Cromwell v. Maryland Brief of Appellants

    In t h e

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 
S eptem ber  T eem  1963 

No. 145

D w ig h t  Cro m w ell , Minor, by 
N adine  R ideout, Mother,

—and—

R eva D in e z  W h it e , Minor, by 
M aggie W h it e , Mother,

—vs.—
S tate of M aryland ,

Appellants,

Appellee.

A P PE A L  E E O M  C IR C U IT  COURT OF D O RCH ESTER C O U N T Y
(E. M cM aster D u er , Judge)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

J u an ita  J ackson  M itch ell  
1239 Druid Hill Avenue 
Baltimore 17, Maryland

T u cker  R . D earing
627 Aisquith Street 
Baltimore, Maryland

J ack  Greenberg 
D errick  A. B e ll , Jr.

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, N. Y.

Attorneys for Appellants



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of Case___ ___ _________ ____ _____________  1

Questions Presented ............ .... .................. ...... ..... ..... . 2

Stipulated Statement of Facts ..................................... 3

A rgu m en t

PAGE

I. Freedom From, and Freedom to Protest 
Against, State Imposed Restrictions Based 
Upon Race and Color, and Freedom to En­
gage in Group Activity for the Advancement 
and Dissemination of Ideas and Beliefs in Exer­
cise of These Rights Are Indispensable Aspects 
of the Individual Liberty Assured Under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment .......................... . 9

II. The Adjudication of Delinquency by the Ju­
venile Court Was a Denial of Due Process and 
Equal Protection of the Laws in That It Was 
Based Upon No Evidence and the Charge Was 
Too Vague to Be Defended Against ..............  14

III. The Adjudication of Delinquency by the Ju­
venile Court Constituted a Denial of Due Proc­
ess and Equal Protection of the Laws in That 
the Decree Constituted a Punishment and 
Therefore Abused the Authority and Jurisdic­
tion of the Juvenile Court ............ .................. . 18



IV. The Juvenile Court Process Violated Appel­
lants’ Constitutional Eights Under the Four­
teenth Amendment by Its Finding of Guilt of 
a Criminal Charge for Which They Could Be 
Imprisoned for a Cruel and Inhuman Period 
Without Providing Them With the Basic Pro­
cedural Safeguards to Which Adults Charged 
With Similar Crimes Would Be Entitled .........  21

C o n c l u s io n  ..................................................................................................... 24

A p p e n d ix  .........    25

T a b l e  o p  C a s e s :

Akers v. State, App. 51 N. E. 2d 91 .......................... 15

Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31 ...................................  9
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516.................................  10
Beauchamp v. United States, 154 F. 2d 413..................  17
Bergen v. United States, 145 F. 2d 181.......................... 17
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 .................................  9
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 ..................  9
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 .........................  11
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S.

715 ..................................................................................  9

Canter v. State (Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 2d 901 .... 17
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 .................10,11,13
Carmean v. People, 110 Colo. 399, 134 P. 2d 1056 .... 15
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196 ..................................... 17
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 .............................  13

11

PAGE



m

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 IT. S. 353 .................................  10

Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noer Motor
Freezer, Inc., 365 IT. S. 127 ........... .......... ..............  10

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 IT. S. 229 ............—10,11,12

Garner v. Louisiana, 368 IT. S. 157 _____ ___________13,16
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 ............................ ........  9
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigations Commit­

tee, 372 IT. S. 539 ........... -............................................... 10
Gomilion v. Lightfoot, 364 IT. S. 339 ...........................  9
Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, 373 IT. S. 683,

31 L. W. 4559 ...............................................................  9

Hambell v. Levine, 243 App. Div. 530, 275 N. Y. S.
702 ................................................... ............................... 15

Hague v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 170, 220 S. W. 96 ....... 17
Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 ..............  9
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 4 2 ....................................... 10
Hollis v. Brownell, 129 Kan. 818, 284 Pac. 388 ........... 15
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 IT. S. 460 ..................  11

In Re James, 185 Va. 335, 38 S. E. 2d 444 .............. 20, 21
In Re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N. Y. S. 765 ....... 15

Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U. S. 61 .............................  9

Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252 .... 23
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 .....................................  9
Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 .................................  10

Leonard v. United States, 231 F. 2d 588 ...................... 17
Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293 .............................  10

PAGE



IV

Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 .............................  10
McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U. S. 637 ..............  9
Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadow Moor Dairies, 321 U. S.

287 .............. ...... ....................................... .....................  11
Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 .......................... 19
Moqnin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 140 A. 2d 914 ............ .. 19

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 .............................  10
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415................................ 10,11
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 .................................  10
N.L.R.B. v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F. 2d 

144 ............ .....................................................................  17

People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State Reformatory,
148 111. 413, 36 N. E. 76 ................................................. 23

People ex rel. O’Connel v. Turner, 55 111. 280 ........    23
Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 ..............  9
Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U. S. 192 ..................  11
Purvis v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. 441, 112 S. W. 2d 186 .. 15

Re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N. E. 2d 647 ............... 17
Re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A. 2d 523 .......................... 17
Re Roth, 158 Neb. 789, 64 N. W. 2d 799 ...................... 17
Re Saunders, 53 Kan. 191, 36 Pac. 348 .......................... 23
Re Smith, (Okla. Crim.), 326 F. 2d 835 .......................... 23

Salinas v. United States, 277 F. 2d 588 ...................... 17
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 ....... 23
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 .................................  9
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 ........................... ..... 10,13
Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 .................................  11
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 .................................  10
State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Ct., 139 Wash. 1, 245 

Pac. 409 ..........................................................................  19

PAGE



V

State ex rel. Cummingham v. Eay, 63 N. H. 406 ......... 23
State v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262 Pae. 168..............  15
Staub v. Baxley, 355 U. S. 313 ........... .......... ............... 13
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 IJ. S. 192 .. 9
Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ................................. 9
Stromberg v. Carlson, 283 U. S. 359 .........................  10
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 639 ..................................... 9

Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154.................................  16
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U. S. 284 ...................... 11
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 .................................  10
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 ........... 15
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 ............. .....10,11,12,13

United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144 ............................................................................ .....  10

United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 
U. S. 29 ........... ............................................................. 11

Watchtower and Bible Tract Society v. Dougherty,
337 Pa. 286, 11 A. 2d 147 ........ ..... .......................... '... 11

Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 ..................  9
Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 .............................  11
Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284 ..................................... 11

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 536 ........................... . 13

S t a t u t e s :

U. S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment .......2, 9,16, 21
Ann. Code of Maryland (1957)

Art. 26, $52 .. .........................................................14,17
Art. 26, $54 .............................................................  19

Art. 26, $61 .............................................................. 19

Art. 26, $66 ..............................................    19

PAGE



Y1

M iscellaneous :
PAGE

31 Am. Jur., Juvenile Courts, §53 (1958) ...................... 21
23 Harv. L. Rev. 109 ......................................................  21

2 Wigmore on Evidence, §665 (3rd ed. 1940) ..............  23



I n  t h e

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 
S eptem ber  T erm  1963 

No. 145

D w ig h t  Cro m w ell , Minor, by  
N adine R ideout, Mother,

—and—

11 e v a  D in e z  W h it e , Minor, by  
M aggie W h it e , Mother,

— vs.—
Appellants,

S tate oe M aryland ,
Appellee.

A P PE A L  FR O M  C IR C U IT  COURT o e  D ORCH ESTER C O U N T Y
(E. M cM aster D uer , Judge)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Statement of Case

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of 
Dorchester County, acting as a Juvenile Court, committing 
Reva Dinez White, minor, and Dwight Cromwell, minor, 
respectively to the Montrose School for Girls and the Mary­
land District School for Boys after finding them to be de­
linquent. The Court found that the minors were disorderly 
because of their participation in civil rights demonstra­
tions, and as such denied Reva Dinez White and Dwight



2

Cromwell liberty without due process and the equal pro­
tection of the laws as required by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Constitution of the United States.

Questions Presented

I.

Participation in peaceful civil rights demonstrations is 
constitutionally protected activity and cannot be made vio­
lative of any law or ordinance without denying the appel­
lants their liberty without due process and the equal 
protection of the law as required by the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the United States Constitution.

II.

The adjudication of delinquency by the Juvenile Court 
was a denial of due process and equal protection of the 
laws in that it was based upon no evidence and the charge 
was too vague to be defended against.

III.

The adjudication of delinquency by the Juvenile Court 
constituted a denial of due process and the equal protec­
tion of the laws in that the decree of the Court constituted 
a punishment and therefore abused the authority and 
jurisdiction of the Court.

IV.

The Juvenile Court process violated appellants’ consti­
tutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by its 
finding of guilt of a criminal charge for which they could 
be imprisoned for a cruel and inhuman period without



3

providing them with basic procedural safeguards to which 
adults charged with similar crimes would be entitled.

Stipulated Statement of Facts

Reva Dinez White and Dwight Cromwell are both minor 
Negro citizens of the United States. They are residents of 
the State of Maryland residing in Cambridge, Maryland in 
Dorchester County. They are both fifteen years of age.

Maggie White is the mother of Reva Dinez White and 
has had the care and custody of Reva all her life.

Nadine Rideout is the mother of Dwight Cromwell but 
Dwight Cromwell has for two or three years resided with 
his grandmother, Brownie Cromwell, who resides next door 
to the mother.

On April 6, May 11, May 13, May 14, May 27 and May 31, 
1963, Reva Dinez White was arrested by the Cambridge 
City Police Department and charged with disorderly con­
duct. On May 15, 1963 following the first four arrests, a 
Juvenile Petition alleging delinquency was filed in the 
Circuit Court for Dorchester County, Maryland by the 
State’s Attorney for Dorchester County and designated as 
number 824 in said Court.

On April 6, May 11, May 13 and May 27, 1963, Dwight 
Cromwell was arrested by the Cambridge City Police De­
partment and charged with disorderly conduct. On May 15, 
1963 following the first three arrests, a Juvenile Petition 
was filed by the State’s Attorney for Dorchester County, 
Maryland and the case designated as number 825 therein.

A hearing in these cases before Judge E. McMaster Duer 
was set and begun on June 6, 1963. The Defendants were 
represented by Tucker R. Dearing, Esq. By agreement be­
tween the Court and Counsel no reporter was present, none 
having been requested by the juveniles or their Counsel.



4

The hearing recessed on June 6 and resumed on June 10 
with all parties present. On June 10, 1963 the Court found 
Eeva Dinez White and Dwight Cromwell delinquent and 
committed Eeva Dinez White to the care and custody of 
Montrose School for Girls and Dwight Cromwell to the 
Maryland Training School for Boys. On June 13, 1963 
an Order for their appeal to the Court of Appeals for Mary­
land was filed.

The first witness was Officer Eandolph Jews, a Negro 
member of the Cambridge Police Department for more than 
thirty years. Over objection by Defense Counsel, he tes­
tified that he had known Eeva Dinez White since 1960. 
He testified that she failed to attend school regularly and 
that during the year 1961 he had frequently observed her 
in automobiles with young men and boys as late as 3 A.M.; 
he testified that he had on occasion taken her home. He 
further testified that he had taken her to Police Head­
quarters in 1961 where she had explained her failure to 
go to school by stating she did not have proper clothing. 
On one occasion the police bought her a pair of shoes. 
Officer Jews testified as to profanity used by Eeva Dinez 
White. Officer Jews further stated that he had had no ex­
perience with and knew little about Dwight Cromwell.

Superintendent of Schools, James Busick, testified that 
during the afternoon of May 27, 1963, Dwight Cromwell 
and Dinez White were among the leaders of a group of 
juveniles picketing the Board of Education office in Cam­
bridge, Maryland; that they were singing and disturbing 
employees of the office. He further testified that they ap­
parently were protesting racial segregation of public 
schools of Dorchester County. He stated that any of those 
in the line of march could have entered the Board of 
Education building and been transferred to any school in 
Dorchester County they wished. He testified that Dinez



5

White and Dwight Cromwell refused an order of the Chief 
of Police to stop singing and that they were subsequently 
arrested by members of the Cambridge Police Department. 
Over objection by Defense Counsel, Mr. Busick read from 
the records of the Board of Education reports of the Prin­
cipal and various teachers of Dinez White and Dwight 
Cromwell. These reports, he testified, were prepared by 
the teachers at his request. They were offered and, over 
objection, were admitted. Photostat copies of said reports 
are attached to this statement of facts. (See Appendix.) 
It is conceded that none of the teachers making the reports 
were present at the hearing.

Otto Cheesman, the Juvenile Probation Officer for Dor­
chester County testified, over objection by Defense Counsel, 
that Maggie White, mother of Dinez White, had been con­
victed in Dorchester County, Maryland of assault and bat­
tery and sentenced to six months in the Maryland Re­
formatory for Women and the sentence suspended. Mr. 
Cheesman testified that earlier in 1963 Brownie Cromwell, 
the grandmother and custodian of Dwight Cromwell had 
telephoned him and requested his assistance in helping to 
straighten out Dwight who had gotten into bad company 
and for whose future she was apprehensive. Mr. Cheesman 
testified that Mrs. Cromwell had also telephoned Judge 
Henry. These calls were later verified by Brownie Crom­
well when she took the witness stand.

Sheriff Calvert Creighton testified that Dinez White 
and Dwight Cromwell had been in his jail on many occasions 
and that Dinez White had used profanity while there.

Trial Magistrate Allan M. Baird testified that he had 
been present at the time of three arrests of Dinez White 
and Dwight Cromwell; that Dinez White used profanity 
and that her mother did not come to get her from the jail 
until 3 A.M. on April 7; that he in Court dismissed Dinez



6

White and Dwight Cromwell and advised them and their 
parents, Maggie White and Brownie Cromwell, that these 
children should stay out of racial demonstrations.

Deputy Sheriffs Ira Johnson, Charles Frey and George 
Kline testified that Dinez White was disorderly and used 
profanity while in the jail, and Deputy Kline testified that 
Dinez White used profanity to him and his wife on the pub­
lic streets of Cambridge when he passed her.

Assistant Chief of Police James Leonard and Officer 
Wallace Brooks testified that on April 6, 1963 Dinez White 
and Dwight Cromwell were in the forefront of a group of 
demonstrators who walked down the streets of Cambridge 
four abreast; refused to obey the police officers’ order to 
disperse and who assaulted the police officers by pushing 
them off the sidewalk. This resulted in the arrest of the 
two children on that date. They were released to the 
custody of their parents without charge.

Officer William Thomas testified that on May 11, 1963 
Dinez White and Dwight Cromwell entered the Recreation 
Center, a pool room and bowling alley, in Cambridge and 
refused to leave when requested to do so by the proprietor 
and by the police. They were arrested and charged with 
disorderly conduct but were again released from jail and 
sent home.

Officer Philip McKelvey testified that on May 13, 1963 
Dinez White and Dwight Cromwell were inside the Dizzy- 
land Restaurant in Cambridge, Maryland; that they refused 
to leave and the manager physically put them, and several 
others, out on the sidewalk. When the two children per­
sisted in sitting on the sidewalk in front of the restaurant 
they were arrested. The manager of the restaurant testi­
fied that he did not tell the police to arrest them, that so far 
as he was concerned they could sit on the sidewalk until 
doomsday, but that he would not serve them and did not



7

want them in his place of business. The two juveniles were 
taken to the jail on the 13th where they remained until 
8 :30 P.M. May 14. The Sheriff testified that all parents of 
the juveniles were notified to come and get their children 
but refused to do so. On instructions of the State’s At­
torney, the Sheriff put the children out of the jail and in­
structed them to go home. Instead of going home they 
went to the Dorset Theater on Race Street in Cambridge, 
together with several other juveniles who had also been in 
jail with them. They entered the inner lobby of the theater 
where a show was in progress and laid on the floor, refus­
ing to get up or leave when ordered to do so by the man­
ager and by Police Officers Bramble and Petrowski al­
though a show was in progress and the officers testified the 
group on the floor constituted a fire hazard. The children 
admitted they did not attempt to purchase tickets at the 
ticket office on the outside of the theater but they did state 
that there was no one in the ticket window at the time. 
After the children were released from jail following an 
arrest on May 27 they were arrested again on May 31, 1963 
by Officer Wallace Brooks of the Cambridge Police Depart­
ment who testified that they entered the aforesaid Recre­
ation Center, laid down and refused to leave.

Over objection by Defense Counsel, a letter from the 
State Health Department was introduced relating to 
Dwight Cromwell; the original letter is hereto attached.

Dinez White and Dwight Cromwell testified that on each 
occasion when they were arrested they were protesting 
racial segregation in the restaurant and theater. They 
each testified that between May 14 and May 27 Judge W. 
Laird Henry had released them, together with a group of 
adults, from Dorchester County Jail and the children tes­
tified that they understood Judge Henry had dismissed all 
charges up to and including May 14. Judge Henry was



8

not available for the hearing. The juveniles testified that 
they were singing songs but that they were not disorderly 
on any occasion and, in general, they denied the testimony 
of the police officers. They both admitted that on May 27 
they left school without permission after lunch and went 
to picket the School Board office. They were suspended for 
three days for leaving school without permission. Dinez 
White testified that on the occasion of the Dorset Theater 
arrest, they were on their knees saying the Lord’s Prayer 
and that race segregation was a cancer in the breast of 
America. She testified that on most of the occasions the 
arrests were made by the Cambridge City Police Depart­
ment and not on formal charges instituted by the owners of 
the property, except in the case of the Superintendent of 
Schools and manager of Dorset Theater.

Muriel Ennals, a juvenile, testified that she was with 
Dwight Cromwell and Dinez White on several of the occa­
sions and that they were not disorderly.

Reverend Charles N. Bourne testified on behalf of the 
children; that Dwight Cromwell went to his church and at­
tended his Sunday School, but that Dinez White did not.

Reginald Robinson, Gloria Richardson, Dwight Camp­
bell, Barbara Burris and Gloria Anderson testified that in 
their opinion the children were not disorderly on any oc­
casion when they saw them.

Nadine Rideout and Maggie White testified that the two 
children were good children.

T h e  a f o r e g o in g  represents a true statement of facts and 
is approved. Exhibits “A ” and “B” are attached hereto 
and made a part hereof. (See Appendix.)



9

A R G U M E N T

I.
Freedom From, and Freedom to Protest Against, State 

Imposed Restrictions Based Upon Race and Color, and 
Freedom to Engage in Group Activity for the Advance­
ment and Dissemination of Ideas and Beliefs in Exercise 
of These Rights Are Indispensable Aspects of the Indi­
vidual Liberty Assured Under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Racial discrimination enforced, sustained or supported 
by any manifestation of state authority is clearly pro­
scribed by the Fourteenth Amendment barring distinctions 
and classifications based upon race or color. The constitu­
tional validity of this issue is foreclosed as a litigable 
question.1

1 See Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, 373 TJ. S. 683, 
decided June 3, 1963, (transfers between public schools); Watson 
v. City of Memphis, 373 U. S. 526, decided May 27, 1963, (public 
parks and playgrounds); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 IJ. S. 
244, decided May 20, 1963 (trespass convictions where local segre­
gation ordinances preempt private choice) ; Johnson v. Virginia, 
373 U. S. 61, (seating in courtrooms); Burton v. Wilmington Park­
ing Authority, 365 XT. S. 715, (restaurants in public buildings) ; 
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 (bus terminal serving passen­
gers in interstate commerce) ; Henderson v. United States, 339 IJ. S. 
816, (dining ears on interstate railroad) ; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 
U. S. 31 (facilities in interstate commerce); Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U. S. 903 (facilities in intrastate commerce) ; Strauder v. Vir­
ginia, 100 IJ. S. 303 (discrimination in jury selection) ; Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, (state enforcement of restrictive covenants); 
Steele v. Louisville <& Nashville B E ., 323 U. S. 192, (discrimina­
tion practiced by statutory collective bargaining agent designation 
pursuant to federal statute) ; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U. S. 483, (public schools) ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 639, 
(professional schools) ; McLaurin v. Board of Regents, 339 U. S. 
637, (graduate schools) ; Gomilion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 
(geographical redistricting).



10

Equally settled is the primacy in our society accorded 
the unfettered exercise of the right of freedom of speech 
and association. See United States v. Carotene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, note 4; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 
77, 95. Included in this constitutionally privileged area 
is the advancement of beliefs and ideas through group 
activity, in recognition of the enhancement of effective 
advocacy by group association.2

Free Trade in ideas means freedom of opportunity to 
persuade to action, not merely to describe facts, Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 537. Thus protected as a part of 
these guaranteed freedoms are lawful activities designed 
to further one’s views.3

Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression 
are suspect.4 And where the line drawn between per­
mitted and prohibited conduct is ambiguous, it will not be 
presumed that the statute curtails constitutionally pro­
tected activities as little as possible. In sum, standards of

2 See NAACP  v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; Bates v. Little Bock, 
361 U. S. 516; Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; NAACP  v. 
Button, 371 U. S. 415; Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation 
Committee, 372 U. S. 539.

3 NAACP  v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; the dissemination of hand­
bills, Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; solicitation of political 
allies; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 42; proselytism, Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; silent display of convictions, Strom- 
berg v. Carlson, 283 U. S. 359; peaceful picketing, Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; protection against prior censorship, Near 
v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697; petition state legislature to redress 
grievances against enforced racial discrimination, Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229; solicitation of governmental action, 
Cf. Eastern B.B. Presidents Conference v. Noer Motor Freezer, 
Inc., 365 U. S. 127, 138.

4 See Near v. Minnesota, supra; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 
479; Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U. S. 293; Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U. S. 513, Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290; DeJonge v. Oregon, 
299 U. S. 353.



11

permissible vagueness are strict where freedom of speech 
and association rights are involved.5 What was being es­
poused here was clearly lawful. Edwards v. South Carolina, 
supra, and cannot be suppressed under the guise of main­
taining public peace. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245, IJ. S. 
60; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 810 U. S. 296.

The picketing which took place was peaceful, attempts 
to secure service from downtown stores was orderly, the 
protestants did not interfere with lawful use of streets by 
others. Picketing, of course, is more than speech, and thus 
may under certain circumstances be subject to restraints 
not usually applicable to the exercise of rights of freedom 
of expression. But here the picketing and demonstrations 
were not connected with violence, see Milk Wagon Drivers 
v. Meadow Moor Dairies, 321 U. S. 287; Plumbers Union v. 
Graham, 345 U. S. 192; nor was it undertaken to achieve 
goals contrary to a valid state policy, Hughes v. Superior 
Court, 339 U. S. 460; Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U. 8. 
284. What is involved here was a lawful attempt to vindi­
cate a valid social goal, Watchtower and Bible Tract Society 
v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A. 2d 147, and the basic self- 
interest of the pickets in the controversy is clearly evident.

In viewing the facts in this case, it must be remembered 
what is at stake. A group of citizens joined together to show 
the public, and the officials of Cambridge, Maryland, their 
concerted dissatisfaction with and opposition to racial 
discrimination. They did not control any of the great 
modern media of communications such as newspapers, radio 
or television stations, or public office. But they could carry

5 See United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 
29; Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284; NAACP  v. Button, 371 U. S. 
415; Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147; Winters v. New York, 
333 U. S. 507, 509-510, 517-518; Thornhill v. Alabama, supra.



12

placards, sing, pray, request the use of facilities, and walk 
upon the streets of Cambridge evidencing their objections 
to the status quo. Among these citizens were minor children 
who because of their race were unemancipated in more ways 
than other minors. Appellants were among this group of 
minors seeking equality, and an end to racial segregation.

In the present case we must apply these principles to 
the following five demonstrations in which the appellants 
participated:

(1) They picketed the Board of Education to protest 
segregated schooling;

(2) They walked down the streets of Cambridge, with 
others, protesting segregation;

(3) They entered a Recreation Center, and refused to 
leave when asked by the proprietor;

(4) They “ sat-in” in a segregated restaurant, and when 
physically ejected they remained in front protesting 
the refusal of service;

(5) They “ sat-in” in a segregated movie theater, and 
refused to leave until they were arrested.

The picketing of the Board of Education was peaceful 
and orderly. The pickets were arrested when they started 
to sing, which singing allegedly disturbed the Board of 
Education personnel. The demonstrators were exercising 
their constitutional right to free speech and the advocacy 
of ideas. See Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Edwards v. 
South Carolina, supra. Their singing was merely a method 
of drawing attention to their presence. It was not con­
tinuous or prolonged, and can hardly be deemed enough of 
a disturbance to allow the police to suppress the demon­
strators’ right to advocate ideas. In Edwards v. South



13

Carolina, supra, the demonstrators sang and their activity 
was held to be a constitutionally protected exercise of their 
rights of speech, assembly, and to petition the government 
for the redress of grievances.

The walk down the streets of Cambridge was an exercise 
of the right of free speech and assembly. Since it did not 
interfere with the free movement of the city it was per­
fectly legal activity. Like picketing, it was an exercise of 
free speech and advocacy of ideas. The power to control or 
regulate the orderly use of the streets by local police au­
thorities cannot be misused to deprive persons of funda­
mental liberty. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 IT. S. 536; 
cf. Cox v. Neiv Hampshire, 312 IT. S. 569, and see Staub v. 
Baxley, 355 IT. S. 313. Any ordinance which is so broadly 
construed and applied as to condemn lawful as well as un­
lawful activity, cannot be sustained. See Thornhill v. Ala­
bama, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra; Shelton v. 
Tucker, supra.

Three of the demonstrations consisted of “ sit-ins” in 
privately operated places of public accommodation. These 
protests are to be distinguished from the activity which 
this Court has deemed an unlawful trespass which decision, 
along with similar decisions from two other jurisdictions, is 
to be reargued before the United States Supreme Court. 
Here, appellants are not charged with trespass but with 
distui'bing the peace. Protests of racial discrimination do 
not constitute disturbances of the peace. Garner v. Louisi­
ana, 368 U. S. 157.

For these reasons we believe the demonstrations were 
exercises of protected activity, and the participation of 
these appellants could not be a constitutionally valid vio­
lation of any law or ordinance.



14

II.

The Adjudication of Delinquency by the Juvenile 
Court Was a Denial of Due Process and Equal Protec­
tion of the Laws in That It Was Based Upon No Evidence 
and the Charge Was Too Vague to Be Defended Against.

The Annotated Code of Maryland, Art. 26, §52 (1957), 
defines the term delinquent child as follows:

(1) Violates any law or ordinance or who commits any 
act which would be a crime not punishable by death 
or life imprisonment;

(2) is incorrigible, ungovernable, habitually disobedient 
or who is beyond control of parents . . .  or other law­
ful authority;

(3) habitual truant;

(4) repeatedly runs away without just cause;

(5) engage in any occupation in violation of law or who 
associates with immoral or vicious persons;

(6) so deports himself as to endanger himself and others.
When we apply this statute to these children we see that 

the findings of the Juvenile Court were clearly erroneous. 
The minors were wrongfully arrested for participating in 
anti-segregation demonstrations during April and May of 
1963. After these wrongful arrests in violation of their 
constitutional rights, they were brought before the Juve­
nile Court where they were charged with being delinquents. 
The evidence brought forth dealt with all aspects of their 
prior conduct as well as their conduct in the racial demon­
strations which resulted in their arrests and subsequent 
adjudication of delinquency. The ultimate finding of de­
linquency was based upon the minors alleged disorderly



15

conduct [in the demonstrations] to the disturbance of the 
public peace. [See petitions 824 and 825 in the Circuit 
Court of Dorchester County sitting as a Juvenile Court.] 
These minors were adjudged delinquent solely upon section 
(1) of the above quoted statute. They had violated a law or 
ordinance and committed an act that would be a crime; that 
being disorderly conduct to the disturbance of the public 
peace. Yet, their conduct constituted no such crime since 
their conduct was constitutionally protected and their ar­
rests were illegal.

The Courts of most states with similar Juvenile Court 
statutes have said that the evidence presented must show 
that the child sought to be committed is in such a condition 
or such circumstances as to be within the purview of the 
statute, and the burden is on the party instituting the pro­
ceedings to prove such fact by competent evidence. See 
Carmean v. People, 110 Colo. 399, 134 P. 2d 1056; Hollis 
v. Brownell, 129 Kan. 818, 284 Pac. 388; Akers v. State, 
App., 51 N. E. 2d 91; State v. Freeman, 81 Mont. 132, 262 
Pac. 168; Hambell v. Levine, 243 App. Div. 530, 275 N. Y. S. 
702; In Re Madik, 233 App. Div. 12, 251 N. Y. S. 765; 
Purvis v. State, 133 Tex. Cr. 441, 112 S. W. 2d 186.

There was no competent evidence in this case and the 
findings constituted a denial of liberty without due process 
of law. This case falls within the doctrine of Thompson v. 
City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960), where the Supreme 
Court of the United States said that a conviction based 
upon no evidentiary support is invalid under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case 
the Court invalidated a conviction for “ loitering” and “dis­
orderly conduct.” The defendant was arrested for loitering 
because he was in a cafe for a half hour, not having bought 
anything. The owner did not ask him to leave or ask to have 
him arrested. The defendant claimed to be waiting for a



16

bus. The “ disorderly conduct” conviction rested upon the 
testimony of the police that defendant was very argumenta­
tive when he was arrested. The Court held that these con­
victions were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to 
be in valid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court followed this doctrine in Garner 
v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157 (1961), where Negroes “ sitting- 
in” at a lunch counter in a white section were convicted of 
disturbing the peace. The statute defined the same as the 
doing of specific violent, boisterous or disruptive acts, and 
any other act in such a manner as to unreasonably disturb 
or alarm the public. Upon their failure to leave they were 
arrested by the police. The Court reversed the convictions 
saying peacefully sitting in places where racial custom 
decreed that petitioners should not sit was not evidence of 
any crime. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U. S. 154, the Court 
reversed a breach of the peace conviction of Negroes sitting 
in a white waiting room in a bus depot. The only evidence 
of the crime was that they were breaking a custom that 
could lead to violence.

These cases clearly establish that a conviction based 
upon no evidence of crime is a denial of due process of law. 
The activities engaged in by the appellants were not crimi­
nal in nature, and merely participating could not constitute 
disorderly conduct or any other crime. Without an affirma­
tive showing of instances of disorderly conduct aside from 
those actions necessarily included in participation in these 
demonstrations a criminal finding of disorderly conduct 
cannot stand. Here there was no proof of instances of dis­
orderly conduct apart from participation in the demonstra­
tions, and therefore the finding of disorderly conduct by the 
Juvenile Court violated due process of law.

Although, procedural requirements are partially relaxed 
in a Juvenile Court, the rudiments of due process and fair



17

play must be followed. See, Re Holmes, 175 Pa. Super. 
137, 103 A. 2d 454, aff’d 379 Pa. 599, 109 A. 2d 523, cert, 
den. 348 U. S. 973. The procedures adopted must guarantee 
the minor a fair and impartial hearing. See Re Roth, 158 
Neb. 789, 64 N. W. 2d 799. Most important the minor must 
be appraised of the charge against him, and the facts upon 
which the charge is based must be set forth. See Re Green, 
123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N. E. 2d 647; Canter v. State (Tex. 
Civ. App.), 207 S. W. 2d 901; Hague v. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 
170, 220 S. W. 96.

In the present case these appellants were found to be 
delinquent because they were disorderly. Presumably this 
meant the crime of disorderly conduct, since the statutory 
definition of delinquency does not include disorderly con­
duct. Therefore these minors were found to have violated 
a law or ordinance. See Ann. Code of Maryland, Art. 26 
§52(1) (1957). The essence of the proceeding was to deter­
mine, among other things, if the appellants had violated 
this criminal law. Such a proceeding is criminal in nature 
and as such the rudiments of due process require that the 
one accused of a crime be fully apprised of the nature and 
facts of the charge against him. See Cole v. Arhansas, 333 
U. S. 196 (1948); Salinas v. United States, 277 F. 2d 588 
(9 Cir. 1960); Leonard v. United States, 231 F. 2d 588 
(5 Cir. 1956); N.L.R.B. v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 
F. 2d 144 (7 Cir. 1951); Beauchamp v. United States, 154 
F. 2d 413 (7 Cir. 1946); Bergen v. United States, 145 F. 2d 
181 (8 Cir. 1944). Yet, appellants were merely charged with 
being delinquent because they were disorderly. The evi­
dence brought forth at the hearing indicates that the dis­
orderly conduct charge came from the various demonstra­
tions. However, no one demonstration, or day, or even 
event was specified. At best this charge amounts to an 
assertion that appellants were disorderly during a period



18

covering over a week. Such a charge is violative of due 
process. The appellants were not apprised of the specific 
act or acts of disorderly conduct with which they were 
charged and the facts upon which such charge or charges 
rest. They were provided with no reasonable means to meet 
these charges or the evidence introduced. The proceedings 
amounted to a complete surprise, for which the appellants 
could not reasonably be expected to prepare. Therefore, 
the vagueness of the charge as to the specific facts of the 
crime made the complaint deficient and violative of due 
process.

III.

The Adjudication of Delinquency by the Juvenile 
Court Constituted a Denial of Due Process and Equal 
Protection of the Laws in That the Decree Constituted 
a Punishment and Therefore Abused the Authority and 
Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court.

The Juvenile Court had no jurisdiction over the appel­
lants because the Act requires a finding that the minors 
need treatment available at the state training school even 
if the minor does fit into the category of delinquent. This 
is the justification for relaxing the ordinary criminal rules 
of procedure and evidence in Juvenile Courts. The pro­
ceeding is not criminal, but corrective, and it is not the 
function of the Court to punish.

“ The Juvenile Act does not contemplate the punishment 
of children where they are found to be delinquent. The 
Act contemplates an attempt to correct and rehabili­
tate. Emphasis is placed in the Act upon the desirabil­
ity of providing the necessary care and guidance in 
the child’s own home and while the Act recognizes that 
there will be cases where hospital care or commitment



19

to a juvenile training school or other institution may 
be necessary, this is all directed to the rehabilitation 
of the. child concerned rather than punishment for any 
delinquent conduct.” See Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 
528,140 A. 2d 914, 918.

Pertinent sections of the Statute read as follows:
u . . .  s, child . . . shall not be charged with the commis­
sion of any crime. The Judge shall then determine 
whether or not such child comes within any aforesaid 
terms and is, by reason thereof, in need of care or 
treatment within the provision and intent of this sub­
title.” [Ann. Code of Maryland, Art. 26, §54 (1957).]

“ . . .  if the Judge determines that the child is not within 
the jurisdiction of the Court or that the child is not 
in need of care or treatment within the provisions or 
intent of this sub-title, the Judge shall dismiss the 
case.” [Ann. Code of Maryland, Art. 26, §61 (1957).]

“ . . . this sub-title shall be liberally construed to the end 
thta such child coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Judges shall receive such care, guidance and control, 
preferably in his own home as will be conducive to the 
child’s welfare and the best interest of the State.” 
[Ann. Code of Maryland, Art. 26, §66 (1957).]

Therefore it is necessary for the Court to determine that 
the minor is in need of care and treatment available at the 
training school before the minor can be so committed. 
Whenever possible, such minor should receive this neces­
sary care in his own home. See, Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 
473, 88 Pac. 609; State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Ct., 139 
Wash. 1, 245 Pac. 409. The Virginia Court, interpreting a 
similar statute said,



20

“ the provisions of Chapter 28, Virginia Code 1942 
(Michie), Sections 1905-1922, are protective, not penal, 
and proceedings thereunder are of a civil nature, not 
criminal, and are intended for the protection of the 
child and society to save the child from evil tendencies 
and bad surroundings, and to give the child more 
efficient care and training that it may become a useful 
member of society.” [See In Re James, 185 Va. 335, 
338, 38 S. E. 2d 444, 447.]

The Court then went on to say:

“ The statute section 1922, provides that it shall be 
liberally construed in order to accomplish the benefi­
cial purposes herein set forth. There is nothing in the 
record to suggest that the accused were inherently 
vicious or incorrigible. To classify an infant as delin­
quent because of a youthful prank, or for a mere single 
violation of a misdemeanor statute or municipal ordi­
nance, not immoral per se, in this day of numberless 
laws and ordinances is offensive to our sense of justice 
and to the intendment of the law. We cannot reconcile 
ourselves to the thought that the incautious violation 
of a motor vehicle law, a single act of truancy or a 
departure from an established rule of similar slight 
gravely is sufficient to justify the classification of the 
offender as delinquent . . . ” [In Ee James, supra, 338, 
447.]

In the present case the Juvenile Court made no finding 
as to the needs of these minors for treatment and care, not 
available at home. The sole purpose in sending these minors 
to a training school was to remove them from the demon­
strations. Since these demonstrations were constitutionally 
protected activities they could not possibly constitute an 
evil or bad surrounding from which the child should be



21

removed., Neither were these minors so incorrigible as to 
require a commitment to the state training school. Their 
participation in the demonstrations did not amount to crim­
inal activity. Furthermore, their conduct was orderly. 
Even if they had been disorderly on one occasion, this is 
not enough to qualify them, for admission, to state training 
school. See In Re James, supra. The decree of the Juvenile 
Court amounted to a punishment for participation in pro­
tected activity and was clearly beyond the jurisdiction and 
power of the Juvenile Court. As such it amounts to a denial 
of . due process, and equal protection of the laws.

IV.

The Juvenile Court Process Violated Appellants’ 
Constitutional Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
by its Finding of Guilt of a Criminal Charge for Which 
They Could Be Imprisoned for a Cruel and Inhuman 
Period Without Providing Them With the Basic Pro­
cedural Safeguards to Which Adults Charged With Sim­
ilar Crimes Would Be Entitled.

Superficially the Juvenile Court proceeding seems to be 
a civil adjudication of the- status of the appellants. If it 
were merely a finding of the needs of the appellants in light 
of their conduct and environment, and for the purpose of 
what is best for these juveniles, it would be a civil adjudi­
cation. However, this was not the case. These minors were 
adjudged delinquent because they were found to have vio­
lated a law or ordinance. An adjudication resting on a 
finding of criminality is inherently criminal in nature. This 
view is followed in jurisdiction with similar Juvenile Court 
Acts where the proceedings against the juvenile are related 
to a charge of some specific criminal offense. The proceed­
ings are said to retain their criminal character. See, 23 
Harv. L. Rev. 109, 31 Am. Jur., Juvenile Courts, §53 (1958).



22

Where a finding of juvenile delinquency is based upon crimi­
nal acts, the Juvenile Court is called upon to do more than 
determine the status of the child. The Juvenile Court is 
really called upon to decide the guilt or innocence of the 
juvenile concerning the crime charged. It is not reasonable 
to say that this determination is not a criminal proceeding 
because it is done with the best interest of the juvenile in 
mind. The reliabilitory nature of the proceeding is depend­
ent upon the need for rehabilitation. The need for rehabili­
tation and treatment is dependent upon the guilt or inno­
cence of the child in regard to the criminal acts alleged. 
To label a child a juvenile delinquent and treat him may 
be civil in nature, but to base this adjudication upon the 
doing of a criminal act colors the proceeding with criminal 
overtones. A finding of delinquency based upon habitually 
disobedient or ungovernable conduct, or habitual truancy, 
or repeatedly running away from home, or so deporting 
oneself as to endanger self or others, does not carry the 
stigma of criminality. On the other hand, a finding of 
delinquency based upon the violation of a law constitutes 
a finding of criminality and changes the nature of the pro­
ceedings from civil to criminal.

The view has generally been taken that the juvenile 
statutes are not unconstitutional by reason of dispensing 
with certain procedural steps and safeguards which are 
usually regarded as essential in criminal prosecutions, such 
as trial by jury, arraignment, plea, notice to the person, 
warrant of arrest, or because of a provision requiring the 
child to be a witness against himself. This generalization 
applies only when the proceedings are civil in nature.

Other jurisdictions have regarded some proceedings 
under these statutes to be criminal in nature, and in such 
a case the absence of the usual safeguards for the protec­
tion of the rights of the accused has been held to render



23

them invalid. See People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State 
Reformatory, 148 111. 413, 36 N. E. 76; People ex rel. 
O’Connel v. Turner, 55 111. 280; Re Saunders, 53 Kan. 191, 
36 Pac. 348; State ex rel. Cummingham v. Ray, 63 N. H. 406. 
In proceedings where the life and liberty of a juvenile delin­
quent is at stake, the rules of procedure should be measured 
by the gravity of the situation and the exigencies of the 
case may impel, that every safeguard be given the child. 
See Re Smith (Okla. Crim.), 326 P. 2d 835.

In this proceeding there was a complete disregard for 
both procedural and substantive due process. There was 
no provision made for a jury. There was no provision made 
for a record for purposes of appeal. [The waiver of a 
court reporter by counsel was made before counsel fully 
realized the criminal nature of the proceeding as devel­
oped.] There was no provision made for arraignment. 
There was no adequate notice to the defendant of the crimi­
nal charge. Most important, there was no attempt made 
to adhere to the rules of evidence. Irrelevant and immate­
rial evidence dealing with all aspects of the appellants prior 
behavior was admitted over objection. This evidence does 
not suport an inference that appellants are delinquent or 
in need of treatment now. See, Schware v. Board of Bar 
Examiners, 353 IT. S. 232; Konigsherg v. State Bar of 
California, 353 IT. S. 252. Alleged official school records 
were allowed to be read in evidence in disregard of the 
hearsay rule. These records were made prior to the hearing 
and strictly for the purposes of the hearing. See, 2 Wig- 
more on Evidence, §665 (3rd ed. 1940).

The whole character of the hearing was so informal as 
to amount to a conviction of crime ultimately leading to 
an indeterminant internment in a state training school 
without regard to basic procedural safeguards afforded 
adults charged with similar crimes.



24

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated it is respectfully requested that 
the delinquency findings of the court below be set aside, 
and apjiellants, Reva Dinez White, and Dwight Cromwell, 
minors, be released from the Montrose School for Girls 
and the Maryland District School for Boys and returned to 
the custody of their parents.

Respectfully submitted,

J u a n ita  J ackson  M itch ell  
1239 Druid Hill Avenue 
Baltimore 17, Maryland

T u ck eb  R. D earing
627 Aisquith Street 
Baltimore, Maryland

J ack  Greenberg
D errick  A. B ell , Jr.

10 Columbus Circle 
New York 19, N. Y.

Attorneys for Appellants



No. Petitions

IN THE
CIRCUIT COURT OF DORCHESTER COUNTY 

SITTING AS A JUVENILE COURT

T@ The Honorable, The Judge of Said Court;

C. Burrnw At.tffinejr ............................................................................................ in the
C o u n ty  of Dorchester, Slate of Maryland, respectfully shows that the following named child under the age of

Delinquent 
eighteen years is fj'ependent 

Neglected 
Feeble-minded

Name Sex Race Age Living With: Parent Guardian Custodian

l i t t s  Rera White ¥ . i  15 . 9«W ««. CtmUfc. .......................

03® 7 » 11®47 V b v k i Whit* ................

Address 47©. High S t a * CawlsrlSg®*. M,

For the reason that on *^prr] <?, ‘ t « r  11» Is* 13. htajr.14, IVfeJ in the County aforesaid ,

th® s a id  Dine® Ret® S M t e  a c t « d  i »  a d i■ • rS atri*  w u m w  t o  th e  d is tu r b a n c e  o f  t i i«  p u b l i c

IN THE MATTER OF

HIMXZ RffH WHITS. 
t Ex Parte.

Your petitioner, therefore, prays said Court to pass an order directing summons to be served upon said G e @ rg ®  C e r w i s h  e n d
White

and requiting ^aid «.hiid^ P ia ® g  S U l l  . ------

to be brought before said Court at some certain time and place, to be named in said order, »<• show chum d anv there he. whv the matter of

said petition may not be determined as herein prayed.
Respectfully submitted,

PKTITIONKR ...........
(">) C. Sum aa Mac®

AriD̂ F.'ss Court Lane Caaferidg®, I f c i y l l i i

Stale of Maryland, Dorchester County, To-wit:

I hereby tf-rtifv that before the undersigned, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Dorchester County, personally appeared the aboved named 

petitioner, C .  H u m * *  M&Ce .this /  J  ^ V f" day of t f c y  , 19§J ,

and made oath in due form of law that the matters and facts se? forth in the aforegoing petition are true as therein stated to the best 

of M * information, knowledge and belief.  ̂ /  J

' SJ l l  ............  .
J

Upon the aforegoing petition and affidavit, it is by the Court, this . ...... I J N H s . . ................. day o f................... t f c g . .....................

19 ordered that a summon* issue directed to and requiring the Sheriff of Dorchester County to serve upon ...

f e s s l . ? ........................  ...... ................................................a copy of this petition ®nd ord«?r hikS a summon® to be nftd ®pptm lie fora

said Court on the 3 ® f # ..................day of ......  , . • , at m m ...........  .... o'clock. A M,

at , ,. * , In aald County; and l« Is forth*? sedated thj| tald IWier iff bring nr eauae itrt be brought. Ilia aald

H i m m  JUnra W lAfc« ........................ ...........  ........................................ ..before this Court at the time end p h w  above designated (or (ha
heating o( ilia matter of said (Million. |r'

True C 

T«tt
CT : / ' /
LLi**- L jtli’, iXl u

* 1*2. It  h* J L  m/ v v Q..a..............
" Judge of the Circuit Court oMlorchestrr County,

•tttlng se% Juvenile Court.

■ Ckrk



25

APPENDIX I



26

APPENDIX II

(See opposite) EiT3



IN THE MATTER OF

w m r r  emmmuu
Ex Parte.

To The Honorable, The Judge of Said Court;

No..... 8 2 5 ......Petitions
IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT OF DORCHESTER COUNTY 
SITTING AS A JUVENILE COURT

G. Bum*® S t*te*8  A tt© ra «f in the
County o f  Dorchester, State nf Maryland, respectfully shows that the following named child under the age of

eighteen years is Dependent 
Neglected 
Feeble-minded

Name

DvJght Crosawell
Sex Race Age

M 1 15
4 -1 8 -4 1

Living Wilh: .uardian Custodian

J m m  »mkM 

WmM» 9  WMmmt

Address 1 £r®@® i t . t C**kride«, NA«

For the reason that on. ^  m the County aforesaid $

the **id Dwight Cromroll aei«d in a dinorsierljr BMsannr t® ffa@ disturteae® of the p tttie  
pmc9«

Your petitioner. th#*r* f»>re pr *v% «sani Court to oas« ar crrlor n . m e r e  :• b~ •« jSS6S!3 •*«*»**(&
Sadirte Hi<Awut

and requiring the said child p © w i g h t  C r ^ » ® l l

to be brought before said Court a? some certain time and place, to be named in said order, to show au- • there be. why the matter *

said petition may not be determined as herein praved.

Respectfully submitted

mijioNER „ ^
( u ) j  c. ©urn&K Ifece

a d d r e s s  C « w r t  L o s e  B l d g . » C a a & r i d g e ,  S i , .

Slate ©f Maryland, Dorchester County, To-wit:

I hereby certify that !>efore the undersigned. Clerk of the Circuit Court for Dorchester ( n»mtv personaliv appeared the aboved named 

petitioner. C .  B u n i M  >fece , hls /  ( '  CC dav ... ^ F  i9 &$

and made oath in due farm of law that th*' matters and facta set forth in the aforegoing petition are frur as therein stated to the hear 

of b i .8  information, knowledge and belief.

{ » )  P h i l i p  L »  C an n on
I 'pon the aforegoing petition and affidavit, it is by the Court, this .. X 3 3 t a  day of

19 . ordered that a summons issue directed to and requiring the Sheriff of Dorchester County to serve upon

Hftdlft* ItldMut

C lerk.

*>F

3 * rd••id Court on the ,

•< .. C*wtMrldj<»* 
Crwnr«ll

hearing of the matter of said petition.

True Copy!

I -HI . 1 '

a copy of tfiii petition and older and • tiimmom to be and appear tie fort

d#y of ............ .Ilf si o'clock, A t  M,

In asld County; am! it 1* further ordered that laid Sheriff bring or cause to be brought, the laid

before this Court at the time and place above designated for the

(• )  W. L a ird  H «n ry , J r .
judge of the Circuit Conti of !».»*< healrt t nunty 

•{fling as a Juvenile Court



27



28

APPENDIX III

STATE OF MARYLAND

D epartm en t  of H ealth  

D orchester C ou nty

S tate B oard of H ealth

D epu ty  S tate H ealth  O fficer  and  
C ou nty  H ealth  O fficer

Maurice C. Pincoffs, M. D.
Ralph J. Young, M. D.
A. Austin Pearre, M. D.
Lloyd N. Richardson, Phar. D.
George M. Anderson, D. D. S.
A. L. Penninian, Jr., P. E.
Huntington Williams, M. D., Dr. P. H. 
Perry F. Prather, M. D., C h a irm a n

C ambridge, M aryland

May 17,1963.

Judge Laird Henry, Jr.,
Court House,
Cambridge, Maryland.

Dear S ir:
Dwight Cromwell was referred to the Dorchester County 

Mental Health Clinic on February 27, 1962 by Mr. Cornish, 
the V. D. Investigator, after being suspected of being a



passive homosexual. He kept his appointments irregularly 
until April 16, 1963 and has not been seen in the clinic 
since then.

29

Very truly yours,

dlb

Eleanora Yates, R.N. 
Public Health Nurse



30

E d yth e  M. J olley , P rin cipal

E leanor K e n y , S ecretary

J . W arren  B ald w in , V ic P r in .
N orma Green , T reasurer

MACE’S LANE HIGH SCHOOL 
Cambridge, M aryland

June 3, 1963
Dinez White 
No. I

In grade 7, teachers reported her as belligerent. Had to 
be sent out of rooms frequently for curt remarks.

In grade 8, same behavior patterns were followed—failure 
to conform to acceptable behavior patterns in classrooms, 
had to be sent from rooms frequently for not doing work, 
curt remarks, sarcasm to teachers— During a study period, 
drew a diagram on board, labelling Mace’s Lane High 
School as a jail—with principal as jailer, vice principal as 
assistant jailer and all teachers as sheriffs. Stopped coming 
to school before school year ended. Was not promoted that 
year.

In grade 8 second year, behavior patterns exhibited were 
the same—belligerent, sarcastic, stubborn, and did not apply 
herself in classrooms. Stopped coming to school before 
the end of the year.

In grade 9, I was informed by the guidance counselor 
that she had declared her intentions to enter school this 
year, to go straight in school in order to make some good 
grades so that she would have a good record to take to 
Cambridge High School next year, 1963-64.



31

See reports from the following teachers:

Miss Dorothy Smith 
Mr. Philip Rollinson 
Mr. Charles Stewart

In the second semester, has had to be sent from classes 
frequently.

Edythe M. Jolley, Principal

* See individual teachers, accounts on attached sheets



32

MACE’S LANE HIGH SCHOOL 
Cambridge, M aryland  

June 3, 1963

Dinez was excused from class because of continued 
insubo rdination.

Teacher, Charles Stewart 
9th Grade Civics

An Account of Poor Conduct on the 
Part of Dinez White

On Tuesday, February 5 while the 9A English class was 
in order, talking occurred. I asked the class to stop all 
talking. I spoke to two persons in particular. Dinez made 
a reply to the statement that I had just made. I spoke to 
her calmly, reminding her that she had nothing to do with 
the matter. Immediately, she exploded emotionally by 
jumping up and telling me the following: “You are stupid 
and ignorant. You make me sick.”

Calmly, I asked her to leave the room. She did, but 
before leaving she raced to the back of the room to get 
her books, then back to the front of the room. Here she 
threw them down and grabbed her coat and again grabbed 
her books to leave the room. I asked her to report to the 
office. I gave instructions to the class to continue working 
and then went to the office to report the incident concerning 
Dinez. Here I tried to explain to her that the affairs of 
others should not upset her to the point that she must 
downgrade or call others names without reason.

I asked her if she was sick, didn’t feel well, or had been 
upset by something earlier. From the conversation with 
her I found her to be disturbed about something. She began 
to cry. I said to her that she should remain out of class at



33

least two weeks to understand her poor behavior exhibited 
in class. Also, she was to apologize to the class and me for 
having caused the disturbance.

Miss Dorothy A. Smith 
Teacher of English 9A

Statement of Discipline 
Student: Dinez White

This student had to be sent:to the office from my art class 
for disciplinary action. This became necessary upon her 
refusal to put away a yearbook when I requested her to do 
so. In her refusal to do this she made derogatory state­
ments which included the use of profanity.

Teacher: Philip Rollinson



34

Dinez White

During the current school year (1962-63) Dinez White 
has been a pleasant, cooperative and helpful student in her 
homeroom. She has often stayed after school to help pre­
pare the room for the next day. She has listened courte­
ously to advice given her by her homeroom teachers. Dinez 
has, however, been tardy almost every morning.

As one of Dinez’s homeroom teachers, I have received 
many unfavorable reports from other teachers concerning 
her classroom activities. In her English class she became 
angry because the teacher sent a student out of the room 
for disorder. She said loudly before the class that the 
teacher was ignorant. In her art class she cursed loud 
enough to be heard by the entire class when the teacher 
insisted that she stop looking at a yearbook. In her algebra 
class, Dinez did no work after the first semester because 
she felt it was futile. Some other teachers have stated that 
Dinez’s attitude was undesirable when corrected.

In a conference with Miss Jolley, Mrs. White (Dinez’s 
mother), her classroom teachers and homeroom teachers, 
Dinez sulked, rolled her eyes at her mother, apologized 
perfunctorily and showed little remorse for her activities.

Dinez was also involved in the organization of a group 
in the school to express disapproval of a teacher. She 
worked with Dwight Cromwell to organize a walk-out from 
the school during a school day without permission. The 
walk-out was conducted on a limited scale.

Dinez has shown little inclination to seriously take advice 
given by the principal or by her homeroom teachers, even 
though she listens attentively and courteously.

David Townsend



35

E d yth e  M . J olley , P rin cipal  
E leanor K en t , S ecretary

J. W arren B ald w in , V ic Pein. 
N orma Green , T reasurer

COPY

MACE’S LANE HIGH SCHOOL 
Cambridge, M aryland

(.Dwight Cromwell)

No. II
June 3, 1963

In grade 7, was a good citizen in school. Was emotionally 
disturbed at home. At home took an overdose of sleeping 
tablets. This had some ill effects on his school work. But 
he remained an obedient student.

In grade 8, was a good citizen in school. Hid not apply 
himself in classes very well. Still quite emotionally dis­
turbed at home. Reported to Health Clinic weekly. Re­
ported to be under psychiatric treatment. Mind didn’t seem 
to be on school, but was an obedient student in school.

In grade 9, still quite emotionally disturbed. Has not 
applied himself in school this year. Came in school in 
September apparently against most teachers and against 
the school. Tried to form a student group during school 
hours to work for Civil Rights in school as he turned it. 
Secured permission under false pretenses from librarian 
to use work room in library for student meeting.

Continued to try to use student group in school to work 
for Civil Rights for students in school and in community 
project.



36

Walked halls 'unnecessarily. Was sent from teacher’s 
class for incessant talk. Did no work in algebra class. 
Called superintendent from school on two occasions.

Still awfully disturbed emotionally.

Edythe M. Jolley, Principal 
#See individual teachers accounts on attached sheets



Oi

An Account of Poor Conduct on the Part of 
Dwight Cromwell

The information which I wish to portray in your minds 
concerning Dwight is merely intended to make know his 
poor adjustment to school like mainly during the first semes­
ter and part of the second semester.

On several occasions Dwight refused to do any assigned 
work given in class. This refusal led to continual pestering 
of other students throughout the class period. This pester­
ing included throwing orange seeds across the room, pull­
ing girls’ hair, using improper words for the classroom such 
as (dam, hell, shit), jumping up whenever he felt like it, 
refusing to govern himself according to school regulations 
when stressed by the teacher.

In January his behavior became so disturbing that stu­
dents began to complain to me that he was keeping them 
from getting their work.

His conduct in class, mainly his word-for-word refusal 
to do as I asked, led to a nimble between the both of us. 
He was asked to report to the office. His refusal again led 
to an outburst of yells by the other class members. Some 
asked Dwight to obey his teacher. I pushed him toward 
the door to leave and called the vice principal to let him 
know that Dwight was on his way to the office.

A follow-up of his conduct was made by his mother, the 
principal, and me. This was only a part of the work and 
time spent by me to understand and direct his behavior. 
Several home visitations had been made, conferences with 
Dwight had been held, and a friendly rapport had been 
established between the both of us. None of these things 
seemed to help when he was under my supervision in class.



38

At the present time I am happy to say that he has im­
proved in his conduct, therefore adjusting better to school 
life. He has a good chance now to achieve the better things 
in life. The rapport once established between us is grow­
ing and I understand more of his physical, mental, home, 
and social problems. Some of these problems, I think, were 
the cause of his poor behavior for a continued period of 
time.

(Miss) Dorothy A. Smith



39

Dwight Cromwell

In the years before the present school year Dwight 
Cromwell appeared to be poorly adjusted, but he exhibited 
good citizenship.

In the school year 1962-63 Dwight developed a contempt 
and disregard for teachers, and their advice. He seemed 
to have difficulty in conforming to any set rules, and 
thought up ways to either break them or make teachers 
believe that he would. He was dropped from one club be­
cause of non-conformity.

Dwight became very confused as to teacher and student 
status, and seemingly felt that some teachers had no right 
to direct him. He became angry when he was corrected in 
classes, especially if the teachers were young. Often he 
ignored directions completely.

Dwight organized a student group in the school to try to 
discredit one of the teachers. He misinterpreted rules, and 
twisted their meanings to suit his argument. He also led 
a group of students from the school grounds without per­
mission, during a school day. Announcements were made 
by Dwight in his homeroom concerning meetings for his 
group under the guise of an English group meeting, until 
his homeroom teachers discovered the nature of the meet­
ings and stopped the announcements.

Dwight has been constantly counseled by his homeroom 
teachers, Miss Jolley and other teachers, but he seems to 
neither listen closely or heed any sound advice given.

When angered Dwight threatens to quit school, and 
make disparaging remarks about the school system, and the 
teachers, unless restrained.



40

Dwight often does not react rationally, and usually 
blames others for any misfortune. He is often tardy in 
coming to school, but feels it should he overlooked.

Dwight has not been a problem in his homeroom proper 
except for tardiness and the expected playing. On a few 
occasions, he has tried unsuccessfully to keep small bits 
of disorder going along. He seems to love chaos, and to 
hate orderly proceedings.

David Townsend