Motion to Dismiss, Affadavit & Brief in Support, Notice of Hearing and Proof of Service

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUPI
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants.

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Civil Action 
No. 35257

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MOTION TO DISMISS 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
PROOF OF SERVICE

MATHER, GLIME & DAOUST 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and 
GERALD STAFFORD, Only 
25 North Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
463-0511



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
MILLIKEN, et al,

Defendants.

Civil Action 
No. 35257

/

MOTION TO DISMISS

COUNT I

NOW COMES the Defendants in the above entitled action, 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD, trustee of 
the Clintondale Community Schools Board of Education and parent 
of school-age children attending the Clintondale Schools, only, 
by their attorneys, MATHER, GLIME & DAOUST, and pursuant to 
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., 
move this Honorable Court to quash service of process made by 
the United States Marshalls' Office and to dismiss this cause 
of action against the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD 
STAFFORD for lack of jurisdiction for the following reason:

1. Service of process was improperly made pursuant to 

Rule 4 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.
WHEREFORE, the Defendants CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 

and GERALD STAFFORD, only, respectfully request this Honorable 
Court to enter an Order quashing service of process and dismiss- 
incr this cause of action for lack of jurisdiction.

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COUNT II

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NOW COMES the Defendants, CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
and GERALD STAFFORD, only, by their attorneys, MATHER, GLIME &
DAOUST, and pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

\

Procedure, move this Honorable Court to dismiss this cause of 
action for the following reasons:

1. The Complaint and Amended Complaint fail to state 
a claim against the Defendants CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and 
GERALD STAFFORD upon which relief can be granted:

(a) the establishment, organization and 
administration of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS has 
never been invidiously motivated or intended to 
circumvent any Federally protected right of any citizen 
and the Plaintiffs have made no allegations to the 
contrary;

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(b) the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS have taken 
no action whatsoever for the purpose of keeping their 
schools predominately white, nor excluded any child from 
any school within the District on account of his race 
and the Plaintiffs have made no allegations to the 
contrary;

(c) the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS have 
heretofore achieved a fully integrated, unitary school 
system, with desirable racial balance fully in accord 
with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Plaintiffs have made no allegations to the contrary;

(d) any allegations made as to any other parties 
besides the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, their Board 
of Education, or employees is insufficient to state a



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claim for relief against the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 
SCHOOLS^ its Board of Education, and the parents and 
children they represent.

2 o The addition of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
and GERALD STAFFORD as party defendants under Rules 19 and 21 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,, 2 8 U.S.C. by the Order of 

September 10, 1973, at this state of the proceedings, coming over 
three (3) years after the initiation of this suit and after 

extensive litigation has taken place between the parties, 
including pleadings, motions, orders, direct and cross examina­
tion of witnesses, findings of fact, and a variety of appeals, 
is an abuse of discretion and cannot now be remedied, and is 
extremely prejudicial to the Defendants, violative of due process 
of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States, contrary to the principles of equity and 
good conscience, and contrary to the requirement of Rule 21 of

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C., that parties 
be added only "on such terms as are just."

3. This lawsuit was initiated and extensively litigated 
(prior to the addition of suburban school district defendants) 
between the original parties who were in collusive agreement to 
seek relief from this Court and to purposefully acquiesce in 
charges of alleged segregation in the Detroit Public Schools. 
Since there was no honest and actual antagonistic assertion of 
rights by these parties, there was no true case and controversy 
before this Court as required by Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution of the United, and this Court was without 
jurisdiction to entertain this proceeding.

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4. Any remedy to the alleged wrongs enumerated in the 

Complaint and Amended Complaint which could be imposed upon the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, the CLINTONDALE BOARD OF EDUCATION, 

and the parents and children they represent including the 
reallocation of pupils, teachers, resources, and facilities 
across the boundary lines of this School District would:

(a) be a deprivation of due process of law as 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States because the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 
SCHOOLS and its BOARD OF EDUCATION have not been a party 
and have not been represented in the extensive 
proceedings which have taken place in this case hereto­
fore and have not been guilty of any acts alleged in the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint or Amended Complaint or the 
violation of any Federal Constitutionally protected right

(b) be unnecessary under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and contrary to the Tenth Amendment since the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and the CLINTONDALE BOARD 
OF EDUCATION have taken no action whatsoever for the 
purpose of keeping their schools predominately white, 
nor excluded any child from any school within the 
District on account of race, and are therefore a unitary 

school district;
(c) be unnecessary under the Fourteenth Amendment 

and contrary to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States since the establishment and 
maintenance of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS by the 
CLINTONDALE BOARD OF EDUCATION has never been 
invidiously motivated or intended to circumvent any 
Federally protected right of any citizen;

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(d) impose a particular racial balance and a fixed 
racial quota upon the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 

unnecessary to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States and 
contrary to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States since the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
have already fully integrated and an appropriate racial 
balance has already been achieved;

(e) result in unreasonable hardship, be unduly 
harsh, and contrary to equity and good conscience 
because it would:

(i) create a cumbersome and unwieldy school 
administrative district, hamper sound education and 
curtail decentralized and diversified locally 
controlled schools more accessible and responsive to 
both black and white parents and to their school-age 

children (while leaving this benefit available to 
parents and children in other areas of the State of

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Michigan who fortuitously live a greater distance 
from the City of Detroit, than do the parents and 
children residing in the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 
SCHOOL DISTRICT) unnecessary to the requirements of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and contrary to the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States;

(ii) discriminate against parents and children 
who wish to participate in school centered, 
extracurricular, social or athletic activities;

(iii) destroy local programs tailored for. 

local needs;
(iv) be disruptive of sound education
(v) increase the exposure of school children

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to unnecessary injury due to a needless increase in 

the distance traveled to and from schools;
(f) usurp the Legislative power of the State of 

Michigan and the lawful power of the duly elected Board 
of Education of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
contrary to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of 

the United States;
(g) render useless the right of the electors of

the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT to cast ballots 
for members of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS BOARD 
OF EDUCATION since local board members would no longer 
control the organization and administration of the 
schools the Clintondale children attend, unnecessary 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 

the United States and contrary to the Tenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United 

States;
(h) disregard the right of private contract as

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guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution 

of the United States;
(i) be contrary to the right of free association

as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution 

of the United States;
(j) be contrary to the right to travel, to settle, 

and to partake of the benefits of .a new place as 
guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States;

(k) be the imposition of a penalty upon the 
Defendants without a judicial trial and therefore a 
bill of attainder in violation of Article I, Section 9 
of the Constitution of the United States, and Article 3 
of the Constitution of the United States;



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(1) present no case or controversy over which this 
Court has jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2 of 

the Constitution of the United States since the Defendant 
CLINTOC;DALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS has already achieved an 
appropriate racial balance.

5. That on or about October 17, 1973, the movants 
requested the concurrence of Plaintiffs' counsel in the relief 
sought in this Motion as required by Rule IX (a) of the Rules 
for the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, and concurrence was denied.

WHEREFORE, the Defendants, CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 
and GERALD STAFFORD, only, respectfully move this Honorable 
Court that an Order of Dismissal be entered in this action for 

the foregoing reasons.

MATHER, (SLIME & DAOUST

mond G. Glime

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Dated: October 17, 1973

By:_____._____
Denis R . Lebuc' y ■Attorneys for the Defendants, 

CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and 
GERALD STAFFORD, Only 
25 North Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
463-0511

7-



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

vs. Civil Action
No. 35257

MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants.

/

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

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STATE OF MICHIGAN)
) ss.

COUNTY OF MACOMB )

RAYMOND G. GLIME and DENIS R. LeDUC, having first been 
duly sworn, depose and say that they have read the foregoing 
Motion to Dismiss by them signed, and that the same is true to 
their knowledge, except as to those matters therein stated to 
be upon information and belief and as to those matters therein 
stated to be upon information and belief and as to those matters 
they believe them to be true.

Subscribed and sworn 
me this 18th day of

to before 
October, 1973

DIANA K. WHEATLEY 
Notary Public, Macomb 
My commission expires:

County
July

Mich. 
11, 1975



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,

Plaintiffs,
v s . Civil Action 

No. 35257
MILLIKEN, et al,

Defendants

/
AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MICHIGAN)
)

COUNTY OF MACOMB )
s s .

I, LILLIAN RICHMOND, of the Township of Clinton, County 
of Macomb and State of Michigan and being duly sworn depose 
and say that:

(a) I am a secretary in the central office of the 
Clintondale Community Schools;

(b) On September 28, 1973 I was served with a copy 
of the Summons, Complaint, and Amended Complaint 
in the case of Bradley, et al vs. Milliken et al., 
Civil Action No. 35257;

(c) I am not an agent appointed to receive service 
of process for the Clintondale Community Schools, 
the Clintondale Superintendent, the Clintondale 
Board of Education or any member thereof;

Further deponent sayeth not.

‘LILLIAN'RICHMOND
Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 16th day of October, A.D., 1973

(
. A —''•( -A 72. 10— — ' L . . . - c . .  t -

7f(iDIANA K. WHEATLEY 
Notary Public, Macomb County, Michigan 
My commission expires: July 11, 1975



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

Vq Civil Action
No. 35257

MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants.

/

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF MICHIGAN)
) ss.

COUNTY OF MACOMB )

I, GERALD STAFFORD, of the Township of Clinton, County 
of Macomb and State of Michigan and being duly sworn depose 
and say that:

(a) I am a trustee of the Clintondale Community 
Schools Board of Education;

(b) At no time have I been served with a copy of 
the Summons, Complaint, or Amended Complaint in 
the case of Bradley, et al vs. Milliken, et al., 
Civil Action No. 35257.

Further deponent sayeth not.

GERALD STAFFORD

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 16th day of October, A.D., 1973.

v.

A _VN- -1A—'
7 s/< lOH

DIANA K. WHEATLEY 
Notary Public, Macomb C 
My commission expires

uounty, Michigan 
July 11, 1975



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

vs. Civil Action
No. 35257

MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Proper service of process not having been made upon 
the Defendants, CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD, 
Trustee of the Clintondale Board of Education, in accordance with 
Rules 4 (d)(1) and 4 (d)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 U.S.C., this Court is entirely without jurisdiction 
over these Defendants and this action must be dismissed. As 
to the Defendant, CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS , service of 
process was attempted (as demonstrated by the Affidavit attached 
hereto) but was improper because it was not in accordance with 
Rule 4(d)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. 
which reads:

"Service shall be made as follows: . . .(6)
upon a State or municipal corporation or other 
governmental corporation thereof subject to suit, 
by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint 
to the chief executive officer thereof or by 
serving the summons and complaint in the manner 
prescribed by the law of that state for the service 
of summons or other like process on any such, 
defendant." Rule 4(d) (6), Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

The applicable Michigan law referred to is M.C.L. 600.1925(5):
"Service of process upon public, municipal, 
quasi municipal, or governmental corporations, 
unincorporated boards, or public bodies may be 
made by leaving a summons and copy of the 
complaint with . . . (5) the president, secretary,
or treasurer in the case of school districts."



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Service of process in this case not having been made upon the 
chief executive official of CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS (being 

the president of the Clintondale Community Schools Board of 
Education) or in accordance with M.C.L. 600.1925(5), any alleged 
service of process was improperly made and should be quashed by 
this Court and this case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

As to the Defendant, GERALD STAFFORD, no attempt 
whatsoever to achieve proper service of process has been made 
by the United States Marshall (as demonstrated by the Affidavit 
attached hereto) and therefore this case must be dismissed 
against the Defendant, GERALD STAFFORD, for lack of jurisdiction. 
Rule 4(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.

2. The Plainitffs have failed to state a claim against 
the Defendants, CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD, 

upon which relief can be granted.
This is a desegregation case with the Plaintiffs alleging 

that they have been denied a Federal Constitutional right to 
integrated schools. No allegation whatsoever has been made 
that the establishment, organization or administration of the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS has been in any way invidiously 
motivated. There is no allegation whatsoever that the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS are anything but an integrated, 
unitary school system fully in accord with the requirements of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Intentional discriminatory actions 
by the Defendants must be alleged before there can be any claim 
to relief. Absent such allegations, the Plaintiffs have failed 
to state a proper claim against the Defendants, CLINTONDALE 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD. Since judicial authority 
may only be exercised when there is a constitutional violation, 
this case must *be dismissed. Green v» School Board oi New Kea>-

"2-



County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v. Holmes County 
Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19 (1969). Swann v. Charlotte- 
Mecklenburg , supra at 22-26 is particularly clear that the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to 
achieving any particular racial balance within a school system. 
Since the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS already have an 
appropriate racial balance, this action must, of necessity, be 
an attempt by the Plaintiffs to impose another, different racial 
balance upon CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS. Being beyond the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for this Court to act 
on this request would be contrary to the Tenth Amendment, and, 
therefore, this case should be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. The addition of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and 
GERALD STAFFORD as party Defendants at this late stage in these 
proceedings has clearly abused the discretion granted to the 
Court under Rules 19 and 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 21 specifically permits a change of parties 
"at any stage in the action," Rule 21, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.; but the Court should deny the request to 
add additional parties if it comes so late in the litigation 
that it would cause prejudice. Petit v. George A. Rheman Co.,
1 F.R.D. 271 (N. D. Ga. 1940). While normally the decision to 
add or drop a party is in the sound discretion of the Court 
(Barr Rubber Products v. Sun Rubber Co. 425 F.2nd 1114 [2nd Cir. 
1970]), it is clearly an abuse of discretion under the particular 

circumstances of this case.
The order of September 10, 1973, by which the CLINTONDALE 

COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD were added as party

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defendants has come over three (3) years after the initiation of 
this suit. In that interim period there have been pleadings, 
motions, orders, voluminous testimony, a trial, findings of fact, 
and several appeals. Since the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS is 
an independent municipal body with the power to sue and to be 
sued, organized and administered by the Clintondale Board of 
Education (elected by and responsible to the electors of the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT), they have a fundamental 
right to be informed of any complaint against them, to cross- 
examine witnesses and to call witnesses on their own behalf. These 

rights are secured to them by the Fifth Amendment to our 
Constitution and cannot be denied. Addition as party Defendants 
at this late stage in these proceedings has effectively prejudiced 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD by denying them 
this fundamental right. Almost all of the essential issues in 
this case have already been determined and addition of new party 
Defendants at this stage must necessarily constitute an abuse of 

discretion by the Court.
The restricted hearing granted to these ne\tf Defendants 

would not remedy the severe prejudicial violations of their 
civil rights. Though it may appear harsh, this case should be 
dismissed and reinitiated by the Plaintiffs from the very 
beginning. The Plaintiffs themselves have caused this dilemma 
by failing to join all necessary parties (or to inform the 
court of all necessary parties not so joined as required by 
Rule 19(c) of the Federal Rules in Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.).
In balancing the potential inconvenience to the Plaintiffs, 
caused by their own inactions, against the immense injury to 
the civil liberties of the Defendants, it is clear that the 
convenience of the Plaintiffs must yield. If the Court allows 
these proceedings to continue, the rights of the Defendants



will have been trampled, and the discretion of the Court to 

add new party Defendants so severely abused as to necessitate 
reversal. Hargrove v» Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company 
153 F. Supp. 681 (W. D. Ky. 1957).

4. The exercise of judicial power is limited by the
express terms of the Constitution to cases and controversies.
Article III, Section 2, United States Constitution. This is a
clear recognition by the authors that the judicial function
requires intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides of an
issue to be confident in a decision. Otherwise, a Court is
placed in the position of giving judgment on crucial,
Constitutional issues without the benefit of all relevant facts.
There must be an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of
rights by the parties. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911). The Court should not hear collusive cases. Lord v.
Veazie, 8 How. 251 (1850); Chicago and G. T. Ry. Co. v, Wellman,
143 U.S. 339 (1892); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
It is the sincere belief of this Defendant, CLINTONDALE
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, that this necessary requirement of a true case
and controversy has been lacking at critical stages of these
proceedings. There has been collusion between the original
parties in this case and an unwillingness by the original party
Defendants to intelligently and vigorously argue their position.
The Detroit Board of Education at various times has viewed these
proceedings as a solution to the mismanagement of its schools.
That Board clandestinely solicited this suit against them and
entered into a pact for a "friendly" lawsuit with the Plaintiffs.
Indeed now, with the prospect of the unjustified altering or
ignoring of School District lines to bus students to Detroit
from neighboring districts which have not engaged in racial

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segregation, there has been created an actual incentive for

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Detroit to commit invidiously discriminatory acts and to 
deliberately mismanage its school system* Thus, the CLINTONDALE 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS now face the dismal prospect of being forced 
into a suit where all the major issues have been given away by 
the previous Defendants in a non-adversary proceeding, The 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, which are fully integrated, which 
have an appropriate racial balance, and which have complied with 
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment are to become a mere 
pool of resources— racial, educational, and financial— to cure 
inadequacies of the Detroit Public Schools over which they have 

no influence or control.
Because of the collusive nature of this case at critical 

points in the proceedings, a true case and controversy as required 
by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution was lacking, and 
therefore, this Court was without proper jurisdiction and this 
case against the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS should be dismissed

5. Any remedy to the alleged wrongs enumerated in 
the Complaint and the Amended Complaint which could be imposed 
upon the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS, the Clintondale Board of 
Education, and the parents and children they represent, such as 
the reallocation of pupils, teachers, resources, and facilities 
across the boundary lines of the School District, would:

(a) Be a denial of liberty and property without 
due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States since the 
Defendants have never had a trial, a judicial hearing, or 
any opportunity to be heard in this case. They have 
not been present to examine and cross-examine witnesses 
or to enter any objections to these proceedings.
Therefore, any possible remedy imposed in this case would 
not only'be a denial of due process of law but a complete



denial of any process of law whatsoever— blatantly in 
violation of the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).

(b) Be unnecessary under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and contrary to the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States since the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS have never been established or maintained by the 
Clintondale Board of Education with invidious motives 
or with the intention to circumvent or deny any Federally 
protected right of any citizen. The CLINTONDALE 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and the Clintondale Board of Education
have taken no action whatsoever for the purpose of keeping 
their schools predominatly white nor excluded any child 
from any school within the District on account of the 
child's race. The CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS are a 
unitary School District fully in compliance with the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Green v. School. 
Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S, 430 (1968); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 

(1971). That there are some predominatly white districts 
existing in outlying metropolitan areas does not in and 
of itself show any deprivation of constitutional rights to 
any citizen so long as the racial makeup of the District 
is the product of neutral and non-discriminatory forces. 
Without any finding of invidious discriminatory acts by 
the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and the Clintondale 
Board of Education, there is no violation! of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and hence this Court is without 
power to usurp the administrative power of the



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Clintondale Board of Education or the CLINTONDALE 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS granted them by the people of 
Clintondale„ Such blatant intervention into the affairs 
of the state and of the people without constitutionally 
sanctioned cause is clearly banned by the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 462 
F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affirmed per curiam, 93 S.Ct. 
1952 (1973); United States v» Texas Education Agency,
467 F .2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972); Keyes v. School District 
No - 1, 44 5 F.2d 990 (10 th Cir. 1971); Spencer v. Kugler, 

326 F. Supp. 1235 (D. N.J. 1971), affirmed, 404 U.S.
1027 (1972); Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 419
F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969); Goss v. Board of Education 
of the City of Knoxville, C.A. 6, 72-1765-1767 (July 18, 

1973).
(c) Impose a particular racial balance and a fixed 

racial quota upon the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS 'in 
effect saying that though the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 
SCHOOLS have already achieved an appropriate racial 
balance, the number of Negro children presently attending 
the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS are necessarily 
inadequate to integrate this district and that a 
certain fixed quota of Negro children must be transferred 
to Clintondale and a fixed quota of Clintondale 
children sent to other districts in order to comply 
with requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. This 

imposition of a particular racial balance and a fixed

-8-



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racial quota has specifically been ruled unnecessary for 

desegregation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Bradley v. School Board 
of the City of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).

(d) Result in an unreasonable hardship, be unduly 
harsh and contrary to equity and good conscience. The 
Defendants have done nothing wrong. No allegations or 
findings have been made that the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 
SCHOOLS or GERALD STAFFORD have operated other than a 
completely desegregated, unitary school system with an 

appropriate racial balance in full compliance with the 
Fourteenth Amendment. That is all that can be asked of 
them. Bradley y. School Board of the City of Richmond,
462 F .2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affirmed per curiam,
93 S.Ct. 1952 (1973); United States v» Texas Education 
Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972); Keyes v. School 
District No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971). Realloca­
tion of'pupils, teachers, resources, and facilities 
across the boundary lines of the school district would 
be a harsh and unconscionable remedy— time and. money 
consuming and disruptive of good education, contrary to 
the obvious advantages of local schools locally controlled 
in close working cooperation.with parents. The 

CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and the Clintondale Board 
of Education do not control housing patterns. They 
stand ready to welcome Negro children into any school in 
the district so long as the child is a resident of the 
district. Under these circumstances, any remedy which 
could be rendered in this case, being unduly harsh and 
unconscionable, is beyond the equitable powers of this 
Court.

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(e) Create a cumbersome and unwieldy school district, 
hamper sound education, and curtail decentralized, 
diversified and locally controlled schools which are more 

accessible and responsive to both black and white parents 
and their school aged children. Such a remedy would leave 
the valuable benefit of local schools available to parents 
and children in other areas of the State of Michigan who 
fortuitously live a greater distance from the City of 
Detroit than do parents and children residing.in the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. This remedy would 
necessarily discriminate against any parents and children 
who wish to participate in school centered, extra­
curricular, social and athletic activities, and render 
school administrators unable to tailor local programs to 
fit local needs. Such destruction to sound education
is unnecessary to the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and contrary to the Tenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.

(f) Usurp the Legislative and Administrative power 
of the State of Michigan and the duly elected Board
of Education of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS. "The 
powers not deligated to the United States by the 
Constitution nor prohibited to it by the States are 
reserved to the States respectively or to the people." 
Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. This is a fundamental element of our entire form 
of Federal government. If invidious discrimination in the 
establishment or maintainence fo the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 
SCHOOLS was shown, then this principle must yield; but 
absent such a showing, it is constitutionally prohibited 
to the United States to interfere with the internal

10



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affairs of the State and its people, and there has been 
no such showing (indeed not even such an allegation) that 
the Clintondale Board of Education has in any way 
'established or maintained its District as an instrument 
of invidious discrimination. There must be such a 
finding of purposeful discrimination by the Defendant 
before the United States, through its Courts, has the 

power to order any restructuring or in any way to interfer 

with the internal affairs of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY 

SCHOOLS. They must show intentional discriminatory acts 
by the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS or the Clintondale 
Board of Education causally connected to segregation 
within the District. There has been no finding of this; 
there has been no allegation of this; and, therefore, ther 
may be no remedy. To do otherwise would be to effectively 
dispense with representative democracy as the basic form 
of government within the State of Michigan and the 

CLINTONDALE SCHOOL DISTRICT— a result hardly intended by 
the authors, the adopters, and the ratifiers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution. Bradley v. 
School Board of the City of Richmond, 462 F„2d 1058 
(4th Cir. 1972), affirmed per curiam, 93 S.Ct. 1952 (1973) 
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F.2d 848 
(5th Cir. 1973); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 445 F.2d 
990 (10th Cir. 1971); Spencer v. Kugler, 326 F. Supp.
1235 (D. N.J. 1971), affirmed, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972);
Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 419 F.2d 1387 
(6th Cir. 1969); Goss v. Board of Education of the City 
of Knoxville, C.A. 6, 72-1766-1767 (July 18, 1973).

(g) Render useless the right of the electors of the
«

CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT to cast ballots for

11



members of the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOL’S Board of
Education since local school board members would no 
longer control the organization and administration of the 
schools the Clintondale children attend. As a member of 
the Republic, each citizen has an inherent right to vote 
which is equal to that of every other citizen. Just as 
the right to vote may be diluted by disproportionate 
representation (Reynolds v, Sims, 377 U.S. 533 [1964]),
so also it may be diluted by eliminating the effectiveness 
of each vote. It is obvious that allowing one Senator 
to cast a full vote, but another to cast only half a vote, 
would prejudicially dilute the right to vote belonging 
to the latter Senator's constituents. So too, the ability 
to vote for local school board members is diluted and 
perhaps rendered useless when the elected school board 
members no longer are responsible for the organization 
and administration of the schools where the children of 
their electors attend. Such action is unnecessary under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and contrary to the Tenth 
Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 

the United States.
(h) Endanger resources of the school districts 

pledged by contract as security for the indebtedness of 
that district and thereby disregard the right of private 
contract as guaranteed by Article I, Section 10, of the 
Constitution of the United States. Such a remedy would 
also disrupt the contractual rights of teachers and other 
personnel employed by the district in the same manner.

(i) Be contrary to the fundamental right of free 
association as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. Aptheker v. Secretary

12



J

of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
(j) Be contrary to the right to travel, to settle and

to partake the benefits of a new place as. guaranteed by
\

the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States. Citizens have a clear and fundamental 
right to move wherever they wish within or without a state. 
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1364). An 
important aspect of this right is necessarily the ability 
to settle in any community a citizen chooses. That right 
should not be denied or diluted as to any citizen black 
or white; but any residence so chosen is much more than a 
mere address. It is a home and a community. It consists, 
of neighbors, churches, shops, and most importantly a 
local school system, and that free choice of a community 
is useless if such an important aspect as its local 
schools can be deprived to its residents without cause.
Such action is a clear denial of the fundamental freedom 
to travel, inherent to citizenship in the United States.

j

(k) Be the imposition of a penalty upon the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and the Clintondale Board
of Education and the people they .represent without benefit 
of a judicial trial and therefore either beyond the powers 
of the Court as granted under Article III of the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States or, if such 
power is granted to the Courts, clearly a bill of attainder 
in violation of Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution 
of the United States.

(l) Present no case or controversy over which this 
Court would have jurisdiction under Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States.

-13-



j - f tlis Plaintiffs srs merely requesting that the 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS achieve an appropriate 
racial balance then such a balance has already been 
achieved within the CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and no 

dispute is presented to this Court.

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Dated: October 18, 1973 Respectfully submitted, 

MATHER, GLIMS & DAOUST

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Debis R. LeDuc~~

Attorneys for Defendants, 
CLINTONDALE COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and 
GERALD STAFFORD, Only 
25 North Gratiot Avenue 
Mount Clemens, Michigan 48043 
463-0511



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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BRADLEY, et al,
Plaintiffs,

v s . Civil Action 
No, 35257

MILLIKEN, et al,
Defendants

/

PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF MICHIGAN)

) s s .
COUNTY OF MACOMB )

CAROL STRACK, being *first duly sworn, deposes and says 
that she is employed in a secretarial capacity by the firm of

1

MATHER, GLIME & DAOUST, attorneys for the Defendants, CLINTONDALE 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS and GERALD STAFFORD, only, and that she served 
a copy of the Motion to Dismiss, Affidavits in Support of Motion, 
Brief in Support,of Motion to Dismiss and Notice of Hearing 
upon the attorneys on the attached list by placing the same in 
an envelope with sufficient postage addressed to each of them 
and by depositing the same in a regular United States Mail 
receptacle located in Mount Clemens, Michigan, on October 18,

1973.
Further, deponent sayeth not-

//

CAROL STRACK

Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this 18th day of October, 
A.D., 1973.

C
„ A  .

DIANA K. WHEATLEY //
Notary Public, Macomb County, Michigan 
My Commission Expires: July 11, 1975



! PAUL R. DIMONO 
| 906 Rose Avenue 
; Ann Arbor, Michigan 4 810 4

J . HAROLD FLANNERY 
CENTER FOR LAW & EDUCATION 
Larsen Hall 
14 Appian Way 
Cambridge, Mass, 02138

«

LUCA°LOUIS R. LU'̂ ho 
WILLIAM E. CALDWELL 
Ratner, Sugarmon & Lucas 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

NATHAN I] JONES
1790 Broadway
New Yo: New York 10019

JACK GREENBERG 
NORMAN J. CKACHKIN 
10 Columbus Circle 
New7 York, New York 10019

WILLIAM M, SAXTON
1881 First National Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226

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DOUGLAS H. WEST
3700 Penobscot Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226

ELLIOTT HALL
950 Guardian Building
Detroit, Michigan 48226

GEORGE T. ROUMELL, JR. 
7th Floor Ford Building 
Detroit, Michigan 48226

FRANK J, KELLEY 
Attorney General 
Law Building 
525 W. Ottawa 
Lansing, Michigan 1 T> -L O