Presley v. City of Monticello Record
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1967

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Wallace v. Lee Motion to Affirm, 1967. 24315b66-c89a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8f325deb-eb93-40a1-bf4f-3e634cbbfcdd/wallace-v-lee-motion-to-affirm. Accessed July 02, 2025.
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i&uprpm? fflmurt of tip' Itnitcit States O cto ber T e r m , 1967 No. 489 In th e GOVERNOR LURLEEN BURNS W ALLACE, in her capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, and as President of Alabama State School Board of Education; A LA B A M A STATE BOARD OF ED UCATION ; ERNEST STONE, Secretary and Executive Officer of Alabama State Board of Education; JAM ES D. NETTLES, ED D AN N ELLY, MRS. CARL STRANG, FRED L. MERRELL, W . M. BECK, VICTOR P. POOLE, W . C. D AVIS, CECIL W ARD and HAROLD C. M ARTIN, as members of Alabama State Board of Education, Appellants, -v.- AN TH O N Y T. LEE and H EN R Y A. LEE, by Detroit Lee and Hattie M. Lee, their parents and next friends; PALMER SULLINS, JR., A L A N D. SULLINS and MARSHA M ARIE SULLINS, by Palmer Sullins and Della D. Sullins, their parents and next friends; GERALD W ARREN B ILLES and HELOISE E LAIN E BILLES, by I. V. Billes, their father and next friend; W IL L IE M. JACKSON, JR., by Mabel H. Jackson, his mother and next friend; W IL L IE B. W Y A T T , JR., and BRENDA J. W Y A T T , by Willie B. Wyatt and Thelma A. Wyatt, their parents and next friends; NELSON N. BOGGAN, JR., bv Nelson Boggan, Sr., and Mamie Boggan, his parents and next friends; W IL L IE C. JOHNSON, JR., BRENDA F A Y E JOHNSON and DW IGHT W . JOHNSON, by Willie C. Johnson and Ruth Johnson, their parents and next friends, and W IL L IA M H. MOORE and E D W IN A M. MOORE, by L. James Moore and Edna M. Moore, their parents and next friends, and U N ITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE U N ITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF A L A B A M A MOTION TO AFFIRM FRED D. GRAY 352 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 JACK GREENBERG JAM ES M. NABRIT, II I CHARLES H. JONES, JR. CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON M E L V YN ZARR 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Appellees Anthony T. Lee, et al. I N D E X PAGE Citations to Opinions Below ......................................... 2 Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 2 Question Presented ........................................................... 2 Statement of the Case ..................................................... 3 A rgument The Court Below Was Clearly Correct in Order ing the Appellants to Implement the School De segregation Decisions of This Court ....................... 9 A. The Court Below Correctly Appraised Ap pellants’ Power Over Public Education in Alabama and Correctly Found That That Power Had Been Exercised to Thwart Rather Than to Promote Desegregation ....................... 10 B. The Relief Fashioned by the Court Below Represents a Measured and Carefully Con sidered Judicial Response to Years of Foot- Dragging and Defiance by State Officials Re sponsible for School Desegregation in Ala bama ................................................................. 12 Co n clu sio n ............................................................................ 15 11 T able of Cases PAGE Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954) .... 9 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955) .... 9 Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 382 U. S. 103 (1965) .............................................................................. 9 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958) .............................. 9 Evans v. Ennis, 281 F. 2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960), cert, den. 364 U. S. 933 (1961) .......................................... 9 Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218 (1964) .................................. 9 Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E. D. La. 1961), aff’d, 368 U. S. 515 (1962) .... 9 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 221 F. Supp. 297 (M. D. Ala. 1963) ..................................... 3 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 231 F. Supp. 743 (M. D. Ala. 1964) .......................2,3,4,5,6,13 NAACP v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M. D. Ala. 1967) ................................................................................ 7 United States v. Rea, 231 F. Supp. 772 (M. D. Ala. 1964) ................................................................................ 3 United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M. D. Ala. 1963) ................................................................................ 3 Wallace v. Lee, 387 U. S. 916 (1967) ............................ 3 Ill Statutes page 28 U. S. C. §1253 ............................................................. 2 Code of Ala. Tit. 52, §61(8) ......................................... 9 Act No. 252, 1966 Special Session of the Alabama Legislature ...................................................................... 6, 7 Act No. 266, 1967 Special Session of the Alabama Legislature ...................................................................... 9 Act No. 285, 1967 Special Session of the Alabama Legislature ...................................................................... 11 M iscellaneous Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Southern School Desegregation, 1966-67 .... 10 . j In the Sntprmt (Emtrt of tip Unite State O ctober T e r m , 1967 No. 489 G o v e r n o r L u r l e e n B u r n s W a l l a c e , in her capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama, and as President of Alabama State School Board of Education; A l a b a m a S t a t e B oard or E d u c a t i o n ; E r n e s t S t o n e , Secretary and Executive Officer of Alabama State Board of Education; J a m e s D . N e t t l e s , E d D a n n e l l y , M r s . C a r l S t r a n g , F red L . M e r r e l l , W . M . B e c k , V icto r P . P o o le , W . C . D a v is , Ce c il W ard and H arold C. M a r t in , as members of Alabama State Board of Education, Appellants, -v- A n t h o n y T . L e e and H e n r y A. L e e , by Detroit Lee and Hattie M. Lee, their parents and next friends; P a l m e r S u l l in s , J r ., A t,a n D. S u l l in s and M a r s h a M ar ie S u l l in s , by Palmer Sullins and Della D. Sullins, their parents and next friends; G er a ld W a r r e n B il l e s and H elo ise E l a in e B il l e s , by I. V. Billes, their father and next friend; W il l ie M. J a c k s o n , J r ., by Mabel II. Jackson, his mother and next friend; AVil l ie B. W y a t t , J r ., and B r e n d a J. W y a t t , by Willie B. AAryatt and Thelma A. Wyatt, their parents and next friends; N e l s o n N. B o g g a n , J r ., by Nelson Boggan, Sr., and Mamie Boggan, his parents and next friends; AVil l ie C. J o h n s o n , J r ., B r e n d a F a y e J o h n s o n and D w i g h t AV. J o h n s o n , by AVillie C. Johnson and Ruth Johnson, their parents and next friends, and W il l ia m II. M oore and E d w in a M. M oore , by L. James Moore and Edna M. Moore, their parents and next friends, and U n it e d S t a t e s of A m e r ic a , Appellees. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MOTION TO AFFIRM 2 Appellees Anthony T. Lee et al.1 respectfully move the Court, pursuant to Eule 16(1) (c) of the Eules of the Court, to affirm the judgment below, and in support thereof would show that plenary consideration of this appeal is unneces sary because the decision below is clearly correct. Citations to Opinions Below The decision below is reported at 267 F. Supp. 458 (M. D. Ala. 1967). An earlier, highly relevant decision of the court below in this case is reported at 231 F. Supp. 743 (M. D. Ala. 1964). Jurisdiction Jurisdiction of this appeal is founded upon 28 U. S. C. §1253, in that injunctive relief was sought and obtained from a three-judge district court constituted pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2281, 2284 against the enforcement of a stat ute of the State of Alabama on the ground of its federal unconstitutionality. Question Presented Did the court below abuse its discretion in requiring ap pellants to exercise their power over public education in Alabama in such a way as to implement, rather than de feat, the school desegregation decisions of this Court? 1 Appellees Lee et al. are the original plaintiffs in this ease. On behalf of the class of all Negro schoolchildren in Alabama, they filed the supplemental complaint and motion requesting the court below to order the state-wide desegregation plan in issue here (see 267 F. Supp. 458, 461-62). Thus they clearly are appellees here, despite unfounded assertions to the contrary by appellants in their jurisdictional statement (see pp. 7-8, 14, 45). In the in 3 Statement of the Case This case originated in January, 1963 as a simple school desegregation case brought by the appellees, Negro chil dren and their parents residing in Macon County, Ala bama.2 3 * After hearing, the district judge ordered the de fendant school board to begin desegregation of the county school system by September, 1963. Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 221 F. Supp. 297 (M. D. Ala. 1963). In compliance with that order, the defendant school board assigned 13 Negro students to a white high school. On Sep tember 2, 1963, these Negro pupils were denied entrance to the white high school by Alabama state troopers acting pursuant to an executive order of Governor George C. Wallace (see 231 F. Supp. at 747). Subsequently, on Sep tember 9, 1963, state troopers again prevented entrance of the Negro pupils to the white high school—again upon the order of Governor Wallace (ibid.). The United States then applied to the district court for injunctive relief against the Governor, which was granted. United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M. D. Ala. 1963). In January, 1964, the State Board of Education closed the desegregated high school and transferred the Negro students to an all-Negro high school (see 231 F. Supp. at 748). The district court then ordered that the Negro stu dents be admitted to two all-white high schools (ibid.).8 stant appeal, appellees Lee et al. have heretofore filed an opposition to appellants’ application for a stay pending appeal, Wallace v. Lee, 387 U. S. 916 (1967). 2 In July, 1963, the United States Avas added as a party plaintiff and as amicus curiae. 3 Official resistance to that order was enjoined in United States v. Rea, 231 F. Supp. 772 (M. D. Ala. 1964). 4 In February, 1964, appellees filed a supplemental com plaint, adding as defendants the Governor, the Executive Officer and Secretary of the Alabama State Board of Edu cation (also known as, and herein referred to as, the State Superintendent of Education) and the other members of the State Board of Education. In this supplemental com plaint appellees requested the district court (1) to enjoin these defendants from operating a dual school system based upon race throughout the State of Alabama; (2) to enter an order requiring state-wide desegregation of public schools in the State of Alabama; (3) to enjoin the use of state funds to perpetuate the dual school system and (4) to enjoin as unconstitutional the tuition grant law of 1957 (Code of Ala., Title 52 §§61 (13)-61 (21)). Thereupon the chief judge of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in response to the request of the district judge, constituted a three-judge court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§2281, 2284 (231 F. Supp. at 746). The three-judge court continued in effect, pending full hearing and determination, the tem porary restraining order issued by the single district judge enjoining the state officials from their various forms of interference with the peaceful and orderly desegregation of the public schools. After extensive trial and briefing, the court rendered its decision of July 13, 1964, 231 F. Supp. 743. The court found interference by the state officials with local school desegregation—and more. The court found that appellants possessed “ general control and supervision over all the public schools in the State of Alabama” and that these powers were exercised to promote and maintain, rather 5 than to eliminate, segregation (231 F. Supp. at 756).4 The court directed appellants to recognize that “ in the exercise of their general control and supervision over all the public schools in the State of Alabama and particularly in the allo cation and distribution of state funds for school operations, they have an affirmative duty to proceed with ‘deliberate speed’ in bringing about the elimination of racial discrimi nation in the public schools of this State” (231 F. Supp. at 756). Appellants were ordered “ to formulate and place into effect plans designed to make the distribution of public funds to the various schools throughout the State of Ala bama only to those schools and school systems that have proceeded with ‘deliberate speed’ in the desegregation of their schools and school systems as required by Brown v. Board of Education” (231 F. Supp. 756-57). But the court withheld state-wide desegregation, preferring to rely for a season upon the good faith of appellants (231 F. Supp. at 756): For the present time, this Court will proceed upon the assumption that the Governor, the State Superinten dent of Education and the State Board of Education will comply in good faith with the injunction of this Court . . . and, through the exercise of considerable judicial restraint, no state-wide desegregation will be ordered at this time. 4 The Court found (231 F. Supp. at 750-51): The evidence in this case is clear that over the years the State Board of Education and the State Superintendent of Education have established and enforced rules and policies regarding the manner in which the city and county school systems exercise their responsibilities under state law. This control relates, among other things, to finances, accounting practices, textbooks, transportation, school construction, and even Bible reading. 6 Appellants were ordered to desist from interfering with local desegregation attempts “— either directly or indirectly —through the use of subtle coercion or outright interfer ence” (231 F. Supp. at 756). Moreover, appellants were enjoined from (order of July 13, 1964, paragraph 6): Failing, in the exercise of its control and supervi sion over the public schools of the State, to use such control and supervision in such a manner as to pro mote and encourage the elimination of racial discrimi nation in the public schools, rather than to prevent and discourage the elimination of such discrimination. The court also concluded that Alabama’s tuition grant law was nothing more than a sham established for the purpose of financing with state funds a white school system in the State of Alabama and enjoined its continued operation (231 F. Supp. at 754). 2 £ 7 On September 1, 1965, a new tuition grant statute was approved5 which was challenged by a supplemental com plaint filed by the United States.6 On September 2, 1966, Act No. 252, 1966 Special Ses sion, was approved, which purported to nullify the school desegregation efforts by local public school officials pur suant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the regulations and guidelines promulgated thereunder by the United States Department of Health, Education and Wel fare.7 5 Code of Ala. Tit. 52, §61(8). 6 The supplemental complaint was filed in August, 1966 and alleged that the new tuition grant statute wras for no purpose other than to perpetuate segregation in the public schools of Alabama. 7 The Act provided, in relevant part: “Any agreement or assur ance of compliance with the guidelines heretofore made or given In September and November, 1966, appellees tiled an additional supplemental complaint and a motion for further relief challenging Act No. 252 and “ again asking for a state-wide desegregation order and an injunction against the use of state funds to support a dual school system” (267 F. Supp. at 461-62). Following extensive discovery, trial and briefing, the court rendered its decision on March 22, 1967, 267 F. Supp. 458. The court’s opinion confirmed its earlier findings that the appellants had enormous authority and power over the actual operation of the various local school systems throughout the state. “ This conclusion was based on the actual assumption or usurpation of authority by these [ap pellants] over the local school boards, exemplified by their total control, when they chose to exert it, over the Macon County school system, and also by the general statutory power granted to these various officials to supervise and control the public schools in the State of Alabama” (267 F. Supp. at 462). The court found from the actions of appellants since July 13, 1964 that its reliance upon the good faith of the ap pellants had been misplaced (267 F. Supp. at 465): “ Not only have these [appellants], through their control and influence over the local school boards, flouted every effort to make the Fourteenth Amendment a meaningful reality to Negro school children in Alabama; they have apparently dedicated themselves and, certainly from the evidence in this case, have committed the powers and resources of their by a local, county or city board of education is null and void and shall have no binding effect.” This Act was struck down in NAACP v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M. D. Ala. 1967). 8 offices to the continuation of a dual public school system such as that condemned by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483.” Therefore, the court concluded that an order granting state-wide desegregation should no longer be withheld (267 F. Supp. at 465): Based upon this fact and a continuation of such con duct on the part of these state 'officials as hereafter outlined, it is now evident that the reasons for this Court’s reluctance to grant the relief to which these plaintiffs were clearly entitled over two years ago are no longer valid. The court set forth in its opinion striking examples of appellants’ actions constituting “ dramatic interference with local efforts to desegregate public schools” (267 F. Supp. 462-470). But, the court concluded, “ the most significant action by these [appellant] state officials, designed to main tain the dual public school system based upon race, is found in the day-to-day performance of their duties in the gen eral supervision and operation of the system” (267 F. Supp. at 470). The court then summarized the appellants’ “wide range of activities to maintain segregated public educa tion throughout the State of Alabama” (267 F. Supp. 470- 78). “ These activities have been concerned with and have controlled virtually every aspect of public education in the state, including site selection, construction, consolida tion, assignment of teachers, allocation of funds, trans portation, vocational education and the assignment of stu dents” (267 F. Supp. at 478). Because it could “ conceive of no other effective way to give the [appellees] the relief to which they are entitled 9 under the evidence in this case” (267 F. Supp. at 478), the court ordered a uniform state-wide plan for school desegre gation. The court also enjoined the 1965 version of the Alabama tuition grant statute,8 finding that “ [i]t is clear that the present tuition statute was born of the same effort to dis criminate against Negroes, and was designed to fill the vacuum left by this Court’s injunction against the 1957 tuition statute” (267 F. Supp. at 477).9 On May 22, 1967, this Court denied a stay of the district court’s injunction, Wallace v. Lee, 387 U. S. 916. A R G U M E N T The Court Relow Was Clearly Correct in Ordering the Appellants to Implement the School Desegregation Deci sions of This Court. The court below correctly concluded that this Court’s school desegregation decisions10 would continue to have little 8 Code of Alabama, Title 52, §61(8) (Act No. 687, approved September 1, 1965). 9 On August 31, 1967, appellant Wallace approved a new tuition grant statute to fill the vacuum left by the court’s injunction in issue here (Act No. 266). 10 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958); HaU v. St. Helena. Parish School Board, 197 F. Supp. 649 (E. D. La. 1961), aff’d, 368 U. S. 515 (1962) ; Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 382 U. S. 103 (1965). See also Evans v. Ennis, 281 F. 2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960), cert. den. 364 U. S. 933 (1961). 10 meaning and effect in Alabama11 unless appellants were or dered to apply the same ingenuity, effort and resources to eradicate the dual school system in Alabama that they had applied to create and maintain it. The court correctly ap praised appellants’ power over public education in Ala bama and fashioned a remedy adequate to reverse the thrust of that power, requiring appellants to promote de segregation rather than fight a rearguard action against it. A. The Court Below Correctly Appraised Appellants’ Power Over Public Education in Alabama and Cor rectly Found That That Power Had Been Exercised to Thwart Rather Than to Promote Desegregation. “ To maintain the racial characteristics of the Alabama public school system, the [appellant] state officials have used their power in essentially two ways. First, they have used their authority as a threat and as a means of punish ment to prevent local school officials from fulfilling their constitutional obligation to desegregate schools, and, second, they have performed their own functions in such a way as to maintain and preserve the racial characteristics of the system” (267 F. Supp. at 466). The evidence as to appellants’ interference with local de segregation attempts is overwhelming. The record is re plete with outrageous examples of “ dramatic interference with local efforts to desegregate public schools” (267 F. Supp. at 470); a few are detailed in the court’s opinion, 267 F. Supp. 462-70. They reveal persistent pressure on 11 The extent o f school desegregation in Alabama has been piti fully small. In the Fall of 1966, 95% of the state’s Negro pupils were attending totally segregated schools. Report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Southern School Desegregation, 1966-67, pp. 8-11. 11 local school officials to maintain segregation, including threats to cut off state funds (see, e.g., Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11),12 to use the state police power (see 267 F. Supp. at 469) and to expose local officials to public hostility (see Tran script, pp. 61-62) and demands that the local officials resist “ illegal” desegregation, that is, desegregation beyond the minimum requirements of the federal courts (see 267 F. Supp. at 467-68; see also Government’s Exhibits 6-11, 94; Transcript, p. 33). Local officials who avoided desegrega tion were rewarded with additional state funds (see 267 F. Supp. at 469-70; Government’s Exhibits 95-97; Defen dants’ Exhibit 5). But, the court found, “ the most significant action by these [appellant] state officials, designed to maintain the dual public school system based upon race, is found in the day- to-day performance of their duties in the general super vision and operation of the system” (267 F. Supp. at 470). “ These activities have been concerned with and have con trolled virtually every aspect of public education in the state, including site selection, construction, consolidation [see 267 F. Supp. at 470-72], assignment of teachers [see 267 F. Supp. at 472-73], allocation of founds [see 267 F. Supp. at 469-70], transportation [see 267 F. Supp. at 473- 74], vocational education [see 267 F. Supp. at 474-75], and the assignment of students” (267 F. Supp. at 478). 12 Subsequent to the court’s decision, on September 1, 1967, ap pellant Wallace approved an Act (No. 285) requiring all students to designate the race of their teacher and providing for the cut-off of state funds to local school boards which did not require and enforce those designations. On application by appellees, the three- judge court bekm issued a temporary restraining order against the Act’s enforcement on September 5, 1967. 12 B. The Relief Fashioned by the Court Below Represents a Measured and Carefully Considered Judicial Re sponse to Years of Foot-Dragging and Defiance by State Officials Responsible for School Desegregation in Alabama. The court below acted on the principle that the equitable remedy must be coextensive with the wrong suffered by appellees and members of their class. Having examined the wide range of appellants’ activities, see Part A, supra, the court decided that “ [t]he remedy to which these [ap pellees] are constitutionally entitled must be designed to reach the limits of the [appellants’] activities in these sev eral areas and must be designed to require the [appellants] to do what they have been unwilling to do on their own— to discharge their constitutional obligation to disestablish in each of the local county and city school systems in Ala bama that are not already operating under a United States court order, the dual public school system to the extent that it is based upon race or color” (267 F. Supp. at 478). The court’s decree does just that (see 267 F. Supp. at 480-91). Preliminarily, it should be noted that the decree is di rected specifically and solely to the appellant state officials, and not to local school boards. All the decree requires is that the appellants use their undoubted power to imple ment a state-wide desegregation plan.13 13 Appellants see a due process violation in the fact that the local school boards were not made formal parties to the suit. This contention was effectively dealt with by the court below (267 P. Supp. at 479) : The argument that this Court is proceeding without juris diction over indispensable parties to this litigation, to-wit, local school boards throughout the state, is not persuasive. We are dealing here with state officials, and all we require at 13 The decree requires the appellants to exercise their clearly- established powers, which heretofore have been used to frustrate desegregation, to effectuate the disestablishment of the dual school system in Alabama by taking the follow ing actions (267 F. Supp. at 480-91): 1. To require that all local school boards not under court desegregation order adopt uniform plans for desegregation that meet minimum constitutional standards; 2. To plan school construction and consolidation so as to promote desegregation; 3. To encourage and assist faculty desegregation; 4. To exercise their supervision over proposed school bus routes so as to eliminate race as a basis for assigning students to school buses and to eliminate overlapping and duplicative bus routes based upon race; this time is that those officials affirmatively exercise their con trol and authority to implement a plan on a state-wide basis designed to insure a reasonable attainment of equal educa tional opportunities for all children in the state regardless o f their race. It may be that in some instances a particular school district will need to be brought directly into the liti gation to insure that the defendant state officials have im plemented this Court’s decree and that the state is not supporting, financially or otherwise, a local system that is being operated on an unconstitutional basis. Hopefully, these instances will be the exception and not the rule. Clearly this possibility does not diminish the propriety of the state-wide relief to be ordered. Having already resolved this issue of state-wide relief against the defendants in the order made and entered in Lee, et al. (United States of America, Amicus Curiae) v. Macon County Board of Education, July 13, 1964, 231 P. Supp. 743, further discussion and analysis is not necessary. 14 5. To terminate all forms of segregation and discrimina tion in all educational institutions under the direct control of the State Board of Education, including trade schools, junior colleges and state colleges; 6. To formulate a detailed program for equalizing Negro schools with white schools; 7. To refrain from interfering with local officials in their attempt to eliminate the dual school system; and, 8. To submit periodic detailed reports of their progress to the court and to the parties. Appellants urge the court to note probable jurisdiction to eliminate “ the chaos now existing in the field of public education” (Jurisdictional Statement, p. 59). Any chaos which may exist in public education in Alabama is of the appellants’ own making. It is they who have employed every resource at their command to circumvent, and sometimes defy, the school desegregation decisions of this Court. When the appellants abandon the segregation policies which they have imposed upon the State of Alabama, then local school officials will “be able to return to the teaching of students and dealing with the related educational problems rather than expending their time and energies trying to tread the difficult ‘middle ground’ between conflicting fed eral and state demands” (267 F. Supp. at 478-79). To hasten that day, the decision below should be affirmed. 15 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the decision below should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, F eed D. Gray 352 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36104 Jack Greenberg James M. Nabrit, III Charles H. Jones, Jr. Charles Stephen Ralston M elvyn Z arr 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for Appellees Anthony T. Lee, et al. • B MONTON STREET NEW VONK >•*, N.U