Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air Brief of Respondent

    No. 38 &

IN THE

§uj*rrmr Court of %  Ittilrtu Bt&tts
October Term, 1964

Gladys Quander T ancil and Barbara J ackson 
W illiams, Appellants

v.
W illiam P. W oolls and F ranklin P. B ackus, Judges 

o f the Corporation Court o f the City of Alexan­
dria, Virginia, Appellees

On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

A llison W. Brown, Jr.
Suite 705
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N. W . 
Washington 6, I). C.

Otto L. T ucker 
901 Princess Street 
Alexandria, Virginia

Attorneys for Appellants

P ress of B yron S. A d a m s , W ashington, D. C.



INDEX

Page
Opinion below .................................................................  2
Jurisdiction ..................................................................... 2
Question presented ........................................................ 2
Statutes involved ...........................................................  2
Statement ........................................................................  3
Argument ........................................................................  6

CITATIONS
Cases :

Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 ...............................  2, 9
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 ................................ 9
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 ................. 8
Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 ................... 6
Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 ............................ 8
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 6 1 ...................................  8
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 9
Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 6

Constitutions :

United States :
Fourteenth Amendment ...........................................2, 4, 9

Virginia:
Section 3 8 ....................................................................  3

S tatutes.:

United States Code:
Title 28, Sec. 1253 ............................................  2

Sec. 1343(3) ......................................... 2
Sec. 2101(b) ......................................... 2
Sec. 2201 ...........................................................  2
Sec. 2284 ...........................................................  2, 5



ii Index Continued

Page
Title 42, Sec. 1981 ......................................... 2

Sec, 1983 ................................................................2
Virginia Code (1950):

Sec. 1-14 ......................................................... 7
Sec. 20-101 .......................................2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
Sec. 20-123 .................................................. 2, 6, 7, 8
Sec. 24-28 ....................................................... 3
Sec. 24-118 ..................................................... 3
Sec. 24-120 ..................................................... 3
Sec. 58-790 ....................................................... 3
Sec. 58-804(b), (d) and (h) ..........................  4
Sec. 58-880 ...............    4



IN  THE

^uprrrnr Court of %  Initrfr ^tatro
October Term, 1964

No.

Gladys Quander T ancil and B arbara J ackson 
W illiams, Appellants

v.
W illiam P. W oolls and F ranklin P. B ackus, Judges 

o f the Corporation Court o f the City of Alexan­
dria, Virginia, Appellees

On Appeal from ihe United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellants appeal from the adverse part of the final 
order entered April 28, 1964, by the District Court, 
consisting of three judges constituted pursuant to 
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2284, and submit



2

this Statement to show that the Supreme Court of 
the United States has jurisdiction o f the appeal and 
that a substantial question is presented.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion o f the District Court for  the Eastern 
District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, is reported 
at 230 E. Supp. 156. The opinion and final order of the 
District Court are attached hereto as Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction o f the District Court to decide the 
question involved in this appeal was invoked under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu­
tion, Title 42, United States Code, Sections 1981 and 
1983, and Title 28, United States Code, Sections 1343 
(3) and 2201. The judgment o f the District Court was 
entered on April 28, 1963, and notice of appeal was 
filed in that court on June 26, 1964. The jurisdiction 
o f the Supreme Court to review this decision by direct 
appeal is conferred by Title 28, United States Code, 
Sections 1253 and 2101(b). The Court’s jurisdiction 
to review the case on direct appeal is sustained by 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399.

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Section 20-101, Code o f Virginia (1950), 
which requires every decree o f divorce entered by a 
court in Virginia to “ contain a recital showing the 
race o f the husband and w ife,”  violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution o f the United States.

STATUTES INVOLVED

Sections 20-101 and 20-123, Code o f Virginia (1950), 
are set forth in Appendix A  hereto.



STATEMENT

Appellants Gladys Qnander Tancil and Barbara 
Jackson Williams are Negro citizens of the United 
States and residents of the State o f Virginia. They 
brought this action in the District Court to have de­
clared unconstitutional, and to enjoin enforcement of 
Section 20-101, Code o f Virginia (1950), which re­
quires every decree o f divorce entered by a court in 
Virginia to “ contain a recital showing the race o f the 
husband and w ife.” 1 The appellees William P. W oolls

1 Appellants were part of a larger group of 14 Negro and white 
plaintiffs, who, in a single proceeding in the District Court, chal­
lenged the constitutionality of several provisions of the Virginia 
Code and Constitution, in addition to the one here at issue, which 
require the maintenance of various types of public records on a 
racial basis. The other provisions of law attacked, and which the 
District Court held unconstitutional (infra, pp. 2a-6a) are as 
follows:

(a) The provision of Section 38 of the Constitution of Vir­
ginia which requires lists of those who have paid their poll 
taxes to state ‘ ‘ white and colored persons separately. ’ ’

(b) The provision of Section 24-28, Code of Virginia (1950), 
as amended, which requires registration lists of “ white and 
colored”  voters to be “ kept and arranged in separate books 
or records. ’ ’

(c) The provision of Section 24-118, Code of Virginia 
(1950), as amended, which requires registration lists of voters 
in certain counties and cities to be kept in loose leaf binders 
“ with white sheets for recording the names of white voters 
and buff sheets for recording the names of colored voters. ’ ’

(d) The provision of Section 24-120, Code of Virginia 
(1950), as amended, which requires lists of those who have 
paid their poll taxes and filed certificates of residence to state 
“ white and colored persons”  and certain tribal Indians 
separately.

(e) The provision of Section 58-790, Code of Virginia 
(1950), as amended, which requires assessors, at the time of



4

and Franklin P. Backus are the two judges o f the 
Corporation Court o f the City o f Alexandria, Virginia. 
Defendant Woolls, on March 4, 1952, entered a decree 
o f divorce in the matter known on the records o f the 
Corporation Court as Gladys Quander Tancil v. 
Herbert P ike Tancil, I I I , Chancery No. 8205, which 
decree recited that each party to the action, including 
appellant Bladys Quander Tancil, is “ colored.”

The Corporation Court o f the City o f Alexandria, 
o f which appellees Woolls and Backus are the judges 
also has jurisdiction over a pending divorce proceed­
ing known on the records o f that court as Barbara 
Jackson Williams v. Charles Oscar Williams, Chan­
cery No. 10322, in which proceeding appellant Barbara

making assessments of real estate to “ note whether the owner 
is white or colored, or Indian.”

(f) The provisions of Section 58-804, paragraphs (b), (d) 
and (h), Code of Virginia (1950), as amended, which require 
land books for the cities and counties to be arranged so that 
separate listings are made of real estate owned by “ white 
persons,”  “ colored persons”  and certain “ tribal Indians.”

(g) The provision of Section 58-880, Code of Virginia 
(1950), as amended, which requires personal property books to 
be arranged so that personal property assessments with taxes 
and levies are shown separately for “ white persons”  and 
‘ ‘ colored persons. ’ ’

The District Court found that these provisions “ serve no other 
purpose than to classify and distinguish official records on the 
basis of race or color”  {infra, p. 4a). The Court held that by 
requiring the separation of names by race, the provisions conflict 
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; the Court 
therefore enjoined their enforcement. Various State and local 
officials, who were defendants below, have noted their appeal to 
this Court from the District Court’s decision {Virginia State Board
of Elections, et al. v. Hamm, No. ------ , October Term, 1964) the
single record of the proceeding before the District Court has been 
filed in this Court, and presumably the Court will want to consider 
the two cases together.



Jackson Williams is suing for, and is entitled to, a 
decree of divorce from  the bond o f matrimony on the 
ground of wilful desertion and abandonment. The 
appellees W oolls and Backus, are required, pursuant 
to Section 20-101 Code o f Virginia (1950) to include 
in any decree o f divorce granted in the pending action 
involving appellant Williams a recital showing that 
she is o f the Negro race.

Appellants, in addition to seeking a declaration of 
the unconstitutionality o f Section 20-101, requested the 
District Court to enjoin the appellees from  enforcing, 
or in any manner giving effect to the provision. Such 
an injunction would protect appellant Williams from 
threatened harm resulting from  application o f the 
statute in connection with her pending divorce action. 
The injunctive relief sought by appellant Tancil would 
require the Corporation Court to strike from  her decree 
of divorce entered by appellee W oods on March 4,1952, 
the word “ colored”  where it appears following the 
names of the parties.

A  three-judge District Court was convened pursuant 
to Title 28, United States Code, Section 2284, and the 
cause was heard February 21, 1964. On April 28, 
1964, the Court rendered its decision and a final order 
granting part o f the relief sought,2 but denying relief 
to these appellants. The Court declined to hold Sec­
tion 20-101 unconstitutional, on the ground, as stated 
by it, that “ vital statistics * * * are aided by the deno­
tation in the divorce decree o f the race o f the parties.”  
This ruling by the District Court upholding the con­
stitutionality of Section 20-101 and refusing to enjoin 
its enforcement constitute the subject o f this appeal. 3

3 See pp. 3-4, n. 1, supra.



6

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS SUBSTANTIAL

It cannot be gainsaid, as the District Court held, 
that a statute is unconstitutional which serves “ no 
other purpose than to classify and distinguish official 
records on the basis o f race or color”  (infra, p. 
4a). That ruling accords with this Court’s expressed 
view that, “ racial classifications are ‘ obviously irrele­
vant and invidious.’ ”  Goss v. Board of Education, 
373 TJ.S. 683, 687, quoting, Steele v. Louisville and 
Nashville JR. Go., 323 U.S. 192, 203. However, the 
District Court closed its eyes to inescapable fact when 
it failed to apply this fundamental precept to Section 
20- 101.

The District Court manifestly erred in upholding 
the constitutionality o f Section 20-101 o f the Virginia 
Code on the ground that the section is related to the 
State’s function o f gathering vital statistics concern­
ing divorces. Another section o f the Code, Section 
20-123, is the only provision o f the State’s divorce law 
relating to the collection o f vital statistics. Section 20- 
123 provides that the clerk o f a court which grants 
divorces must make a report o f each divorce granted 
in his court to the State Registrar o f Vital Statistics 
on a form  furnished by the State Bureau o f Vital 
Statistics3 for that purpose. Pursuant to the terms of 
Section 20-123, that report must include: (a ) alleged 
cause of the divorce; (b ) sex o f plaintiff and defend­
ant; (c ) occupation o f plaintiff and defendant; (d ) 
date o f marriage; (e) place o f marriage; ( f )  number 3

3 The Bureau of Vital Statistics is established within the State 
Department of Health pursuant to Section 32-353.5, Code of Vir­
ginia (1962 Cum. Supp.). The Bureau’s authority and functions 
are spelled out in detail in Sections 32-353.4 through 32-353.31 of 
the Code. The State Registrar is in charge of the Bureau.



7

of children in fam ily; (g ) time o f separation, and, 
finally (h ) plaintiff’s and defendant’s “ color” .*

The collection o f vital statistics concededly is a legiti­
mate function o f government. But the record o f this 
case is devoid o f any evidence that Section 20-101, 
which requires the recital o f race in divorce decrees, 
was enacted with a statistical purpose in view or that 
it has ever served such a function. There were no 
issues o f fact tried before the District Court in this 
case. The appellants made a timely motion for sum­
mary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 o f the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and oral argument o f counsel, plus 
the pleadings and briefs of the parties, provided the 
basis for the Court’s consideration o f the matter. The 
appellees, through their counsel, the Attorney General, 
offered no evidence to show that Section 20-101 is re­
lated to the collection o f vital statistics by the State. 
It is apparent, therefore, from  this lack of evidence, 
as well as the existence in the Code of Section 20-123, 
which relates by its terms to the collection o f statistics, 
that the Court’s finding that Section 20-101 serves a 
statistical purpose represents sheer speculation. Since 
the State has shown no justification for the racial pro­
visions contained in Section 20-101, the section should 4

4 There is no definition in the Code of the term, “ race”  as it is 
used in Section 20-101. Section 1-14 of the Code (1950), however, 
provides:

Colored persons and Indians defined.—Every person in whom 
there is ascertainable any Negro blood shall be deemed and 
taken to be a colored person, and every person not a colored 
person having one-fourth or more of American Indian blood 
shall be deemed an American Indian; except that members of 
Indian tribes living on reservations allotted them by the Com­
monwealth having one-fourth or more of Indian blood and less 
than one-sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal 
Indians so long as they are domiciled on such reservations. 
(Code 1919, §67; 1930,'p. 97).



8

have been held unconstitutional by the District Court 
and its enforcement enjoined.5

The decisions o f this Court make clear that the 
processes o f a state court system may not be used to 
promote distinctions between persons based on race. 
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61; Hamilton v. Ala­
bama, 376 U.S. 650. Under the statutory provision 
here in question, Virginia has conditioned access to its 
courts by parties seeking a divorce on a requirement 
that they submit to a judicial determination o f their 
race. I f, as in the case o f the appellants, the parties 
involved are Negro, the requirement is demeaning in 
the same sense as any other form of racial discrimina­
tion; and for Negro lawyers in the State, serving 
Negro clients, it is an annoying and irritating experi­
ence every time they are required to prepare a divorce 
decree.6

V irginia ’s divorce law is contained in Title 20, Chap­
ter 6, o f the State Code. Chapter 6 contains 37 sec­
tions, but except for Section 20-101, requiring the 
recital o f race, no requirement is set forth in any 
other part o f the law as to the form or content o f a 
divorce decree. Furthermore, with regard to Section 
123, which explicitly concerns the collection o f vital 
statistics, o f the eight items o f information which must

5 The District Court plainly was mistaken if it meant by its deci­
sion to suggest that a provision of law which has a racial purpose, 
and no other, is saved from unconstitutionality because it aids in 
the collection of statistical data. Every law whieh promotes racial 
distinctions, is likely to facilitate the collection of statistics con­
cerning race. It is obvious, however, that this fact alone does not 
provide justification for such a law or make it constitutional.

6 Compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494, where 
the Court took notice of the fact that state-compelled discrimination 
between the races “ is usually interpreted as denoting the inferior­
ity of the Negro group.”



9

be reported by clerks o f courts to the State registrar, 
only the item relating to race is set apart by the re­
quirement of judicial determination. The singling out 
o f “  ‘ race’ as the single item of information”  required 
in a decree “ in itself ‘ underscores the purely racial 
character and purpose’ of the statute.”  Anderson v. 
Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403. Nor does it matter that 
Section 20-101 applies equally to Negro and white. 
“ Race is the factor upon which the statute operates 
and its involvement promotes the ultimate discrimina­
tion which is sufficient to make it invalid.”  Id. at 404; 
and see N.A.A.G.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 463; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524.7

It is submitted that the District Court erred in fail­
ing to hold that Section 20-101 conflicts with the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. W e believe 
that the question presented by this appeal is substan­
tial and that it is o f public importance.

Respectfully submitted,
A lliso n  W . B l o w n , Jr.

Suite 705
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N. W . 
Washington 6, D. C.

O tto L. T u c k e r  
901 Princess Street 
Alexandria, Virginia

August 1964 Attorneys for Appellants

7 At the District Court hearing, counsel for the appellees dis­
claimed any relationship between Section 20-101 and Virginia’s 
miscegenation statute. The latter provisions are contained in a 
separate chapter, Chapter 4, of Title 20, entitled “ Colored Persons; 
Marriage Between White and Colored Persons.”  The validity of 
that chapter is not at issue in this proceeding and an examination 
of its provisions fails to disclose any way in which it would be 
affected by a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 
20-101.



APPENDIX



la

APPENDIX A

Text of statutes involved (Code of Virginia (1950)):
Sec. 20-101. Decree to show race of parties.—Any inter­

locutory or final decree granting a divorce a mensa et 
thoro or a vinculo matrimonii, as the case may be, shall 
contain a recital showing the race of the husband and 
wife; but the failure of such decree to contain such recital 
shall not affect the validity of such decree or divorce. 
(Code 1919, §5106; 1938, p. 202.)

* m # *
Sec. 20-123. Report of divorces by clerk to State Regis­

trar of Vital Statistics.—The clerk of every court author­
ized to grant divorces in Virginia shall on or before the 
tenth day of each month forward to the State Registrar 
of Vital Statistics a report of each divorce and of each 
annulment of a marriage granted in his court during the 
preceding month, on the forms provided by the Bureau of 
Vital Statistics for that purpose.

The reports shall include alleged cause, sex, occupation, 
and color of plaintiff and defendant, date and place of 
marriage, number of children in family, and time of sepa­
ration, provided however, the record discloses such info.r- 
mation.

Such reports shall be filed and preserved in the State 
Registrar’s office, and from them he shall prepare annually 
a compilation of divorces in each county and corporation 
and make a report of such compilation to the General 
Assembly at each regular session.

There shall be allowed to such clerks a compensation of 
twentydive cents for every divorce reported, to be paid 
as a part of the costs of the suit.

The State Registrar shall certify to the Comptroller 
the number of divorces and annulments reported by each 
clerk. (1918, p. 397; 1938, p. 188; Michie Code 1942,
§ 5116a.)



2a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 3127 

E . L eslie  H a m m , e t  al,., Plaintiffs

v.

V ir g in ia  S ta te  B oard of E l e c t io n s , et  a l ., Defendants

(Argued February 21, 1964 Decided April 28, 1964)

Before B r y a n , Circuit Judge, and L e w is  and B u t z n e r , 
District Judges

Allison W. Brown, Jr., Esquire, Washington, D. C. and 
Otto L. Tucker, Esquire, Alexandria, Virginia, attor­
neys for the plaintiffs;

Robert Y. Button, Esquire, Attorney General of Virginia; 
R. D. Mellwaine, III, Esquire, Assistant Attorney 
General of Virginia; William J. Hassen, Esquire, Com­
monwealth’s Attorney, Arlington, Virginia; Ralph G. 
Louk, Esquire, Commonwealth’s Attorney, Fairfax, 
Virginia; Earl F. Wagner, Esquire, Commonwealth’s 
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, attorneys for defend­
ants.

A lb e r t  V. B r y a n , Circuit Judge:

Certain Virginia statutes and a section of her constitu­
tion are here attacked by plaintiff Negro and white citi­
zens of the State as violative of the Fourteenth and Fif­
teenth amendments of the Federal constitution. The laws 
assailed deal with records relating to: (1) voting, (2) 
property tax assessments, and (3) divorce. Plaintiffs 
allege that provisions in the first category “ require lists 
of persons who are qualified voters in Virginia to be main­



3a

tained on a racially segregated basis.” 1 The second cate­
gory is averred to “ provide for the maintenance on a 
racially segregated basis of public records pertaining to 
property ownership and taxation” .2 * * * * * The divorce statute 
in suit directs that every decree of divorce must recite the 
race of the spouses.8 * * Besides asking for a declaration of

1 Specifically, the following portions of Virginia's voting records 
laws are questioned as unconstitutional:

(a) Article II, § 38 of the Virginia Constitution—requiring lists 
of those who have paid their poll taxes to state ‘ ‘ white and colored 
persons separately. ’ ’

(b) Section 24-28 Code of Virginia—requiring registration lists 
of “ white and colored”  voters to be “ kept and arranged in sep­
arate books or records. ’ ’

(c) Section 24-118 Code of Virginia—requiring registration lists 
of voters in certain counties and cities to be kept in loose leaf 
binders 11 with white sheets for recording the names of white voters 
and buff sheets for recording the names of colored voters. ’ ’

(d) Section 24-120 Code of Virginia as amended in 1963, re­
quiring lists of those who have paid their poll taxes and filed cer­
tificates of residence to state “ white and colored persons”  and 
certain tribal Indians separately.

2 That part of the property ownership and taxation statutes
criticized are:

(a) Section 58-790, Code of Virginia, requiring assessors, at the 
time of making assessments of real estate to “ note whether the
owner is white or colored, or Indian as defined by Section 1-14 of 
the Code.”

(b) Section 58-804, pars, b, c, d and h, Code of Virginia, requir­
ing land books for the cities and counties to be arranged so that 
separate listings are made of real estate owned by “ white persons,”  
“ colored persons”  and certain “ tribal Indians.”

(c) Section 58-880, Code of Virginia, requiring personal prop­
erty books, to be arranged so that personal property assessments 
with taxes and levies are shown separately for “ white persons”  
and “ colored persons.”

8 Section 20-101, Code of Virginia, requires “ any interlocutory
or final decree granting a divorce a mensa et thoro or a vinculo
matrimonii . . . [to] contain a recital showing the race of the hus­
band and wife. . . . ”



4a

the invalidity of these statutory and constitutional provi­
sions, plaintiff's also “ seek an injunction restraining the 
various governmental officials named as defendants from 
enforcing, executing or administering their provisions.”

The “ separate but equal”  racial doctrine was condemned 
a decade ago in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). Subsequent decisional law has made it axio­
matic that no State can directly dictate or casually pro­
mote a distinction in the treatment of persons solely on 
the basis of their color. To be within the condemnation, 
the governmental action need not effectuate segregation 
of facilities directly. Cf. Anderson v. Martin, 375 TJ.S. 
399, 402 (1964). The result of the statute or policy must 
not tend to separate individuals by reason of difference in 
race or color. No form of State discrimination, no matter 
how subtle, is permissible under the guarantees of the 
Fourteenth amendment freedoms. See, e.g., Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 
(1961); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).

Although the legislative history of the provisions pres­
ently under examination cannot adequately be traced, it 
is evident from the language employed that, save for the 
divorce decree statute, they serve no other purpose than 
to classify and distinguish official records on the basis of 
race or color. Separation of white and colored on the 
poll tax, residence-certificate and registration lists as well 
as on the assessment rolls renders these provisions invalid 
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth amend­
ment.

Of course, the designation of race, just as sex or religious 
denomination, may in certain records serve a useful pur­
pose, and the procurement and compilation of such infor­
mation by State authorities cannot be outlawed per se. 
For example, the securing and chronicling of racial data 
for identification or statistical use violates no constitu­
tional privilege. If the purpose is legitimate, the reason



justifiable, then, no infringement results. The infirmity of 
the provisions just mentioned lies in their mandate of 
separation of names by race.

Vital statistics, obviously, are aided by denotation in 
the divorce decrees of the race of the parties. This pro­
vision of section 20-101 of the Virginia Code is not objec­
tionable in law. Of course, the advertence must be made 
in every case, not just in suits involving Negroes.

For the reasons outlined, the defendant State and local 
officers will be restrained from further administration and 
enforcement of the Virginia laws in issue insofar as they 
are inconsistent with the views herein expressed. Since 
no voting rights and tax assessments are impaired by the 
present practice, and so there is no urgency for earlier 
changes, compliance with the restraint we now impose will 
not be required before December 31, 1964.

5a

IX THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP VIRGINIA 

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

Civil Action No. 3127 

E. L eslie  H a m m , e t  a l ., Plaintiffs

v.

V ir g in ia  S ta te  B oard op E l e c t io n s , e t  a l ., Defendants

Final Order

Upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well 
as for the reasons, set forth in the opinion of the Court 
this day filed, it is D eclared  :

1. That Article II, § 38 of the Constitution of Virginia 
is in conflict with the Fourteenth amendment of the Con­
stitution of the United States insofar as the said section



6a

requires the lists of poll taxes paid to state the names of 
white and colored persons separately;

2. That § 24-28 of the Code of Virginia is in conflict with 
the Fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States insofar as the said section requires that the 
voting registration lists of white and colored persons he 
kept and arranged in separate books or records;

3. That § 24-118 Code of Virginia is in conflict with the 
Fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States insofar as the said section requires the registration 
lists of voters in named counties and cities to be kept in 
binders with white sheets for recording the names of white 
voters and buff sheets for recording the names of colored 
voters;

4. That § 24-120 Code of Virginia, as amended in 1963, 
is in conflict with the Fourteenth amendment of the Con­
stitution of the United States insofar as the said section 
requires the lists of persons who have paid their poll taxes 
and filed certificates of residence to state separately the 
names of white and colored persons and certain tribal 
Indians;

5. That §§ 58-790; 5>8-804, paragraphs b, c, d and h; and 
58-880 Code of Virginia are in conflict with the Fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States inso­
far as the said sections require the lists of assessments 
of real estate, the arrangement of the listings in the 
land books of real estate, and the arrangement of the per­
sonal property books to note and show separately the 
names of the property owners as white or colored persons; 
and

6. That § 20-101, Code of Virginia (1950) is not in con­
flict with the Fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States,

Accordingly, it is A d ju d g ed , O rdered  and D ecreed  that 
the defendants, their agents, employees and successors be,



7a

and each of them is hereby, restrained and enjoined from 
enforcing any of the constitutional or statutory provisions 
hereinbefore declared to be in conflict with the Fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States, but 
this injunction shall not be effective before December 31, 
1964.

April 28th, 1964

United States Circuit Judge 

United States District Judge 

United States District Judge