Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
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October 16, 1992

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Case Files, Thompson v. Raiford Hardbacks. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 1992. ab57b479-5c40-f011-b4cb-0022482c18b0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d733d621-4959-4f5e-89d4-4a3fe6032c22/defendants-motion-to-dismiss-or-for-summary-judgment-and-in-opposition-to-plaintiffs-motion-for-temporary-restraining-order. Accessed June 18, 2025.
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| ® _ 3 Se Dior IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION LOIS THOMPSON on behalf of and as next friend to TAYLOR KEONDRA DIXON, ZACHERY X. WILLIAMS, CALVIN A. THOMPSON and PRENTISS LAVELL MULLINS, Plaintiffs, Vv. Civil No. 3:92-1539-R BURTON F. RAIFORD, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. N o N a l N a s N a t l N a l N a l N w N a N l N w N a S u n l a a a ? a a ’ “ a n t S u ? “ ? DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT | + 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF AUTHOR PIES. 0 ts vv a ie oa ite Saini ii I. INTRODUCTION. os elie tle iy ai 0 ov iui wai via tag igi yh tis 1 Il. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND vv iv eis oie a wien a 6 A. The Medicald Program iv «+ oc oi vc Tete in vie % oie oie 6 B. Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic And Treatment Program. «uc sv cis « + 0% aie sa 7 11. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS.» viv. « « 2 visite einiin oi vo range, 9 A. HCFA's Previous Actions Regarding Screening Of Children For Elevated Blood levels . . . , + viv v's 9 B. The 199) CDC. Statement” . . . . vos v0 vy vrs 12 C. The September 1992 HCFA Guidelines . . . . uv 2 eo ov « '» 16 IV, “BRGUMENT ANDI BUTHORITIES . v vv ve vie lie athe ag aie ai 21 A. The Named Plaintiffs' Claims Should Be Dismissed Because They Have Not Suffered Any Injury And Thus Lack SANGIN ENS SUB le vrs ves mise a ia a a ha 21 : ot Principles of Standing « + . 2. oy vin ivi Niteita 21 2. Plaintiffs Have Suffered No Injury As A Result of The New HCFA Guidelines .'. . «. . . , 24 B. Plaintiffs' Complaint As To Defendant USA Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Or Alternatively, Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In Favor Of Defendant USA . . J + 8 guia, hy 28 1. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With The Medicaid Statute . . ot. Jiiip Jobe 28 2. The HCFA Guidelines Give States The Option Of Using The EP Test For "Low Risk" Children Only & =. u...iiv Ww woe ow Tul, 33 3. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With The 11991 CDC Statement . ... gies Lo Lay Onan no 32 - PS J 3 C. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Satisfy The Requirements For Temporary Injunctive Relief . . . . . 34 3. Standards for injunctive Relief . '. . . vv iu a 34 2. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Substantial Likelihood Of Success On The Merits . . . + oie . 36 3. There Is No Substantial Threat Of Irreparable Injury If The Temporary Relief Plaintiffs Seek From Defendant USA IS NOC Granted « ov ov io vieciniv. on wiht igban di 37 4. The Threatened Injury To Plaintiffs Does Not Outweigh Any Damage Preliminary Relief Might Cause To Defendant USA And PRE PUDIIC oo 3 oe eis is aie nin wail EE 38 Be Plaintiffs' Motion Should Also Be Denied Because It Improperly Seeks To Alter The Status QUO « voc =v vo vv devo 40 Vv. CONCLUSION te ts 8. Be ot i ie wee ea 42 - 41 = ¢ ¢ TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASE(S): PAGE(S) Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1983) o eile Ne cities Laine sie Bly 23g 2D Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 P.24.:806 (5th Cir. 1989) ies + wi Ye eet Sle, Ye yw 34, 35 Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 835 Pe2@ 128 {SLR CIT. 1088) vo viv le vieiiv vinnie eee 36 Asarco v, Radish, 490 U.S, 605 (1989) + v vv «iv 0 vo vite vin ein 22 Atkins v, Rivera, 477 U.8.:184. (1986) . + « viv. iv vw Ww Nd Joa i'e Brown v. Sibley, 630'F.2q 760 (Sth Cir. 1981) . iv « vivin sino 4927 Canal Authority of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (53th Cir. FO74) ui oy vie esi ee Teak 3D Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985) viva aie we ee 29 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . .. + «ieee 28, 29 DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.24 1267 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. r 211 S.Ct. 519: (1990)... + + vv ev + 35 Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.24 464 (5th Cir. 1585) nev vai we VEY eile 35,36 Ethyl Coyp. Vv. E.P.A., 541-F.24 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S, 941 (19768) .. + +. 0 hii, JU00 a0 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 8U.8.0. 555 (1080) Rl. om. . an. 0 ie ae ea i a a ia Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 44] VeSei 91 {1970 4 ie ite wis v Tv ov 0 viene eae Ry ie yity * Harris vv. MeRae 4448 U.S. 207 (1980) i. i uns Ww dn otis a Harris v. Wilters, 596 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 3979 . . «4d &iww vie Siay Holland America Ins. Co. Vv. Succession of Roy, 777 FP.2Q5992 ({SLtNECIT. 1IBBY 'v "vv vilei va 2 0 a wim Bene 35.37 - iii - Ra J Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc., 847 'P.24 186°(5th Cir. 1988)", . . « 's Lewis v. Hegstrom, 767 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1985) Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 583 (1984) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, U.S. y 112:8. Ct. 2130: (1992) v .» Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670 (Oth Cir. 1984) ovis oi v « = Martinez v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1976) Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1985) Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) oie a ae ei WE Ca Schlesinger v. Reservists To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208 (1973) oe a a Te a Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 4830. CS, 34 {Y081Y >, JL. a Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569 (1982) Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.24 804 (oth Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1963) Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) United States wv. Rutherford, 442 U.S, 544 (1979) i... University of Texas v. Camenisch, 4510.8, 380 (1981): « vv v + 27% Valley Forge College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1981) + 5. . i Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S5. 490.1(1975) White 'v, Carlucci, 862 F.24 1209 (5th Cir. 1939) Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) - iy o STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 42 U.S.C. 1396 42 0.8.0. 8 13960: .. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A) 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) 42 U.8.C.a 8 139600, a0 42 C.F.R. § 1396d(a) (4) (B) 42 U.S.C. 13964(r) . § § § § 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) § § § § 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (43) (A) 42 C.F.R. 440.40(b) . MISCELLANEOUS Conference Report, H.R. 101-386, 101 Cong. 1st Sess., p. 453 o I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, four children who are residents of West Dallas, Texas, purport to represent a nationwide class of all Medicaid- eligible children who are at risk for lead poisoning.! Plaintiffs contend that they have not been given the appropriate blood lead level assessment and treatment by the State of Texas. As to defendant USA, they contend that guidelines issued recently by the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"), a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), which became effective on September 19, 1992, encourage states to test Medicaid-eligible children for lead poisoning by using a less sensitive blood test (the erythrocyte PEOtkpor HYP or "EP" test), which would not detect lead levels at the threshold at which concern is recommended by the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), rather than a more sensitive blood lead test. The continued use of the EP test, according to plaintiffs, contravenes a requirement of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), for "blood lead level assessment" and is inconsistent with the October 1991 Statement of the CDC "Preventing Lead Poisoning in ! Plaintiffs initiated this action on or about July 29, 1992 against defendant Burton F. Raiford, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services. On or about August 6, 1992, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. Defendant United States of America ("USA") has not been served with either the original complaint or the first amended complaint. On or about September 10, 1592, plaintiffs once again amended their complaint ("Complaint") to include the USA as a defendant. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 1 o o« Young Children: A Statement By The Centers For Disease Control" and HHS' "Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning" issued in February 1991, both of which recognize that the lead screening test of choice is now the blood lead test. Plaintiffs seek a sweeping mandatory, preliminary and permanent injunction to require that HCFA compel the states to use the blood lead test as the sole screening test for lead poisoning.? They also seek an order enjoining the federal government from supporting, allowing or financing the states' continued use of the EP test as a screening test for lead poisoning.’ 2 It is only this form of relief which plaintiffs appear not to seek as preliminary relief from defendant USA. In addition, plaintiffs seek an order which would require HCFA to issue guidelines requiring that states retest all Medicaid- eligible children previously tested with the EP test with the blood lead level test. ’ Plaintiffs also seek certain relief from defendant Burton Raiford, Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services. Specifically, plaintiffs seek a mandatory preliminary and permanent injunction to require the State of Texas to use the blood lead test as the sole screening device for lead poisoning statewide, and enjoin the State from using the EP test. Plaintiffs also seek an order requiring defendant Raiford to declare West Dallas and other geographic areas in the State of Texas high risk areas for children for lead poisoning, and notify all EPSDT providers that eligible children residing in such designated high risk geographic areas be given lead blood level assessments. In addition, plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendant Raiford to give effective notice and outreach of the availability of blood lead screening and treatment to all EPSDT- eligible children; and implement a case management program to ensure that lead screening and treatment is provided for all EPSDT-eligible children in accordance with the CDC guidelines. Finally, plaintiffs seek an order requiring defendant Raiford to retest, using the blood lead level test, all EPSDT-eligible children previously tested with the EP test. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 2 o « Defendant USA hereby opposes plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction Against the U.S.A. ("Motion") and respectfully moves this Court for dismissal of plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety. As a threshold matter, plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. Plaintiffs suffer no injury from the HCFA guidelines. The injury of which they complain -— i.e., the State of Texas' alleged failure to perform a blood lead test and appropriate lead poisoning intervention -- does not stem from the challenged September 1992 HCFA guidelines. Indeed, those very guidelines would require that plaintiffs receive the blood lead tests they seek.? Granting the relief sought by plaintiffs from defendant USA would not redress plaintiffs' injury and would offer plaintiffs no relief not already offered by the very guidelines plaintiffs challenge. Furthermore, requiring HCFA to issue guidelines which mandate the states' use of the direct blood lead test (rather than the EP test) in all cases would not accomplish plaintiffs' intended result (i.e., universal use of the blood lead test), and may actually harm the plaintiffs themselves. Given the states' current capacity limitations for blood lead tests, requiring blood lead tests of all Medicaid-eligible children, without assigning priority according to whether the child 'is at "high risk" or "low risk," may result in * In accordance with the challenged HCFA guidelines, the four named plaintiffs would be deemed to be "high risk" for significant lead exposure. The HCFA guidelines require that the more sensitive blood lead test be administered for those children determined to be "high risk." DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 3 . QC significant delays in providing blood lead tests (and necessary intervention) for "high risk" children such as plaintiffs. Even if the Court finds that plaintiffs possess the requisite standing to bring this suit, the case must be dismissed because plaintiffs' claims are wholly lacking in merit. Contrary to plaintiffs' allegations, the new HCFA guidelines do not contravene the statutory requirement of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), for blood lead level assessment. Section 1396d(r) defines lead screening as consisting of " (iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment appropriate for age and risk factors)." On its face, § 1396d(r) does not require "blood lead tests" as plaintiffs contend and plaintiffs offer nothing to indicate that Congress intended the term "lead blood level assessment" be to have the restrictive (and highly technical) meaning they ascribe to it. Plaintiffs' claims evidence a fundamental misunderstanding of the new HCFA guidelines. There is no merit to plaintiffs' assertion that HCFA's guidelines generally allow (indeed encourage) the use of the EP test. The guidelines require the blood lead test for all children determined to be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. States continue to have the option to use the EP test as the initial screening blood test only in those instances where, after a verbal assessment, the EPSDT provider deems the child to be "low risk."’ > Thus, plaintiffs' suggestion that the guidelines were intended to limit the federal government's financial obligations is ludicrous. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 4 ¢ o HCFA has, however, encouraged the most widespread use of the blood lead test and will share in the states' costs of screening all children (including those assessed as "low risk"), through the use of the blood lead test.S In addition, the new HCFA guidelines are consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. Plaintiffs' allegations to the contrary are groundless. Indeed, the HCFA guidelines were developed in consultation with the CDC, and the CDC itself has stated that the guidelines are consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. See Declaration of Susan Binder, M.D. Chief, Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, CDC, attached hereto as Exhibit "B," at q 19. Finally, for the same reasons that plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, plaintiffs are not entitled to temporary injunctive relief. This is all the more true because plaintiffs seek mandatory preliminary injunctive relief which would alter the status quo, rather than maintain it, by forcing HCFA to rescind its current EPSDT lead screening guidelines and issue revised guidelines requiring states to administer the blood lead test for all Medicaid-eligible children. Thus, plaintiffs' Motion for temporary injunctive relief should be denied. ® HCFA estimates that the majority of young Medicaid- eligible children will be assessed as "high risk" due to their physical living conditions. See Declaration of William McC. Hiscock, attached hereto as Exhibit "A," at <q 14. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- § Na eo II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND A. The Medicaid Program Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, establishes a jointly funded, cooperative federal- state program designed to "enabl[e] each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State," to furnish medical assistance to eligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396. See Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 165 (1986); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 571 (1982); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). While the Medicaid program is voluntary, states that choose to participate must submit a state plan which fulfills all requirements imposed by the Medicaid statute and its implementing regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. See Schweiker Y. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 301. The Secretary is obligated to approve a state plan that meets all federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b). Upon approval of the state plan, a state becomes entitled to reimbursement by the federal government, termed "federal financial participation" ("FFP") for a portion of its allowable payments to hospitals, nursing homes, and other providers furnishing medical assistance to eligible recipients. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a). Both the state plans and the states' implementation of the plans are subject to oversight by the Secretary to ensure continued compliance with the federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 6 S s The day-to-day administration of state Medicaid programs is performed by the states, not by the federal government. Within the broad framework of federal requirements and oversight, the states operate their individual programs in accordance with state rules and criteria that vary widely. "As long as a State complies with the requirements of the Act, it has wide discretion in administering its local program." lewis v. Hedstrom, 767 F.24 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). The Medicaid statute, however, does mandate that, at a minimum participating states provide certain eligible groups with some specific services. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (A). Apart from certain statutory requirements, each state chooses the services (and payment levels), and any additional groups (other than those mandated by the Act) for which it will provide coverage. Id. The states also have considerable discretion concerning the administrative and operating procedures they will use to implement federal requirements. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 301. B. Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment Program The Medicaid statute mandates that states provide Early and Periodic Screening and Diagnostic and Treatment Program ("EPSDT") services to Medicaid-eligible individuals under the age of 21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a) (43) (A) and 1396d(a) (4) (B). In 1989, Congress amended the Social Security Act to define EPSDT services when it enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA 89"), DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =- 7 _ 3 eo Pub. L. 101-239,°103 Stat. 2106 (Dec. 19, 1989). Section 6403 of OBRA 89 provided the definition of EPSDT services by adding § 1396d(r) to the Medicaid statute, effective April 1, 1990.’ In particular, section 6403 of OBRA 89, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), defines screening services to include, at a minimum, (1) a comprehensive health and developmental history (including assessment of both physical mental health development), (11) a comprehensive unclothed physical exam, (1ii) appropriate immunizations according to age and health history, (iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment appropriate for age and risk factors), and (Vv) health education (including anticipatory guidance). (Emphasis added). HCFA provides instructional and interpretive guidance to the states through the "State Medicaid Manual," policy letters, and memoranda (which are sometimes known as "Action Transmittals"). These z The Secretary's regulation, promulgated before the 1989 amendment and found at 42 C.F.R. § 440.40(b), generally defines EPSDT services, but does not define the services in detail. OBRA 89, § 6403, now 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), was derived from H.R. 3299, '§ 4213. Conference Report, H.R. 101-386, 101 Cong. 1st Sess., p. 453. The Conference Report stated that the legislation "codifies the current regulations on minimum components of EPSDT screening and treatment, with minor changes," and provides that "screening must include blood testing when appropriate, as well as health education." (Emphasis supplied). The legislative history furnishes no additional guidance regarding tests or methods for screening. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 8 ¢ & materials reflect HCFA policy, and delineate how the states can comply with federal Medicaid law, including federal EPSDT requirements. See Declaration of William McC. Hiscock (the "Hiscock Declaration") at ¢ 3, attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The EPSDT statutory provisions and the regulations are interpreted by the Secretary in the State Medicaid Manual. III. UNCONTROVERTED FACTS A. HCFA's Previous Actions Regarding Screening Of Children For Elevated Blood Levels Since the early 1970's, long before Congress amended the EPSDT statutory provisions to define EPSDT "screening" as explicitly including blood lead level assessments "appropriate for age and risk factors," HCFA consistently has advocated state screening of children under the EPSDT program for elevated blood lead levels. Hiscock Declaration at § 6 and HCFA State Medicaid Manual § 5-70-E (1) (June 28, 1972) ("all children between ages of 1-6 should be periodically screened for lead poisoning"), attached thereto as Exhibit v2.0 HCFA has a longstanding commitment toward identifying and paying for the costs of treating Medicaid-eligible children that are found to have elevated blood levels. Hiscock Declaration at q 5.® To further ® This commitment is reflected, for example, in HCFA's 1978 policy decision to share in the states' costs of investigating sources of lead poisoning as a Medicaid "preventive" service. Hiscock Declaration at § 5 and HCFA Action Transmittal, 78-59 DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 9 3 . that goal, HCFA considers and relies upon the evolving state of medical knowledge to form the basis of its EPSDT lead screening guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at § 7. HCFA collects this medical knowledge from various sources of medical expertise, including, most importantly, the CDC's periodic statements on "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children." Hiscock Declaration at q 7.° HCFA also considers input from other governmental agencies (such as the Maternal and Child Health Bureau of the HHS Public Health Service) and from nongovernmental entities, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and other public interest advocacy groups concerned with childhood lead poisoning and prevention issues. Hiscock Declaration at q 7. HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening guidelines to reflect the advances. in scientific knowledge of the effects of childhood lead poisoning. Hiscock Declaration at q 8. For instance, in 1972 the State Medicaid Manual guidelines advised state intervention and treatment of children when an EPSDT screen determined a child's blood lead level to be greater than 80 micrograms per deciliter ("mg/dL") of whole blood. Hiscock Declaration at q 8 and Exhibit 2 attached thereto at 16. By 1988, HCFA revised its EPSDT guidelines to require intervention when an EPSDT screen determined a child's blood lead level to be greater than 30 ug/dL. Hiscock (July 1, 1978) attached thereto as Exhibit "1." The CDC has issued four policy statements with respect to preventing childhood lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at q 5. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 10 ¢ eo Declaration at ¢ 8. In 1985, CDC issued a policy statement with respect to lead level testing in children. Binder Declaration at § 5. The 1985 CDC Statement set forth the threshold for concern by pediatric health care providers at a blood lead level of 25 ug/dL of whole blood. Binder Declaration at § 5. The actions suggested by the 1985 CDC Statement ranged from periodic retesting to chelation therapy treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at § 5. In addition, the 1985 CDC Statement recognized the EP test as the screening test of choice for lead poisoning in children. Binder Declaration at ¢q 5. In 1990, consistent with the then current recommendations of the 1985 CDC Statement on "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children," HCFA required interventions when an EPSDT screen determined a child's elevated blood lead level to be greater than 25 ug/dL. Hiscock Declaration at § 8. Thus, in response to increased medical knowledge of the effects of elevated blood lead levels, HCFA has continuously lowered the blood lead level threshold at which it recommends or requires concern and follow-up by Medicaid health care providers. Hiscock Declaration at ¢q 8. Similarly, HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening guidelines to reflect available technological improvements in blood lead level assessments. Hiscock Declaration at € 9. In 1972, the agency did not establish any particular preferred test for EPSDT blood DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 11 o« ol lead screening. Hiscock Declaration at § 9 and Exhibit "2" attached thereto. In 1988, however, HCFA recommended the EP test as the primary lead screening test under the EPSDT program. Hiscock Declaration at q 9. (Rather than directly measuring lead in the blood, the EP test indirectly assesses blood lead by detecting certain protein indicators of elevated blood lead levels, i.e. erythrocyte protoporphyrin. By contrast, the "blood lead test" directly measures bios lead levels. Hiscock Declaration at § 9; Binder Declaration at LA ) By April of 1990, HCFA's guidelines required, rather than merely recommended, a blood lead test where a child was found to have 2 stlevatsg EP levels. Hiscock Declaration at § 9. Therefore, HCFA's guidelines have not only grown increasingly more stringent in setting blood lead level thresholds for concern, but they have also required increasingly more sensitive blood testing where medical knowledge indicated that such testing was appropriate. Hiscock Declaration at q 9. B. The 1991 CDC Statement In or about 1989, the CDC chartered an advisory committee to reevaluate a number of issues regarding childhood lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at § 6. The work of that advisory committee ultimately contributed substantially to the publication of the October 1991 CDC Statement, "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children: A Statement By The Centers For Disease Control" ("1991 CDC Statement"). Binder Declaration at § 6 and 1991 CDC Statement attached thereto as DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 12 ¢ LJ Exhibit "1." The advisory committee members, representative of a wide variety of organizations and interests including physicians, state and local boards of health, hospitals, organizations dealing with housing and environmental issues, and a professional who represented laboratory interests, see 1991 CDC Statement, attached as Exhibit "1" of Binder Declaration at v, provided written advice and recommendations to the CDC regarding childhood lead poisoning prevention. Binder Declaration at q 6. Furthermore, the advisory committee received expert advice from a group of official consultants, who provided input for the advisory committee's written recommendations. Binder Declaration at ¢q 6. In addition to the written recommendations of the advisory committee, CDC eoneidersd comments from medical groups, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, representatives of companies who produce or use lead, drug manufacturers, and childhood lead poisoning prevention interest groups. Binder Declaration at § 7. Furthermore, before publishing the 1991 CDC Statement, CDC provided HCFA with draft materials for the 1991 CDC Statement, and received comments and suggestions from HCFA. Binder Declaration at q 8; Hiscock Declaration at 9 10. In addition, the CDC itself engaged in studies of childhood lead poisoning, the results of which are reflected in the 1991 CDC Statement. Binder Declaration at q 9. The 1991 CDC Statement differs from the 1985 CDC Statement in that it lowers the threshold for concern by pediatric health care DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 13 ¢ ® providers from the blood lead level of 25 ug/dL to 10 upg/dL. 1991 CDC Statement at 1; Binder Declaration at ¢ 12. The actions suggested as a result of such blood lead level results range from periodic retesting to community prevention activities to chelation therapy treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning. 1991 CDC Statement at 3; Binder Declaration at q 12. The focus of the 1991 CDC Statement is on "primary prevention" -- i.e. preventing exposure to lead before children become poisoned. 1991 CDC Statement at 3, 4; Binder Declaration at q 12. The 1991 CDC Statement is intended to provide guidance and recommendations, rather than mandates, to pediatric health care providers, state and local public agencies for dealing with childhood lead poisoning. Binder Declaration at q 11. While the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that the screening test of choice is now the blood lead test, because the EP test is not sensitive enough to identify children with blood lead levels below 25 ug/dL, the 1991 CDC Statement also acknowledges the need for a transition period necessary to allow state health departments, health care providers and laboratories to reach adequate capacity for performing the blood lead test. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at q 13. To reach adequate capacity will require the acquisition of the necessary laboratory equipment and the hiring and training of appropriate personnel. Binder Declaration at q 13. During this transition or phase-in period to the use of the blood lead test as the primary screening method, the 1991 CDC Statement DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 14 o ¢ recognizes that some programs will continue to use the EP test as a screening test. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at § 13. The 1991 CDC Statement further distinguishes between those children to be considered high-risk and low-risk for high-dose exposure to lead, and recommends the use of a series of questions designed to ascertain the risk level of a child, as well as the type and frequency of testing the child should receive. 1991 CDC Statement at 42-44; Binder Declaration at q 15. In addition, the 1991 cDC Statement recognizes that virtually all children are at risk for lead poisoning, and as a result, a phase-in of universal screening using the blood lead test for all children is recommended, except in communities where large numbers or percentages of children have been screened and found not to have lead poisoning. 1991 CDC Statement at 2; Binder Declaration at § 16. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that full implementation of universal screening using the blood lead test will require the availability of cheaper and easier-to-use methods of blood lead measurement. 1991 CDC Statement at 2; Binder Declaration at § 16. The 1991 CDC Statement further recognizes that "[c]hildren at the highest risk should be given the highest priority for screening." 1991 CDC Statement at 39; Binder Declaration at q 16.!° © The CDC has rechartered a new advisory committee on childhood lead poisoning prevention which is scheduled to meet in or about Spring of 1993. Binder Declaration at q 17. At that time, the new advisory committee will consider whether to amend the current 1991 CDC Statement or issue a revised CDC report on lead poisoning prevention. Binder Declaration at q 17. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 15 o ¢ C. The September 1992 HCFA Guidelines HCFA's current EPSDT guidelines, which took effect on September 19, 1992, continue the trend of revising HCFA policy to keep up with the latest medical knowledge, and to incorporate increasing technological advances in blood lead level assessments. Hiscock Declaration at § 10. The new guidelines primarily are a response to the 1991 CDC Statement. Hiscock Declaration at § 10. CDC officials responsible for compiling the 1991 CDC Statement reviewed and commented upon drafts of HCFA's new EPSDT lead screening guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at q 10; Binder Declaration at 4 17. On December 6, 1991, several HCFA agency officials met with a CDC official who was one of the principal authors of the 1991 CDC Statement, Dr. Sue Binder, to discuss CDC's views on HCFA's draft EPSDT lead screening guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at q 10; Binder Declaration at q 17. In response to CDC's comments, HCFA made various revisions to the draft guidelines, and then circulated the revised drafts to various other governmental and private entities for comment. Hiscock Declaration at § 10. CDC expressed its view that the proposed HCFA guidelines were consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. Hiscock Declaration at q 10; Binder Declaration at q 19. Other entities that reviewed and commented on drafts of HCFA's guidelines include the American Academy of Pediatrics; the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Health Resources and Services Administration of the HHS Public Health Service; and an organization of the State DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 16 o« ¢ Medicaid Directors' Association known as the Medicaid Maternal and Child Health Technical Advisory Group. Hiscock Declaration at § 11. Thus, in revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA received and considered input from an array of public and private organizations concerned with childhood lead poisoning. Hiscock Declaration at q 11. HCFA considered several factors in formulating its current EPSDT lead screening guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at § 12. HCFA noted that the 1991 CDC Statement recommends that health care providers should first verbally assess a child's risk of having elevated blood lead levels by asking a series of questions to determine the likelihood of a child's exposure to lead sources. Hiscock Declaration at € 12; Binder Declaration at § 15. The HCFA guidelines also require such an assessment. HCFA State Medicaid Manual, attached to Declaration of Michael M. Daniel in Support of Motion for TRO Against the USA ("HCFA guidelines") at § 5123.2(a). Depending upon the answers to questions in this "verbal ARsasaliont children are considered to be either at "high risk" or "low risk" of being lead poisoned. Hiscock Declaration at q 12.Y" In revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines on lead testing for children, HCFA also took note that the 1991 CDC Statement recommended lowering the blood lead level threshold for which concern 'I' Although the 1991 CDC Statement indicates that all children are at risk for lead poisoning, CDC and HCFA have both recognized that the highest priority should be reserved for those children with the highest blood lead levels. 1991 CDC Statement at 39; Hiscock Declaration at q 12; Binder Declaration at q 16. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS! MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 17 ol oo and follow-up is recommended from 25 ug/dL of whole blood to 10 ug/dL, 1991 CDC statement at 1; Hiscock Declaration at ¢ 13, and acknowledged that the 1991 CDC Statement recommends screening through the use of a blood lead test rather than the EP test to assess blood lead levels lower than 25 ug/dL. 1991 CDC Statement at 2; Hiscock Declaration at q 13; Binder Declaration at § 13. However, HCFA also took into account CDC's recognition of the need for a "transition" period to move away from EP testing and move toward blood lead testing. Hiscock Declaration at q 13; see Binder Declaration at q 13. HCFA's revised guidelines incorporate CDC's methodology of using verbal assessments to determine "risk categories" of a child's likelihood of being exposed to dangerous levels of lead. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(a); Hiscock Declaration at § 14. Consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement, HCFA's guidelines bifurcate children into "high risk" and "low risk" categories for likelihood of lead exposure based upon the answers elicited in the verbal assessment. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(a), (b); Hiscock Declaration at q 14; see Binder Declaration at q 15. HCFA's guidelines mandate the most sensitive blood lead testing process for children determined to be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(c); Hiscock Declaration at q 14. This requirement is consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement which recommends that the highest priority be reserved for those children with the highest blood lead levels. 1991 CDC Statement at 39; Hiscock Declaration at q 14; DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 18 ¢ eo see Binder Declaration at q 16. As a practical matter, HCFA believes that the majority of EPSDT-eligible children will be deemed to be at "high risk" for elevated blood lead levels due to the socioeconomic conditions that often circumscribe where Medicaid recipients reside. Hiscock Declaration at § 14 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto. In addition, while HCFA's revised EPSDT guidelines stress that blood lead testing is the preferred method for assessing blood lead levels of children deemed to be at "low risk," the guidelines give states the option of using either the blood lead test or the EP test as the initial screen for "low risk" children during the transition period. HCFA guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at q 15 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto. HCFA made this pragmatic policy choice after considering coments from CDC and various organizations that indicated that many localities simply do not currently have the technology and/or the capacity available to universally conduct blood lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible children, both "high risk" and "low risk." Hiscock Declaration at q 15. Both the 1991 CDC Statement and HCFA's guidelines recognize the problems many communities face in moving away from EP testing and toward blood lead testing. 1991 CDC Statement at 2, 41; HCFA guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at { 15 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto; Binder Declaration at q 13. However, the federal government (through HCFA), has encouraged the most widespread use of the blood lead test and will share in the costs of screening "low DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 19 o« o risk" children through the use of the blood lead test, if, as HCFA recommends, states use this test. See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(c); Hiscock Declaration at § 15 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto. Even for this limited group of "low risk" children, states must use the blood lead test in instances of elevated EP test results. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(b); Hiscock Declaration at § 16. Where subsequent verbal risk assessments suggest increased lead exposure for children previously deemed "low risk," however, a blood lead test must be performed. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(b); Hiscock Declaration at q.16 17 Since EPSDT-eligible children must be "periodically" screened for medical problems in accordance with a prescribed "periodicity schedule" set by each state, each and every EPSDT child should be evaluated for their risk of lead exposure at each periodic screening, and accordingly receive the test appropriate for their particular risk category. Hiscock Declaration at q 17. HCFA will continue to revise and update its guidelines in response to future guidance from the CDC and other organizations, and 2 In the situation where a "low risk" child continuously resides in an area which a state or local health official declares lead-free, HCFA's guidelines require only verbal risk assessments of the child's likelihood of lead exposure, rather than a blood lead test or an EP test. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2 (a); Hiscock Declaration at q 17. Similar to other "low risk" children, however, if the verbal assessment indicates increased likelihood of lead exposure for this group of children, then states must use either a blood lead test or the EP test to determine blood lead levels. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2{(b); Hiscock Declaration at q 17. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 20 o J as the technology necessary to perform the blood lead test becomes more universally available. Hiscock Declaration at q 19. Iv. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES A. The Named Plaintiffs' Claims Should Be Dismissed Because They Have Not Suffered Any Injury And Thus Lack Standing To Sue i. Principles of Standing Article III of the Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual "cases" or "controversies" as a means of properly separating functions among the three branches of federal government. Asarco v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Flast v. cohen, 392 U.S. 83, .94 (1967). See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The doctrines that surround the "case and controversy" requirement therefore rest on the principles that govern an independent judiciary in our democratic government. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471-72; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Considering such principles, the Supreme Court in Allen stated that "(t)he Art. III doctrine that requires a litigant to have ‘standing' to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most important of these doctrines." Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. And in fact, "the standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted." DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 21 Id. at 752. To determine whether a particular plaintiff has standing to bring an action, federal courts look to both the constitutional and prudential limitations of the standing doctrine. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471. In order to have standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test by alleging (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 464 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court has recently explained this requirement in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -- an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of -- the injury has to be "fairly . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." U.S. ¢ 112.8. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (citations omitted). The injury must be one that is distinct and palpable. Gladstone, Realtors v., Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 501. See also Allen, 468 U.S. at 752; Schlesinger V. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 218 (1973). The party who invokes federal jurisdiction bears the burden of DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 22 « o establishing these elements. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. Since these elements are an indispensable part of plaintiff's case, "each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof" with particularized allegations of fact. 1Id.; Warth, 422 U.S. at 501-02. If, after an opportunity to provide such particularized allegations of fact, "standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed." Warth, 422 U.S. at 501-02 (emphasis added). "A federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1990). As explained in detail below, plaintiffs do not meet the requirements of standing to sue on their own behalf (or on behalf of the class which they purport to represent). The injury of which they complain does not stem from HCFA's issuance of the challenged guidelines and cannot be redressed by rescission of these guidelines or any other relief plaintiffs request from defendant USA. Accordingly, the Court should therefore dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 2. Plaintiffs Have Suffered No Injury As A Result of The New HCFA Guidelines The four named plaintiffs allege that they live near a battery crushing and lead product fabrication plant located in West Dallas. Complaint at q 24. Under the challenged HCFA guidelines, all Medicaid-eligible children should be given a verbal assessment to DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 23 4 dg determine whether they are at "high risk" or "low risk" for exposure to dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs! response to at least one of the verbal assessment questions listed in the new HCFA guidelines -- "Does your child live near a lead smelter, battery recycling plant, or other industry likely to release lead . . . .?" -- should clearly be in the affirmative. See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(a). Under the new HCFA guidelines, "[i]f the answer to any question is positive, a child is considered high risk for high doses of lead exposure." HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(b) (emphasis in original). As a result, all four plaintiffs would be considered at "high risk" of having elevated blood levels. Since the HCFA guidelines require that the most sensitive blood lead test be administered for those children determined to be at "high risk," plaintiffs should receive the blood lead test they desire. See HCFA guidelines at 5-15; Hiscock Declaration at q 14. These plaintiffs therefore will not be injured by the application of the new HCFA guidelines. In fact, plaintiffs will only benefit from their application. Not only is there no "concrete and particularized" injury that these plaintiffs would suffer as a result of the application of the new HCFA guidelines, there is not even a threat of a "conjectural or hypothetical" injury from those guidelines. In addition, the requested injunctive relief would not redress any alleged harm to plaintiffs. In order to establish redressability, plaintiffs must show that "relief from the [alleged] injury [is] DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 24 o o 'likely' to follow from a favorable decision." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751. Or, in the recent phraseology of the Supreme Court, plaintiffs must show some "potential gain" from the relief requested. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 451 (1989). Plaintiffs seek to enjoin defendant USA, both preliminarily and permanently from supporting, allowing or financing the states' use of the EP test as a screening test for lead poisoning, and to require the federal defendant to mandate that states use the blood lead test as the sole screening device for lead poisoning. They also seek to enjoin HCFA's September 19, 1992 guidelines, and to require that HCFA issue guidelines requiring that states retest all Medicaid-eligible children previously tested with the EP test with the blood lead test. Complaint at q 73. Yet the four named plaintiffs will fare no better as a result of the granting of this extraordinary relief. The injury of which they complain -- i.e., the State of Texas' alleged failure to perform a blood lead test and appropriate lead poisoning intervention —= cannot be redressed by enjoining the challenged September 1992 HCFA guidelines. To the contrary, those guidelines require a blood lead test and appropriate intervention in the circumstances alleged by plaintiffs, and granting the relief sought by plaintiffs from defendant USA would offer them no additional relief. Furthermore, requiring HCFA to issue guidelines that require the states' use of only the blood lead test would, in all likelihood, have little or no practical effect. The HCFA guidelines take into account DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 25 oo 4 the requisite "transition" period needed for all states to move away from EP testing and move toward universal blood lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible children, while mandating that children at "high risk" receive the blood lead test now. See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2 (c); Hiscock Declaration at ¢ 13. The states cannot immediately develop full capacity for blood lead testing. Indeed, the relief plaintiffs seek may actually harm them. In drafting its new EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA carefully considered the fact that many states and localities currently do not have the technology and/or the capacity available to conduct universal blood lead testing. See Hiscock Declaration at qf 15. As a result, during the transition period to eventual universal blood lead testing of all Medicaid-eligible children, HCFA has made a conscious and pragmatic policy choice to allow states to continue use of the EP test in limited circumstances. See Hiscock Declaration at 1 19 and Exhibit "3" attached thereto. While states are currently undergoing the necessary transition to eventual universal blood lead testing, HCFA has reserved the highest priority of testing using the blood lead test for those children, like plaintiffs, who are assessed as "high risk." See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(c); Hiscock Declaration at q 14." Given the states' current capacity 3 plaintiffs, who should clearly receive the blood lead test pursuant to the new HCFA guidelines, cannot claim to have suffered the same injury as those "low risk" children for whom the guidelines do not mandate use of that test. Once the Court concludes that the proposed class representatives lack individual DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 26 o oe limitations, requiring blood lead testing of all Medicaid-eligible children, without assigning priority according to whether the child is at "high risk" or "low risk," may result in significant delays in blood lead testing (and necessary intervention) for "high risk" children such as plaintiffs.! B. Plaintiffs' Complaint As To Defendant USA Should Be Dismissed For Failure To State Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Or Alternatively, Summary Judgment Should Be Granted In Favor Of Defendant USA Even if the Court finds that plaintiffs possess the requisite standing to bring this suit, plaintiffs have nevertheless failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and their Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure standing, "the proper procedure . . . is to dismiss the complaint, not to deny the class for inadequate representation or to allow other class representatives to step forward." Brown Vv. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. 1981). Because standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite, dismissal on standing grounds is to take place before class certification issues are ever reached. Id. As a result, plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed. 4 Finally, plaintiffs lack standing to seek an order which would require HCFA to issue guidelines requiring that states retest all Medicaid-eligible children previously tested with the EP test with the blood lead level test. See Complaint at q 73. Since EPSDT-eligible children must be periodically screened for medical problems in accordance with a prescribed "periodicity schedule" set by each state, each EPSDT child -- even those previously tested with the EP test -- should be evaluated for their risk of lead exposure under the new HCFA guidelines. Hiscock Declaration at § 17. As a result, many Medicaid-eligible children, including these plaintiffs, who previously received an EP test under the old HCFA guidelines should now receive the blood lead test in any event. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 27 _¢ o 12(b) (6). Alternatively, because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendant USA in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 3. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With The Medicaid Statute The Supreme Court has "long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . ." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,, 467 uU.s. 837, 844 (1984) (citations omitted). See also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (a statutory interpretation by an agency charged with applying the statute is entitled to "considerable deference."). "To sustain the [agency's] application of [a] statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the > Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6) allows courts discretion as to whether to consider "matters outside the pleading" such as affidavits, and courts may or may not elect to convert a Rule 12(b) (6) motion into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. See Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, ing., 847 F.24 186, 193 -n.3 (5th Cir. 1938) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (1969)). As a result, the Court has the discretion to exclude the Hiscock and Binder declarations accompanying defendant USA's 12(b) (6) motion and simply dismiss the action based on the Complaint and the attachments thereto. Even if the Court, in its discretion, chooses to consider the Hiscock and Binder declarations in deciding the legal issues before it, thereby converting defendant USA's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment should be granted in defendant's favor as there are no genuine issues of material fact, and defendant USA is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 28 _¢ & result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings." Udall Vv. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (citations omitted); accord Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1979). Moreover, the Secretary of HHS need not prove that the method chosen is the only, or even the best, means to accomplish the regulatory objective, only that "the agency decision was rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors." Ethyl Corp. Vv. E.P.A., 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (citations omitted). Contrary to plaintiffs' allegation, the new HCFA guidelines do not contravene the statutory requirement of the Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), for lead testing. Section 1396d(r) defines lead screening as consisting of " (iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment appropriate for age and risk factors) ." (Emphasis added). On its face, § 1396d(r) does not require "blood lead tests" as plaintiffs contend and plaintiffs offer nothing to indicate that Congress intended the phrase "lead blood level assessment" to have the narrow, technical meaning plaintiffs ascribe to it. See Complaint at q 70. In fact, the Conference Report to OBRA 89, § 6403, now 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r), stated that the legislation "codifies the current regulations on minimum components of EPSDT screening and treatment, with minor changes," and provides that DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 29 _¢ & "screening must include blood testing when appropriate, as well as health education." Conference Report, H.R. 101-386, 101 Cong. 1st Sess., p. 453 (emphasis supplied). The legislative history furnishes no additional guidance regarding types of blood tests or other methods for screening.!® As plaintiffs correctly point out, the Secretary of HHS, the CDC and HCFA have all consistently recognized that the blood lead test is the preferred mode for blood lead level assessments of children. See Complaint at qq 63, 64 and 68; HHS' "Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning" (February 1991) at 23; Binder Declaration at q 13 and Exhibit "1" attached thereto; Hiscock Declaration at § 15; HCFA guidelines at Preamble. The blood lead test is not the only test for assessing blood lead levels, however. Moreover, Congress clearly stated that "age and risk factors" should be taken into account in determining the blood lead level assessment "appropriate" for each Medicaid-eligible child. HCFA's approach under the new EPSDT lead screening guidelines takes into account the "appropriate for age and risk factors" aspect of § 1396d(r). HCFA has followed the recommendations of the 1991 CDC Statement and has established a framework within which a verbal assessment is first given to determine what type of blood lead level ® It should also be noted that at the time Congress considered and passed OBRA 89, CDC recommended the EP test as the test of choice. Moreover, it would be anomalous, given the basic structure and operation of the Medicaid program, which gives states latitude in determining the services to be provided, for Congress to tell states not only that children's lead levels must be assessed, but also to mandate a particular test. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 30 & ® assessment is most appropriate in light of such factors as age and risk for exposure to lead. See Hiscock Declaration at q 14; Binder Declaration at q 15. Therefore, the challenged HCFA guidelines do not contravene the Medicaid Act. 2. The HCFA Guidelines Give States The Option Of Using The EP Test For "Low Risk" Children Only Plaintiffs contend that the HCFA guidelines, which became effective on September 19, 1992, continue to sanction the use of the EP test as the primary screening test for lead poisoning in young children throughout the country. Complaint at § 62. In drawing this erroneous conclusion, plaintiffs ignore the plain language of the new HCFA guidelines as well as their context. As explained in the Hiscock Declaration, under the guidelines, the first step for an EPSDT provider is to conduct a verbal assessment for each Medicaid-eligible child in order to determine "risk categories" (i.e., a child's likelihood of being exposed to dangerous levels of lead). Hiscock Declaration at q 14. If even one of the questions enumerated in the guidelines is answered in the affirmative, that child is automatically considered to be "high risk." See HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2 (b). HCFA's guidelines require the blood lead test for children determined to be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. HCFA guidelines at § 5123.2(c); Hiscock Declaration at q 14. If all verbal assessment questions are answered in the negative, that child is considered to be "low risk," and the EPSDT provider is then given the option to administer the blood lead test or the EP test. HCFA DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 31 OC o guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at ff 15. As a result, states continue to have the option to use the EP test as the initial blood lead level screening test only in those instances where, after a verbal assessment, the EPSDT provider deems the child to be "low risk," and further determines to administer the EP test rather than the blood lead level test. See HCFA guidelines at Preamble; Hiscock Declaration at q 15." 3. The HCFA Guidelines Are Consistent With The 1991 CDC Statement Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the new HCFA guidelines are consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. While the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that the lead screening test of choice is now the blood lead test because the EP test is not sensitive enough to identify children with blood lead levels below 25 ug/dL, see Complaint at q 68, plaintiffs conveniently fail to mention the portion of the 1991 CDC Statement which acknowledges the need for a transition period until the recommendations of the 1991 CDC Statement can be implemented fully. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at q 13 and Exhibit "1" attached thereto. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that this transition period is necessary to allow state health departments, 7 The federal government will nevertheless share in the states' costs of screening "low risk" children through the use of the blood lead test, and has encouraged states to use the more sensitive test in all cases, as well as to increase their blood lead testing capacities so that they will eventually be able to perform universal blood lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible children. See Hiscock Declaration at § 19 and HCFA letter to State Medicaid Directors attached as Exhibit "3" thereto. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 32 OC 6 health care providers and laboratories to reach adequate capacity for performing the blood lead level test, which will require the acquisition of the necessary laboratory equipment and the hiring and training of appropriate personnel. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at ¢ 13. The 1991 CDC Statement itself recognizes that during this transition or phase-in period which should culminate in the eventual use of the blood lead test as the primary screening method, some programs will continue to use the EP test as a screening test. 1991 CDC Statement at 41; Binder Declaration at q 13. Recognizing the need for this transition period, and completely consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement, HCFA has given states the option to use the EP test in certain circumstances (i.e., for "low risk" children only) under the new HCFA guidelines. See HCFA guidelines at Preamble. The basic premise of plaintiffs' Complaint -- that the HCFA guidelines ignore or are inconsistent with the 1991 CDC Statement -- is simply wrong.' Indeed, the HCFA guidelines were developed in consultation with the CDC and the CDC itself has stated that the guidelines are consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. ee Binder Declaration at q 19.7 ® In any event, plaintiffs could not present a claim for relief based on the allegations (even if true) that the HCFA guidelines are inconsistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. That statement is not binding on HCFA, or for that matter, or anyone. It is merely a recommendation. See Binder Declaration at ¢ 11. ' In addition, the HCFA guidelines are fully consistent with HHS' "Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning" issued in February 1991. Both recognize that the EP DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 33 OC &« C. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Satisfy The Requirements For Temporary Injunctive Relief For the same reasons that plaintiffs lack standing and have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and for additional reasons as well, plaintiffs are not entitled to temporary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief should therefore be denied. 1. Standards for Injunctive Relief As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, and should be granted only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion. Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1929); White v. Carlucci, 862 F.24 1209, 1211 (5th Cir. 1989); Holland America Ins. Co. Vv. Succession of Roy, 777 F.24:992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985); Enterprise Int'l. Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, "[t]he decision to grant a preliminary injunction is the exception rather than the rule." Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). In order to obtain the extraordinary remedy of temporary injunctive relief, the movant must "by a clear showing, carr([y] the burden of persuasion," White, 862 F.2d at 1211, as to four elements. The movant test is not a useful screening test for blood lead levels below 25 pug/dL, and that blood lead testing is the preferred method for lead screening of all Medicaid-eligible children. See HHS report at 23, 40; HCFA guidelines at Preamble. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 34 & &® must demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits exists; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury exists if the preliminary relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any damage preliminary relief might cause to the opponent; and (4) that the relief sought will not disserve the public interest. DFW Metro Line Servs. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.s. , 111 8, CL. E519 (1990); Allied Marketing, 878 F.2d at 809; Enterprise Int'l, 762 F.2d at 471; Canal Authority of the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572-73 (5th Cir: 1974). "'[T]lhe movant has a heavy burden of persuading the district court that all four elements are satisfied, '" and "if the movant does not succeed in carrying its burden on any one of the four prerequisites," preliminary relief may not be granted. Enterprise Int'l, 762 F.2d at 472 (citations omitted). Accord Anderson v. Douglas & lomason Co., 835 F.2d 123, 133 (5th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy any of the prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief in this case. As a result, plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 35 ¢ o 2. Plaintiffs Do Not Have A Substantial Likelihood Of Success On The Merits Of Their Claims Against Defendant USA As defendant USA has previously demonstrated, plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims against defendant USA for several reasons. First, plaintiffs lack the requisite standing to maintain those claims since they are unable to demonstrate any concrete injury fairly traceable to the challenged HCFA guidelines. Furthermore, the injunctive relief plaintiffs have requested against defendant USA would not redress any alleged harm plaintiffs may have suffered in any event. Second, plaintiffs' claims that the new HCFA guidelines are contrary to the provisions of the Medicaid statute and the 1991 CDC Statement are without merit. As defendant USA has previously demonstrated, the new HCFA guidelines are consistent with the provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) which calls for "lead blood level assessments appropriate for age and risk factors." Moreover, CDC itself has recognized that the HCFA guidelines are consistent with its 1991 CDC Statement. 3. There Is No Substantial Threat Of Irreparable Injury If The Temporary Relief Plaintiffs Seek From Defendant USA Is Not Granted For the same reasons plaintiffs lack the requisite injury to confer standing to sue the federal defendant, they cannot show a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the new HCFA guidelines remain in effect. In fact, rather than suffering any injury as a result of the new HCFA guidelines, plaintiffs, who, under the new EPSDT lead screening guidelines, are considered at "high risk" for lead poisoning, will only benefit from the verbal assessment and DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 36 ¢ w testing framework of the HCFA guidelines. Furthermore, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[s]peculative injury is not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant." Holland America Ins. Co., 777 F.2d at 997. Plaintiffs' alleged fear that as they "continue in the EPSDT screening system they may never receive the appropriate blood lead test," Motion at 6, is mere speculation on their part. The new HCFA guidelines specifically require that these four plaintiffs receive blood lead tests. Thus, if plaintiffs fail to receive these tests, it is despite HCFA's new guidelines, not because of them.” Plaintiffs have therefore failed to demonstrate a substantial threat of irreparable injury if their requested injunctive relief as to defendant USA is not granted. 4. The Threatened Injury To Plaintiffs Does Not Outweigh Any Damage Preliminary Relief Might Cause To Defendant USA And The Public While plaintiffs would suffer no injury if their request for injunctive relief from the defendant USA is denied, and in fact, would only benefit from the application of the new HCFA guidelines, defendant USA and the individual states would be damaged by the relief plaintiffs seek. HCFA to issue guidelines which mandate the use of the blood lead test exclusively would not, as discussed earlier, ensure more accurate lead level assessments. The states could not 2 Any continued failure or refusal by the State of Texas to administer the blood lead test as to these named plaintiffs would contravene the HCFA guidelines. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 37 ¢ J follow such guidelines given the absence of the technology and/or capacity of states presently to perform universal blood lead tests for all Medicaid-eligible children. The carefully considered HCFA guidelines take into account the requisite transition period needed for all states to reached full capacity to perform universal blood lead tests on all Medicaid-eligible children. Given the current limited capacity of states to perform the more sensitive blood lead test, to enjoin the new HCFA guidelines, even temporarily, would likely result in "low risk" children receiving no lead testing at all (while states abandon the EP test but are still unable to provide the blood lead test),? or in delaying the use of the more sensitive blood lead test for "high risk" children (while states attempt to use their limited blood lead testing capacities for all Medicaid-eligible children, regardless of whether they are "high risk" or "low risk"). Indeed, plaintiffs themselves might be forced to endure additional delays in obtaining the blood lead test in Texas which they (as "high risk" children) should now clearly be entitled to receive under the new HCFA guidelines. As plaintiffs correctly recognize in their Motion, ending childhood lead poisoning is a national policy of the highest priority 21. Although HCFA recognizes that the EP does not detect blood lead levels of less than 25 ug/dL, it nonetheless does detect higher blood lead levels and is useful for identifying those children who, despite a "low risk" verbal assessment nevertheless show a very elevated blood lead level and therefore require further screening and intervention. DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 38 ¢ eo for defendant USA. See Motion at 7. HCFA clearly is committed to this goal and the agency's commitment to the diagnosis and treatment of lead poisoning among Medicaid-eligible children is most aptly reflected in the new HCFA guidelines. The new guidelines represent a rational and pragmatic balance between the current lack of technology and/or capacity of states to conduct universal blood lead tests, and the recognition that, while blood lead tests of all such children is desirable, the highest priority for testing should continue to be those children with the highest risk of lead poisoning. The HCFA guidelines support and further the CDC's own recommendations in the 1991 CDC Statement. Plaintiffs' request that HCFA require states to begin universal blood lead testing immediately is not only an impractical and ahrealiscic solution, but a true disservice to the public interest in effectuating a smooth transition to eventual universal blood lead testing for all Medicaid-eligible children nationwide. 5. Plaintiffs' Motion Should Also Be Denied Because It Improperly Seeks To Alter The Status Quo In addition to plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief as demonstrated above, because the requested injunction would alter the status quo by forcing HCFA to rescind it current EPSDT lead screening guidelines and issue revised guidelines requiring states to administer the blood lead test, see Motion at 5, plaintiffs bear an even heavier burden. The purpose of preliminary relief is to preserve the status quo ante litem pending DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 39 « ¢ full resolution of the controversy on the merits. University of Texas Vv. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1509 (Sth Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 583 (1984). "Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often necessary if . . . [the relative positions of the parties] are to be preserved", the preliminary injunction hearing is not transformed into a trial on the merits. University of Texas Vv. Camenisch, 451 U.S. at 395. As a result, courts are "extremely cautious" about issuing preliminary injunctions when such relief would change the legal landscape that existed immediately prior to the moving party's request. Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984). Nor is it proper, by altering the status quo on an emergency injunction motion, to grant the plaintiff the full relief to which he or she may be entitled if successful on the merits at the conclusion of the trial. Id. See also Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 P.2d4 204, 808 (9th cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1963). It is indisputable here that plaintiffs' Motion, if granted, would alter -- rather than preserve -- the relative positions of the parties in this case. Granting plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief here would, in effect, improperly give plaintiffs virtually all of the final relief they seek on the merits from defendant USA. This principle is particularly applicable when plaintiffs here seek to have defendant USA ordered to take action by requesting a DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 40 ¢ ¢ mandatory injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, recognizing the gravity of a mandatory injunction, has stated that "[m]andatory preliminary relief, which goes well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the law and the facts clearly favor the moving party." Martinez v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976). Accord Harris v. Wilters, 596 F.2d 678, 680 (Sth Cir. 1979) (only in rare instances is the issuance of a mandatory preliminary injunction proper). As defendant USA has demonstrated, since neither the facts nor the law in this case favors plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs not only have failed to satisfy the stringent prerequisites for injunctive relief, but have failed to meet the heightened standards for a mandatory injunction. As a result, plaintiffs' Motion should be denied. Vv. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety because plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action. Alternatively, the Court should dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6), or because there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, grant summary judgment in favor of defendant USA in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Finally, the DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 41 ¢ * Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Dated: October 16, 1992 Respectfully submitted, STUART M. GERSON Assistant Attorney General MARVIN COLLINS United States Attorney MARY ANN MOORE Assistant United States Attorney Texas Bar No. 14360400 if Fk “SHEILA LIEBER J Cilins ol Kefebg a ALINA S. KOFSKY [ 7 7 Attorneys, Department of Justice Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division 901 E Street, N.W., Room 1010 Washington, D.C. 20530 (202) 514-4523 (202) 616-8470 (Fax #) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 42 J ® OF COUNSEL: HENRY R. GOLDBERG, Deputy Chief Counsel for Litigation DAVID V. PEERY, Attorney Office of the General Counsel Department of Health and Human Services Room 500, East Highrise Building 6325 Security Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21207 (410) 965-8871 (410) 966-5187 (Fax #) DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT =-- 43 o ¢ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 16th day of October, 1992, a copy of Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and In Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and Memorandum in Support, was served on the following individuals listed below, via certified mail, return receipt requested: Laura B. Beshara Michael M. Daniel MICHAEL M. DANIEL, P.C. 3301 Elm Street Dallas, Texas 75226-1637 Edwin N. Horne a Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General State of Texas P.O. Box 12548 Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 ih wr) tis Ll drt MARY \ANN MOORE Wh ‘ DEFENDANT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT -- 44 4 o UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LOIS THOMPSON, on behalf of and as next friend to TAYLOR DIXON, et al., Plaintiffs, Vv. Civ. A. No. CA3-92-1539-R BURTON F. RAIFORD, Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. N a a ” Na st ” N a N w N a a N a N a ? a l ’ v t a a l ’ u t ? “ v t ? u t “ u t ? S u ? “o ui ” “ u s ? ” DECLARATION OF WILLIAM McC. HISCOCK I, WILLIAM McC. HISCOCK, declare: l. I am the Chief of the Special Initiatives Staff, Medicaid Bureau, Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). "I have been employed by HCFA for thirteen years. I supervise an office of six people. 2. My responsibilities as Chief of the Medicaid Bureau's Special Initiatives Staff include assisting the agency's implementation of particular aspects of the Medicaid program, including the agency's implementation, in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) and 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.50 - 441.62, of the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment ("EPSDT") program. In this capacity, I also act as a liaison between the Medicaid Bureau and other governmental agencies, such as the HHS DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 1 Lg 3 Public Health Service Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), that have closely related responsibilities with HCFA for administering federal health-related programs. I have been involved in formulating HCFA's policies concerning EPSDT screening of children for elevated blood lead levels since 1979. The statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge and upon information made available to me in the course of my official duties. 3. HCFA provides instructional and interpretive guidance to the states through the "State Medicaid Manual," policy letters, and memoranda (which are sometimes known as "Action Transmittals"). These materials and the State Medicaid Manual reflect HCFA policy, ahd delineate how the states can comply with federal Medicaid law, including federal EPSDT requirements. 4. TI have reviewed plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint in this lawsuit, plaintiffs' motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and their papers in support of these motions. TI am familiar with plaintiffs' allegations in these documents regarding plaintiffs' challenge to HCFA's revised State Medicaid Manual guidelines concerning EPSDT screening for elevated blood lead levels. 5. HCFA has an enduring and longstanding commitment toward identifying and paying for the costs of treating Medicaid eligible children that are found to have elevated blood lead levels. This commitment is reflected, for example, in HCFA's 1978 policy decision to share in the states' costs of DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 2 & & investigating sources of lead poisoning as a Medicaid "preventive" service. HCFA Action Transmittal, 78-59 (July 1, 1978), attached as FExhibit "1." 6. Since the early 1970's, HCFA consistently has advocated state screening of children under the EPSDT program for elevated blood lead levels, long before Congress amended the EPSDT statutory provisions in 1989 to define EPSDT "screening" as explicitly including blood lead level assessments "appropriate for age and risk factors." See, e.g., HCFA State Medicaid Manual § 5-70-E (1) (June 28, 1972) ("all children between ages of 1-6 should be periodically screened for lead poisoning"), attached as Exhibit "2." Indeed, in 1989 Congress amended the EPSDT statute to incorporate then-existing HCFA policy, as reflected in HCFA's EPSDT regulations, and HCFA's State Medicaid Manual EPSDT program guidelines. See HCFA State Medicaid Manual § 5122 (April 1988) (containing language similar to 1989 Congressional amendments, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)). 7. In pursuing its commitment to ensure that childhood lead poisoning of Medicaid eligible children is promptly detected and treated, HCFA considers and relies upon the evolving state of medical knowledge to form the basis of the agency's EPSDT lead screening guidelines. HCFA discerns this medical knowledge from various sources of medical expertise, including, most importantly, the CDC's periodic statements on "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children." HCFA also receives input from other government agencies (such as the Maternal and Child Health Bureau DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 3 _¢ __¢ of the HHS Public Health Service) and from nongovernmental entities, such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and other public interest advocacy groups concerned with childhood lead poisoning and prevention issues. 8. HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening guidelines to reflect the advances in knowledge of the effects of childhood lead poisoning. For instance, in 1972 the State Medicaid Manual guidelines advised state intervention and treatment of children when an EPSDT screen determined a child's blood lead level to be greater than 80 micrograms of lead per deciliter ("ug/dL") of whole blood. Exhibit 2 at 16. By 1988, HCFA revised its EPSDT guidelines to require intervention when an EPSDT screen determined a child's blood lead level to be greater than 30 ug/dL. In 1990, consistent with the then current recommendations of the 1985 CDC Statement on "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children," HCFA required interventions when an EPSDT screen determined a child's elevated blood lead level to be greater than 25 ug/dL. Thus, in response to increased medical knowledge of the effects of elevated blood lead levels, HCFA has continuously lowered the blood lead level threshold at which it recommends or requires concern by health care providers. 9. Similarly, HCFA periodically revises its EPSDT screening guidelines to reflect available technological improvements in blood lead level assessments. In 1972, the agency did not establish any particular preferred test for EPSDT blood lead screening. See Exhibit 2. In 1988, however, HCFA recommended DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 4 « o the erythrocyte protoporphyrin ("EP") test as the primary lead screening test under the EPSDT program. (Rather than directly measuring lead in the blood, the EP test indirectly assesses blood lead by detecting a protein indicator of elevated blood lead levels, i.e. erythrocyte protoporphyrin. By contrast, the "blood lead test" directly measures blood lead levels.) By April of 1990, HCFA's guidelines required, rather than merely recommended, a blood lead test where a child was found to have elevated EP levels. Therefore, HCFA's guidelines have not only grown increasingly more stringent in setting blood lead level thresholds, but the agency guidelines have also required increasingly more sensitive blood lead testing where medical knowledge indicated that such testing was appropriate. 10. HCFA's current EPSDT guidelines, which took effect on September 19, 1992, continue this trend of revising HCFA policy to keep up with the latest medical knowledge, and to incorporate increasing technological advances in blood lead level assessments. HCFA's current guidelines primarily are a response to the latest of CDC's periodic revisions to its Statement on childhood lead poisoning, "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Children: A Statement by the Centers for Disease Control," October, 1991 (the "1991 CDC Statement"). I and various HCFA officials consulted with CDC officials continuously during the drafting of the 1991 CDC Statement. Similarly, various CDC officials responsible for compiling the 1991 CDC Statement reviewed and commented upon preliminary drafts of HCFA's current EPSDT DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 5 4 &« screening guidelines. On December 6, 1991 I and several other HCFA personnel met with a CDC official who was one of the principal authors of the 1991 CDC Statement, Dr. Sue Binder, Chief of CDC's Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, to discuss CDC's views on HCFA's EPSDT lead screening guidelines. In response to CDC's comments, HCFA made various revisions to the draft guidelines, and then circulated the revised drafts to various other governmental and private entities for comment. It is my understanding, based on my conversations with CDC personnel including Dr. Binder, that CDC believes HCFA's revised guidelines are consistent with the approach endorsed by CDC in its 1991 CDC Statement. I have read the Declaration of Dr. Sue Binder filed in this action, which confirms this understanding. 11. Other entities that reviewed and commented on drafts of HCFA's EPSDT lead screening guidelines include the American Academy of Pediatrics; the Maternal and Child Health Bureau, Health Resources and Services Administration, HHS Public Health Service; and an organization of the State Medicaid Directors Association known as the Medicaid Maternal and Child Health Technical Advisory Group. Thus, in revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA received and considered input from an array of public and private organizations concerned with childhood lead poisoning. 12. HCFA considered several factors in formulating its current EPSDT blood lead screening guidelines. HCFA noted that the 1991 CDC Statement recommends that health care providers DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 6 _ ® should first verbally assess a child's risk of having elevated blood lead levels by asking a series of questions to determine the likelihood of a child's exposure to lead sources. Depending upon the answers to these questions in the "verbal assessment," children are considered to be either at "high risk" or "low risk" of being lead poisoned. Although the 1991 CDC Statement indicates that all children are at risk, HCFA was cognizant of CDC's recommendation that the highest priority should be reserved for those children with the highest blood lead levels. 13. In revising its EPSDT lead screening guidelines, HCFA also took note that the 1991 CDC Statement recommended lowering the blood lead level threshold for which concern and follow-up is recommended from 25 'ug/dL of whole blood to 10 ug/dL. The 1991 CDC Statement, therefore, recommends screening through use of a blood lead test rather than the EP test to assess blood lead levels at levels lower than 25 ug/dL. While the 1991 CDC Statement notes that the EP test is not sensitive for blood lead levels at the lower ranges for which the CDC recommends concern by health care providers, the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that not all programs currently have the capacity to conduct universal blood lead testing. Accordingly, HCFA took into account CDC's recognition of the need for a "transition" period to move away from EP testing, and move toward blood lead testing. HCFA's revised EPSDT screening guidelines, therefore, constitute a synthesis of input from various organizations, balanced by the DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 7 _¢ & pragmatic reality of the limited availability of the technology to perform universal blood lead testing. 14. HCFA's revised guidelines incorporate cps methodology of using verbal assessments to determine "risk categories" of a child's likelihood of being exposed to dangerous levels of lead. Consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement, HCFA's guidelines bifurcate children into "high risk" and "low risk" categories for likelihood of lead exposure based upon the answers elicited in the verbal assessment. HCFA's guidelines mandate the most sensitive blood lead testing process for children determined to be at "high risk" of having elevated blood lead levels. This requirement is consistent with the 1991 CDC Statement which recommends that the highest priority be those children with the highest blood lead levels. As a practical matter, HCFA believes that the majority of EPSDT eligible children will be deemed to be at "high risk" for elevated blood lead levels, due to the socioeconomic conditions that often circumscribe where Medicaid recipients reside. i5. Further, while HCFA's revised EPSDT guidelines stress that blood lead testing is the preferred mode for blood lead level assessments of children deemed to be at "low risk," the guidelines grant states the option of using either the blood lead test or the EP test as the initial screen for "low risk" children during the transition period. HCFA made this pragmatic policy choice after considering comments from CDC and various organizations that indicated that many localities simply do not DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 8 oC \¢ currently have the technology available and/or the capacity to universally conduct blood lead testing for all Medicaid eligible Children, both "high risk" and "low risk." The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes the problems many communities face in moving away from EP testing and toward blood lead testing. In light of the practical realities of the nonavailability of universal blood lead testing capacity in some communities, HCFA's guidelines grant states the option of using the EP test as the initial screen only for "low risk" children during the phase-in of universal blood lead testing. However, the federal government (through HCFA) will share in the costs of screening "low risk" children through the use of blood lead test. In other words, HCFA will provide federal financial participation for all states use of the blood lead test to screen for lead poisoning, regardless of the individual child's lead poisoning risk assessment. 16. Even for this limited group of "lov risk" children, states must use the blood lead test in instances of elevated EP test results. But where subsequent verbal risk assessments suggest increased lead exposure for children previously deemed at "low risk," a blood lead test must be performed. 17. In the situation where a "low risk" child continuously resides in an area that a state or local health official declares to be lead-free, HCFA's guidelines require only verbal risk assessments of the child's likelihood of lead exposure, rather than a blood lead test or an EP test. But, similar to other "low DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 9 o ® risk" children," if the verbal assessment indicates increased likelihood of lead exposure for this group of children, then states must use either a blood lead test or EP test to determine blood lead levels. If a state chooses to use an EP test on this group, and that test indicates elevated blood lead levels, then a blood lead test must be performed. Thus, because all EPSDT- eligible children must be "periodically" screened for medical problems in accordance with a "periodicity schedule" set by the state, each and every EPSDT child should be evaluated for their risk of lead exposure, and accordingly receive the appropriate blood lead level assessment. 18. HCFA's guidelines currently stress that blood lead testing is the preferred method of EPSDT lead screening for all Medicaid eligible children. As a result, HCFA will share in the costs of paying for universal blood lead tests for all EPSDT children in all instances. But given the existing technological limitations of such testing, HCFA's policy choice to grant states the option of using the EP test in certain limited instances represents a realization of the very practical problems of available resources that certain states face. HCFA seeks to retain state flexibility in EPSDT screening, and emphasizes that the September 19, 1992 guidelines are merely another in a continuing series of phases of Medicaid guidance on EPSDT blood lead screening. 19. HCFA has recently issued a policy letter to all State Medicaid Directors which clarifies the limited instances in which DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 10 OC 1 § states have the option of using the EP test during the transition period. Exhibit "3." This letter emphasizes HCFA's commitment to sharing in the costs of universal blood lead testing for all EPSDT children, and also reemphasizes that blood lead tests are preferred for all Medicaid eligible children. 20. In sum, HCFA's EPSDT lead screening policy has kept pace with the evolving medical knowledge of the effects of childhood lead poisoning. HCFA will continue to revise and update its guidelines in response to future guidance from the CDC and other organizations, and as the technology necessary to perform the blood lead test becomes universally available. 21. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury ‘that the foregoing is true and correct, and certify that the attached Exhibits 1-3 are true and correct copies. -— Dated: October /5 1992 at Baltimore, Maryland. (dds WILLIAM McC. HISCOCK DECLARATION OF WILLIAM HISCOCK 11 o a 5-70-00 p. 15 Assistance Services and Payment in Medical Assistance Programs Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment of ¢ -70-20 Eligible Individuals Under Age 21 E. f. Be i. Screening (Continued) Vision Testing. Administer a vision screening test appropriate to the child's age. Consultation by ophthalmologists and optometrists can be of help in determining the type of tests to be used and the criteria for determining when a child should be referred for diagnostic examination, Hearing Testing. Administer a hearing screening test appropriate to the child's age. Consultation on suitable tests for screening and on methods of administering the tests should be obtained from audiologists or from State health or education departments, Anemia Test. The most easily administered test for anemia is a microhematocrit determination from venous blood or a finger- stick, This should be done on all children or, if possible, a hemoglob.in concentration which will give a more accurate determination of anemia should be done. Sickle Cell Test. Check all Negro children for sickle cell trait, This may be done with a sickle cell preparation or a hemoglobin solubility test. If a child has been properly tested once for . sickle cell disease, he does not have to be tested again. Tuberculin Test. Give a tuberculin test to every child:who hag not had one within one year. Urine Screening. Carry out a rapid urine screening on all children for the presence of sugar, albumin and bacteria. i Lead Poisoning Screening. It is not possible to identify which children may have had undue exposure to lead-based paint and other sources of lead poisoning, except by determination of blood- lead levels, Therefore, all children between the ages of 1-6 should be periodically screened for lead poisoning, Children 6 and over should MSA- PRG-21 EXHIBIT 1 to HISCOCK DECL 6-28-72 5-70-00 p. 16 3 | Medical a : - ply jance | @ Past 5. Services and Payment in Medical Assistance Programs : 5-70-00 Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment of Eligible Individuals Under Age 21 5-70-20 E. Screening (Continued) be screened when medically indicated. The principal source ’ of childhood lead poisoning i8 lead-based paint, but pollution of the environment from such things as burning lead batteries lead poisoning. Early identification and prompt treatment of symptomatic and asymptomatic (over 80 mg/100 milliliters 73 BE of whole blood) cases can prevent the serious sequelae of i lead poisoning, such as mental impairment, mental retardation and involvement of the central nervous system. Venous OT capillary blood .samples may be used, depending on local laboratory facilities. m, Nutritional Status. Physical and laboratory determinations carried out in the screening process will usually yield information useful in assessing nutritional status. Of par- ticular imphrtance are measurements of height, weight, head circumference and hemoglobin concentration or hematocrit. A child having any detectable nutritional deficiencies should be referred to a nutritionist or public health nurse for consultation. : : n. Immunization Status. The screening progras presents an excellent opportunity to ascertain a child's immunization status, a major tool in preventing disease and disability. . During the screening process, assess the child's {immunization status; i.€., whether he has been imaunized against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio, measles, rubella, and mumps, and whether he is in need of booster shots, When it is available, the child's immunization record should be brought to the screening center. 1f immunization OT updating of {mmunization is needed, provide the immunization OT updating at the screening center or make sure it is done through the facility or provider to whom the child goes for child health supervision. MSA-PRG-21 6-28-72 basic 04-gg 04-88 EARLY AND PERIODIC SCREENING, DIAGNOSIS " TREATMENT 5122(Cont.) 3. Appropriate Vision Testing. - Administer an age-appropriate vision | assessment. Consultation by opthalmologists and optometrists can help determine the type of procedures to use and the criteria for determining when a child should be referred for diagnostic examination. 4. Appropriate Hearing Testing. - Administer an age-appropriate hearing assessment. Obtain consultation and suitable procedures for screening and methods of administering them from audiologists, or from State health or education departments. 5. Appropriate Laboratory Tests. - Identifying as Statewide screening requirements the minimum laboratory tests or analyses to be performed by medical providers for particular age or population groups. Physicians providing screening/assessment services under the EPSDT program use their medical judgement in determining the applicability of the laboratory tests or analyses to be performed. If any laboratory tests or analyses are medically contraindicated at the time of screening/assessment, provide them when no longer medically contraindicated. As appropriate, conduct the following laboratory tests: a. Anemia Test. — The most easily administered test for anemia is a mierohematoecrit determination from venous blood or a fingerstick. b. Sickle Cell Test. — Diagnosis for sickle cell trait may be done with sickle cell preparation or a hemoglobin solubility test. If a child has been properly tested once for sickle cell disease, the test need not be repeated. c. Tuberculin Test. — Give a tuberculin test to every child who has not received one within a year. d. Lead Toxicity Screening. — All EPSDT eligible children, ages 1-5 should be screened for lead toxicity, using the erythrocyte protoporphyrin (EP) test as the primary screening test. Children with any elevated EP (greater than, or equal to, 50 micrograms per deciliter of whole blood) should receive a blood lead test. Children with both an elevated EP and an elevated blood lead (greater than, or equal to, 30 micrograms per deciliter) require diagnosis and treatment, which includes environmental epidemiologic services to identify the source of lead, and periodic re-evaluation. e. Others. — In addition to the the tests above, there are several other tests to consider. Their appropriateness are determined by an individual's age, sex, health history, clinical symptoms and exposure to disease. These include a urine screening, pinworm slide, urine culture (for girls), serological test, drug dependency screening, and stool specimen for parasites, ova and blood. 6. Dental Screening Services. - Although an oral examination may be part of a physical examination, it does not substitute for examination through direct referral to a dentist. The judgement that dental treatment is or is not necessary can only be made by a dentist. It is the intent of the regulation not to disrupt continuous, comprehensive dental care situations, but rather to encourage and develop them. Rev. 2 5-11 EXHIBIT 2 TO HISCOCK DECLARATION _¢ Health Care Financing Administration 6325 Security Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21207 MEDICAID BUREAU Dear State Medicaid Director: The purpose of this letter is to clarify certain aspects of the lead screening requirements published in the September 1992 revision of the State Medicaid Manual (SMM), Part 5, for the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program. We consulted with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and other organizations prior to revising our instructions, and we continue to consult with CDC about developments in the capacity for screening and for performing blood lead tests. We believe that our published guidelines are consistent with the CDC statement, Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children (October, 1991). Effective September 19, 1992, States are required to screen all Medicaid eligible children between the ages of 6 months and 72 months of age at their next scheduled EPSDT screening for lead poisoning. Screening consists of both a verbal risk assessment and a blood lead level assessment. A child answering "yes" to one or more of the risk assessment questions is determined to be at high risk, and a blood-lead test must be performed. A child answering "no" to all questions is determined to be at low risk, and may receive either a blood-lead test or an erythrocyte protoporphyrin (EP) test. We believe that most Medicaid eligible children will be at high risk for lead poisoning. We consider all children between the ages 6 through 72 months to be at risk for elevated blood lead levels. In the vast majority of cases, HCFA expects Medicaid eligible children will receive a blood lead test. Children who live in a community officially declared "lead free" by a State or local health authority and answer "no" to all risk assessment questions, do not need a blood lead level assessment. However, such a child must still receive a verbal risk assessment at every periodic screen to determine if any changes have occurred which would change the child's risk status. Although our SMM instructions are only the first phase in a transition period, and take into account the currently available state of the art of lead screening technology, I am aware that concerns have been raised over the continued use of the EP test, even for children who are at low risk. Direct blood lead testing is the preferred mode of ascertaining blood lead levels for all Medicaid eligible children, and Federal financial participation is available for any Medicaid expenditures for that purpose. While the EP test is not as sensitive as tests which directly measure EXHIBIT 3 TO HISCOCK DECL oC Le Page 2 - State Medicaid Director blood lead levels, it is easier and somewhat less expensive to perform than the blood-lead test. In addition, the EP test will identify most children with blood lead levels at or above 25 micrograms per deciliter, for whom medical interventions are clearly indicated. We recognize, as does CDC, that not all communities currently have the technology and laboratory capacity to perform blood-lead tests on all children, while they do have the capability of performing the EP test. We do not believe it appropriate to wait until a simpler and cheaper blood-lead test is available, and permit many lead poisoned children to go undetected in the interim. Thus, our instructions require initial blood lead testing for those children assessed to be at high risk. The EP test is allowed only for low risk children, although the blood lead test is preferred. I am asking the HCFA regional office staff to help you implement the revised policy, and to identify and work through any barriers you may encounter. Acknowledging that States require time to develop the needed capacities, CDC is currently pursuing research and development efforts to develop instrumentation and protocols for simpler blood-lead tests. At this time, we cannot set a firm date for the end of the transition period. As research and development efforts progress and capacity becomes available, we will be providing further guidance which will culminate with the requirement for blood lead testing of all Medicaid eligible children, whether at high or low risk. I hope this letter clarifies our recent instructions on lead screening. Sincerely yours, At Christine Nye or Director cc: All Regional Administrators All Associate Regional Administrators Division of Medicaid _¢ « IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION LOIS THOMPSON on behalf of and as next friend to TAYLOR KEONDRA DIXON, ZACHERY X. WILLIAMS, CALVIN A. THOMPSON and PRENTISS LAVELL MULLINS, Plaintiffs, Vv. Civ. A. No. CA3-92-1539-R BURTON F. RAIFORD, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Texas Department of Human Services, and THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. N t ? N a s t N a s N a i N w u t i a t N u ? w t a “ n t “ i n t w i t m s “ i “ n s “ i t “ i ? “ o w t “ u s ? DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. I, Sue Binder, M.D. declare the following to be true and correct: 1. I am the Chief of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, National Center for Environmental Health and Injury Control, Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). My office is located at Mailstop F42, Room 1342, 4770 Buford Highway, Atlanta, Georgia 30341-3724. In my position as Chief of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch, I am responsible for developing and Sipienenting CDC policies and programs in non-occupational lead poisoning prevention. I supervise DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 1 4 _¢ approximately 30 employees, whose duties include overseeing grants to state and local childhood lead poisoning prevention programs, conducting epidemiologic studies of critical issues in childhood lead poisoning prevention, conducting surveillance for blood lead levels in children, and assisting other government agencies and the private sector in issues related to nonoccupational lead poisoning prevention. The operating budget of the Lead Poisoning Prevention Branch was $18.7 million in Fiscal Year 1992. I assumed my current position in 1990. 2 I hold an M.D. degree from Tufts University School of Medicine in Boston, Massachusetts. I have been involved with lead poisoning prevention activities since 1989, and with environmental public health issues since 1984. I have authored and co-authored several articles in professional medical journals regarding childhood lead poisoning. I was one of the principal authors of the October 1991 CDC statement, "Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children: A Statement By The Centers For Disease Control" ("1991 CDC Statement"), and the February 1991 HHS Report to Congress, "Strategic Plan For The Elimination Of Childhood Lead Poisoning." Furthermore, I have given numerous professional presentations across the country on childhood lead poisoning. 3. The statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge and upon information made available to me in the course of my ottictal duties. 4. I am generally familiar with plaintiffs' allegations that HCFA's September 19, 1992 State Medicaid Manual guidelines ("HCFA guidelines") are inconsistent with the 1991 CDC Statement. DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 2 o _d 5. In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 241, the CDC has issued four policy statements with respect to preventing childhood lead poisoning. In 1985, CDC issued a policy statement with respect to lead level testing in children. The 1985 CDC Statement set forth the threshold for concern by pediatric health care providers at a blood lead level of 25 micrograms per deciliter ("ug/dL") of whole blood. The actions suggested by the 1985 CDC Statement ranged from periodic retesting to chelation therapy treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning. In addition, the 1985 CDC Statement recognized the erythrocyte protoporphyrin ("EP") test as the screening test of choice for lead poisoning in children. 6. In or about 1989, the CDC chartered an advisory committee to reevaluate a number of issues regarding childhood lead poisoning. The work of that advisory committee ultimately contributed substantially to the publication of the 1991 CDC Statement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "1." The advisory committee members, representative of a wide variety of organizations and interests including physicians, state and local boards of health, hospitals, organizations dealing with housing and environmental issues, and a professional who represented laboratory interests, see Exhibit "1" at v, provided written advice and recommendations to the CDC regarding childhood lead poisoning prevention. Furthermore, the advisory committee received expert advice from a group of official consultants, who provided input for the advisory committee's written recommendations. 7. In addition to the written recommendations of the advisory DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 3 4 _¢ committee, CDC considered comments from medical groups, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, representatives of companies who produce or use lead, drug manufacturers, and childhood lead poisoning prevention interest groups. 8. Furthermore, before publishing the 1991 CDC Statement, CDC provided the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") with a draft of the 1991 CDC Statement, and received comments and suggestions from HCFA. 9. The CDC itself has engaged in studies of childhood lead poisoning, the results of which are reflected in the 1991 CDC Statement. 10. I served as one of the principal authors of the 1991 CDC Statement. In addition, I synthesized the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee and other interested parties and government agencies, and consulted with the appropriate CDC officials knowledgeable in this area in order to ensure that the 1991 CDC Statement was consistent with CDC policy. 11. The 1991 CDC Statement is intended to provide guidance and recommendations, rather than mandates, to pediatric health care providers, state and local public agencies for dealing with childhood lead poisoning. 12. The 1991 CDC Statement differs from the. 1985 CDC Statement in chat Tit lowers the threshold for concern by pediatric health care providers from the blood lead level of 25 ug/dL to 10 ug/dL. The actions suggested as a result of such blood lead level results range from periodic retesting to community prevention activities to DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 4 &( Le chelation therapy treatments in more severe cases of lead poisoning. The focus of the 1991 CDC Statement is on "primary prevention" -- i.e. preventing exposure to lead before children become poisoned. 13. While the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that the screening test of choice is now the blood lead test since the EP test is not sensitive enough to identify children with blood lead levels below 25 pug/dL, the 1991 CDC Statement also acknowledges the need for a transition period until the recommendations of the 1991 CDC Statement can be implemented fully. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that this transition period is necessary to allow state health departments, health care providers and laboratories to reach adequate capacity for performing the blood lead level test. (To reach adequate capacity will require the aequisition of the necessary laboratory equipment and the hiring and training of appropriate personnel.) During this transition or phase-in period to the use of the blood lead test as the primary screening method, the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that some programs will continue to use the EP test as a screening test. 14. The EP test is an indirect assessment of lead levels in blood since it measures the chemical erythrocyte protoporphyrin whose level in blood rises when lead is present. By contrast, the blood lead level test is a direct assessment of lead levels in blood, using one of two electrochemical techniques to assess lead levels -- anodic toning voltammetry or atomic absorption spectroscopy. 15. The 1991 CDC Statement further distinguishes between those children to be considered high-risk and low-risk for high-dose exposure to lead, and recommends the use of a series of questions DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 5 o _d designed to ascertain the risk level of a child, as well as the type and frequency of testing the child should receive. 16. In addition, the 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that virtually all children are at risk for lead poisoning, and as a result, a phase-in of universal screening using the blood lead level test for all children is recommended, except in communities where large numbers or percentages of children have been screened and found not to have lead poisoning. The 1991 CDC Statement recognizes that full implementation of universal screening using the blood lead level test will require the availability of cheaper and easier-to-use methods of blood lead measurement. The 1991 CDC Statement further recognizes that the highest priority should continue to be those children with the highest blood lead levels. 17. In 1991, I was contacted by HCFA agency officials to discuss HCFA's proposed guidelines with respect to lead testing in children. During 1991 and 1992, my staff and I discussed drafts of HCFA's guidelines regarding lead testing of children with HCFA agency officials on at least two occasions. On or about December 6, 1991, I met with William Hiscock and other HCFA agency officials to provide verbal comments on behalf of the CDC to HCFA with respect to the proposed HCFA guidelines. 18. The CDC has rechartered a new advisory committee on childhood lead poisoning prevention which is scheduled to meet in or about Spring of 1993. At that time, the new advisory committee will consider whether to amend the current 1991 CDC Statement or issue a revised CDC report on lead poisoning prevention. DECLARATION OF SUE BINDER, M.D. -- Page 6 o oC 19. CDC believes that the final HCFA guidelines, which became effective on September 19, 1992, are consistent with the 1991 CDC Staterent. 20. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, and certify that Exhibit "1" attached hereto is a true and correct copy. This declaration was executed on the 8 day of October, 1992, at Atlanta, Georgia. ON u N .D, -- Page 7