St. Mary's Honor Center v Hicks Brief Amici Curiae

    3fn flje Supreme Court of tfje tliiiteb States
October Term, 1992

St. Mary’s H onor Center , et al., petitioners

v.
Melvin H icks

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION AS AMICI CURIAE

Donald R. Livingston
General Counsel

Gwendolyn Young Reams 
Associate General Counsel

Vincent J. Blackwood 
Assistant General Counsel

Karen M. Moran 
Attorney
Equal Employment Oppor­

tunity Commission 
Washington, D.C. 20507

William C. Bryson 
Acting Solicitor General

James P. Turner 
Acting Assistant Attorney 

General
Edwin S. Kneedler 

Assistant to the Solicitor 
General

Edward C. DuMont 
Assistant to the Solicitor 

General
David K. Flynn 
Rebecca K. Troth 

Attorneys
Washington, D.C. 20530 
(202) 514-2217



QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the plaintiff in an employment discrimination 

case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of l!)f>4 or 
42 U.S.C. 1083 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
once he has (i) established a prima facie case and (ii) 
proved that all permissible grounds advanced by the 
defendant in support of its actions are unworthy of 
credence.

(I)



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Interest of the United States and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission................................................... 1

Statement ................................................................................  2
Summary of argum ent.........................................................  9
Argument:

Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on the basis of his prima facie case and proof that all 
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by petitioners to 
justify their actions were unworthy of credence ...........  12
A. Requiring respondent to do more than discredit all 

nondiscriminatory explanations proffered by peti­
tioners would be inconsistent with the order of proof 
established by McDonnell Douglas and subsequent
cases............................................................................  12

B. The McDonnell Douglas order of proof properly re­
quires the employer to frame the factual issues for 
decision by identifying the nondiscriminatory ex­
planations that the plaintiff must refute ...................  18

C. There is no evidence on the record in this case of a 
nondiscriminatory motive that was not articulated
by petitioners ........................................................  25

Conclusion...............................................................................  29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:

Benzies v. Illinois Dcp't of Mental Health & Develop­
mental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 483 U.S. 1000 (1987) ..........................................  19

Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503
(5th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................  19

Brooks v. Monroe Systems for Business, Inc., 873 F.2d
202 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989)...........  17

Burger v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, Inc., 856 F.2d 
1040 (8th Cir. 1988)....................................................... 20

(H I)



IV

Cases—Continued: Page
Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d Cir.),

cert, dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987)..........................  19
Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525

(11th Cir. 1983).............................................................. J9
EEOC v. Flasher Co., No. 91-G279 (10th Cir. Dec. 29,

1992) .................................................................................. 19, 21
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567

(1978> ............................................................................. 17,20,25
Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275 (6th

Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 (1992) ............  26
Goldman v. First National Bank, No. 92-1773 (1st Cir.

Feb. 18, 1993) ...................................................................  19
Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir.

1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1205 (1983) .................... 2
Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1989) . 19
Ibrahim v. New York State Dept of Health, 904 F.2d

161 (2d Cir. 1990).......................................................... 19
International Blid. of Teamsters v. United States, 431

U.S. 324 (1977) ................................................................. l3) 21
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985)............  19
MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d 1054

(8th Cir. 1988) ..................................................................  17
Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir.

19R7).................................................................................. 26
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) .. 2, 6, 9,

12-13
Miller v. WFLI Radio Inc., 687 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1982).. 19
Nix v. WLCY Radio/Raliall Communications, 738 F.2d

1181 (11th Cir. 1984) ........................................................  24
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986)............................  24
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) . 4
Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557 (7th Cir.),

cert, denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).............................  23-24
Pullman-Standard v. Sivint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)............. 16

Cases—Continued:

V

Page
23Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).....

Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554
(11th Cir. 1987)..............................................................

Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981) ....................................  13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 25,

Thornbrough v. Columbus & G. R.R., 760 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1985).........................................................................

Tye v. Board of Education, 811 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.),
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987)..............................

United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983)............
United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711 (1983) ..................................................  2, 15, 16,
Visser v. Packer Engineering Assocs., 924 F.2d 655

(7th Cir. 1991) ..................................................................
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)...................

Statutes:
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621

et seq...................................................................................
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et

seq....................................................................................... 1
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105

Stat. 1073 ........................................................................
42 U.S.C. 1981 a(c)..........................................................

42 U.S.C. 1981 ....................................................................
42 U.S.C. 1983 .................................................................... 1

Miscellaneous:
Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses:

The Fallacy of the “Pretext-Plus ” Ride in Employ ment 
Discrimination Cases, 43 Hast. L.J. 57 (1991) ...........  19-20,

19

29

19

19
24

25

26
24

1

,4

18
18
4

,4

24



3!u tlje Suprem e C ourt of tlje Qllmtrtj ^>tntrO
October Term, 1992 

No. 92-602

St. Mary’s H onor Center , et al., petitioners

v.

Melvin H icks

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR TIIE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION AS AMICI CURIAE

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION
This case concerns the method by which a plaintiff 

may prove intentional employment discrimination 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1904, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e et s eq., and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The 
Attorney General and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) share substantial 
responsibility for the enforcement of Title VI1. The 
EEOC also has primary responsibility for interpreta­
tion and enforcement of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., and

(1)



2

the courts have applied the same order and standards 
of proof to claims of age discrimination under the 
ADEA. See, e.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 
683 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 
1205 (1983). The resolution of this case will directly 
affect the government’s discharge of these responsi­
bilities. The EEOC participated as amicus curiae in 
support of respondent in the court of appeals, and the 
United States has previously participated in cases in 
this Court involving similar issues, including 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), and United States Postal Service Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983), as well as in 
numerous other cases under Title VII and the ADEA.

STATEMENT
1. Respondent Melvin Hicks began work in August 

1978 as a correctional officer at petitioner St. Mary’s 
Honor Center, a minimum security state prison in St. 
Louis, Missouri. Pet. App. A2, A28. In February 1980 
he was promoted to shift commander, a supervisory 
position. Id. at A2. Prior to the events at issue in 
this case, respondent had never been suspended, 
“written up,” or otherwise subjected to any disci­
plinary action. Id. at A3.

In January 1984 the superintendent of St. Mary’s, 
Arthur Schulte, was demoted and transferred to 
another institution in response to complaints about 
management of the prison. Pet. App. A15. He was 
replaced by petitioner Steven Long. Ibid. Both 
Schulte and Long are white. Id. at A2, A15 n.l. At 
the same time, the chief of custody and two shift 
commanders, all of whom were black, were removed

3

and replaced by white employees.1 Id. at A15 & nn.l, 3. 
John Powell became chief of custody and respondent’s 
immediate supervisor. Id. at A2. Re-spondent and 
another black shift commander were initially retained 
as part of the new administration.

In March 1984, respondent was suspended for five 
days after an incident in which other officers arriving 
at St. Mary’s during respondent’s late-night shift 
discovered that the front-door officer and another 
guard were away from their posts, the “control 
center” officer was required to leave his post momen­
tarily to open the door, and the first floor lights were 
turned off. None of the officers directly involved was 
disciplined. Powell testified at trial that it was his 
policy to discipline only the shift commander for 
violations occurring during his shift.2 * Pet. App. A16- 
A17.

Two weeks later, respondent properly authorized 
use of a St. Mary’s vehicle by two officers. Those two 
officers and the control center officer all failed to 
enter the use of the vehicle in an official log, as 
required by prison rules. The disciplinary review 
board recommended that respondent be demoted from 
shift commander to correctional officer for that 
failure. Powell, who was a member of the review 
hoard, voted to terminate respondent. Again, none of

1 The position of chief of custody was first offered to a black 
employee, who declined the offer. Pet. App. A15 n.2.

2 Powell was responsible for initiating disciplinary proceed­
ings. A four-person disciplinary review board would then 
make a recommendation to the superintendent of St. Mary’s, 
who would in turn make a recommendation to the director of 
the state prison administration. See Pet. App. A17 n.6.



4

the other individuals involved was disciplined. 
Shortly after this incident, but before his demotion, 
respondent was reprimanded for failing to investigate 
an inmate fight, although he had given Powell a 
memorandum about the incident and ordered a 
subordinate to submit a report. Pet. App. A17-A18 & 
n.7.

When respondent was informed of his demotion, he 
asked for and was given the rest of the day off. As 
respondent was leaving the meeting, Powell followed 
and ordered him to open his locker so that Powell 
could retrieve respondent’s copy of the shift com­
mander’s manual. Respondent refused, and indicated 
in the ensuing confrontation that he would “step 
outside” with Powell. Powell sought disciplinary 
action against respondent based on the “threats” 
made during this confrontation, and a disciplinary 
board recommended that respondent be suspended for 
three days. Superintendent Long instead recom­
mended that respondent be fired, based on the 
“severity and accumulation” of his violations. Re­
spondent was fired on June 7, 1984. Pet. App. A18-A19.

2. Respondent then commenced this action, 
alleging that petitioners had demoted and fired him 
because of his race, in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 19G4, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and 
42 U.S.C. 1983.3 Pet. App. A14. Petitioners defended

3 Respondent sued St. Mary’s under Title VII and Long 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Because the issues and standards are not 
materially different, we will refer only to Title VII. See Pet. 
App. AC-A7 (and cases cited); cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 104, 180 (1989) (framework of proof developed 
under Title VII applies to cases under 42 U.S.C. 1981)-

5

on the ground that “the severity and the accumula­
tion of violations committed” by respondent supplied 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for demoting 
and firing him. Id. at A23; see Pet. Br. 8.

a. Respondent introduced evidence intended to 
show that the reasons petitioners offered for their 
actions were unworthy of credence. With respect to 
the five-day suspension in March, respondent showed 
that on two occasions that same month lie had 
reported that no front-door officer was present when 
he arrived at St. Mary’s during the shift commanded 
by officer Sharon Hefele, who is white. The control 
center officer stated that Officer Hefele had ordered 
him to open and close the front door, which required 
him to leave his assigned post. Despite the close 
similarity between those incidents and the one for 
which respondent was suspended, no one was ever 
disciplined for those incidents. Pet. App. A19-A20, 
A24-A25.

Similarly, respondent had reported on another 
occasion that during Officer Hefele’s shift the doors 
to the main power room and the annex building were 
unlocked, in violation of regulations, yet the prison 
administration took no action. A white officer who 
took a set of prison keys home with him was never 
disciplined. And a white officer who admitted that, as 
an acting shift commander, he had actually allowed an 
inmate to escape received only a letter of reprimand.4 
Pet. App. A20, A2.r)-A2(5.

4 The district court noted that so far as appeared from the 
record, that reprimand was the only discipline meted out to 
any officer other than respondent during the period at issue in 
this case. Pet. App. A27. Apparently, the only dispute among



6

The incident that resulted in respondent’s March 
suspension was reported by a white officer, Ed Ratliff. 
Pet. App. A16, A19 n.8. On the day of that incident, 
Ratliff permitted an unescorted inmate to climb into 
the prison superintendent’s office to retrieve some 
work passes locked inside. When respondent brought 
this incident, which the d istric t court term ed a 
“striking and obvious breach of security,” to Powell’s 
attention, Powell took no disciplinary action, but 
commended Ratliff for “defusing a volatile situation.” 
Id. at A19 & nn.9-10, A25. On another occasion, 
Ratliff brought his brother, a deputy marshal, to St. 
Mary’s, and directly countermanded respondent’s 
instruction tha t the brother check his gun while 
inside the prison. Although respondent reported the 
incident, Powell refused to recommend discipline 
against Ratliff. Id. at A19.

Finally, ten days before respondent’s confrontation 
with Powell, respondent had reported to Powell that a 
white subordinate had become indignant at receiving 
a low service rating and had cursed respondent with 
“highly profane language.” Pet. App. A20. Powell 
concluded that the subordinate was “merely venting 
justifiable frustration,” and took no action. Id. at 
A20-A21 & n.14, A2G n.17.

b. After reviewing the evidence, the district court 
first found that respondent had proved a prima facie 
case of race discrimination under McDonnell Dong- 
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), by showing

prison administrators with respect to the escape incident was 
w hether the le tte r of reprimand should remain in the 
responsible officer’s file permanently, or be removed after six 
months. Id. at A25 n.16.

7

that he was a member of a protected class, that he had 
the necessary job qualifications for the position of 
shift commander, that he had a satisfactory record in 
that position until the change of administration at St. 
Mary’s, and that after he was demoted the position of 
shift commander remained open and was then fdled by 
a white employee. Pet. App. A22-A23. The district 
court further found that petitioners had carried their 
burden of production at the second stage of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework by articulating non- 
discrim inatory reasons for their actions—namely, 
the severity and accumulation of violations committed 
by petitioner. Id. at A23.

Finally, the district court found, at the third stage 
of the McDonnell Douglas framework, that respon­
dent had “carried his burden in proving that the 
reasons given for his demotion and termination were 
pretextual.” Pet. App. A26; see id. at A23-A2G. The 
court observed tha t respondent was “mysteriously 
the only person disciplined for violations actually 
committed by his subordinates,” id. a t A23-A24, 
noting th a t a white shift commander was never 
disciplined for similar or more serious infractions 
occurring on her shift. Id. a t A24-A25. Although 
Superintendent Long had testified, “ra ther sheep­
ishly,” that he considered the vehicle log incident “a 
serious violation for which harsh discipline was 
justified,” the court found tha t contention uncon­
vincing in light of the fact that “much more serious 
violations, when committed by [respondent’s] co­
workers, were either disregarded or treated much 
more leniently.” Id. at A25. Finally, the court found 
tha t respondent had been “provoked” into the final 
confrontation with Powell, and that “the evidence



8

suggests that Powell manufactured the confrontation 
* * * in order to terminate plaintiff.” Id. at A2G.

Although respondent had proved that the only 
reasons advanced by petitioners were pretextual, the 
district court nevertheless entered judgment for 
petitioner. Pet. App. A27-A30. The court was of the 
view that even after demonstrating that petitioners’ 
reasons were not worthy of credence, respondent 
“still fborel the ultimate burden to prove that race 
was the determining factor in [petitioners’] decision,” 
id. at A2G, and it concluded that respondent had not 
proved that the actions taken against him were 
‘racially rather than personally motivated,” id. at 
A27.

The court pointed to no specific evidence in the 
record that Powell, Long or other prison administra­
tors harbored any personal animosity against re­
spondent, independent of his race. It did note that no 
action was taken against black subordinates who had 
actually committed two of the violations for which 
respondent was disciplined, and that there were black 
members of the disciplinary review boards convened 
to consider respondent’s violations. Id. at A27-A28. 
The court also concluded that neither the general 
pattern of personnel changes at St. Mary’s nor the 
reduction in the number of blacks in supervisory 
positions raised an inference of racial discrimination, 
and that neither Long nor Powell had been aware, 
prior to the 1984 personnel changes, of a 1981 study 
that had concluded that “blacks possessed too much 
power at St. Mary’s.”5 Id. at A27-A28.

5 The district court described the study as “a comprehen­
sive comparison of [the honor centers in St. Louis and Kansas

9

3. The court of appeals reversed and ordered entry 
of judgment for respondent. Pet. App. A1-A12. It 
reasoned that the district court’s “unequivocal 
factual finding” that petitioners’ asserted reasons for 
their actions were pretextual, id. at A ll, left peti­
tioners “in a position of having offered no legitimate 
reason for their actions,” and “in no better position 
than if they had remained silent” in the face of 
respondent’s prima facie case, id. at A10. “Once 
[respondent] proved all of [petitioners’] proffered 
reasons for the adverse employment actions to be 
pretextual,” the court held, “[respondent 1 was enti­
tled to judgment as a matter of law,” without any need 
for further evidence of discrimination. Id. at A10-A11. 
Thus, the court concluded, it was improper for the 
district court to have rejected respondent’s claim by 
“assum[ing]—without evidence to support the 
assumption—that [petitioners’] actions were some­
how ‘personally motivated.’ ” Id. at A10.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent alleged that he was demoted and 

discharged by petitioners because of his race, and the 
case proceeded under the familiar burden-shifting 
framework prescribed by this Court in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and

City, | which discussed the shortfalls and suggested means of 
improvement,. In a section toward the end of the study (the 
author] pointed out that too many blacks were in positions of 
power at St. Mary’s, and that the potential for subversion of 
the superintendent’s power, if the staff became racially 
polarized, was very real. No witness for the defendants 
admitted he was aware of [this] study at the time of the 1984 
personnel changes.” Pet. App. A21. See FX 1.



10

subsequent decisions. F irst, the plaintiff must 
establish a prima facie case. That initial showing 
creates a rebuttable but otherwise legally mandatory 
presumption: if the employer remains silent in the 
face of the prima facie case, the court must enter 
judgment for the plaintiff. In order to avoid that 
result, the employer is required to articulate some 
clear and reasonably specific nondiscriminatory 
reason for the challenged employment action. Fin­
ally, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the 
reason advanced by the employer was not its true 
reason, but was merely a pretext for discrimination. 
This Court has said that that burden “merges” with 
the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proving illegal 
discrimination, which may be carried either directly 
through proof of a discriminatory motive, or 
indirectly by showing that the employer’s pi-offered 
explanation is unworthy of credence.

In this case, there is no dispute that respondent 
made out a prima facie case. Petitioners responded by 
articulating a facially legitimate reason for demoting 
and firing respondent: the “severity and accumula­
tion” of his violations of prison rules. The district 
court found that respondent then carried his final 
burden of showing that petitioners’ proffered reason 
for their actions was unworthy of belief. The court 
nevertheless went on to hold that respondent was not 
entitled to judgment because lie had not adduced some 
further evidence that petitioners’ actions were mot­
ivated by his race.

As the court of appeals held, that conclusion is 
inconsistent with this Court’s prior decisions. The 
question is not whether a plaintiff must prove 
intentional discrimination, which is undisputed, but

11

how he may prove it. This Court has consistently 
explained that a plaintiff may carry his ultimate 
burden indirectly, by discrediting the employer’s 
proffered explanation for its actions. Moreover, a 
contrary holding would be inconsistent with the 
premise that an employer that is unable or unwilling 
to articulate a credible nondiscriminatory reason for 
a challenged action is more likely than not concealing 
a discriminatory reason. An employer that remained 
silent in the face of the plaintiff’s prima facie case 
would be held liable for discrimination; there is no 
logical justification for putting an employer that 
fabricates a nondiscriminatory explanation in any 
better position.

Petitioners argue that even if a plaintiff discredits 
all nondiscriminatory reasons actually advanced by 
the employer, the employer should be entitled to 
consideration by the trier of fact of the possibility 
that there was some other, unarticulated motivation 
for the employer’s action. Put the McDonnell Dong- 
las framework of proof is designed to be a sensible and 
efficient means of bringing litigants and the courts to 
the ultimate question of discrimination. Because any 
number of nondiscriminatory reasons might, have 
accounted for a typical employment decision, it would 
not be sensible or efficient to force the plaintiff to 
attem pt to negate every possible such reason. 
Instead, it is reasonable to require the employer, 
which is of course in the best position to know its 
true reasons for acting, to frame specific issues for 
response by the plaintiff and decision by the court.

Finally, petitioners argue that judgment for the 
plaintiff should not be compelled where legitimate 
reasons for the employer’s actions, while not articu­



12

lated by the employer itself, “emerge” from the plain­
tiffs case or are “suggested” by the employer’s other 
evidence. That argument has little to do with the 
facts of this case. A fair reading of the district 
court’s opinion reveals at most a wholly unsup­
ported—and therefore clearly erroneous—“assump­
tion” that respondent was actually fired because of 
personal animosity (unrelated to race) on the part of 
John Powell, his immediate supervisor. Even per­
suasive evidence of Powell’s “personal” animosity 
would hardly be conclusive, because final decisions af­
fecting respondent’s employment were made not by 
Powell, but by others in the prison administration. In 
any event, however, petitioners can point to nothing 
in the record to indicate that Powell’s obvious 
hostility toward respondent was based on anything 
other than respondent’s race.

ARGUMENT

RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW ON TIIE BASIS OF HIS 
I’RIMA FACIE CASE AND PROOF THAT ALL 
NONDISCRIM IN ATORY REASONS PROFFERED 
BY PETITIONERS TO JUSTIFY THEIR ACTIONS 
WERE UNWORTHY OF CREDENCE

A. Requiring Respondent To I)o More Than 
Discredit All Nondiscriniinatory Explanations 
Proffered By Petitioners Would Be Inconsistent 
With '1'lie Order Of Proof Established By 
McDonnell Douglas  And Subsequent Cases

Respondent alleged that he was demoted and 
discharged by petitioners because of his race. In a 
series of cases beginning with McDonnell Douglas

13

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), this Court has set 
forth the “allocation of burdens and order of 
presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging 
discriminatory treatment.” Texas Dep't of Commu­
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981). The 
applicable three-step procedural framework has 
become familiar:

First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by 
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie 
case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff 
succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriniinatory reason for the 
employee’s rejection.” Third, should the defen­
dant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then 
have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered 
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but 
were a pretext for discrimination.

Id. at 252-253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 
at 802).

There is no dispute that respondent proved a prima 
facie case. See Pet. App. A8 & n.7. That threshhold 
showing “eliminates the most common nondiscrimi- 
natory reasons” for the challenged employment 
action: the plaintiff’s lack of qualifications, or the 
employer’s lack of an available position. See Burdine, 
450 U.S. at 253-254 & n.G; International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 
(1977). It therefore creates a “legally mandatory,” 
although rebuttable, presumption: if the employer 
remains silent in the face of the plaintiff’s initial



14

showing, then “the court must enter judgment for the 
plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 & n.7.

Establishment of a prima facie case requires the 
employer to “clearly set forth, through the intro­
duction of admissible evidence, the reasons” for its 
challenged actions. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255. The 
employer does not bear the burden of proving that it 
was motivated by the legitimate reasons it identifies, 
and therefore did not discriminate. The employer 
need only articulate a nondiscriminatory explanation 
for its actions, supported by sufficient evidence to 
permit acceptance of that explanation by a rational 
trier of fact. Id. at 255, 257. In this case, petitioners 
articulated a facially legitimate reason for demoting 
and firing respondent: the “severity and accu­
mulation” of his violations of prison administration 
rules. Pet. App. A8; Pet. Hr. 8.

Once the employer has articulated a nondiscrimina­
tory explanation for its actions, the plaintiff is 
accorded “the opportunity to demonstrate that the 
proffered reason was not the true reason for the 
employment decision.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 250. The 
burden of proof on that issue rests with the plaintiff, 
and “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading 
the court that she has been the victim of intentional 
discrimination.” Ibid. This Court made clear in 
Burdine that the plaintiff may carry that ultimate 
burden “either directly by persuading the court that a 
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the em­
ployer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of cre­
dence.” Ibid.

The district court in this case found that respon­
dent had carried his burden at the third stage of the

15

McDonnell Douglas framework “indirectly,” by dis­
crediting the only nondiscriminatory explanation 
proffered by petitioners for their actions. Pet. App. 
A23-A26. The district court nevertheless went on to 
hold that respondent was not entitled to judgment, 
because he had not adduced some further evidence 
that petitioners’ actions were motivated by his race. 
Id. at A27-A29. As the court of appeals correctly 
concluded, id. at A11-A12, that holding is inconsistent 
with this Court’s statement in Burdine that a Title 
VII plaintiff may carry his ultimate burden “by 
showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is 
unworthy of credence.” 450 U.S. at 256.

Relying in part on this Court’s later decision in 
United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. 
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1083), petitioners argue that 
the courts should focus on “the ultimate question of 
discrimination,” rather than the details of the 
McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework.0 Pet. Br. 6

6 Petitioners rely (Pet. Br. 14, 25-26) on language in Burdine 
stating that the presumption of discriminatory motive raised 
by the plaintiffs prima facie case “drops from the case” once 
the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its 
actions. 450 U.S. at 255 & n.10. The Court made that passing 
comment, however, in the course of explaining that although 
the employer’s showing “destroys the legally mandatory 
inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff’s initial 
evidence,” that initial evidence “and inferences properly 
drawn therefrom” remain very much part of the case. Id. at 
255 n.l(). The Court noted, for example, that “there may be 
some cases where the plaintiff’s initial evidence, combined with 
effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to 
discredit the defendant’s explanation.” Ibid. To be sure, once 
the employer has carried its burden of production, the plain­
tiff’s mere introduction of evidence to rebut the employer’s



1C

15; see also id. at 13-1G, 25-2G. We agree with 
petitioners that “intentional discrimination is the 
key factual issue in an employment discrimination 
case.” Id. at 2G. But that statement of the issue begs 
the crucial question of how the plaintiff may prove 
“intentional discrimination.” As explained above, the 
Court answered that question squarely in Burdine: 
the plaintiff may make the required showing either 
through direct evidence of a discriminatory motive, or 
by showing that the employer’s proffered explana­
tions are pretextual. Far from altering or undercut­
ting that disjunctive standard of proof, Aikens  
reiterated it in haec verba.1 Aikens, 4G0 U.S. at 71G; 
see also id. at 717-718 (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(“the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a 
plaintiff prevail when * * * he demonstrates that the

explanation does not, in itself, resuscitate a “legally mandatory 
inference” of discrimination. But where, as in this case, the 
plaintiff has succeeded in proving  “that the employer’s 
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence,” he has carried 
a burden which, as the Court specifically observed, “merges 
with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that [hej has 
been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 256.

7 In light of this Court’s specific and repeated articulation of
this standard of proof in cases directly addressing the issue, we
find inexplicable petitioners’ attempted reliance on Pullman- 
Standard  v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-290 (1982). ru llm a n -  
Standard held that a factual finding that a particular seniority 
system was not adopted with discriminatory intent was 
reviewable only for clear error, and rejected the notion that in 
that context discriminatory intent could be inferred from 
evidence of disparate impact. Nothing in the decision suggests 
that it implicates, let alone undercuts, anything that the Court 
said a year earlier in Burdine—and repeated a year later in 
Aikens.

17

legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason given by the 
employer is in fact not the true reason for the 
employment decision”).

Moreover, a rule that the employer is—or even may 
be—entitled to judgment in its favor after the plaintiff 
has convinced the trie r of fact that all non- 
discriminatory reasons put forward by the employer 
are unworthy of belief would be inconsistent with the 
premise that an employer that is unwilling or unable 
to articulate a credible nondiseriminatory reason for 
a challenged action is more likely than not concealing 
a discriminatory reason. See Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). That logical 
inference, which the Court has explicitly stated 
compels a judgment for the plaintiff if the employer 
remains silent in the face of a prima facie case 
(Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 & n.7), is no less compelling 
where the employer, rather than remaining silent, 
offers a false explanation for its actions. If anything, 
the inference of discrimination is stronger if the 
employer offers a false explanation.7 8 * Accordingly, as 
the court below held, Bet. App. All), there is no logical 
justification for placing an employer that fabricates a 
nondiseriminatory explanation in a better position

8 See, e.g., MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d 
1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 1988) (“As a matter of both common sense 
and federal law, an employer’s submission of a discredited 
explanation for firing a member of a protected class is itself 
evidence which may persuade the finder of fact that such 
unlawful discrimination actually occurred.”); Brooks v. 
Monroe Systems for Business, Inc., 873 F.2d 202, 204 (8th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).



18

than an employer that remains silent in the face of a 
prima facie case of discrimination.9

B. The M c D o n n e l l  D o u g l a s  Order Of Proof 
Properly Requires The Employer To Frame The 
Factual Issues For Decision By Identifying The 
Nondiscriminatory Explanations That The Plain­
tiff Must Refute

For the reasons stated above, the court of appeals 
correctly held that once respondent discredited all of 
the nondiscriminatory reasons advanced by petition­
ers, he had satisfied his ultimate burden of persuasion 
under this Court’s decisions and was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Pet. App. A10-A11. 
Petitioners argue (Pet. Br. 21), however, that even if 
a plaintiff discredits all nondiscriminatory reasons 
actually advanced by the employer, he “|has| not nec­
essarily eliminate[dj all lawful motives for the 
employment decision.” They contend that such a 
showing entitles the plaintiff to no more than 
consideration by the trier of fact; and, on petitioners’

9 A rule that the articulation of any facially legitimate 
reason for a challenged action, no matter how incredible given 
the facts of the case, ensures a defendant at least the possibility 
of a favorable decision from the trier of fact would also create 
perverse incentives for abuse of the judicial process by culpable 
defendants. Although perhaps muted in the context of bench 
trials, these incentives would become markedly more pro­
nounced (and more costly) in the context of jury trials, such as 
those now available under recent statutory changes. See 42 
U.S.C. 1981a(c), enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. 
L. No. 102-166, §102, 105 Stat. 1073 (1991). Put bluntly, it 
makes no sense, as a matter of law or of judicial administration, 
to create incentives for defendants to lie rather than settle 
meritorious cases.

1!)

view, the factfinder may depart entirely from the 
position of either party and find that the employer 
acted for some nondiscriminatory reason that is 
“contained in the record,” although not identified by 
the employer as the true reason for its actions.10 Id.

10 The courts of appeals are divided on the question of what 
a plaintiff must prove to prevail in a Title VII case where there 
is evidence of pretext. Petitioners’ position finds support in 
decisions of the First, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits which state, at least in dicta, that proof that the 
employer’s own explanations for its actions are incredible is 
insufficient by itself to compel (or in some cases even to 
permit) judgment for the plaintiff. See, e.g., Goldman v. First 
National Bank, No. 92-1773 (1st Cir. Feb. 18, 1993), slip op. 8 
(dictum) (reviewing prior cases); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 807 
F.2d 823, 827-828 (4th Cir. 1989); Benzie.s v. Illinois Dep't. of 
Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d I 16, 148 
(7th Cir.) (dictum), cert, denied, 483 U.S. 1000 (1987); EEOC v. 
Flasher Co., No. 91-0279 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 1992), slip op. 17-18 
(dictum); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 
529 (11th Cir. 1983). Respondent’s contrary position (and that 
of the Eighth Circuit in this case) finds support in decisions of 
the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth and District of Columbia 
Circuits. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. New York State Dep't of Health, 
904 F.2d 101, 108 (2d Cir. 1990); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, 
Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 898-900 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert, dismissed, 
483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Thornbrough v. Columbus & G. R.R., 700 
F.2d 033, 039-040, 040-047 (5th Cir. 1985); Tye v. Board of 
Education, 811 F.2d 315, 320 (0th Cir.), cert, denied, 484 (J.S. 
924 (1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
There are, moreover, apparent inconsistencies among decisions 
within several circuits. Compare, e.g., Thornbrough, supra, 
with Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 
1508 & n.O (5th Cir. 1988); Tye, supra, with Miller v. WFLI  
Radio Inc., 687 F.2d 136, 138-139 (6th Cir. 1982); Clark, supra, 
with Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 
1504 (11th Cir. 1987). See generally Lanctot, The Defendant



20

at 17. The district court in this case adopted that 
approach, faulting respondent for not disproving a 
possible explanation for petitioners’ actions—per­
sonal animosity unrelated to race—that petitioners 
themselves had never advanced during the course of 
the trial. See Pet. App. A27. Any such rule would, 
however, seriously undermine the fair and efficient 
operation of the McDonnell Douglas framework of 
proof.

As this Court has explained, that framework should 
be viewed and applied as “a sensible, orderly way to 
evaluate the evidence” in an employment discrimina­
tion case. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577. In that light, the 
probative value of proof that the reasons the employer 
advances are unworthy of credence arises largely 
because

we know from our experience that more often than 
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, 
without any underlying reasons, especially in a 
business setting. Thus, when all legitimate 
reasons for rejecting an applicant have been 
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s 
actions, it is more likely than not the employer, 
who we generally assume acts only with some 
reason, based his decision on an impermissible 
consideration such as race.

Ibid. As a theoretical matter, however, a given 
employment decision might conceivably have been 
justified by any number of reasons that would be

Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the “Pretext-Plus” 
Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 Hast. L..J. 57, 71- 
91 (1991) (collecting cases).

21

“legitimate” in the sense that they are not prohibited 
by Title VII. But it would not be sensible or orderly, 
or an efficient use of a trial court’s or the parties’ 
resources, to force the plaintiff to attempt to negate 
all possible nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
employer’s actions—including reasons that were 
never even proffered by the employer itself." After 
all, the employer is in the best position to know on 
what basis it acted. See International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 35!) n.45. If 
the employer does not articulate a given reason, it is 
at least more likely than not that that reason did not 
in fact motivate the employer’s action.

The Court has made clear that in a Title VII case, 
“the allocation of burdens * * * is intended pro- 11 *

11 As the Tenth Circuit said in EEOC v. Flasher Co., No. 91-
(5279 (Dec. 29, 1992), slip op. 11, “[tjhe articulation of a facially, 
nondiscriminatory reason * * * defines the parameters of the 
trial, as the plaintiff then knows the precise reason that he or 
she may try to show is only a pretext for an illegal 
discriminatory motive. By articulating the reasons for the 
plaintiffs termination, the defendant eliminates a myriad of 
possible reasons that would otherwise have to be addressed. 
That is, we require the defendant to identify and enunciate the 
reasons for the termination at the outset, because there is no 
limit to the potential number of reasons that could be raised at 
trial. Otherwise litigation of discrimination claims would be 
needlessly confused and delayed.” We find it difficult to 
reconcile this sensible statement of the reasons for requiring 
the employer to “defin[e] the parameters of the trial” with the 
court’s later observation that proof that the reason given by the 
employer is pretextual does not compel judgment for the 
plaintiff. Slip op. 17-18. In any event, the court in Flasher 
held that the legitimate reason advanced by the employer in 
that case was not pretextual. Id. at 18.



22

gressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive 
factual question of intentional discrimination,” 
Bur d in e , 450 U.S. at 255 n.8, and “to bring the 
litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this 
ultimate question,” id. at 253. In particular, the 
employer’s articulation of alleged nondiscriminatory 
reasons for its actions is meant to move the inquiry 
to “a new level of specificity,” and to “frame the 
factual issue with sufficient clarity” so that the 
parties—and the court—can move efficiently to the 
final stage of the litigation. At that stage, the 
plaintiff must carry his ultimate burden of proving 
discrimination, but he can do so either by direct proof 
of a discriminatory motivation, or by satisfying the 
trier of fact that the explanations proffered by the 
employer are pre-textual.12 Id. at 255-250. Once the 
employer’s stated reasons have been shown to be 
false, allowing the fact finder to determine (or 
speculate) that the employer acted with some other, 
unarticulated motivation would vitiate this sensible 
method for narrowing the issues to be addressed by 
the parties and decided by the court or jury.

It is true that by proving that an employer’s stated 
reasons are not its actual reasons, a plaintiff does not 
necessarily rule out the possibility that the employer 
might have acted for some unarticulated, nondis-

,2 This Court’s emphasis in Burdine on the fact that “the 
defendant’s explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear 
and reasonably specific,” 450 U.S. at 258, at least in part to 
satisfy “the requirement that the plaintiff be afforded ‘a full 
and fair opportunity’ to demonstrate pretext,” ibid., clearly 
implies that the demonstration required from the plaintiff 
relates only to the reasons actually placed in issue by the 
defendant.

23

criminatory reason. But that is not the plaintiffs 
burden. The plaintiff need only show that it was more 
likely than not that the employer acted for a 
discriminatory reason. Once the plaintiff has es­
tablished a prima facie case, he has, under McDonnell 
Douglas, produced sufficient evidence to give rise to a 
mandatory presumption to that effect. At that point, 
it is both fair and sensible to require the defendant 
employer, which is in the best position to ascertain 
and demonstrate the true reasons for its own 
personnel actions, to advance the decision-making 
process by stating the “clear and reasonably specific” 
explanation on which it intends to rely to justify its 
challenged action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258. An 
employer that has not discriminated should always 
have a plausible explanation for its actions—i.e., the 
true one, which a plaintiff will be unable to discredit. 
Irrational, mistaken, unattractive or even despicable 
—but nondiscriminatory—reasons will shield an 
employer from liability under Title VII, so long as the 
employer articulates them and the trier of fact finds 
them credible.13 See, e.g., Pollard  v. Rea Magnet

13 Some courts have suggested that an employer might 
dissemble about its motivations in a Title VII action because its 
real reasons for acting, while not prohibited by Title VII, would 
cause it embarrassment—or predicate legal liability—in some 
other context. See, e.g., Sliager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 
401 (7th Cir. 1990); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 
557, 559 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 484 IJ.S. 977 (1987). That is an 
unremarkable consequence of being involved in legal 
proceedings. The employer may of course choose to remain 
silent in the Title VII action, preferring to run the risk of 
unwarranted liability in that context rather than exposing 
itself to some other and presumably greater cost; but there is 
nothing unreasonable about forcing that choice, once the



24

Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir.) (employer’s 
belief that plaintiff had lied about being injured was 
mistaken, but not pretextual), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 
977 (1987); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commun­
ications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984) (mis­
taken belief that employee had broken a rule not 
pretextual).

By contrast, the approach taken by the district 
court in this case places an unreasonable burden on 
Title VI I  plaintiffs. By ruling against respondent 
despite finding that he had proved that all of his 
former employer’s stated reasons for demoting and 
discharging him were pretextual, the district court 
effectively required him either to produce direct 
evidence of discriminatory motive, or to rebut all

plaintiff has proved what he is required to prove in order to 
raise a legally mandatory inference of discrimination. See 
Lanctot, supra, 43 Hastings L.J. at 136-140. If, on the other 
hand, the employer produces truthful evidence of its 
motivations and thereby avoids liability in a Title VII action, it 
can hardly complain about the possible collateral consequences 
of having told the truth—particularly if the evidence reveals, 
for example, some separate illegality, or violation of a 
contractual obligation. See id. at 138. Such a predicament is 
little different from, for example, that of a litigant who must 
choose between bearing his burden of proof in a civil 
proceeding and invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege to 
remain silent because of possible collateral criminal conse­
quences. See, e.g., United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 759 
(1983) (“a dilemma demanding a choice between complete 
silence and presenting a defense [in a civil case] has never been 
thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self­
incrimination” (emphasis omitted)) (quoting W illiam s  v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970)). Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 
157, 173 (1986) (defendant has no “right” to use false evidence).

possible unarticulated reasons for petitioners’ 
actions. Requiring a plaintiff to prove the negative of 
each and every possible motivation that the employer 
might have had, rather than focusing on the reasons 
that the employer has advanced, would deprive the 
plaintiff of the “full and fair opportunity to 
demonstrate pretext” emphasized by this Court in 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-258, and make a mockery of 
the “sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence” 
otherwise established by this Court’s cases. Furnco, 
438 U.S. at 577.

C. There Is No Evidence On The Record In This 
Case Of A Nondiscriminatory Motive That Was 
Not Articulated By Petitioners

Petitioners argue (Pet. Br. 16-17, 22-24) that 
judgment for the plaintiff is not compelled upon a 
showing of pretext if other reasons, not articulated by 
the employer, are somehow “suggested by the 
employer’s evidence” or, alternatively, “emerge dur­
ing the employee’s case.” Pet. Br. 16. As to the first 
suggestion, for the reasons discussed in Part B we 
find little merit in the notion that an employer should 
have some right to ask a court or jury to speculate 
about possible permissible motivations that it is 
unable or unwilling to articulate. This Court in 
Aikens summarized the factfinder’s job as being to 
“decide which party’s explanation of the employer’s 
motivation it believes,” 460 U.S. at 716, not to range 
freely over the record in search of hidden justifica­
tions advanced by neither side.'4 14

14 Any such rule would also be substantially less manageable 
in the context of cases tried to a jury, rather than to a court. 
Under such a regime, a court would at least be required to



26

As to alternative explanations effectively raised by 
the plaintiff himself, petitioners correctly note that 
several lower courts, including the Eighth Circuit, 
have held that a trial court is not compelled to find 
discriminatory intent, even after a showing that an 
employer’s stated reasons are false, in cases in which 
additional reasons for the adverse employment action 
are raised by the plaintiff and remain unrebutted at 
the close of trial.15 We agree that such cases present

articulate for itself what it believed to be the real explanation 
for the employer’s conduct, and support its position with 
specific evidence from the record. Review of a jury verdict 
for the defendant, on the other hand, would presumably 
involve the question whether any rational jury could have 
found that any unspecified nondiscriminatory explanation for 
the employer’s conduct was fairly “suggested” by the record. 
Aside from insulating many verdicts for the defendant from 
effective review, such a standard would involve trial judges 
and appellate courts in yet another round of speculation—this 
time, twice removed from the reasons and evidence actually 
advanced at trial by the one party in the best position to know 
and be able to disclose the truth: the employer.

15 See, e.g., Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 
275, 283 (fith Cir. 1991) (articulated reason clearly pretextual, 
but no discrimination where complaint alleged plaintiff was 
fired because of continued relationship with individual who 
shot her on company property), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1497 
(1992); Visser v. Packer Engineering Assocs., 924 F.2d 655, 657 
(7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (plaintiff’s evidence of pretext proved 
action really taken for different but nondiscriminatory reason); 
Maguire v. Marquette University, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(pendent claim alleged action taken for nondiscriminatory 
reason); Burger v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, Inc., 856 F.2d 
1046, 1047-1048, 1051 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff’s evidence 
of pretext included letters from firing official demonstrating 
different but nondiscriminatory reasons).

27

a significantly different issue from that presented 
here, because a plaintiff who asserts or proves a 
nondiscriminatory reason, even if unstated by the 
defendant, effectively undermines his own case. 
Moreover, under those circumstances the plaintiff 
cannot convincingly argue that he did not have an 
adequate opportunity to rebut evidence that he 
himself has offered. Petitioners’ contention to the 
contrary notwithstanding, however, this is not such a 
case.

Petitioners state that “the district court found that 
[respondent] introduced through his own testimony 
evidence of personal animosity his immediate super­
visor had toward him,” and that the “court made the 
credibility determination that the supervisor’s 
personal animosity was the truthful explanation for 
the employment decision.” Pet. Br. 11; see also id. at 
22-24. That characterization of the record and the 
district court’s decision is inaccurate.

First, it is not entirely clear that the district court 
found as a fact that respondent’s demotion and 
discharge were motivated by personal animosity. The 
court stated only (i) that “although [respondent! has 
proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he 
has not proven that the crusade was racially rather 
than personally motivated,” and (ii) that while 
respondent had demonstrated that he was treated 
more harshly than others, “[i]t is not clear * * * that 
[respondent’s] race was the motivation for the harsh 
discipline.” Pet. App. A27. Although the first 
statement does suggest, as the court of appeals 
inferred (id. at A10), that the district court believed 
that the prison administration was motivated by 
personal animosity toward respondent, the court