Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University & Agricultural & Mechanical College v Tureaud, Jr. Brief for Appellee

    1ST THE

limtfii States Cflmtri nf Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 15540

B oard of S upervisors of L ouisiana S tate U niversity  and 
A gricultural and M echanical C ollege, et al .,

Appellants,
v.

A lexander P. T ureaud, Jr., A  Minor, By Alexander P. 
Tureaud, Sr., His Father and Next Friend,

Appellee.

A ppeal F rom  th e  U nited  S tates D istrict C ourt 
for t h e  E astern D istrict  of L ouisiana

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

A. P. T ureaud, Sr.,
1821 Orleans Avenue,

New Orleans, Louisiana,
U. S. T ate,

1718 Jackson Street,
Dallas, Texas,

R obert L. Carter,
T hurgood M arshall ,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York, New York,

Counsel for Appellee.

Supreme Printing Co., I nc., 114 W orth Street, N. Y. 13, BEekm an  3-2320 
«^gj^49



(llmtrt sti Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 15540

-----------------------o------------- ----------

B oard of S upervisors of L ouisiana S tate U niversity  and 
A gricultural and M ech anical  College, et al .,

Appellants,
v.

A lexander P. T ureaud, Jr., A  Minor, By Alexander P. 
Tureaud, Sr., Hi-s Father and Next Friend,

Appellee.

A ppeal F rom  th e  U nited S tates D istrict Court 
for th e  E astern D istrict of L ouisiana

——---------------- o------------- ----------

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE

Statement

This is a simple case involving the effort of appellee, 
a Negro, to secure his constitutional right to equal edu­
cational opportunities. The trial court found that appellee 
could secure equal educational opportunity only by being 
allowed to attend Louisiana State University and so 
ordered, 116 F. Supp. 248. Upon appeal here, judgment 
was reversed by a divided court on the ground that the 
matter should have been heard before a three judge court, 
207 F. 2d 807. We took the cause to the United States 
Supreme Court, and this Court’s mandate was stayed and 
subsequently the Supreme Court granted our petition for



2

writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of this Court and 
remanded the cause for reconsideration, 347 U. S. 491.

In the meantime, and prior to the Supreme Court’s 
order staying this Court’s mandate, appellants secured a 
dissolution of the injunction against them and promptly 
expelled appellee from school. The procedural picture 
thereby created was so confusing that appellee has been 
unable to secure reinstatement, of the trial court’s injunc­
tion until the instant judgment upon which this appeal is 
based. It should be remembered, in this connection, that 
appellee has not been in attendance at Louisiana State Uni­
versity pending disposition of this case, although that was 
clearly within the contemplation and expectation of the 
Supreme Court and the basis for its order staying this 
Court’s mandate.

ARGUMENT

In view of the School Segregation Cases, a single 
district judge clearly has authority to enjoin the exclu­
sion of a Negro from a state university solely because 
of his race and color.

It is now clear that whatever procedural objections 
could have been raised to the issuance of an injunction 
by a United States District Judge sitting alone are now 
no longer applicable. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U. S. 483; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497. The United 
States Supreme Court, in a sweeping and clear-cut opinion, 
held that “ in the field of public education the doctrine of 
separate but equal has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”

There is no longer any doubt that a state policy main­
taining racially segregated public educational facilities is 
contrary to the constitutional mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. A mere reading of the opinion of the Supreme



3

Court in those cases makes it manifest that their interdic­
tion against segregation per se and the application of 
the “ separate but equal”  doctrine embraced the entire 
field of public education. In the light of these decisions, 
no state policy, which seeks to maintain, as a part of the 
state’s public educational system, segregated schools for 
Negro and white students meets with the requirements of 
the federal Constitution.

While there may have been room for doubt concerning 
the power of the court below to grant injunctive relief in 
this case prior to the decisions in the School Segregation 
Cases, we submit that no question concerning this power 
can be persuasive at this time. The decisions of the 
Supreme Court in the School Segregation Cases have con­
clusively settled the substantive validity of state action 
which seeks to enforce racial segregation in the field of 
public education. No delicate questions of state-federal 
relationship can now be involved in the enjoining of state 
action in this regard as void and unconstitutional by an 
ordinary district court. The Supreme Court has settled the 
question, and lower federal courts must now follow the 
Supreme Court’s formula. In short, the substantive issue 
in this case—appellee’s right not to be excluded from 
Louisiana State University on the basis of his race—no 
longer presents a substantial federal question which would 
necessitate the convening of a three-judge court. Ex Parte 
Poresky, 290 U. S. 30 ; Jameson & Son v. Morganthau, 307 
U. S. 171; Stratton v. St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co., 282 IT. S. 10.

Appellants seek to limit the reach of the School Segre­
gation Cases to public elementary and secondary schools. 
True, the cases decided involved elementary and secondary 
schools, but these decisions, together with McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, 339 IT. S. 337, and Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U. S. 629, leave little doubt that whatever the 
status of the “ separate but equal”  doctrine in other areas,



4

it is no longer a valid constitutional yardstick with respect 
to public education. It should be added, parenthetically, 
that even application of that doctrine would be of little 
benefit to appellants’ cause since the trial court’s original 
grant of injunctive relief, which has now been reinstated, 
was based not upon the unconstitutionality of segregation 
per se, but upon appellants’ violation of the “ separate but, 
equal”  formula.

None of the cases cited by appellants are in point. 
Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A. 2d 574 (Del. 1955), reversing 108 
A. 2d 173 (Del. 1954), involves the right of public officials to 
withhold relief as to a class seeking admission to elemen­
tary school pending final terms of the relief granted in 
the School Segregation Cases. But the United States 
Supreme Court is seeking to evolve a formula which will 
permit school officials to approach the question of redis­
tricting and redefining school lines, affecting a large num­
ber of persons, so as to conform to the Court’s decree with­
out undue administrative disruption of the school program. 
This approach was made only because of the large num­
ber of Negro and white children who would be affected by 
the transition. No -such problem arises in this case.

Fleming v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 128 F. 
Supp. 469 (E. D. S. C. 1955). Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 
124 F. Supp. 290 (N. D. Ga. 1954); andl Clements v. Board 
of Education, — F. Supp. — (S. D. Ohio 1955), cited 
by appellants, are of dubious authority since all three cases 
are pending before United States Courts of Appeal. Ap­
pellants also relied upon the trial court’s opinion in Lone­
some v. Maxwell, 123 F. Supp. (Md. 1954), but that case 
was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit on March 14, 1955, — F. 2d —, on the 
sweeping and all-inclusive ground that recent decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court had stripped the “ sep­
arate but equal”  doctrine of validity in all fields.



5

As to the merits of this controversy, the court below 
found that appellee could secure equal educational oppor­
tunities only by being admitted to Louisiana State Uni­
versity. This decision was and is clearly correct under 
applicable constitutional standards. Brown v. Board of 
Education, supra; Bolling v. Sharpe, supra; McLaurin v. 
Oklahoma State Regents, supra. Since it cannot be said 
that the Court’s findings are clearly wrong and not sup­
ported by the evidence, its decision on the merits of this 
controversy should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, for the reasons hereinabove indicated, 
we submit that the judgment of the court below should 
be affirmed.

A. P. T ueeatjd, Sr.,
1821 Orleans Avenue,

New Orleans, Louisiana,

U. S. T ate,
1718 Jackson Street,

Dallas, Texas,

R obert L. Carter,
T hurgood M arshall ,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York, New York,

Counsel for Appellee.