Plaintiffs' Response to Emergency Application for Stay

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants

-Vs-
RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

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) Case No. Miscellaneous 75-8090
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PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY APPLICATION
FOR STAY

LOUIS R. LUCAS
RATNER, SUGARMON, LUCAS & SALKY 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
NATHANIEL JONES
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
JOHN A. DZIAMBA 
746 Main Street 
P.O. Box D
Willimantic, Connecticut 06226
THOMAS ATKINS
451 Massachusetts Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees



1• CURRENT STATUS OF THESE PROCEEDINGS

On July 25, 1974, the United States Supreme 
Court remanded the within action to the District Court 
with instructions that there be a "prompt formulation of 
a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to 
exist in Detroit City Schools", a remedy which has been 
delayed since 1970. Bradley v. Milliken, 418 U.S. (1974) 
(emphasis added).

Thereafter, on September 12, 1974, plaintiffs 
filed a motion in the District Court seeking to immediately 
implement a Detroit-only desegregation plan. It was not 
until January, 1975, that the Detroit Board of Education 
created an Office of School Desegregation for the purpose 
of developing a plan for the desegregation of the Detroit 
Schools.

A plan was submitted to the District Court by 
the Detroit Board on April 1, 1975.

Ironically, the plan submitted by the Detroit 
Board of Education asks the Federal District Court to order, 
as desegregation remedy, what will essentially be the 
creation of a dual school system. Under the Board's proposed 
plan, there would be an outer ring of "white" schools (57% 
black) wrapped around an inner core of some 123 untouched 
and largely black schools (95-100% black). These 123 schools 
are not a part of the pupil desegregation plan. They are

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ysimply "written off". See, Testimony of Dr. Michael
2/

Stolee, App. ____ _ .

Secondly, the Board's plan proceeds from the 
novel notion that the Constitution requires that only 
white schools need be desegregated. See, Testimony of 
Merle Hendrickson, App. ____.

Third, the Board's plan is ultimately grounded 
on self imposed limitation based on white flight. See, 
Testimony of Merle Hendrickson, App.____.

On April 1, 1975 in accordance with the order 
of the District Court plaintiffs filed their proposed 
plan. On April 30, 1975 a modified plan was submitted by 
plaintiffs based on more detailed data furnished by the 
Board.

The State defendants submitted no plan but did 
submit a Court ordered critique of the Detroit Board's 
plan. App._____.

Hearings on the Board of Education's plan began 
on April 29, 1975.

On May 1, 1975, plaintiffs, based on represent­
ations to the Court by both defendants, that time was of

— The Board points to 8, secondary school "open 
enrollment" programs as somehow desegregating these schools. 
As the Dean of the College of Urban Affairs at Michigan 
State University put it, once again the burden is being 
placed on black children and their parents to meet the 
Board's duty. In any event there is no,even theoretical, 
program for the large number of elementary schools not even 
considered for desegregation by the Detroit Board.

2/— App. _____ references are to an appendix pre­
pared for this response.

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of the essence,filed a motion with the District Court 
requesting that d. ndunts be required to immediately 
purchase, lease, or charter 300 school buses to be used 
in implementing such plan as would be ordered by the Court. 
Thereafter, on May 21, 1975, the Honorable Robert E. DeMascio 
issued an order wherein the State Defendants were required 
to make available 150 buses to the Detroit Board of Educa­
tion. Defendants, Milliken, et al., herein seek a stay 
of that order.

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II. PLAINTIFF'S PLAN, PREMISED ON THE
DUAL LIABILITY OF THE STATE AND ITS 
DETROIT SCHOOL BOARD AGENT, WILL 
DESEGREGATE EVERY SCHOOL,' START IN 
SEPTEMBER AND REQUIRE MORE THAN 
150 BUSES.

The Order of the District Court, dated May 21,
1975, requiring the State Defendants to acquire 150 school 
buses is only a starting point for the equipment necessary 
for the process of desegregating the Detroit Public Schools-

1. The Plan submitted to the Court by the plain­

tiffs is premised on the law of this case, Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) that both the State and its 
agent, the Detroit School Board, share liability for the 
creation and maintenance of an unconstitutional system of 
black and white segregated schools.

2. The Plan submitted by the plaintiffs can be 
ordered into place for the beginning of the school term 
which begins in September, 1975. The District Court is 
under a mandate from the Supreme Court to produce a 
desegregation plan which will vindicate the constitutional 
rights of the children of Detroit to a school system free 
of segregation to the extent possible within the boundaries 
of Detroit and that the mandate is for such a plan at the 
earliestpossible moment. The Supreme Court decision in this 
case was handed down on July 25, 1974. Plaintiffs watch 
with alarm as yet another school year approaches, with no

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Known order of any federal court which will unlock the
doors of the "black warehouses" with which black children

3/
have been placed by the Detroit Board and the State.

Thus, the Plaintiff's Plan, unlike the Detroit 
Board's Plan, is designed to desegregate the entire school 
system, now. Testimony by the Detroit Board's own trans­
portation director, Mr. Norman Watson, verifies that it 
is entirely possible to work out all the bus routes in 
Plaintiff's Plan within a matter of two weeks at the most.

Testimony by Plaintiff's experts, Dr. Stolee 
and Dr. Foster, verify that the techniques used in Plain­
tiff's Plan are well-known techniques, will require no new 
technology, are already being used by many school systems 
which have been successfully desegregated, and will work 
in Detroit.

3. The Plaintiff's Plan, will require approxi­
mately 271 buses, using a 66-passenger bus, and assuming 
that each bus will make four trips... (See page 7A of 
Plaintiff's Plan, submitted on April 1, 1975; revised on 
April 30, 1975.) Using the same technique applied by the

3/
The references in the District Court's opinion 

on the transportation order are indications of the effect 
of : (a) The failure of the Detroit Board to present a
plan of pupil reassignment which affects sections of the 
city. (b) The Board's and to an extent the Court's failure 
to realize that the Supreme Court has rejected certain argu­
ments about a 70-30 system. (c) The lack of real assistance 
by the State and (d) the insistance by the Detroit Board on 
$49,000,000.

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State Critique to the Defendant Board's Plan plaintiff’s
Plan would require 380 buses, using a 66-passenger bus,
and assuming that each bus will make at least three trips.
(See page 29, State Critique, submitted on April 21, 1975,

4/
to the Federal District Court.)

While Plaintiff's Plan proceeds from a different 
set of assumptions than does the State, from the stand 
point of estimating the number of buses needed, it is 
clear that the minimum number of buses needed is not likely 
to be less than the 271 estimated by Plaintiffs, and that 
the number may well exceed 350.

4. The State defendants have themselves concluded 
"with an adjustment downward from 425 to 250 buses, the 
Detroit Plan for the purchase or lease of buses, the hiring 
of driver and attendants, and additional safety guards appears 
to be adequate for the number of pupils to be transported." 
(Page 31, State Critique, submitted on April 21, 1975, to 
the Federal District Court.)

The State Critique concluded, further, that "The 
total cost of the transportation and crossing guard compon­
ent under the purchase plan— adjusting for the reduction 
in number of buses needed, the exclusion of bus attendants,

_4/
The State Critique suggested that it was 

possible to get as many as four elementary runs and one 
secondary run each morning. This would require the simple 
and not unusual staggering of school openings by grade 
level.

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and increased estimates for administrative, clerical 
services, supplies and maintenance--would appear to be 
approximately $6,605,000. Under the lease plan with 
similar adjustments, total costs would approximate 
$4,074,000." (Page 32, State Critique.)

All of these costs were modifed by testimony 
and amending letter from the State Superintendent.

5. The Plaintiff's plan is premised on the 
equitable allocation of the burden of desegregation between 
residential area, schools and students, and the equitable 
distribution of the benefit of desegregation to black and 
white students, at every grade level. Unlike the plan 
submitted by the Detroit Board, Plaintiff's Plan seeks 
to avoid the predictably resegregative effects of partial 
desegregation. This is accomplished by involving every part 
of the school system, in every part of the City of Detroit. 
(See Stolee, App. ___ ) .

The Plaintiff's Plan also seeks to avoid requiring 
either black students or white students to carry dispropor­
tionately large portions of the burden of desegregation by 
providing for the involvement of both black and white resi­
dential areas and schools and black and white students in 
the desegregation process.

Plaintiff's Plan seeks to guarantee that the 
Constitutional rights of all Detroit students to attend 
"not black schools, not white schools, just schools". The 
sole exception (found in both plans) to this is that 
kindergarten students are not required to leave their

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area of residence to attend schools. Expert witnesses 
for the Detroit Board conceded on cross-examination the 
harmful effects on black and white children of leaving a 
set of school which are racially identifiable black.
(See Dean Edward Simpkins, at App. _____.)



Ill. THE STATE'S AGENT, THE DETROIT SCHOOL 
BOARD", HAS PRODUCED a" PLAN WHICH NOT 
ONLY CONTAINS MINIMUM STUDENT DESEGRE­
GATION, 'BUT ALSO SEEKS THE ORDERING 
OF A SERIES OF COSTLY NON-DESEGREGATION 
COMPONENTS, WOULD RESULT IN THE HIRING 
OF MORE THAN 3400 NEW EMPLOYEES, AND 
HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENT­
ATION^^

1. The Board's Plan, if ordered as proposed, 
would contain a total of 15 new components, 5 of which 
are directly related to desegregation, 2 others of 
which should be combined with one of the first 5, and 
9 others which should take place whether or not the school 
system were undergoing student desegregation. Plaintiff's 
expert, Dr. Stolee has testified that 5 of the proposed 
components have direct relatedness to desegregation--In- 
Service Training of faculty and staff (App. , );
School-Community Relations (App. , __ ); Testing
(App. _____ ) ; Co-Curricular (App.___________) ;
Monitoring (App. _____ _____) .

Dr. Stolee also testified that two of the other 
components should be combined with the School-Community 
Relations component--School Community Liaison (App. );
and, Parental Involvement (App. _____).

Finally, Dr. Stolee testified that the remaining 
components were all programs which any school system should 
be doing, whether or not it was undergoing desegregation--

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Guidance (App. ___ ____); Vocational Education (App.

____)' Career Education (App. ___ _____)• Accountability
(APP- ___ _); Curriculum Design (App. ____  ); Bilingual-
BiCultural Education (App. _____)• Multi-Ethnic Curriculum
(APP- ____ _______) • Plaintiffs have suggested a Reading
Component to remedy education deficits resulting from 
segregation.

It is Plaintiff's position that none of these 
components should be permitted to serve as substitutes for 
desegregation, nor should they be seen as roadblocks to 
desegregation. However the Boardinsists that the District 
Court excuse its failure to desegregate half the system 
and desegregate nothing until it gets all of these com­
ponents .

2. The Board's Plan, if implemented as proposed, 
would cost nearly $40,000,000 over and above the cost of 
system-wide desegregation. The Board insists that these 
components must accompany the pupil desegregation order 
and that no pupil plan can be implemented or decided until 
the $40,000,000 has been granted to it, a position which 
flies in the face of experience obtained nationally, since 
the 1964 Supreme Court decision in Brown which outlawed 
Jim Crow schools. Plaintiffs agree with the Board on 
the educational desirability of the components, for the 
most part, but disagree with the Board's assertion that 
the components are indispensable to desegregation.

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3. The Board's Plan, if implemented as pro­
posed, would necessitate hiring more than 3400 new employees, 
many of them at salaries well in excess of those paid the 
most experienced and tenured teachers. While Plaintiffs 
do not, without qualification, reject all of these proposed 
new hires, it is clear that they are differentially needed 
to either promote desegregation or support a desegregation 
order.

4. As has been shown above, the Board's Plan, 
while going to great lengths to present and defend non­
desegregation related components, has failed to meet the 
principal test to which the Board and State Defendants 
are being held by the Constitution--the maximum amount of 
actual desegregation. The remedy for unconstitutional 
school segregation is "maximum," "actual," "all-out desegre­
gation." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. at 25-30; 
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 1,37;
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214; Green v. County School Board,
391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (conversion "to a system without 
a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools.")

- 1 1 -



IV. THE STATE DEFENDANTS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL 
EXPERIENCE IN STUDENT TRANSPORTATION, 
EXERCISE SUBSTANTIAL CONTROL OVER 
TRANSPORTATION BY LOCAL DISTRICTS, IS 
THE MAJOR SOURCE OF FUNDING FOR LOCAL 
DISTRICT TRANSPORTATION, AND PROVIDE 
EXTENSIVE ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DISTRICTS 
UPON REQUEST.

1. It is the law of this case that the State 
officials were partners with the local defendant Board 
in creating and maintaining a system and pattern of 
segregated schools within the City of Detroit. (Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).

2. The State defendants have substantial experi­
ence in the transportation of students within local school 
districts within Michigan. According to the testimony of 
Dr. Charles O'Leary, the State's chief official in the 
area,the State Board of Education provides continuing and
substantial assistance to local school districts planning

_5/or implementing student transportation. This assistance
includes selection of equipment, selection and design of 
routes, training of drivers. At the present time, the 
State defendants have provided one or another form of 
assistance to local Michigan School Districts which are

_5/
Whatever claim the State makes in its Motion 

about the need for his testimony, it is plain from reading 
it that nothing he said affects the necessity for the 
Court's order.

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transporting 1,000,000 public students, including the 
City of Detroit. (See App. _____ _____).

3. The State defendants, through the power to 
grant or withhold reimbursement for certain student trans­
portation expenses, exercise effective control over the 
actual operation of local public school district trans­
portation. This control is manifested in part by the 
authority granted to the State to refuse reimbursement
to any districts whose buses fail to meet the standards
promulgated ty the State Board (App._____ ); which fail
to provide the requisite driver education training run 
by State Colleges in each of four locations (App.
_____); which fail to select routes in the manner deemed
most desirable by the state (App. _____ ). State law
even dictates the color allowed for school buses of local 
districts, and under what circumstances districts may alter 
the basic yellow school bus design.

4. The ability of local school districts to 
provide student transportation is totally predicated on 
the grant of authority from the state to local districts.
The state has specified that in some districts this decision 
at the local level may only be exercised by the electors, 
while in other local districts the local school board is 
empowered to so decide without electoral approval. In 
either event the State provide funds for bus equipment 
costs (one seventh (1/7) each year App. ____  _____).

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5. Tne State has also authorized, by specific 
acts, local school districts to levy mileage for educational 
purposes, including the purpose of paying for all or part 
of student transportation costs.

6. State reimbursement to local school district 
for student transportation includes 100% reimbursement for 
special education children, and 75% reimbursement for 
transportation to relieve overcrowding, compensate for 
distances found too great pursuant to student assignment 
decisions, and to guard against safety hazards. The decision 
by tne State to withhold funds for any, or all, of these 
activities could, in many instances, mean that the local 
school district would have to simply discontinue the program 
of student transportation. The decision of local school dis­
tricts to discontinue student transportation would work great 
hardships on many students and their families, since the 
average bus trip is 19 miles round trip or 9 1/2 miles one 
way, and, m  at least one instance, kindergarten students
are transported distances which require a one-way trip of
, , , . 6/two nours duration. (App. r ) ~—

_£/
. Previously briefed in this case, the Detroit 

Cl?°°l Dlstrict did not until two years ago received State 
reimbursement for regular pupil transportation. Today Detroi
?ĥ 'l-h'9^tS 1S^S than tne reimbursement provided other distric ihe hlstory of tne State’s defense to this discrimination is 
allegedly based on an urban-rural classification. However in 
act, tnat classification fails because of the urban (city) di-
I * ? ? ™  he ^ri-c°unty area who are "grandfathered" into the 
aci, and have always received reimbursement. If Detroit had
fleet^s^h^ ^  ^  C°Uld have Purchased ^ s  busleet as the others did with one seventh (1/7) per year capita' cost contributed by the State. 1 Y capita.

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 r

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7. Plaintiffs contend, in view of the substantial 
experience and control over student transportation exercised 
by the State defendants, and in view of the finding of 
complicity in the creation and maintenance of school segre­
gation in Detroit, that State defendants should not be per­
mitted to plead their inability or disinterest in helping 
to alleviate the condition their illegal actions helped to 
create.

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V. THE STATE DEFENDANTS' APPLICATION DOES 
NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A STAY

1. The State Defendants argue that if they are 
not granted a full stay pending accelerated appellate 
review, "...defendants, Milliken, et al., will be required 
to pay out or to bind themselves contractually to pay out 
up to approximately 2.4 million dollars that will be unre­
coverable by them, in the event they later prevail or appeal, 
to the irreparable to injury of themselves and the taxpayers 
of the State of Michigan."

i The District Court, however, in denying the
State Defendants1 request for a stay saw no irreparable 
harm to defendants for two reasons:

THE COURT: Mr. McCargar, the Court
see no irreparable harm for two reasons.
In the first place, the very last sentence 
of the Court's Memorandum Opinion states 
that since the jurisdiction is continuing 
this Court may, at any time, amend or 
supplement its order as the circumstances 
may require.

Secondly, and quite apart from any­
thing written in the Memorandum Opinion, 
there is no way to be irreparably harmed 
when you'r talking about exchanging dollars.
You cannot be irreparably harmed by placing 
an order and making the contractual arrange­
ments as ordered in that document today when 
you would not only have sufficient time to 
file an emergency appeal, you will also 
have a state with a market in the neighbor- j/ 
hood of fourteen hundred (1400) buses annually.

Actually according to Dr. O'Leary it is 1600.
7 _ /

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One hundred-fifty (150) buses does not 
even begin to absorb the availability of 
that market. So that there are two pro­
spects. The Court may amend its order 
at any time since the jurisdiction is 
obviously continuing here. We have not 
decided the remedial phaseof this case. 
Secondly, there can be no irreparable 
harm when the contract, once negotiated 
or the lease arrangements, once made can 
find its absorption on the open market. 
So, the irreparable harm argument is not 
impressive. Your motion for a stay is 
denied. App. _____.
The Court omitted a most important factor.

Either the District or State defendants must pay. If, 
on appeal it should be determined that the State should 
not pay, the State can get all of its money back simply 
by withholding it from the next quarterly payment to the 
Detroit Board or from transportation funds due Detroit 
now and in the future. Since a bookkeeping entry can 
make the State whole, how is there any harm? The defen­
dants who segregated Detroit's children fight. One says 
we're too poor - the other says "let them eat cake". Both, 
continue to deny black children their Constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs also agree that should defendants' 
request for stay be granted no irreparable harm would be 
suffered by defendants. Instead, the only irreparable 
damage would be to the black children of the City of Detroit 
who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the Court's 
Order.

The United States Supreme Court has decreed that 
plaintiffs' remedy has already been too long delayed.

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Bradley v. Milliken, 418 U.S.717 (1974). Should this
Court grant the State's motion, the Constitutional right 
of black children in Detroit to a desegregated school 
system will be again delayed over the issue of conforming 
conduct to the requirement of the Constitution which, in 
this case, necessitates the expenditure of funds. Mere 
injures, however substantial, in terms of money, time and 
energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are 
not enough. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn, v. Federal 
Power Commission, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

The balancing of the Constitutional right of black 
dhildren of the City of Detroit clearly outweighs the State's 
proffered fear of irreparable injury in that, as the District 
Court indicated, any monies expended by the State may be 
easily recovered. (App. ____ , supra).

As the Court stated in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, 
supra, "(r)elief saving the claimant from irreparable injury 
at the expense of similar harm caused another, might not 
qualify as the equitable judgment that a stay represents."
259 F.2d, at 925. Plaintiffs maintain that the issuance 
of a stay would unduly harm plaintiffs and further delay 
and frustrate the mandate of the Supreme Court to desegre­
gate the Detroit School system "now".

2. In their Application for Stay, defendants 
argue that the July 11, 1972 order of District Court requir­
ing State defendants to acquire 295 buses for a metropolitan

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desegregation plan was vacated by this Court, 484 F.2d 
215 (CA 6, 1973) and that this Court's en banc decision 
was subsequently reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
418 U.S. 717 (1974).

Plaintiffs respectfully submit, however, that 
defendants have misinterpreted this Court's ruling on the 
1972 order for the purchase of buses as well as the deci­
sion of the Supreme Court. While this Court vacated the 
order of the District Court relative to the aspects of 
the metropolitan remedy, it stated:

In the exercise of its equity powers, 
a District Court may order that public 
funds be expended, particularly when such 
an expenditure is necessary to meet the 
minimum requirements mandated by the 
Constitution. 484 F.2d at 258 (6th Cir.
1973).

Thus, the Order by the Court below merely rein­
stated, with modification, the original Order for Acquis- 
tion of Transportation entered by the District Court on 
July 11, 1972.

3. The State Defendants do not oppose the need 
to order vehicles so that a desegregation plan may be 
implemented in the Detroit City schools in September, 1975. 
Rather, defendants argue that absent a finding of consti­
tutional violations by defendants regarding school finance, 
the state defendants can not be compelled to bear the costs 
of supplying transportation vehicles.

This argument was rejected by the Court below 
and by numerous other Courts who have held that once it is

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determined that the State has committed de jure acts of
segregation, it may be required by court order to assist 
in the remedy. Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education,
508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974) Cert denied. _____ U.S. ___ __
(1975); Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F.Supp. 1218 (D.Del. 1974); 
Hart v. Community School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp.
699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 
(6th Cir. 1973).

4. State defendants further challenge the Order 
of the District Court on the ground that such order is 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. This issue was fully 
raised by defendants in the District Court and was there 
rejected. In an order dated March 12, 1975, the District 
Court stated:

"In any event, the Eleventh Amend­
ment does not bar suits seeking prospec­
tive injunctive relief, nor is such 
injunctive relief objectionable because 
it requires an incidental expenditure of 
funds from the State Treasury. Ex Parte 
Young 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)1
Plaintiffs' response to defendants' Eleventh

Amendment argument is fully discussed in Plaintiffs' Reply
. . . !_/Brief which is incorporated herein by reference.
5. Defendants also claim that "... the instant 

order directly compels the payment of additional, unappro­
priated funds from the State Treasury and, is, in substance

The "Reply Brief" was filed earlier with the 
Court but is appended to this Brief for ease of reference 
as Appendix A to the Brief.

_8 /

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and effect, a prohibited award of money damages against 
the State of Michigan." Plaintiffs assert, however, that 
the Order by the District Court is not an award for money 
damages but rather provides for prospective injunctive

to remedy past discriminations against black children 
in the City of Detroit for which the state defendants were 
found to be liable.

Where an action is one for the enforcement of . 
Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Eleventh Amendment offers 
no immunity to State officials. U.S. v. Board of School 
Commissioners of the City of Indianapolis, 503 F.2d 68 
(7th Cir. 1974). Ex Parte Young, supra. Therefore, the 
arguments raised by defendants in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 
of their Application for Stay are specious, and wholly 
inapplicable.

6. Finally, plaintiffs contend that defendants' 
Application for Stay must be judged by certain established 
criteria as set out in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, Assoc., 
supra. In addition, in order to prevail, the defendants 
must satisfy each of the requirements established in 
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, for granting, "this extraordinary 
relief". cf. Blakeaship v. Boyle, 447 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.,
1971), where the Court found that although an applicant for 
a stay order has successfully demonstrated irreparable injury 
if the stay were denied, thus meeting one of the criteria 
for granting a stay, insufficient showing of the likelihood

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of eventual success on the merits has been made, and 
accordingly it denied the requested relief.

A. Defendants Cannot Demonstrate 
a Strong Likelihood That Thev 
Will Prevail On The Merits *
Of Their Appeal.

To reiterate plaintiffs' position, as heretofore 
stated in Plaintiffs' Reply Brief and above, it is within 
the scop^ of a District Court's equity power to order the 
expenditure of State funds to implement a plan for the 
desegregation of schools. Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F.Supp. 
1218; Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F .2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).

The record in this action is substantial with 
regard to involvement of these state defendants in de jure 
acts of segregation relative of the Detroit Public Schools.

The District Court has previously found that 
'rhe State refused, until this session of the legislature, 
to provide authorization or funds for the transportation 
of pupils within Detroit regardless of their poverty or 
distance from the school to which they were assigned, while 
providing m  many neighboring, mostly white, suburban school
districts the full range of State supported transportation." 
484 F.2d at 238.

The historical denial, together with the record 
of state involvement in segregation is a clear predicate 
for requiring that the State defendants assume the costs 
of acquisition.

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The implementation of procedures necessary to 
assure Constitutional rights of the individuals may place, 
directly or indirectly, additional financial burdens upon 
the State, even though it is not a formal party to the 
proceedings. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 318 F .Supp 786 (WDND 1970).

The record in this action together with the 
authorities cited, clearly support plaintiffs' contention 
that there does not exist that "substantial indication of 
probable success" needed to justify such an "intrusion into 
the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review 
as would be effected by granting the State Defendants' 
Application for Stay in the case at bar. Virginia 
Petroleum Jobbers, supra, at 925.

B. Defendants Must Show That 
Without The Relief Sought,
They Would Suffer Irreparable 
Injury.

As the Court stated in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers, 
supra, "(t)he key word in this consideration is irreparable. 
259 F.2d at 925 (Emphasis in original). While defendants 
in the case at bar have claimed that they stand to be 
irreparably harmed by denial of their application, this 
claim was rejected by the District Court. (See reference 
to Court's Oral Ruling on Defendants' Motion for stay, supra

It is apparent from the Court's Ruling even if 
defendants should prevail on the merits of their appeal,

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they would not necessarily suffer in irreparable harm in that 
they have available to them a market which could absorb 
any vehicles acquired pursuant to the Court's Order.
App. ____. More importantly, they can get every cent
back from the Detroit board if it is determined the State 
is without obligation.

As indicated above, even as to the monetary cost 
to be incurred by defendants in complying with the Court's 
order:

...mere injuries, however substantial, 
in terms of money, time and energy neces­
sarily expended in the absence of a stay 
not enough. Virginia Petroluem Jobbers, 
supra, at 925. .......

C. The State Defendants Must Show 
That The Insurance Of A Stay 
Will Not Substantially Harm 
Other Parties Interested In 
The Proceedings

As the Court stated in Virginia Petroluem Jobbers, 
supra, "(r)elief saving the claimant from irreparable injury 
at the expense of similar harm caused another, might not 
qualify as the equitable judgment that a stay represents." 
259 F .2d at 925. Plaintiffs reiterate that their remedy, 
as mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court, has too long been 
delayed. Moreover, plaintiffs contend that, should defen­
dants be granted this stay, plaintiffs constitutional rights 
will be further delayed by arbitrary bus assembly and manu­
facture schedules of bus companies. Thus, the harm to 
plaintiffs' class which would be incurred by any delay in

- 24-



the purchase of transportation vehicles far exceeds any 
inconvenience to defendants occasioned by the need to act 
forthwith.

- 2 5 -



CONCLUSION

The State defendants, in their motion to this 
Court, have taken the position that their application is 
of particular importance because, in part, of the Detroit 
Board's request that the District Court order the expenditure 
of Fifty-Eight Million Dollars'1. We have taken the liberty, 
in part because of that reference, of bringing to this 
Court's attention the pace of the proceedings below and the 
suggestion by the District Court in its order that there 
might be no remedy in September, 1975, despite a Supreme
Court command last July, 1974.I

We have also sought to outline the Detroit Board's 
refusal and the District Court's hesitancy to desegregate 
schools in Detroit because they are 70% black, despite the 
Supreme Court's rejection of that logic.

We have also sought to point out that a real 
desegregation plan, which unlike the Board's plan, does not 
recreate a dual system in Detroit, will require more trans­
portation equipment than that already required to be ordered 
by the District Court.

*je respectfully submit that it is important that 
immediate steps be taken to insure: (1) that there will
be a constitutionally adequate desegregation plan put into 
effect in September; (2) that sufficient transportation 
capacity will be available in September; (3) that one

- 2 6 -



of uhe defendants place the order, regardless of who 
ultimately is required to pay; and (4) that the District 
Court and the parties be admonished to accelerate pro­
ceedings or modify the course thereof so that the pupil 
reassignment plan may be determined, leaving other educa­
tion components for decision at a later date.

Should this Court decline to lift the stay, 
previously granted, and require the defendants to proceed, 
the plaintiffs will be left without an effective remedy 
which can be timely implemented for the start of the school 
term. Such a state of affairs would, more than anything 
else, clearly tell the black students trapped in schools 
segregated by official policy and actions by state and 
local defendants, that there is no one prepared to assist 
them in securing those rights to which they are entitled 
under the Constitution of the United States. Black children 
have been told by the Detroit Board that there are too many 
of them and that warehouses will have to be set up for 
the excess black students; they have been told by the 
defendant Board that approximately 58% of all black children 
in Detroit are not to be considered for pupil reassignment 
by virtue of the Board's decision not to consider the large 
majority of central city schools for inclusion in its dese­
gregation plan; and they have been told by the State defen­
dants that the State has no responsibility to assist in 
eliminating the segregation it helped cause.

- 2 7 -



Under the circumstances of this case we urge 
Court to vacate the stay previously entered and 

deny the application for a stay pending appeal. We respect­
fully urge the Court to include in that order such further 
directions to the parties and the Court below as may be 
necessary to insure a constitutionally adequate plan for 
implementation in September, 1975.

Respectfully submitted,

LOUIS R. LUCAS
RATNER, SUGARMON, LUCAS & SALKY 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

NATHANIEL JONES 
1790 Broadway 
New York, New York 10019

JOHN A. DZIAMBA 
746 Main Street 
P.0. Box D
Willimantic, Connecticut 06226

THOMAS ATKINS 
451 Mass Avenue 
Boston, Massachusetts 02116

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees

- 2 8 -



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing
Plaintiffs' Response To Emergency Application For Stay
was mailed this f ' day of June, 1975, to all counsel
of record.

.x V A /
/ ' v /
- J , X -- ■ ^ '" /-< < . v

LOUIS R. LUCAS

- 2 9



IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants

-Vs-
RONALD BRADLEY, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

)
)
)
)
) Case No. Miscellaneous 75-8090
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF

LOUIS R. LUCAS
RATNER, SUGARMON, LUCAS & SALKY 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
NATHANIEL JONES
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
JOHN A. DZIAMBA 
746 Main Street 
P.O. Box D
Willimantic, Connecticut 06226
THOMAS ATKINS
451 Massachusetts Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees



TABLE OF CONTENTS
. Page

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .. .. .. . .. . V . . .. .. . . i 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . .,. . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . V. . V . . 2
STATEMENT O F . FACTS .. . . .. . .. . . . . . .  . . . .. ... V. . 2
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THE 

PARTICIPATION OF THE DEFENDANTS , MILLIKEN,
ET AL., IN EQUITABLE-RELIEF FROM CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . ‘.. .. . . . . .  . . 3

II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSITUTION DOES NOT PROVIDE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
TO A STATE IN AN ACTION WHEREIN COMPELLING 
CONSTITUIONAL RIGHTS-ARE-SOUGHT TO BE- - 
PROTECTED . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . V . . • 3

III .A DISTRICT COURT MAY, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS 
- EQUITY POWERS, ORDER THE EXPENDITURE OF STATE 
FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT A PLAN FOR THE- DESEGREGATION- 
OF SCHOOLS .. .. .. . . .. ... ... .. .. .. . . .  .. . • • • • • V 7

service ..;.....'.. v.........v..v. . V. V.'.. .11



POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

IV THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THE PARTICIPATION OF 
THE DEFENDANTS, MILLIKEN, ET AL . , IN EQUITABLE RELIEF 
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Cases: . -
Edelman v.~ Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
Ex Parte Youngs 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
Other Authorities:
United States-Constitution, Amendment Eleven

II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
DOES NOT PROVIDE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO A STATE IN AN ACTION

. WHEREIN COMPELLING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE SOUGHT TO BE 
PROTECTED.
Cases:
Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Ci'r. 1973)
Edelman v'. Jordan, supra'. .
Ex Parte Young, supra , •

Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward Countv, 377 U S '  
218 (1964)----------  -----------------------

Other Authorities:
Michigan Constitution, Article I, Section 2 
Wright, Law of Federal Courts, 186 (2d ed, 1970)

III, A DISTRICT COURT MAY, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS EQUITY 
POWERS, ORDER THE EXPENDITURE OF STATE FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT A PLAN FOR THE DESEGREGATION OF SCHOOLS'.
Cases:

*Bradley v'. Milliken, supra'. ■



Brad ley v R i c h m o n d , 325 F'.Supp'. 828 and 324 F.Supp. 456

Brewer v~ School Board of the City of Norfolk, 456 F'.2d 
943 (4th Cir. 1972  ̂ cert, denied, 409 U.S. 892 .*'

Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board . '396 U S'
226 (T95"9l ~-----------------------------‘

Davis v. Board of Education of North Little Rock, 449 
F .2d 500~('8th Cir. 1971) ----------

Evans v. Buchanan, 379 F.Supp. 1218 . ' '
Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, 482 F.2d 1044(Jth Cir> 1.973;
Griffin v . County School Board of Prince Edward County, 

supra" " : ‘ • ~  L

Plaquemines Parish School Board v. United States, 415 
F .2d 8T7"“(3'th Cir". 1969)---------------------

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 318 
F .Supp. /8b 1W.D.N.D. 1970)

U.S. v , Board of Education of Baldwin Countv, 423 F.2d 
1013 (5th Cir. I 9 7 0 r  ^

UVs ',..vV Board of School Comm', of Indianapolis, 474 F.2d 
81 (7th Cir. 1973')“

United States v'. School District 151, 301 F.Supp. 201
(N.D. llT: 1969) aff'd 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), 
cert, denied, 402 U.S. 943.



I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by William G. Milliken, et al . , State

Defendants in the within action, from an order by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division,

I wherein State Defendants^were required to acquire, at State 
!, expense, 150 school buses to be used by the Detroit Public 
r Schools in the implementation of a plan for the desegregation 
■ of the Detroit schools.

' , STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Pursuant to an order by the United States Supreme Court 

in its decision of July 25, 1974, the Detroit Board of Education 
submitted to the District Court a plan for the desegregation 
of the Detroit Public Schools. Subsequently, plaintiffs also

• submitted a separate plan to the Court for the desegregation
. of the Detroit Schools. •
*

On May 1, 1975, plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, 
filed a motion with the District Court requesting that defen­

, dants be required to immediately purchase, lease, or charter 
: 300 school buses to be used in implementing such plan as would

be ordered by the Court. Thereafter, and on May 21, 1975, the 
Honorable Robert E. DeMascio issued an order wherein the State 
Defendants were required to make available 150 buses to the 
Detroit Board of Education. The State Defendants hereiii appeal 
the order of the District Court which requires the State to

t

I



bear the cost of the acquisition of the vehicles. Defendants 
base their appeal on the ground that such an order is contrary 
to the Eleventh Amendment. Specifically, the State Defendants 
argue that the financing and implementation of a desegregation 
remedy, involving the expenditure of State revenues, is beyond 
the power of the parties to this action. These defendants assert 
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits the expenditure of public 
funds from the State Treasury, in order to comply with orders 
of a Federal Court. It is further argued that any order issued 
by the Court requiring the' commitment of State funds must be 
directed at the State of Michigan which is not a party to the 
action and which is protected by the Eleventh Amendment from 
such an order. For the reasons set out below, plaintiffs assert 
that this appeal by the State Defendants is without merit and 
should be denied. '

- 2-



I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT BAR THE PARTICIPATION 
OF THE DEFENDANTS MILLIKEN, ET AL. IN EQUITABLE RELIEF 
FROM CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS, . :

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: • ' .

The judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit 

• in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens 

- of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State. .

The Eleventh Amendment limitation on suits against states is 
different than the limitations arising under the common law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. While sovereign immunity protect 
states from suit in any forum absent consent, the Eleventh 
Amendment merely places jurisdiction limitations on federal 
courts.

The jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment is not 
absolute, however. Thus, it has been established that suits 
for injunctive relief against state officials may be heard in 
federal courts, consistent with the Constitution, where the 
complaint is that the official, acting in his capacity as agent 
of the state, has engaged in unauthorized or unconstitutional 
conduct. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the Supreme Court held that while 
suits for prospective injunctive relief against a state official



are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, at least certain actions 
which seek the award of an accrued monetary liability are 
prohibited. On the facts before the Court in Edelman, the 
Court held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear 
certain causes of action which closely resemble actions for 
monetary damages. "[A] suit that seeks the award of an accrued 
monetary liability which must be met from the general revenues 
of the State... is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal court." 
Edelman v. Jordan, supra. .

The issue in the within action is not, however, the same 
as was before the Court in Edelman, i.e., whether the district 
court had jurisdiction under Article III of the Consitution, to 
decide the case. As noted above, Ex Parte Young established 
and Edelman confirmed the jurisdiction of the federal courts to 
hear actions for injunctive relief against state officials.
Rather, the question presented here concerns whether a federal 
court, having jurisdiction to decide a case, may order defendants 
to take action which will cost them money. From the authorities 
cited, the answer would appear to be that a federal court has such 
authority.

In choosing to defend an action properly brought in a 
federal forum, defendants must assume responsibility for the 
normal incidents of such a suit, including the cost of 
prospective relief, Court costs, witness fees, and attorney 
fees'.

/.



II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION DOES 
NOT PROVIDE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY TO A STATE IN AN ACTION WHEREIN 
COMPELLING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ARE SOUGHT TO BE PROTECTED.

Where the protection of compelling Constitutional rights 
is at issue, the Eleventh Amendment does not afford a State 
immunity from its duty to support the Constitution and the right 
guaranteed to citizens erf a State pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

These same state defendants are charged not only under the 
Constitution o'f the United States of America, but also under 
the Constitution of the State of Michigan with the duty of 
providing pupils an education without discrimination with 
respect to race. (Art. VIII, §2, Mich, Constitution of 1963 
Art . I , §2, of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be denied the equal protection 
of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the 
enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be 
discriminated against in the exercis.e thereof 
because of religion, race, color or national origin.)

In an order dated July 11, 1972, issued by the late 
Judge Stephen Roth of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan, Eastern Division, these 
same state defendants were required to bear the costs of 
acquiring vehicles necessary for the desegregation of the 
Detroit Schools under a metropolitan plan. This Court vacated 
that order relative to the aspects of the metropolitan remedy 
but stated: *



In the exercise of its equity powers , a District 
Court may order that public funds be expended, 
particularly when such an expenditure is neces­
sary to meet, the minimum requirements mandated 
by the Constitution. Bradley v'. Milliken, 484 F .2d 215, at 258 (6th Cir. 197jj ’

Likewise, in an order dated March 12, 1975, the Court
below stated at page 3:

"...the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits 
seeking prospective injunctive relief, nor is 
such injunctive relief objectionable because 

. . it requires an incidental expenditure of funds
from the State, Ex Parte-Young, supra,;

■ Edelmen v, Jordan~4T5 U .S . 651 (1974) . 11
. An Eleventh Amendment argument was dismissed by the Court

• in Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S.
.218 (1964), where it was stated:
. It is contended that the case is an action

• against the State, is forbidden by the Eleventh. 
Amendment, and, therefore, should be dismissed

. The complaint, however, charged that State and 
' County officials are depriving Petitioners of

rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It has been settled law since Ex Parte Young 
[citation omitted], that suits against state... 
officials to enjoin them from invading Con­

. stitutional rights are not forbidden by the
. Eleventh Amendment.. 377 U.S. at 228 .

As indicated, the law is clear that the Eleventh Amendment 
has no bearing on the issues involved herein. Indeed, where a 
state has failed to desegregate its schools , affirmative action 
is required of the state.. .and there would not even be the 
possibility of raising the Eleventh Amendment issue defensively,'.'. 

'Wright Law of Federal Courts , 186 (2d Ed. 1970). Thus, .the 
State defendants argument that the order of the District Court

- 6 - i



is barred by the Eleventh Amendment , must fail.

III'. A DISTRICT COURT MAY, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS EQUITY 
POWERS, ORDER THE EXPENDITURE OF STATE FUNDS TO IMPLE­
MENT A PLAN FOR THE DESEGREGATION OF SCHOOLS'.

Once it is determined that the State has committed de jure 
acts of segregation, it may be required by the Court to correct 
their violation. Evans v~. Buchanan 379 F.Supp. 1218;
Bradley v't Mil liken 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973).

It is well established that where a pattern of violations 
of constitutional rights is established, the affirmative obli­
gation under the Fourteenth Amendment is imposed not only on 
the individual school district, but (also) on the state 
defendants'. Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward 

• County, supra".

• The record in this action is substantial with regard to 
involvement of these state defendants in de_ jure acts of 
segregation relative to the Detroit Public Schools'.

The District Court has previously found that "the State 
refused, until this session of the legislature, to provide 
authorization or funds for the transportation of pupils within 
Detroit regardless of their poverty or distance from the school 
to which they were assigned, while providing in many neighbor- 
m g , mostly white, suburban school districts the full range 
of State supported transportation." See, Bradley v'. Milliken,



484 F.2d 215, 238 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc). The Court further
found that "During the critical years covered by this record 
the School District of Detroit was denied any allocation 
of State funds for pupil transportation, although such funds 
were made generally available for students who lived over a 
mile and a half from their assigned schools in rural Michigan." 
Bradl e y , supra , at 240’,

This historical denial, together with the record of state 
involvement in segregation is a clear predicate for requiring 
that the State defendants assume the costs of acquisition.

The implementation of procedures necessary to assure 
Constitutional rights of the individuals may place, directly 
or indirectly, additional financial burdens upon the State, 
even though it is not a formal party to the proceedings".
Swann v~. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 318 F.Supp 
786 (WDND 1970)

A federal court clearly has the power to order school 
authorities to use funds already in their budgets to 
accomplish desegregation, regardless of the fact that they 
may previously have denoted those funds to some other purpose'. 
Goss v'. Board of Education of Knoxville , 482 F.2d 1044,
1046 (6th Cir . 1973); Brewer v~. School Board of the City 
of Norfolk, 456 F'.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir . 1972) Cert. denied,
409 IT.S'. 892; Davis v. Board of Education of North Little
Rock, 449 F'.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971) .



A Eederal Court may also, in appropriate circumstances, 
require additional funds to be made available to finance 
desegregation'. Griffin v~t. School Board of Prince Edward 
County, supra'.; Plaquemines Parish School Board v't United 
States, 415 F.2d 817, 826-34 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. 
School District 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 232 (N. D. 111. 1969), 
aff’d 432 F .2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), Cert, denied, 402 U.S.
943; United States v. Board of School Comm, of Indianapolis ,
474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir'. 1973).

Thus, contrary to the contention of the state defendants , 
the Eleventh Amendment clearly permits an order fot the 
expenditure of state funds by state officials when necessary to 
comply with a valid injunctive order'.

Plaintiffs contend that the United States Supreme Court 
. has decreed that their remedy has been too long delayed and 
, that further delays would frustrate the Supreme Court's mandate 
to desegregate the Detroit School System "now". Consequently, 
pla intiffs argue that immediate steps must be taken to insure 
the availability of transportation in anticipation of a 
Court-approved plan for the desegregation of the Detroit 
Schools'. The law is settled that pending implementation 
and pending further litigation, defendants must take all 
steps necessary to implement integration. U.S'. v. Board 
of Education of Baldwin County, 423 F,2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1970); 
Carter v". West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 226

- 9-



(1969), 396 U.S. 290 (1970); and in pertinent parts, Bradley 
v* Richmond, 325 F.Supp. 828 and 324 F.Supp. 456 (E.D. V a . 1970), 
The harm to plaintiffs' class which would be incurred by any 
delay in the purchase of transportation vehicles far exceeds 
any inconvenience to defendants occasioned by the need to act 

forthwith. ■ '

Therefore, for all of the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs 
respectfully urge that this appeal by the State Defendants be 
denied and the Order of the District Court be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

J-. HAROLD FLANNERY 
PAUL R . DIMOND 
WILLIAM E. CALDWELL
Lawyers' Committee for 

Civil Rights Under 
, the Law
733 15th Street 
Suite 520
Washington, D.C, 20005

LOUIS R. LUCAS ...
RATNER, SUGARMON, L U C A S a n d  SALKY 
525 Commerce Title Building 
Memphis, Tennessee 38103
JOHN A. DZIAMBA
746 Main Street
Post Office Box D
Williamantic, Connecticut 06226

. THOMAS I'. ATKINS 
.451 Massachusetts Avenue 
Boston, Massachusetts 02118
NATHANIEL R. JONES 
General Counsel 
N.A.A.C.P.
1790 Broadway
New York, New York 10019
ELLIOT S'. HALL 
2755 Guardian Building 
500 Griswold Avenue •
Detroit, Michigan -



SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing

Plaintiffs' Reply Brief was mailed this _____  day of
May, 1975, to all counsel of record.

LOUIS R. LUCAS