Wilder v. Lambert Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody

    rt

Prlsoner t s Name: ilulia P. Wilder

Prison Number: 00130718

place of Conf inenent: ON PAROLE PROI.I KITBY CORRECTIONS FACILITY

rN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR TEE.MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAITIA

MONTGO!{ERY DIVISION

--x

JUIIA P. WfLDER' 3

Petitioner, : Civil Action No.

- against

EALON U. LN{BERT, JACN C. LUFKIN AND 3

JOHN T. PORTER TN THETR OFFICAL
CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE ALABAMA :
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, AND
TED BUTLER, A PROBATION AND PAROLE :
OFFICER, EMPLOYED BY THE ALABAITA
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, 3

Respondents. :

:
--x



Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By A

----PETSO-If 
-Tn-@

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THE DISTRTCT COURT FOR THE
MTDDLE DISTRTCT OF ALABAII,IA, MONTGOMERY DIVISION:

1. The name and location of the court which entered

the judgment of conviction and sentence under attack are:

(a) The Circuit Court of Pickens County, Alabama.

(b) Carrollton, Pickens County, Alabama.

2. The date of the judgment of conviction and sentence

is May 31 , L979.

3. The sentence is that Julia P. Wilder be imprisoned

in the penitentiary of the State of Alabama for a period

of five years. She is currently on parole in the custody

of respondent members of the State Board of Pardons and Parole.

4. The nature of the offense involved is that petitioner

was charged in a three count indictment with violating AIa.

Code S 17-23-1 (1975) in that she allegedly voted illegaIly

in Democratic Primary Run-Off Election of September 26, 1978

(hereinafter run-off ) .

5. Petitioner's plea was not guilty.

6. Trial was had before a jury.

7. Petitioner testified at trial.

8. Petitioner appealed her conviction.

9. The facts of petitioner's appeal are as follows:

(a) The judgment of conviction was appealed to the

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama. That court affirmed the

conviction on March 31, 1981. 401 So.2d 151.



(b) The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama denied a

motion for rehearing of the appeal on April 2I, 1981. Id.
(c) The Supreme Court of Alabama denied a petition

for writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals on July

24 1981. 401 So.2d 167 .

(d ) The Supreme Court of the United States denied a

petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Crininal Appeals

on November 15, 1981. 454 U.S. 1057.

10. Other than the appeals described in paragraphs 8 and

9 above, the other petitions, applications, motionsr ot proceed-

ings filed or maintained by petitioner with respect to the

judgment of November 2,1979 of the Circuit Court of Pickens County

are described in paragraph 11 below.

11. A motion for a new trial was made to the Circuit

Court of Pickens County. The motion was denied on September 27,

t979.

L2. Petitioner was convicted in violation of her rights
guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and by the

Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1971 et seq., for each of the

reasons stated below.

I'. Introductorv Facts

13" Petitioner Julia P. Wilder was convicted of

illegal voting because of her alleged participation in an

effort to assist elderly and illiterate black voters to cast

absentee ballots in the run-off.

2-



14 On October 10 1978 two weeks after the run-off

election. the Sheriff of Pickens County, llE. Louie Coleman,

along with the District Attorney of the County, Mr. Pep Johnston,

an investigator named Mr. Charlie Tate, and }lr. Johnstonrs

secretaryr tls. Kitty Cooper, opened the county absentee ballot

box, and began searching for ballots which could be connected

to petitioner and the general effort to aid elderly blacks in

Pickens County to vote by absentee ballot. Tr. 69-70*/

They isolated thirty-nine absentee ballots out of the many

cast. These ballots were isolated, by the following method.

Mr. Tate was able to get the names of certain of the voters

whose application for an absentee baIlot petitioner had turned

in. Tr. 70-71, 74-76 i see also Tr. 45-46. Since at that time

Alabama 1aw required that the absentee baIlot contain the name

of the voter, AIa. Code SS17-10-6, 17-10-7 (1975'), amended Acts

1980, No. 80-732, p. 1478, SS3, 4, Mr. Tate was thus able t,o

isolate the ballots of these voters,' and when it was noticed

that each of these ballots had been notarized by Mr. Paul

Ro1lins, a black notary public from outside of Pickens County,

all of the absentee ballots notarized by Mr. Rollins, amounting

to a total of 39, were isolated. Tr. 68, 75-76.

15. Each of the 39 absentee ballots was represented

to be the vote of a different black, eIderly, and infirmed

resident of Pickens County. The state claimed that Ms. Wilder

participated in the casting of these ballots in violation of

Ala. Code S 17-23-1 (1975).

:/ All transcript citations refer to the transcript of peti-
tionerrs tria1.

3-



II. Grounds of Constitutional fnvalidity
- --o-f -p-e-EiEIo ne r rs -c-b nvfcEi o n- 

-
15. Based on the evidence offered at trial r ro rational

jury could have found that each of the elements of the offense

charged was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner's

conviction therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Anendment as construed in Jaclgo-n-v-r--Yirglqtg, 443

u.s. 307 (1979).

(a) The elements

are that she employed fraud

v. State, 52 AIa. 299 (1875)

of the offense against petitioner

to vote more than once. Wilson

; Wilde-r- -y.- -S-qA!e , 40 1 So.2d 151 ,

150 (A1a. Crim. App. ), cert. {q!r_e_{, 40'l So.2d 167 (Ala. '1981),

ce_5.t . de_etq{ , 454 U. S. 1 057 ( 1 982 ) .

(b) The evidence offered against petitioner, viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is summarized

in the subparagraphs below.

(i) Petitioner picked up a number of apPlica-

tions for absentee ballots from the Circuit Clerkrs

Office during the week prior to the run-off. Tr. 44.

Subsequently, petitioner returned some completed

absentee baIlot applications. Tr. 45. On the day.

before the run-off petitioner deposited a number of

absentee ba1lots. Id.

(ii) Petitioner was present with three or four

other women, who did not include the voters, tst the

notarizing of the absentee baIlots, Tt. 17, and was

4-



permitted by the notary, ME. Rollins, to rePresent
whether the signatures were genuine, Tt. 22, 25-27.

(iii) Testimony was given by 14 of the 39 voters

whose ballots virere introduced into evidence.

(iv) Of these 14 witnesses the Court of Criminal

Appeals cited the testimony of five of the witnesses,

Mr. Charles Cunningham, lls. Lucille Harris, lls. Sophia

Spann, Ms. I,,u1a Deloach, and Mr. Robert Goines, as

having been incriminatory of petitioner to some degree.

401 So.2d at 161-162. The testimony of Mr. Cunningham

!,ras said to be incriminatory because Mr. Cunningham

testified that pet,itioner aided him in voting by ab-

sentee ballot in a "wet-dry" election. Tr. 189, 193.

I1r. Cunningham never testified that petitioner did

not aid him to vote by absentee balIot in the run-off.

In fact he stated that petitioner read him the names

of the candidates appearing on the absentee baIlot

when she aided him to vote. Tr. 19't . The testimony

of Ms. Harris, Ms. Spann, tls. Deloach, and Mr. Goines

vras said by the Court of Criminal Appeals to have

inculpated petitioner because each was said to have

claimed never to have received or voted an absentee

ballot for the run-off. 401 So.2d at 162. In fact

only two of the voters were able to testify with a

reasonable degree of certaint,y that they never re-

ceived an absentee baIIot, Ms. Ilarris, Tr. 145, and

5-



Ms. Spann, Tr. 105-107. With both these witnesses no

connection rdas drawn between their asserted failure
to receive an absentee bal1ot and petitioner.
According to Ms. Harris I ballot application, the

absentee ba11ot was sent to her home. Tr. 147-149.

Ms. spannrs ballot was sent to the home of Ms. Minnie

Dunner HiII. See Tr. 22; State's exhibit # 51. Ms.

Harris testified that petitioner had discussed absentee

voting with her, and that Ms. Harris had decided to
vote by absentee ba1lot for the candidates petitioner
endorsed "the democratsr', Tr. 148. Ms. Deloach

testified that she had never fi1led out or signed an

absentee baIlot; she did not state that she never

received one. Tr. 181. Ms, Deloach testified that
she consented to petitioner's offer to fiII out a

paper for hei so that Ms. Deloach could vote without
going to the poIls. Tr. 183-184. Mr. Goines at

first testified that he had previously seen the

absentee baIlot voted in his name. Tr. 83. Subse-

quently, in reaction to leading and coercive questions

by the prosecution, Mr. Goines became intimidated
into believing that his own conduct was at issue and

denied any connection with the absentee ballot. Tr.
84-8 5 .

(v) Of the nine remaining witneses who had voted

absentee ballots, three, Ms. Mattie Gipson, TE. 99-'105,

6-



Ms. _Clemmie We1ls, Tr. 170-179, and Ms. Maudine Latham,

whose testimony was entered in summary form by stipula-

tion, TE. 193, drew no connection between their respec-

tive voting activities in the run-off and petitioner.

(vi) The remaining six voter-witnesses, Ms. Annie

Billups, b1E. Nat Dancy, tlS. Mamie Lavendar, ME. Lewis

Minor, Ms. Bessie Bi1lups, and I'ls. Fronnie Rice

varied in their ability to recaIl the underlying

events surrounding theiE vote in the run-off, but no

one of the six gave testimony from which it could

be concluded that petitioner employed fraud against

them in order to vote more than once. Each voter

recalled that petitioner had aided that voter in

voting absentee, with that voter's knowledge and

consent. Tr. 94-95 (A. Billups); Ir. 126 (N. Dancy);

Tr. 134-135, 137-138 (M. Lavender); Tr. 140-144 (t.

Minor); Tr. 154, 160-151 (e. Billups); Tr. 163,

158-169 (r. Rice).

(c) The prosecution advanced various grounds on

which it felt petitioner should be held culpable, asserting prin-

cipally the following: i) that petitioner did not adequately

explain absentee voting to the voters, TE.268; ii) that many

of the absentee ballot applications were signed with an 'X'

while the corresponding absentee ballot had been signed in

script, and that many of the witnesses denied having signed the

absentee ballot voted in their name, Tr . 269-270, 300; iii)

7-



Ehat the notary did not have the voters before him when he

notarized the ba11ots, Tr. 269, 301; iv) that some of t,he

witnesses testified that they had never before seen the

absentee ballots voted in their names, Tt. 270,.300. These

alleged flaws in the procedures petitioner used in her dealings

with the voters did not prove that she employed fraud against

the voters in order that she could vote more than once. The

evidence presented shows that where petitioner aided people to
vote absentee, she did so with the knowledge and consent of the

voter. The details of her relationship with the voters beyond

this relationship of trust and consent are largely obscured in
the t.estimony by the voters I poor memory, their inability to

read and write, their d9€, their lack of understanding of the

voting process and their susceptibility to the leading and

coercive questions cjf the prosecutor. Even after viewing all

of the evidence in the light most favorable to respondents,

the evidence offered against petitioner would perforce leave a

reasonable doubt as to petitioner's guilt in the minds of a

rational jury.

17. The indictment charging petitioner with violating S

17-23-1 was for each of the reasons specified in paras. 19-21 |

infra, insufficient to inform petitioner of the nature and cause

of the accusation against herr ES required by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments .

18. The indictment against petitioner charges that peti-

tioner:

8-



,ICOUNT ONE

ndid vote more than once, or did deposit
more than one ballot for the same office
as her voter oE did vote il1ega1ly or fraud-
ulent1y, in the Democratic Primary Run-
off Election of September 26, 1978,

''COUNT TWO

"did vote more than once as an absentee
voter, ot did deposit more than one absen-
tee ballot for the same office or offices as
her voter oE did cast i11ega1 or fraudulent
absentee ballots, in the Democratic Pri-
mary Run-off Election of September 26,
1978,

'ICOUNT THREE

"did cast illegal or fradulent absentee
ballots in the Democratic Primary Run-
off Election of September 26, 1978, in
that she did deposit with the Pickens
County Circuit Clerk, absentee ballots
which erere fraudulent and which she
knew to be fraudulent, against the peace
and dignity of the State of Alabama. "

19. The indictment $ras constitutionally insufficient

because it failed to provide notice of the charges submitted

to petitioner's jury as the basis for her conviction under

S 17-23-1. The indictment accused petitioner of violating

S 17-23-1 by 'votIing] i1Iega11y" or "castIing] i11egal

absentee baIIots," but it failed to identify either the acts

constituting the alleged illegalities or the elements of the

statutes which purportedly caused those acts to be il1egal.

That failure deprived petitioner of constitutionally required

notice.
(a) The trial judge instructed the jury on four

-9



statutes,. AIa" Code S 17-10-3 (1975 ) [miscited by the judge as

S '17-23-31 , Tr. 308-309; Ala. Code S 17-10-6 (1975 ) [miscited

by the judge as S 17-10-71, Tr.309-310; AIa. Code S 17-10-7

(1975) , Tr. 310-31 1 ; and Ala. Code S 13-5-115 ('1975) , Tr. 311 .

None of these statutes or their elements was charged against

petitioner in the indictment.

(b) The jury was instructed that proof that pet,ltioner

had committed any act "not authorized by or contr:ary to"

any 1aw would constitute an "illegal" act warranting petitioner's

conviction under S 17-23-1. Tr. 308. The effect of that instruc-

tion and of the subsequent instructions on each of the statutes

listed in para. 19(a), supra, was to make each of those statutes

a separate ground for liability under S 17-23-1. The indictment

made no allegations whatsoever that petitioner had violated

those statutes or had engaged in acts which would constitute

violations of those statutes.
(c) For these reasons the indictment failed to provide

notice of the offenses actually submitted to the jury as required

by the Constitution and petitionerrs resulting conviction was

obtained in violation of due process.

20. The indictment contained conclusionary allegations of

fraudulent conduct by petitioner, but it failed to provide fair

notice as required by the Constitution in that it failed to give

sufficient notice of the particulars of the alleged fraud.

(a) The indictment alleged in Count T, in the alterna-

tive with other allegations, that petitioner voted fraudulently

10



in the run-off. It alleged, in the alternative with other allega-
tions in Count If, that she cast fraudulent absentee ballots in
the run-off . In Count If f , it alleged t,hat she deposited

fraudulent absentee ballots with the Pickens County Circuit
C1erk, and that she knew the ballots were fraudulent.

(b) fn order to provide constitutionally requisite

notice, the indictment was required to ldentify the particulars

of the alleged fraud with sufficient specificity to inform peti-

tioner fairly of the actions or transactions which constituted

the alleged fraud with which she was charged. It did not do sor

and its failure to make those factual allegations deprived peti-
tioner of the notice demanded by the Sixth and Eourteenth Amend-

ments.

21. The indictment failed to aIlege accurately each of

the elements of S 17-23-1, and therefore failed to provide the

minimum notice required by the Constitution
(a) In this case, fraud is a necessary element of

S 17-23-1 under the rules of Alabama 1aw set forth in para.

16(a) supra.

(b) Counts one and two of the indictment do not aIIege

that petitioner acted with fraudulent intent or knowledge. They

aIlege no mens rea of any sort.
(c) Since the verdict against petitioner was a general

verdict finding her "guilty as charged in the indictmerlt, " Tr.

315, and since she was thereupon adjudged guilty of one undiffer-

entiated violation of S 17-23-1, the deficient counts prejudiced

1't



petitioner and rendered the indictrnent as a whole insufficient
under the Constitution

22. Section 17'23-'l is unconstitutional as apPlied to

petitioner, since the conduct for which she was convicted, as

established by the evidence offered at trial' was protected by

the Voting Rights Act and the Pirst, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth

Amendments to. the Constitution.
(a) The evidence introduced against petitioner at

trial is set forth in para. 15(b) supra. The evidence shows

participation by petitioner in an effort to aid and encourage

e}derly, illiterate, and disabled blacks to vote by absentee

ballot. The evidence shows no intent by petitioner to engage

in criminal activity of any sort.
(b) A11 the prosecution proved was participation

by petitioner in activities protected under the United States

Constitution. The "E'irst Amendment freedom to gather in

association for the purpose of advancing shared beliefs is

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by any

State.'r Democratic Partv of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 ,

121 (1981). Additionally, the right to vote is "a fundamental

political right, because preservative of aII rights." Yick Wo

v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

(c) Furthermore, the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C-

S 1971, et seq., provides a right to illiterate and disabled

persons to have the assistance of a person of their choice in

voting, and thus protects those who give such assistance. 42

U.S.C. S 1973aa-6.

12



23. The vague and overbroad terms of S 17-23-1 are

unconstitutional for failure to meet the strict standards of

statutory specificity required of laws that potentially overreach

federally protected activitY.
(a) On its facen section 17-23-1 penalizes "any kind

of il1egaI or fraudulent votingr" and thus permits the incorpora-

tion of any provision of Alabama law which a prosecutor can

remotely connect to voting activities. The statute contains

no clear mens rea element.

(b) For these reasons S 17-23-1 fails to provide fair

notice of the nature of the forbidden conduct. Because of the

absence of a meaningful description of the proscribed conduct,

S 17-23-1 fails to provide discernible policy guidelines for law

enforcement officials to follow in enforcing the statute, and

encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the sort

forbidden by €.9.r Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574-575

(1974). Eurthermore, conviction on the basis of strict Iiability

is permitted by the language of S 17-23-1. Section 17-23-1 is

therefore unconstitutionally vague

(c) Since S 17-23-1 reaches constitutionally protected

conduct, such as that described in para. 22 supra, it is required

by the doctrine of, €.9.r Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffnan

Estates, U.S. , 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 369 (1982), to be drawn

precisely to achieve legitimate state objectives while avoiding

interference with constitutionally protected activities. Section

17-23-1 is not so drawn. On its face, S 17-23-1 permits convic-

13



tion for failure to observe the provisions of any law which

can be connected to voting activities regardless of whether the

accused was acting in good faith. Moreover, as applied to peti-

tioner, S 17-23-1 permitted conviction based on the federally
protected activity, described in para. 22 -xEgr_e. Therefore,

S 17-23-1 is unconstitutionally overbroad within the principles

of , €.9. , Dunn v. B1utns!e:!g, 405 U. S. 330, 343 (1972) .

(d) Section S 17-23-1 had never been judicially

construed in any reported opinion prior to petitioner's appeal,

and even its predecessor statute had not been reviewed in any

reported opinion since 1888. The 19th century Alabama Supreme

Court cases construing the statuter €.9., Wilson v. State, 52 Ala.

299, (1875), and Gordon v. State, 52 AIa. 308 (1875), leave

considerable residual uncertainty as to various elements and

applications of the statute, and leave the statute with the

potential to reach federally protected conduct. Any judicial

limitat,ions imposed on the broad terms of the statute were dis-
regarded by the trial judge and the prosecution in petitionerrs

case, and yrere not followed by the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals when it upheld petitionerrs conviction. Inoperative

limiting constructions cannot be permitted to save a statute.

Regardless of the constructions of the statute by the Alabama

Supreme Court, S 17-23-1 is therefore unconstitutionally

vague and overbroad.

24. If any of the constructions of S 17-23-1, mentioned in

paras. 16(a) and 23(d) supra were valid and operative at the time

14



of petitioner's triaI, the instructions to the jury impernissibly
broadened the statute so as to create ex post facto liability in

violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

as construed in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1953).

The instructions to the jury also impermissibly broadened S

13-5-115 causing, under the same principles, a separate violation

of the Due Process Clause.

(a) The jury instructions permitted various statutes

to be incorporated into S 17-23-1, as described in para. 19(a)

supra. They further permitted a conviction for "i1legaI" voting

without any showing of mental culpabilityr Els described in para.

19(b), supra, and thus allowed petitioner to be convicted on a

strict liability basis for any transgression of any of the

incorporated statutes. If S 17-23-'t was subject to limiting

constructions at the dime of petitioner's triaI, these jury

instructions abrogated the constructions retroactively in

violation of Bouie.

(b) Section 13-5-115 penalizes the making of a sworn

statement required under the election laws "falsely and corruptly"

-- i.e., with criminal intent. The trial court instructed the

jury that petitioner could be liable under S 13-5-115 for "falsely

and incorrectly" making a required statement. By substituting

"incorrectly" for "corruptlyr" the instructions removed the

intent element from S 13-5-15 and thus impermissibly expanded

the reach of the statute in violation of Bouie.

25. Both S 17-23-1 and S 13-5-115 were presented to the

15



the jury as strict liabitity offenses. Tr. 201, 204. Therefore,

as applied to petitioner, those statutes denied her due process,

especially inasmuch as they touched on rights protected by the

Constitution. Petitioner's conviction stands in violation of
the Fourteenth Anendment.

26. The prosecution was permitted to impeach its own wit-
nesses by reading to the jury notes purporting to be transcripts
of statem6nts taken by the district attorney during out-of-court
interrogations, and to use such statements as substantive evidence

against petitioner, in violation of her rights under the Confron-

tation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(a) The prosecution used notes from purported out of
court interrogatories of prosecution witnesses Ms. Bessie

Billups, TE. 159, and Ms. Fronnie Rice, TE. 166, to impeach their
testimony at tria1, and those notes read by the prosecution

into the record were allowed in as substantive evidence. In

the out-of-court statement of Ms. Billups she purportedly

denied that she had ever seen the absentee bal1ot voted in

her name. This contradicted Ms. Billups' in person testi-
mony. The statement of Ms. Rice was also used to get her to
state that she had never received an absentee balIot, thus

contradicting her previous testimony.

(b) Because of the paucity of evidence against peti-
tioner, and the broadness of S 17-23-1 as construed in the instruc-
tions, TE. 201-204, these out-of-court statements lrere crucial to

l5



the prosecution and devastating to petitioner, and constituted a

denial of her rights under the Confrontation Clause and the Due

Process Clause.

27. The decision to prosecute petitioner was motivated by

her race and her political activities, and therefore her conviction

eras obtained in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, and of the First and Fifteenth Amendments

and the Supremacy Clause.

(a) The vague and overbroad nature of S 17-23-1 invites
selective and discriminatory enforcementr ds described in para.

23(b), supra.

(b) Petitioner's prosecution was (i) selective in that

others similarly situated have not been proceeded against, (ii) dis-

criminatory in that she was singled out for prosecution because

of her race, and (iii) recriminatory in that she $ras singled

out for the further reason that she had engaged in federally

protected political activities within Pickens County. Because

the prosecution was motivated by race it denied petitioner her

rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws.

Because the prosecution was recriminatory it violated those

constitutional and federal statutory rights whose exercise it

punished, ds enumerated in para. 22 supra.

(c) Section 17-23-1 was dormant at the time of peti-

tioner's prosecution. It had not even been cited in a reported

opinion since its predecessor statute was referred to in Gandy

17



v. State, 85 AIa. 20 (1888). On information and belief, there

is no record of a single prosecution under S 17-23-1 in Pickens

County previous to the prosecutions of petitioner. Petitionerrs
prosecution was therefore invidiously selective.

(d) Petitioner was singled out for prosecution because

she is black, and because those she was aiding to vote by

absentee ballot are also black.

(e) Petitioner was, before her conviction, a politic-

ally active black resident of Pickens County. She has been

president of the Pickens County chapter of the Southern Christian

Leadership Conference. Petitioner was also, Et the time of her

conviction, the President of the-Pickens County Voters League,

and a recognized leader in an effort to bring out the black

vote in Pickens County. On information and belief, although

Pickens County is over 40t blackr rro black has ever won a

county-wide election. In addition to the reasons set forth in

para. 27 (d) , supra, petitioner was singled out for prosecution

under S17-23-1 because of her leadership role in the effort to

increase the political influence of blacks Iiving in Pickens

County.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the Court:

( 1 ) Order the respondents to answer this petition and to

show cause why petitioner should not be discharged from her

unconstitutional restraint ;

(2) Order the respondents to furnish all exhibits,

depositions and notes of pre-triaI interviews with witnesses;

18



(3) Conduct a hearing at which argument and proof may be

offered concerning the allegations of this petition;
(4) Permit petitioner, who is indigent, to proceed

without payment of costs or feesi

(5) After full hearing, discharge petitioner from her un-

constitutional restraint; and

(5) Grant such other relief as may be appropriate.

Respectfully submitted,

VANZETTA PENN DURANT
639 Martha Street
Montgomery, Alabama 35108
262-7337

JACK GREENBERG
I,ANI GUINIER
JAMES S. LIEBMAN
SIEGFRIED KNOPF

10 Columbus Circle
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019
(212) s86-8397

Attorney for Petitioner
Of counsel:

ANTHONY G. AI,TSTERDAI{
New York University School of Law
40 Washington Square South, Room 327
New York rNew York 100'l 2
(212) s98-2638

't9