De Funis v. Odegaard Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1973
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. De Funis v. Odegaard Brief Amicus Curiae, 1973. 74cc1c90-af9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d2332b2f-0681-4b86-8c16-fbdd3082cc07/de-funis-v-odegaard-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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No. 73-235
■§>tuir£tu£ tourt at tlje Xnitrt States
OCTOBER TERM, 1973
M arco D e F unis, et al.,
Appellants
v.
Charles Odegaaro, P resident of the
U niversity of W ashington, ct al.
T c t i ' t i t on <l,<' 9
Q« Appeal From The Supreme
Court Of The State Of
Washington
uO f\; |-p O U Ct-^TIOr ck̂ x \ \ Q>
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS AMICUS CURIAE
J. A lbert W oll
General Counsel, AFL-CIO ;
R obert C. M ayer
'X L aurence Gold
736 Bowen Building
815 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20005
T homas E. H arris
Associate General Counsel,
AFL-CIO
815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
t •
2
American Indians and Philippine Americans), who were
acknowledge^ less qualified under the School’s admission
standards than applicants of other races. That court con
cluded that this system of racial classification was justified
by the elimination of “ racial imbalance within public legal
education,” (507 P.2d at 1182), the production of “ a racial
ly balanced student body at the law school,” (id. at 1184),
and the alleviation of a nation-wide “ shortage of minority
attorneys,’ (ibid.).
_/
The position of the American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) is that
this holding can not be squared with the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantees of due process and the equal pro
tection of the laws.
The AFL-CIO is a federation of 113 national and inter-'
national unions having a total membership of approxi
mately 13,500,000 working men and women. The Federa
tion’s interest in the question presented here is the product
of the following interrelated considerations:
First:
“ [T]he labor movement is the most integrated major
institution in American society, certainly more inte
grated than the corporations, the churches, or the uni
versities. * * * The percentage of blacks in the unions
is a good deal higher than the percentage of blacks in
the total population. # * * Moreover, blacks are joining
unions in increasing numbers. According to a 1968 re
port by Business Week, one out of every three new
union members is black.” Rustin, The Black And The
Unions, Harper’s Magazine, May, 1971, pp. 73, 76.
The major function of the trade union movement is to act'
ns its members’ exclusive bargaining represenlativc in
dealing with llieir employers on matters of “ wages, hours,,
and other tei'ms and conditions of employment.” See
§§8(a) (5), 8(d) & 9(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. And as this Court
has recognized:
“ Inevitably differences arise in the maimer and degree
to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect
individual employees and classes of employees. The1
mere existence of such differences does not make then
invalid. The complete satisfaction of all represented is
hardly to be expected. * * * Differences in wages, hours
and conditions of employment reflect countless varia
bles.” Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338.
Thus, unions are front-line institutions dealing with and
attempting to harmonize, on a day-to-day basis, the inevi
table clashes of economic interest between individual em
ployees and between groups of employees (as well as those
between employees as a class and their employers).
Organized labor, therefore, well understands that there
is no escape from the necessity of rules of selection where
there are more applicants than there are openings, whether
the places to be filled are jobs, or positions in a professional
school (which serves as the method of entry to a particular
field of endeavor). And the union movement is fully cog
nizant that in our society, where employment is a major
, determinant of economic position, such rules are perhaps
the most important of all the norms governing the distri
bution of scarce resources. Precisely because this is so,
organized labor knows that if there is to be domestic tran
quility these rule's must be fair in fact and must be per-
l
eoived to bo fair by those whose fate they decide.
George Lichtheim has pointed o u t-“ Tf n
as a source of political antagonism'is rn ledm T * - the
resHlaal tensions • • • need not and doubtless wil] „ ol M
\VX1 'r” C M d * ‘ o'erab,
ZIZZTZZZ; n The N w Y o " k ^ *
™ st potent in a period, such as the present in w h ilh T
and rising nnemplovment spiralin. !„fl hlgh
sess ion , sudden shortensT ^
radical restrnetnring of establ s W , ! T * T * * * *
and an overall nno e * , ! d f and wo,'k Patterns,
‘- “ ’ M r
disequilibrium J" " P thG P0*0" 1''"1 for a violent
. , ^ r : r b°T 7 •
firmly eommitted to ! e*P°n ™«>. is- therefore,
hope ,„ r “ ul° , ~ io” ,h“ ‘ « » one best
‘ "ose rules of selection Z t ^ • * '
"artificial, arbitrarv ! a 7 m" S‘ ” ot constitute
ployment [that] opiate invffiousTy To T -" '" '" *°
the basis of racial ^ T y to discriminate on
and that they must n o t ° p r o ^ ^ ^ . Cl.a8,^ tioil,,»
erence for any group, minority or U o r “ JT, ̂
4
/
GnM N v- Vide rower Co., 401 U.8. 424, 431).
This commitment is not based on tlie fallacy^that there
: : ac,“ ' r c,i,ori“ * '» ^
appioacli the accuracy of the litmus test. Rather it is
from'' f'a a 'W°s,li,io" ,,w‘ retreat is beat
. fair and racialJy neutral employment * * * de
792° 801) ^ 411 u t
two’ t! ’ here -S ” ° equitable method of mediating be
tween the competing claims of minority workers, majority
workers, employers and the society at large.
. ®°CaUSe thG decision below rejects the proposition stated
a l t h o l f U McDonnell Douglas, its effects are pernicious,
although its intentions are the best.
Second, the AFL-CIO’s commitment to equal oppor
tumty as just defined has been manifested in two major
parallel courses of action. J *
T’ “ Rederat‘011 pressed for enactment of Title VII of
tLe CT R« hts A « of 1904 („,,d the strengthen!,,-1972
amendments), with the approving understanding that the
n,o„ movement would be strictly regulated thereby It
as ice,; c only multi-racial organization to thus prefer
fidelity to the eradication of racial discrimination ahead
in the 80 r r r frc0d01" ,rom government dictation
has reclll'ed ** m t N " al ^ AS * * * * * R“sti“
. 7 ! ™ drive aoa‘nst discrimination was ex
a Fair °F th<i figh‘ made b ̂ tbe AFL-CIO to have
• section writtea illt0 tbe
Rohert Tf ? Act B° tb Presid^ t Kennedy and
Robert Kennedy were opposed to including an FEPd
>
V.A
\
6
' ̂ section because they thought it would kill the bill, but
George Meany pressed for it. He did so for a simple
reason. The AFL-CIO is a federation of affiliates
which retain a relatively high degree of autonomy.
The parent body can urge compliance with its policies,
but the decision to act is left up to the affiliates. Meany'
felt that the only way the AFL-CIO could deal ef
fectively with unions practicing discrimination would
be to demand compliance with the law of the land.
He testified before the House Judiciary Committee
that the labor movement was calling “ for legislation
for the correction of shortcomings in its own ranks.”
And the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act greatly
speeded the process of this correction.” Rustin, The
Blacks And The Unions, supra at p. 76.
In a complementary effort, the AFL-CIO has been a
major force in a far-ranging affirmative action program,
the Apprenticeship Outreach Movement, to assure that
minorities have meaningful access to the most highly
skilled and well paying technical jobs in industry. William
M. Ross, the Deputy Executive Director of the Recruitment
and Training Program Inc. of New York, in a speech to
the Annual Rocky Mountain Apprenticeship Conference in
Salt Lake City, delivered in November 1973, described the
essence of the Outreach approach as follows:
“ Above all else, the outreach approach is an advocacy
strategy which is designed to provide a wide variety of
tutorial and supportive services to minority workers
who are seeking entry in the apprenticeship training
programs and skilled jobs in the construction industry.
“ The outreach concept originated in 1964 when The
Workers Defense League established a program to re
cruit black and Spanish speaking youth for placement
i
in construction apprenticeship training programs in
New York City. This program was the outgrowth of
a series of violent demonstrations which occurcd at
several construction sites in the city during the summer
of 19G3. These demonstrations, which were part of an
attempt to halt all publicly financed construction in
New York until 25 percent of the jobs in this industry
were tilled by black and Spanish speaking workers,
resulted in hundreds of arrests and costly work stop
pages. The Harlem hospital project, which was shut
down for more than four months, cost the city of New
York more than $250,000 for overtime payments to
police alone. The total,cost of this shut down ran into
the millions.
“ Together with most of the other civil rights or
ganizations in the city, the W.D.L. became a member
of the Joint Committee on Equal Employment Oppor
tunity which was established to coordinate the various
demonstrations. Initially, these protest activities were
predicated on the belief that it would be relatively easy
to find enough qualified black and Spanish workers to
fill the job slots which were being demanded, if sufficient
legal and community pressure could be brought to bear
upon the unions and contractors to force them to open
their apprenticeship programs to non-whites. However,
it soon became increasingly obvious that a special effort
was required to seek out qualified applicants who would
commit themselves to a career in the building trades.
“ With a-small grant from the Taconic Foundation,
The Workers Defense League rented a storefront in the
heart of the Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto in Brooklyn and
established a program to (1) disseminate information
on construction employment opportunities; (2) to recruit,
counsel, and tutor black and Spanish speaking appren
ticeship applicants and (3) to provide follow-up sup-
i
portive services to the non-white apprentices who were
accepted into the unions’ training programs.
“ Within our first two years, we had placed more than
500 black and Spanish speaking youths in apprenticeship
programs.
“ Because of our success in New York and the failure
of other approaches in various cities around the coun
try, our outreach concept was adopted as a formal
program within the Manpower Administration of the
U.S. Department of Labor in 1967. Subsequently, our
approach became the model for several other local
organizations throughout the nation.
“ Since 1967, the apprenticeship outreach movement has
grown by leaps and bounds. At the present time, there
are 120 federally funded outreach programs in 227 dif
ferent cities. Of this total
. . . 37 are operated by the Urban League’s leap
program
. . . 26 are operated by R-T-P
. . . 17 are operated by local building and construction
trade councils
. . . 15 are operated by the AFL-CIO Human Re
sources Development Institute
. . . 24 are operated by other miscellaneous local
organizations such as the Trade Union Lcadci ship
Council in Detroit and Philadelphia; The New Jersey
Department of Labor and Industry; The Mexicain-
American Opportunities Foundation in Los Angeles;
The Opportunities Industrialization Center in Pitts
burgh, etc.
“ Because of the apprenticeship outreach movement,
there has been a dramatic and significant increase in
8
0
the number a ml percent ago of minority youth in con
struction apprenticeship programs. For example:
In 1960, there were less than 2,000 non-white
apprentices in the entire united states, and as late as
1906 non-white apprentices represented only two per
cent of all registered construction apprentices.
“ But between the time the outreach program was
first funded in 1967 and July of this year more than
26,000 non-white youths have been indentured in regis
tered apprenticeship programs in construction.
274 Asbestos Workers
1223 Bricklayers
5372 Carpenters
1126 Cement Masons
2896 Electricians •
466 Elevator Constructors k
251 Glaziers
1411 Iron Workers ; -
287 Lathers
1603 Operating Engineers y
1909 Painters
354 Plasterers .
.1031 Roofers
1289 Sheet Metal
145 Tile Setters
2410 Pipe Trades
“ At the present time non-white youths comprise ap
proximately fifteen percent of all registered construc
tion apprentices.”
Both Title VII and the Outreach program are faithful
to the premise that the rules of selection for employment
must, in this Court’s words in Griggs, make “ j6b
qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion,
10
nationality and sex become irrelevant” (401 U.S. at 436),
Indeed, perhaps the most significant fact about Outreach
is that it puts the lie to the counsel of despair and con
descension that racial preferences, such as that instituted
by the University of Wasliingon Law School, are nec
essary because minorities can not compete on the basis
of qualifications. As Mr. Ross noted in another passage
o f the same speech:
“ Our experience convinced us that fairly administered
tests and other qualifications which are relevant to job
requirements are not in surmountable obstacles to the
entry of minorities into apprenticeship. Indeed, we are
very proud of the tutoring techniques we have developed
to overcome the testing problem. In fact, we have now-
reached the point where in some cities our applicants:
are achieving higher test scores than all other appli
cants, white or black. For example, 73 percent of our
applicants scored ‘ high’ on a recent test which was given
by the Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Committee in
Now York. We have now reached the point where our
applicants are better at taking tests than the average
applicants.”
The answer, in other words, is not to abandon our com
mitment to the allocation of employment opportunities on
the basis of merit, a course that would be inconsistent with
the urgent need to maximize productivity and efficiency to
meet the critical economic problem we now face, but to
refine our measures of merit and to provide those who
have not received a sufficient grounding in . basic skills
the compensatory tutoring necessary to enable them to
compete on the basis of qualifications.
It is, we suppose, possible, in theory, that a system of
I I
equal opportunity embracing tlie principles slates iii
Griggs and McDonnell Douglas could survive affirmance
of the holding below. But it is not even remotely likely
that this would be the consequence. -The pressure, by a
significant number of policy makers, for sweeping, short
term, solutions to the agonizing economic problems of the
minority communities, without regard to the unfairness
of such solutions to those like Mr. De Funis, who have
both legitimate aspirations and substantial problems of /
their own, is too intense. In this area, as in others in our
political life, the overriding recent trend has been to ignore
the long-term costs of utilizing questionable means to
achieve the end sought.
Yet those long-term costs promise to be immense. In
an address to the AFL-CIO’s Eighth Constitutional Con
vention, some five years ago, Mr. Rustin pointed out the
factor that these planners overlook—it is that this country
faces a racial problem consisting of “ two elements—black
rage and white fear [that] feed on each other and set
this nation on a collision course.” (Proceedings of the
AFL-CIO’s Eighth Constitutional Convention, pp. 105-106)
Obviously neither this rag'e nor this fear can be pandered
to insofar as it is irrational. The program the labor move
ment has evolved does not do so. But the white fears en
gendered by racial preferences are not irrational. And
such preferences, while they may give the appearance of
answering “ black [or more broadly minority] rage,” do
not do so in a meaningful sense. As Mr. Rustin noted:
“ We don’t want special categories labeled ‘ Negro
carpenters’ >or ‘ Negro plumbers’ who have lower skills
and get less pay. We want Negroes.who are carpenters
l '
12
and plumbers—with the same skills and training and
wages that everyone else. has. We want the same pride
in our trade that any worker with dignity wants. And
We will not settle for less.” Id at 111.
That result can only be achieved by affording equal em
ployment opportunities as we have defined that concept.
It will not he achieved by a program of racial preferences.
It is because of the foregoing considerations that the
AFL-CIO has sought this opportunity to present its views
concerning this case to the Court.
ARGUMENT
The profound central lesson of the Fourteenth Amend
ment for this case, is, in the words of the brief amicus of
the Anti-Defamation League of B ’nai B ’ritli in- support of
the jurisdictional statement (at pp. 11, 12, 16), that the:
“ Constitutionality [of racial classifications! turns on
whether [they! work any deprivation, and even if not,
on whether they are justified by a compelling interest,
' by ‘ some overriding statutory purpose,’ McLaughlin
' v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). ‘ Without such
justification the racial classification . . . is reduced to
an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal
Protection Clause.’ McLaughlin v. Florida, supra,
‘ 379 U.S. at 192-93.
# # # #
“ [A! compelling state interest sufficient to justify a
racial classification can he shown only if the classifica
tion is undertaken in the course of administering a
remedy for proven prior discrimination, * * * [so that
the] remedy has followed with precision a wrong shown
with precision in a record # * *, or at least if, while
serving an allowable state purpose, it imposes no depri
vation on anyone.”
That statement of the law is drawn from, and meticulously
documented to, this Court’s decisions. To avoid needless
repetition we therefore incorporate the discussion of those
precedents in that brief by reference, take the conclusion
reached as a given, and devote ourselves herein to enlarg
ing upon and refining the basic proposition quoted above.
1. In allocating the 145 to 150 openings in the first-year
class, the University of Washington Law School applied
its test of qualification, expressed in essence in a weighted
formula, the “ predicted first year average,” so that black
Americans, Chicano Americans, native American Indians
or Philippine Americans (but not Asian Americans) were
treated separately from, and more favorably than, appli
cants of other races. The qualifications of these “ minority”
applicants wore compared only with others in that group,
and not against the entire universe of applicants.
The result was that “ minority” applicants were accepted
who would have been summarily rejected but for their mem
bership in that class. Juris. Stat. App. C. Finding XXIII.
In all, 44 minority applicants .were accepted, 38 of whom
had qualifications lower than Mr. Do Funis, the plaintiff-
appellant here, who is white, and who was not accepted.
Thus, “ the admissions of the less qualified [minority] stu
dents resulted in a denial of places to those better qualified
[of other races].” Juris. Stat. App. C. Finding XXIV.
There can be no dispute, then, that the Law School uti
lized a racial classification in determining who should be
accepted for its first year ftlass. And it is equally clear that
13
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14
tliis deprived Mi-. T)e Funis, and others similarly situated,
of a right to compote for placement in the Law School under-
some system of selection that does not discriminate against
them on the grounds of race.
2. There is no showing here that this racial classification
and preference for minority students is justified as a rem
edy, either for present discrimination, or for the present
effects of past discrimination.
(a) The record is barren of evidence that the Law School
was motivated by an intent to discriminate against minority
applicants. And there is no evidence that the School’s pres
ent rules of selection have discriminatory consequences for
minority applicants. Those rules as applied equally to all
had produced a student body with a racial mix approxi
mately that of the state (B ’nai B ’rith Juris. Stat. Brief,
p. 14), and were based on criteria that reliably predicted
'law school performance of both “ minority” and majority
students.
In a carefully considered and comprehensive decision,
Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm., — F.2d —, 6 FEP
Oases 1045 (C.A.2, Nov. 21, 1973), Judge Friendly has re
viewed the standards for judging the legality of testing
procedures challenged as discriminatory:
“ In Castro v. Beecher, supra, 459 F.2d at 732, the First
Circuit stated that
‘The public employer must, we think, in order to justify
the use of a means of selection shown to have a racially
disproportionate impact, demonstrate that the means
is in fact substantially related to job performance.’
Judge Coffin later referred to the defendants’ obli-
\
15
gation to ‘ come forward with convincing facts estab
lishing a fit between the qualification and the job.’ Td.
* * * [A] showing of a racially disproportionate impact
puts on the municipal or state defendants not simply
a burden of going forward but a burden of persuasion.
* * * But if the public employer succeeds in convincing
the court that the examination was “ substantially re
lated to job performance,” an injunction should not
issue simply because he has not proved this to the hilt.
* * * “ Cases like this one have led the courts deep into
the jargon of psychological testing. Plaintiffs insist
that the only satisfactory examinations are those which
have been subjected to ‘ predictive validation’ or ‘ con
current validation,’ preferably the former. The district
court defined these terms as follows: ‘ Predictive vali
dation consists of a comparison between the examina
tion scores and the subsequent job performance of those
applicants who are hired’ ; ‘ Concurrent validation re
quires the administration of the examination to a group
of current employees and a comparison between their
relative scores and relative performance on the job.’
The judge wisely declined to insist on either. The Four
teenth Amendment no more enacted a particular theory
of psychological testing than it did Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics. Experience teaches that the
preferred method of today may be the rejected one of
tomorrow. What is required is simply that an examina
tion must be ‘ shown to bear a demonstrable relation
ship to successful performance of the jobs for which
it was used.’ Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 n.14. To be sure, an impressive showing of pre
dictive validation may end the inquiry then and there,
and one of concurrent validation may come close to
•doing so; thus these methods may well be preferable
in that sense. But these two schemes have their own
16
difficulties, and the failure to use one of them is not
fatal, at least from a constitutional standpoint, as long
as the examination is properly job-related.” Vulcan
Society, 6 FEP Cases at pp. 1049, 1050, footnotes
omitted.
In the instant case even the threshold showing—“ racially
.disproportionate impact” —necessary to require justifica
tion of the Law School’s qualifications criteria has not
been met. And, in any event, the “ demonstrable relationship
to successful [school] performance,” which must be proved
on that showing, is, as we understand the record, universally
acknowledged. *
(b) We hasten to add that none of this is -to say that
the present criteria are the only lawful ones, or, indeed,
that Mr. De Funis or any one else has a Fourteenth Amend
ment right to insist on these or similar rules of selection.
The law is a field as broad as human experience itself.
The range of permissible performance-related admission,
criteria is correspondingly broad. The Law School retains
the primary responsibility for the development of sensitive
and accurate measures of qualification attuned to its edu
cational mission as the School defines that mission. In
Judge Friendly Trenchant paraphrase: “ The Fourteenth
Amendment no more enacted a particular theory of psy
chological testing than it did Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics.” Vulcan Society, 6 FEP Cases at 1050. But that
Amendment did enact a ban on rules of selection based on
racial classifications. •' ,
. I
(c) Even proof of past discrimination against minority
applicants would not validate the racial classification here
17
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i
which works a deprivation of the constitutional rights of
the majority applicants.
Initially, it is difficult, at best, to give content to the
concept of past discrimination by the Law School against
• the minority applicants who are the beneficiaries of this
preference. A number of attempts, by a single individual,
over a period of years, to gain admission to a law school
is the rare exception. Almost without exception to speak
o f past discrimination in this context, as the court below
recognized, is to speak of overall societal failures or
failures at a lower rung in the educational ladder.
The policy of “ remedying” such discrimination by sub
stituting racial criteria for criteria “ shown to bear a
4 demonstrable relationship to successful performance”
(Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431) suffers from
four fatal flaws:
First, “ the indiyidual [majority applicant who is not
admitted] may have had no part in discrimination against
4 blacks; to impose on him the costs of remedying societal
discrimination seems unjust. It is all the more unjust since
the burden would fall most heavily on, whites who are
themselves relatively deprived.” Developments In The Law
—Employment Discrimination And Title VII Of The Civil
Rights Act of 19C4', 84 Harv. L. Eev. 1109, 1116. To weight
economic competition in this fashion against those who
can not be said to have meaningfully participated in a ,
wrong is impermissibly close to imposing punishment on the
ground of “ collective guilt,” in effect creating “ attaints
of the blood” for all members o f non-minority groups.
Second, such racial classifications:
“ have serious countereducative effects. Gordon Allport
i ' ■ /
i -
has defined ethnic prejudice as ‘ an antipathy based
upon a faulty and inflexible generalization.’ A crucial
objective of any antidiscrimination [program] must,
then, be education; it must break down faulty racial
stereotypes. Preferences, however, have the reverse
effect. * * * white [applicants], resentful of being
turned down * * * due to minority quotas, will only
have their stereotypes reinforced by a government that
proclaims blacks and other minorities to be in need of
special advantages.” Ibid; footnotes omitted.
Both of these factors, as we have pointed out (at pp.
supra) tend to create and maintain legitimate white fears,
thereby increasing social tensions and exacerbating the
, overall racial dilemma.
Third, the paternalistic grant of “ benign” preferences
serves to demean the recipient in his own eyes. The rein
forcement of invidious stereotypes just noted is not confined
to the majority applicants who are discriminated against.
See McPherson, The Blade Law Student: A Problem of
Fidelities, Atlantic Magazine, April 1970, p. 88; Gfraglia,
Special Admission Of The “ Culturally Deprived” To Law
School, 119 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 351, 353-359. By the same
token this device tends to deprive minority applicants, who
have in fact qualified on merit, of the full recognition for
their achievement they richly deserve. See p. supra.
Fourth, it is a delusion to believe that the overall inter
ests of society are advanced by diluting the reliance on
qualification and relying on race in selecting those who
• will fill a limited number of positions (either in a profes
sional school class or a job market). To the extent that well
paying positions are plentiful and there is an economy of
' 18
10
abundance, modifying rules of selection in this manner
may be of relatively little moment except to tliose directly
and adversely affected. Hut neither of those conditions
obtain. These are not times that allow the prodigal waste -
of scarce resources, the most valuable of which is “ efficient
and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions,”
(McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801),
responsive to the expectation that achievement brings re
wards. Thus:
, i
“ Many economists have suggested that in increasing
: equality, productivity should not be sacrificed. Instead, ]
output should be maximized and changes made in the
way tliat output is distributed. Such an approach is
a more refined and efficient means of giving aid, since ,
the beneficiaries can be identified more precisely and ,
the true costs of the process can be computed with
greater precision.” Developments— Title VII, 84 Harv.
L. Rev. at 1115.
The sum of the matter is that this racial classification is
“ an invidious discrimination forbidden by the Equal Pro
tection Clause” (McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 193), ■>
because the guarantee of the “ equal protection of the law
can not be squared with a system that deprives members
of one race of their rights in order to provide “ recom
pense” tp members of another.
This conclusion accords with that reached by Congress.
Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641. The problem here
is in all essential respects that treated in Title VII, where
Congress banned all employment discrimination against,
minority groups, (§§703(a)-(d)) as well as preferences for
20
them (§703( j )) and affirmed the lawfulness of job-related
qualifications. (§703(h)). As this Court stated in Griggs
40b U.S. at 430-431 (footnote omitted):
The Court of Appeals’ opinion, and the partial dissent,
agreed that, on the record in the present case, “ whites
register far bettor on the Company’s alternative re
quirements’ ’ than Negroes. 420 F. 2d 1225,' 1239 n. 6.
This consequence would appear to bo directly traceable
to race. Basic intelligence must have the means of
articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing
process. Because they are Negroes, petitioners have
long received inferior education in segregated schools
and this Court expressly recognized these differences
in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285
(1969). There, because of the inferior education re
ceived by Negroes in North Carolina, this Court barred
the institution of a literacy test for voter registration
on the ground that the test would abridge the right to
vote indirectly on account of race. Congress did not
intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to
every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the.
Act does not command that any person be hired simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination,
or because he is a member of a minority group. Dis
criminatory preference for any group, minority or
majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the re
moval of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other im
permissible classification’ ’
The critical difference between Gaston County, on the
one hand, and Griggs and the instant case, on the other,
is that in the former the method utilized to eradicate the
21
effects of past discrimination did not deprive any other
voter of his rights, while in the latter, to substitute selec
tion on the basis of race for selection on the basis of
qualification does impinge on the rights of those not
accorded the preference, because their opportunity to obtain
one of a limited number of places is correspondingly
diminished.
(d) The burden of the argument thus far has been that
racial classifications that result in a preference, in securing
' one of a limited number of openings, to less qualified
minority applicants over more qualified majority appli
cants, as measured by criteria “ shown to bear a demonstra
ble relationship to successful performance,” ( Griggs, 401
U.S. at 431), does not meet the.jequirements of the Consti
tution. There is a contrary line of authority in the lower
federal courts upon which the court below relied. The most
recent decision in that line is Associated General Con
tractors v. Altshuler, ------F. 2d------ , 6 FEP Cases 1031
(C.A.l, Nov. 30,1973).
In Altshuler, the court sustained the validity of a re
quirement, imposed by the Commonwealth of Massachu
setts, upon contractors engaged in publically funded con
struction, that the contractor must:
“ ‘ . . . maintain on his project, which is located in an
area in which there are high concentrations of minor
ity group persons, a not less than twenty percent ratio
of minority employee man hours to total employee man »
hours in each job category. . . . ’ ”
• ♦ # #
. “ The Secretary of Transportation and Construction
for the Commonwealth, who is charged with enforcing
22
[this] provision, interprets [it] to mean that [the
Commonwealth] requires the hiring of only ‘ qualified’
workers.”
Contractors who do not meet this ratio are subject to
sanctions unless at a hearing they demonstrate that they
have taken “ every possible measure to achieve compli
ance.” 6 FEP Cases at 1014.
The First Circuit recognized that:
“The Commonwealth’s affirmative action plan forces us
to address a fundamental question: are there consti
tutional limits to the means by which racial criteria
may be used to remedy tbe present effects of past dis
crimination and achieve equal opportunity in the fu
ture?” 6 FEP Cases at 1019.
The answer it proposed was that rules of selection may be
based on racial criteria so long as these do not require pref
erence to “ unqualified minority workers,” and so long, as
the employer is granted the opportunity to prove that the
only reason he did not meet his assigned “ goal” is that to
.do so he would have been required to hire “ unqualified mi
nority workers.'” 6 FEP Cases at 1019-1021. This was in
essence the approach of Contractors A ss’n. of Eastern Pa.
v. The Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (C.A.3) cert,
denied 404 U.S. 854, where the court relied upon the asser
tion that the goals and timetables for minority hiring there
set would not “ eliminat[e] job opportunities for white
tradesmen,” (422 F.2d at 173).
But neither the First Circuit nor the Third Circuit (or
the other of the lower courts that have embraced this posi
tion) have explained the justification for discriminating in
favor of less qualified minority workers and against, more
23
qualified majority workers. This is undoubtedly because no
justification exists. The harm to the majority worker who
is thereby unemployed is precisely the same. It is, in fact,
precisely the same as the harm visited upon a more qualified
minority worker who is rejected in favor of a less qualified
majority worker on racial grounds.
This Court has therefore emphasized that:
“ Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be
preferred over the better qualified simply because of
minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifica
tions as such, Congress has made such qualifications
the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality,
and sex become irrelevant.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. '
Thus, it is not constitutionally sufficient that the better >
qualified worker had an attenuated opportunity for a job
rather than having his job opportunities “ eliminated” . For
his right is to a system of selection embodying “ fair and
racially neutral employment and personnel decisions,”
( cf., McDonell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801).
(e) The conclusion that the decision below, and kindred
decisions such as Altshuler, are wrongly decided does not
“ provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of
the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox.” Griggs,
401 U.S. 431. The argument pressed here rests on the
premise that if a method of selection “ which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to * * *
performance, [it] is prohibited.” Ibid. Moreover, organized
labor’s entire response to'the challenge of providing equal
employment opportunity is predicated upon the recogni
tion: first, that the range of affirmative actioji open to
enable minority Americans to meet performance related
\
/
24
rules of selection is, and should be, all but unlimited; and,
v second, that affirmative action, in this sense, does work.
See pp. supra. But we do insist that Government may
“ not command that any person be [preferred] simply
because he was formerly the subject of discrimination,
or because he is a member of a minority group,” and
that the Constitution does forbid “ discriminatory pref
erence for any group, minority or majority,” (cf. Griggs4
.401 U.S. at 431).
-----—'V..
25
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, as well as those stated
by the appellants, and the other amici supporting their
position, the decision below should be reversed.
Ts . '
AT.
(A Hi
*
Respectfully submitted,
J. A lbert W oll i
General Counsel, AFL-CIO
R obert C. M ayer
L aurence Gold
* 736 Bowen Building
815 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20005
T homas E. H arris
Associate General Counsel,
AFL-CIO
815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006