2, 1990
Without conducting an evidentiary hearing and in direct
contravention of state law and the recently-expressed preference of a
majority of the Texas Legislature. the Court has directed as part of its
interim remedial crder of January 2, 1990. that one hundred fifteen
stats C :irict judges in nine Texas counues be selected through non-
partisan elections. Straightforwardly stated, this part of the Court's
order is riot a judicia! remedy: it is judicial reform. The remedial garb
cannot disguisz its reform character. It cannot be squared with +=
Court's determination that "[p]arty affiliation is simply irrelevant under
the controlling law.” Finding of Fact No. 43, Memorandum Opinion
and Order of November 8, 1989. as modified. at p. 80.
L_GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The Court has given no explanation based in law or facts relevant
10 this case for rejecting century-old state election law. It has made
no factual findings on the issue: it has expressed no legal conclusions
on it; and it has conducted no evidentiary hearing on it. It simply has
announced it. However broad the Court's equitable powers may be,
thzy neither encompass nor justify what the Court has done.
While this forum is indisputably a proper one to resolve whether
the rights of minority voters are being protected. it is just as
indisputably the wrong one for debating whether state judges should
be elected in non-partisan elections. The Texas Legislature and the
people of Texas, not this Court, are the proper judges of that debate.
It is before them that the debate must be conducted and by them that
the contentious issue must be resolved. The laudable objectives of the
Voting Rights Act leaves that part of our federal system unperturbed.
It has not changed the balance so much that all state election policy
choices may be made by the federal courts. If supported by the facts,
policy choices that disenfranchise minority voters may be overricen:
however, some c.ioices remain for the states. Here. the Court not only
ex-rcised a policy choice the state alone is entitled to make: in doing
so, it has adopted a policy widely recognized as harmful to mino:-“ty
voters because of its disproportionately depressive effect on minority
voter turr.. ut. Enhancement of minority voter rights pursuant to the
dictates of the Voting Rights Act provides no legal justification for
diminishing those same rights pursuant :o the dictates of some
unspecified law or power.!
The Court should resist an all-too-understandable inclin: zion to
cut the Gordian knot of this difficult debate while wielding its judicial
sword at other aspects of state election law appropriately within its
jurisdictional arc. Instead, it is obligated to heed the Fifth Circuit's
1 This legal proposition is valid even if, in the short term. the enhancement
exceeds to some degree the diminishment. The accuracy of such speculaticn is
tnaddressed by the evidence in this case. Even if it had been. however. the
diminishment is legally baseless because it is unaccompanied by a-y legal principle.
3.
‘staunch admonition” in recent voting rights decision involving
elected state judges:
[A] federal court should jealously guard and
sparingly use its awesome powers to ignore or
brush aside long-standing state constitutional
provisions. statutes, and practices. There can
be no doubt that . . . federal courts do and
indeed must have this authority in our unique
form of government. It is the use of this power
that must be maintained in the balance, a
balance which is more delicate than usual
when a state's judicial process is involved.
Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1988): see also
Cook v. Luckett, 735 F.2d 912, 918 (5th Cir. 1984) (in remedying vote
dilution, "federal court must honor state policies to the greatest extent
possible when choosing among available plans or fashioning its ow=":
emphasis added).
Guided by these governing principles and for the more pract:_al
reasons set forth below,2 the Court should re-tailor the interim
remedy to fit the violation it has found and grant the Motion to Alter
the Order of January 2, 1990.
[I. PRACTICAL REASONS
A Financial Burden
The Secretary of State's Office estimates that conducting 1990
non-partisan elections on the May and June dates ordered by the
Court will cost between two and three million dollars more than
conducting elections under the system of party primary and general
elections governing Texas district judge races for over a century.
While such a large financial imposition might not constitute a barrier
4 See also Statement Concerning Non-Partisan Elections As An Aspect Of An
Intertm Remedy, flled December 29. 1989.
3
to equitable relief directly related to violations of the Voting Rights
Act, it is a legitimate barrier to the imposition of relief unrelated to
the violations determined by the Court on November 8th. Cf
Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872
F.2d 1201. 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1989) (categorizing costliness of
reorganization in voting rights cases as irrelevant factor in liability
finding, although potentially relevant in crafting a remedy).3
B Administrative Burdens and Associated Uncertainties
There are massive gaps between the Court's January 2nd
directive to conduct non-partisan judicial elections in 1990 and the
statutory framework set forth in the Texas Election Code ar
conducting elections. Set forth below are some of the crucial gaps
between the provisions of the Election Code. which was not enacted in
contemplation of non-partisan elections for state officials, and the
dictates of the Court, which provides no direction on how to conduct
such elections.
The order fails to designate the officials responsible for
conducting the election, and the Election Code does not answe:- the
questions of who is to give notice of this election, to order election
supplies, to print the ballots, to appoint the election judges and clerks
for the polling places, to conduct absentee voting, and to canvass the
election returns.
3 There is an additional financial considerations apparently not contemplated in
the Court's order. State statutes make no provision for the State to pay for the Court-
ordered election. The counties likewise lack the statutory authority to do so. Who is to
Pay is a question that state law leaves unanswered. The order also fails to specify:
whether the candidates must pay a filing fee: what the fee is; who is to recetve the fee: or
whether a petition in lieu of a filing fee is permitted. The Election Code does not answer
any of these questions.
The order does not recognize that county-owned voting
equipment is traditionally used in the primary elections and by other
political subdivisions conducting elections on uniform election dates.
This court-ordered May and June election will severely interrupt the
state's other elections if the county retains its equipment for the
court-ordered election and refuses to provide it to the political parties
and other political subdivisions.
The order does not prescribe a method for determining the
order in which opposing candidates names will appear on the non-
partisan ballot for the judicial races.
The order does not specify which election precincts are to be
used in he county nor does it address the permissibility of
consolidating election precincts for this election.
The order is silent on the period for absentee voting. The
Election Code gives no guidance on the absentee voting period for the
cour" -ordered runoff.
The order does not address the permissibility of write-i-
candidates in the election or whether a declaration of intent to run as
a write-in is required.
The order does not discuss whether candidates may withdraw
from the election or establish a deadline for such withdrawal.
The order does not name the authority responsible for
canvassing the returns of the election. It does not address whether
the canvass is conducted locally only or whether a state-level canvass
is required.4
4 The order creates yet another anomaly, apparently uncontemplated by the
Court. There is a possibility (indeed a likelihood) that additional vacancies will occur
in the office of district judge in the nine affected counties. Such vacancies will be filied
.5-
The order does not specify the recount procedures to be
followed in the election. The failure to specify the canvassing
authority renders the Election Code provisions useless for a recount of
the election.
The transition from the current electoral system for state offices
to the non-partisan system mandated by the Court cannot be made
under the existing combination of the Texas Election Code and the
Court's January 2nd order. The Court will have to amend its order
either to direct additional changes to the state election process or to
permit use of the existing state process of party primaries and general
elections. The latter course clearly is more consistent with the
Court's rulings, the Voting Rights Act, and fundamental principles of
federalism. Within the confines of the violations round by the Court, it
would accomplish two laudable goals: minimization of disruption of
the state electoral process: and enhancement of the interim relie:
afforded the plaintiffs.
III. -FILI
There is an alternative to the court-ordered plan which. while it
still presents substantial difficulties, a!leviates to some extent the
administrative and financial burdens discussed in Part II. above. It is
not being recommended to the Court. merely noted for its
consideration.
Earlier incarnations of state election law permitted "cross-filing"
for elective offices. The Court might consider a version of cross-filing
to be appropriate in the matter now before it. Candidates for state
in accordance with the Election Code. which means that those unexpired terms will be
filled in countywide partisan elections.
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|
district judge could file with either or both political parties to appear
on the March primary ballot. Filing would be accempanied either by a
petition with the appropriate number of signatures or by a filing fee
which would be split between the two parties. Candidates then would
appear on both parties ballots in the March primary. Any runoff then
would occur in the November general election.
CONCLUSION
The Court's directive to conduct non-partisan district judge
elections in 1990 unduly and unnecessarily intrudes into a matter
lying within the state legislature's domain. Through his submittal of a
joint motion urging adoption of the proposed interim plan. :he
Attorney General on behai. of the State of Texas harmonized as much
as possidle the Court's November 8th mandate to revise the state
electoral system to protect minority voting rights with long-
established state policies expressed in fundamental state law. The
Attorney General urges the Court to re-establish that harmony by
receding (rom its order that non-partisan elections be part of the
interim remedy.
Respectfully submitted.
din ALA
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2191
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 4th day of January, 1990. I sent a copy of
the foregoing document by overnight courier to each of the following:
William L. Garrett, Garrett, Thompson & Chang, 8300 Douglas. Suite
800, Dallas, Texas 75225; Re. indo Rios. Southwest Voter Registration
& Education Project. 201 N. St. Mary's, Suite 521, San Antonio. Teas
78205; Sherrilyn A. Ifill. NAACP Legal Defense -nd Educational Fuad.
Inc., 99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor, New Yc:k. New York 10013;
Gabrielle K. McDonald. 301 Congress Avenue. Suite 2050. Austin.
Texas 78701; Edward B. Cloutman, III, Mullinax, Wells. Baab &
Cloutman, P.C., 3301 Elm Street. Dallas. Texas 75226-1637: J. Eugene
Clements, Porter % Clements, 700 Louisiana, Suite 3500. Houston,
Texas 77002-2730: and Robert H. Mow, Jr.. Hughes & Luce, 2800
Momentum Place, 1717 Main Street, Dallas, Texas 75201.
Rerea Hicks
EXHIBIT
F
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR T HE FIFTH CIRCUIT
U-S. CLURT OF Apps
No. 90-8014 FILED
JAN 11 1999
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN GIL
CITIZENS, COUNCIL NO. 4434, BERT F, SANUCHEAY
RiS
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, ETC., ET AlL.,
Defendants,
JIM MATTOX,
Defendant-Appellee,
versus
JUDGE F. HAROLD ENTZ, ETC.,
and JUDGE SHAROLYN WOOD, ETC.
and GEORGE S. BAYOUD, JR., ETC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
and
TOM RICKHOFF, SUSAN D. REED, JOHN
J. SPECIA, JR., SID L. HARLE, SHARON
MACRAE and MICHAEL P. PEDAN, Bexar
County, Texas State District Judges.
Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas
Before GEE, DAVIS and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
IT IS ORDERED that appellants’ motion for stay
pending appeal are GRANTED. We do so in order that the State of
Texas may be allowed a reasonable opportunity to address the
problem presented by the holding of the district court entered
November 8, 1989, that the state system of selecting judges is
invalid as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. See
Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1988).
That holding, if sustained on appeal, will require an
organic and wholesale review and reconstitution of the Texas
judicial selection system, a task which should be addressed and
carried out by the state’s elected representatives, rather than
by the federal courts. Only if it becomes apparent that the state
is unwilling to act with measured and appropriate speed in this
regard should our courts intervene. When the State has had a
reasonable period within which to address the problem presented
in a special session of the Legislature, the Court will entertain
a motion to dissolve. That has not yet occurred; when it does, we
will be amenable to a motion to dissolve the stay which we enter
today. In the meantime, on our own motion, we EXPEDITE and
consolidate the appeals from the district court’s orders of
November 8, 1989, and January 2, 1990.1
1 This appeal being founded on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(a) (1) and
1292 (b), we need not concern ourselves about the motion pending
«
It is further ORDERED that the motion of appellant Judge
Sharolyn Wood, etc., for leave to consolidate this appeal with
case number 89-6226 is DENIED. Instead, on its own motion the
court consolidates this appeal with case number 90-9003.
It is further ORDERED that the motion of appellee Jim
Mattox, etc., for leave to strike the notice of designation of
independent counsel and the emergency application for stay filed
on behalf of George S. Bayoud, Jr. is DENIED.
“before the trial court (denominated a "Rule 59(e)" motion in
certain of the filings) to modify that court’s interlocutory
injunctive order. Rule 59(e) has no application to interlocutory
orders, and the notice of appeal vests jurisdiction over this
order in our court. See Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp. , 869
F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1989).
EXHIBIT
G
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND /ODESSA DIVISION
LULAC COUNCIL #4434, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
VS. Civil Action No.
MO-88-CA-154
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants. on
Wo
n
Wo
n
Wo
n
Ao
n
Lo
n
Un
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that, in their official capacities, the Attorney
General of the State of Texas (Jim Mattox), the Secretary of State of the
State of Texas (George S. Bayoud, Jr.), and the members of Texas's Judicial
Districts Board (Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas, Mike McCormick, Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Ron
Chapman, Presiding Judge of the 1st Administrative Judicial Region,
Thomas J. Stovall, Jr., Presiding Judge of the 2nd Administrative Judicial
Region, James F. Clawson, Jr., Presiding Judge of the 3rd Administrative
Judicial Region, John Cornyn, Presiding Judge of the 4th Administrative
Judicial Region, Robert Blackmon, Presiding Judge of the 5th
Administrative Judicial Region, Sam B. Paxson, Presiding Judge of the 6th
Administrative Judicial Region, Weldon Kirk, Presiding Judge of the 7th
Administrative Judicial Region, Jeff Walker, Presiding Judge of the 8th
Administrative Judicial Region, Ray D. Anderson, Presiding Judge of the 9th
Administrative Judicial Region, Joe Spurlock II, President, Texas Judicial
Council, and Leonard E. Davis) hereby appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the Court's Orders of January 2, 1990, and
January 11, 1990 (and the underlying liability determination in the order of
November 8, 1989, as modified).
(
Respectfully submitted,
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY F. KELLER
First Assistant Attorney General
or ) es ie : El
A FHCKS = ig
Special Assistant Attorney General
JAVIER GUAJARDO
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE DEFENDANTS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT couRt FF | | E D WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND /ODESSA DIVISION JBI 9:3 1357
LULAC COUNCIL #4434. et al.. U.S DISTRICT court
Plaintiffs, ov CLER FFiCT
roils DEPUTY
VS. Civil Action No.
MO-88-CA-154
JIM MATTOX, et al.,
Defendants. on
Wo
n
Un
Un
Ao
n
An
un
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that. in their official capacities, the Attorney
General of the State of Texas (Jim Mattox), the Secretary of State of the
State of Texas (George S. Bayoud. Jr.), and the members of Texas's Judicial
Districts Board (Thomas R. Phillips, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Texas, Mike McCormick, Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals, Ron
Chapman, Presiding Judge of the 1st Administrative Judicial Region,
Thomas J. Stovall, Jr., Presiding Judge of the 2nd Administrative Judicial
Region, James F. Clawson, Jr., Presiding Judge of the 3rd Administrative
Judicial Region, John Cornyn, Presiding Judge of the 4th Administrative
Judicial Region, Robert Blackmon, Presiding Judge of the 5th
Administrative Judicial Region, Sam B. Paxson, Presiding Judge of the 6th
Administrative Judicial Region, Weldon Kirk, Presiding Judge of the 7th
Administrative Judicial Region, Jeff Walker, Presiding Judge of the 8th
Administrative Judicial Region, Ray D. Anderson, Presiding Judge of the 9th
Administrative Judicial Region, Joe Spurlock II, President, Texas Judicial
Council, and Leonard E. Davis) hereby appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the Court's Order of January 2, 1990, (and
the underlying liability determination in the order of November 8, 1989, as
modified).
Respectfully submitted.
JIM MATTOX
Attorney General of Texas
MARY F. KELLER
ist 5 ant Attorney General
— RENEA HICKS i
Special Assistant Attorney General
JAVIER GUAJARDO
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
(512) 463-2085
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE DEFENDANTS
’
i