Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
Public Court Documents
October 16, 1992
75 pages
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Case Files, Thompson v. Raiford Hardbacks. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 1992. ab57b479-5c40-f011-b4cb-0022482c18b0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d733d621-4959-4f5e-89d4-4a3fe6032c22/defendants-motion-to-dismiss-or-for-summary-judgment-and-in-opposition-to-plaintiffs-motion-for-temporary-restraining-order. Accessed November 02, 2025.
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| ® _ 3 Se Dior
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LOIS THOMPSON on behalf of and
as next friend to TAYLOR KEONDRA
DIXON, ZACHERY X. WILLIAMS,
CALVIN A. THOMPSON and PRENTISS
LAVELL MULLINS,
Plaintiffs,
Vv. Civil No. 3:92-1539-R
BURTON F. RAIFORD, in his
capacity as Commissioner of
the Texas Department of Human
Services,
and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
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DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
| + 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHOR PIES. 0 ts vv a ie oa ite Saini ii
I. INTRODUCTION. os elie tle iy ai 0 ov iui wai via tag igi yh tis 1
Il. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND vv iv eis oie a wien a 6
A. The Medicald Program iv «+ oc oi vc Tete in vie % oie oie 6
B. Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic
And Treatment Program. «uc sv cis « + 0% aie sa 7
11. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS.» viv. « « 2 visite einiin oi vo range, 9
A. HCFA's Previous Actions Regarding Screening
Of Children For Elevated Blood levels . . . , + viv v's 9
B. The 199) CDC. Statement” . . . . vos v0 vy vrs 12
C. The September 1992 HCFA Guidelines . . . . uv 2 eo ov « '» 16
IV, “BRGUMENT ANDI BUTHORITIES . v vv ve vie lie athe ag aie ai 21
A. The Named Plaintiffs' Claims Should
Be Dismissed Because They Have Not
Suffered Any Injury And Thus Lack
SANGIN ENS SUB le vrs ves mise a ia a a ha 21
: ot Principles of Standing « + . 2. oy vin ivi Niteita 21
2. Plaintiffs Have Suffered No Injury As
A Result of The New HCFA Guidelines .'. . «. . . , 24
B. Plaintiffs' Complaint As To Defendant USA
Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State
Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Or
Alternatively, Summary Judgment Should Be
Granted In Favor Of Defendant USA . . J + 8 guia, hy 28
1. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent
With The Medicaid Statute . . ot. Jiiip Jobe 28
2. The HCFA Guidelines Give States The
Option Of Using The EP Test For
"Low Risk" Children Only & =. u...iiv Ww woe ow Tul, 33
3. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With
The 11991 CDC Statement . ... gies Lo Lay Onan no 32
- PS
J 3
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Satisfy The
Requirements For Temporary Injunctive Relief . . . . . 34
3. Standards for injunctive Relief . '. . . vv iu a 34
2. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Substantial
Likelihood Of Success On The Merits . . . + oie . 36
3. There Is No Substantial Threat Of
Irreparable Injury If The Temporary
Relief Plaintiffs Seek From Defendant
USA IS NOC Granted « ov ov io vieciniv. on wiht igban di 37
4. The Threatened Injury To Plaintiffs
Does Not Outweigh Any Damage Preliminary
Relief Might Cause To Defendant USA And
PRE PUDIIC oo 3 oe eis is aie nin wail EE 38
Be Plaintiffs' Motion Should Also Be
Denied Because It Improperly Seeks
To Alter The Status QUO « voc =v vo vv devo 40
Vv. CONCLUSION te ts 8. Be ot i ie wee ea 42
- 41 =
¢ ¢
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE(S): PAGE(S)
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1983) o eile Ne cities Laine sie Bly 23g 2D
Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc.,
878 P.24.:806 (5th Cir. 1989) ies + wi Ye eet Sle, Ye yw 34, 35
Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co.,
835 Pe2@ 128 {SLR CIT. 1088) vo viv le vieiiv vinnie eee 36
Asarco v, Radish, 490 U.S, 605 (1989) + v vv «iv 0 vo vite vin ein 22
Atkins v, Rivera, 477 U.8.:184. (1986) . + « viv. iv vw Ww Nd Joa i'e
Brown v. Sibley, 630'F.2q 760 (Sth Cir. 1981) . iv « vivin sino 4927
Canal Authority of the State of Florida v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (53th Cir. FO74) ui oy vie esi ee Teak 3D
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) viva aie we ee 29
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . .. + «ieee 28, 29
DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 901 F.24 1267 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, U.S. r 211 S.Ct. 519: (1990)... + + vv ev + 35
Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion
Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana,
762 F.24 464 (5th Cir. 1585) nev vai we VEY eile 35,36
Ethyl Coyp. Vv. E.P.A., 541-F.24 1 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S, 941 (19768) .. + +. 0 hii, JU00 a0
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 8U.8.0. 555 (1080) Rl. om. . an. 0 ie ae ea i a a ia
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
44] VeSei 91 {1970 4 ie ite wis v Tv ov 0 viene eae Ry ie yity *
Harris vv. MeRae 4448 U.S. 207 (1980) i. i uns Ww dn otis a
Harris v. Wilters, 596 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 3979 . . «4d &iww vie Siay
Holland America Ins. Co. Vv. Succession of Roy,
777 FP.2Q5992 ({SLtNECIT. 1IBBY 'v "vv vilei va 2 0 a wim Bene 35.37
- iii -
Ra J
Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc.,
847 'P.24 186°(5th Cir. 1988)", . . « 's
Lewis v. Hegstrom, 767 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1985)
Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 583 (1984)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
U.S. y 112:8. Ct. 2130: (1992) v .»
Martin v. International Olympic Committee,
740 F.2d 670 (Oth Cir. 1984) ovis oi v « =
Martinez v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1976)
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas
Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1985)
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice,
491 U.S. 440 (1989) oie a ae ei WE Ca
Schlesinger v. Reservists To Stop The War,
418 U.S. 208 (1973) oe a a Te a
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
4830. CS, 34 {Y081Y >, JL. a
Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982)
Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc.,
316 F.24 804 (oth Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1963)
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)
United States wv. Rutherford,
442 U.S, 544 (1979) i...
University of Texas v. Camenisch,
4510.8, 380 (1981): « vv v + 27%
Valley Forge College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1981) + 5. . i
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S5. 490.1(1975)
White 'v, Carlucci, 862 F.24 1209 (5th Cir. 1939)
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990)
- iy
o
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
42 U.S.C. 1396
42 0.8.0. 8 13960: ..
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A)
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b)
42 U.8.C.a 8 139600, a0
42 C.F.R. § 1396d(a) (4) (B)
42 U.S.C. 13964(r) .
§
§
§
§
42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)
§
§
§
§ 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (43) (A)
42 C.F.R. 440.40(b) .
MISCELLANEOUS
Conference Report, H.R. 101-386,
101 Cong. 1st Sess., p. 453
o
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, four children who are residents of West Dallas,
Texas, purport to represent a nationwide class of all Medicaid-
eligible children who are at risk for lead poisoning.! Plaintiffs
contend that they have not been given the appropriate blood lead level
assessment and treatment by the State of Texas. As to defendant USA,
they contend that guidelines issued recently by the Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA"), a component of the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which became effective on
September 19, 1992, encourage states to test Medicaid-eligible
children for lead poisoning by using a less sensitive blood test (the
erythrocyte PEOtkpor HYP or "EP" test), which would not detect lead
levels at the threshold at which concern is recommended by the Centers
for Disease Control ("CDC"), rather than a more sensitive blood lead
test. The continued use of the EP test, according to plaintiffs,
contravenes a requirement of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(r), for "blood lead level assessment" and is inconsistent with
the October 1991 Statement of the CDC "Preventing Lead Poisoning in
! Plaintiffs initiated this action on or about July 29,
1992 against defendant Burton F. Raiford, in his official
capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human
Services. On or about August 6, 1992, plaintiffs filed their
first amended complaint. Defendant United States of America
("USA") has not been served with either the original complaint or
the first amended complaint. On or about September 10, 1592,
plaintiffs once again amended their complaint ("Complaint") to
include the USA as a defendant.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 1
o o«
Young Children: A Statement By The Centers For Disease Control" and
HHS' "Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning"
issued in February 1991, both of which recognize that the lead
screening test of choice is now the blood lead test.
Plaintiffs seek a sweeping mandatory, preliminary and permanent
injunction to require that HCFA compel the states to use the blood
lead test as the sole screening test for lead poisoning.? They also
seek an order enjoining the federal government from supporting,
allowing or financing the states' continued use of the EP test as a
screening test for lead poisoning.’
2 It is only this form of relief which plaintiffs appear
not to seek as preliminary relief from defendant USA. In
addition, plaintiffs seek an order which would require HCFA to
issue guidelines requiring that states retest all Medicaid-
eligible children previously tested with the EP test with the
blood lead level test.
’ Plaintiffs also seek certain relief from defendant Burton
Raiford, Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services.
Specifically, plaintiffs seek a mandatory preliminary and
permanent injunction to require the State of Texas to use the
blood lead test as the sole screening device for lead poisoning
statewide, and enjoin the State from using the EP test.
Plaintiffs also seek an order requiring defendant Raiford to
declare West Dallas and other geographic areas in the State of
Texas high risk areas for children for lead poisoning, and notify
all EPSDT providers that eligible children residing in such
designated high risk geographic areas be given lead blood level
assessments. In addition, plaintiffs seek an order requiring
defendant Raiford to give effective notice and outreach of the
availability of blood lead screening and treatment to all EPSDT-
eligible children; and implement a case management program to
ensure that lead screening and treatment is provided for all
EPSDT-eligible children in accordance with the CDC guidelines.
Finally, plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendant Raiford to
retest, using the blood lead level test, all EPSDT-eligible
children previously tested with the EP test.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 2
o «
Defendant USA hereby opposes plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Against the U.S.A.
("Motion") and respectfully moves this Court for dismissal of
plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety. As a threshold matter,
plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. Plaintiffs suffer no
injury from the HCFA guidelines. The injury of which they complain -—
i.e., the State of Texas' alleged failure to perform a blood lead test
and appropriate lead poisoning intervention -- does not stem from the
challenged September 1992 HCFA guidelines. Indeed, those very
guidelines would require that plaintiffs receive the blood lead tests
they seek.? Granting the relief sought by plaintiffs from defendant
USA would not redress plaintiffs' injury and would offer plaintiffs no
relief not already offered by the very guidelines plaintiffs
challenge. Furthermore, requiring HCFA to issue guidelines which
mandate the states' use of the direct blood lead test (rather than the
EP test) in all cases would not accomplish plaintiffs' intended result
(i.e., universal use of the blood lead test), and may actually harm
the plaintiffs themselves. Given the states' current capacity
limitations for blood lead tests, requiring blood lead tests of all
Medicaid-eligible children, without assigning priority according to
whether the child 'is at "high risk" or "low risk," may result in
* In accordance with the challenged HCFA guidelines, the
four named plaintiffs would be deemed to be "high risk" for
significant lead exposure. The HCFA guidelines require that the
more sensitive blood lead test be administered for those children
determined to be "high risk."
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 3
. QC
significant delays in providing blood lead tests (and necessary
intervention) for "high risk" children such as plaintiffs.
Even if the Court finds that plaintiffs possess the requisite
standing to bring this suit, the case must be dismissed because
plaintiffs' claims are wholly lacking in merit. Contrary to
plaintiffs' allegations, the new HCFA guidelines do not contravene the
statutory requirement of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r),
for blood lead level assessment. Section 1396d(r) defines lead
screening as consisting of " (iv) laboratory tests (including lead
blood level assessment appropriate for age and risk factors)." On its
face, § 1396d(r) does not require "blood lead tests" as plaintiffs
contend and plaintiffs offer nothing to indicate that Congress
intended the term "lead blood level assessment" be to have the
restrictive (and highly technical) meaning they ascribe to it.
Plaintiffs' claims evidence a fundamental misunderstanding of the
new HCFA guidelines. There is no merit to plaintiffs' assertion that
HCFA's guidelines generally allow (indeed encourage) the use of the EP
test. The guidelines require the blood lead test for all children
determined to be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels.
States continue to have the option to use the EP test as the initial
screening blood test only in those instances where, after a verbal
assessment, the EPSDT provider deems the child to be "low risk."’
> Thus, plaintiffs' suggestion that the guidelines were
intended to limit the federal government's financial obligations
is ludicrous.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 4
¢ o
HCFA has, however, encouraged the most widespread use of the blood
lead test and will share in the states' costs of screening all
children (including those assessed as "low risk"), through the use of
the blood lead test.S
In addition, the new HCFA guidelines are consistent with the 1991
CDC Statement. Plaintiffs' allegations to the contrary are
groundless. Indeed, the HCFA guidelines were developed in
consultation with the CDC, and the CDC itself has stated that the
guidelines are consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. See
Declaration of Susan Binder, M.D. Chief, Lead Poisoning Prevention
Branch, CDC, attached hereto as Exhibit "B," at q 19.
Finally, for the same reasons that plaintiffs lack standing and
have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted,
plaintiffs are not entitled to temporary injunctive relief. This is
all the more true because plaintiffs seek mandatory preliminary
injunctive relief which would alter the status quo, rather than
maintain it, by forcing HCFA to rescind its current EPSDT lead
screening guidelines and issue revised guidelines requiring states to
administer the blood lead test for all Medicaid-eligible children.
Thus, plaintiffs' Motion for temporary injunctive relief should be
denied.
® HCFA estimates that the majority of young Medicaid-
eligible children will be assessed as "high risk" due to their
physical living conditions. See Declaration of William McC.
Hiscock, attached hereto as Exhibit "A," at <q 14.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- §
Na eo
II.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. The Medicaid Program
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as Medicaid,
42 U.S.C. § 1396, establishes a jointly funded, cooperative federal-
state program designed to "enabl[e] each State, as far as practicable
under the conditions in such State," to furnish medical assistance to
eligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 154, 165 (1986); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 571 (1982);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). While the Medicaid program
is voluntary, states that choose to participate must submit a state
plan which fulfills all requirements imposed by the Medicaid statute
and its implementing regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. See Schweiker
Y. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
at 301. The Secretary is obligated to approve a state plan that meets
all federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b).
Upon approval of the state plan, a state becomes entitled to
reimbursement by the federal government, termed "federal financial
participation" ("FFP") for a portion of its allowable payments to
hospitals, nursing homes, and other providers furnishing medical
assistance to eligible recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a). Both the
state plans and the states' implementation of the plans are subject to
oversight by the Secretary to ensure continued compliance with the
federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 6
S s
The day-to-day administration of state Medicaid programs is
performed by the states, not by the federal government. Within the
broad framework of federal requirements and oversight, the states
operate their individual programs in accordance with state rules and
criteria that vary widely. "As long as a State complies with the
requirements of the Act, it has wide discretion in administering its
local program." lewis v. Hedstrom, 767 F.24 1371, 1373 (9th Cir.
1985) (citations omitted).
The Medicaid statute, however, does mandate that, at a minimum
participating states provide certain eligible groups with some
specific services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A). Apart from certain
statutory requirements, each state chooses the services (and payment
levels), and any additional groups (other than those mandated by the
Act) for which it will provide coverage. Id. The states also have
considerable discretion concerning the administrative and operating
procedures they will use to implement federal requirements. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 301.
B. Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment Program
The Medicaid statute mandates that states provide Early and
Periodic Screening and Diagnostic and Treatment Program ("EPSDT")
services to Medicaid-eligible individuals under the age of 21. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (43) (A) and 1396d(a) (4) (B). In 1989, Congress
amended the Social Security Act to define EPSDT services when it
enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA 89"),
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =- 7
_ 3 eo
Pub. L. 101-239,°103 Stat. 2106 (Dec. 19, 1989). Section 6403 of OBRA
89 provided the definition of EPSDT services by adding § 1396d(r) to
the Medicaid statute, effective April 1, 1990.’
In particular, section 6403 of OBRA 89, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r),
defines screening services to include, at a minimum,
(1) a comprehensive health and developmental
history (including assessment of both physical
mental health development),
(11) a comprehensive unclothed physical exam,
(1ii) appropriate immunizations according to age
and health history,
(iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level
assessment appropriate for age and risk factors),
and
(Vv) health education (including anticipatory
guidance).
(Emphasis added).
HCFA provides instructional and interpretive guidance to the
states through the "State Medicaid Manual," policy letters, and
memoranda (which are sometimes known as "Action Transmittals"). These
z The Secretary's regulation, promulgated before the 1989
amendment and found at 42 C.F.R. § 440.40(b), generally defines
EPSDT services, but does not define the services in detail.
OBRA 89, § 6403, now 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), was derived from H.R.
3299, '§ 4213. Conference Report, H.R. 101-386, 101 Cong. 1st
Sess., p. 453. The Conference Report stated that the legislation
"codifies the current regulations on minimum components of EPSDT
screening and treatment, with minor changes," and provides that
"screening must include blood testing when appropriate, as well
as health education." (Emphasis supplied). The legislative
history furnishes no additional guidance regarding tests or
methods for screening.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 8
¢ &
materials reflect HCFA policy, and delineate how the states can comply
with federal Medicaid law, including federal EPSDT requirements. See
Declaration of William McC. Hiscock (the "Hiscock Declaration") at ¢
3, attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The EPSDT statutory provisions and
the regulations are interpreted by the Secretary in the State Medicaid
Manual.
III.
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
A. HCFA's Previous Actions Regarding Screening Of Children For
Elevated Blood Levels
Since the early 1970's, long before Congress amended the EPSDT
statutory provisions to define EPSDT "screening" as explicitly
including blood lead level assessments "appropriate for age and risk
factors," HCFA consistently has advocated state screening of children
under the EPSDT program for elevated blood lead levels. Hiscock
Declaration at § 6 and HCFA State Medicaid Manual § 5-70-E (1)
(June 28, 1972) ("all children between ages of 1-6 should be
periodically screened for lead poisoning"), attached thereto as
Exhibit v2.0
HCFA has a longstanding commitment toward identifying and paying
for the costs of treating Medicaid-eligible children that are found to
have elevated blood levels. Hiscock Declaration at q 5.® To further
® This commitment is reflected, for example, in HCFA's 1978
policy decision to share in the states' costs of investigating
sources of lead poisoning as a Medicaid "preventive" service.
Hiscock Declaration at § 5 and HCFA Action Transmittal, 78-59
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 9
3 .
that goal, HCFA considers and relies upon the evolving state of
medical knowledge to form the basis of its EPSDT lead screening
guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at § 7. HCFA collects this medical
knowledge from various sources of medical expertise, including, most
importantly, the CDC's periodic statements on "Preventing Lead
Poisoning in Children." Hiscock Declaration at q 7.° HCFA also
considers input from other governmental agencies (such as the Maternal
and Child Health Bureau of the HHS Public Health Service) and from
nongovernmental entities, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics
and other public interest advocacy groups concerned with childhood
lead poisoning and prevention issues. Hiscock Declaration at q 7.
HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening guidelines to
reflect the advances. in scientific knowledge of the effects of
childhood lead poisoning. Hiscock Declaration at q 8. For instance,
in 1972 the State Medicaid Manual guidelines advised state
intervention and treatment of children when an EPSDT screen determined
a child's blood lead level to be greater than 80 micrograms per
deciliter ("mg/dL") of whole blood. Hiscock Declaration at q 8 and
Exhibit 2 attached thereto at 16. By 1988, HCFA revised its EPSDT
guidelines to require intervention when an EPSDT screen determined a
child's blood lead level to be greater than 30 ug/dL. Hiscock
(July 1, 1978) attached thereto as Exhibit "1."
The CDC has issued four policy statements with respect to
preventing childhood lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at q 5.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 10
¢ eo
Declaration at ¢ 8.
In 1985, CDC issued a policy statement with respect to lead level
testing in children. Binder Declaration at § 5. The 1985 CDC
Statement set forth the threshold for concern by pediatric health care
providers at a blood lead level of 25 ug/dL of whole blood. Binder
Declaration at § 5. The actions suggested by the 1985 CDC Statement
ranged from periodic retesting to chelation therapy treatments in more
severe cases of lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at § 5. In
addition, the 1985 CDC Statement recognized the EP test as the
screening test of choice for lead poisoning in children. Binder
Declaration at ¢q 5.
In 1990, consistent with the then current recommendations of the
1985 CDC Statement on "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children," HCFA
required interventions when an EPSDT screen determined a child's
elevated blood lead level to be greater than 25 ug/dL. Hiscock
Declaration at § 8. Thus, in response to increased medical knowledge
of the effects of elevated blood lead levels, HCFA has continuously
lowered the blood lead level threshold at which it recommends or
requires concern and follow-up by Medicaid health care providers.
Hiscock Declaration at ¢q 8.
Similarly, HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening
guidelines to reflect available technological improvements in blood
lead level assessments. Hiscock Declaration at € 9. In 1972, the
agency did not establish any particular preferred test for EPSDT blood
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 11
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lead screening. Hiscock Declaration at § 9 and Exhibit "2" attached
thereto. In 1988, however, HCFA recommended the EP test as the
primary lead screening test under the EPSDT program. Hiscock
Declaration at q 9. (Rather than directly measuring lead in the
blood, the EP test indirectly assesses blood lead by detecting certain
protein indicators of elevated blood lead levels, i.e. erythrocyte
protoporphyrin. By contrast, the "blood lead test" directly measures
bios lead levels. Hiscock Declaration at § 9; Binder Declaration at
LA ) By April of 1990, HCFA's guidelines required, rather than
merely recommended, a blood lead test where a child was found to have
2 stlevatsg EP levels. Hiscock Declaration at § 9. Therefore, HCFA's
guidelines have not only grown increasingly more stringent in setting
blood lead level thresholds for concern, but they have also required
increasingly more sensitive blood testing where medical knowledge
indicated that such testing was appropriate. Hiscock Declaration at
q 9.
B. The 1991 CDC Statement
In or about 1989, the CDC chartered an advisory committee to
reevaluate a number of issues regarding childhood lead poisoning.
Binder Declaration at § 6. The work of that advisory committee
ultimately contributed substantially to the publication of the October
1991 CDC Statement, "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children: A
Statement By The Centers For Disease Control" ("1991 CDC Statement").
Binder Declaration at § 6 and 1991 CDC Statement attached thereto as
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 12
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Exhibit "1." The advisory committee members, representative of a wide
variety of organizations and interests including physicians, state and
local boards of health, hospitals, organizations dealing with housing
and environmental issues, and a professional who represented
laboratory interests, see 1991 CDC Statement, attached as Exhibit "1"
of Binder Declaration at v, provided written advice and
recommendations to the CDC regarding childhood lead poisoning
prevention. Binder Declaration at q 6. Furthermore, the advisory
committee received expert advice from a group of official consultants,
who provided input for the advisory committee's written
recommendations. Binder Declaration at ¢q 6.
In addition to the written recommendations of the advisory
committee, CDC eoneidersd comments from medical groups, including the
American Academy of Pediatrics, representatives of companies who
produce or use lead, drug manufacturers, and childhood lead poisoning
prevention interest groups. Binder Declaration at § 7. Furthermore,
before publishing the 1991 CDC Statement, CDC provided HCFA with draft
materials for the 1991 CDC Statement, and received comments and
suggestions from HCFA. Binder Declaration at q 8; Hiscock Declaration
at 9 10. In addition, the CDC itself engaged in studies of childhood
lead poisoning, the results of which are reflected in the 1991 CDC
Statement. Binder Declaration at q 9.
The 1991 CDC Statement differs from the 1985 CDC Statement in
that it lowers the threshold for concern by pediatric health care
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 13
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providers from the blood lead level of 25 ug/dL to 10 upg/dL. 1991 CDC
Statement at 1; Binder Declaration at ¢ 12. The actions suggested as
a result of such blood lead level results range from periodic
retesting to community prevention activities to chelation therapy
treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning. 1991 CDC Statement
at 3; Binder Declaration at q 12. The focus of the 1991 CDC Statement
is on "primary prevention" -- i.e. preventing exposure to lead before
children become poisoned. 1991 CDC Statement at 3, 4; Binder
Declaration at q 12. The 1991 CDC Statement is intended to provide
guidance and recommendations, rather than mandates, to pediatric
health care providers, state and local public agencies for dealing
with childhood lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at q 11.
While the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that the screening test
of choice is now the blood lead test, because the EP test is not
sensitive enough to identify children with blood lead levels below 25
ug/dL, the 1991 CDC Statement also acknowledges the need for a
transition period necessary to allow state health departments, health
care providers and laboratories to reach adequate capacity for
performing the blood lead test. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder
Declaration at q 13. To reach adequate capacity will require the
acquisition of the necessary laboratory equipment and the hiring and
training of appropriate personnel. Binder Declaration at q 13.
During this transition or phase-in period to the use of the blood lead
test as the primary screening method, the 1991 CDC Statement
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 14
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recognizes that some programs will continue to use the EP test as a
screening test. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at § 13.
The 1991 CDC Statement further distinguishes between those
children to be considered high-risk and low-risk for high-dose
exposure to lead, and recommends the use of a series of questions
designed to ascertain the risk level of a child, as well as the type
and frequency of testing the child should receive. 1991 CDC Statement
at 42-44; Binder Declaration at q 15. In addition, the 1991 cDC
Statement recognizes that virtually all children are at risk for lead
poisoning, and as a result, a phase-in of universal screening using
the blood lead test for all children is recommended, except in
communities where large numbers or percentages of children have been
screened and found not to have lead poisoning. 1991 CDC Statement at
2; Binder Declaration at § 16. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that
full implementation of universal screening using the blood lead test
will require the availability of cheaper and easier-to-use methods of
blood lead measurement. 1991 CDC Statement at 2; Binder Declaration
at § 16. The 1991 CDC Statement further recognizes that "[c]hildren
at the highest risk should be given the highest priority for
screening." 1991 CDC Statement at 39; Binder Declaration at q 16.!°
© The CDC has rechartered a new advisory committee on
childhood lead poisoning prevention which is scheduled to meet in
or about Spring of 1993. Binder Declaration at q 17. At that
time, the new advisory committee will consider whether to amend
the current 1991 CDC Statement or issue a revised CDC report on
lead poisoning prevention. Binder Declaration at q 17.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 15
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C. The September 1992 HCFA Guidelines
HCFA's current EPSDT guidelines, which took effect on
September 19, 1992, continue the trend of revising HCFA policy to keep
up with the latest medical knowledge, and to incorporate increasing
technological advances in blood lead level assessments. Hiscock
Declaration at § 10. The new guidelines primarily are a response to
the 1991 CDC Statement. Hiscock Declaration at § 10. CDC officials
responsible for compiling the 1991 CDC Statement reviewed and
commented upon drafts of HCFA's new EPSDT lead screening guidelines.
Hiscock Declaration at q 10; Binder Declaration at 4 17. On
December 6, 1991, several HCFA agency officials met with a CDC
official who was one of the principal authors of the 1991 CDC
Statement, Dr. Sue Binder, to discuss CDC's views on HCFA's draft
EPSDT lead screening guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at q 10; Binder
Declaration at q 17. In response to CDC's comments, HCFA made various
revisions to the draft guidelines, and then circulated the revised
drafts to various other governmental and private entities for comment.
Hiscock Declaration at § 10. CDC expressed its view that the proposed
HCFA guidelines were consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. Hiscock
Declaration at q 10; Binder Declaration at q 19.
Other entities that reviewed and commented on drafts of HCFA's
guidelines include the American Academy of Pediatrics; the Maternal
and Child Health Bureau, Health Resources and Services Administration
of the HHS Public Health Service; and an organization of the State
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 16
o« ¢
Medicaid Directors' Association known as the Medicaid Maternal and
Child Health Technical Advisory Group. Hiscock Declaration at § 11.
Thus, in revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA received
and considered input from an array of public and private organizations
concerned with childhood lead poisoning. Hiscock Declaration at q 11.
HCFA considered several factors in formulating its current EPSDT
lead screening guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at § 12. HCFA noted
that the 1991 CDC Statement recommends that health care providers
should first verbally assess a child's risk of having elevated blood
lead levels by asking a series of questions to determine the
likelihood of a child's exposure to lead sources. Hiscock Declaration
at € 12; Binder Declaration at § 15. The HCFA guidelines also require
such an assessment. HCFA State Medicaid Manual, attached to
Declaration of Michael M. Daniel in Support of Motion for TRO Against
the USA ("HCFA guidelines") at § 5123.2(a). Depending upon the
answers to questions in this "verbal ARsasaliont children are
considered to be either at "high risk" or "low risk" of being lead
poisoned. Hiscock Declaration at q 12.Y"
In revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines on lead testing
for children, HCFA also took note that the 1991 CDC Statement
recommended lowering the blood lead level threshold for which concern
'I' Although the 1991 CDC Statement indicates that all
children are at risk for lead poisoning, CDC and HCFA have both
recognized that the highest priority should be reserved for those
children with the highest blood lead levels. 1991 CDC Statement
at 39; Hiscock Declaration at q 12; Binder Declaration at q 16.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS!
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 17
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and follow-up is recommended from 25 ug/dL of whole blood to 10 ug/dL,
1991 CDC statement at 1; Hiscock Declaration at ¢ 13, and acknowledged
that the 1991 CDC Statement recommends screening through the use of a
blood lead test rather than the EP test to assess blood lead levels
lower than 25 ug/dL. 1991 CDC Statement at 2; Hiscock Declaration at
q 13; Binder Declaration at § 13. However, HCFA also took into
account CDC's recognition of the need for a "transition" period to
move away from EP testing and move toward blood lead testing. Hiscock
Declaration at q 13; see Binder Declaration at q 13.
HCFA's revised guidelines incorporate CDC's methodology of using
verbal assessments to determine "risk categories" of a child's
likelihood of being exposed to dangerous levels of lead. HCFA
guidelines at § 5123.2(a); Hiscock Declaration at § 14. Consistent
with the 1991 CDC Statement, HCFA's guidelines bifurcate children into
"high risk" and "low risk" categories for likelihood of lead exposure
based upon the answers elicited in the verbal assessment. HCFA
guidelines at § 5123.2(a), (b); Hiscock Declaration at q 14; see
Binder Declaration at q 15. HCFA's guidelines mandate the most
sensitive blood lead testing process for children determined to be at
"high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. HCFA guidelines at
§ 5123.2(c); Hiscock Declaration at q 14. This requirement is
consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement which recommends that the
highest priority be reserved for those children with the highest blood
lead levels. 1991 CDC Statement at 39; Hiscock Declaration at q 14;
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 18
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see Binder Declaration at q 16. As a practical matter, HCFA believes
that the majority of EPSDT-eligible children will be deemed to be at
"high risk" for elevated blood lead levels due to the socioeconomic
conditions that often circumscribe where Medicaid recipients reside.
Hiscock Declaration at § 14 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto.
In addition, while HCFA's revised EPSDT guidelines stress that
blood lead testing is the preferred method for assessing blood lead
levels of children deemed to be at "low risk," the guidelines give
states the option of using either the blood lead test or the EP test
as the initial screen for "low risk" children during the transition
period. HCFA guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at q 15 and
Exhibit "3" attached thereto. HCFA made this pragmatic policy choice
after considering coments from CDC and various organizations that
indicated that many localities simply do not currently have the
technology and/or the capacity available to universally conduct blood
lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible children, both "high risk" and
"low risk." Hiscock Declaration at q 15.
Both the 1991 CDC Statement and HCFA's guidelines recognize the
problems many communities face in moving away from EP testing and
toward blood lead testing. 1991 CDC Statement at 2, 41; HCFA
guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at { 15 and Exhibit "3"
attached thereto; Binder Declaration at q 13. However, the federal
government (through HCFA), has encouraged the most widespread use of
the blood lead test and will share in the costs of screening "low
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 19
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risk" children through the use of the blood lead test, if, as HCFA
recommends, states use this test. See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(c);
Hiscock Declaration at § 15 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto.
Even for this limited group of "low risk" children, states must
use the blood lead test in instances of elevated EP test results.
HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(b); Hiscock Declaration at § 16. Where
subsequent verbal risk assessments suggest increased lead exposure for
children previously deemed "low risk," however, a blood lead test must
be performed. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(b); Hiscock Declaration at
q.16 17
Since EPSDT-eligible children must be "periodically" screened for
medical problems in accordance with a prescribed "periodicity
schedule" set by each state, each and every EPSDT child should be
evaluated for their risk of lead exposure at each periodic screening,
and accordingly receive the test appropriate for their particular risk
category. Hiscock Declaration at q 17.
HCFA will continue to revise and update its guidelines in
response to future guidance from the CDC and other organizations, and
2 In the situation where a "low risk" child continuously
resides in an area which a state or local health official
declares lead-free, HCFA's guidelines require only verbal risk
assessments of the child's likelihood of lead exposure, rather
than a blood lead test or an EP test. HCFA guidelines at §
5123.2 (a); Hiscock Declaration at q 17. Similar to other "low
risk" children, however, if the verbal assessment indicates
increased likelihood of lead exposure for this group of children,
then states must use either a blood lead test or the EP test to
determine blood lead levels. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2{(b);
Hiscock Declaration at q 17.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 20
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as the technology necessary to perform the blood lead test becomes
more universally available. Hiscock Declaration at q 19.
Iv.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
A. The Named Plaintiffs' Claims Should Be Dismissed Because They
Have Not Suffered Any Injury And Thus Lack Standing To Sue
i. Principles of Standing
Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to
adjudicating actual "cases" or "controversies" as a means of properly
separating functions among the three branches of federal government.
Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 750 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982);
Flast v. cohen, 392 U.S. 83, .94 (1967). See U.S. Const. art. III, §
2. The doctrines that surround the "case and controversy" requirement
therefore rest on the principles that govern an independent judiciary
in our democratic government. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 471-72; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
Considering such principles, the Supreme Court in Allen stated
that "(t)he Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have
‘standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most
important of these doctrines." Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. And in fact,
"the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a
complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff
is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted."
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 21
Id. at 752.
To determine whether a particular plaintiff has standing to bring
an action, federal courts look to both the constitutional and
prudential limitations of the standing doctrine. See Allen, 468 U.S.
at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471. In order to have standing
under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must satisfy a
three-prong test by alleging (1) an injury that is (2) fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3)
likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Allen, 468 U.S. at
751; Valley Forge, 464 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court has recently
explained this requirement in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury
in fact" -- an invasion of a legally-protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of -- the injury has to be "fairly
. trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before
the court." Third, it must be "likely," as
opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
U.S. ¢ 112.8. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citations omitted).
The injury must be one that is distinct and palpable. Gladstone,
Realtors v., Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501. See also Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; Schlesinger
V. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1973).
The party who invokes federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 22
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establishing these elements. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. Since these
elements are an indispensable part of plaintiff's case, "each element
must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof" with particularized allegations
of fact. 1Id.; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501-02. If, after an opportunity to
provide such particularized allegations of fact, "standing does not
adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be
dismissed." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501-02 (emphasis added). "A federal
court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing
otherwise deficient allegations of standing." Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1990).
As explained in detail below, plaintiffs do not meet the
requirements of standing to sue on their own behalf (or on behalf of
the class which they purport to represent). The injury of which they
complain does not stem from HCFA's issuance of the challenged
guidelines and cannot be redressed by rescission of these guidelines
or any other relief plaintiffs request from defendant USA.
Accordingly, the Court should therefore dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint
for lack of jurisdiction.
2. Plaintiffs Have Suffered No Injury As A Result of The New
HCFA Guidelines
The four named plaintiffs allege that they live near a battery
crushing and lead product fabrication plant located in West Dallas.
Complaint at q 24. Under the challenged HCFA guidelines, all
Medicaid-eligible children should be given a verbal assessment to
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 23
4 dg
determine whether they are at "high risk" or "low risk" for exposure
to dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs! response to at least one of the
verbal assessment questions listed in the new HCFA guidelines -- "Does
your child live near a lead smelter, battery recycling plant, or other
industry likely to release lead . . . .?" -- should clearly be in the
affirmative. See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(a). Under the new HCFA
guidelines, "[i]f the answer to any question is positive, a child is
considered high risk for high doses of lead exposure." HCFA
guidelines at § 5123.2(b) (emphasis in original). As a result, all
four plaintiffs would be considered at "high risk" of having elevated
blood levels. Since the HCFA guidelines require that the most
sensitive blood lead test be administered for those children
determined to be at "high risk," plaintiffs should receive the blood
lead test they desire. See HCFA guidelines at 5-15; Hiscock
Declaration at q 14. These plaintiffs therefore will not be injured
by the application of the new HCFA guidelines. In fact, plaintiffs
will only benefit from their application. Not only is there no
"concrete and particularized" injury that these plaintiffs would
suffer as a result of the application of the new HCFA guidelines,
there is not even a threat of a "conjectural or hypothetical" injury
from those guidelines.
In addition, the requested injunctive relief would not redress
any alleged harm to plaintiffs. In order to establish redressability,
plaintiffs must show that "relief from the [alleged] injury [is]
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 24
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'likely' to follow from a favorable decision." Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. at 751. Or, in the recent phraseology of the Supreme Court,
plaintiffs must show some "potential gain" from the relief requested.
Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 451
(1989). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendant USA, both preliminarily
and permanently from supporting, allowing or financing the states' use
of the EP test as a screening test for lead poisoning, and to require
the federal defendant to mandate that states use the blood lead test
as the sole screening device for lead poisoning. They also seek to
enjoin HCFA's September 19, 1992 guidelines, and to require that HCFA
issue guidelines requiring that states retest all Medicaid-eligible
children previously tested with the EP test with the blood lead test.
Complaint at q 73. Yet the four named plaintiffs will fare no better
as a result of the granting of this extraordinary relief. The injury
of which they complain -- i.e., the State of Texas' alleged failure to
perform a blood lead test and appropriate lead poisoning intervention
—= cannot be redressed by enjoining the challenged September 1992 HCFA
guidelines. To the contrary, those guidelines require a blood lead
test and appropriate intervention in the circumstances alleged by
plaintiffs, and granting the relief sought by plaintiffs from
defendant USA would offer them no additional relief.
Furthermore, requiring HCFA to issue guidelines that require the
states' use of only the blood lead test would, in all likelihood, have
little or no practical effect. The HCFA guidelines take into account
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 25
oo 4
the requisite "transition" period needed for all states to move away
from EP testing and move toward universal blood lead testing for all
Medicaid-eligible children, while mandating that children at "high
risk" receive the blood lead test now. See HCFA guidelines at §
5123.2 (c); Hiscock Declaration at ¢ 13.
The states cannot immediately develop full capacity for blood
lead testing. Indeed, the relief plaintiffs seek may actually harm
them. In drafting its new EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA
carefully considered the fact that many states and localities
currently do not have the technology and/or the capacity available to
conduct universal blood lead testing. See Hiscock Declaration at
qf 15. As a result, during the transition period to eventual universal
blood lead testing of all Medicaid-eligible children, HCFA has made a
conscious and pragmatic policy choice to allow states to continue use
of the EP test in limited circumstances. See Hiscock Declaration at
1 19 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto. While states are currently
undergoing the necessary transition to eventual universal blood lead
testing, HCFA has reserved the highest priority of testing using the
blood lead test for those children, like plaintiffs, who are assessed
as "high risk." See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(c); Hiscock
Declaration at q 14." Given the states' current capacity
3 plaintiffs, who should clearly receive the blood lead
test pursuant to the new HCFA guidelines, cannot claim to have
suffered the same injury as those "low risk" children for whom
the guidelines do not mandate use of that test. Once the Court
concludes that the proposed class representatives lack individual
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 26
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limitations, requiring blood lead testing of all Medicaid-eligible
children, without assigning priority according to whether the child is
at "high risk" or "low risk," may result in significant delays in
blood lead testing (and necessary intervention) for "high risk"
children such as plaintiffs.!
B. Plaintiffs' Complaint As To Defendant USA Should Be Dismissed For
Failure To State Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Or
Alternatively, Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In Favor Of
Defendant USA
Even if the Court finds that plaintiffs possess the requisite
standing to bring this suit, plaintiffs have nevertheless failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and their Complaint
should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
standing, "the proper procedure . . . is to dismiss the
complaint, not to deny the class for inadequate representation or
to allow other class representatives to step forward." Brown Vv.
Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. 1981). Because standing is a
jurisdictional prerequisite, dismissal on standing grounds is to
take place before class certification issues are ever reached.
Id. As a result, plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed.
4 Finally, plaintiffs lack standing to seek an order which
would require HCFA to issue guidelines requiring that states
retest all Medicaid-eligible children previously tested with the
EP test with the blood lead level test. See Complaint at q 73.
Since EPSDT-eligible children must be periodically screened for
medical problems in accordance with a prescribed "periodicity
schedule" set by each state, each EPSDT child -- even those
previously tested with the EP test -- should be evaluated for
their risk of lead exposure under the new HCFA guidelines.
Hiscock Declaration at § 17. As a result, many Medicaid-eligible
children, including these plaintiffs, who previously received an
EP test under the old HCFA guidelines should now receive the
blood lead test in any event.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 27
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12(b) (6). Alternatively, because there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, summary judgment should be granted in favor of
defendant USA in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.
3. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With The Medicaid Statute
The Supreme Court has "long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . ." Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,, 467 uU.s. 837,
844 (1984) (citations omitted). See also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (a
statutory interpretation by an agency charged with applying the
statute is entitled to "considerable deference."). "To sustain the
[agency's] application of [a] statutory term, we need not find that
its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the
> Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) allows courts
discretion as to whether to consider "matters outside the
pleading" such as affidavits, and courts may or may not elect to
convert a Rule 12(b) (6) motion into a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56. See Isquith v. Middle South Utilities,
ing., 847 F.24 186, 193 -n.3 (5th Cir. 1938) (citing 5 C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (1969)). As a
result, the Court has the discretion to exclude the Hiscock and
Binder declarations accompanying defendant USA's 12(b) (6) motion
and simply dismiss the action based on the Complaint and the
attachments thereto. Even if the Court, in its discretion,
chooses to consider the Hiscock and Binder declarations in
deciding the legal issues before it, thereby converting defendant
USA's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment
should be granted in defendant's favor as there are no genuine
issues of material fact, and defendant USA is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 28
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result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first
instance in judicial proceedings." Udall Vv. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965) (citations omitted); accord Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45; Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980); United States
v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1979).
Moreover, the Secretary of HHS need not prove that the method
chosen is the only, or even the best, means to accomplish the
regulatory objective, only that "the agency decision was rational and
based on consideration of the relevant factors." Ethyl Corp. Vv.
E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976)
(citations omitted).
Contrary to plaintiffs' allegation, the new HCFA guidelines do
not contravene the statutory requirement of the Medicaid statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(r), for lead testing. Section 1396d(r) defines lead
screening as consisting of " (iv) laboratory tests (including lead
blood level assessment appropriate for age and risk factors) ."
(Emphasis added). On its face, § 1396d(r) does not require "blood
lead tests" as plaintiffs contend and plaintiffs offer nothing to
indicate that Congress intended the phrase "lead blood level
assessment" to have the narrow, technical meaning plaintiffs ascribe
to it. See Complaint at q 70. In fact, the Conference Report to OBRA
89, § 6403, now 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), stated that the legislation
"codifies the current regulations on minimum components of EPSDT
screening and treatment, with minor changes," and provides that
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 29
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"screening must include blood testing when appropriate, as well as
health education." Conference Report, H.R. 101-386, 101 Cong. 1st
Sess., p. 453 (emphasis supplied). The legislative history furnishes
no additional guidance regarding types of blood tests or other methods
for screening.!® As plaintiffs correctly point out, the Secretary of
HHS, the CDC and HCFA have all consistently recognized that the blood
lead test is the preferred mode for blood lead level assessments of
children. See Complaint at qq 63, 64 and 68; HHS' "Strategic Plan for
the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning" (February 1991) at 23;
Binder Declaration at q 13 and Exhibit "1" attached thereto; Hiscock
Declaration at § 15; HCFA guidelines at Preamble. The blood lead test
is not the only test for assessing blood lead levels, however.
Moreover, Congress clearly stated that "age and risk factors"
should be taken into account in determining the blood lead level
assessment "appropriate" for each Medicaid-eligible child. HCFA's
approach under the new EPSDT lead screening guidelines takes into
account the "appropriate for age and risk factors" aspect of §
1396d(r). HCFA has followed the recommendations of the 1991 CDC
Statement and has established a framework within which a verbal
assessment is first given to determine what type of blood lead level
® It should also be noted that at the time Congress
considered and passed OBRA 89, CDC recommended the EP test as the
test of choice. Moreover, it would be anomalous, given the basic
structure and operation of the Medicaid program, which gives
states latitude in determining the services to be provided, for
Congress to tell states not only that children's lead levels must
be assessed, but also to mandate a particular test.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 30
& ®
assessment is most appropriate in light of such factors as age and
risk for exposure to lead. See Hiscock Declaration at q 14; Binder
Declaration at q 15. Therefore, the challenged HCFA guidelines do not
contravene the Medicaid Act.
2. The HCFA Guidelines Give States The Option Of Using The EP
Test For "Low Risk" Children Only
Plaintiffs contend that the HCFA guidelines, which became
effective on September 19, 1992, continue to sanction the use of the
EP test as the primary screening test for lead poisoning in young
children throughout the country. Complaint at § 62. In drawing this
erroneous conclusion, plaintiffs ignore the plain language of the new
HCFA guidelines as well as their context. As explained in the Hiscock
Declaration, under the guidelines, the first step for an EPSDT
provider is to conduct a verbal assessment for each Medicaid-eligible
child in order to determine "risk categories" (i.e., a child's
likelihood of being exposed to dangerous levels of lead). Hiscock
Declaration at q 14. If even one of the questions enumerated in the
guidelines is answered in the affirmative, that child is automatically
considered to be "high risk." See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2 (b).
HCFA's guidelines require the blood lead test for children determined
to be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. HCFA
guidelines at § 5123.2(c); Hiscock Declaration at q 14. If all verbal
assessment questions are answered in the negative, that child is
considered to be "low risk," and the EPSDT provider is then given the
option to administer the blood lead test or the EP test. HCFA
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 31
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guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at ff 15. As a result,
states continue to have the option to use the EP test as the initial
blood lead level screening test only in those instances where, after a
verbal assessment, the EPSDT provider deems the child to be "low
risk," and further determines to administer the EP test rather than
the blood lead level test. See HCFA guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock
Declaration at q 15."
3. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With The 1991 CDC
Statement
Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the new HCFA guidelines are
consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. While the 1991 CDC Statement
recognizes that the lead screening test of choice is now the blood
lead test because the EP test is not sensitive enough to identify
children with blood lead levels below 25 ug/dL, see Complaint at q 68,
plaintiffs conveniently fail to mention the portion of the 1991 CDC
Statement which acknowledges the need for a transition period until
the recommendations of the 1991 CDC Statement can be implemented
fully. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at q 13 and
Exhibit "1" attached thereto. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that
this transition period is necessary to allow state health departments,
7 The federal government will nevertheless share in the
states' costs of screening "low risk" children through the use of
the blood lead test, and has encouraged states to use the more
sensitive test in all cases, as well as to increase their blood
lead testing capacities so that they will eventually be able to
perform universal blood lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible
children. See Hiscock Declaration at § 19 and HCFA letter to
State Medicaid Directors attached as Exhibit "3" thereto.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 32
OC 6
health care providers and laboratories to reach adequate capacity for
performing the blood lead level test, which will require the
acquisition of the necessary laboratory equipment and the hiring and
training of appropriate personnel. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder
Declaration at ¢ 13.
The 1991 CDC Statement itself recognizes that during this
transition or phase-in period which should culminate in the eventual
use of the blood lead test as the primary screening method, some
programs will continue to use the EP test as a screening test. 1991
CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at q 13. Recognizing the need
for this transition period, and completely consistent with the 1991
CDC Statement, HCFA has given states the option to use the EP test in
certain circumstances (i.e., for "low risk" children only) under the
new HCFA guidelines. See HCFA guidelines at Preamble. The basic
premise of plaintiffs' Complaint -- that the HCFA guidelines ignore or
are inconsistent with the 1991 CDC Statement -- is simply wrong.'
Indeed, the HCFA guidelines were developed in consultation with the
CDC and the CDC itself has stated that the guidelines are consistent
with the 1991 CDC Statement. ee Binder Declaration at q 19.7
® In any event, plaintiffs could not present a claim for
relief based on the allegations (even if true) that the HCFA
guidelines are inconsistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. That
statement is not binding on HCFA, or for that matter, or anyone.
It is merely a recommendation. See Binder Declaration at ¢ 11.
' In addition, the HCFA guidelines are fully consistent
with HHS' "Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead
Poisoning" issued in February 1991. Both recognize that the EP
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 33
OC &«
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Satisfy The Requirements For Temporary
Injunctive Relief
For the same reasons that plaintiffs lack standing and have
failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and for
additional reasons as well, plaintiffs are not entitled to temporary
injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief should
therefore be denied.
1. Standards for Injunctive Relief
As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, preliminary injunctive
relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, and should be granted
only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion. Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878
F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1929); White v. Carlucci, 862 F.24 1209, 1211
(5th Cir. 1989); Holland America Ins. Co. Vv. Succession of Roy, 777
F.24:992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985); Enterprise Int'l. Inc. v. Corporacion
Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985).
Accordingly, "[t]he decision to grant a preliminary injunction is the
exception rather than the rule." Mississippi Power & Light Co.
v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). In
order to obtain the extraordinary remedy of temporary injunctive
relief, the movant must "by a clear showing, carr([y] the burden of
persuasion," White, 862 F.2d at 1211, as to four elements. The movant
test is not a useful screening test for blood lead levels below
25 pug/dL, and that blood lead testing is the preferred method for
lead screening of all Medicaid-eligible children. See HHS report
at 23, 40; HCFA guidelines at Preamble.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 34
& &®
must demonstrate
(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits exists;
(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury
exists if the preliminary relief is not granted;
(3) that the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs any damage preliminary relief might
cause to the opponent; and
(4) that the relief sought will not disserve the
public interest.
DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d
1267, 1269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.s. , 111 8, CL. E519
(1990); Allied Marketing, 878 F.2d at 809; Enterprise Int'l, 762 F.2d
at 471; Canal Authority of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572-73 (5th Cir: 1974). "'[T]lhe movant has a heavy burden of
persuading the district court that all four elements are satisfied, '"
and "if the movant does not succeed in carrying its burden on any one
of the four prerequisites," preliminary relief may not be granted.
Enterprise Int'l, 762 F.2d at 472 (citations omitted). Accord
Anderson v. Douglas & lomason Co., 835 F.2d 123, 133 (5th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy any of the prerequisites for
preliminary injunctive relief in this case. As a result, plaintiffs’
Motion should be denied.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 35
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2. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Substantial Likelihood Of Success
On The Merits Of Their Claims Against Defendant USA
As defendant USA has previously demonstrated, plaintiffs are
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims against defendant
USA for several reasons. First, plaintiffs lack the requisite
standing to maintain those claims since they are unable to demonstrate
any concrete injury fairly traceable to the challenged HCFA
guidelines. Furthermore, the injunctive relief plaintiffs have
requested against defendant USA would not redress any alleged harm
plaintiffs may have suffered in any event. Second, plaintiffs' claims
that the new HCFA guidelines are contrary to the provisions of the
Medicaid statute and the 1991 CDC Statement are without merit. As
defendant USA has previously demonstrated, the new HCFA guidelines are
consistent with the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) which calls for
"lead blood level assessments appropriate for age and risk factors."
Moreover, CDC itself has recognized that the HCFA guidelines are
consistent with its 1991 CDC Statement.
3. There Is No Substantial Threat Of Irreparable Injury If The
Temporary Relief Plaintiffs Seek From Defendant USA Is Not
Granted
For the same reasons plaintiffs lack the requisite injury to
confer standing to sue the federal defendant, they cannot show a
substantial threat of irreparable injury if the new HCFA guidelines
remain in effect. In fact, rather than suffering any injury as a
result of the new HCFA guidelines, plaintiffs, who, under the new
EPSDT lead screening guidelines, are considered at "high risk" for
lead poisoning, will only benefit from the verbal assessment and
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 36
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testing framework of the HCFA guidelines.
Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[s]peculative
injury is not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on
the part of the applicant." Holland America Ins. Co., 777 F.2d at
997. Plaintiffs' alleged fear that as they "continue in the EPSDT
screening system they may never receive the appropriate blood lead
test," Motion at 6, is mere speculation on their part. The new HCFA
guidelines specifically require that these four plaintiffs receive
blood lead tests. Thus, if plaintiffs fail to receive these tests, it
is despite HCFA's new guidelines, not because of them.” Plaintiffs
have therefore failed to demonstrate a substantial threat of
irreparable injury if their requested injunctive relief as to
defendant USA is not granted.
4. The Threatened Injury To Plaintiffs Does Not Outweigh Any
Damage Preliminary Relief Might Cause To Defendant USA And
The Public
While plaintiffs would suffer no injury if their request for
injunctive relief from the defendant USA is denied, and in fact, would
only benefit from the application of the new HCFA guidelines,
defendant USA and the individual states would be damaged by the relief
plaintiffs seek. HCFA to issue guidelines which mandate the use of
the blood lead test exclusively would not, as discussed earlier,
ensure more accurate lead level assessments. The states could not
2 Any continued failure or refusal by the State of Texas to
administer the blood lead test as to these named plaintiffs would
contravene the HCFA guidelines.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 37
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follow such guidelines given the absence of the technology and/or
capacity of states presently to perform universal blood lead tests for
all Medicaid-eligible children. The carefully considered HCFA
guidelines take into account the requisite transition period needed
for all states to reached full capacity to perform universal blood
lead tests on all Medicaid-eligible children. Given the current
limited capacity of states to perform the more sensitive blood lead
test, to enjoin the new HCFA guidelines, even temporarily, would
likely result in "low risk" children receiving no lead testing at all
(while states abandon the EP test but are still unable to provide the
blood lead test),? or in delaying the use of the more sensitive blood
lead test for "high risk" children (while states attempt to use their
limited blood lead testing capacities for all Medicaid-eligible
children, regardless of whether they are "high risk" or "low risk").
Indeed, plaintiffs themselves might be forced to endure additional
delays in obtaining the blood lead test in Texas which they (as "high
risk" children) should now clearly be entitled to receive under the
new HCFA guidelines.
As plaintiffs correctly recognize in their Motion, ending
childhood lead poisoning is a national policy of the highest priority
21. Although HCFA recognizes that the EP does not detect
blood lead levels of less than 25 ug/dL, it nonetheless does
detect higher blood lead levels and is useful for identifying
those children who, despite a "low risk" verbal assessment
nevertheless show a very elevated blood lead level and therefore
require further screening and intervention.
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 38
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for defendant USA. See Motion at 7. HCFA clearly is committed to
this goal and the agency's commitment to the diagnosis and treatment
of lead poisoning among Medicaid-eligible children is most aptly
reflected in the new HCFA guidelines. The new guidelines represent a
rational and pragmatic balance between the current lack of technology
and/or capacity of states to conduct universal blood lead tests, and
the recognition that, while blood lead tests of all such children is
desirable, the highest priority for testing should continue to be
those children with the highest risk of lead poisoning. The HCFA
guidelines support and further the CDC's own recommendations in the
1991 CDC Statement. Plaintiffs' request that HCFA require states to
begin universal blood lead testing immediately is not only an
impractical and ahrealiscic solution, but a true disservice to the
public interest in effectuating a smooth transition to eventual
universal blood lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible children
nationwide.
5. Plaintiffs' Motion Should Also Be Denied Because It
Improperly Seeks To Alter The Status Quo
In addition to plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the prerequisites
for preliminary injunctive relief as demonstrated above, because the
requested injunction would alter the status quo by forcing HCFA to
rescind it current EPSDT lead screening guidelines and issue revised
guidelines requiring states to administer the blood lead test, see
Motion at 5, plaintiffs bear an even heavier burden. The purpose of
preliminary relief is to preserve the status quo ante litem pending
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 39
« ¢
full resolution of the controversy on the merits. University of Texas
Vv. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d
1489, 1509 (Sth Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 583
(1984). "Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is
often necessary if . . . [the relative positions of the parties] are
to be preserved", the preliminary injunction hearing is not
transformed into a trial on the merits. University of Texas Vv.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. As a result, courts are "extremely
cautious" about issuing preliminary injunctions when such relief would
change the legal landscape that existed immediately prior to the
moving party's request. Martin v. International Olympic Committee,
740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984). Nor is it proper, by altering the
status quo on an emergency injunction motion, to grant the plaintiff
the full relief to which he or she may be entitled if successful on
the merits at the conclusion of the trial. Id. See also Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 P.2d4 204, 808 (9th cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1963).
It is indisputable here that plaintiffs' Motion, if granted,
would alter -- rather than preserve -- the relative positions of the
parties in this case. Granting plaintiffs' requested injunctive
relief here would, in effect, improperly give plaintiffs virtually all
of the final relief they seek on the merits from defendant USA.
This principle is particularly applicable when plaintiffs here
seek to have defendant USA ordered to take action by requesting a
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 40
¢ ¢
mandatory injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
recognizing the gravity of a mandatory injunction, has stated that
"[m]andatory preliminary relief, which goes well beyond simply
maintaining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored,
and should not be issued unless the law and the facts clearly favor
the moving party." Martinez v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th
Cir. 1976). Accord Harris v. Wilters, 596 F.2d 678, 680 (Sth Cir.
1979) (only in rare instances is the issuance of a mandatory
preliminary injunction proper).
As defendant USA has demonstrated, since neither the facts nor
the law in this case favors plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs not only
have failed to satisfy the stringent prerequisites for injunctive
relief, but have failed to meet the heightened standards for a
mandatory injunction. As a result, plaintiffs' Motion should be
denied.
Vv.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss plaintiff's
Complaint in its entirety because plaintiffs lack standing to bring
this action. Alternatively, the Court should dismiss plaintiffs’
Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), or because there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, grant summary judgment in favor of defendant USA in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Finally, the
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 41
¢ *
Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction.
Dated: October 16, 1992 Respectfully submitted,
STUART M. GERSON
Assistant Attorney General
MARVIN COLLINS
United States Attorney
MARY ANN MOORE
Assistant United States Attorney
Texas Bar No. 14360400
if Fk
“SHEILA LIEBER J
Cilins ol Kefebg a
ALINA S. KOFSKY [ 7 7
Attorneys, Department of Justice
Federal Programs Branch, Civil
Division
901 E Street, N.W., Room 1010
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-4523
(202) 616-8470 (Fax #)
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 42
J ®
OF COUNSEL:
HENRY R. GOLDBERG, Deputy Chief
Counsel for Litigation
DAVID V. PEERY, Attorney
Office of the General Counsel
Department of Health and
Human Services
Room 500, East Highrise Building
6325 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21207
(410) 965-8871
(410) 966-5187 (Fax #)
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 43
o ¢
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of October, 1992, a copy
of Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss or in the
Alternative for Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and
Memorandum in Support, was served on the following individuals listed
below, via certified mail, return receipt requested:
Laura B. Beshara
Michael M. Daniel
MICHAEL M. DANIEL, P.C.
3301 Elm Street
Dallas, Texas 75226-1637
Edwin N. Horne a
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
State of Texas
P.O. Box 12548
Capitol Station
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
ih wr) tis Ll drt
MARY \ANN MOORE Wh
‘
DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION
TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS
MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 44
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LOIS THOMPSON, on behalf of and
as next friend to TAYLOR DIXON,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv. Civ. A. No. CA3-92-1539-R
BURTON F. RAIFORD,
Commissioner of the Texas
Department of Human Services,
and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
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DECLARATION OF WILLIAM McC. HISCOCK
I, WILLIAM McC. HISCOCK, declare:
l. I am the Chief of the Special Initiatives Staff,
Medicaid Bureau, Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"),
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). "I have
been employed by HCFA for thirteen years. I supervise an office
of six people.
2. My responsibilities as Chief of the Medicaid Bureau's
Special Initiatives Staff include assisting the agency's
implementation of particular aspects of the Medicaid program,
including the agency's implementation, in accordance with 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(r) and 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.50 - 441.62, of the Early
and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment ("EPSDT")
program. In this capacity, I also act as a liaison between the
Medicaid Bureau and other governmental agencies, such as the HHS
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 1
Lg 3
Public Health Service Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), that
have closely related responsibilities with HCFA for administering
federal health-related programs. I have been involved in
formulating HCFA's policies concerning EPSDT screening of
children for elevated blood lead levels since 1979. The
statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge and
upon information made available to me in the course of my
official duties.
3. HCFA provides instructional and interpretive guidance to
the states through the "State Medicaid Manual," policy letters,
and memoranda (which are sometimes known as "Action
Transmittals"). These materials and the State Medicaid Manual
reflect HCFA policy, ahd delineate how the states can comply with
federal Medicaid law, including federal EPSDT requirements.
4. TI have reviewed plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint in
this lawsuit, plaintiffs' motions for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, and their papers in support of
these motions. TI am familiar with plaintiffs' allegations in
these documents regarding plaintiffs' challenge to HCFA's revised
State Medicaid Manual guidelines concerning EPSDT screening for
elevated blood lead levels.
5. HCFA has an enduring and longstanding commitment toward
identifying and paying for the costs of treating Medicaid
eligible children that are found to have elevated blood lead
levels. This commitment is reflected, for example, in HCFA's
1978 policy decision to share in the states' costs of
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 2
& &
investigating sources of lead poisoning as a Medicaid
"preventive" service. HCFA Action Transmittal, 78-59 (July 1,
1978), attached as FExhibit "1."
6. Since the early 1970's, HCFA consistently has advocated
state screening of children under the EPSDT program for elevated
blood lead levels, long before Congress amended the EPSDT
statutory provisions in 1989 to define EPSDT "screening" as
explicitly including blood lead level assessments "appropriate
for age and risk factors." See, e.g., HCFA State Medicaid Manual
§ 5-70-E (1) (June 28, 1972) ("all children between ages of 1-6
should be periodically screened for lead poisoning"), attached as
Exhibit "2." Indeed, in 1989 Congress amended the EPSDT statute
to incorporate then-existing HCFA policy, as reflected in HCFA's
EPSDT regulations, and HCFA's State Medicaid Manual EPSDT program
guidelines. See HCFA State Medicaid Manual § 5122 (April 1988)
(containing language similar to 1989 Congressional amendments,
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)).
7. In pursuing its commitment to ensure that childhood lead
poisoning of Medicaid eligible children is promptly detected and
treated, HCFA considers and relies upon the evolving state of
medical knowledge to form the basis of the agency's EPSDT lead
screening guidelines. HCFA discerns this medical knowledge from
various sources of medical expertise, including, most
importantly, the CDC's periodic statements on "Preventing Lead
Poisoning in Children." HCFA also receives input from other
government agencies (such as the Maternal and Child Health Bureau
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 3
_¢ __¢
of the HHS Public Health Service) and from nongovernmental
entities, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and other
public interest advocacy groups concerned with childhood lead
poisoning and prevention issues.
8. HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening guidelines
to reflect the advances in knowledge of the effects of childhood
lead poisoning. For instance, in 1972 the State Medicaid Manual
guidelines advised state intervention and treatment of children
when an EPSDT screen determined a child's blood lead level to be
greater than 80 micrograms of lead per deciliter ("ug/dL") of
whole blood. Exhibit 2 at 16. By 1988, HCFA revised its EPSDT
guidelines to require intervention when an EPSDT screen
determined a child's blood lead level to be greater than 30
ug/dL. In 1990, consistent with the then current recommendations
of the 1985 CDC Statement on "Preventing Lead Poisoning in
Children," HCFA required interventions when an EPSDT screen
determined a child's elevated blood lead level to be greater than
25 ug/dL. Thus, in response to increased medical knowledge of
the effects of elevated blood lead levels, HCFA has continuously
lowered the blood lead level threshold at which it recommends or
requires concern by health care providers.
9. Similarly, HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening
guidelines to reflect available technological improvements in
blood lead level assessments. In 1972, the agency did not
establish any particular preferred test for EPSDT blood lead
screening. See Exhibit 2. In 1988, however, HCFA recommended
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 4
« o
the erythrocyte protoporphyrin ("EP") test as the primary lead
screening test under the EPSDT program. (Rather than directly
measuring lead in the blood, the EP test indirectly assesses
blood lead by detecting a protein indicator of elevated blood
lead levels, i.e. erythrocyte protoporphyrin. By contrast, the
"blood lead test" directly measures blood lead levels.) By April
of 1990, HCFA's guidelines required, rather than merely
recommended, a blood lead test where a child was found to have
elevated EP levels. Therefore, HCFA's guidelines have not only
grown increasingly more stringent in setting blood lead level
thresholds, but the agency guidelines have also required
increasingly more sensitive blood lead testing where medical
knowledge indicated that such testing was appropriate.
10. HCFA's current EPSDT guidelines, which took effect on
September 19, 1992, continue this trend of revising HCFA policy
to keep up with the latest medical knowledge, and to incorporate
increasing technological advances in blood lead level
assessments. HCFA's current guidelines primarily are a response
to the latest of CDC's periodic revisions to its Statement on
childhood lead poisoning, "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children:
A Statement by the Centers for Disease Control," October, 1991
(the "1991 CDC Statement"). I and various HCFA officials
consulted with CDC officials continuously during the drafting of
the 1991 CDC Statement. Similarly, various CDC officials
responsible for compiling the 1991 CDC Statement reviewed and
commented upon preliminary drafts of HCFA's current EPSDT
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 5
4 &«
screening guidelines. On December 6, 1991 I and several other
HCFA personnel met with a CDC official who was one of the
principal authors of the 1991 CDC Statement, Dr. Sue Binder,
Chief of CDC's Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, to discuss CDC's
views on HCFA's EPSDT lead screening guidelines. In response to
CDC's comments, HCFA made various revisions to the draft
guidelines, and then circulated the revised drafts to various
other governmental and private entities for comment. It is my
understanding, based on my conversations with CDC personnel
including Dr. Binder, that CDC believes HCFA's revised guidelines
are consistent with the approach endorsed by CDC in its 1991 CDC
Statement. I have read the Declaration of Dr. Sue Binder filed
in this action, which confirms this understanding.
11. Other entities that reviewed and commented on drafts of
HCFA's EPSDT lead screening guidelines include the American
Academy of Pediatrics; the Maternal and Child Health Bureau,
Health Resources and Services Administration, HHS Public Health
Service; and an organization of the State Medicaid Directors
Association known as the Medicaid Maternal and Child Health
Technical Advisory Group. Thus, in revising its EPSDT lead
screening guidelines, HCFA received and considered input from an
array of public and private organizations concerned with
childhood lead poisoning.
12. HCFA considered several factors in formulating its
current EPSDT blood lead screening guidelines. HCFA noted that
the 1991 CDC Statement recommends that health care providers
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 6
_ ®
should first verbally assess a child's risk of having elevated
blood lead levels by asking a series of questions to determine
the likelihood of a child's exposure to lead sources. Depending
upon the answers to these questions in the "verbal assessment,"
children are considered to be either at "high risk" or "low risk"
of being lead poisoned. Although the 1991 CDC Statement
indicates that all children are at risk, HCFA was cognizant of
CDC's recommendation that the highest priority should be reserved
for those children with the highest blood lead levels.
13. In revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA
also took note that the 1991 CDC Statement recommended lowering
the blood lead level threshold for which concern and follow-up is
recommended from 25 'ug/dL of whole blood to 10 ug/dL. The 1991
CDC Statement, therefore, recommends screening through use of a
blood lead test rather than the EP test to assess blood lead
levels at levels lower than 25 ug/dL. While the 1991 CDC
Statement notes that the EP test is not sensitive for blood lead
levels at the lower ranges for which the CDC recommends concern
by health care providers, the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that
not all programs currently have the capacity to conduct universal
blood lead testing. Accordingly, HCFA took into account CDC's
recognition of the need for a "transition" period to move away
from EP testing, and move toward blood lead testing. HCFA's
revised EPSDT screening guidelines, therefore, constitute a
synthesis of input from various organizations, balanced by the
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 7
_¢ &
pragmatic reality of the limited availability of the technology
to perform universal blood lead testing.
14. HCFA's revised guidelines incorporate cps methodology
of using verbal assessments to determine "risk categories" of a
child's likelihood of being exposed to dangerous levels of lead.
Consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement, HCFA's guidelines
bifurcate children into "high risk" and "low risk" categories for
likelihood of lead exposure based upon the answers elicited in
the verbal assessment. HCFA's guidelines mandate the most
sensitive blood lead testing process for children determined to
be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. This
requirement is consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement which
recommends that the highest priority be those children with the
highest blood lead levels. As a practical matter, HCFA believes
that the majority of EPSDT eligible children will be deemed to be
at "high risk" for elevated blood lead levels, due to the
socioeconomic conditions that often circumscribe where Medicaid
recipients reside.
i5. Further, while HCFA's revised EPSDT guidelines stress
that blood lead testing is the preferred mode for blood lead
level assessments of children deemed to be at "low risk," the
guidelines grant states the option of using either the blood lead
test or the EP test as the initial screen for "low risk" children
during the transition period. HCFA made this pragmatic policy
choice after considering comments from CDC and various
organizations that indicated that many localities simply do not
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 8
oC \¢
currently have the technology available and/or the capacity to
universally conduct blood lead testing for all Medicaid eligible
Children, both "high risk" and "low risk." The 1991 CDC
Statement recognizes the problems many communities face in moving
away from EP testing and toward blood lead testing. In light of
the practical realities of the nonavailability of universal
blood lead testing capacity in some communities, HCFA's
guidelines grant states the option of using the EP test as the
initial screen only for "low risk" children during the phase-in
of universal blood lead testing. However, the federal government
(through HCFA) will share in the costs of screening "low risk"
children through the use of blood lead test. In other words,
HCFA will provide federal financial participation for all states
use of the blood lead test to screen for lead poisoning,
regardless of the individual child's lead poisoning risk
assessment.
16. Even for this limited group of "lov risk" children,
states must use the blood lead test in instances of elevated EP
test results. But where subsequent verbal risk assessments
suggest increased lead exposure for children previously deemed at
"low risk," a blood lead test must be performed.
17. In the situation where a "low risk" child continuously
resides in an area that a state or local health official declares
to be lead-free, HCFA's guidelines require only verbal risk
assessments of the child's likelihood of lead exposure, rather
than a blood lead test or an EP test. But, similar to other "low
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 9
o ®
risk" children," if the verbal assessment indicates increased
likelihood of lead exposure for this group of children, then
states must use either a blood lead test or EP test to determine
blood lead levels. If a state chooses to use an EP test on this
group, and that test indicates elevated blood lead levels, then a
blood lead test must be performed. Thus, because all EPSDT-
eligible children must be "periodically" screened for medical
problems in accordance with a "periodicity schedule" set by the
state, each and every EPSDT child should be evaluated for their
risk of lead exposure, and accordingly receive the appropriate
blood lead level assessment.
18. HCFA's guidelines currently stress that blood lead
testing is the preferred method of EPSDT lead screening for all
Medicaid eligible children. As a result, HCFA will share in the
costs of paying for universal blood lead tests for all EPSDT
children in all instances. But given the existing technological
limitations of such testing, HCFA's policy choice to grant states
the option of using the EP test in certain limited instances
represents a realization of the very practical problems of
available resources that certain states face. HCFA seeks to
retain state flexibility in EPSDT screening, and emphasizes that
the September 19, 1992 guidelines are merely another in a
continuing series of phases of Medicaid guidance on EPSDT blood
lead screening.
19. HCFA has recently issued a policy letter to all State
Medicaid Directors which clarifies the limited instances in which
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 10
OC 1 §
states have the option of using the EP test during the transition
period. Exhibit "3." This letter emphasizes HCFA's commitment
to sharing in the costs of universal blood lead testing for all
EPSDT children, and also reemphasizes that blood lead tests are
preferred for all Medicaid eligible children.
20. In sum, HCFA's EPSDT lead screening policy has kept
pace with the evolving medical knowledge of the effects of
childhood lead poisoning. HCFA will continue to revise and
update its guidelines in response to future guidance from the CDC
and other organizations, and as the technology necessary to
perform the blood lead test becomes universally available.
21. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under
penalty of perjury ‘that the foregoing is true and correct, and
certify that the attached Exhibits 1-3 are true and correct
copies.
-—
Dated: October /5 1992 at Baltimore, Maryland.
(dds
WILLIAM McC. HISCOCK
DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 11
o a
5-70-00 p. 15
Assistance
Services and Payment in Medical Assistance Programs
Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment of ¢
-70-20
Eligible Individuals Under Age 21
E.
f.
Be
i.
Screening (Continued)
Vision Testing. Administer a vision screening test appropriate
to the child's age. Consultation by ophthalmologists and
optometrists can be of help in determining the type of tests
to be used and the criteria for determining when a child should
be referred for diagnostic examination,
Hearing Testing. Administer a hearing screening test appropriate
to the child's age. Consultation on suitable tests for screening
and on methods of administering the tests should be obtained from
audiologists or from State health or education departments,
Anemia Test. The most easily administered test for anemia is
a microhematocrit determination from venous blood or a finger-
stick, This should be done on all children or, if possible,
a hemoglob.in concentration which will give a more accurate
determination of anemia should be done.
Sickle Cell Test. Check all Negro children for sickle cell trait,
This may be done with a sickle cell preparation or a hemoglobin
solubility test. If a child has been properly tested once for .
sickle cell disease, he does not have to be tested again.
Tuberculin Test. Give a tuberculin test to every child:who hag
not had one within one year.
Urine Screening. Carry out a rapid urine screening on all
children for the presence of sugar, albumin and bacteria. i
Lead Poisoning Screening. It is not possible to identify which
children may have had undue exposure to lead-based paint and other
sources of lead poisoning, except by determination of blood- lead
levels, Therefore, all children between the ages of 1-6 should be
periodically screened for lead poisoning, Children 6 and over should
MSA- PRG-21
EXHIBIT 1 to HISCOCK DECL 6-28-72
5-70-00 p. 16
3 |
Medical a
:
-
ply jance
| @
Past 5. Services and Payment in Medical Assistance Programs
:
5-70-00 Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment of
Eligible Individuals Under Age 21
5-70-20 E. Screening (Continued)
be screened when medically indicated. The principal source
’
of childhood lead poisoning i8 lead-based paint, but pollution
of the environment from such things as burning lead batteries
lead poisoning. Early identification
and prompt treatment
of symptomatic and asymptomatic (over 80 mg/100 milliliters
73 BE
of whole blood) cases can prevent the serious sequelae of
i
lead poisoning, such as mental impairment, mental retardation
and involvement of the central nervous system. Venous OT
capillary blood .samples may be used, depending on local
laboratory facilities.
m, Nutritional Status. Physical and laboratory determinations
carried out in the screening process will usually yield
information useful in assessing nutritional status. Of par-
ticular imphrtance are measurements of height, weight, head
circumference and hemoglobin concentration or hematocrit. A
child having any detectable nutritional deficiencies should
be referred to a nutritionist or public health nurse for
consultation.
: :
n. Immunization Status. The screening progras presents an
excellent opportunity to ascertain a child's immunization
status, a major tool in preventing disease and disability.
. During the screening process, assess the child's {immunization
status; i.€., whether he has been imaunized against diphtheria,
pertussis, tetanus, polio, measles, rubella, and mumps, and
whether he is in need of booster shots, When it is available,
the child's immunization record should be brought to the
screening center. 1f immunization OT updating of {mmunization
is needed, provide the immunization OT updating at the screening
center or make sure it is done through the facility or provider
to whom the child goes for child health supervision.
MSA-PRG-21
6-28-72
basic
04-gg 04-88 EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSIS " TREATMENT 5122(Cont.)
3. Appropriate Vision Testing. - Administer an age-appropriate vision
| assessment. Consultation by opthalmologists and optometrists can help determine the
type of procedures to use and the criteria for determining when a child should be referred
for diagnostic examination.
4. Appropriate Hearing Testing. - Administer an age-appropriate hearing
assessment. Obtain consultation and suitable procedures for screening and methods of
administering them from audiologists, or from State health or education departments.
5. Appropriate Laboratory Tests. - Identifying as Statewide screening
requirements the minimum laboratory tests or analyses to be performed by medical
providers for particular age or population groups. Physicians providing
screening/assessment services under the EPSDT program use their medical judgement in
determining the applicability of the laboratory tests or analyses to be performed. If any
laboratory tests or analyses are medically contraindicated at the time of
screening/assessment, provide them when no longer medically contraindicated. As
appropriate, conduct the following laboratory tests:
a. Anemia Test. — The most easily administered test for anemia is a
mierohematoecrit determination from venous blood or a fingerstick.
b. Sickle Cell Test. — Diagnosis for sickle cell trait may be done with
sickle cell preparation or a hemoglobin solubility test. If a child has been properly tested
once for sickle cell disease, the test need not be repeated.
c. Tuberculin Test. — Give a tuberculin test to every child who has not
received one within a year.
d. Lead Toxicity Screening. — All EPSDT eligible children, ages 1-5
should be screened for lead toxicity, using the erythrocyte protoporphyrin (EP) test as the
primary screening test. Children with any elevated EP (greater than, or equal to, 50
micrograms per deciliter of whole blood) should receive a blood lead test. Children with
both an elevated EP and an elevated blood lead (greater than, or equal to, 30 micrograms
per deciliter) require diagnosis and treatment, which includes environmental
epidemiologic services to identify the source of lead, and periodic re-evaluation.
e. Others. — In addition to the the tests above, there are several other
tests to consider. Their appropriateness are determined by an individual's age, sex,
health history, clinical symptoms and exposure to disease. These include a urine
screening, pinworm slide, urine culture (for girls), serological test, drug dependency
screening, and stool specimen for parasites, ova and blood.
6. Dental Screening Services. - Although an oral examination may be part of a
physical examination, it does not substitute for examination through direct referral to a
dentist. The judgement that dental treatment is or is not necessary can only be made by
a dentist. It is the intent of the regulation not to disrupt continuous, comprehensive
dental care situations, but rather to encourage and develop them.
Rev. 2 5-11
EXHIBIT 2 TO HISCOCK DECLARATION
_¢
Health Care Financing Administration
6325 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21207
MEDICAID BUREAU
Dear State Medicaid Director:
The purpose of this letter is to clarify certain aspects of the lead screening
requirements published in the September 1992 revision of the State Medicaid
Manual (SMM), Part 5, for the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and
Treatment (EPSDT) program.
We consulted with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and other organizations
prior to revising our instructions, and we continue to consult with CDC about
developments in the capacity for screening and for performing blood lead tests.
We believe that our published guidelines are consistent with the CDC statement,
Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children (October, 1991).
Effective September 19, 1992, States are required to screen all Medicaid eligible
children between the ages of 6 months and 72 months of age at their next
scheduled EPSDT screening for lead poisoning. Screening consists of both a verbal
risk assessment and a blood lead level assessment. A child answering "yes" to one
or more of the risk assessment questions is determined to be at high risk, and a
blood-lead test must be performed. A child answering "no" to all questions is
determined to be at low risk, and may receive either a blood-lead test or an
erythrocyte protoporphyrin (EP) test. We believe that most Medicaid eligible
children will be at high risk for lead poisoning.
We consider all children between the ages 6 through 72 months to be at risk for
elevated blood lead levels. In the vast majority of cases, HCFA expects Medicaid
eligible children will receive a blood lead test. Children who live in a community
officially declared "lead free" by a State or local health authority and answer "no" to
all risk assessment questions, do not need a blood lead level assessment. However,
such a child must still receive a verbal risk assessment at every periodic screen to
determine if any changes have occurred which would change the child's risk status.
Although our SMM instructions are only the first phase in a transition period, and
take into account the currently available state of the art of lead screening
technology, I am aware that concerns have been raised over the continued use of
the EP test, even for children who are at low risk. Direct blood lead testing is the
preferred mode of ascertaining blood lead levels for all Medicaid eligible children,
and Federal financial participation is available for any Medicaid expenditures for
that purpose. While the EP test is not as sensitive as tests which directly measure
EXHIBIT 3 TO HISCOCK DECL
oC Le
Page 2 - State Medicaid Director
blood lead levels, it is easier and somewhat less expensive to perform than the
blood-lead test. In addition, the EP test will identify most children with blood lead
levels at or above 25 micrograms per deciliter, for whom medical interventions are
clearly indicated. We recognize, as does CDC, that not all communities currently
have the technology and laboratory capacity to perform blood-lead tests on all
children, while they do have the capability of performing the EP test. We do not
believe it appropriate to wait until a simpler and cheaper blood-lead test is
available, and permit many lead poisoned children to go undetected in the interim.
Thus, our instructions require initial blood lead testing for those children assessed
to be at high risk. The EP test is allowed only for low risk children, although the
blood lead test is preferred.
I am asking the HCFA regional office staff to help you implement the revised
policy, and to identify and work through any barriers you may encounter.
Acknowledging that States require time to develop the needed capacities, CDC is
currently pursuing research and development efforts to develop instrumentation and
protocols for simpler blood-lead tests. At this time, we cannot set a firm date for
the end of the transition period. As research and development efforts progress and
capacity becomes available, we will be providing further guidance which will
culminate with the requirement for blood lead testing of all Medicaid eligible
children, whether at high or low risk.
I hope this letter clarifies our recent instructions on lead screening.
Sincerely yours,
At
Christine Nye
or Director
cc:
All Regional Administrators
All Associate Regional Administrators
Division of Medicaid
_¢ «
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LOIS THOMPSON on behalf of and
as next friend to TAYLOR KEONDRA
DIXON, ZACHERY X. WILLIAMS,
CALVIN A. THOMPSON and PRENTISS
LAVELL MULLINS,
Plaintiffs,
Vv. Civ. A. No. CA3-92-1539-R
BURTON F. RAIFORD, in his
capacity as Commissioner of
the Texas Department of Human
Services,
and
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants.
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DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D.
I, Sue Binder, M.D. declare the following to be true and correct:
1. I am the Chief of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch,
Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, National Center
for Environmental Health and Injury Control, Centers for Disease
Control ("CDC"), Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS"). My office is located at Mailstop F42, Room
1342, 4770 Buford Highway, Atlanta, Georgia 30341-3724. In my
position as Chief of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, I am
responsible for developing and Sipienenting CDC policies and programs
in non-occupational lead poisoning prevention. I supervise
DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 1
4 _¢
approximately 30 employees, whose duties include overseeing grants to
state and local childhood lead poisoning prevention programs,
conducting epidemiologic studies of critical issues in childhood lead
poisoning prevention, conducting surveillance for blood lead levels in
children, and assisting other government agencies and the private
sector in issues related to nonoccupational lead poisoning prevention.
The operating budget of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch was $18.7
million in Fiscal Year 1992. I assumed my current position in 1990.
2 I hold an M.D. degree from Tufts University School of
Medicine in Boston, Massachusetts. I have been involved with lead
poisoning prevention activities since 1989, and with environmental
public health issues since 1984. I have authored and co-authored
several articles in professional medical journals regarding childhood
lead poisoning. I was one of the principal authors of the October
1991 CDC statement, "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children: A
Statement By The Centers For Disease Control" ("1991 CDC Statement"),
and the February 1991 HHS Report to Congress, "Strategic Plan For The
Elimination Of Childhood Lead Poisoning." Furthermore, I have given
numerous professional presentations across the country on childhood
lead poisoning.
3. The statements made herein are based upon my personal
knowledge and upon information made available to me in the course of
my ottictal duties.
4. I am generally familiar with plaintiffs' allegations that
HCFA's September 19, 1992 State Medicaid Manual guidelines ("HCFA
guidelines") are inconsistent with the 1991 CDC Statement.
DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 2
o _d
5. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 241, the CDC has issued four
policy statements with respect to preventing childhood lead poisoning.
In 1985, CDC issued a policy statement with respect to lead level
testing in children. The 1985 CDC Statement set forth the threshold
for concern by pediatric health care providers at a blood lead level
of 25 micrograms per deciliter ("ug/dL") of whole blood. The actions
suggested by the 1985 CDC Statement ranged from periodic retesting to
chelation therapy treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning.
In addition, the 1985 CDC Statement recognized the erythrocyte
protoporphyrin ("EP") test as the screening test of choice for lead
poisoning in children.
6. In or about 1989, the CDC chartered an advisory committee to
reevaluate a number of issues regarding childhood lead poisoning. The
work of that advisory committee ultimately contributed substantially
to the publication of the 1991 CDC Statement, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "1." The advisory committee members,
representative of a wide variety of organizations and interests
including physicians, state and local boards of health, hospitals,
organizations dealing with housing and environmental issues, and a
professional who represented laboratory interests, see Exhibit "1" at
v, provided written advice and recommendations to the CDC regarding
childhood lead poisoning prevention. Furthermore, the advisory
committee received expert advice from a group of official consultants,
who provided input for the advisory committee's written
recommendations.
7. In addition to the written recommendations of the advisory
DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 3
4 _¢
committee, CDC considered comments from medical groups, including the
American Academy of Pediatrics, representatives of companies who
produce or use lead, drug manufacturers, and childhood lead poisoning
prevention interest groups.
8. Furthermore, before publishing the 1991 CDC Statement, CDC
provided the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") with a
draft of the 1991 CDC Statement, and received comments and suggestions
from HCFA.
9. The CDC itself has engaged in studies of childhood lead
poisoning, the results of which are reflected in the 1991 CDC
Statement.
10. I served as one of the principal authors of the 1991 CDC
Statement. In addition, I synthesized the advice and recommendations
of the advisory committee and other interested parties and government
agencies, and consulted with the appropriate CDC officials
knowledgeable in this area in order to ensure that the 1991 CDC
Statement was consistent with CDC policy.
11. The 1991 CDC Statement is intended to provide guidance and
recommendations, rather than mandates, to pediatric health care
providers, state and local public agencies for dealing with childhood
lead poisoning.
12. The 1991 CDC Statement differs from the. 1985 CDC Statement
in chat Tit lowers the threshold for concern by pediatric health care
providers from the blood lead level of 25 ug/dL to 10 ug/dL. The
actions suggested as a result of such blood lead level results range
from periodic retesting to community prevention activities to
DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 4
&( Le
chelation therapy treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning.
The focus of the 1991 CDC Statement is on "primary prevention" -- i.e.
preventing exposure to lead before children become poisoned.
13. While the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that the screening
test of choice is now the blood lead test since the EP test is not
sensitive enough to identify children with blood lead levels below 25
pug/dL, the 1991 CDC Statement also acknowledges the need for a
transition period until the recommendations of the 1991 CDC Statement
can be implemented fully. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that this
transition period is necessary to allow state health departments,
health care providers and laboratories to reach adequate capacity for
performing the blood lead level test. (To reach adequate capacity
will require the aequisition of the necessary laboratory equipment and
the hiring and training of appropriate personnel.) During this
transition or phase-in period to the use of the blood lead test as the
primary screening method, the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that some
programs will continue to use the EP test as a screening test.
14. The EP test is an indirect assessment of lead levels in
blood since it measures the chemical erythrocyte protoporphyrin whose
level in blood rises when lead is present. By contrast, the blood
lead level test is a direct assessment of lead levels in blood, using
one of two electrochemical techniques to assess lead levels -- anodic
toning voltammetry or atomic absorption spectroscopy.
15. The 1991 CDC Statement further distinguishes between those
children to be considered high-risk and low-risk for high-dose
exposure to lead, and recommends the use of a series of questions
DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 5
o _d
designed to ascertain the risk level of a child, as well as the type
and frequency of testing the child should receive.
16. In addition, the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that
virtually all children are at risk for lead poisoning, and as a
result, a phase-in of universal screening using the blood lead level
test for all children is recommended, except in communities where
large numbers or percentages of children have been screened and found
not to have lead poisoning. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that
full implementation of universal screening using the blood lead level
test will require the availability of cheaper and easier-to-use
methods of blood lead measurement. The 1991 CDC Statement further
recognizes that the highest priority should continue to be those
children with the highest blood lead levels.
17. In 1991, I was contacted by HCFA agency officials to
discuss HCFA's proposed guidelines with respect to lead testing in
children. During 1991 and 1992, my staff and I discussed drafts of
HCFA's guidelines regarding lead testing of children with HCFA agency
officials on at least two occasions. On or about December 6, 1991, I
met with William Hiscock and other HCFA agency officials to provide
verbal comments on behalf of the CDC to HCFA with respect to the
proposed HCFA guidelines.
18. The CDC has rechartered a new advisory committee on
childhood lead poisoning prevention which is scheduled to meet in or
about Spring of 1993. At that time, the new advisory committee will
consider whether to amend the current 1991 CDC Statement or issue a
revised CDC report on lead poisoning prevention.
DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 6
o oC
19. CDC believes that the final HCFA guidelines, which became
effective on September 19, 1992, are consistent with the 1991 CDC
Staterent.
20. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of
perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge, and certify that Exhibit "1" attached hereto is a true and
correct copy. This declaration was executed on the 8 day of
October, 1992, at Atlanta, Georgia.
ON u N .D, -- Page 7