Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC and the Missouri State Conference of the NAACP Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
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December 12, 1997

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC and the Missouri State Conference of the NAACP Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 1997. b6bff81c-bc9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/ce7655e5-d76a-4720-b568-a65878fe8c9f/lutheran-church-missouri-synod-v-fcc-and-the-missouri-state-conference-of-the-naacp-brief-for-the-united-states-as-amicus-curiae. Accessed June 13, 2025.
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ORAL ARGUMENT IS SCHEDULED ON JANUARY 12, 1998 No. 97-1116 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD Appellant, v . FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, MISSOURI STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF THE NAACP, et al., Intervenors APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FINAL BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER Acting Assistant Attorney General MARK L. GROSS LISA WILSON EDWARDS Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES A. Parties and Amici Except for the United States, which is an amicus on appeal, all parties, intervenors, and amici appearing before the district court and this Court are listed in appellant's brief. B. Rulings Under Review References to the rulings at issue appear in appellant's brief. C. Related Cases Counsel for the United States is not aware that this case has previously been before this Court or any other court, nor is counsel aware of any related cases. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES ................................ 1 ISSUE PRESENTED.............................................. 2 STATUTES AND REGULATIONS .................................... 2 STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................... 2 STATEMENT OF THE C A S E ...................................... 2 A. F a c t s ................................................2 B. The FCC's EEO Regulation And Enforcement Practices . . 5 C. Administrative Proceedings .......................... 9 1. ALJ Decision......................................9 2. Review Board Decision ........................ 12 3 . FCC Decision.....................................13 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.......................................17 ARGUMENT: I. STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FCC'S RACE-NEUTRAL EEO REGULATION ................ 18 II. EVEN IF STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES, THE EEO REGULATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO SATISFY A COMPELLING INTEREST OF THE FCC . . . . 26 A. The FCC's EEO Regulation Serves A Compelling Governmental Interest ........................ 26 B. The FCC's EEO Regulation Is Sufficiently Narrowly Tailored ............................ 32 CONCLUSION................................................... 35 - 1 - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES: PAGE * Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200 (1995)................................ pass i m Billish v. City of Chicago. 962 F.2d 1269 (7th Cir. 1992), on rehearing, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993) 25 City of Richmond v. j.a . Croson Co.. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) ...................... 20, 21, 26, 32 Coomes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 572 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978) ........ 15 Coral Constr Co. v. King County. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992) . . 25 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) 14 Cunico V. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60. 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990)..................................... 21 ECC v. League of Women Voters. 468 U.S. 364 (1984) ........ 29 Florida State Conf. of Branches of the NAACP v. ECC, 24 F. 3d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1994).......................... 23 Fullilove V. Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980)............ 28, 32 Heller v. DP£, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) ........................ 19 Hopwpod v. State of Texas. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).................. 28 King's Garden. Inc, v. ECC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974) .............. 9, 13, 14 Metro Broadcasting. Inc, v. ECC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) . . 27, 28 Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson. No. 96-16729, 1997 WL 538757 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1997) .......... 24, 34 * Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks. -ii- CASES (continued): PAGE NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n. 425 U.S. 662 (1976) ........ 30 Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County. 26 F.3d 1545 (llth Cir. 1994).................................. 24, 25 Plyler v. Dos, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ........................ 19 Podberesky v. Kirwan. 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).......... 21 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) . . 28, 29 Regents of the Univ. of Cal, v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) .................................. 27 Schweiker v. Wilson. 450 U.S. 221 (1981) .................. 19 SEC v. Life Partners. Inc.. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996) . . . 2 Taxman v. Board of Educ.. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), petition for cert, granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997)................................ 28 TV9. Inc. v. FCC. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974) .................... 31 West Mich. Broad. Co. v. £££, 735 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985).................... 31 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND NOTICES: Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Employment Opportunity in the Broadcast Radio and Television Services. 2 FCC Red. 3967 (1987) ........ 8 Channel 5 Pub. Broad.. Inc.. 10 FCC Red. 10388 (1995) ........ 8 Enterprise Media of Toledo. L.P.. 12 FCC Red. 3920 (1997) . . 24 In re Applications of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Hearing Designation Order. 9 FCC Red. 914 (1994) ........ 3 In re Applications of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Initial Decision. 10 FCC Red. 9880 (ALJ 1995) . . . passim In re Applications of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Decision. 11 FCC Red. 5275 (Rev. Bd. 1996) . . . . 3, 12, 13 -in- ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND NOTICES (cont'd): PAGE IH-_re_JtoPlications of The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. Memorandum Opinion and Order. 12 FCC Red. 2152 (1997) .................. 13, 14, 15, 16 Nelson Enters. . Inc.. 12 FCC Red. 5234 (1997)................ 8 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees. 23 FCC 2d 430 (1970) ...................... 30 Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licensees. 54 FCC 2d 354 (1975).......... 30 Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices. 60 FCC 2d 226 (1976).................................. 30 Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to General Counsels (June 28, 1995) ........ 24 Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making. 11 FCC Red. 5154 (1996) ....................... 6, 7, 8, 31 Pappas Telecasting Inc. . 11 FCC Red. 2945 (1996) .......... 24 Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices. 18 FCC 2d 240 (1969).................................. 29 Resort Broad. Co.. 12 FCC Red. 7785 (1977) ................ 24 CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES: Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3 ........................ 29 First Amendment............................................ 14 Establishment Clause .................................... 14 Fifth Amendment...................................... 2, 14-15 Section 1, Equal Protection Clause ........................ 2 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 634, 98 Stat. 2797 (1984).............................. 30 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e £t. seq.................................14, 28 Section 702, 42 U.S.C. 2 0 0 0 e - l .............................14 - IV- Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 307 ........................................ 29 47 U.S.C. 309 (k) ...................................... ' 30 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1 .........................................15 47 U.S.C. 334 .............................................. 29 REGULATIONS: 47 C.F.R. 73.1015.................................. 12, 13, 15 * 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 passim 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(a) 5 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b) .................................. 5,6 9 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b)(1).................................. '9/22 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b)(3)................................ 32̂ 33 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 (c) . ................................. 6 9 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c) (1)-(5).............................. 6 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 (c) (1) (ii)............................... 10 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 (c) (2) : ...................................... 10 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c)(3)...................................... 11 47 C.F.R. 73.2080 (c) ( 5 ) ....................................... 11 47 C.F.R. 73.3612 .......................................... 31 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4722) 31 STATUTES (continued): PAGE -v- GLOSSARY EEO = FCC = RFRA = Equal employment opportunity Federal Communications Commission Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S C 2000bb-l IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 97-1116 THE LUTHERAN CHURCH-MISSOURI SYNOD Appellant, v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, MISSOURI STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF THE NAACP, et al., Intervenors APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION FINAL BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES This case involves a constitutional challenge to the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) regulation, 47 C.F.R. 73.2080, administered by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The regulation requires television and radio broadcasters to engage in efforts to establish and maintain a continuing program of equal employment opportunity, and to encourage qualified minorities and women to apply for employment positions at their stations. The FCC evaluates a broadcaster's compliance with the EEO regulation upon the filing of an application for renewal of the broadcaster's license. The United States has an interest in this case because the issue presented concerns the constitutionality of a federal regulation that seeks to ensure -2- equal employment opportunity and that is administered by a federal agency. Other agencies have adopted similar employment policies to ensure equal opportunity in the workplace. Thus, the Court's decision in this case could affect the employment practices of federal agencies. ISSUE PRESENTED We will address only the following question: Whether the FCC's EEO regulation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS All applicable statutes and regulations are contained in the appellant's and the appellee's briefs. STANDARD OF REVIEW The FCC's ruling that its EEO regulation is race-neutral and not subject to strict scrutiny analysis is a question of law subject to de novo review. See SEC v. Life Partners. Inc., 87 F.3d 536, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1996). STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Facts. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (hereinafter Church or licensee) operates two broadcast stations in Clayton, Missouri. KFUO(AM) is a day-time only, noncommercial station that broadcasts religious programming, and KFUO-FM is a full-time commercial station broadcasting classical music with some religious programming. Initial Decision, 10 FCC Red. 9880 56 (ALJ 1995)(J .A. 45). The stations are located on the campus of -3- Concordia Seminary, which is operated by the Church. Id. at 9881 57(J.A. 46). In September 1989, the Church filed applications to renew its licenses for both stations. The licenses were set to expire in February 1990. Decision, 11 FCC Red. 5275, 5276 55 (Rev. Bd. 1996)(J.A. 40). Shortly after the Church filed its renewal application, the FCC requested additional information about the stations' employment recruitment efforts (J.A. 40). The supplemental data submitted by the Church indicated that during the seven-year license term — February 1, 1983 to February 1, 1990 — the licensee “received no minority referrals” (J.A. 40). In January 1990, the Missouri State Conference of Branches of the NAACP, the St. Louis Branch of the NAACP, and the St. Louis County Branch of the NAACP (collectively NAACP), petitioned the FCC to deny the Church's license renewal, asserting noncompliance with the FCC's EEO regulations. Id. at 5275-5276 551, 6 (J.A. 39-40). The FCC sought additional information as to the Church's hiring practices, and learned that the Church required applicants for all jobs to be experienced in Lutheran doctrine, and for salespersons at the FM station also to have “classical music expertise.” Hearing Designation Order, 9 FCC Red. 914, 922 5523, 25, 26 (1994)(J.A. 90, 98-99). Representations made by the licensee in explaining its recruitment efforts and job requirements raised further questions with the FCC “as to whether and to what extent the licensee engaged in misrepresentation or lack of candor” regarding its EEO -4- program. Id, at 925 530(J.A. 101). The case was designated for a hearing. Id. at 925 531(J.A. 101). Evidence at the administrative hearing showed that over the seven-year license term, the two stations averaged 20 full-time and 11 part-time employees. Initial Decision, 10 FCC Red. at 9889 5568, 70(J.A. 54). During the seven-year license term, the AM and FM stations made 43 full-time hires, and sought referrals by placing job advertisements for 30 of those hires (69.8%). of the full-time hires, 25 (58.1%) were female and seven (16.3%) were minority. Of the seven minority hires, two were hired after January 2, 1990, the date that the NAACP filed its petition to deny renewal of the licenses. Id. at 568(J.A. 54). During the license term, the station hired 41 part-time employees, and sought referrals for 26 (63.4%) of those hires. Of the 26 referrals, 21 (80.7%) were from the Concordia Seminary. Of the 41 part-time hires, all were white and seven (17%) were female. IcL_ at 570 (J. A. 54) . The operations manager testified at the hearing that the licensee relied on “contacts at local Lutheran churches or agencies [including state employment agencies] to find applicants" for job openings. Id. at 9888, 9890 5566, 73(J.A. 53-55); see also id. at 9892 5581-83(J.A. 57)(describing religious publications and organizations where the licensee advertised job openings). The Church also “believed that it was essential or highly desirable for announcers and salespersons for the FM station to be knowledgeable about classical music.” id. M E M O R A N D U M TO: Ted Shaw Norman Chachkin Steve Ralston v/' David Goldberg Cathy Powell Olati Johnson FROM: Paul S o n n ^ " RE: Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC DATE: April 22, 1998 MF Attached are copies of the briefing in the D.C. Circuit in Lutheran Church-Missouri Svnod v. FCC, last week’s horrible decision concerning the FCC’s very modest EEO program for regulated broadcasters. Also attached are papers concerning a pending case, Safeco Insurance Co. v. City oj White House, involving another very modest affirmative action program: the EPA’s requirement that, on EPA-funded projects, contractors solicit bids from minority subcontractors. This is a pure outreach program, which imposes no requirements concerning the ultimate awarding of the subcontracts, and makes use of no numerical goals of any sort. An appeal from a favorable district court ruling is currently being briefed in the Sixth Circuit. -5- at 9900 5136(J.A. 65). During the license term, the FM station hired 15 salespersons, but only eight of the 15 persons had some classical music background or experience working at a classical music station. Id. at 9901 5145(J.A. 66). During the license term, the Church was informed by its counsel of the FCC's EEO requirements (id. at 9892-9893 5585-87, 92(J.A. 57-58)), and during the fall of 1988, the FM station's general manager attended a meeting by the Missouri Broadcasters Association where the EEO requirements were discussed. Id. at 9894 593(J.A. 59). B. The FCC's EEO Regulation And Enforcement Practices. The FCC's EEO regulation requires that licensees afford “equal opportunity in employment” to all qualified persons and prohibits discrimination in employment by licensees because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(a). The regulation requires broadcasters to “establish, maintain, and carry out a positive continuing program of specific practices designed to ensure equal opportunity in every aspect of station employment.” 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b). In order to facilitate equal employment opportunity at all levels of hiring and promotion, the regulation directs licensees to: (i) inform station managers of their responsibilities to ensure vigorous enforcement of its policy of equal opportunity; (ii) inform employees and recognized employee organizations of the station's EEO policy; (iii) communicate its EEO policy to sources of qualified applicants without regard to race, color, religion, national origin or sex; (iv) conduct a continuing program to -6- exclude unlawful forms of discrimination; and (v) conduct a continuing review of job structure and employment practices. 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b). The regulation also reguires licensees to engage in specific employment practices to ensure egual opportunity in the competition for job openings at broadcast stations. Licensees are directed to engage in the following “to the extent possible, and to the extent that they are appropriate in terms of the station's size, location, etc.” (47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c)): (1) Disseminate its equal opportunity program to job applicants and employees * * * * * (2) Use minority organizations, organizations for women, media, educational institutions, and other potential sources of minority and female applicants, to supply referrals whenever job vacancies are available in its operation * * * * * (3) Evaluate its employment profile and job turnover against the availability of minorities and women in its recruitment area * * * * * (4) Undertake to offer promotions of qualified minorities and women in a nondiscriminatory fashion to positions of greater responsibility [and] * * * * * (5) Analyze its efforts to recruit, hire, and promote minorities and women and address any difficulties encountered in implementing its equal employment opportunity program. Section 73.2080(c) gives licensees guidance on satisfying each of these obligations. 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c)(1)-(5). The FCC characterizes its EEO program as “an efforts-based approach to assessing EEO compliance." Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, n fcc Red. 5154, 5158 f7 (1996) (1996 Notice). The agency does not require licensees to employ -7- minorities or women at parity with their representation in the local labor force, or indeed to do any race-based hiring. Moreover, the agency does not require that a licensee's applicant pool achieve any particular level of racial balance. Instead, the FCC focuses on licensees' efforts to contact sources of referral for qualified minority and female candidates for job openings at stations, and calls for “self-analysis of [the licensee's] outreach program." Ibid. The FCC's EEO policy objective is to ensure that a licensee's method of notifying the public of job vacancies include a diverse range of persons, minority and non-minority, men and women, in order to give broadcasters a wide pool of qualified persons from which to choose in making employment decisions. Id. at 5158-5159. The FCC undertakes a two-step process in evaluating a licensee's EEO compliance. First, the agency reviews the station's EEO program as described in the renewal application, looking at “recruitment sources, minority and female referrals received, and the licensee's analysis of the effectiveness of its EEO efforts.” 11 FCC Red. at 5150 f9. The FCC also compares the composition of the station's workforce with the relevant labor force to determine whether the agency's processing guidelines are met.17 If this first stage of review indicates that the 17 The FCC's processing guidelines rely on data for the relevant labor force in the metropolitan statistical area where the station is located. Id. at 5160 n.19. Stations with five to 10 full time staff members satisfy the guidelines where minority and female representation in the overall staff is “at least 50% of that of the relevant labor force, and on their upper-level (continued...) -8- station's EEO efforts are satisfactory, the station will be found in compliance. If not, the FCC will engage in a second, more detailed analysis of the station's employment practices by reguesting additional information to determine whether the station notifies sources of minority and female referrals when job vacancies occur, and engages in continuous self-assessment of its EEO program. Ibid. The focus of the FCC's review is to ensure that a station's outreach efforts include minorities and woman as well as nonminorities and men.2/ Stations that engage in sufficient outreach, including efforts to reach minorities and women, even though their workforce may not reflect a commensurate level of minority and female employees, will be deemed in compliance with the regulation as long as their employment practices nevertheless are nondiscriminatory. See Channel 5 Pub. Broad.. Inc., 10 FCC Red. 10388 513 (1995) (despite failure to meet the agency's processing guidelines, licensee satisfies EEO requirements based on efforts to recruit minorities and women); Nelson Enters.f Inc., 12 FCC Red. 5234 59 (1997). - (...continued) staffs is at least 25% of that of the relevant labor force." Id. at 5160 510. Stations with 11 or more full-time staff satisfy the guidelines where minority and female representation of the staff “is at least 50% of that of the relevant labor force for both overall and upper-level job categories.” Ibid. Licensees are not bound to adhere to these guidelines in their hiring in order to satisfy the EEO rule. - In 1987, the FCC amended its EEO rules to de-emphasize the use of statistics in measuring EEO compliance, and instead to focus on the licensee's overall efforts to administer its employment practices in a nondiscriminatory manner. See Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Equal Employment Opportunity in the Broadcast Radio and Television Services. 2 FCC Red. 3967 (1987). -9- C. Administrative Proceedings. 1. ALJ Decision. After a five-day hearing, the ALJ determined that although the Church did not engage in intentional discrimination against any person, it gave an improper hiring preference to Lutheran church members for positions that were not reasonably connected with the espousal of the Church's views, in violation of King's Garden. Inc, v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974). Initial Decision, 10 FCC Red. at 9907 5193(J.A. 72). In Kina's Garden, the court of appeals upheld the FCC's rule that exempted employment connected with espousal of a licensee's religious views from the agency's EEO regulations, but required enforcement of the rule with respect to job positions that have no substantial connection with program content or positions connected with programs having no religious dimension. 498 F.2d at 60-61. Further, the ALJ determined that the licensee's EEO efforts “though flawed, were acceptable" for the first half of the license term (February 1983 to August 1987), but that the Church's efforts were “unsatisfactory” and violated 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b) and (c) during the second half (August 1987 to February 1990) in various respects. 10 FCC Red. at 9907 5193(J.A. 72). The ALJ determined that, during the second half of the license term, no management level employee implemented an effective or consistent EEO program, nor was any management level employee instructed to do so, in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b)(1). 10 FCC Red. at 9911 5218(J.A. 76). -10- The ALJ also found that the employment application used by the stations did not inform prospective employees that discrimination was prohibited, in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c) (1) (ii) . Instead, the application contained a statement that the Church “retained the right to give hiring preferences to persons who were members in good standing of a [Lutheran congregation].” Id. at 9911 5219(J.A. 76). As a result, the ALJ found that “prospective employees were given no notice of the Stations' EEO policies, and the employment application contained a statement that was sguarely contrary to the Commission's EEO policies” (J.A. 76). The ALJ also determined that efforts to solicit the assistance of sources that could result in minority applicants were “irregular, and were generally unsuccessful in attracting minorities to the Stations," in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c)(2). Id. at 9911 5220(J.A. 76). The ALJ found that although in July 1989 the licensee sent letters to 10 local universities and personnel agencies requesting minority and female referrals, the letters mentioned no specific job openings, and indicated that the station would inform the addressees once employment opportunities arose. The ALJ observed that although nine full-time and five part-time positions later arose, the licensee failed to make further contact with these organizations, and none of the letters resulted in referrals of minority applicants (J.A. 76). The ALJ also determined that the stations failed formally to -11- evaluate their employment profile and job turnover against the availability of minorities and women in their recruitment area, in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c)(3). Id. at 9912 5221(J.A. 77). Finally, the ALJ determined that the licensee failed to engage in continuing review of the stations' job structures, and failed to evaluate their efforts to recruit or hire minorities, in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(c)(5). Id. at 9912 ?222(J.A. 77). As a result of the stations' noncompliance with the EEO regulations, the ALJ imposed EEO reporting c o n d i t i o n s id. at 9916 ffl252-253, 9921 5282(J.A. 81, 86). The ALJ stated that these reporting conditions will afford the stations the opportunity to put into place an EEO program that is in compliance with the FCC's regulations, and enable the Commission to review the station's EEO efforts periodically. Id. at 9916 5253(J.A. 81). The ALJ also determined that the Church engaged in acts of misrepresentation and/or lack of candor in the following ways: (1) through statements made to the Commission with respect to the minority recruitment program detailed in its 1989 renewal application, and (2) by informing the Commission that knowledge of classical music was required for salespersons at the FM - The ALJ ordered the licensee to submit four reports in six-month intervals providing the following: a list of persons hired and those who applied for job openings during the reporting period, including their referral or recruitment source, job title, part-time or full-time status, job classification, date of hire, sex and race or national origin. 10 FCC Red. at 9921 5282(J.A. 86). The ALJ also required the licensee to provide a narrative statement as to its efforts to recruit minorities for positions filled during the respective six-month reporting periods, including recruitment sources utilized, and whether any applicants declined offers of employment. Id. at 9922 5282(J.A. 87) . -12- station, in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.1015. Id. at 9912 f223(J.A. 77). As a result of these misrepresentations, the ALJ imposed a forfeiture in the amount of $50,000. Id. at 9917-9918 5257(J.A. 82-83). 2. Review Board Decision. On petition for review, the FCC's Review Board affirmed the ALJ's determination that the licensee's EEO program was in noncompliance from August 1987 to February 1990. See Decision, 11 FCC Red. at 5277 514(J.A. 41). The Review Board affirmed the imposition of reporting requirements for its noncompliance with 47 C.F.R. 73.2080, and in addition subjected the Church's license to a short-term renewal ending January 1, 1997, one month earlier than the expiration of the current license term. Id. at 5281 5533-34(J.A. 43B). The Review Board also affirmed the ALJ's determination that the licensee lacked candor in describing its EEO program in the 1989 renewal application. Decision, 11 FCC Red. at 5278- 528 0(J.A . 42-43). Rather than respond to questions posed by the FCC in its renewal application, the licensee provided the following narrative statement (id. at 5278 520(J.A. 42)): When vacancies occur, it is the policy of KFUO and KFUO-FM to seek out qualified minority and female applicants. We deal only with employment services, including state employment agencies, which refer job candidates without regard to their race, color, religion, national origin or sex. We contact the various employment services and actively seek female and minority referrals and we specifically request them to provide us with qualified female and minority referrals. The Review Board determined that this statement represented to the Commission that the licensee had “a model program and sought out qualified minority and female applicants on a regular basis -13- from sources likely to refer such applicants." Id. at 5279 522(J.A. 43). The evidence adduced at the hearing disclosed that the licensee never implemented an EEO program, and sought gualified minority applicants only through “word of mouth.” id. at 5279 524(J.A. 43). The Review Board stated that the licensee's “pattern of indifference to the Commission's EEO requirements, including the information about the Station's actual EEO program expected as part of the renewal process, resulted in information not reflective of the truth and therefore is tantamount to a lack of candor”(J.A. 43) . - The Review Board affirmed the $50,000 forfeiture based on lack of candor in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.1015, and modified the ALJ's ordering clause to specify that the stations' renewals are granted for a short-term, ending January 1, 1997, one month before the normal license term. Id. at 5281 5531, 34, 5282 539(J.A. 44). 3. FCC Decision. The full Commission affirmed the Review Board's determination, but reduced the forfeiture for misrepresentation and lack of candor to $25,000, and restored the licensee's renewal to a full term. Memorandum Opinion and Order. 12 FCC Red. 2152 51 (1997)(J.A. 23). The Commission first addressed the constitutional arguments raised by the Church, and held that Kina's Garden, which limited the Church's exemption from the EEO rules only to those - The Review Board did not address the merits of the ALJ's second lack of candor determination, finding that the first instance of misrepresentation was sufficient for imposing the $50,000 forfeiture. Id. at 5280 527(J.A. 43A). -14- individuals hired in employment positions involved in espousing the Church's religious views, was not overruled by Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 12 FCC Red. at 2157 510(J.A. 28). The FCC observed that Amos upheld the constitutionality under the First Amendment of Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination in employment to secular, nonprofit activities of religious organizations.17 At the outset, the Commission observed that Amos was not a broadcast case, and did not discuss the Commission's EEO requirements (J.A. 28). The Commission further noted language in Kina's Garden that the broad exemption of religious activities in Section 702 “was simply not relevant to the Commission's regulation of the EEO practices of broadcast licensees under the public interest standard of the Communications Act." Id. at 2158 flO(J.A. 29), citing Kina's Garden. 498 F.2d at 58. Rejecting the application of the Section 702 exemption to the across-the-board hiring of religious broadcasters, the court of appeals in Kina's Garden stated (498 F.2d at 59): “[w]e have no evidence that Congress wished in 1972 to upset this well established doctrine that licensed broadcasters must meet FCC-imposed obligations inapplicable to the private sector generally." The Commission next rejected the Church's claim that the EEO regulation was race-conscious and therefore violated the Fifth The plaintiffs in Amos were individuals fired from their jobs with church-owned corporations for failing to qualify as church members. They argued that Section 702 of Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e-l), which exempts religious organizations from the prohibition against religious discrimination, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 483 U.S. 330-331. -15- Amendment, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 12 FCC Red. at 2159 113(J.A. 30). The Commission stated (J.A. 30): Contrary to the Church's position, our EEO rule does not use racial classifications, nor does it require that any person be hired or be given a hiring preference based on race. Rather, it requires that licensees make efforts to recruit minority and women applicants so that they will be assured access to the hiring process. Thus, the EEO rule, applied to the Church here, does not result in the deprivation of a constitutional right on the basis of race, and the Church has not even identified any person who arguably suffered any such injury. The Commission also rejected the Church's argument that application of the EEO regulations to its renewal violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-l, which prohibits government from “substantially burden[ing]” the free exercise of religion absent a compelling interest. The Commission held that the application of the EEO regulations is not a substantial burden on a religious broadcaster for those employment positions that are not involved in espousing religious views. 12 FCC Red. at 2160 514 (J.A. 31), citing Coomes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 572 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.) (“[c]ases abound in which the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion has been held to not be absolute, and indirect and incidental burdens thereon were found to be constitutionally proper"), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978). The Commission affirmed the ALJ and Review Board determinations with respect to the licensee's acts of misrepresentation in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.1015. The Commission agreed with the ALJ and Review Board that the -16- “licensee's composite description of its recruitment program submitted in its renewal applications was seriously misleading,” and that statements by the licensee “created a false impression that the licensee's program fully comported with Commission reguirements” when in fact the “licensee's EEO recruitment program had fallen into noncompliance." 12 FCC Red. at 2162 519(J.A. 33). The Commission held that the licensee displayed an intent to deceive the Commission with respect to describing its EEO program “because of the likelihood that serious guestions would be raised about their renewal applications." Id. at 2163 520(J.A. 34). The Commission further reinstated the ALJ's finding that station officials lacked candor with respect to the classical music requirement at the FM station. Id. at 2163 521(J.A. 34). The Commission held that the operations manager “knew that classical music knowledge was not a prerequisite * * * and that only half of the persons hired for sales positions had such experience." Id. at 2164 522 (J.A. 35). The Commission determined that the operations manager was "motivated by his knowledge of the licensee's inadequate recruitment efforts and * * * by the specific desire to justify the deficient practices at the FM station” (J.A. 35) . The Commission affirmed the decisions below granting the licensee's renewal subject to reporting conditions as a consequence of the EEO infractions in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080. Id. at 2165 523(J.A. 35A). The Commission reduced the $50,000 fine imposed by the ALJ, and affirmed by the Review Board, to $25,000. Id. at 2166 525(J.A. 36). -17- SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT The FCC's EEO regulation is a race-neutral nondiscrimination provision that does not require any licensee to engage in race conscious decision-making and therefore need not be evaluated under strict scrutiny. The licensee in this case was found to have violated the FCC's EEO regulation because it failed to adopt the nondiscrimination and outreach policies embodied in the FCC's regulation. That EEO regulation does not utilize racial classifications for purposes of governmental decision-making, and does not subject the licensee to government action because of factors that require race to be considered in decision-making. Instead, the rule requires only that a licensee not discriminate on the basis of race or sex in its employment practices, and that its outreach efforts are balanced enough to reach a diverse pool of potential applicants. No licensee is prohibited from engaging in any additional outreach or recruitment efforts it wishes to undertake. And nothing in the FCC policy requires a licensee to take any action affecting an applicant or employee on the basis of race, and therefore there simply is no predicate for the application of strict scrutiny. Even if this Court determines that strict scrutiny does apply in evaluating the constitutionality of the EEO regulation, the provision satisfies that level of review. The EEO regulation satisfies the compelling interest of the FCC to ensure that licensees engage in nondiscriminatory employment practices by, in part, not excluding women and minorities when making hiring decisions. The FCC's EEO program was also promulgated because of -18- the agency's determination that the presence of women and minorities at broadcast stations will help to ensure that the station will strive to serve the diverse programming needs of the community where the station is located. The FCC'5 EEO regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the second-prong of strict scrutiny analysis. Because it is a nondiscrimination provision, it has little or no effect on nonminorities. The FCC enforces the regulation in a flexible manner, and the regulation is subject to periodic review by the agency and Congress. ARGUMENT I STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FCC'S RACE-NEUTRAL EEO REGULATION The FCC's EEO regulation is not subject to strict scrutiny because it is race-neutral and nondiscriminatory, and does not require any race-conscious decision-making affecting any individual. Regulatory or statutory provisions that do not utilize race for purposes of decision-making ordinarily have not been subjected to strict scrutiny analysis. In this case, the federal regulation under review requires broadcasters only to adopt nondiscriminatory employment policies and practices, and in doing so ensure that minorities and women are not arbitrarily excluded from consideration for job openings. The EEO regulation does not require licensees to create a racially-balanced applicant pool, and does not call for any race- based hiring. The regulation is merely designed to ensure that, to the extent practicable, licensees' recruitment and outreach -19- actions and public notification of job opportunities include efforts to reach minorities and women thereby create a diverse applicant pool from which they can make employment decisions on a nondiscriminatory basis.£/ This type of outreach, stopping well short of using race in decision-making, does not create the kind of race-based action that has been subjected to strict scrutiny. In Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Pena. 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny applies to a governmentally imposed racial classification that may deny an individual a benefit or otherwise detrimentally affect an individual based on race. The racial classification under challenge in Adarand was one incorporated into a subcontracting compensation clause included in bidding contracts for federal highway projects. Under the subcontracting compensation clause, prime contractors were compensated for the additional cost associated with awarding subcontracts to small businesses owned - Because the FCC's EEO regulation should not be subjected to strict scrutiny, we think that it should be subject to “rational basis” review. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) (under rationality review, the challenged government action is constitutional where it “classif[ies] the persons it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state action, we * * * seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose."). “[A] classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). Rational basis review requires only that the government demonstrate that it has a reasonable basis for its policy, and the policy should be upheld “even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Id. at 321. Because the FCC1s EEO regulation satisfies strict scrutiny, as explained infra at pp. 26-34, it clearly satisfies rational basis review. -20- and operated by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals. Under the terms of the contract, small businesses owned and operated by minorities were presumed socially and economically disadvantaged. 515 U.S. at 205. The Department of Transportation awarded a prime contract for a highway construction project to Mountain Gravel & Construction Co. When Mountain Gravel solicited bids from subcontractors, Adarand submitted the low bid. Ibid. Gonzales Construction Co., a minority-owned business, also submitted a bid. Despite Adarand's low bid, Mountain Gravel awarded the subcontract to Gonzales as permitted by the subcontracting compensation clause. Gonzales' race thereby was a factor in its receipt of the contract, and the decision not to give it to Adarand. Ibid. While the Supreme Court did not rule on the constitutionality of the racial classification challenged in Adarand, it did find that this kind of race-based decision making, even when Congressionally imposed, required analysis under strict scrutiny. The Court stated, “whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection,” id. at 229-230, and held that strict scrutiny applies to those federal racial classifications that cause unequal treatment based on race. Id. at 224, 227. This kind of racial classification is similar to the state-sponsored program that was subjected to strict scrutiny in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495-496 (1989). In Crosonf the Supreme -21- Court subjected the City of Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan to strict scrutiny analysis because it required prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses. Id. at 477. Other racial classifications that require decision-making based on race which have been subjected to strict scrutiny include a state university's decision to create a minority-only scholarship program fPodberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1992)), and a school board's decision to retain a less-senior black social worker over a white social worker during a reduction-in-force (Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60f 917 F.2d 431, 437-438 (10th Cir. 1990)). By contrast, the present case does not trigger strict scrutiny since the FCC's EEO regulation does not require the licensee to make any race-conscious hiring decisions, create a racially exclusive applicant pool, or create any specific racial balance in that pool. The FCC rule requires only that a licensee hire in a nondiscriminatory manner, and that the licensee make sure that its efforts to publicize job opportunities be broad enough to reach women and minorities who, according to the composition of the station workforce, may not have been reached in prior outreach activities, in addition to the non-minorities and men who have been reached by past outreach activities. The licensee's argument here (Church Br. 35-36 (emphases omitted)) that it was penalized by the FCC for failing to be “race-conscious at every step in its hiring process for every -22- vacancy” during the second half of its licensing term, is clearly specious, and inaccurately characterizes the findings of fact which constitute the basis for the violation of the EEO policy. The FCC's EEO regulation is a race-neutral nondiscrimination provision, and does not require “race-consciousness” during the hiring process. The FCC policy does not require race-conscious hiring practices at all; rather, the hiring must be nondiscriminatory. The outreach the FCC encourages a licensee to undertake for minorities and women in addition to the licensee's current outreach practices is not designed to create any particular racial balance in the applicant pool, but only to ensure that minorities and women are not excluded from notification of those opportunities. The FCC does not prohibit any particular type of outreach the licensee is already doing or may choose to adopt; the FCC seeks only to ensure that outreach efforts reach a broadly-defined public. The ALJ determined, and the Review Board and Commission affirmed, that the licensee failed to implement the FCC's race- neutral policies in the following ways. First, the ALJ found that management-level employees of the stations failed to implement a continuous or consistent EEO program, and that no management-level employee was specifically instructed to do so, in violation of 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b)(1). Initial Decision, 10 FCC Red. 9880, 9911 ^218 (ALJ 1995)(J.A. 76). Second, the ALJ found that the employment application used by the stations did not contain a notice informing prospective employees that discrimination was prohibited and that they could notify the -23- appropriate agencies if they believed they had been the victims of discrimination. Id. at 9911 5219(J.A. 76). Finally, the licensee failed to engage in continuing review of the stations' job structure, and failed to analyze its recruitment efforts. Id. at 9912 5222(J.A. 77). The licensee's violation of these race-neutral provisions does not trigger strict scrutiny analysis because the EEO policy simply does not require the licensee to engage in race-based decision-making. See also Florida State Conf. of Branches nf i-hP N&ACE v. ZCC, 24 F.3d 271, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[t]he Commission's EEO program does not * * * purport to require a licensee to achieve numerical goals of minority employment * * *.”). The evidence instead shows that the licensee preferred to employ Lutheran church members, and as a direct result of that practice failed to comply with the nondiscrimination policy embodied in 47 C.F.R. 73.2080. Thus, the FCC's determination to impose reporting requirements on the licensee is not the result of a program requiring a racial preference and does not require justification under strict scrutiny. The FCC's EEO regulation requires only that certain measures be taken to ensure a broad pool of applicants — one that includes qualified minorities and women — by requiring that licensees announce job openings on a nondiscriminatory basis, and to expand existing practices to avoid excluding appropriate organizations and institutions likely to refer qualified minority and female job applicants to the extent practicable. The regulation does not preclude outreach to organizations that the - 2 4 - licensee regularly utilizes for job referrals. In fact, where outreach to these organizations results in a broad pool of candidates, a licensee will be found in compliance with the regulation. See Resort Broad. Co., 12 FCC Red. 7785 ^7 (1977) ; accord Enterprise Media of Toledo. L.P., 12 FCC Red. 3920 512 (1997); Pappas Telecasting Inc.f 11 FCC Red. 2945 512 (1996). Therefore, there is simply no race-based decision-making and no predicate for strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Monterey Mechanical Co. V. Wilson, No. 96-16729, 1997 WL 538757, *9 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 1997) ("We are not faced with a non-discriminatory outreach program, requiring that advertisements for bids be distributed in such a manner as to assure that all persons, including women- owned and minority-owned firms, have a fair opportunity to bid. The Equal Protection Clause as construed in Adarand applies only when the government subjects a 'person to unequal treatment.'”). Indeed, the Justice Department, in its review of the Adarand decision that was disseminated to all federal agencies, carefully scrutinized this issue, and concluded that outreach and recruitment aimed at minorities or women generally did not fall within strict scrutiny because race or sex was not a factor in any actual employment decisions. See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum to General Counsels at 7 (June 28, 1995) (attached as Addendum). Courts that have addressed outreach have characterized such practices as race-neutral. In Peiahtal v. Metropolitan DadP County, 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994), the court of appeals evaluated the constitutionality of an affirmative action plan - 2 5 - that sought to redress prior discrimination against minorities and women in a county fire department. Plaintiff, a white male, applied to become a firefighter when the department was hiring pursuant to a program that called for the selection of black, Hispanic and female applicants in accordance with certain goals. Despite plaintiff's high score on the firefighter examination, black, Hispanic and female applicants were hired over plaintiff in order to satisfy the terms of the affirmative action plan. Id. at 1548-1549. In evaluating the affirmative action plan under the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, the court of appeals observed that the county had engaged in unsuccessful “race-neutral measures” for remedying the discrimination against women and minorities. The unsuccessful race-neutral measures were: (1) “initiat[ing] high school and college recruiting programs to provide information and to solicit applications from young minorities and women for firefighting positions”; (2) engaging in “outreach programs"; and (3) designating a "recruitment specialist to organize and implement a special recruitment program.” Id. at 1557-1558; see also Coral Constr. £sl». v. King County. 941 F.2d 910, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) (training sessions for small businesses and providing information on accessing small business assistance programs considered “race- neutral measures”), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992); Billish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1290 (7th Cir. 1992) ("aggressive recruiting" considered a race-neutral measure), on rehearing, 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 908 (1993). Thus, the portion of the FCC's EEO regulation -26- that calls for outreach to women and minorities, to the extent practicable, is a race-neutral measure that need not be subjected to strict scrutiny. II EVEN IF STRICT SCRUTINY APPLIES, THE EEO REGULATION IS CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO SATISFY A COMPELLING INTEREST OF THE FCC Even if strict scrutiny applies, the FCC's EEO regulation is constitutional. In Adarand, the Supreme Court made applicable to federal uses of racial classifications the same standard of review, strict scrutiny, that the Court's decision in Croson applied to state and local uses of racial classifications. Under strict scrutiny, the use of racial criteria must be shown to satisfy a compelling governmental interest, and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235-237; Croson. 488 U.S. at 493, 507. A. The FCC '-S EEO Regulation Serves A Compelling Governmental Interest In Croson f Justice O'Connor stated that remedying the identified effects of past discrimination constitutes a compelling interest that can support the use of a racial classification by the government. Justice O'Connor stated that compelling interest can be established where the government seeks to remedy the effects of its own discrimination, or where it seeks to remedy the effects of discrimination by private actors within its jurisdiction, i.e., where the government becomes a "passive participant" in that conduct and helps to perpetuate a system of exclusion. Croson, 499 U.S. at 492; id. at 518-519 - 2 7 - (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In this case, the FCC's EEO policy was adopted for the purpose of deterring discriminatory employment practices by licensees, and to promote programming that reflects the interests of minorities and women in the community. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-320 (1978), Justice Powell wrote that a university has a compelling interest in student diversity and thus can take the race of applicants into account in its admissions process. Id, at 311-314. In Metro Broadcasting. Inc, v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Supreme Court held that diversification of ownership of broadcast stations was a permissible basis for using race- based criteria because the FCC's objective was to serve the goal of programming diversity. Id. at 567-568. The Court reached that conclusion after applying “intermediate scrutiny” to the FCC's “benign use of race." Adarand overturned Metro Broadcasting only to the extent that Metro required “intermediate scrutiny” of racial classifications by the federal government. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226-227. The Adarand Court did not address whether the FCC's minority ownership policy as a measure to further diverse programming would satisfy strict scrutiny. Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The majority today overrules Metro Broadcasting only insofar as it is 'inconsistent with [the] holding' that strict scrutiny applies to 'benign' racial classifications promulgated by the Federal Government. * * * The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is not inconsistent with the -28- Court 's holding today — indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case * * *.") . Federal appeals courts that have recently addressed whether diversity is a permissible basis to support the use of racial criteria have rejected it on Constitutional grounds (Hopwood v. State Qf Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert- denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996)), and under Title VII (Taxman v. Board of Educ.. 9 1 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), petition for cert, granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997)). However, unlike the school board in Taxman and the State in Hopwood, the FCC is unique in that it has an inherent responsibility pursuant to its congressional mandate to ensure that broadcasters operate their stations in the public interest, including ensuring that broadcasters offer a wide variety of news and information in order to meet the diverse needs of the community. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 230 (“[R]equiring that Congress, like the States, enact racial classifications only when doing so is necessary to further a 'compelling interest1 does not contravene any principle of appropriate respect for a coequal branch of the Government.”); Fullilove V. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-473 (1980); Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the FCC has a substantial government interest in ensuring that broadcasters present a balanced and adequate coverage of news and public issues. The Court stated that broadcast licensees have an obligation to act in the public interest, and that the FCC, as the agency regulating the nation's - 2 9 - airwaves, has the authority to impose certain obligations on a licensee to serve this public trust. Id. at 379-380. “[G]iven spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a sense as fiduciaries for the public by presenting 'those views and voices which are representative of [their] community.'’’ £££ v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984), quoting Red Lion. 395 U.S. at 389. Congress regulates broadcasters through its Commerce Clause powers, and “through the regulatory oversight of the FCC [can ensure] that only those who satisfy the 'public interest, convenience, and necessity1 are granted a license to use radio and television broadcast frequencies." Id. at 376. Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 307, Congress authorized the FCC to determine the conditions which shall attach to the grant of an application for renewal of a broadcast license. The FCC's rule prohibiting employment discrimination by licensees was first implemented in 1969, and required licensees to establish, maintain and carry out a positive, continued program to ensure EEO in every aspect of station employment. Petition for Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 18 FCC 2d 240 (1969). In 1992, Congress codified the FCC's EEO requirements by directing the agency to bolster broadcast EEO enforcement by conducting midterm review of broadcast television stations, and endorsed the EEO regulation by prohibiting the Commission from amending it as it pertains to television licensees and permittees. 47 U.S.C. 334. In 1996, Congress codified the agency's procedures for - 3 0 - license renewal by enacting legislation that required the agency, prior to renewal, to ascertain whether the station “has served the public interest, convenience, and necessity” and whether there have been any “serious violations * * * of this [Act] or the rules and regulations of the Commission." 47 U.S.C. 309(k). When this legislation was promulgated, the FCC had formulated many rules designed to prohibit employment discrimination by licensees. See Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees. 23 FCC 2d 430 (1970); Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies and Practices of Broadcast Licenseesr 54 FCC 2d 354 (1975); Nondiscrimination in Employment Practices, 60 FCC 2d 226 (1976). The Supreme Court has indirectly endorsed the FCC's EEO regulations. In NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 425 U.S. 662 (1976), the Court struck down similar regulations proposed by the NAACP as in excess of the Commission's statutory mandate. However, the Court observed that the FCC's EEO rules could “be justified as necessary to enable the FCC to satisfy its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 seq., to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups.” 425 U.S. at 670 n.7. The FCC extended the EEO rules to cable television systems, and Congress codified that requirement in 1984. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2797 (1984). The language of Section 634 of the Cable Communications Policy Act mirrors that of the FCC's EEO - 3 1 - regulation, and also requires that cable broadcasters file annual employment reports similar to that required of broadcasters pursuant to 47 C.F.R. 73.3612. Congress explained (H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4722)): Because of the potentially large impact cable programming and other services provided by the cable industry has on the public, the employment practices of the industry have an importance greater than that suggested by the number of its employees. The Committee strongly believes that equal employment opportunity requirements are particularly important in the mass media area where employment is a critical means of assuring that program service will be responsive to a public consisting of a diverse array of population groups. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that the FCC may promulgate regulations that help to ensure that stations provide programming that is responsive to minorities and women in the local community. See TV9. Inc, v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929, 937-938 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974); West Mich. Broad. Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 613-616 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). The Commission “does not assume that minority and female employment will always lead to minority and female-oriented programming or to the expression of a particular minority or female viewpoint on the airwaves,” but the agency recognizes that “as more minorities and women are employed in the broadcast industry, varying perspectives are more likely to be aired." 11 FCC Red. at 5156 f3. The Commission stated in the 1996 Notice (ibid.) that deterrence of unlawful discrimination rests[] on the belief that a broadcaster that engages in unlawful discrimination cannot, by definition, fulfill the needs of the entire community * * * [and] that employment discrimination in the - 3 2 - broadcast industry inhibits our efforts to diversify media ownership by impeding opportunities for minorities and women to learn the operating and management skills necessary to become media owners and entrepreneurs. B. The FCC's EEO Regulation Is Sufficiently Narrowly Tailored The FCC's EEO program is sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy strict scrutiny. Factors for determining whether federal program utilizing racial criteria is narrowly tailored include: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (2) the duration of the remedy and whether it is subject to periodic review; (3) program flexibility and the availability of waiver provisions; (4) the manner in which race is used; and (5) the effect of the program on nonbeneficiaries. Fullilover 448 U.S. at 510-516 (Powell, J., concurring); Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-510. The FCC's EEO rule encompasses race-neutral provisions in that it proscribes discrimination against all persons on the basis of race and sex, and directs licensees to afford equal opportunity in employment to all qualified persons. 47 C.F.R. 73.2080. The regulation also requires licensees to communicate its EEO policy and employment needs to sources of qualified applicants without regard to race and sex. 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b)(3). Because the FCC uses race-neutral measures in implementing its EEO program, it satisfies this element of strict scrutiny. Further, the FCC periodically reviews its EEO program and over the years has made the nondiscrimination provision applicable to new forms of telecommunications technology. See, supra pp. 29-32. Since the EEO regulation is subject to regular - 3 3 - review by the FCC and Congress, it therefore satisfies this element of narrow tailoring. The FCC's EEO program is inherently flexible in that it does not require that minorities or women be hired at broadcast stations. Rather it merely seeks to ensure that announcements for job openings are distributed to sources for referral of qualified candidates that will include organizations that are likely to reach qualified minority and female applicants. Moreover, in the case of a job opening at a station, the EEO program does not require that a certain number of minorities or women apply for positions, nor does it proscribe the kinds of outreach a station may choose to do. The only requirement of the EEO policy is that broadcasters engage in efforts that may create a broad pool of potential applicants, including potential minority and female candidates. Quite significantly, the EEO regulation's use of racial criteria is extraordinarily modest, in that it merely requires broadcasters to include potential sources of minority and female applicants when job vacancies occur. Such outreach to sources likely to produce minority and female candidates is undertaken consistent with the FCC's requirement that licensees communicate its EEO policy and employment needs to qualified applicants, and sources for referral of qualified applicants, without regard to race or sex. 47 C.F.R. 73.2080(b)(3). Thus, the outreach measure does not require that licensees direct their recruiting efforts solely to minority and female candidates. The regulation requires that licensees recruit on a nondiscriminatory basis, and - 3 4 - in that process institute measures to ensure, to the extent practicable, communication of employment opportunities include qualified minorities and women. Finally, the EEO regulation has virtually no effect on nonminorities. It has no direct racial affect on nonminority candidates for employment since the regulation is designed to further nondiscrimination in employment at broadcast stations and merely to expand the number of job applicants. Nonminority candidates for employment are not disadvantaged here based on their race, since the regulation permits licensees to make employment decisions on a nonracial basis. 1 J The FCC's EEO regulation is fundamentally different from the “good faith efforts" provision ruled unconstitutional in Monterey Mechanical. 1997 WL 538757, at * *15. While that California contracting provision required prime contractors to engage in "good faith efforts" to subcontract with minority-, women- and disabled-veteran-owned firms, the regulation also imposed on prime contractors "mandatory requirements" designed to meet a 23% goal for contracting with these businesses. Id. at *1, 10. Prime contractors who were also minority, female or disabled-veteran-owned could satisfy this percentage goal by retaining a percentage of the work for themselves, whereas persons falling outside the state statute's protected class were required to subcontract out 23% of the work on a public contract, or at minimum engage in good faith efforts to do so. Id. at *7. The FCC's EEO regulation, however, does not impose such a requirement. -35- CONCLUSION The FCC's order should be affirmed. ISABELLE KATZ PINZLER Acting Assistant Attorney General MARK L. GROSS LISA WILSON EDWARDS Attorneys Department of Justice P.O. Box 66078 Washington, D.C. 20035-6078 'W M k ■: - - - • • • ■ > £ m ■■■:■ ' - % 7 - v : ^ ■ ■' * . ■ C : £ S N ■ 1 - • ■-■ ' .v ■ ■ v. »::j . . . ' *r ' • . • r . . . - . V : . /:■ ■ • • ! ; • __: ;••• : • ' , - r - .. • •V • ■ /•<■. . . V - , : ' r . x. • ' ' ■ . f •. - ■ :■ - - V if.; ■■ ■■■ . ... - • m t - ■" '’ ■ • • • . ; -i* ̂ ;/•' ' 4 .. '. 1 ... * • .. - ' -- :• '*■. - • ‘ . .. . •* . '•>/ . . .• •• •- , * >*- '• . A D D E N D U M c •*C . . ' " * '• •• • i ' ■\ , - . •. Office of Legal Counsel 30530 June 28, 1995 MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL COUNSELS From: Walter Dellinger Assistant Attorney General { ^ — Re: Ada rand This memorandum sets forth preliminary legal guidance on the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Adarand Constructors. Inc, v. Pena. 63 U.S.L.W. 4523 (U.S. June 12, 1995), which held that federal affirmative action programs that use racial and ethnic criteria as a basis for decisionmaking are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The memorandum is not intended to serve as a definitive statement of what Adarand means for any particular affirmative action program. Nor does it consider the prudential and policy questions relevant to responding to Adarand. Rather, it is intended to provide a general overview of the Court's decision and the new standard for assessing the constitutionality of federal affirmative action programs. Our conclusions can be briefly summarized. Adarand made applicable to federal affirmative action programs the same standard of review, strict scrutiny, that Citv of Richmond v. J.A. Croson C o.. 488 U.S. 469 (1989), applied to state and local affirmative action measures -- with the important caveat that, in this area, Congress may be entitled to greater deference than state and local governments. Although Adarand itself involved contracting, its holding is not confined to that context; rather, it is clear that stria scrutiny will now be applied by the courts in reviewing the federal government’s use of race-based criteria in health, education, hiring, and other programs as well. The Supreme Court in Adarand was careful to dispel any suggestion that it was implicitly holding unconstitutional all federal affirmative action measures employing racial or ethnic classifications. A majority of the Justices rejected the proposition that "stria scrutiny" of affirmative action measures means "stria in theory, fatal in faa," and agreed that "the unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country" may justify the use o f race-based remedial measures in certain circumstances. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4533. jcL at 4542 (Souter, J., dissenting); i&. at 4543 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Only two Justices advocated positions that approach a complete ban on affirmative action. The Court s decision leaves many questions open — including the constitutionality of the very program at issue in the case. The Court did not discuss in detail the two requirements of strict scrutiny: the governmental interest underlying an affirmative action measure must be "compelling" and the measure must be "narrowly tailored" to serve that interea. As a consequeace, oar analysis of Ada rand's effects on federal *nion must be based on Croson and the lower court decisions applying strict scrutiny to and local programs. It is unclear, however, what differences will emerge in the application of stria scrutiny to affirmative action by the national government; in particular, the Court expressly left open the question of what deference the judiciary should give to determinations by Congress that affirmative action is necessary to remedy discrimination against racial and ethnic minority groups. Unlike state and local governments, Congress may be able to rely on national findings of discrimination to justify remedial racial and ethnic classifications; it may not have to base such measures on evidence o f discrimination in every geographic locale or seaor of the economy that is affected. On the other hand, as with state and local governments under CrPSOn, Congress may not predicate race-based remedial measures on generalized, historical societal discrimination. Two additional questions merit mention at the outset. First, the Court has not resolved whether a governmental institution must have sufficient evidence of discrimination to establish a compelling interest in engaging in race-based remedial action before it takes such action. A number of courts of appeals have considered this question in reviewing state and local affirmative action plans after Croson. and all have concluded that governments may rely on "post-enactment" evidence — that is, evidence that the government did not consider when adopting the measure, but that reflects evidence of discrimination providing support for the government's determination that remedial action was warranted at the time of adoption. Those courts have said that the government must have had some evidence of discrimination when instituting an affirmative action measure, but that it need not marshal all the supporting evidence at that time. Second, while Adarand makes clear that remedying past discrimination will in some circumstances constitute a compelling interest sufficient to justify race-based measures, the Court did not address the constitutionality of programs aimed at advancing nonremedial objectives - such as promoting diversity and inclusion. For example, under Justice Powell's controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. 438 U.S. 265 (1978), increasing the racial and ethnic diversity of the student body at a university constitutes a compelling interest, because it ennches the academic experience on campus. Under stria scrutiny, it is uncertain whether and in what settings diversity is a permissible goal of affirmative action beyond the higher education context. To the extent that affirmative action is used to foster racial and ethnic diversity, the government must seek some further objective beyond the achievement of diversity itself. Our discussion in this memorandum proceeds in four steps. In Section I, we analyze the facts and holding of Adarand itself, the scope of what the Court did decide, and the questions it left unanswered. Section II addresses the stria scrutiny standards as applied to state and local programs in Croson and subsequent lower court decisions; we consider the details of both the compelling interest and the narrow tailoring requirements Croson - 2 - mandated. In Section HI, we turn to the difficult question o f how precisely the Croson standards should apply to federal programs, with a focus on the degree o f deference courts may give to congressional determinations that affirmative action is warranted. Finally, in an appendix, we sketch out a series o f questions that should be considered in analyzing the validity under AAnnH of federal affirmative action programs that employ race or ethnicity as a criterion. The appendix is intended to guide agencies as they begin that process. I. The Adarand Case A. Facts Aria rand involved a constitutional challenge to a Department o f Transportation ("DOT") program that compensates persons who receive prime government contracts if they hire subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by "socially and economically disadvantaged" individuals. The legislation on which the DOT program is based, the Small Business Act, establishes a government-wide goal for participation of such concerns at "not less than 5 percent of the total value of ali prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year." 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1). The Act further provides that members of designated racial and ethnic minority groups are presumed to be socially disadvantaged. Id, § 637(a)(5). § 637(d)(2),(3); 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(b)(1).' The presumption is rebuttable. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124. I l l (c)-(d), 124.601-124.609.2 In Adarand. a nonminority firm submitted the low bid on a DOT subcontract. However, the pnme contractor awarded the subcontract to a minority-owned firm that was presumed to be socially disadvantaged; thus, the prime contractor received additional compensation from DOT. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4525. The nonminority firm sued DOT, arguing that it was denied the subcontract because of a racial classification, in violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for DOT. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that DOT'S race-based action satisfied the requirements of "intermediate scrutiny," which it determined was the applicable standard of review under the Supreme Court's rulings * 7 1 The following groups are entitled to the presumption: African American; Hispanic; Asian Pacific; Subcontinent Asian; and Native American. £« Adarand. 63 U.S.L.W. at 4524. This list of eligible groups parallels that of many federal affirmative action programs. 7 DOT also uses the subcontractor compensation mechanism in implementing the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 ("STURAA"), Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106(c)(1), 101 Stat. 145, and its successor, the IntermodaJ Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 ("1STEA"), Pub. L. No. 102-240, $ 1003(b), 105 Stat. 1919-22. Both laws provide that "not less than 10 percent’ of funds appropriated thereunder "shall be expended with small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” STURAA and ISTEA adopt the Small Business Act's definition of "socially and economically disadvantaged individual," including the applicable race-based presumptions. Adarand. 63 U.S.L.W. at 4525. - 3 - ir Metro Broadcasting. Inc, v. FCC. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), and Fullilove v. Klutznick. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Sss Adaand, 63 U.S.L.W . at 4525. B. The Holding By a five-four vote, in in opinion written by Justice O ’Connor, the Supreme Court held in Ada rand that strict scrutiny is now the standard o f constitutional review for federal affirmative action programs that use racial or ethnic classifications as the basis for decisionmaking. The Court made clear that this standard applies to programs that are mandated by Congress, as well as those undertaken by government agencies on their own accord. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4530. The Court overruled Metro Broadcasting to the extent that it had prescribed a more lenient standard of review for federal affirmative action measures. LL’ Under stria scrutiny, a racial or ethnic classification must serve a "compelling interest" and must be "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest. L i/ This is the same standard of review that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson C o.. 488 U.S. 469 (1989), applies to affirmative action measures adopted by state and local governments. It is also the same standard of review that applies to government classifications that facially discriminate against minorities. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4529, 4531. In a portion of her opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas, Justice O’Connor sought to "dispel the notion that stria scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact’" when it comes to affirmative action. LL at 4533 (quoting Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)). While that familiar maxim doubtless remains true with respect to classifications that, on their face, single out racial and ethnic minorities for invidious treatment/ Justice O’Connor's opinion declared that the federal government may have a compelling interest to a a on the basis of race to overcome the "persistence of both the practice and lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country." Id In this respect, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Adarand tracks her majority opinion in Croson. There, too, the Court declined to interpret 3 3 Justice O’Connor (along with three other Justices) bad dissented in Metro Broadcasting and urged the adoption of strict scrutiny as the standard of review for federal affirmative action measures. * A classification reviewed under intermediate scrutiny need only (i) serve an "important" governmental interest and (ii) be "substantially related" to the achievement of that objective. Metro Broadcasting. 497 U.S. at 564-65. 3 £«, e g.. McLaughlin v. Florida. 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (racial and ethnic classifications that single out minorities for disfavored treatment are in almost all circumstances "irrelevant to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose") (internal quotations omitted); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1,11 (1967) ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies" state law that prohibited interracial marriages). - 4 - the Constitution as imposing a flat ban on affirmative action by state and local governments. 488 U .S. at 509-11. Two members o f the ArlaraqH majority, Justices ScaJia and Thomas, wrote separate concurring opinions in which they took a more stringent position. Consistent with his concuning opinion in Croson. Justice Scalia would have adopted a near-absolute constitutional bar to affirmative action. Taking issue with Justice O’Connor’s proposition that racial classifications may be employed in certain circumstances to remedy discrimination against minorities, Justice Scalia stated that the "government can never have a ‘compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis o f race to ‘make-up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction." 63 U.S.L.W . at 4534 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).6 According to Justice Scalia, "[ijndividuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus on the-individual . . . The compensation o f victims o f specific instances of discrimination through "make-whole" relief, which Justice Scalia accepts as legitimate, is not affirmative action, as that term is generally understood. Affirmative action is a group-based remedy: where a group has been subject to discrimination, individual members of the group can benefit from the remedy, even if they have not proved that they have been discriminated against personally.7 Justice O’Connor’s treatment o f affirmative action in Adarand is consistent with this understanding. Although Justice Thomas joined the portion of Justice O’Connor’s opinion holding that the government's interest in redressing the effects of discrimination can be sufficiently compelling to warrant the use of remedial racial and ethnic classifications, he apparently agrees with Justice Scalia's rejection of the group-based approach to remedying discrimination. Justice Thomas stated that the "government may not make distinctions on the basis of race," and that it is "irrelevant whether a government’s racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help * In his Crosop concurrence. Justice Scalia said that he believes that "there is only one circumstance in which the States may act bv race to ‘undo the effects of past discrimination’: where that is necessary to eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial classification." 488 U.S. at 524 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). For Justice Scalia, *[t]his distinction explains [the Supreme Court’s] school desegregation cases, in which [it has] made plain that Slates and localities sometimes have an obligation to adopt race-conscious remedies. Id, The school desegregation cases are generally not thought of as affirmative action cases, however. Outside of that context. Justice Scalia indicated that he believes that *[a]t least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb . . . can justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that our Constitution is color-blind." Id. at 521. 7 Local 28. Sheet Metal Workers’ lnt’1 Ass’p v. EEOC. 478 U.S. 421,482 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.. 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986) (plurality opinion); jd, at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). those thought to be disadvantaged." I$L (Thomas, J., concurring in pan and concurring in the judgment). The four dissenting Justices in Adarand (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)' would have reaffirmed the intermediate scrutiny standard of review for congressionally authorized affirmative action measures established in Metro Broadcasting and would have sustained the DOT program on the basis of Fullilove. where the Coun upheld federal legislation requiring grantees to use at least ten percent of certain grants for public works projects to procure goods and services from minority businesses. Justices Stevens and Souter argued that the DOT program was more narrowly tailored than the legislation upheld in Fullilove. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4539-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting); at 4542 (Souter. J., dissenting). All four dissenters stressed that there is a constitutional distinction between racial and ethnic classifications that are designed to aid minorities and classifications that discriminate against them. As Justice Stevens put it, there is a difference between a "No Trespassing" sign and a "welcome mat." IjL at 4535 (Stevens, J., dissenting). i<L. ("an attempt by the majority to exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market is fundamentally different from a [race-based] subsidy that enables a relatively small group of [minorities] to enter that market."); also id. at 4543 (Souter, J., dissenting); isL at 4544 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For the dissenters, Justice O’Connor's declaration that strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs is not "fatal in fact" signified a "common understanding" among a majority of the Coun that those differences do exist, and that affirmative action may be entirely proper in some cases. XiL at 4543 (Ginsburg. J., dissenting). In Justice Ginsburg’s words, the "divisions" among the Justices in Adarand "should not obscure the Coun’s recognition of the persistence of racial inequality and a majority’s acknowledgment of Congress’ authority to act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to counteract discrimination's lingering effects." Id. The dissenters also emphasized that there is a "significant difference between a decision by the Congress of the United States to adopt an affirmative-action program and such a decision by a State or a municipality." 1^ at 4537 (Stevens, J., dissenting); isL at 4542 (Souter, J., dissenting). They stressed that unlike state and local governments, Congress enjoys express constitutional power to remedy discrimination against minorities; therefore, it has more latitude to engage in affirmative action than do state and local governments. IsL at 4538 (Stevens. J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that the majority opinion did not necessarily imply a contrary view. at 4542 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, there were at most two votes in Adarand (Justices Scalia and Thomas) for anything that approaches a blanket prohibition on race-conscious affirmative action. Seven justices confirmed that federal affirmative action programs that use race or ethnicity as a decisional factor can be legally sustained under certain circumstances. * * Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Souter wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. And Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice BreyeT. - 6 - C. Scope of Adarand Although Ada rand involved government contracting, it is clear from the Supreme Court’s decision that the stria scrutiny standard o f review applies whenever the federal government voluntarily adopts a racial or ethnic classification as a basis for derisiomnaking.' Thus, the impact o f the decision is not confined to contracting, bat will reach race-based affirmative action in health and education programs, and in federal employment.* 10 Furthermore, Ada rand was not a "quota" case: its standards will apply to any classification that makes race or ethnicity a basis for decisionmaking.11 Mere outreach and recruitment efforts, however, typically should not be subject to the Ada rand standards. Indeed, post- Croson cases indicate that such efforts are considered race-neutral means o f increasing minority opportunity.12 In some sense, o f course, the targeting o f minorities through outreach and recruitment campaigns involves race-conscious action. But the objective there is to expand the pool of applicants or bidders to include minorities, not to use race or ethnicity in the actual decision. If the government does not use racial or ethnic classifications in selecting persons from the expanded pool, Adarand ordinarily would be inapplicable.13 * Bv voluntary affirmative action, we mean racial or ethnic classifications that the federal government adopts on its own initiative, through legislation, regulations, or internal agency procedures. This should be contrasted with affirmative action that is undertaken pursuant to a court-ordered remedial directive in a race discrimination lawsuit against the government, or pursuant to a court-approved consent decree settling such a suit. Prior to Croson. the Supreme Court bad not definitely resolved the standard of review for court-ordered or court-approved affirmative action. See United States v. Paradise. 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (court order); Local 93. lnt’l Ass'n of Firefighters v Citv of Cleveland. 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (consent decree). The Court has not revisited the issue since Croson was decided. Lower courts have applied strict scrutiny to affirmative action measures in consent decrees. See, e g.. Stuart v. Roache. 951 F.2d 446, 449 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, J.). 10 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is the principal federal employment discrimination statute. The federal government is subject to its strictures. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17. The Supreme Court has held that the Title VII restrictions on affirmative action in the workplace are somewhat more lenient than the constitutional limitations. See Johnson v Transportation Agepcv. 480 U.S. 616, 627-28 n.6 (1987). But see id. at 649 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (expressing view that Title VI] standards for affirmative action should be "no different" from constitutional standards). 11 We do not believe that Adarand calls into question federal assistance to historically-black colleges and universities. “ See, e.g.. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County. 26 F.3d 1545, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1994); Billisb v. Citv of Chicago. 962 F.2d 1269, 1290 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated op other grounds. 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County. 941 F.2d 910, 923 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992). 13 Outreach and recruitment efforts conceivably could be viewed as race-based decisionmaking of the type subject to Adarand if such efforts work to create a "minorities-only" pool of applicants or bidders, or if they are so focused on minorities that nonminorities are placed at a significant competitive disadvantage - 7 - Adarand does not require stria scrutiny review for programs benefitting Native Americans as members of federally recognized Indian tribes. In Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Supreme Court applied rational basis review to a hiring preference in the Bureau of Indian Affairs for members of federally recognized Indian tribes. The Court reasoned that a tribal c lassification is "political rather than racial in nature," because it is "grained to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members o f quasi-sovereign tribal entities." I&. at 554. See id. at 553 n.24. Adarand did not address the appropriate constitutional standard of review for affirmative action programs that use gender classifications as a basis for decisionmaking. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never resolved the matter.14 However, both before and after Croson. nearly all circuit court decisions have applied intermediate scrutiny to affirmative action measures that benefit women.15 The Sixth Circuit is the only court that has equated racial and gender classifications: purporting to rely on Croson. it held that gender-based affirmative action measures are subject to stria scrutiny.16 17 That holding has been criticized by other courts of appeals, which have correctly pointed out that Croson does not speak to the appropriate standard of review for such measures.11 D. Open Questions on Remand Adarand did not determine the constitutionality of any particular federal affirmative action program. In fact, the Supreme Court did not determine the validity of the federal legislation, regulations, or program at issue in Adarand itself. Instead, the Court remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit for a determination of whether the measures satisfy strict scrutiny. with respect to access to contracts, grants, or jobs. 14 The lone gender-based affirmative action case that the Supreme Court has decided is Johnsop v. Transportation Agencv. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). But Johnson only involved a Title Ml challenge to the use of gender classifications — no constitutional claim was brought. at 620 n.2. And as indicated above (see supra note 10), the Court in Johnson held that the Title VII parameters of affirmative action are not coextensive with those of the Constitution. 17 See, e.g.- Fnslev Branch. NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579-80 (11th Cir. 1994); Contractors k̂ss’n v Citv of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d 990, 1009-10 (3d Cir. 1993); Lamprecht v. FCC. 958 F.2d 382. 391 (D C. Cir. 1992) (Thomas, J.); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County. 941 F.2d at 930-31; Gen. Contractors v. Citv and County of San Francisco. 813 F.2d 922, 939 (9th Cir. 1987). '♦ See Conlin v. Blanchard. 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989); |ss. llifi Brunet v. Citv of Columbus. 1 F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 1993), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct. 1190 (1994). 17 gee, e.g.. Enslev Branch. NAACP v Seibels. 31 F.3d at 1580. - 8 - Ada rand left open the possibility that, even under strict scrutiny, programs statutorily prescribed by Congress may be entitled to greater deference than programs adopted by state and local governments. This is a theme that some of the Justices had explored in prior cases. For example, in a portion of her Croson opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, Justice O'Connor wrote that Congress may have more latitude than state and local governments in utilizing affirmative action. And in his concurrence in Fullilove. Justice Powell, applying strict scrutiny, upheld a congressionally mandated program, and in so doing, said that be was mindful that Congress possesses broad powers to remedy discrimination nationwide. In any event, in Ada rand , the Court said that it did not have to resolve whether and to what extent courts should pay special deference to Congress in evaluating federal affirmative action programs under strict scrutiny. Aside from articulating the components o f the strict scrutiny standard, the Court’s decision in Adarand provides little explanation of how the standard should be applied. For more guidance, one needs to look to Croson and lower court decisions applying it. That exercise is important because Adarand basically extends the Croson rules of affirmative action to the federal level -- with the caveat that application of those rules might be somewhat less stringent where affirmative action is undertaken pursuant to congressional mandate. n. The Croson Standards In Croson. the Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to a Richmond, Virginia ordinance that required prime contractors who received city contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of those contracts to businesses owned and controlled by members of specified racial and ethnic minority groups -- commonly known as minority business enterprises ("MBEs"). The asserted purpose of Richmond's ordinance was to remedy discrimination against minorities in the local construction industry. Croson marked the first time that a majority of the Supreme Court held that race- based affirmative action measures are subject to strict scrutiny.11 Justice O’Connor's opinion in Croson19 said that "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this " Croson was decided by a six-three vote. Five of the Justices in the majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy) concluded that strict scrutiny was the applicable standard of review. Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, but consistent with his long-standing views, declined to *engag[e] in a debate over the proper standard of review to apply in affirmative-action litigation." 488 U.S. at 514 (Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). " Justice O’Connor’s opinion was for a majority of the Court in some parts, and for a plurality in others. - 9 - compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype." 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion). Ssc al$£ &. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("[Sjtrict scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classifications by race, whether or not its asserted purpose is '‘remedial' or ‘benign.'"). In short, the compelling interest inquiry centers on "ends" and whv the government is classifying individuals on the basis o f race or ethnicity; the narrow tailoring inquiry focuses on "means" and asks how the government is seeking to meet the objective of the racial or ethnic classification. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that (a) the Richmond MBE program did not serve a "compelling interest" because it was predicated on insufficient evidence of discrimination in the local construction industry, and (b) it was not "narrowly tailored" to the achievement of the city’s remedial objective. A. Compelling Governmental Interest l. Remedial Objectives Justice O'Connor’s opinion in Croson stated that remedying the identified effects of past discrimination may constitute a compelling interest that can support the use by a governmental institution of a racial or ethnic classification. This discrimination could fall into two categories. First, the government can seek to remedy the effects of its own discrimination. Second, the government can seek to remedy the effects of discrimination committed by private actors within its jurisdiction, where the government becomes a "passive participant" in that conduct, and thus helps to perpetuate a system of exclusion. 488 U.S. at 492 (plurality opinion); jd at 519 (Kennedy. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In either category, the remedy may be aimed at ongoing patterns and practices of exclusion, or at the lingering effects of prior discriminatory conduct that has ceased. Ada rand. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4542 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Court has long accepted the view that constitutional authority to remedy past discrimination is not limited to the power to forbid its continuation, but extends to eliminating those effects that would otherwise persist and skew the operation of public systems even in the absence of current intent to practice any discrimination."). Croson requires the government to identify with precision the discrimination to be remedied. The fact and legacy of general, historical societal discrimination is an insufficient predicate for affirmative action; "While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone, cannot justify a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in Richmond, Virginia." 488 U.S. at 499. isL at 505 ("To accept Richmond’s claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for ‘remedial relief for every disadvantaged group."). Similarly, "amorphous" claims of discrimination in certain sectors and industries are inadequate. !£. at 499 ("[A]n amorphous claim that there - 10 - has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot justify the use of an unyielding racial quota."). Such claims "provideQ no guidance for [the government] to determine the- precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy, and would have "no logical stopping point." Id. at 498 (internal quotations omitted). The Court indicated that its requirement that the government identify with specificity the effects of past discrimination anchors remedial affirmative action measures in the present. It declared that ‘ [i}n the absence of particularized findings" of discrimination, racial and ethnic classifications could be "ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future." IsL at 498. (internal quotations omitted). The Court in Croson did not require a judicial determination of discrimination in order for a state or local government to adopt remedial racial or ethnic classifications. Rather, relying on Justice Powell’s plurality opinion in Wygant v . Jackson Board of Education. 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the Court said that the government must have a "'strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.’" CrPSOP. 488 U.S. at 500 (quoting Wygant. 476 U.S. at 277). The Court then suggested that this evidence should approach "a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation" of the rights of minorities. 488 U.S. at 500.20 Notably, the Court said that significant statistical disparities between the level of minority participation in a particular field and the percentage of qualified minorities in the applicable pool could permit an inference of discrimination that would support the use of racial and ethnic classifications intended to correct those disparities. Id, at 507. See i i at 501 ("There is no doubt that where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.") (internal quotations omitted'). But the Court said that a mere underrepresentation of minorities in a particular sector or industry when compared to general population statistics is an insufficient predicate for affirmative action. Icf ("When special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who may possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value.") (internal quotations omitted). Applying its "strong basis in evidence" test, the Court held that the statistics on which Richmond based its MBE program were not probative of discrimination in contracting by the city or local contractors, but at best reflected evidence of general societal discrimination. Richmond had relied on limited testimonial evidence of discrimination, supplemented by ® Lower courts have consistently said that C tosod requires remedial affirmative action measures to be supported by a "strong basis in evidence" that such action is warranted. Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County. 26 F.3d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994); Concrete Works v. City and Countv of Denver. 36 F.3d 1513, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Donaghv v. City of Omaha. 933 F.2d 1448, 1458 (8th Cir.), cert, denied. 502 U.S. 1059 (1991). Some courts have said that this evidence should rise to the level of prima facie case of discrimination against minorities. See, e.g., O'Donnell Constr Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 450 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, J.); Cone Corn v Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 915 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 983 (1990). - 11 - statistical evidence regarding: (i) the disparity between the number of prime contracts awarded by the city to minorities during the years 1978-83 (less than one percent) and the city’s minority population (fifty percent), and (ii) the extremely low number of MBEs that were members of local contractors’ trade associations. The Court found that this evidence was insufficient. It said that more probative evidence would have compared, on the one hand the number of qualified MBEs in the local labor market with, on the other hand, the number o f city contracts awarded to MBEs and the number o f MBEs in the local contractors* associations. In Adarand Justice O’Connor’s opinion noted that "racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality," and as an example, it pointed to the "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct" that underpinned the court- ordered affirmative action measures that were upheld in United States v. Paradise. 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 63 U.S.L.W . at 4533 (internal quotations omitted).21 Her opinion did not say, however, that only overwhelming evidence of the sort at issue in Paradise can justify affirmative action. Again, Croson indicates that what is required is a "strong basis in evidence" to support the government’s conclusion that race-based remedial action is warranted, and that such evidence need only approach a prima facie showing of discrimination against minorities. 488 U.S. at 500. The factual predicate in Paradise plainly exceeded a prima facie showing. Post-Croson lower court decisions support the conclusion that the requisite factual predicate for race-based remedial action does not have to rise to the level of discrimination in Paradise. The Court in Croson left open the question whether a government may introduce statistical evidence showing that the pool of qualified minorities would have been larger "but for” the discrimination that is to be remedied. Post-Croson lower court decisions have indicated that such evidence can be probative of discrimination.:: Croson also did not discuss the weight to be given to anecdotal evidence of discrimination that a government gathers through complaints filed with it by minorities or through testimony in public hearings. Richmond had relied on such evidence as additional 21 The measures at issue in Paradise were intended to remedy discrimination by the Alabama Department of Public Safety, which had not hired a black trooper at any rank for four decades, 480 U.S. at 168 (plurality opinion), and then when blacks finally entered the department, had consistently refused to promote blacks to the uppeT ranks. Id. at 169-71. n See, e.g.. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d 990, 1008 (3d Cir. 1993); O’Donnell Constr Co. v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1992); sL Associated Gen. Contractors v. Coalition for Economic Equity. 950 F.2d 1401, 1415 (9th Cir. 1991) (government had evidence that an "old boy network" in the local construction industry bad precluded minority businesses from breaking into the mainstream of "qualified" public contractors). - 12 - support for its MBE plan, but the Court discounted it. Post-Croson lower court cases, however, have said that anecdotal evidence can buttress statistical proof of discrimination.* 23 24 * In addition, Croson did not discuss which party has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to the constitutionality o f an affirmative action program when it is challenged in court. Prior to Croson. the Supreme Court had spelled out the following evidentiary rule: while the entity defending a remedial affirmative action measure bears the initial burden o f production to show that the measures are supported by "a strong basis in evidence," the "ultimate burden” of proof rests upon those challenging the measure to demonstrate that it is unconstitutional. Wygant. 476 U .S. at 277-78 (plurality opinion).34 Lower courts consistently have said that nothing in Croson disturbs this evidentiary rule.23 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Croson did not resolve whether a government must have sufficient evidence of discrimination at hand before it adopts a racial classification, or whether "post-hoc" evidence of discrimination may be used to justify- the classification at a later date -- for example, when it is challenged in litigation. The Court did say that governments must "identify [past] discrimination with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.” 488 U.S. at 504. However, every court of appeals to consider the question has allowed governments to use "post-enactment" evidence to justify affirmative action -- that is, evidence that the government did not consider when adopting a race-based remedial measure, but that nevertheless reflects evidence of discrimination providing support for the determination that remedial action was warranted at the time of adoption.26 Those 33 £ee. e g . Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d at 1002-03 (while anecdotal evidence of discrimination alone rarely will satisfy the Croson requirements, it can place important gloss on statistical evidence of discrimination); Coral Constr Co. v King Countv. 941 F.2d at 919 (”[t]he combination of convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent;" anecdotal evidence can bring "cold numbers to life"); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough Countv. 908 F.2d at 916 (testimonial evidence adduced by county in developing MBE program, combined with gross statistical disparities in minority participation in public contracting, provided "more than enough evidence on the question of prior discrimination and need for racial classification''). 24 §« also Wygant. 476 U.S. at 293 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (when the government "introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby supplying the court with the means for determining that the [government] had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the [challengers] to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the [government’s] evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently ‘narrowly tailored"). 23 See, e g . Concrete Works v City and Countv of Denver. 36 F.3d at 1521-22; Contractors Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d at 1005; Cone Con? v. Hillsborough Countv. 908 F.2d at 916. 24 5S£ Concrete Works v. Cirv & County of Denver. 36 F.3d at 1521; Contractors Ass’n v. Citv of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d at 1004); Coral Constr Co. v King County. 941 F.2d at 920. As the Second Circuit put it when permitting a state government to rely on post-enactment evidence to defend a race- - 13 - cojrts have interpreted Croson as requiring that a government have some evidence of discrimination prior to embarking on remedial race-conscious action, but not that it marshal all such evidence at that time.27 * * * 2. Ngnremgdial Qtawiiycs Because Richmond defended its MBE program on remedial grounds, the Court in Croson did not explicitly address i f and when affirmative action may be adopted for "nonremedial" objectives, such as promoting racial diversity and inclusion. The same is true o f the majority opinion in Ada rand since the program at issue in that case also is said to be remedial. In his Adarand dissent, Justice Stevens said that the majority’s silence on the question does not foreclose the use of affirmative action to serve nonremedial ends. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4539 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, in the wake o f Croson and Adarand there are substantial questions as to whether and in what settings nonremedial objectives can constitute a compelling interest.31 To date, there has never been a majority opinion for the Supreme Court that addresses the question. The closest the Court has come in that regard is Justice Powell's based contracting measure, "[t]he law is plain that the constitutional sufficiency of . . . proffered reasons necessitating an affirmative action plan should be assessed on whatever evidence is presented, whether prior to or subsequent to the program’s enactment." Harrison & Burrowcs Bridge Constructors. Inc v. Cuomo. 981 F.2d 50. 60 (2d Cir. 1992). 2~ See Concrete Works v. Cirv and County of Denver. 36 F.3d at 1521 ("Absent any preenactment evidence of discrimination, a municipality would be unable to satisfy Croson. However, we do not read Croson’s evidentiary requirement as foreclosing the consideration of post-enactment evidence."); Coral Constr Co v. King County. 941 F.2d at 920 (requirement that municipality have "some evidence" of discrimination before engaging in race-conscious action "does not mean that a program will be automatically struck down if the evidence before the municipality at the time of enactment does not completely fulfill both prongs of the strict scrutiny test. Rather, the factual predicate for the program should be evaluated based upon all evidence presented to the district court, whether such evidence was adduced before or after enactment of the [program]."). One court has observed that the "risk of insincerity associated with post-enactment evidence ... is minimized" where the evidence "consists essentially of an evaluation and re-ordering of [the] pre-enactment evidence" on which a government expressly relied in formulating its program. Contractors Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d at 1004. Application of the post-enactment evidence rule in that case essentially gave the government a period of transition in which to build an evidentiary foundation for an affirmative action program that was adopted before Croson. and thus without reference to the Croson requirements. In Coral Construction, the Ninth Circuit permitted the government to introduce post-enactment evidence to provide further factual support for a program that had been adopted after Croson. with the Croson standards in mind. See Coral Constr. Co v. King Countv. 941 F.2d at 914-15, 919-20. l* Given the nation’s history of discrimination, virtually all affirmative action can be considered remedial in a broad sense. But as Croson makes plain, that history, on its own, cannot properly form the basis of a remedial affirmative action measure under strict scrutiny. - 14 - separate opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265 (1978), which said that a university has a compelling interest in taking the race o f applicants into account in its admissions process in order to foster greater diversity among the student body.” According to Justice Powell, this would bring a wider range of perspectives to the camp os, and in turn, would contribute to a more robust exchange of ideas - which Justice Powell said was the central mission of higher education and in keeping with the time-honored First Amendment value in academic freedom. £fi£ ifiL at 311-14.K Since Bakke. Justice Stevens has been the most forceful advocate on the Court for nonremedial affirmative action measures. He has consistently argued that affirmative action makes just as much sense when it promotes an interest in creating a more inclusive and diverse society for today and the future, as when h serves an interest in remedying past wrongs. A da rand. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4539 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Croson. 488 U .S. at 511-12 & n .l (Stevens, J., concurring); Johnson v. Transportation Agency. 480 U.S. 616, 646-47 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); Wygant. 476 U.S. at 313-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As a circuit judge in a case involving an ostensibly remedial affirmative action measure, Justice Ginsburg announced her agreement with Justice Stevens’ position "that remedy for past wrong is not the exclusive basis upon which racial classifications may be justified." O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Justice Stevens' concurrence in Croson. 488 U.S. at 511). In Metro Broadcasting, the majority relied on Bakke and Justice Stevens' vision of affirmative action to uphold FCC affirmative action programs in the licensing of broadcasters on nonremedial grounds; the Court said that diversification of ownership of broadcast licenses was a permissible objective of affirmative action because it serves the larger goal of exposing the nation to a greater diversity of perspectives over the nation's radio and television airwaves. 497 U.S. at 567-68. The Court reached that conclusion under intermediate scrutiny, however, and thus did not hold that the governmental interest in seeking diversity in broadcasting is "compelling." Ada rand did not overrule the result in Metro Broadcasting -- a point not lost on Justice Stevens. See Adarand. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4539 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The majority today overrules Metro Broadcasting only insofar as it" is inconsistent with the holding that federal affirmative action measures are subject to strict scrutiny. "The proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify [a racial or ethnic classification] is dqi inconsistent with the Court's holding today -- indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case . . . ."). On the other hand, portions of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Croson and her dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting appear to cast doubt on the validity of nonremedial 19 * * * 19 Although Justice Powell wrote for himself in Bakke. his opinion was the controlling one in the case. 50 Although it apparently has not been tested to any significant degree in the courts. Justice Powell’s thesis may carry over to the selection of university faculty: the greater the racial and ethnic diversity of the professors, the greater the array of perspectives to which the students would be exposed. - 15 - affirmative action programs. In one passage in her opinion in Croson. Justice O’Connor stated that affirmative action must be "strictly reserved for the remedial setting." 1 4 at 493 (plurality opinion). Echoing that theme in her dissenting opinion (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia) in Metro Broadcasting. Justice O’Connor urged the adoption o f strict scrutiny for federal affirmative action measures, and asserted that under that standard, only one interest has been “recognized" as compelling '*nfuigh to justify eariai classifications: “remedying the effects of racial discrimination.” 497 U.S. at 612. Justice Kennedy's separate dissent in Metro Broadcasting was also quite dismissive of non-remedial justifications for affirmative action; he criticized the majority opinion for “allow[ing] the use of racial classifications by Congress untied to any goal of addressing the effects of past race discrimination’). 14 at 632 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Nowhere in her Croson and Metro Broadcasting opinions did Justice O’Connor expressly disavow Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. Accordingly, lower courts have assumed that Justice O’Connor did not intend to discard Bakke.31 * That proposition is supported by Justice O’Connor’s own concurring opinion in Wvgant v, Jackson Board of Education. 476 U.S. 267 (1986), in which she expressed approval of Justice Powell’s view that fostering racial and ethnic diversity in higher education is a compelling interest. 14. at 286. Furthermore, in Wygant. Justice O’Connor said that there might be governmental interests other than remedying discrimination and promoting diversity in higher education that might be sufficiently compelling to support affirmative action. 1 4 For example, Justice O’Connor left open the possibility that promoting racial diversity among the faculty at primary and secondary schools could count as a compelling interest. 1 4 at 288 n“. In his Wvgant dissent, Justice Stevens argued that this is a permissible basis for affirmative action. Id. at 313-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). On the assumption that Bakke remains the law, it is clear that to the extent affirmative action is used to foster racial and ethnic diversity, the government must seek some further objective, beyond the mere achievement of diversity itself.33 As Bakke teaches, in higher education, that asserted goal is the enrichment of the academic experience. And according to 31 §££ Winter Park Communications. Inc, v. FCC. 873 F.2d 347, 353-54 (D.C. Cir. 1989), affd sub B9tli Metro Broadcasting. Inc v. FCC. 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Winter Park. 873 F.2d at 357 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Shurbert Broadcasting. Inc v. FCC. 876 F.2d 902, 942 (D C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, C.J., dissenting), affd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting. Inc, v. FCC. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). In Davis v. Halpem. 768 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court reviewed the law of affirmative action in the wake of Croson and Metro Broadcasting, and, citing Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. said that a university has a compelling interest in seeking to increase the diversity of its student body. 14 at 981. S« ajso United States v Board of Educ Township of Piscatawav. 832 F. Supp. 836, 847-48 (D.N.J. 1993) (under constitutional standards for affirmative action, diversity in higher education is a compelling governmental interest) (citing Bakke and Croson). 33 The Court has consistently rejected -racial balancing" as a goal of affirmative action. £« Croson. 488 U.S. at 507; Johnson. 480 U.S. at 639; Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. FFOC. 478 U.S. 421,475 (1986) (plurality opinion); Bakke. 438 U.S. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). - 16 - the majority in Metro Broadcasting, the asserted independent goal that justifies diversifying the owners of broadcast licenses is adding variety to the perspectives that are communicated in radio and television. That same kind of analysis must be applied to efforts to promote racial and ethnic diversity in other settings. For instance, diversification o f the ranks in a law enforces eat agency arguably serves vital public safety and operational needs, and thus enhances the agency's ability to carry out its functions effectively. See Wygant. 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("P]n law enforcement . . . in a city with a recent history o f racial unrest, the superintendent of police might reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a more effective job o f maintaining law and order than a force composed only of whites."); Paradise. 480 U .S. at 167 n.18 (plurality opinion) (noting argument that race-conscious hiring can "restoreO community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and facilitate^ effective police service by encouraging citizen cooperation").33 It is more difficult to identify any independent goal that may be attained by diversifying the racial mix of public contractors. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in Croson on precisely that ground. Citing his own Wygant dissent, Justice Stevens contrasted the "educational benefits to the entire student body" that he said could be achieved through faculty diversity with the minimal societal benefits (other than remedying past discrimination, a predicate that he said was not supported by the evidence in Croson) that would flow from a diversification of the contractors with whom a municipality does business. SSS Croson. 488 U.S. at 512-13 (Stevens. J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Furthermore, the Court has stated that the desire to develop a growing class of successful minority entrepreneurs to serve as "role models" in the minority community is not. on its own, a valid basis for a racial and ethnic classification. £eg Croson. 488 U.S. at 497 (citing Wygant. 476 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion)): see also Wygant. 476 U.S. at 288 n" (O'Connor, J., concurring). Diversification of the health services profession was one of the stated predicates of the racial and ethnic classifications in the medical school admissions program at issue in Bakke. The asserted independent goal was "improving the delivery of health-care services to communities currently underserved." Bakke. 438 U.S. at 310. Justice Powell said that ”[i]t may be assumed that in some situations a State’s interest in facilitating the health care of its citizens is sufficiently compelling to support the use of a suspect classification." IsL The 31 31 al!2 Detroit Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young. 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979), cert, denied. 452 U.S. 938 (1981) ("The argument that police need more minority officen it not simply that blacks communicate better with blacks or that a police department should cater to the public’s desires. Rather, it is that effective crime prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in the police."). - 17 - problem in Bakke. however, was that there was "virtually no evidence" that the preference for minority applicants was "either needed or geared to promote that goal." Id* u Assuming that some nonremedial objectives remain a legitimate basis for affirmative action after Ada rand, there is a question o f the nature o f the showing that may be necessary to support racial and ethnic classifications that are premised on such objectives. In higher education, the link between the diversity o f the student body and the diversity o f viewpoints on the campus does not readily lend itself to empirical proof. Justice Powell did not require any such evidence in Bakke. He said that the strong First Amendment protection of academic freedom that allows "a university to its own judgments as to education includes the selection o f its student body.” Bakke. 438 U .S. at 312. A university is thus due some discretion to conclude that a student "with a particular background — whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or disadvantaged — may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of its body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital service to humanity." LL at 314. It could be said that this thesis is rooted in a racial stereotype, one that presumes that members of racial and ethnic minority groups have a "minority perspective" to convey. As Justice O’Connor stated in Croson. a driving force behind stria scrutiny is to ensure that racial and ethnic classifications are not motivated by "stereotype." Croson. 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion). There are sound arguments to support the contention that seeking diversity in higher education rests on valid assumptions. The thesis does not presume that gU individuals of a particular race or ethnic background think and a a alike. Rather, it is premised on what seems to be a common sense proposition that in the aggregate, increasing the diversity o f the student body is bound to make a difference in the array o f perspectives communicated at a university. Metro Broadcastine. 497 U .S. at 579 ("The predictive judgment about the overall result o f minority entry into broadcasting is not a rigid assumption about how minority owners will behave in every case but rather is akin to Justice Powell’s conclusion in Bakke that greater admission of minorities would contribute, on average, to the robust exchange o f ideas.") (internal quotations omitted). Nonetheless, after Croson and Adarand. a court might demand some proof o f a nexus between the diversification of the student body and the diversity of viewpoints expressed on the campus.15 Likewise, a court may demand a faoual predicate to support the proposition that greater diversity in a law enforcement agency will serve the operational needs o f the agency * ** ** Aside from the proffered justification in Bakke. the government may have other reasons for — to Increase the number of minority health professionals. ** Justice Powell cited literature on this subject in support of his opinion in Bakke. See 438 U.S. at 312-13 n.48, 315 n.50. - 1 8 - and improve its performance,1* or that minority health care professionals are more likely to work in medically underserved communities.17 B. Narrow Tailoring Test In addition to advancing a compelling goal, m y governmental use of race must also be "narrowly tailored." There appear to be two underlying purposes o f the narrow tailoring test: first, to ensure that race-based affirmative action is the product of careful deliberation, not hasty decisionmaking; and, second, to ensure that such action is truly necessary, and that less intrusive, efficacious means to the end are unavailable. As h has been applied by the courts, the factors that typically make up the "narrow tailoring" test are as follows: (i) whether the government considered race-neutral alternatives before resorting to race conscious action; (ii) the scope of the affirmative action program, and whether there is a waiver mechanism that facilitates the narrowing o f the program’s scope; (iii) the manner in which is used, that is, whether race is a factor in determining eligibility for a program or whether race is just one factor in the decisionmaking process; (iv) the comparison of any numerical target to the number of qualified minorities in the relevant sector or industry; (v) the duration of the program and whether it is subject to periodic review; and (vi) the degree and type of burden caused by the program. In Adarand. the Supreme Court referred to its previous affirmative action decisions for guidance on what the narrow tailoring test emails. It specifically mentioned that when the Tenth Circuit reviewed the DOT program at issue in Adarand under intermediate scrutiny, it had not addressed race-neutral alternatives or the duration of the program. Before describing each of the components, three general points about the narrow tailoring test deserve mention. First, it is probably not the case that an affirmative action measure has to satisfy every factor. A strong showing with respect to most of the factors may compensate for a weaker showing with respect to others. Second, all of the factors are not relevant in every case. For example, the objective of the program may determine the applicability or weight to be given a factor. The factors may play out differently where a program is nonremedia]. Third, the narrow tailoring test should not necessarily be viewed in isolation from the compelling interest test. To be sure, the inquiries are distinct: as indicated above, the compelling interest inquiry focuses on the ends o f an affirmative action measure, whereas the * 5s* Haves v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass’n. 10 F.3d 207, 215 (4th Cir. 1993) (although the use of racial classifications to foster diversity of police department could be a constitutionally permissible objective, city failed to show a link between effective law enforcement and greater diversity in the department's ranks). 77 See Bakjce. 438 L.S. at 311 (opinion of Powell, J.) (noting lack of empirical data to support medical school’s claim that minority doctors will be more likely to practice in a disadvantaged community). - 19 - narrow tailoring inquiry focuses on the means. However, as a practical matter, there may be an interplay between the two. There is some hint o f this in Croson. In several places, the Court said that the weak predicate of discrimination on which Richmond acted could not justify the adoption of a rigid racial quota ~ which suggests that if Richmond had opted for some more flexible measure die Court might have been less demanding when reviewing the evidence of discrimination. By the same token, the more compelling the interest, perhaps less narrow tailoring is required. For example, in Sheet Metal Workers v FF.OC. 478 U.S. 421 (1986), and United States v. Paradise. 480 U.S. 149 (1987), the Supreme Court upheld what on their face appear to be rather rigid classifications to remedy egregious and persistent discrimination. However, it bears emphasizing that the Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized any trade-off between the compelling interest and narrow tailoring tests. It is also far from clear that the Court in Croson would have found that a more flexible MBE program, supported by the generalized evidence of discrimination on which Richmond relied, could withstand strict scrutiny. In addition, the membership of the Court has changed dramatically in the years since Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise. Both cases were decided by five-four margins, and only one member of the majority (Justice Stevens) remains. And while Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise that ample evidence of deeply entrenched discrimination gave rise to a very weighty interest in race-based action, she dissented on the ground that the particular remedies selected were too rigid. 1. Race-Neutral Alternatives In Croson. the Supreme Court said that the Richmond MBE program was not "narrowly tailored," in pan because the city apparently had not considered race-neutral means to increase minority participation in contracting before adopting its race-based measure. The Court reasoned that because minority businesses tend to be smaller and less- established, providing race-neutral financial and technical assistance to small and/or new' firms and relaxing bonding requirements might achieve the desired remedial results in public contracting -- increasing opportunities for minority businesses. 488 U.S. at 507, 510. Justice Scalia suggested an even more aggressive idea: "adopt a preference for small businesses, or even for new businesses -- which would make it easier for those previously excluded by discrimination to enter the field. Such programs may well have a racially disproportionate impact, but they are not based on race." IsL at 526 (Scalia, J., concurring). As such, they would not be subjected to strict scrutiny. The Court in Croson did not specify the extent to which governments must consider race-heutral measures before resorting to race-conscious action. It would seem that the government need not first exhaust race-neutral alternatives, but only give them serious - 20 - attention.” This principle would comport with the purposes of ensuring that race-based remedies are used only when, after careful consideration, a government has concluded that less intrusive means would not work. It also comports with Justice Powell's view that in the remedial setting, the government need not use the "least restrictive means" where they would not accomplish the desired ends as well. S s Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 508 (Powdl, J., concurring); j g also Wvgant. 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (plurality opinion of Justice PoweD) (narrow tailoring requirement ensures that "less restrictive means" are used when they would promote the objectives of a racial classification "about as well") (internal quotations omitted).” This approach gives the government a measure of discretion in determining whether its objectives could be accomplished through some other avenue. In addition, under this approach, the government may not be obliged to consider race-neutral alternatives every time that it adopts a race-conscious measure in a particular field. In some situations, the government may be permitted to draw upon a previous consideration of race-neutral alternatives that it undertook prior to adopting some earlier race-based measure.* 40 In the absence of prior experience, however, a government should consider race-neutral alternatives at the time it adopts a racial or ethnic classification. More fundamentally, even where race- neutral alternatives were considered, a court might second-guess the government if the court believes that an effective race-neutral alternative is readily available and hence should have been tried. £eg Metro Broadcasting. 497 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (FCC affirmative action programs are not narrowly tailored, in pan, because "the FCC has never determined that it has any need to resort to racial classifications to achieve its asserted interest, and it has employed race-conscious means before adopting readily available race- neutral, alternative means"); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199-200 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (district court’s race-based remedial order was not narrowly tailored because the court "had available several alternatives" that would have achieved the objectives in a less intrusive manner).41 31 £ee Coral Constr King County. 941 F.2d at 923 ("[W]hile strict scrutiny requires serious, good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives, strict scrutiny does not require exhaustion of every such possible alternative."). " £f Billish v Citv of Chicago. 989 F.2d 890, 894 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (Posner, J.) (in reviewing affirmative action measures, courts must be "sensitiv[e] to the importance of avoiding racial criteria . . . whenever it is possible to do so, [as] Croson requires"), cert, denied. 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993). 40 Contractors Ass’n v. Citv of Philadelphia. 6 F.3d at 1009 n.18. 41 Sge also Fnslev Branch. NAACP v. Seibels. 31 F.3d 1548, 1571 (11th Cir. 1994) (city should have implemented race-neutral alternative of establishing non-discriminatory selection procedures in police and fire departments instead of adopting race-based procedures; "continued use of discriminatory tests. . . compounded the very evil that [race-based measures] were designed to eliminate"); Aiken v. Citv of Memphis. 37 F.3d 1155, 1164 (6th Cir. 1994) (remanding to loweT court, in part, because evidence suggested that the city should have used obvious set of race-neutral alternatives before resorting to race - 21 - 2. Sgppg of Proeram/Administrative Waivers Justice O’Connor's opinion for the Court in Croson criticized the scope of Richmond’s thirty percent minority subcontracting requirement, calling it a "rigid numerical quota that did not permit consideration, through some form of administrative waiver mechanism, of whether particular individuals benefiting from the ordinance had suffered from the effects of the discrimination that the city was seeking to remedy. 488 U.S. at 508. At first blush, this criticism of the Richmond plan may appear to conflict with previous Court decisions, joined by Justice O’Connor, that held that iace-based remedial measures need not be limited to persons who were the victims of discrimination. (See supra p. 5.) Upon closer reading, however, Croson should not be interpreted as introducing a "victims- only" requirement through the narrow tailoring test.42 43 * 45 The Court’s rejection in Adarand of Justice Scalia’s position that compensation is due only to individuals who have been discriminated against personally provides further confirmation that Croson did not impose any such requirement. The Court's focus in Croson on individualized consideration of persons seeking the benefit of a racial classification appears to have been animated by three separate concerns about the scope of the Richmond plan. First, the Court indicated that in order for a remedial affirmative action program to be narrowly tailored, its beneficiaries must be members of group? that were the victims of discrimination. The Court faulted the Richmond plan because it was intended to remedy discrimination against African-American contractors, but included among its beneficiaries Hispanics, Asian-Americans, Native-Americans, Eskimos, and Aleuts -- groups for which Richmond had proffered "absolutely no evidence of past discrimination." Id at 506. Therefore, the Court said, even if the Richmond MBE program was "’narrowly tailored’ to compensate African-American contractors for past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why they are forced to share this ’remedial relief with an Aleut citizen who moves to Richmond tomorrow?" I£ /3 Second, the Court said that the Richmond plan was not even narrowly tailored to remedy discrimination against black conscious measures). 42 Most lower courts have not construed Croson in that fashion. See, e.g.. Billish v City of Chicago. 962 F.2d 1269, 1292-94 (7th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds. 989 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.) (en baDc), cert’. denied, 114 s Ct 290 (1993); Coral Constr Co. v. King County. 941 F.2d at 925-26 n. 15; Cunico v Pueblo School Pi$t. No 60. 917 F.2d 431, 437 (10th Cir. 1990). But see Winter Park v Frr 873 F.2d 347, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Williams, J., concurring in pan and dissenting in pan) (interpreting £E2*2fl « requiring that racial classifications be limited "to victims of prior discrimination")- Main Line Pavjng Co. v. Poarcj of Educ., 725 F. Supp. 1347, 1362 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (MBE program not narrowly tailored, in pan, because it "contained] no provision to identify those who were victims of past discrimination and to limit the program’s benefits to them"). 45 Q’Pomell Copstr. Co v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d at 427 (MBE program was not narrowly tailored because of "random inclusion of racial groups for which there was no evidence of past discrimination"). - 22 - contractors because "a successful black entrepreneur . . . from anywhere in the country" could reap its benefits. IsL at 508. That is, the geographic scope of the plan was not sufficiently tailored.44 Third, the Court contrasted the "rigidity" of the Richmond plan with the flexible waiver mechanism in the ten percent minority participation requirement that was upheld in Fullilove. As the Court in Crosoa described it, the requirement in Fullilove could be waived where a minority business charged a "higher price [that] was not attributable to the effects o f past discrimination." Id* & £ Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 488 (plurality opinion). The theory is that where a business is struggling to overcome discrimination, it may not have the capacity to submit a competitive bid. That an effective waiver provision allows for "individualized consideration" o f a particular minority contractor’s bid does not mean that the contractor has to be a "victim" o f a specific instance o f discrimination. It does mean that if the contractor is wealthy and has entered the mainstream o f contractors in the community, a high bid might not be traceable to the discrimination that a racial or ethnic classification is seeking to redress. Instead, such a bid might reflect an effort to exploit the classification.45 3. Manner in Which Race is Used The Court’s attack on the "rigidity" of the Richmond ordinance also implicates another common refrain in affirmative action jurisprudence: the manner in which race is used is an integral part of the narrow tailoring requirement. The clearest statement of the Court's somewhat mixed messages in this area is that programs that make race or ethnicity a requirement of eligibility for particular positions or benefits are less likely to survive constitutional challenge than programs that merely use race or ethnicity as one factor to be considered under a program open to all races and ethnic groups.4* * 41 * * 44 * 44 Compare Associated Gen Contractors v Coalition for Economic Eauitv. 950 F.2d at 1418 (MBE program intended to remedy discrimination against minorities in county construction industry was narrowly tailored, in part, because scope of beneficiaries was limited to minorities within the county) with Podbcreskv v. Kirwan. 38 F.3d 147, 159 (4th Cir.) (scholarship program intended to remedy discrimination against African-Americans in Maryland was not narrowly tailored, in pan, because African- Americans from outside Maryland were eligible for the program), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995). 41 S<* Milwaukee County Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler. 922 F.2d 419, 425 (7th Cir.) (noting that administrative waiver mechanism enabled state to exclude from scope of beneficiaries of affirmative action plan in public contracting ’two wealthy black football'players’ who apparently could compete effectively outside the plan), cert, denied. 500 U.S. 954 (1991); Concrete General. Inc, v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n. 779 F. Supp. 370, 381 (D. Md. 1991) (MBE program not narrowly tailored, in part, because it had ’no provision to ’graduate' from the program those contracting firms which have demonstrated the ability to effectively compete with non-MBE’s in a competitive bidding process’); see also Shurberg Broadcasting. Inc v. FCC. 876 F.2d at 916 (opinion of Silberman, J.) (’There must be some opportunity to exclude those individuals for whom affirmative action is just another business opportunity.'). 44 The factor that we labeled above as "scope of beneficiaries/administrative waivers* is sometimes considered by courts under the heading of "flexibility", along with a consideration of the manner in which race is used. For the sake of clarity we have divided them into two separate components of the narrow - 23 - Two types of racial classifications are subject to criticism as being too rigid. First and most obvious is an affirmative action program in which a specific number of positions are set aside for minorities. The prime example is the medical school admissions program that the Court invalidated in BafciiC- Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in the case turned squarely on the fact that the pro gram reserved sixteen percent a t the skits at the school for members o f racial and ethnic minority groups. Another example o f this type o f classification is the program upheld in Fullilove. It provides that, except where the Secretary o f Commerce determines otherwise, at least ten percent o f the amount o f federal grants for certain public works projects must be expended by grantees to purchase goods or services from minority-owned businesses. 42 U .S.C . ( 6705(f)(2). The second type of classification that is vulnerable to attack on flexibility grounds is a program in which race or ethnicity is the sole or primary factor in determining eligibility. One example is the FCC’s "distress sale" program, which allows a broadcaster whose qualifications have been called into question to transfer his or her license prior to an FCC revocation hearing, provided the transferee is a minority-owned business.* 47 * Another example of affirmative action programs in which race or ethnicity is a requirement of eligibility are college scholarships that are reserved for minorities.41 Under both types of classifications, persons not within the designated categories are rendered ineligible for certain benefits or positions.49 Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke tailoring test. 47 The distress sale program was upheld under intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting. 41 There is a plausible distinction between college scholarships that are reserved for minorities and admissions quotas that reserve places at a college for minorities. In Podbereskv v. Kirwan. 38 F.3d 147 (4tb Cir 1994), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995), the Fourth Circuit held that a college scholarship program for African Americans was unconstitutional under Croson. The Fourth Circuit’s decision, however, did not equate the scholarship program with the admissions quota struck down in Bakke. and it did not turn on the fact that race was a requirement of eligibility for the program. 49 The statutes and regulations under which DOT has established the contracting program «t issue in Adarand are different. Racial and ethnic classifications are used in the form of a presumption that members of minority groups are ’socially disadvantaged.* However, that presumption is rebuttable, and members of nonminority groups are eligible for the program ’on the basis of clear and convincing evidence* that they are socially disadvantaged. Adarand. 63 U.S.L.W. at 4524. jgg at 4540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the relevant statutes and regulations in Adarand are better tailored than the Fullilove legislation, because they *doQ not make race the sole criterion of eligibility for participation in the program.* Members of racial and ethnic are presumed to be disadvantaged, but the presumption is rebuttable, and even if it does not get the presumption, *a small business may qualify [for the program] by showing that it is both socially and economically disadvantaged’). - 24 - rested on the fact that the admissions program at issue was a quota that saved places for minorities solely on the basis of their race.30 As Justice Powell put it, such a program tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage c€ the so ts in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats. 438 U.S. at 319. Justice Powell contrasted admissions programs that require decisions based "solely" on race and ethnicity, id* at 315, with programs in which race or ethnic background is simply one factor among many in the admissions decision. Justice Powell said that in the latter type of program, "race or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." Id. at 317. In Justice Powell's view, such programs are sufficiently flexible to meet the narrow tailoring requirement. This line of reasoning also resonates in Johnson v. Transportation Agency. 480 U.S. 616 (1987). There, the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative action plan under which a state government agency considered the gender of applicants31 as one factor in making certain promotion decisions. The Court noted that the plan "set[] aside no positions for women," but simply established goals for female representation that were not "construed" by the agency as "quotas." at 638. The Court further observed that the plan "merely authorize^] that consideration be given to affirmative action concerns when evaluating qualified applicants." Id. The Court stressed that in the promotion decision in question, "sex . . . was but one of numerous factors [that were taken] into account." J d The agency’s plan "thus resemble[d]" the type of admissions program "approvingly noted by Justice Powell" in Bakke: it "requires women to compete with all other qualified applicants. No persons are automatically excluded from consideration; all are able to have their qualifications weighed against those of other applicants." IdL also id. at 656-57 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (agency’s promotion decision was not made "solely on the basis of sex;" rather, "sex was simply used as a ‘plus factor’"). 30 Bakke is the only Supreme Court affirmative action case that ultimately turned on the "quota" issue. In Croson. the Court referred disparagingly to the thirty percent minority subcontracting requirement at issue in the case as a "quota." but that was not in itself the basis for the Court’s decision. 31 Although Johnson was a Title VI] gender classification case, its reasoning as to the distinction between quotas and goals is instructive with respect to the constitutional analysis of racial and ethnic classifications. - 25 - Finally, Croson itself touches on the point. The Court said that in the absence of a waiver mechanism that permitted individualized consideration of persons seeking a share of city contracts pursuant to the requirement that thirty percent of the dollar value of prime contracts go to minority subcontractors, the Richmond plan was "problematic from an equal protection standpoint because [it made] the color o f an applicant's skin the sole relevant consideration." 488 U.S. at 508. 4. Comparison o f Numerical Target to Relevant Market Where an affirmative action program is justified on remedial grounds, the Court has looked at the size o f any numerical goal and its comparison to the relevant labor market or industry. This factor involves choosing the appropriate measure of comparison. In Croson. Richmond defended its thirty percent minority subcontracting requirement on the premise that h was halfway between .067 percent — the percentage o f city contracts awarded to African- Americans during the years 1978-83 - and 50 percent - the African-American population of Richmond. The Court in Croson demanded a more meaningful statistical comparison and much greater mathematical precision. It held that numerical figures used in a racial preference must bear a relationship to the pool of qualified minorities. Thus, in the Court's view, the thirty percent minority subcontracting requirement not narrowly tailored, because it was tied to the African-American population of Richmond, and as such, rested on the assumption that minorities will choose a particular trade "in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population." 488 U.S. at 507.J: 5. Duration and Periodic Review Under Croson. affirmative action represents a "temporary” deviation from "the norm of equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups.” Croson. 488 U.S. at 510. A particular measure therefore should last only as long as it is needed. £se Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring). Given this imperative, a racial or ethnic classification is more likely to pass the narrow tailoring test if it has a definite end-date,32 33 or is subject to 32 Compare Aiken v. Cirv of Memphis. 37 F.3d ai 1165 (remanding to lower court, in part, because race-based promotion goals in consent decree were tied to "undifferentiated" labor force statistics; instructing district court on remand to determine whether racial composition of city labor force "differs materially from that of the qualified labor pool for the positions" in question) with Edwards v. City of Houston. 37 F.3d 1097, 1114 (5th Cir. 1994) (race-based promotion goals in city police department were narrowly tailored, in part, because the goals were tied to the number of minorities with the skills for the positions in question), reh’g granted. 49 F.3d 1048 (5th Cir. 1995). 33 Paradise. 480 U.S. at 178 (plurality opinion) (race-based promotion requirement was narrowly tailored, in pan, because it was "ephemeral," and would "endureQ only until" non-discriminaiory promotion procedures were implemented); Sheet Metal Workers. 478 U.S. at 487 (Powell, J., concurring) (race-based hiring goal was narrowly tailored, in pan, because it "was not imposed as a permanent requirement, but [was] of limited duration"); Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 513 (Powell, J., concurring) (race- based classification in public works legislation was narrowly tailored, in pan, because it was "not a - 26 - meaningful periodic review that enables the government to ascertain the continued need for the measure. The Supreme Court has said that a set end-date is less important where a program does not establish specific numerical targets for minority participation. Johnson. 480 U.S. at 640. However, it remains important for such a program to undergo periodic review. 5 a i i . 639-40. Simply put, a racial or ethnic classification that was justified at the point of its adoption may no longer be required at some future point. If the classification is subject to reexamination from time to time, the government can react to changed circumstances by fine- tuning the classification, or discontinuing it if warranted. 5 a Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 489 (plurality opinion); s a alS£ Metro Broadcasting. 497 U.S. at 594; Sheet Metal Workers. 478 U.S. at 478 (plurality opinion); id* * at 487-88 (Powell, J., concurring). 6. Burden Affirmative action necessarily imposes a degree o f burden on persons who do not belong to the groups that are favored by a racial or ethnic classification. The Supreme Court has said, however, that some burdens are acceptable, even when visited upon individuals who are not personally responsible for the particular problem that the classification seeks to address. £e§ Wygant. 475 u .S . at 280-81 (plurality opinion) ("As pan of this Nation’s dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy."). This was implicitly reaffirmed in Croson and Adarand: in both cases, the Coun "recognize[d] that any individual suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be,"54 but declined to hold that the imposition of that burden pursuant to an affirmative action measure is automatically unconstitutional. In some situations, however, the burden imposed by an affirmative action program may be too high. As a general principle, a racial or ethnic classification crosses that threshold when it "unsettled] . . . legitimate, firmly rooted expectation^],"55 or imposes the "entire burden . . . on particular individuals."56 Applying that principle in an employment case where seniority differences between minority and nonminority employees were involved, a plurality of the Coun in Wvgant stated that race-based layoffs may impose a more substantia] burden than race-based hiring and promotion goals, because "denial of a permanent part of federal contracting requirements"); O’Donnell Constr Co v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d at 428 (ordinance setting aside a percentage of city contracts for minority businesses was not narrowly tailored, in pan, because it contained no "sunset provision" and no "end [was] in sight”). * Adarand. 63 U.S.L.W. at 4531 (citing Croson'). ' 35 Johnson. 480 U.S. at 638. 34 Sheet Metal Workers. 478 U.S. at 488 (Powell, J., concurring). - 27 - future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job." Wygant. 476 U.S. at 282-83; s k also id* at 294 (White, J., concurring). In a subsequent case, however, Justice Powell warned that "it is too simplistic to conclude that hiring [or other employment] goals withstand constitutional muster whereas layoffs do not . . . . The proper constitutional inquiry focuses an the effect, if any, and the diffuseness of the burden imposed on innocent nonminorities, not on the label applied to the particular employment plan at issue." Sheet Metal Workers. 478 U.S. at 488 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). In the contracting area, a racial or ethnic classification would upset settled expectations if it impaired an existing contract that had been awarded to a person who is not included in the classification. This apparently occurs rarely, if at all, in the federal government. A more salient inquiry therefore focuses on the scale of the exclusionary effect o f a contracting program. For example, in Fullilove. Justice Powell thought h salient that the contracting requirement at issue in the case reserved for minorities a very small amount o f total funds for construction work in the nation (less than one percent), leaving nonminorities able to compete for the vast remainder. For Justice Powell, this rendered the effect of the program "limited and so widely dispersed that its use is consistent with fundamental fairness." Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 515. In some instances, conversely, the exclusionary effect of racial classifications in contracting may be considered too large. For example, the lower court in Croson held that Richmond's thirty percent minority subcontracting requirement imposed an impermissible burden because it placed nonminorities at a great "competitive disadvantage." J A. Croson Co. v. Citv of Richmond. 822 F.2d 1355, 1361 (4th Cir. 1987). Similarly, an affirmative action program that effectively shut nonminority firms out of certain markets or particular industries might establish an impermissible burden. For example, the dissenters in Metro Broadcasting felt that the FCC's distress sale unduly burdened nonminorities because it "created a specialized market reserved exclusively for minority controlled applicants. There is no more rigid quota than a 100% set-aside . . . . For the would-be purchaser or person who seeks to compete for the station, that opportunity depends entirely upon race or ethnicity." 497 U.S. at 630 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenters also dismissed the majority’s contention that the impact of distress sales on nonminorities was minuscule, given the small number of stations transferred through those means. The dissenters said that ”[i]t is no response to a person denied admission at one school, or discharged from one job, solely on the basis of race, that other schools or employers do not discrimina^." IsL C. The Post-Croson Landscape at the State and Local Level Croson has not resulted in the end of affirmative action at the state and local level. There is no doubt, however, that Croson. in tightening the constitutional parameters, has diminished the incidence of such programs, at least in contracting and procurement. The post-Croson experience of governments that continue to operate affirmative action programs - 28 - in that area is instructive.37 * * 40 Many governments reevaluated their MBE programs in light of Croson. and modified them to comport with the applicable standards. Typically, the centerpiece of a government’s efforts has been a "disparity study," conducted by outside experts, to analyze patterns and practices in the local construction industry. The purpose of a disparity study is to determine whether there is evidence of discrimination against minorities in the local construction industry that would justify the use of remedial racial and ethnic classifications in contracting and procurement. Some studies also address the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives. In addition to obtaining a disparity study, some governments have held public hearings in which they have received evidence about the workings of the local construction industry. Post-Croson affirmative action programs in contracting and procurement tend to employ flexible numerical goals and/or bidding preferences in which race or ethnicity is a "plus" factor in the allocation decision, rather than a hard set-aside o f the sort at issue in Croson. It appears that many o f the post-Croson contracting and procurement programs that rest on disparity studies have not been challenged in court.3' At least one of the programs was sustained in litigation.” Another was struck down as inconsistent with the Croson standards.60 Challenges to other programs were not resolved on summary judgment, and 37 A comprehensive review of voluntary affirmative action in public employment at the state and local level after Croson is beyond the scope of this memorandum. We note that a number of the programs have involved remedial racial and ethnic classifications in connection with hiring and promotion decisions in police and fire departments. Some of the programs have been upheld, and others struck down. Compare Peiehtal v. Metropolitan Dade County. 26 F.3d 1545 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding race-based hiring goal in county fire department under Croson) with Long v Cirv of Saginaw. 911 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1990) (striking down race-based hiring goal in city police department under Croson and Wygant). " That has been true in Richmond. It is our understanding that the city conducted a post-Croson disparity study and enacted a new MBE program that establishes a bidding preference of *20 points* for prime contractors who pledge to meet a goal of subcontracting sixteen percent of the dollar value of a city contract to MBEs. The program works at the "prequalification* stage, when the city is determining its pool of eligible bidden on a project. Once the pool is selected, the low bidder is awarded the contract. * Associated Gen. Contracton v. Coalition for Economic Equity. 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991). 40 Associated Gen. Contracton v. City of New Haven. 791 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1992), vacated on mootness grounds. 41 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1994). - 29 - were remanded for further fact finding.61 Contracting and procurement programs that were not changed after Croson have met with a mixed reception in the courts.62 m . Application o f the Croson Standards at the Federal Level In essence, Adarand federalizes Croson. with one important caveat; Congress may be entitled to some deference when it acts on the basis o f race or ethnicity to remedy the effects of discrimination. The Court in Adarand hinted that at least where a federal affirmative action program is congressionally mandated, the Croson standards might apply somewhat more loosely. The Court concluded that it need not resolve whether and to what extent the judiciary should pay special deference to Congress in this area. The Court did, however, dte the opinions o f various Justices in Fullilove. Croson. and Metro Broadcasting concerning the significance of Congress’ express constitutional power to enforce the antidiscrimination guarantees of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments -- under Section 2 of the former and Section 5 of the latter — and the extent to which courts should defer to exercises of that authority that entail the use of racial and ethnic classifications to remedy discrimination. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4531. Some of those opinions indicate that even under stria scrutiny, Congress does not have to make findings of discrimination with the same degree of precision as a state or local government, and that Congress may be entitled to some latitude with respect to its selection of the means to the end of remedying discrimination.63 61 Coral Constr Co v. King County. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied. 502 U.S. 1033 (1992); Concrete Works v City and Countv of Denver. 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995). The courts in these two cases commented favorably on aspects of the programs at issue and the disparity studies by which they are justified. 45 We are aware of at least one such program that survived a motion for summary judgment and apparently is still in effect today. S<* Cone Coro, v Hillsborough County. 908 F.2d 908 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 983 (1990). Others have been invalidated. 5«, e.g . O’Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia. 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Contractors' Assoc, v. Citv of Philadelphia. WL 11900 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1995); Arrow Office Supply Co v. Citv of Detroit. 826 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D. Mich. 1993); F. Buddie Constr. Co. v. City of Elvria. 773 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Main Line Paving Co v. Board of Educ.. 725 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 43 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states and municipalities from denying persons the equal protection of the laws. Section 5 gives Congress the power to enforce that prohibition. Because Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to stales and municipalities, jee United States v. Guest. 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1966), it is uncertain whether Congress may act under Section 5 of that amendment to remedy discrimination by purely private actors. 5s Adarand 63 U.S.L.W. at 4538 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because Congress has acted with respect to the States in enacting STURAA, we need not revisit today the difficult question of ( 5’s applicability to pure regulation of private individuals."); Metro Broadcasting. 497 U.S. it 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) ("Section 5 empowers Congress to act respecting the Slates, and of course this case concerns only the administration of federal programs by federal officials."). Nevertheless, remedial legislation adopted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily have to act on the states directly. Indeed, when Congress - 30 - In Fullilove. Justice Powell’s concurring opinion said that even under strict scrutiny, "[t]he degree of specificity required in the findings of discrimination ard the breadth of discretion in the choice of remedies may vary with the nature and authority of a governmental body." Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 515 n.14 (Powell, J., concurring). Ii was therefore of paramount importance to Justice Powell that the racial and ethnic classtfiaDcn in Fullilove was prescribed by Congress, which, Justice Powell admonished, ’properly may — and indeed must - address directly the problems of discrimination in our society." I&. at 499. Justice Powell emphasized that Congress has "the unique constitutional power" to take such action under the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 500. i*L at 483 (plurality opinion) ("[I]n no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive remedial power than in the Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with the competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees."). Justice Powell observed that when Congress uses those powers, it can paint with a broad brush, and can devise national remedies for the national problem of racial and ethnic discrimination. I i. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring). Furthermore, Justice Powell said that through repeated investigation of that problem, Congress has developed familiarity with the nature and effects of discrimination: "After Congress has legislated repeatedly in an area of national concern, its Members gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh hearings or prolonged debate when Congress again considers action in that area." I i at 503. Because Congress need not redocument the fact and history of discrimination each time it contemplates adopting a new remedial measure, the findings that supported the Fullilove legislation were not restricted to the actual findings that Congress made when it enacted that measure. Rather, the record included "the information and expertise that Congress acquires in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation." I i A court reviewing a race- based remedial act of Congress therefore "properly may examine the total contemporary record of congressional action dealing with the problems of racial discrimination against [minorities].” I i Finally, Justice Powell gave similar deference to Congress when it came to applying the narrow tailoring test. He said that in deciding how best to combat discrimination in the country, the "Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments give Congress a . . . measure of discretion to choose a suitable remedy." I i at 508. seeks to remedy discrimination by private parties, it may be indirectly remedying discrimination of the states; for in some cases, private discrimination was tolerated or expressly sanctioned by the states. Private discrimination, moreover, often can be remedied under the enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment. Section 1 of that amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. Section 2 gives Congress the power to enforce that prohibition by passing remedial legislation designed to eliminate "the badges and incidents of slavery in the United States." Jones v. Alfred Maver Co.. 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). The Supreme Court has held that such legislation may be directed at remedying the discrimination of private actors, as well as that of the states. I$jL at 438. See also Runvon v. McCrarv. 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). In Fullilove. the plurality opinion concluded that the Commerce Clause provided an additional source of power under which Congress could adopt race-based legislation intended to remedy the discriminatory conduct of private actors. Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 475 (plurality opinion). - 31 - Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson is very much in the same vein. She too commented that Congress possesses "unique remedial powers . . . under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Croson. 488 U.S. at 488 (plurality opinion) (citing Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 483 (plurality opinion)). By contrast, stale and local governments have "no specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates af the Fourteenth Amendment," but rather are subject to its "explicit constraints ." Id. at 490 (plurality opinion). Therefore, in Justice O'Connor’s view, state and local governments "must identify discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief.” Id* at 504. Congress, on the other hand, can make, and "has made national findings that there has been societal discrimination in a host of fields.” Id* It may therefore "identify and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination" through the use of racial and ethnic classifications that would be impermissible if adopted by a state or local government. Id* at 490 (plurality opinion).44 Justice O’Connor cited her Croson opinion and reiterated these general points about the powers of Congress in her Metro Broadcasting dissent. S fi 497 U.S. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) ("Congress has considerable latitude, presenting special concerns for judicial review, when it exercises its unique remedial powers . . . under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (internal quotations omitted). It would be imprudent, however, to read too much into Justice Powell's opinion in Fullilove and Justice O’Connor's opinion in Croson. They do not, for example, support the proposition that Congress may simply assert that because there has been general societal discrimination in this country, legislative classifications based on race or ethnicity are a necessary remedy. The more probable construction of those opinions is that Congress must have some particularized evidence about the existence and effects of discrimination in the sectors and industries for which it prescribes racial or ethnic classifications. For example. Congress established the Fullilove racial and ethnic classification to remedy what the Court saw as the well-documented effects of discrimination in one industry -- construction — that had hindered the ability of minorities to gain access to public contracting opportunities. See Fullilove. 448 U.S. at 505-06 (Powell, J., concurring); $££ also id. at 473 (plurality opinion). Based on this reading of Croson and Fullilove. the endorsement in Ada rand of strict scrutiny of federal affirmative action programs does not mean that Congress must find discrimination in every jurisdiction or industry affected by such a measure (although it is unclear whether, as a matter of narrow tailoring, the scope of a classification should be narrowed to exclude regions and trades that have not been affected by the discrimination that is to be remedied.). State and local governments must identify discrimination with some precision within their jurisdictions; Congress' jurisdiction is the nation as a whole. But after Adarand. Congress is subject to the Croson "strong basis in evidence" standard. Under that standard, the general history of racial discrimination in the nation would not be a sufficient ** Justices Kennedy and Scalia declined to join that part of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Croson that drew a distinction between the respective powers of Congress and state or local governments in the area of affirmative action. - 32 - predicate for a remedial racial or ethnic classification. In addition, evidence of discrimination in one sector or industry is not always probative of discrimination in other sectors and industries. For example, a history o f lending discrimination against minorities arguably cannot serve as a catch-all justification for racial and ethnic classifications bcnrfjrrrng minority-owned firms through the entire economy; application of the narrow tailoring test would suggest that if lending discrimination is the problem being addressed, then the government should tackle it directly." Furthermore, under the new standard, Congress probably does not have to bold a bearing or draft a report each time it adopts a remedial racial or ethnic classification. But where such a classification rests on a previous law or series o f laws, those earlier measures must be supported by sufficient evidence o f the effects o f discrimination. And if the findings in the older laws are stale, Congress or the pertinent agency may have to demonstrate the continued relevance of those findings; this would satisfy the element of the narrow tailoring test that looks to the duration of classifications and whether they are subject to reevaluation. Where the record is sparse, Congress or the relevant agency may have to develop it. That endeavor may involve the commissioning o f disparity studies of the type that state and local governments around the country undertook after Croson to demonstrate that remedial racial and ethnic classifications in public contracting are warranted. Together, the myriad state and local studies may provide an important source o f evidence supporting the use by the federal government of national remedial measures in certain sectors of the economy. Whatever deference a court might accord to federal remedial legislation after Adarand. it is undecided whether the same degree of deference would be accorded to nonremedial legislation. In Metro Broadcasting, the majority gave substantial deference to congressional judgments regarding the need for diversity in broadcasting and the linkage between the race of a broadcaster and programming output. Metro Broadcasting. 497 U.S. at 566, 572-73, 591 n.43. The dissenters did not do so, precisely because the classifications were nonremedial and hence, in their view, did not implicate Congress’ powers under the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. LL at 605, 628-29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Finally, many existing federal affirmative action programs are not specifically mandated by Congress. Courts are unlikely to accord federal agencies acting without a congressional mandate the same degree of deference accorded judgments made by Congress itself. Agencies do not have the "institutional competence" and explicit "constitutional 45 Pin eras and practices of bank lending to minorities, may, however, reflect a significant "secondary effect" of discrimination in particular sectors and industries, 1̂ , because of that discrimination, minorities cannot accumulate the necessary capital and achieve the community standing necessary to qualify for loans - 33 - authority" that Congress possesses. Adaand, 63 U.S.L.W . at 4538 (Stevens, J., dissenting).66 Although some existing agency programs were not expressly mandated in the first instance in legislation, they may nonetheless be viewed by a court as having been mandated by Congress through subsequent congressional action. For example, in Metro Broadcasting, the programs at issue were established by the FCC on its own; Congress’ role was limited to FCC oversight hearings and the passage of an appropriations riders that precluded the FCC from using any funds to reconsider or cancel its programs. 497 U.S. at 572-79. The majority concluded that this record converted the FCC programs into measures that had been "specifically approved - indeed, mandated by Congress." Id. at 563. Under strict scrutiny, it is uncertain what level of congressional involvement is necessary before a court will review an agency’s program with deference. What may be required is evidence that Congress plainly has brought its own judgment to bear on the matter. £ f Adarand. 63 U.S.L.W . at 4537 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("An additional reason for giving greater deference to the National Legislature than to a local law-making body is that federal affirmative-action programs represent the will o f our entire Nation’s elected representatives . . . . " ) (emphasis added); jjL at 4538 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congressional deliberations about a matter as important as affirmative action should be accorded far greater deference than those of a State or municipality.") (emphasis added). IV. Conclusion Adarand makes it necessary to evaluate federal programs that use race or ethnicity as a basis for decisionmaking to determine if they comport with the strict scrutiny standard. No affirmative action program should be suspended prior to such an evaluation. The information gathered by many agencies in connection with the President’s recent review of federal affirmative action programs should prove helpful in this regard. In addition, appended to this memo is a nonexhaustive checklist of questions that provides initial guidance as to what should be considered in that review process. Because the questions are just a guide, no single answer or combination of answers is necessarily dispositive as to the validity of any given program. “ $££ Milwaukee County Pavers Ass’o v. Fiedler. 710 F. Supp. 1532, 1540 n.3 (W.D. Wise. 1989) (noting that for purposes of judicial review of affirmative action measures, there is a distinction between eongressionally mandated measures and those that are "independently established" by a federal agency), tffd, 922 F.2d 419 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 500 U.S. 954 (1991); sL Bakke. 438 U.S. at 309 (opinion of Powell, J.) (public universities, like many "isolated segments of our vast governmental structure are not competent to make [findings of national discrimination], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria"). • 34 - Appendix: Questions to Guide Review of Affirmative Action Programs L Authority Is the use of racial or ethnic criteria as a basis for decisionmaking mandated by legislation? If not mandated, is it expressly authorized by legislation? If there is no express authorization, has there been any indication of congressional approval o f an agency’s action in the form of appropriations riders or oversight hearings? These questions are important, because Congress may be entitled to some measure o f deference when h decides that racial and ethnic classifications are necessary. If there is no explicit legislative mandate, authorization, or approval, is the program premised on an agency rule or regulation that implements a statute that, on its face, is race- neutral? For example, some statutes require agencies to give preferences to "disadvantaged" individuals, but do not establish a presumption that members o f racial groups are disadvantaged. Such a statute is race-neutral. Other statutes, like those at issue in Adarand. require agencies to give preferences to "disadvantaged" individuals, but establish a rebuttable presumption that members of racial groups are disadvantaged. Such a statute is race conscious. because it authorizes agencies to use racial criteria in decisionmaking. II. Purpose What is the objective of the program? Is it intended to remedy discrimination, to foster racial diversity in a particular sector or industry, or to achieve some other purpose? Is it possible to discern the purpose from the face the relevant statute or legislation? If not. does the record underlying the relevant legislation or regulation shed any light on the purpose of the program? A. Factual Predicate: Remedial Programs If the program is intended to serve remedial objectives, what is the underlying factual predicate of discrimination? Is the program justified solely by reference to general societal discrimination, general assertions o f discrimination in a particular sector or industry, or a statistical underrepresentation of minorities in a sector or industry? Without more, these are impermissible bases for affirmative action. If the discrimination to be remedied is more particularized, then the program may satisfy Adarand. In assessing the nature of the factual predicate of discrimination, the following factors should be taken into account: 1. Source. Where can the evidence be found? Is it contained in findings set forth in a relevant statute or legislative history (committee reports and hearings)? Is evidence contained in findings that an agency has made on its own in connection with a rulemaking process or in the promulgation of guidelines? Do the findings expressly or implicitly rest on - 35 - findings made in connection with a previous, related program (or series o f programs)0 2. Type. What is the nature of the evidence? Is it statistical or documentary? Are the statistics based on minority underrepresentation in a particular sector or industry compared to the general minority population? Or are the statistics more sophisticated and focused? For example, do they attempt to identify the number of qualified minorities in the sector or industry or seek to explain what that number would look like "but for" the exclusionary effects of discrimination? Does the evidence seek to explain the secondary effects of discrimination - for example, bow the inability of minorities to break into certain industries due to historic practices of exclusion has hindered their ability to acquire the requisite capital and financing? Similarly, where health and education programs are at issue, is there evidence on bow discrimination has hampered minority opportunity in those fields, or is the evidence simply based on generalized claims of societal discrimination? In addition to any statistical and documentary evidence, is there testimonial or anecdotal evidence of discrimination in the record underlying the program — for example, accounts of the experiences of minorities and nonminorities in a particular field or industry? 3. Scope. Are the findings purported to be national in character and dimension? Or do they reflect evidence of discrimination in certain regions or geographical areas? 4. "Authorship". If Congress or an agency relied on reports and testimony of others in making findings, who is the "author" of that information? The Census Bureau? The General Accounting Office? Business and trade associations? Academic experts? Economists? (There is no necessary hierarchy in assessing authorship, but the identity of the author may affect the credibility of the findings.) 5. Timing. Since the adoption of the program, have additional findings of discrimination been assembled by Congress or the agency that could serve to justify the need for the program when it was adopted? If not, can such evidence be readily assembled now? These questions go to whether "post-enactment" evidence can be marshaled to support the conclusion that remedial action was warranted when the program was first adopted. B. Factual Predicate: Nonremedia! Pisgrams Adarand does not directly address whether and to what extent nonremedial objectives for affirmative action may constitute a compelling governmental interest. At a minimum, to the extent that an agency administers a nonremedial program intended to promote diversity, the factual predicate must show that greater diversity would foster some larger societal goal beyond diversity for diversity’s sake. The level and precision of empirical evidence supporting that nexus may vary, depending on the nature and purpose of a nonremedial program. For a nonremedial program, the source, type, scope, authorship, and timing of underlying findings should be assessed, just as for remedial programs. - 36 - m . Narrow Tailoring A. Race-Neutral Alternatives Did Congress or the agency consider nce-nentral means to achieve the ends of the program at the time it was adopted? Race-neutral alternatives might include preferences based on wealth, income, education, family, geography. In the commercial setting, another such alternative is a preference for new, emerging businesses. Were any of these alternatives actually tried and exhausted? What was the nature and extent of the deliberation over any race-neutral alternatives - for example, congressional debate? agency rulemaking? Was there a judgment that race-neutral alternatives would not be as efficacious as race conscious measures? Did Congress or the agency rely on previous consideration and rejection of race-neutral alternatives in connection with a prior, related race-conscious measure (or series of measures)? B. Continued Need How long has the program been in existence? Even if there was a compelling justification at the time of adoption, that may not be the case today. Thus, an agency must determine whether there is a continued need for the program. In that regard, does the program have an end date? Has the end date been moved back? Is the program subject to periodic oversight? What is the nature o f that oversight - does Congress play a role through hearings/reports, or does the agency conduct the review or oversight on its own? Has the program ever been adjusted or modified in light o f a periodic review? What were the results of the most recent review and oversight conducted by either Congress or the agency? Is there evidence of what might result if the racial classification were discontinued? For example, is there evidence of the current level of minority participation in government contracting where racial criteria are not used (which may speak to whether discrimination can be remedied without a preference)? C. Pool of Beneficiaries Are the benefits of the program spread relatively equally among minority individuals or businesses? Is there information on whether the same individuals or businesses tend to reap most of the benefits, and if so, whether those beneficiaries have overcome discrimination? If the program is intended to remedy discrimination against minorities, does it include among its beneficiaries subgroups that may not have been discriminated against? Is there a procedure for tailoring the pool of beneficiaries to exclude such subgroups? Is there a mechanism for evaluating whether the program is needed for segments within a larger industry that have been the locus of discrimination? - 37 - D. Manner in Which Race is Used Does the program establish fixed numerical set-asides? Is race an explicit requirement of eligibility for the program? If there is no such facial requirement, does the program operate that way in practice? Or is race just one o f several factors - a "plus" - used in decisionmaking? Could the objectives o f a program that uses race as a requirement for eligibility be achieved through a more flexible use o f race? E. Burden What is the nature o f the burden imposed on persons who are not included in the racial or ethnic classification that the program establishes? Does the program dig)lace those persons from existing positions/contiacts? Does it upset any settled expectations that they have? Even if that is not the case, the burden may be impermissible where the exclusionary impact is too great. What is the exclusionary impact in terms o f size and dimension? What is the dollar value of the contracts/grants/positions in question? Does the exclusionary impact of the program fall upon a particular group or class o f individuals or sectors, or is it more diffuse? What is the extent o f other opportunities outside the program? Are persons who are not eligible for the preference put at a significant competitive disadvantage as a result of the program? - 38 - CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on December 12, 1997, two copies of the foregoing Final Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae were sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following counsel: William E. Kennard Daniel M. Armstrong C. Grey Pash, Jr. David Silberman Allan Sacks Office of the General Counsel Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W., Room 602 Washington, D.C. 20554 David Honig 3636 16th Street, N.W. Suite B-366 Washington, D.C. 20010 Michael P. McDonald Center for Individual Rights 1233 20th Street, N.W. Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20036 Lawrence W. Secrest III Wiley Rein & Fielding 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Mark Troobnick American Center for Law & Justice 1000 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007 Leonard J. Pranschke Pranschke & Holderle, L.C. 1611 Des Peres Road, Suite 300 St. Louis, Missouri 63131-1850 Gene C. Schaerr Nathan A. Forrester Sidley & Austin 1722 Eye Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Richard R. Zaragoza Kathryn R. Schmeltzer Barry H. Gottfried Scott R. Flick Fisher Wayland Cooper Leader & Zaragoza L.L.P. 2001 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20006-1851 Lisa Wilson Edwards Attorney CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(d), this brief contains no more than 8,750 words. Lisa Wilson Edwards Attorney