Billingsley v. Clayton Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
June 1, 1965
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Billingsley v. Clayton Brief for Appellants, 1965. 1aefbfde-c69a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d9264cbb-1e7e-4649-b3cd-c3b25c281bd6/billingsley-v-clayton-brief-for-appellants. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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In THE
H m te b S ta te s ’ C o u r t of appeals;
F o r t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t
No. 22,304
O r z e l l B i l l i n g s l e y , Sr., C. H e r b e r t O l iv e r , J. S. P h i
f e r a n d A b r a h a m W o o d s , Jr. f o r t h e m s e l v e s , j o i n t l y
AND SEVERALLY, AND FOR ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Appellants,
- vs. -
G e o r g e W . C l a y t o n , a s P r e s i d e n t o f t h e J u r y B o a r d o f
J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , A l a b a m a ; M r s . F r e d B a t s o n , a s
V i c e P r e s i d e n t o f t h e J u r y B o a r d o f J e f f e r s o n C o u n
t y , A l a b a m a ; W a l t e r E . P a l m e r , a s A s s o c ia t e M e m b e r
o f t h e J u r y B o a r d o f J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , A l a b a m a ;
J a m e s F . C h e a t w o o d , a s C l e r k o f t h e J u r y B o a r d o f
J e f f e r s o n C o u n t y , A l a b a m a ; a n d e a c h o f t h e i r s u c
c e s s o r s IN OFFICE.
Appellees.
a p p e a l f r o m t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s d i s t r ic t c o u r t f o r t h e
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
O r z e l l B i l l i n g s l e y , J r .
P e t e r A . H a l l
J . M a s o n D a v is
O s c a r W . A d a m s , J r .
M e l v i n L. W u l f
J a c k G r e e n b e r g
N o r m a n A m a k e r
C h a r l e s M o r g a n , J r .
5 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Attorneys for Appellants
1
I N D E X
PAGE
STATEMENT.............................................................. 1
The Proceedings...................................................... 1
The Jury Board and its Selection Techniques . . . . 3
The Random Procedures Followed in the Selection
of Names of Jurors from the Jury Box in Jeffer
son County .......................................................... 7
The Results: Grand J u r ie s ..................................... 9
The Results: Petit J u r ie s ....................................... 12
The Population........................................................ 13
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERRO R................................. 14
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 15
I. A Survey or Canvass or Sample System of Juror
Name Selection Is not only a Proper but Is also
a Preferred Technique which Should end the
Systematic Exclusion of Racial or other Groups
from Jury R o lls ..................................................... 15
The Problem of the Selection of Sources of
Names .......................................................... 15
The Survey or Canvass or Sample System
Can Provide an Accurate Cross-section . . . . 19
Discretionary Power in the Hands of Jury Of
ficials Must Be Elim inated......................... 20
XX
Literary Digest Juries Do Not March in Step
with American Life — or L a w .................. 23
The Results of Discrimination in Juror Name
Selection ...................................................... 29
Segregated Ju s tice .......................................... 31
Remedies for the Systematic Exclusion of Ne
groes from Jury Service............................. 34
The Negro Revolution and All White Courts 38
II. The Evidence Clearly Shows that the Jury
Board Systematically Excluded the Names of
Negroes from Jury Rolls in Both the Birming
ham and Bessemer D ivisions............................. 45
Plaintiffs Proved a Prima Facie C a se ......... 45
The Laws of Probability Demonstrate the
Likelihood of Exclusion............................... 51
III. Conclusion............................................................ 54
Certificate of Service..................................................... 57
APPENDIX A .............................................................. 58
The Opinion and Order of the court below, June
7, 1962 .................................................................... 58
The Order on Pretrial Hearing, July 20, 1964 . . . . 66
Additional Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in the Court below, December 2, 1964 . . . . 68
Ill
APPENDIX B ............................................................ 71
Statutes Relating to the Operation of the Jury
System in Jefferson County, A labam a............ 71
APPENDIX C
Maxwell, N.A., “The Liuzzo Case,” The Wall St.
Jrnl., May 4, 1965 ................................................ 83
T a b l e o f C a s e s
Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E. 2d 711
(1964) ...................................................................... 34
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964) . . . . 34
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, (1953) ................. 22
Bailey v. Wharton, Civil Action No. 3674 (j)
(D.C.S.D. Miss.) .................................................... 36
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1 9 4 6 )........ 19
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) .............................................. 39
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882) .................... 34
Brown v. Rutter, 139 F. Supp. 679 (D.C.W.D. Ky.,
1956) ........................................................................ 35
Cameron v. Johnson, . . . U.S. . . ., 33 L. Week 3395
(1965) ...................................................................... 42
Clarence C. Walker Civic League v. Board of Public
Instruction, 154 F.2d 726 (5th Cir., 1946)............. 50
Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir., 1964) . . . . 46
IV
Cox v. Louisiana, . . . U.S. . ., 33 L. Week 4105
(1965) .................................................... 40, 41, 42, 43
Cobb v. Montgomery Library Board, 207 F. Supp.
880 (M.D. Ala., 1962) ............................................ 46
Collins v. Walker, 335 F. 2417 ( ) cert. den. sub.
nom. Hansley v. Collins, No. 407, . U.S. . . .,
33 L. Week 3171 (1 9 6 4 )......................................... 22
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ................... 34, 36
Douglas v. California, 372, U.S. 353 (1963) 23
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 ( ) 23
Eskridge v. Washington;'4i7^"U.S.-i^'(1958) 23
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) 34
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 ............................... 35
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) ................... 24
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 23
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) ......... 19
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ..................... 23
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) ................. 34
Harper v. Mississippi, . Miss. . . ., 171 So. 2d 129
(1965) ..................................................................... 34
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (1 9 6 5 )........... 23
Hazlewood v. Aycock, Civil Action No. . . (1965). 36
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) 34, 28
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) ........................... 34
Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935) ........... 34
Jackson v. United States, No. 21,345 (5th Cir.) 37
V
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) .......................
Louisiana v. United States, . . . U.S. . . ., 33 L. Week
4262 (1965) ............................................................
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, (1880) .................
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 387 (1935) ............. 34,
Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 464 (1947) .............
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1 9 3 9 ).................
Rabinowitz v. United States, No. 21,256 (5th Cir.) . .
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ...................
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955) .....................
Repouille v. United States, 165 F. 2d 152 (2d Cir.,
1947) .......................................................................
Shepard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1950) .................
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) ............. 19, 20,
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) . .
Swain v. Alabama, . . U.S. . . ., 33 L.Week 4231
(1965) ............................................................22, 46,
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) . .
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) ...............
Whitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496 (1964), cert. den.
379 U.S. 931 (1964) .................................... 31, 34,
United States v. Mississippi, . U.S. , 33 L.Week
4258 (1965) ............................................................
United States ex. rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d
71 (1959) cert, den., 361 U.S. 838
(1959) .............................................. 29, 31, 46, 50,
23
20
34
46
34
34
37
24
34
19
54
34
34
47
19
24
46
20
54
VI
United States ex. re. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 54
(5th Cir., 1962) cert, den., 372 U.S. 924
Statutes:
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 (3) ......................................... 2
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 .................................................2, 36
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 .......................................... 2, 35, 36
28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201 .................................................. 2, 36
Title 30, Sec. 72, Code of Ala., 1940 — 1958 ......... 9, 41
18 U.S.C. Sec. 243 ......................................... 35, 36, 50
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985 ............. ...................................... 36
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 .................................................... 36
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343 .................................................... 36
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 .................................................... 36
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1863 (c) ............................................ 36
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651 .................................................... 36
28 U.S.C. Sec. 1861-71 .............................................. 36
Title III, Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...........................36-37
(H.R. 5640, pending)
18 U.S.C. 1507 ............................................................ 41
Title 62, Secs. 199-200, Code of Alabama (recomp.
1958 .......................................................................... 15
Title 30, Sec. 34-6, Code of Alabama (recomp 1958) 50
Title 30, Sec. 51, Code of Alabama (recomp. 1958) 50
Title 30, Sec. 48-9, Code of Alabama (recomp.
1958) 49, 50
V ll
Statutes (Cont’d.):
Title 30, Sec. 21, Code of Alabama (recomp. 1958) 49
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 ......................... 25
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 ..................................... 23
Title 30, Sec. 38, Code of Ala. (recomp. 1958). . .51, 53
Title 30, Sec. 72, Code of Ala. (recomp. 1958)........ 51
Other Authorities:
Barksdale, The Use of Survey Research Findings as
Legal Evidence (1957) .......................................19, 21
Bulletin, Criminal Division (July 17, 1950) ......... 38
Bulletin, Criminal Division (June 8, 1953) ........... 38
Cash, Mind of the South (1941) ........................... 30, 31
Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice (1965) . . 23
(Proceedings and Interim Report of the)de Tocque-
ville, Journey to America (1960) ....................... 25
Frankel, The Alabama Lawyer, 1954-64: Has the
Official Organ Atrophied?, Col. L. Rev., (Nov.
1964) ....................................................................... 39
Fenton, In Your Opinion, (1960) .........................17, 21
Gallup and Rae, The Rules of Democracy,
(1940) .......................................16, 17, 18, 21, 52, 53
Ginzburg, 100 Years of Lynchings, (1962) ........... 29
Harrington, The Other America, (1 9 6 2 )........16, 24, 44
Jury Commissions for U.S. District Courts, Report
of the Committee on the Judiciary, No. 261 . . . . 38
The Jury System in the Federal Courts (1960) . . . 26
vm
Other Authorities (Coni’d.):
Justice, (U.S. Civil Rights Commission Reports,
1961) ................................................ 24, 25, 35, 37, 38
Kennedy, Law and the Courts, in The Polls and Pub
lic Opinion, Meier and Saunders, ed. (1949) .19, 23
Lester, Justice in the American South (1965) .32, 35
Maxwell, The Liuzzo Case, The Wall Street Journal,
(June 2, 1965) .................................................... 29, 33
Morgan, A Time to Speak, (1964) ......................... 32
Morgan, Look, (June 29, 1965) ............................... 33
Nelson, “Jim Crow Justice,” Los Angeles Times,
(June 13-17, 1965) ...................................... 15, 33, 35
Olshausen, Rich and Poor in Civil Procedure, 9 Sci
ence and Society 11 (1947) ................................. 24
Racial Discrimination in the Southern Federal
Courts, Southern Regional Council, (1965) ........ 32
Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting and Voting Trends,
in The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
Vol. 45 No. 1 (1965) .......................................... 27, 28
Snead and Womack, Juries — Selection of Federal
Jurors — Exclusion of Economic Class (Mar.
1961) ....................................................................26, 27
Southern Regional Council Reports, May 1963, June
1964, July 14, 1964 ................................................ 33
Trebach, The Rationing of Justice; Constitutional
Rights and the Criminal Process (1964) ........... 24
Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, (1964) ..................... 44
United States Attorneys Bulletin, (January 6, 1956) 38
1960 U. S. Census, A labam a...................................... 14
I n t h e
U n tte b S ta te s C o u r t of appeals
F o r t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t
No. 22,304
Orzell Billingsley, Sr., C. Herbert Oliver, J. S. Phifer
and Abraham Woods, Jr. for themselves, jointly and
severally, and for all others similarly situated,
Appellants,
v.
George W. Clayton, as President of the Jury Board of
Jefferson County, Alabama; Mrs. Fred Batson, as Vice
President of the Jury Board of Jefferson County, Ala
bama; Walter E. Palmer, as Associate Member of the
Jury Board of Jefferson County, Alabama; James F.
Cheatwood, as Clerk of the Jury Board of Jefferson
County, Alabama; and each of their successors in office.
Appellees.
A PPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
Statement
The proceedings.
On April 26, 1962, the plaintiffs,1 Negro residents of
the Birmingham and Bessemer Divisions of Jefferson
1 P laintiff B illingsley was also p a rty to a civil action then pending
in the C ircuit C ourt of the Tenth Judic ia l C ircuit (Jefferson County)
A labama. (R. 8-9)
2
County, Alabama, filed this class action. The defendants
are the members and clerk of the Jury Board of Jeffer
son County, Alabama ( “Jury Board” ). Jurisdiction was
invoked under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 (3), Title 42
U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1983 and the Fifth and Four
teenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States. (R. 3,4-5)
The plaintiffs alleged that in the selection of names
for jury service the Jury Board used irregular and arbi
trary methods (contrary to the Constitution and laws
of Alabama and the United States) and systematical
ly excluded Negroes. (R. 8)
They sought a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec
tion 2201 that the Board’s policy, custom or usage in ex
cluding qualified Negroes from jury rolls and boxes is
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution of the United States. (R. 11.) They
also sought to enjoin the Jury Board “and all persons
in active concert and participation with them” from
failing or refusing to include in their selection the names
of Negroes otherwise qualified for Jury duty and from
using the names then used until the names of all quali
fied Negroes had been included (R. 11-2).
They sought a temporary restraining order (R. 10,
13-4) and preliminary (R. 10, 14-5) and permanent (R.
10) injunctions. A hearing was held on May 16, 1962
(R. 21), the court taking the matter under advisement
(R. 22).
On June 7, 1962, the Court declined — without preju
dice to a final decree — to issue a temporary restraining
order (R. 22) (See Opinion and Order, Appendix A,
p. 58).
3
On November 2, 1964, a final hearing was held (E.
34). The court entered judgment against the plaintiffs
on December 2, 1964 (R. 34-7 at 37) finding additional
facts and adopting the opinion previously filed on mo
tion for a temporary restraining order. (See Addition
al Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law; Appen
dix A, p. 68)
Notice of appeal was filed on December 31, 1964
(R. 37-8).
The Jury Board and Its Selection Techniques.
The three members of the Jury Board:
a. Generally supervise the clerk (R. 150, 158, 60, 162,
186,187-9)
b. Know few or no Negroes (R. 151, 155-6, 191, 478)
c. The two male members are retired (R. 43,185)
d. Have suggested the names of white persons for
jury duty but have suggested the names of no
Negroes (R. 149-50,190-2)
e. Use the same juror selection techniques in the
Birmingham and Bessemer Divisions of Jefferson
County (R. 464-5)
The Jury Board relies on a house-to-house survey to
obtain the names of persons to be placed on jury rolls
(R. 82-3, 92,149,152-3, 278, 283-4, 371, 436.) Phone books,
the city directory, tax records, letters and visits to store-
owners and postmasters are also sometimes employed
(R. 45-48, 92-93, 337-9, 436). But primary reliance is
placed on the personal canvass of neighborhoods (R.
371). The voter registration list has never been used
(R. 91), tax rolls are relied upon rarely (R. 92) and the
city directory is used for corrections and spelling (R. 92).
4
Store people and postmasters are consulted in rural areas
(R. 304, 372).
The conduct of the survey is in the hands of the clerk
of the Jury Board. For a number of years J. F. Cheat-
wood served in this capacity (R. 82, 277, 435). He utilized
five to nine assistants to make the survey; each was a
white woman (R. 89-90, 293, 342-3). The Jury Board at
tempts by use of its techniques to obtain a fair repre
sentation — an economic and racial “cross-section” of
the population — for jury duty (R. 277, 284, 295, 311).
Despite this neither Mr. Cheatwood nor his assistant
(later his successor) (R. 367-8, 435) knew:
a. What percentage of a precinct was surveyed (R.
294)
b. The percentage of Negroes and whites on jury
lists (R. 85, 312)
c. The Negro communities he went to in Bessemer
(R. 376)
d. Negro people personally (R. 351, 381-2, 444)
e. The time spent in a Negro community visited
and remembered (R. 384)
f. The amount of time spent in Negro and white
neighborhoods (R. 442).
Although work sheets employed by canvassers do not
designate race (R. 290) they are not retained (R. 84).
Jury rolls prior to 1953 have been burned (R. 54-5, 86).
Present jury rolls contain no racial designations (R. 56-
7, 88, 447); nor do jury cards (R. 400, 406-7, 432-3).
Names contained on past jury lists are brought for
ward and used in succeeding lists (R. 55, 91). When a
person has actually served his name is removed for two
years (R. 90, 91).
5
The procurement of names of Negroes and whites
is handled differently. The methods employed are racial
ly determined. For example:
Letters. The Jury Board sent letters to Negroes
asking them to suggest names for inclusion on jury
lists but did not use letters to obtain the names of
whites (R. 57, 61, 303, 339, 436). There was diffi
culty obtaining Negro but not white names so let
ters were mailed only to Negroes (R. 295, 303). Of
88 letters mailed to Negroes only 9 replies were re
ceived (R. 322-3). The mailed form requests the pre
cinct number, the name, and residence and business
addresses, the occupation, place and date of birth of
the person suggested for jury duty (R. 337-8). This
technique was employed even though the Jury Board
knew it was not effective in providing the names of
Negroes (R. 340-2). At the first hearing (in 1962) a
Negro attorney stated that the next time a letter
came he’d send in 50,000 names, Mr. Cheatwood then
stating that he thought the letters would now be ef
fective (R. 346). At the time of the second hearing (in
1964) Negro attorneys were no longer on the mail
ing list (R. 437). No question of the legality or il
legality of attorneys suggesting names of prospective
jurors had been considered. And the practice of mail
ing letters to Negroes was continued — but not to
Negro lawyers (R. 436-7).
Volunteers. Thousands of whites have volun
teered for jury duty by coming to the Jury Board
office. Only 2 Negroes have done so (R. 349). White
groups assist the Jury Board but Negro professional
people have never been consulted nor has their as
sistance been sought (R. 347).
Publicity. Although articles appeared in the Bir-
6
mingham daily papers concerning jury service they
did not appear in Negro papers the Jury Board seek
ing no publicity there (R. 344).
The house-to-house survey. The white ladies em
ployed by the clerk to conduct the survey are ob
tained from the Personnel Board of Jefferson County
(R. 90). Thirteen to fifteen months are spent mak
ing the survey (R. 293).
There is more difficulty in obtaining the names
of Negroes than whites (R. 303, 305-9, 327-9). In
back alleys the canvasser may have to walk five or
six blocks to obtain two or three names (R. 328-329).
And Negroes are more suspicious and won’t come to
the door (R. 305-6). “When they refuse to answer the
question I say thank you and walk off,” said the
clerk. “I am not out there to argue with any of the
citizens” (R. 307). Fifty percent of the cards which
are left with white people are returned; less than 5
percent of those left with Negroes are returned (R.
327-8).
The white women employed by the Jury Board
are not allowed to go into “back alleys” the clerk
covering these areas himself (R. 343, 449-50). Indeed
the clerk and one other white man cover the Negro
areas (R. 343, 369-70, 380-1). None of the white ladies
go into the Negro community (R. 369-70). They don’t
go into rough areas, slum areas, where the homes
are in bad repair, the porches are falling off and
there are vicious dogs (R. 439, 440).
Despite the difficulty encountered in obtaining
the names of Negroes for jury service the entire staff
of the Jury Board is white (R. 375, 440). The clerk
did not know if Negro personnel would help (R.
7
339). And never tried to hire any Negro ladies (R.
442). Once a letter was sent to a Negro it was not
felt necessary to call on him personally since “that
would be a lot of trouble” and “costing double” (R.
59). Letters mailed to the Negro attorneys in this
case resulted in “nair” a name back (R. 61-2). In the
higher Negro income areas the personal survey is ef
fective but names do not come back from the letters
(R. 84, 308).
Work sheets are checked by the clerk (there is
no quota) some canvassers getting 30 to 40 names,
others 70 to 80 (R. 311). In a congested area the clerk
says he can cover 300 to 400 houses on foot per day
(R. 345). When no one is home he leaves cards for
the owner to fill out and return to the Jury Board
(R. 441).
The Jury Board employs the same policy in the
Birmingham and Bessemer Divisions of Jefferson
County (R. 441, 464-5).
The Random Procedures Followed in the Selection of
Names of Jurors from the Jury Box in Jefferson County,
Birmingham Division.
Cards on which are written the names of prospec
tive jurors are drawn from the big jury box (a heavy
steel box on rollers) (R. 111-2) by the presiding judge.
The cards are then taken to the Circuit Clerk’s office,
he draws up the list of jurors and gives it to the sheriff
who executes subpoenas requiring prospective jurors to
report to the jury assembly room on the 5th floor of
the court house (R. 203, 231). The clerk and the judge
who organizes the jury enter the jury assembly room
and the judge swears them in. The jury is then in the
charge of the jury room bailiff (R. 232).
8
Within an hour the cards containing the names of
jurors are placed in “a small black tin box” (R. 112,
232, 235) and a mimeographed list of the names of per
sons on the jury venire is drawn (R. 232).
No racial designations are on the cards or the list
and the names themselves are kept secret until 10:30
a.m. on Monday morning when they are made public
(R. 232-3).
At 9:00 a.m. on Mondays the docket is sounded, cases
announced ready are sent to the case clerk and readied
for trial (R. 233). The trial judge then sends to the jury
assembly room for the “tin little box” and draws the
names of 24 to 28 persons from it (R. 111-3). The partial
panel — persons whose names have been drawn — are
then brought to the courtroom where the lawyers pro
ceed to “strike” (R. 113).
Bessemer Division
The clerk sets the docket. Thirty days before trial
time the jury box is removed from the safe in the clerk’s
office and taken to the courtroom. In the presence of
the clerk the judge opens the box, shuffles the cards,
pulls out a “handful” and counts out 20. Then he re
shuffles the box. After selecting the names of 80 per
sons the venire is sent to the sheriff for service (R. 397-
9).
When grand juries are to be selected the clerk car
ries the box to the courtroom the judge drawing 35 to
40 names from the box. The clerk then prepares an al
phabetical list of the names drawn and delivers it to
the sheriff for service. On the following Monday morn
ing the prospective grand jurors arrive in court and 18
of them are selected for grand jury duty (R.R. 419-
20).
9
The Results — Grand Juries
Birmingham Division. Since 1947 (R. 211) the larg
est number of Negroes to appear on a grand jury which
consists of 18 persons is 3 (R. 214). On others 2 Negroes
have appeared. Almost all grand juries include at least 1
Negro (R. 213-5). Four grand juries are empaneled in
the Birmingham Division each year (R. 214, 216-7).
The names of grand jurors are selected at random
from the jury box (R. 215, 226).
Bessemer Division. On only one occasion (September
9,1957, when Caliph Washington was indicted) in the last
20 years has a Negro sat on a grand jury (R. 70, 357,
392-3, 415-6). The names of grand jurors are drawn from
the jury box at random (R. 418-22) at least 4 times a
year (Title 30, Sec. 72, Code of Alabama, 1940 Recomp.
1958). “The strange absence of Negroes from grand
jury service” is unexplained (R. 422).
The Results, Birmingham Division:
A. Petit Jurors in the Jury Assembly Room.
1. The testimony of attorneys practicing in Bir
mingham.
Roscoe B. Hogan, 12 years practice — 8 to 12
of the 90 to 105 persons in the jury assembly room are
Negroes (R. 167-8). Arthur D. Shores, 25 years practice
— 7 of the 65 to 70 persons in the jury assembly room
was the highest number he had ever seen (R. 128-9).
David H. Hood, 14 years practice — often no Negroes in
the jury assembly room (R. 100-1) sometimes 1 or 2
(R. 100).
2. The testimony of officials.
J. Edgar Bowron, presiding judge and a Circuit
Judge for 27 years —■ the number of Negroes varies but
10
there were 8 one week 2 or 3 another (R. 240). Of 240
persons called for jury duty 8 or .10 may be Negroes
(R. 242-3). Julian Swift, Circuit Clerk, 14 years —
'‘imagines” 10% or 12% of persons in the jury assembly
room are Negroes (R. 210). Nine of 112 or 105 (R.
206) who appeared during the week he testified were
Negroes (R. 205). He recalfe as many as 18 to 20 Ne
groes reported for jury duty once but never as many as
30% (R. 209) and on further examination fixed 10 to
12% as the percentage of Negroes in the room (R. 210).
3. The testimony of Negroes called for jury duty.
Frederick L. Ellis — 10 Negroes in room with
him. There were 35 or 40 there he “imagined.” The
room was full (R. 246). Hugh L. Lemon — 3 of 100
were Negroes (R. 122). Louis J. Willie — 10 of more
than 100 were Negroes (R. 139).
B. Partial panels called from the jury assembly room.
1. The testimony of attorneys practicing in Bir
mingham.
Jerry O. Lor ant, 12 years practice — no
judgment of largest number of Negroes seen on a par
tial panel (R. 76). Negroes had served on juries in cases
he’d tried (R. 77), but he couldn’t remember how often
or the name of a case (a criminal case) or the judge
before whom it was tried (R. 78-80). David H. Hood —
14 years practice — no Negroes on panels prior to 1961
but he has seen 1 or 2 since then (R. 102-3). James G.
Adams, 41 years practice — “occasionally, not often, but
occasionally” he has seen Negroes on a partial panel
apparently in the criminal courts (R. 115). He has seen
3 Negroes on a partial panel of 27 to 28 men but in the
preceding year he saw no more than 1 or 2 Negroes
(R. 117-9). Arthur D. Shores, 25 years practice — on 1
11
or 2 occasions he observed 1 or 2 Negroes on partial
panels (R. 129). Matt Murphy, 15 years practice —
once saw 6 to 8 Negroes on a partial panel (R. 144-5)
but since 1960 he has seen no more than 3 or 4 on a
panel of 40 and this in a criminal case (R. 145-7). John
H. Lair, 10 years practice — once saw 7 Negroes on a
panel but doesn’t remember the case and may have been
in error (R. 220).
2. The testimony of officials.
Emmett Perry, Circuit Solicitor since 1947 —
he had seen Negroes on partial panels but never counted
the number of them (R. 212-3). Wallace Gibson, Circuit
Judge criminal courts since 1957 — once saw a partial
panel of 24 jurors with 6 Negroes none of whom ac
tually served (R. 223). Prior to this one occasion the
largest number of Negroes in a partial panel was 2 or
3 (R. 224-5). J. Edgar Bowron, presiding judge and a
Circuit Judge for 27 years — Negroes are on partial
panels fewer times than they are not (R. 239) and infre
quently have served on juries in his court. No more
than 1 Negro has served on a petit jury at one time
(R. 238). He often handles excuses from jury duty but
there is no evidence that a higher percentage of Ne
groes than whites sought excuses (R. 240-4).
Negroes who are called for jury service seldom leave
the jury assembly room and when they do are almost
always struck and rarely serve (R. 125, 140, 174, 197,
228-9, 245, 247-54, 255-7). In the criminal courts agree
ments not to include Negroes on partial panels called
from the jury room have been abolished (R. 225). But
exclusionary agreements exist in the civil courts (R. 115,
169-70, 198-9, 234, 237) although this was disputed (R.
220-1).
12
The Results: Bessemer Division
A. Petit Juries
1. The testimony of attorneys practicing in Bes
semer.
H. P. Lipscomb, Jr., more than 40 years prac
tice — 3 Negroes out of “quite a number” of whites;
4 or 5 juries were empaneled for the Washington case
in 1957. Prior to 1962 this was the only time any
Negroes were empaneled (R. 69-70). During the succeed
ing 2 years he noted as many as 3 or 4 Negroes on the
venire of 50 to 60 persons (R. 360-4). David H. Hood, 14
years practice — no observation of Negroes on the panel
or venire (R. 97). William C. Smithson, 45 years prac
tice — no Negroes seen on a jury panel (R. 109). Hugh
McEniry, 52 years practice — last saw a Negro juror
serve in the Caliph Washington case (R. 180-1). Edward
Saunders, 32 years practice — no Negroes on a panel in
5 years (R. 183-5).
2. The testimony of officials.
Edward L. Ball, Jr., Circuit Judge and at
torney for 23 years — cannot recall a civil or criminal
case when Negroes actually served on a petit jury (R.
390-1). Since 1957, 4 Negroes usually appear on a venire
of 37 to 38 people, one week it was 5 Negroes in a venire
of 48, and once there were 7 or 8 Negroes on a venire
of 42 (R. 391-2). There have never been as many Ne
groes as whites on a venire (R. 410). Although there
are no racial markings on jury cards he knows by ad
dresses which communities are predominantly or all
white and which are Negro (R. 401-3). Elmore McAdory,
Deputy Circuit Clerk and Registrar for 12 years — no
Negroes have served on a petit jury in 20 years (R. 415).
13
Negroes first began to appear on the venire in 1953
(R. 424). Although he once observed 9 Negroes on a
venire and once 8 he could recall no details of this
except it happened in 1964 (R. 430-1).
Several Negroes testified as to their own qualifica
tions and the failure of the state to call them or their as
sociates, neighbors, kinsmen and church members for
jury service (R. 261-76). Indeed the clerk of the Jury
Board had no opinion on whether “the incidence of quali
fication for conviction of crime was higher among
white than colored, or colored than white” when the
Court asked (R. 444). There was no testimony concern
ing Negro or white crime or illiteracy rates (R. 464).
There is some vague testimony concerning more whites
being qualified and more colored citizens asking to be ex
cused or it “could be the sheriff didn’t serve Negroes”
(see generally R. 467-74). But the presiding judge of the
Tenth Judicial Circuit (Birmingham Division) did not
testify that he excused more or a higher percentage of
Negroes than whites (R. 240-4). Nor did the Deputy
Clerk (Bessemer Division) know about this (R. 422).
There was no testimony regarding the rates of lit
eracy, householding, freeholding, honesty, intelligence,
character, habitual drunkeness, disease or physical weak
ness of either Negroes or whites.
The population: Jefferson County as a whole.
There are 120,205 (70%) white and 51,961 (30%)
non-white males over 21 years of age in Jefferson County
(R. 301). Of these 13,796 white and 7,097 non-white males
are over 65 years of age and, consequently, ineligible
for jury service (R. 302-3). Thus the total number of
whites eligible for jury service in Jefferson County is
14
106,409 (70%). The total number of eligible non-whites,
44,864 (30%) (R. 302-3; see 1960 U.S. Census, Alabama
p. 2-83).
The total number of names listed on jury rolls is ap
proximately 52,000 (R. 284).
Bessemer Division. The Bessemer Division consists
of Precincts 53, 33 and a small part of 9 (R. 364-5, 377-
9). There are 33,989 males over 21 years of age. Of
these 20,449 are white, 13,540 are non-white. Of the
29,900 males in the 21 to 65 age bracket 18,313 (61%)
are white, 11,587 (39%) are non-white. (See Exhibit 1:
also R. 376-9).
The total number of names listed on jury rolls in
1961-63 was 8,892 (R.379).
Birmingham Division. There are 121,373 males eligi
ble for jury service in the Birmingham Division. Of
these 88,096 (73%) are white, 33,277 (27%) are non
white.
The total number (approximate) of names listed on
jury rolls is 43,108.
Specifications of Error
1. The District Court erred in ruling that the plain
tiffs did not prove that the Jury Board systematically
excluded from jury rolls the names of Negroes in the
Birmingham and Bessemer Divisions of Jefferson Coun
ty, Alabama in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.
2. The District Court erred in refusing to enjoin the
Jury Board from discriminating against the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated in the selection of names
of persons eligible for jury service, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.
15
Argument
X A SURVEY OR CANVASS OR SAMPLE SYSTEM
OF JUROR NAME SELECTION IS NOT ONLY A
PROPER BUT IS ALSO A PREFERRED TECHNIQUE
WHICH SHOULD END THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLU
SION OF RACIAL OR OTHER GROUPS FROM JURY
ROLLS.
The problem of the selection of sources of names.
The survey or canvass or sample system of juror
name selection2 offers hope for federal and state
courts across the nation. Selection techniques now dif
fer from state to state and within states from court to
court. The federal system differs from the state sys
tem. Qualifications differ from state to state. Federal
qualifications differ from state qualifications. Indeed
former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall re
cently noted: “A Justice Department survey in 1961
showed that the 92 federal district courts had 92 dif
ferent systems of selecting juries.” 3
One jury commissioner’s telephone book is another’s
city directory. A third may try voter registration lists.
The Junior Chamber of Commerce, church membership
lists (regardless of the First Amendment), lists of school
teachers, American Legion posts or labor unions, lists
of industrialists and lists of automobile owners, lists of
2 A lthough th e Jefferson County ju ro r nam e selection system is
sometim es term ed a canvass (See T itle 62, Section 199, Code of A la
bam a; Recomp. 1958) it is, in reality , a sam ple selection system
upon the only “. . . six per cent of th e population of the county . . .”
th e Ju ry B oard’s responsibility is discharged. (See T itle 62, Section
200, Code of A labam a; Recomp. 1958). (R. 285) The Ju ry B oard does
not claim to canvass every dw elling in th e county.
8 Nelson, Jack. Jim Crow Justice, Los Angeles Times, Thursday,
Ju n e 16, 1965.
16
householders or PTA members or registered voters or
real property tax payers —* all are used. The dearth of
truly cross-sectional lists is the plague of jury commis
sioners. Some rely, especially in the federal courts, on
the “key-man system,” key men suggesting their friends
and associates for jury duty. One clear light shines
through the forest of lists 4 — the United States in al
most every one of its courts tries its citizens before Lit
erary Digest juries.5
The inability of the Literary Digest list system and,
for that matter, any other list system to obtain a eross-
4 “A sm all point: A m erica has a self-im age of itself as a nation of
jo iners and doers. There are social clubs, charities, com m unity drives,
and the like. Churches have always played an im portan t social role,
often m ark ing off the status of individuals. And yet the en tire s truc
tu re is a phenom enon of the m iddle class. Some tim e ago, a study in
F ranklin , Indiana, reported th a t the percentage of people in the bo t
tom class who w ere w ithout affiliations of any kind was eight tim es
as g reat as th e percentage in the high income class. The poor person
who m ight w an t to jo in an organization is afraid. Because he or she
w ill have less education, less money, less com petence to articulate
ideas th an anyone else in the group they stay aw ay.” H arrington,
Michael, T he O ther Am erica, P enguin Books, Inc., Baltim ore, 1964,
p. 130.
5 T he L iterary D igest by 1895 had collected lists of nam es of m id
dle and upper economic class persons who m ight subscribe to the
m agazine and purchase its advertised products. In 1895, it had 350,000
names, by 1900, 685,000. In 1916 it entered the polling field. In 1920 it
m ailed 11,000,000 ballots to residen tia l te lephone subscribers seeking
th e ir preferences as to p residential nominees. It conducted polls on
national prohibition and o ther m atte rs like th e M ellon tax reduction
proposal.
P rio r to the 1928 P residen tial election it m ailed 18,000,000 ballots
and in 1932 20,000,000 ballots. I t correctly predicted the w inner each
year.
Jam es J. F arley considered the poll “conclusive evidence.” O thers
hailed it as “uncanny,” “infallible,” “am azingly accurate.” Before it
began its 1936 operations it was said, “the Digest poll is still the Bible
of m illions.” To pred ic t the Roosevelt-Landon race it m ailed 10,000,000
ballots to its list of te lephone subscribers and autom obile owners.
One of every four ballots was retu rned . (Gallup, George and Rae,
S. F., The Pulse o f Democracy, Simon and Shuster, New York, 1940.
pp. 39-43)
17
section of the population, was demonstrated in 1936.
Prior to the Digest’s mailing of its ballots in 1936,
George Gallup’s American Institute of Public Opinion
made preliminary studies and discovered that although
Landon would receive 59% of the votes of telephone
subscribers and 56% of the votes of automobile own
ers, he would receive only 18% of the votes of those on
relief. Following this the Institute began in earnest a
prediction not merely of the coming election results
but also of the coming results of the Digest poll. It pre
dicted that the Digest would predict 56% for Landon,
and 44% for Roosevelt. The Institute also predicted
that the Digest would be wrong in 1936. And it predict
ed the Digest’s margin of error within 1%. The editor
of the Digest retorted: “Our fine statistical friend . . .
should be advised that the Digest would carry on with
those old fashioned methods that have produced correct
forecasts exactly one hundred percent of the time.” 6
Messrs. Gallup and Rae point out that in 1936 class
alignments were drawn with a firmness; economics di
vided America. The large sample used was of no help
since the basis of sample selection was itself faulty: per
sons in upper income brackets tended to respond to
mail canvasses in greater proportion than the poor; the
rich were so angry with Roosevelt they were moved to
protest; and the entire sample was biased to older per
sons. More than this the Digest system failed to capture
changes in sentiment near the end of the campaign
— an error Mr. Gallup was to make 12 years later.7
e Ibid,., p. 47.
'l B u t it should be noted th a t although G allup’s predictions in 1936
w ere correct and, coupled w ith the resu lts of other scientific surveys
opened the field of scientific polling, his e rro r of 6.8% percentage
points was g rea ter than the 4.8 percentage point e rro r m ade in 1948.
Pollsters today would be ru ined by an erro r of 6.8 percentage points.
Fenton, J. M., In Y our Opinion, L ittle Brown and Company, Boston,
18
Thus in 1936 when the cleavage of economic class
was as pronounced as the racial cleavage in the South
the Literary Digest failed spectacularly — as spectacu
larly as Mr. Roosevelt succeeded with 60.7% of the
votes. The use of lists — and no welfare, relief, or other
lists of the visible or invisible poor were then used by
the Digest or are now used by the courts — led to the
Digest’s colossal error. And the death of the magazine.
The jury system in America faces the same problem of
error, the same continuing trial, of “those old fashioned
methods that have” — fictionally — “produced correct
forecasts exactly one hundred percent of the time.”
“One fundamental lesson became clear in the 1936
election: the heart of the problem of obtaining an ac
curate measure of public opinion lay in the cross section,
and no mere accumulation of ballots could hope to elimi
nate the error that sprang from a biased sample.” 8
Indeed, “less than one tenth of one percent of The
Literary Digest’s 19 point error in 1936 could reason
ably be due to the size of the sample. One tenth of one
percent is the range of error which can be expected with
practical certainty in a sample of 2,227,500 cases . . .
where opinion divides in the ratio of 55 to 45. The Di
gest’s final report, showing Landon with 57 percent to
43 percent for Roosevelt, was based on 2,376,523 ballots.
Virtually all the Digest’s error was undoubtedly due to
two other factors which determine accuracy in this field
of opinion research — cross section and timing.” 9
I960, p. 9. In 1948 the public opinion polls w en t w rong because they
stopped in terview ing too early (October 15) and did not catch last
m inute trends, th e re was an “unusually high proportion of undecided
vo ters” then and “the problem of vo ter tu rnou t was particu larly
acute.” The 1948 errors have been rem edied in la te r surveys. (Ibid.,
pp. 71-3).
8 G allup and Rae, op. cit., pp. 54-5, emphasis supplied.
9 Ibid., p. 71.
19
The Survey or Canvass or Sample System Can Provide
an Accurate Cross-Section.
Juries are required to be drawn from a cross-section
of the eligible population.10 The jury decides ultimate
questions. Prior to its decision the jury is intensively ed
ucated with facts and law. But the jury’s verdict can
be accurate only to the degree that the jury itself is
not drawn from a biased source. A jury venire drawn at
random, is itself a sample of the names in the jury box.
To the degree that the names in the box represent a
cross-section of the population the jury’s verdict can be
unbiased. To the extent that the names of jurors are not
drawn from a cross-section of the population the venire
is as biased as the verdict of the jury is inclined to be.
Survey results are themselves used “as evidence in
numerous cases and in various areas of litigation.” 11
10 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); see also Glas-
ser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). “The system atic and in ten
tional exclusion . . . of a racial group, Sm ith v. Texas, 311 U.S, 128
. . . deprives the ju ry system of the broad base it was designed by
Congress to have in our dem ocratic society. I t is a departu re from the
sta tu to ry scheme. . . . The in ju ry is not lim ited to the defendant—
there is in ju ry to th e ju ry system, law as an institution, to the com
m unity a t large, and to the dem ocratic ideal reflected in th e processes
of our courts.” Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
11 “Most frequen tly in trade-m ark , trade-nam e, and un fair com pe
tition cases.” They are also em ployed in false and m isleading advertis
ing cases and in cases involving “adulterated and m isbranded foods,
drugs and cosmetics; design pa ten t infringem ent; and changes of
venue.” Sam pling techniques have been employed “in an ti- tru s t lit i
gation and public u tility ra te cases.” Barksdale, H. C., The Use of
S u rvey Research Findings as Legal Evidence, P rin te rs’ Ink Books,
P leasantville, N.Y., 1957, p. 141.
A lthough Judge Learned Hand once reg retted th a t the courts have
no Gallup poll to aid them in defining the “good m oral character”
dem anded of a candidate fo r naturalization (Repouille v. United
States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2nd circ. 1947)), Mr. Gallup had, in fact,
conducted a survey on the problem w ith w hich the court was con
cerned (Kennedy, F. R., L aw and the Courts, a C hapter in The Polls
and Public Opinion, edited by M eier and Saunders, H. W., H enry Holt
and Company, N ew York, 1949, p. 104, note 41.) The conduct of su r
veys by an agent of the court has been suggested (Ibid., p. 106).
20
The introduction into evidence of survey results
may be debatable. Questions arise regarding the relia
bility of the survey, the partisanship of the research
er, the admissibility of hearsay evidence and the prob
lem of whether to judicially notice survey results. But
the use of a survey system of jury selection poses only
problems relating to the administration of the survey
itself.
Discretionary Power in the Hands of Jury Officials
Must be Eliminated.
President Johnson in his address to the joint session
of Congress Monday, March 15,1965, stated:
“Experience has clearly shown that the existing proc-
cess of law cannot overcome systematic and ingeni
ous discrimination. No law we now have on the
books can insure the right to vote when local offi
cials are determined to deny it.”
The same may be said regarding the right to serve
on juries. But techniques may be established in a sur
vey system of jury selection to provide checks against a
racially exclusionary administration. Discretion is an en
emy of the selection of names of a cross-section of the
population.12 As Mr. Justice Black has said. .. by rea
son of the wide discretion permissible in the various
steps of the plan, it is equally capable of being applied
in such a manner as practically to proscribe any group
thought by the law’s administrators to be undesira
ble.” 13
12 Condem nation of discretion in the hands of sta te voting officials
is a t the h ea rt of two recent decisions of the Suprem e Court. See
United States v. Mississippi, ——• U.S. ------, 33 L.W.4258 (1965) and
Louisiana v. United S ta te s ,------U .S .------- , 33 L.W.4262 (1965).
is Sm ith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
21
Survey research procedures may be adopted which
eliminate the discretion of the canvasser.14 “Within the
interviewing area, reporters work from prearranged se
lection codes in determining which people to question —
they are allowed no personal choice in the matter. The
total process is designed to minimize the bias which
might be introduced either by the home office statisti
cians or the interviewer in the field.
“It serves to remove from the interviewer’s hands
the decision on where to start interviewing and whom
to question, thus reducing the possibility of bias. If in
terviewers were given a choice in this matter, human
nature might inevitably work to turn up a sample of
front-porch sitters or, in rural areas, a representative
scattering of farms without fierce looking dogs.” 10
The elimination of discretion in the hands of jury
commissioners seems essential — especially since such
discretion no longer has any value. In urban unlike rural
areas no jury commissioner’s circle of friends and knowl
edge of the community-at-large is sufficient to enable
him — by himself or with a clerk or another commis
sioner — to select the names of persons he knows for
jury service. Indeed in a pluralistic society with differ
ent cultures and subcultures a jury commissioner may
know no one in many segments of society to ask for
names. He may have no knowledge to enable him to
14 Barksdale, H. C., op. cit., pp. 17-35; see also Roper, B. W., Public
Opinion Surveys in Legal Proceedings, 51 A.B.A. Jm l. 44 (January ,
1965) com m enting on Sherm an, E. F., The Use of Public Opinion Polls
in Continuance and Venue Hearings, 50 A.B.A. Jrn l., p. 357, (A pril
1964). Fenton, J. M., op. cit., pp. 11-18. Gallup, George and Rae, S. F.,
op. cit., pp. 56-76.
15 Fenton, J. M., op. cit., p. 15. See also R. 439-40 regarding the
problem of vicious dogs.
22
find lists of persons.16 The survey system of jury selec
tion can eliminate this problem which has grown as
have our cities.
Criminal defendants ordinarily serve as challengers
of the systematic exclusion of a class from juries. But
the mass of names that must be examined and the ex
pense of that examination are often economically pro
hibitive. This difficulty of proof led the courts to sta
tistical determinations of exclusion and standards of a
prima facie case.17 Any survey system of jury exclu
sion should meet the constitutional requirement that the
procedure followed by jury commissioners — their
“course of conduct” — “not operate to discriminate in
the selection of jurors on racial grounds.” 18
Sampling techniques employed by pollsters rely on
the laws of probability. And mathematical formulae ap
plied to random drawings from jury boxes can prove
with the smallest range of error — an infinitesimal
range when compared with other techniques of proof
— not only whether or not there has been systematic
exclusion from jury rolls but also what group has been
excluded and the extent of the exclusion. This tech
nique is used later to show the extent of Negro exclu
sion in Jefferson County.
The Jury Board of Jefferson County, Alabama, em-
16 Indeed, is i t constitutionally perm issible to seek out lists of names
of persons in racial o r o ther groups to include on a “general ven ire
lis t?” A lthough Judge Rives reserved ru ling on th is question in
Collins v. W alker, 335 F.2d 417 (1964) cert. den. sub. nom. Hanchey v.
Collins, No. 407, ------ U.S. ------ , 33 L. W eek 3171 (1964) Judge Jones
sta ted th a t Negroes “perhaps” m ust be included but, apparently , not
purposefully. Cf. Sw ain v. Alabam a, ------ U.S. ------ , 33 L. W eek 423
(1965) and cases th e re cited.
17 See V.S. ex. rel. Seals v. W iman, 304 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1962).
18 A ve ry v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1953).
23
ploys the proper technique of juror selection; the fact
that it did not correctly use i t 19 should not detract
from the basic soundness of the method itself, one that
can and should be used in state and federal courts across
the land. “The courts’ machinery and processes for dis
covering truth are time-tested but they are not per
fect.” And most of our judges recognize the value of
availing themselves of all modern scientific aids in their
search for truth as soon as their reliability can be es
tablished. If the application of opinion research method
ology can contribute to the discovery of truth in the
courts of justice, it can serve no worthier purpose.” 20
Literary Digest juries do not march in step with the
trends of American life or law.
In the South the problem of jury selection is com
pounded by the problems of poverty and race.
The United States seeks to abolish class distinction
in court. Although many legal problems remain for the
poor advances have been made.21
As the federal government moved to protect the
rights of the oppressed — whether defenseless because
19 See statem ent pp. 3-7, infra.
20 Kennedy, F. R., op. cit., p. 108.
21 G riffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1958)_.v0.he righ t of the poor to a
free transc rip t); Eskridge v. W a s h in g tc A f^ I U.S. 214 (1958) (m ade
Griffin re troac tive); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (the
righ t of the poor to counsel on appeal); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963) (the righ t of poor to free transcrip t for post-conviction rem
edy); Gideon v. W ainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (the righ t of the poor
to counsel in non-capital felony cases); H arvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d
263 (1965) (the righ t of the poor to counsel in m isdem eanor cases);
See also National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, Proceedings
and In terim Report of the, W ashington, D.C. (1965); C rim inal Justice
A ct of 1964.
24
of poverty 22 or race or both—the Supreme Court moved
to insure democracy on the state level. It declared the
equal right of every man to an equal vote.23
But the exclusion of the poor and Negroes from the
administration of justice continues. And it continues in
those very institutions which are intended to protect
the rights of the minority, the weak and oppressed
against the demands of the majority, the wealthy and
powerful. As the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has
said:
“The victims of lawlessness in law enforcement are
usually those whose economic and social status af
ford little or no protective armour — the poor and
racial minorities. Members of minority races, of
course, are often prevented by discrimination in gen
eral from being anything but poor. So, while almost
every case of unlawful official violence or discrimina
tion studied by the Commission involved Negro vic
tims, it was not always clear whether the victim
suffered because of his race or because of his lowly
economic status. Indeed, racially patterned miscon
duct and that directed against persons because they
are poor and powerless are often indistinguishable.
However, brutality of both types is usually a de
privation of equal protection of the laws and of di
rect concern to the Commission.” 24
22 See Trebach, A. S., The Rationing of Justice; Constitutional
Rights and the Criminal Process, R utgers Univ. Press, New B runs
wick, N.J., 1964. F or a sem inal trea tm en t see Olshausen, George,
Rich and Poor in Civil Procedure, 11 Science and Society, No. 1
(1947).
23 Reynolds v. Sim s, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); W esberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
24 Justice, U.S. Civil R ights Comm. Rep. 1961, pp. 2-3.
25
But if the poor and Negroes served on juries, would
official oppression continue? Probably not, for juries es
tablish standards of community conduct. By wrongful
acquittals they endorse crime, 25 by proper convictions
they contain it. The Commission has noted:
“The jury is perhaps the most important instrument
of justice. For jury service is the only avenue of di
rect participation in the administration of justice
open to the ordinary citizen. Moreover the function
of the jury can be a solemn one. It is the jury, not
the judge, who must pronounce a man ‘guilty’ or
‘not guilty’ — an awesome responsibility.” 26
Although the nation has declared a war on pover
ty 27 it often seems that white southern justice has de
clared a war against the poor. And there are many poor
as Alexis de Tocqueville, in his notebook recording his journey in
the U nited S tates recounts this conversation w ith a M ontgomery,
A labam a law yer in 1832:
De Tocqueville asks, “Is it then tru e th a t the ways of the people
of A labam a are as v iolent as is said?”
A. “Yes. There is no one here b u t carries arm s under his
clothes. A t the slightest quarrel, knife or pistol comes to hand.
These things happen continually; it is a sem i-barbarous sta te of
society.”
Q. “B ut w hen a m an is k illed like that, is his assassin not
punished?”
A. “He is always brought to trial, and always acquitted by the
ju ry , unless there are greatly aggravating circum stances. I cannot
rem em ber seeing a single m an who was a little known, pay w ith
his life for such a crime. This violence has become accepted. Each
ju ro r feels th a t he m ight, on leaving the court, find him self in the
same position as the accused, and he acquits. Note th a t the ju ry
is chosen from all the free-holders, how ever sm all th e ir p roperty
m ay be. So it is the people th a t judges itself, and its prejudices
in this m atte r stand in the w ay of its good sense.”
De Tocqueville, Alexis, Journey to America, edited by J. P. Mayer,
Yale U niversity Press, New Haven, translated by George Lawrence,
1960, p. 108).
26 Justice, ibid., p. 89.
27 Economic O pportunity A ct of 1964.
26
— 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 28 poor. They are invisible,
“off the beaten track,” away from the suburbs. And it is
in the suburbs where jurors live: “. . . the very develop
ment of the American city has removed poverty from
the living emotional experience of millions upon mil
lions of middle-class Americans.” 29
The exclusion of the poor by Literary Digest jury
selection systems by key-man 30 or other biased polling
techniques is disastrous for the jury system — and for
justice. “The poor are not like everyone else. They are
a different kind of people. They think and feel differ
ently; they look upon a different America than the mid
dle class looks upon. They, and not the quietly desper
ate clerk or the harried executive, are the main victims
of this society’s tension and conflict.” 31
Michael Harrington also points out that “The mid
dle class does not understand the nature of its judg-
28 H arrington, Michael, op. cit. p. 9.
22 Ibid., p. 12.
30 See generally The Jury System, in th e Federal Courts, W est P u b
lishing Co., St. Paul, (1960). Snead, W. E., and Womack, J. E., Com
m ent: Juries — Selection of Federal Jurors — Exclusion of Economic
Class — N atural Resources Jrnl., p. 181 (Mar. 1961). “The character
of the key-m an system itself m ight give rise to an inference of dis
crim ination. If the key-m an is not acquainted w ith Negroes or la
borers it is un likely h e w ill pick them fo r the a rray (Ibid., pp. 185-6).
U nder the New Mexico D istrict key-m an system, an impossible b u r
den of proof is placed on one w ho challenges the ju ry panel o r a rray
on the ground of exclusion of an economic class (Ibid., 186). The
prospects of successful a ttack are discouraging. The system itself in
sulates ju ry selection from attack. The righ t to have a represen tative
ju ry under these circum stances is a righ t w ithout a rem edy (Ibid.,
p. 187).
31 Ibid., p. 135. “A fter one reads the facts, e ither th e re are anger
and shame, or the re are not. And, as usual, the fate of the poor hangs
upon the decision of the better-off.” (Ibid., p. 156) See also Gallup,
George, op. cit., pp. 60-1.
27
ments. And worse, it acts upon them as if they were
universal and accepted by everyone.” 32
But any system of jury selection which fails to af
firmatively seek out jurors from all segments of society
will almost inevitably be “predominantly male, middle-
aged, middle-minded and middle class.” 33
And there is little doubt that jurors tend to vote in
accordance with their consciences — and conscience may
well be a creature of experience. What many lawyers
have known, others are now submitting to study. One 34
stated:
“In reality jury deliberations are often anything but
rational and certainly never confined solely to the
evidence . . . Figuring in deliberations were trial func
tionaries . .. the evidence . .. and nontrial matter.
Nontrial matter consisted of ‘weather,’ ‘people on the
jury or in the community,’ ‘reputation of the parties
in the case,’ ‘the famliy of the accused,’ ‘reputation of
the lawyers,’ and ‘race and racial differences.’ ” 35
* ❖ ❖
“Voting by the jurors in East Baton Rouge Parish
evidenced considerable uniformity. Among re
sponding petit jurors, associations between birth
place, previous jury service, socio-economic class,
and a vote of guilty or not guilty were significant.
. . . Individually, previous jury service and a birth-
32 Ibid., p. 125.
83 A com m ent of Mr. Justice Devlin appearing in M em orandum
subm itted by the N ational Council for Civil L iberties to the D epart
m ental Com m ittee on Ju ry Service, th e Home Office, October, 1963,
p. 2.
84 Reed, J. P., Ju ry Deliberations, V oting and Voting Trends, Vol.
45, No. 1, The Southw estern Social Science Q uarterly 361 (1965).
as Ibid., p. 364.
28
place in the Anglo-Saxon northern part of Louisiana
produced proportionally a greater number of guilty
votes than ‘fresh jurors’ (no previous jury service)
and a birthplace in the French southern part of the
state. The class based nature of the juror’s vote ap
peared in associations between occupation, educa
tion, and vote outcome. “. . . the higher the status of
the individual juror the more likely he was to vote
guilty; the lower the status of the individual juror
the more likely he was to vote not guilty.”
❖ ❖ ^
“Petit jurors also differentially treated persons
accused of a crime. Persons with high occupational
status were much more frequently held not guilty
than their low socio-economic counterparts. 38
̂ ^
“Judgment by one’s peers has been running
counter to holding the accused strictly accountable
for his offense. Among jurors whose socio-economic
status was low there were more not guilty votes for
both low-and high-status violators of the criminal
code than guilty votes. High status jurors were
fewer in number and rarely, if ever, majorities on
the juries in East Baton Rouge Parish.”
* * *
“On a national level, the long term trend in ver
dict outcomes would seem to be quite similar. In
writings by Koestler, Bok, and Martin and Swinney
the implications are that ‘jury justice’ favors the
accused. While the data are somewhat old and sparse,
they lend support to the literature which has made
the same claim for many decades.” 37
36 Ibid., pp. 365-6.
37 Ibid., p. 369.
29
The Results of Discrimination in Jury Name Selection.
In the South the results of racial discrimination are
often so apparent as to be assumed. Most of us have
come to accept that which we have always known. “We
have called the figures startling; but we do not feign
surprise because we have long known that there are
counties not only in Mississippi but in the writer’s own
home state of Alabama, in which Negroes constitute the
majority of the residents but take no part in government
either as voters or as jurors. Familiarity with such a
condition thus prevents shock, but it all the more in
creases our concern over its existence.” 38
Lynchings were for years an extra curricular activity
of the worst and best elements in the southern town. Ap
proximately 5,000 Negroes have been reported lynched
in the United States since 1859.39 The number not re
ported and consequently not known must be staggering.40
“When a lynching took place, neither local nor state
officials made any honest effort to apprehend and punish
the criminals. The police either didn’t investigate at all
38 U.S. ex. rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 78-79 (1959).
39 Ginsburg, R., 100 Years of Lynchings, L ancer Books, New York,
1962, p. 253.
40 As is the num ber and w hite/N egro ratio of legal executions for
the crim e of rape. Betw een 1930 and 1963, 449 m en w ere executed
for rape; 45 (10%) w ere white, 402 (89.6%) w ere Negroes, 2 w ere
Indians. Of these executions the 11 states of th e Old Confederacy
accounted fo r 393 (87%) of the total; two arose in federal courts and
the rem ainder in border and adjoining states. Negroes fared better
w ith m urder. Of a national to ta l of 3315 executions for m urder only
1625 (49%) w ere Negroes. Executions, N ational P risoner Statistics,
U.S. Dept, of Justice, B ureau of Prisons, No. 34, May 1964. For a
resum e of recen t civil rights killings see M axwell, Neil, The Liuzzo
Case, The W all S tree t Journal, May 4, 1965, rep rin ted here as A p
pendix C, p. 83. Since the M axwell article, O’Neal Moore, Negro
D eputy Sheriff was slain (June 2, 1965) a t Varnado, Louisiana, 7
m iles no rth of Bogalusa.
30
or reported, tongue in cheek, that they were unable to
identify anybody, though who the guilty parties were was
commonly neighborhood knowledge. Judges, attorney-
generals (sic), and governors almost never made any at
tempt to spur them into active performance of their duty.
When, for a wonder, they did, they got no co-operation
or support from the body of ‘best citizens’ in the local
community or the state; on the contrary, the ranks closed
now as always, and all investigators got was grim warn
ings to mind their own business under penalty of tar and
feathers.” 41
“Contrary to wide-spread popular belief, which the
South itself has fostered, the persistence of lynching in
the region down to the present has not been due simply
and wholly to the white-trash classes. Rather, the major
share of the responsibility in all those areas where the
practice has remained common rests squarely on the
shoulders of the master classes. The common whites have
usually done the actual execution, of course, though even
that is not an invariable rule (I have myself known uni
versity-bred men who confessed proudly to having helped
roast a Negro). But they have kept on doing it, in the last
analysis, only because their betters either consented
quietly or, more often, definitely approved.” 42
Yesterday’s lynch mob may be tomorrow’s jury. As
W. J. Cash said. “. . . the South was solidly wedded to
Negro-lynching because of the cumulative power of
habit, obviously.” 43 But more than that, he notes that
in time of stress for “best” as well as the “sorriest crack
er,” lynching was “an act of racial and patriotic expres-
41 Cash, W. J., M ind of the South, V intage Books, New York, 1941,
pp. 309-10.
42 Ibid., pp. 310-11.
42 Ibid., p. 121.
31
sion,” of “chivalry,” an act of “ritualistic value in respect
to the entire southern sentiment. . “It was not wrong
but the living bone and flesh of right.” 44
After Reconstruction — when the courts were even
tually returned to the white South — the Negro “was to
become almost open game.” Negroes and racially mav
erick white Southerners could find no justice — only
oppression — in the halls of southern justice.45
Southern justice was and is as white as the marble on
a courthouse facade.
Often this court has been forced to take judicial notice
of facts obviously true.46 This court knows the nature
and extent of racial segregation in the South — and in
Jefferson County, Alabama. Indeed the name Birming
ham provided the world a pre-Selma symbol of intransi
gence. This court also knows of the “grisly ‘Hobson’s
Choice’ ” 47 much of the South provides a Negro criminal
defendant on trial for his life.
Segregated Justice.
The county courthouse has always been a seat of pow
er in the South. Yesterday Negroes rarely went there.
When they went it was to pay taxes or purchase a license
or be a witness or be tried. Tomorrow they may go there
to vote or serve on juries or, perhaps, to work, or prac
tice law, or see a friend. But that tomorrow — like so
many of the South’s tomorrows — will never come if
segregated justice continues.
44Ibid.
« Ibid., p. 122-3. See also Ibid., 425.
46 Sometimes th a t the facts noticed are painful and an indictm ent
e ither of a society or the law yers w ith in it. See U.S. ex. rel. Goldsby
v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (1959).
« W hitus v. Balkcom, 333 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Circ. 1964).
32
Southern federal courts are themselves almost totally
white;48 Jefferson County’s courts more so.49
In Jefferson County no Negroes work for the Jury
Board (R. 136). In the Bessemer Division the names of
Negroes called for petit jury service are placed on the
bottom of the jury list (R. 397, 399). And they are segre
gated and placed on jury number 4 (R. 360-1, 394-7). The
courthouses, Birmingham and Bessemer, were segre
gated. (See R. 385-7.) The courthouse segregation policy
— drinking fountains and rest rooms — is in the hands
of the county commission (R. 399). The court noted that
there was a time when they used a “C” or some desig
nation to show who was colored or white (R. 428). The
names of jurors have been carried over from previous
lists (R. 156). Voter lists in the county now designate
color (R. 165).
In this system of justice it should cause no wonder
ment that when a Negro served on a jury with 11 white
men (the defendant was a Negro) the whites allowed
the lone Negro juror to decide the case (R. 116).
During the trial of this case in a federal court a white
witness used the term “nair” in making his point to a
Negro attorney (R. 61-2). The solicitor himself referred
to a Negro witness as “Arthur” (R. 130). When called
48 Racial D iscrim ination in the Southern Federal Courts, Southern
Regional Council, A tlanta, 1965.
48 See Morgan, Charles, A Tim e to Speak, H arper and Row, pp.
113-122. Morgan, Charles, Integration in the Y ellow Chair, New South,
Southern Regional Council, A tlanta, Feb. 1963, p. 11. “The Deep South
rem ains tru e to its heritage. The segregation of th e m achinery of
justice, police, judges, courts and juries, rem ains. “B ut rea lly s ta
tistical evidence is unnecessary. One need only en ter a sou thern court
room to see discrim ination a t w ork.” Lester, A nthony, Justice in the
A m erican South, A m nesty In ternational, 1 M itre C ourt Buildings
Temple, London, E.C. 4., (1965) pp. 12-3.
33
to task over his pronunciation of the word Negro he re
sponded, “I can’t change my speech after 59 years.” The
court stated: “We understand.” (R. 132-3).
Although between 1960 and 1964, 145 Negroes applied
to the City-County Civil Service System for the position
of clerk-typist only 17 passed their examinations. Some
of these 17 have been certified to county officers but the
county officer need take only 1 of 3 names furnished
to him (R. 452-6). Of course the Jury Board took none.
Civil rights killings in the South increase. Convictions
are few. And when convictions occur the sentences are
wrist slaps — more an encouragement to murder than
a guarantor of order.50
All-white justice as it exists in Jefferson County and
other sections of Alabama and the South makes heroes of
killers, rallying points of men accused of heinous crimes.
Philadelphia and Jackson, Mississippi, law men and fer
tilizer salesmen, Selma and Birmingham Klansmen,
bombers, burners, and sharpshooters strike terror in the
hearts of Negro citizens seeking to free themselves from
the vestiges of slavery.
Any consideration of the systematic exclusion of Ne
groes from juries requires recognition of the totality of
the system of segregated justice.51
And the cases which consider and condemn total ex
clusion or token inclusion of Negroes on juries are le-
50 See M axwell, Neil, op. c i t , A ppendix C, and Morgan, Charles,
Look, June 29, 1965 p. ------. See also Eighteen A ffidavits from A la
bama, New South, Southern Regional Council, A tlanta, Ju n e 1964,
p. 3; Southern Bombings, New South, Southern Regional Council,
May, 1963, p. 8; Law Enforcem ent in Mississippi, a repo rt of the
Southern Regional Council, A tlanta, Ju ly 14, 1964.
51 F or an excellent contem porary review of segregated justice in
the South see Nelson, Jack, “Jim Crow Justice,” Los Angeles Times,
June 13-17, 1965, p. 1. (a series of articles).
34
gion. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)
(Negroes prohibited by statute); Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370 (1881) (No Negroes for jury service); Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883) (Negroes prohibited by
statute); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (No
Negroes called within memory); Hollins v. Oklahoma,
295 U.S. 394 (1935) (No Negroes called for jury service);
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938) (No Negroes
called for 30 years); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) (One Negro called within memory); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (Eighteen Negroes called in
7 years); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (No Negroes
called for 16 years); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463
(1947) (Three Negroes called in 30 years); Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (Twenty-one Negroes served
in 6 years); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (No
Mexicans served for 25 years); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85 (1955) (Six Negroes called in 18 years); Eubanks v.
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (One Negro served in 18
years); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964)
(One Negro served in 24 years).
Recent decisions of this court are equally strict. U.S.
ex rel Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F. 2d 71, cert, den., 361
U.S. 838 (1959); U.S. ex rel Seals v. Wiman, 304 F. 2d 53,
cert, den., 372 U.S. 924 (1963); Whitus v. Balkcom, 333
F. 2d 496, cert. den. 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
Some state appellate courts in the deep South also
have responded to the challenges of racial exclusion.52
Remedies for the Systematic Exclusion of Negroes from
Jury Service.
In almost every instance the burden of challenging
52 See A llen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964) w here
the rig h t to challenge was extended to a w hite civil rights w orker.
See also H arper v . M ississipp i,------M iss .------- 171 So.2d 129 (1965).
35
the systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries has fallen
to the shoulders of criminal defendants. Neither trial
courts on their own motion, appellate courts with super
visory power, prosecuting attorneys, nor the legal arms
of state and federal government have moved to guaran
tee that the clear mandate of the constitution will be car
ried out at the local level. Since the usual challenge of
exclusion involves a single criminal case the system of
exclusion continues.53
The law has been clear for 85 years but “. . . the prob
lem of racial exclusion from jury service is relatively
widespread and, in certain areas, deeply entrenched. The
serious and continuing nature of the problem is revealed
by the frequency of cases in which the issue of jury ex
clusion is raised and by local situations which the facts
in those cases disclosed; by the plain statements of judges
and official observers; and by various field studies con
ducted by the Commission’s staff.” 54
Other remedies are available. But the criminal sanc
tions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 243 have not been enforced. Sec
tion 243 sanctions have been invoked by the Department
of Justice one time in 90 years.55
A third course is an action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.
Prior to this case Section 1983 has been invoked once.
In Brown v. Rutter56 a class suit was brought by Negroes
to enjoin the practice of excluding Negroes from jury
53 “in m any parts of the deep south, Negroes have trad itionally
been and rem ain system atically excluded from juries.” “. . . most
sou thern ju ries are still predom inantly or en tirely w hite.” Lester,
Anthony, op. cit., p. 22. See also Nelson, Jack, op. cit., generally.
54 Justice, 1961 U.S. Comm, on Civil R ights Report, p. 90.
55 Charge to G rand Ju ry —Civil Rights Act, 30 Fed. Cas. 1002 (No.
18,259) (C.C.W.D. Va. 1878); E x parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
56 139 F. Supp. 679 (D.C.W.D. Ky„ 1956).
36
service in the county. The District Court held that the
plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction. On the assur
ances of the defendants that the practice would cease,
however, the Court withheld the injunction but retained
jurisdiction over the matter in the event a showing were
made that the practice was being perpetuated.
The Section 1983 remedy was first suggested by Mr.
Justice Jackson dissenting in Cassell v. Texas.57 “I sup
pose there is no doubt,” he said, “and if there is, this
Court can dispel it, that a citizen or class of citizens un
lawfully excluded from jury service could maintain in
a Federal Court an individual or a class action for an in
junction or mandamus against the state officers respon
sible . . . .
“If the order were evaded or disobeyed, imprisonment
for contempt could follow.” 58
A fourth avenue lies in an action against Federal
Court jury officials (the Clerk and Jury Commissioner)
under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981, 1985, and
1988; 18 U.S.C. Sec. 243: 28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and
1343, 1863 (c) and 2201; and 28 U.S.C. Sections 1651 and
1861-71.59
A fifth remedy may rest in Title III of the Civil Rights
57 3 39 U.S. 282 (1950).
58 Ibid.., pp. 303-4.
69 A single class action of this natu re has been filed and is p end
ing in the U nited S tates D istrict C ourt fo r the Southern D istrict of
Mississippi; Sam uel Bailey et al., v. Loryce B. W harton, C lerk, e t al.
Civil Action No. 3674 (J) . Two class actions against sta te ju ry officials
are pending: concerning G reene County, A labama, Johnnie Coleman
et al v. M arlin Barton et al., U nited States D istrict C ourt for th e N orth
ern D istrict of A labama, Civil Action No. 63-4-W; concerning Macon
County, A labam a, W illiam P. M itchell e t al. v. Edgar Johnson, et al.,
U nited States D istrict C ourt for the Middle D istrict of A labama, Civil
Action No. ------. There is also presen tly pending in the U nited States
D istrict C ourt for the N orthern D istrict of Mississippi an action seeking
to restra in the enforcem ent, operation and execution of the Mississippi
ju ro r qualification statu tes, W illie Hazelwood et al., v. C. B. Aycock,
Civil Action N o .------.
37
Act of 1964. Although courthouses themselves are cer
tainly covered by the provisions of Title III the Depart
ment of Justice apparently questions whether or not
coverage extends to jury rooms, juror seating in court
rooms, jury lists, rolls and boxes or wheels.
In 1961 the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights found:
“The practice of excluding Negroes from juries on
account of their race still persists in a few states. The
burden of combating such racial exclusion from juries
now rests entirely on private persons — almost in
variably defendants in criminal trials.
“Only criminal remedies are available to the Federal
Government to combat unconstitutional jury exclu
sion. The Federal Government has successfully in
voked a criminal statute only once, in the late 1870’s.
“Civil actions instituted in the name of the United
States would constitute a more effective method of
preventing discriminatory exclusion from juries.” 60
The Commission then recommended “that Congress
consider the advisability of empowering the Attorney
General to bring civil proceedings to prevent the ex
clusion of persons from jury service on account of race,
color, or national origin.”01 Unless Title III is an answer
to the Commission there has been no Congressional
answer.
Congress has recognized problems of Federal juror
selection as has the Attorney General.62 In a letter to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, February 11,
1965, he stated, in part: “. . . there appears to be a serious
need for the strengthening the method of jury selection
60 Justice, op. cit., pp. 111-2. Also see Rule 6 (b) (1) F. R. Cr. Proc.
regarding challenging the a rray of grand jurors.
61 Ibid., p. 113.
62 P resen tly pending in this court are tw o F ederal ju ry selection
challenges. See Jackson v. United States, No. 21,345 and Rabinow itz
v. United States, No. 21,256.
38
in the Federal Courts. In recent years the Department
has experienced difficulties in connection with the selec
tion of jurors in certain cases.”63 The Attorney General
noted the dismissal of indictments due to the failure of
juries to be representative of a cross-section. He noted
one list of jurors had been selected from a list of regis
tered voters and women who volunteered. In another
case 90% of the trial jurors came from lists of members
of the P.T.A.
The Attorney General’s answer to the problem — one
concurred in by the Judicial Conference of the United
States and the House of Representatives — is no answer
at all. H.R. 5640, now pending in the Committee on the
Judiciary of the Senate of the United States does not seek
to standardize the selection techniques for Federal court
juries, let alone those for state courts. It merely provides
for one or more full-time jury commissioners, requires
that the names of persons selected for jury duty be re
tained for two years, and places responsibility for select
ing sources of names on the chief judge of the District
Court. In short, no change is made; this is especially true
since many chief judges presently exercise that authority.
The Negro Revolution and All-White Courts.
Courts technically rid the nation of legally enforced
segregation in public education and public life. But racial
63 Ju ry Commissions for U.S. D istrict Courts, R eport of th e Com
m ittee on the Judiciary, No. 261, p. 3. This problem is not new to the
D epartm ent. See (B ulletin) Criminal Division, Vol. 9, No. 14, pp. 1-2
(Ju ly 17, 1950); (B ulle tin ) Crim inal Division, Vol. 12, No. 9, p. 1 (June
8, 1953); U nited States A ttorneys Bulletin , Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (Jan . 6,
1956). R eprin ted in Justice, U.S. Civil Rts. Comm. Rept. 1961 at pp.
251-252.
Several com m unications regarding th e selection of ju ries and seek
ing inform ation regarding selection techniques have also been m ailed
to clerks and U nited States attorneys by the A dm inistrative Office
U.S. Courts and the D epartm ent of Justice, respectively.
39
segregation dies hard — as hard in court as in schools.
And litigation is by its nature slow, much slower than a
march from Selma to Montgomery or a few weeks on the
streets and sidewalks and in the jails of Birmingham.
The Negro revolution in the South has been remark
ably non-violent. Protected by the First, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States, The Movement petitions peacefully, assembles
and speaks to the conscience of the nation. It has been
met by brutality — the brutality of those charged with
the preservation of law and order. Thus the struggle in
the South since the 1954 Brown64 decision has not been
a struggle for law and order. It has been a struggle of
law against order — new law against a harsh, entrenched
old order.
Criticism of the Department of Justice, the Executive
and Congress has been coupled with criticism of the
courts. There is avoidance of law by white intransigents,
disillusionment with law by Negro activists. Negroes in
the South have always feared state courts. Today they
view them merely as places to avoid, or, if unavoidable,
to appeal or remove cases from. Their fear of state legal
processes is based upon experience. No government can
repeal experience. It will die hard.
Lawyers and judges know — or, at least hope — that
the conflicts of men can be best settled in court. But it
is their duty to make certain courts are open and fair —
and above suspicion. In the Deep South, courts and the
Bar65 have failed miserably but not irretrievably to per-
64 Brow n v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
66 See F rankel, M. E., The A labam a Law yer, 1954-1964; Has the
Official Organ A trophied?, 64 Col. L.R. 1243 Nov. 1964).
40
form their duties under the Constitution and to make
state courts instruments for peaceful social change rather
than repression.
Perhaps no man better knows the nature of freedom
and, at the same time, the fabric of Jefferson County, Ala
bama, than Mr. Justice Black.
In Cox v. Louisiana66 he said:
“Those who encourage minority groups to believe
that the United States Constitution and federal laws
give them a right to patrol and picket in the streets
whenever they choose, in order to advance what they
think to be a just and noble end, do no service to those
minority groups, their cause or their country . . . the
history of the past 25 years if it shows nothing else
shows that his [appellant’s] group’s constitutional
and statutory rights have to be protected by the
courts, which must be kept free from intimidation
and coercive pressures of any kind. Government un
der law and as ordained by our Constitution is too
precious, too sacred, to be jeopardized by subjecting
the courts to intimidatory practices that have been
fatal to individual liberty and minority rights wher
ever and whenever such practices have been allowed
to poison the streams of justice. I would be wholly
unwilling to join in moving this country a single
step in that direction.”67
Cox68 considered the application of a Louisiana stat
ute that forbade picketing and parading to influence
“. . . any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the
discharge of his duty” . . . in or near a courthouse. The
66
67
68
u.s.
u.s.
u.s.
33 L. Week, 4105 (1965).
33 L. W eek 4110, 4113 (1965).
33 L. W eek 4105 (1965).
41
statute was patterned after a federal statute,69 and each
Justice upheld its validity. The court split 5 to 4 on its
application. The majority stated that there is a “. . . dan
ger that some judges, jurors, and other court officials
wil be consciously or unconsciously influenced by dem
onstrations in or near their courtrooms both prior to as
well as at the time of the trial. A State may also properly
protect the judicial process from being misjudged in
the minds of the public.”70 But the majority reversed
the conviction.
Mr. Justice Black noted that the demonstration under
review was carried out:
“. .. for the express purpose of influencing court
house officials in the performance of their official
duties . . .
% %
“This statute. . . was enacted to protect courts and
court officials from the intimidation and dangers that
inhere in huge gatherings at courthouse doors and
jail doors to protest arrests and to influence court
officials in performing their duties.
* * *
“The streets are not now and never have been the
proper place to administer justice. Use of the streets
for such purposes has always proved disastrous to in
dividual liberty in the long run, whatever fleeting
benefits may have appeared to have been achieved.
And minority groups, I venture to suggest, are the
ones who always have suffered and always will suf
fer most when street multitudes are allowed to sub
stitute their pressures for the less glamorous but
«0 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1507.
70------u .S . -------, 33 L. W eek 4105, 4107 (1965).
42
more dependable and temperate processes of the law.
Experience demonstrates that it is not a far step from
what to many seems the earnest, honest, patriotic,
kind-spirited multitude of today, to the fanatical,
threatening lawless mob of tomorrow. And the
crowds that press in the streets for noble goals today
can be supplanted tomorrow by street mobs pressur
ing the courts for precisely opposite ends.”71
As recently as June 7, 1965, Mr. Justice Black again
dissenting72 noted:
“Every person who has the slightest information
about what is going on in this country can understand
the importance of these issues. The summary disposi
tion the Court makes of this case fails properly to
enlighten . . . in this field of activities which encom
passes some of the most burning, pressing, and im
portant issues of our time.”
Mr. Justice Black wanted made clear the extent to
which streets and passages and entry and exits to public
properties could be blocked in demonstrations. He felt
that “Perhaps at no time in the Nation’s history has
there been a greater need . . .”73 to clarify rights in this
field.
This is a day of demonstrations. Men and women
march for peace in the North and West, for civil rights
across the land, and to protest governmental activity as
diverse as a House Committee on Un-American Activities
hearing in Chicago and the cutting of beautiful trees in
a New York suburb. Men and women, young and old
alike, have sat-, stood-, lain-, knelt-, slept-, and taught-in.
71 ___u .S . -------, 33 L. W eek 4110, 4112-3 (1965).
72 Cameron v. Johnson ,------U .S .-------, 33 L. W eek 3395 (1965).
73 Ibid., p. 3397.
43
Perhaps out of their striking at the order — out of “dis
order” in the non-legal sense of the word — gains have
been made. To Negroes their right to a cup of coffee in
a previously all-white Jackson, Mississippi, hotel was
brewed in marches in the streets of Birmingham, the na
tion’s other cities and then Washington. To Negroes the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed in the Birmingham
jail as certainly as the Voting Rights Bill of 1965 when
passed will have been written by marching men in Selma
and Montgomery, Alabama.
No lawyer in the field of civil liberties and rights has
to my knowledge “encourage [d] minority groups to be
lieve . . . [they have] a right to patrol and picket in the
streets whenever they choose .. .”.74
The Negro revolution, although protected by the Con
stitution, has not lately waited for legal advice and plan
ning. Lawyers are called when arrests are made, in
junctions issued, or walls of troopers erected.
The march to equal protection of the law and the
emancipation of a former slave people must be re-chan
neled into the courts. But if the courts themselves stand
as enemies, as all-white citadels of power, who can ex
pect men who daily risk their lives to worry over dem
onstrations at the courthouse or the words of a nearby
lawyer or a far-away judge?
White man’s justice comes more and more into focus
in the eyes of the Negro American. With each unpunished
murder, each beating by a sheriff, each judicially uttered
racially derogatory remark, each criminal prosecution
for harassment, each trial by all-white juries, the court-
74 u .S . a t -------, 33 L. W eek a t 4113 (1965).
44
house becomes less justice’s temple, more the Negroes’
target.75
This movement has lived in the words of Thoreau:
“If the injustice is part of the necessary friction of
the machine of government, let it go, let it go. Per
chance it will wear smooth — certainly the machine
will wear out. . . . if it is of such a nature that it
requires you to be the agent of such an injustice to
another, then, I say, break the law. Let your life be
the counter-friction to stop the machine. What I have
to do is to see, at any rate, that I do not lend myself
to the wrong which I condemn.
“As for adopting the ways which the state has pro
vided for remedying the evil, I know not of such
ways. They take too much time, and a man’s life will
be gone.
* * *
“It is not my business to be petitioning the Governor
or the Legislature any more than it is theirs to pe
tition me; and if they should not hear my petition,
what should I do then? But in this case the state has
provided no way. Its very Constitution is the evil.”76
In Alabama as in much of the South it is the courts
themselves — the battleground to which we urge the
civil rights movement — that have within them the very
evil; all-white justice, Negro exclusion, Negro repression.
75 “The m an is w hite. He has m any guises: as policeman, as judge,
as ren t collector—as au tho rity m ade tangible.”
* * *
“H arlem , fo r all its brashness, fo r all the ubiquitous rhy thm s of
rock ’n roll, is afraid. And fo r good reason. The w hite has been the
Man, and in m any cases he still is.” H arrington, Michael, op. cit.,
pp. 65-66.
76 T horeau, H. D., C ivil Disobedience, F lem ing H. Revel Co., W est-
wood, N.J., 1964, pp. 28-9.
45
It is white juries and white justice the Negro strug
gles against. Can he be long expected to heed the coun
sels of the cautious? Or can demonstrations be expected
soon on the steps of the courthouse, in the halls of justice,
in the courtroom and then the jails?
The Evidence Clearly Shows That The
Jury Board Systematically Excluded
The Names Of Negroes From Jury Rolls In
Both The Birmingham And Bessemer Divisions.
Plaintiffs Proved a Prima Facie Case.
Evidence of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the
jury assembly room in the Birmingham Division and
from petit jury venires in the Bessemer Division is — in
the absence of any explanation by the Jury Board — con
clusive.77
In the Birmingham Division estimates of the number
of Negroes present in the jury assembly room ranged
from none to 12 out of panels of more than 100 persons.
Resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the Jury
Board an average of 10 per cent or less of those present
in the jury assembly room were Negroes. A lower per
centage is supported by the Record.
In the Bessemer Division, resolving all reasonable
doubts in favor of the Jury Board, an average of 5 per
cent or less of those on venires were Negroes. But there
was some testimony indicating as many as 10 per cent
of those appearing on venires were Negroes.
The number of Negroes appearing on partial panels
or petit juries in the Birmingham Division seems unim
portant in light of peremptory challenges, exclusionary
agreements by attorneys with the knowledge of the
77 See statem ent, pp. 9-14.
46
court, and the failure to call Negroes from the jury as
sembly room to the courtroom. Of course, “all persons
in active concert and participation with” the Jury Board
(R. 11) can be enjoined by the District Court.
Consequently the rarity of Negroes on partial panels
in the Birmingham Division, on venires in the Bessemer
Division, or on trial juries in either Division need not be
relied upon by plaintiffs.
Swain v. Alabama78 erects new barriers to the eradi
cation of exclusionary practices in jury selection. Because
of Swain no great reliance is placed on the absence of
Negroes from actual service on petit juries. But that ab
sence — and the absence of Negroes at every other stage
of the juror selection process — is relied upon in invoking
the rule of exclusion.79 As this court said in U.S. ex rel
Seals v. Wiman, supra, at 67:
“. . . very decided variations in proportions of Ne
groes and whites on jury lists from racial proportions
in the population, which variations are not explained
and are long continued furnish sufficient evidence of
systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service.”
Under Swain when the token participation of Negroes
on jury venires — before the exercise of peremptory chal
lenges and before exclusionary agreements take effect —
is greatly disparate from the percentage of Negroes eligi
ble for jury service (a variance of more than 10 per
centage points) a prima facie case is established.
78------ U .S .------- , 33 L. W eek 4231 (1965).
78 Norris v. A labama, 294 U .S. 587 (1935); H ernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954); U.S. ex. rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F2d 71; U.S. ex.
rel. Seals v. W iman, 304 F2d 53 (1962); W hitus v. Balkcom , 333 F2d
496 (1964). See also Cobb v. M ontgom ery L ibrary Board, 207 F. Supp.
880 (M.D. Ala., 1962); Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Circ. 1984).
47
A 10% inclusion of Negroes in the Birmingham Divi
sion (or for that matter all other inclusions that may be
gleaned from the Record) falls far short of the 27% of
the eligible population that is Negro. A 10% or less in
clusion in the Bessemer Division falls shorter still for
there 39% of the eligible population is Negro. The Swain
10 percent rule (33 L.W. at 4233) has no effect here ex
cept, perhaps, to strengthen plaintiffs’ case.
The court below seemed somewhat bewildered by the
exclusion of Negroes in the Bessemer Division. Although
it found .. that the Cut-Off [Bessemer Division] jury
rolls are made up in the same manner as the rolls in Bir
mingham,” (R. 31) the court asked, at one point:
“I believe there has only been one instance on which
there has been a Negro called on the panel in Bes
semer. Can you account for that?”
“No, sir,” the witness replied. “I can not.” (R. 292)
And at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case the court
again asked:
“There is some question in my mind about the Bes
semer Cut-off. I don’t understand why they don’t get
the same proportion of jurors, colored jurors, that
they do in Birmingham.
“Do you have any evidence on this matter?”
“Yes, Mr. Clayton I believe,” the defense attorney
replied, “I would like to hear from him.” (R. 458)
George W. Clayton, Vice Chairman of the Jury Board,
then became the only witness called by the state. He
twice testified that the same techniques were used in
selecting names in the Birmingham and Bessemer Di
visions (R. 459, 464-5). He was asked by his attorney:
48
“Do you have any explanation you can offer to the
Court as to the reason why it appears that fewer Ne
groes were called for service on the grand juries in
the Bessemer Cut-off and are called on the jury venire
in the Bessemer Cut-off than compares with the pop
ulation ratio in the Bessemer Cut-off?”
“I have served on the state grand jury many years ago
myself,” he replied, “and usually when they get them,
they get them out of the jury box.” (R. 462).
Again the court tried:
“Do you have any explanation, I don’t know, maybe
the Court has something to do with the drawing of
the grand juries.” (R. 465)
Again to no avail.
Again the court tried:
“Do you have any explanation why there would be a
discrepancy in the number of Negroes?” (R. 465-6)
Again to no avail.
Again, the court:
“The chance of getting more Negroes on a petit jury
is considerably enhanced over the grand jury?”
“They have the same drawing when they organize a
grand jury in this courthouse and the Bessemer court
house,” Mr. Clayton responded. (R. 467)
Again: “It could be in the service of process on the
men?”
“It could be,” Mr. Clayton responded. “I am not
saying what it could be, I am just saying . . . ” and he
was interrupted. (R. 467)
49
Again: “I am concerned with finding if it is the fault
of the jury board. You are the only one before us at
this time, and if there is a fault here ..
At last an answer. “If I knowed any fault or anything
we could do, I am ready, but I believe we have men in
there and they are hard to get. A lot of them don’t want
to serve on the jury.” (R. 467-8)
A moment later the court asked:
“Have you found it harder to find colored people than
it is white people?”
Mr. Clayton responded: “Some of them, they don’t
seem like — seems like more don’t know — don’t
much want to serve on the j u ry .. .”80
Finally the court asked: “Do more colored citizens ask
to get off than white?” and got a type of affirmative
answer. (R. 469-70).
But, of course, Mr. Clayton doesn’t excuse jurors from
service (R. 469) and the judge who does knew of no
racial disparity in the excusing of jurors (R. 240-4). As a
matter of fact it would be a crime for Mr. Clayton to ex
cuse someone from jury service.81 Mr. Clayton finally
testified that a higher percentage of Negroes than whites
would be disqualified for jury service (R. 474). Of
course, he did not testify as to why or as to the percentage
of disparity for he did not know literacy rates (R. 464),
nor did he or anyone else testify about crime rates, the
number of householders, free-holders, honesty, intelli
gence, sound judgment, character, integrity, habitual
drunkeness, permanent disease or physical weakness of
Negroes or whites.82 But he did know that more Negroes
80 Cf. V.S. ex. rel. Seals v. W iman, 304 F.2d 53, 65 (1962).
81 T itle 30, Sec. 48, 49, Code of A labam a 1940 (Recomp. 1958).
82 T itle 30, Sec. 21, Code of A labam a 1940 (Recomp. 1958).
50
were being called for jury duty since the filing of this
suit. (R. 475).
It was apparently on the basis of Mr. Clayton’s testi
mony — which is barely comprehensible, giving it a most
charitable interpretation — that the court felt the state
had rebutted the plaintiffs’ prima facie case.
A diligent search of the Record discloses no explana
tion of the Negro juror to Negro population variation in
the Bessemer Division. Nor was there any explanation
of the variation in the Birmingham Division. About this
the Court expressed no concern. The only way in which
the Jury Board may be absolved from responsibility for
the absence of Negroes is to presume that judges or
clerks or the sheriff excluded Negroes at some stage of
the drawing summoning or serving procedure. There is
no evidence of this. And the criminal guilt of public
officials should not be presumed.83
As this Court said in Harpole, supra, at 78:
“We cannot assume that Negroes . . . had en masse, or
in any substantial numbers, voluntarily abstained
from registering as electors and, by such action, had
rendered themselves ineligible for jury duty. If the
registration officials freely and fairly registered quali
fied Negroes as electors, that fact rested more in the
knowledge of the state. The burden was on appellee,
as the state’s representative, to refute the strong
prima facie case developed by the appellant.”
ss See 18 U.S.C. 243; also T itle 30, Sections 34-6, 48-9, 51, Code of
A labam a 1940 (Recomp. 1958). See also Clarence C. W alter Civic
League v. Board o f Public Instruction, 154 F2d 726 (5th Circ. 1946)
cited by the court below.
51
The Laws of Probability Demonstrate the Likelihood of
Exclusion.84
Grand juries in Jefferson County are empaneled four
times a year.85 The testimony regarding Negro partici
pation on grand juries is clear. Grand Juries are always
composed of 18 men.86 In the Birmingham Division in
17 years, 1948 to 1964, inclusive, there were at least 68
separate random drawings of grand jurors. In the Bes
semer Division during the same period there were at
least 68 separate random drawings of grand jurors. There
are no peremptory challenges of grand jurors, no ex
clusionary agreements, no staying behind in the jury
assembly room. They are drawn at random.87
Here the total number of names placed in jury boxes
in the Birmingham Division was 43,108;88 in the Bes
semer Division, 8,892.89
The ratio of Negroes to whites in the eligible popula
tion in the Bessemer Division is 61 to 39;90 in the Bir
mingham Division it is 73 to 27.91
The Jury Board testified that they sought ( “some
times I lean over backwards trying to get as many as I
can” (R. 295)) to include a cross-section of the popula
tion on the jury rolls (R. 277, 284, 295, 311, 459, 462-3,
465-6, 470) and they “put them in the box. We have a
84 Com putations w ere supervised by John F. K raft, Inc., a national
opinion research firm headquarte red in New York, N.Y.
85 Title 30, Sec. 72, Code of A labam a 1940 (Recomp. 1958).
86 T itle 30, Sec. 38, Code of A labam a 1940 (Recomp. 1958).
87 Idem
88 See S tatem ent, p. 13-4.
89 Idem
90 Idem
91 Idem
52
high percentage, we get a percentage in the box . . . but
we know we have got them in the box like in this other
part of the county” (R. 463). Taking the Jury Board at
its word we assume that the cross-section of the names
in the Bessemer Division box is truly a cross-section
(39% Negro) and the cross-section in the Birmingham
Division is truly a cross-section (27%) Negro.92
According to Messrs. Gallup and Rae:93
“The laws of probable error have long been known.
These laws have been tested by a great variety of ex
periments ranging from an analysis of height and
weight data to throwing dice or tossing coins many
thousands of times. They are laws which no govern
ment can repeal,”94
The laws of probability have been widely used in
many fields of study since the early speculations of Swiss
mathematician, Jakob Bernoulli,. .. “demonstrate that a
small number of cases chosen at random from among
a very large group of the same kind of cases are almost
92 It- is, of course, know n th a t the num ber of nam es in each box
declines a fte r each draw ing, declines over a period of tw o years un til
the box is refilled, and the eligible population ratios of Negroes and
w hites are based on 1960 U.S. census figures. These factors favor the
Ju ry B oard since, a fte r each draw ing of a d isproportionately h igh num
ber of nam es of w hite persons from the boxes the probability th a t the
nam es of Negroes w ill be draw n increases. Also the ratio of Negro to
to ta l population in Jefferson County has declined. A ccording to the
1940 U.S. census the to ta l Jefferson County population was 459,930 of
w hom 179,150, (39%) w ere non-w hite. A ccording to th e 1950 census
the to ta l Jefferson County population was 558,928 of w hom 208,459
(37%) w ere non-w hite.
93 Gallup, George and Rae, S. F., op. cit.
94 Ibid.., p. 69. Emphasis supplied.
53
certain to have the main characteristics of the whole
group.”95
The laws of probability operate when the number of
drawings is known, the number of names drawn is
known, and the drawings are at random. This is exactly
the case here. And there is no evidence that the judge
who drew the names excused Negroes disproportionately
or discriminated against or in favor of Negroes in the
drawing, or excusing of persons whose names were
drawn. Consequently it must be presumed that the 18
persons who served on each of four grand juries per
year represent the racial composition of the total number
of names in the box at the time of the drawing.96 In
Bessemer in only one of the 68 drawings did the name
of a Negro appear. In Birmingham in each drawing the
name of one Negro appeared, sometimes the names of
two Negroes appeared, sometimes three. (See statement,
P-9)
Bessemer Division probability computations based
upon a ratio of 61 per cent white to 39 per cent Negro
population in the box, 68 random drawings of names of
grand jurors, 18 persons per drawing, fix the odds of
drawing the name of one and only one Negro in those
17 years at less than one in a billion.
In the Birmingham Division probability computations
based upon a ratio of 73 per cent white to 27 per cent
95 G allup and Rae, op. tit., p. 57. The exam ple the authors use:
“Im agine a wooden box filled w ith 1000 black and 1000 w hite m arbles,
com pletely m ixed together.” They then provide a chart of the results
of several random draw ings of black and w hite m arbles. “Thus, it
m ay be seen, in the successive samples, there is a tendency for the
proportions d raw n in the samples to cluster around the actual p ro
portions of b lack and w hite m arbles in the box. If every m arble is
given an equal chance to be draw n, the proportion of w hite o r the
proportion of b lack in the sam ple tends to be the same as each in
the to ta l.” (Ibid., p. 58).
96 T itle 30, Section 38, Code of A labam a 1940 (Recomp. 1958).
54
Negro population in the box, 68 random drawings of
names of grand jurors, 18 persons per drawing, fixes the
chance of drawing an average of two Negroes per grand
jury in those 17 years at less than one in 20 million.
CONCLUSION
Concurring in Shepard v. Florida,97 Mr. Justice Jack-
son said:
“***I do not see, as a practical matter, how any
Negro on the jury would have dared to cause a dis
agreement or acquittal. The only chance these Ne
groes had of acquittal would have been in the cour
age and decency of some sturdy and forthright white
person of sufficient standing to face and live down
the odium among his white neighbors that such a vote,
if required, would have brought. To me, the technical
question of discrimination in the jury selection has
only theoretical importance.”98
But Mr. Justice Jackson was probably wrong in 1950.
He would certainly be wrong today. Two basic truths
emerge from the recent history of the South. First,
“sturdy and forthright white persons of sufficient stand
ing . . . ” are too few. Those that will endure “the odium”
are few indeed.99 Second, the Negro revolution has dem
onstrated that Negroes will dare “to cause a disagree
ment.” Tens of thousands have done so in the streets
and jails of the South. More important than this the mere
presence of a Negro often changes behavior, thought and
word patterns. Perhaps white jurors—much like white
men gathered in a restaurant tell Negro stories more
97 341 U .S. 50 (1951).
98 Ibid., p. 55.
99 Cf. U.S. ex. rel. Goldsby v . Harpole, op. cit.
55
softly or not at all when the Negro waiter appears—will
think and act differently when Negroes serve on juries
with them.
Proper utilization of a survey system of jury selec
tion will have far reaching effects. In Black Belt coun
ties where the Negro population ranges upward to 80%
jury lists will contain a high percentage of Negroes.
White men riding shotgun on a lonely highway will think
twice before shooting down innocent workers in the
struggle for human rights.
The Negro lawyer in the South may find his prac
tice includes the personal injury cases that now find their
way to the white lawyer on the other side of town. In
deed, the racial political cavortings of white lawyers may
become more subdued.
A moderate newspaperman may be able to editorial
ize on racial matters without fear of an all-white jury
and a libel verdict in non-racial cases.
The Negro workman may find that his broken leg
is as valuable to an insurance company or a jury as the
broken leg of the white man who works by his side.
And most importantly the hundreds and thousands
of Negro men and women who have entered guilty pleas
rather than exercise a “grisly ‘Hobson’s choice’ ” may ex
ercise their right to trial by jury.
Negro neighborhood crime rates may decline for to
Negro jurors the life and sanctity of the Negro neigh
borhood will be important.
Removal of civil rights cases from state courts will
decline for, as state courts become fair tribunals, they
will be used by Negro people.
56
The working of the Federal System will be enhanced
for by strengthening state courts—by making them fair—
the doctrine of Federalism is itself strengthened. Courts
no less than state legislatures are an instrumentality of
states rights’—or wrongs. The jury system is the bul
wark of liberty. It has been weakened in a proportion
that equals, almost exactly, the extent to which it has
been perverted by the exclusion from it of racial and
other groups. This court in the first case of its kind to
reach an appellate tribunal has an opportunity to breathe
new life into the jury system as an effective instrumen
tality of a free people.
The decision of the court below should be reversed.
Instructions regarding the use of the survey system of
jury selection should be given. An injunction should issue
from the court below to require the fair administration
of the Jefferson County jury system.
Oscar W. Adams, Jr.
1630 4th Avenue North
Birmingham, Alabama
Melvin L. Wulf
156 Fifth Avenue
New York, N. Y.
Jack Greenberg
Norman Amaker
10 Columbus Circle
New York, N. Y.
Respectfully submitted,
Orzell Billingsley, Jr.
Peter A. Hall
J. Mason Davis
Charles Morgan, Jr.
5 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
57
Certificate of Service
This is to certify that I have served a copy of the
foregoing Brief for Appellants upon the counsel of record
for Appellees, by mailing copies to them at their office
address, air mail, postage prepaid.
This . . . . day of June, 1965.
Attorney for Appellants.
58
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
O r z e l l B i l l i n g s l e y , Sr., C. H e r b e r t O l iv e r , J . S. P h i
f e r , A b r a h a m W o o d s , J r ., f o r t h e m s e l v e s , j o i n t l y a n d
s e v e r a l l y , a n d f o r a l l o t h e r s s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d ,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL ACTION
vs. NO. 10136
G e o r g e W. C l a y t o n , as President of the Jury Board of
Jefferson County, Alabama; M r s . F r e d B a t s o n , as Vice
President of the Jury Board of Jefferson County, Ala
bama; W a l t e r E. P a l m e r , as Associate Member of the
Jury Board of Jefferson County, Alabama; J a m e s F .
C h e a t w o o d , as Clerk of the Jury Board of Jefferson
County, Alabama; and each of their successors in office.
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
(Filed June 7,1962)
This matter is before the Court on application for
preliminary injunction, following a hearing during
which extensive testimony was taken.
The jurisdiction of the Court is invoked under Title
28, U.S.C.A., § 1343(3). The suit is alleged to be author
ized under Title 42, U.S.C.A. § § 1981 and 1983, and the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States. Declaratory relief is sought un
der Title 28, U.S.C.A. § 2201,
59
Plaintiffs are Negro citizens of Jefferson County,
Alabama. Plaintiff, C. Herbert Oliver, is a resident of
that part of the county known as the “Bessemer Cut-
Off.” The other plaintiffs reside in the Birmingham di
vision of the county. Defendants Clayton, Batson and
Palmer are members of the Jury Board and defendant
Cheatwood is Clerk of the Jury Board of Jefferson
County.
The action is filed on behalf of plaintiffs, as well as
on behalf of all others similarly situated, pursuant to
Rule 23(a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff Billingsley now has a civil action pending
in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County which is to be
tried when reached in proper order.
The plaintiffs charge that Negro citizens possessing
all of the qualifications of jurors and none of the dis
qualifications have been and are arbitrarily, intention
ally, and systematically excluded from jury service in
Jefferson County, Alabama, and discriminated against
in the organization of juries in said county solely on ac
count of their race or color; that since Reconstruction
days and at the present time the jury rolls of said county
contain less than five per cent of the names of the total
number of Negro males eligible for jury duty, and that
the method of the selection of names of Negroes to be
placed on the jury rolls and in the jury boxes of said
county by the defendant Board members is highly ir
regular, arbitrary and contrary to the method prescribed
by the Constitution and the laws of the State of Ala
bama and of the United States of America.
Plaintiffs pray that defendants be enjoined from fail
ing or refusing to place the names of all qualified per
sons on the jury rolls and in the jury boxes in said county
60
solely on account of their race or color, and from utiliz
ing any names presently contained in the jury boxes or
on the jury rolls for jury duty until such times as the
names of all Negroes qualified for jury duty shall have
been placed in the boxes and on the rolls.
The evidence in this case reveals that in making up
the jury rolls the Clerk of the Jury Board and his as
sistants go through the telephone directories and tax
records and make a personal survey of each precinct in
the county at least once a year. In addition to the per
sonal survey, the Clerk has yearly for many years mailed
letters to some 80 to 100 or more prominent Negro citi
zens, including ministers, requesting that they submit
the names of individuals qualified for jury service. Re
plies have been received from only about one out of
nine or ten such requests for information. A check is
made of the name submitted and those qualified are
placed on the jury rolls and ultimately in the jury box.
It appears that these letter requests are made because
of the difficulty in obtaining information from prospec
tive Negro jurors. The evidence reveals that the Clerk
and his assistants have had difficulty in obtaining in
formation from Negroes of the lower economic level and,
as above indicated, prominent Negro citizens have been
indifferent in respect to furnishing names of prospec
tive jurors.
In making the survey not every house is visited but
if the occupant is not at home -where a visit is made a
card is left by which the occupant may furnish informa
tion as to his availability for jury service. Only five per
cent of such cards have been returned from the area oc
cupied by Negroes of the lower economic level, as con
trasted to fifty per cent from whites and Negroes of
the higher economic level. In short, the evidence reveals
61
that the Board has made extra efforts to procure infor
mation with respect to prospective Negro jurors over
and above that exerted to procure like information from
prospective white jurors. The Board has not received the
same cooperation from colored citizens as it has from
white citizens, and the rank and file of the colored citi
zens do not appear to be as interested in jury service as
is the case with white citizens. The evidence reveals that
in the course of the years the Clerk has been connected
with the Board thousands of white persons have called
or come into the office to find out why they had not
been called for jury duty. During the same period, very
few Negroes had called, and only two came by the of
fice for like purpose.
The records of the Jury Board do not reveal the
racial identity of a juror. Plaintiffs content that there
should be no such identification. The evidence wholly
fails to reveal the percentage of Negro voters on the
roll, but, judging from the number called for service, the
number is substantial.
The Circuit Court in the Birmingham division is in
continuous session for the trial of jury cases, except dur
ing the summer vacation and during brief periods of
time in the spring and fall for the trial of non jury cases.
The evidence reveals that, with rare exceptions, Negro
jurors appear for duty on every panel, the number rang
ing from three or four to as many as twenty. A number
of Negro witnesses who testified stated they had been
called on one or more occasions for jury duty. Others
testified they had not been called, but, as above indi
cated, many whites were not called. Some of those who
are called for jury duty are used in the trial of cases.
The evidence discloses that at times lawyers in civil
actions, upon ascertaining that certain Negroes were on
62
the panel, would agree, that as respects to the particular
case up for trial, to avoid having to strike him, if a
Negro juror’s name was drawn, he would not be brought
from the jury assembly room. One of the Circuit Judges
testified that this practice had been abandoned several
years ago in his division of the court. The evidence does
not indicate that the practice has been indulged in where
there was a Negro lawyer or Negro party involved.
The Court does not commend this practice, if present
ly indulged in; nevertheless, these defendants are not to
be condemned for something for which they are not re
sponsible. Such matters should be addressed to the Court.
Few Negroes appear to have been called for jury
duty in the Bessemer Cut-Off. The evidence reveals that
exactly the same standards were applied by the Jury
Board in the selection of prospective jurors in the Bes
semer Cut-Off as were applied in the Birmingham divi
sion. Taking such evidence at face value, the real cause
of complaint would appear to lie with others than the
Board. There was a dearth of evidence with respect to
the matter in the Bessemer Cut-Off as compared to that
respecting the Birmingham division. Perhaps the mat
ter will be clarified upon the final hearing of this case.
The general provisions with respect to juries and the
jury commissions of the several counties of the State
are found in Title 30, § § 1 to 100, of the Code of Ala
bama, 1940. Except for certain general provisions, the
matter is largely regulated in Jefferson County by Sec
tions 196 to 228 of Title 62, Code of Alabama, 1940. In
Jefferson County the body charged with the selection
of jurors is called a “Jury Board” whereas, in other
counties it is called a “Jury Commission.” In Jefferson
County, the law requires (§ 199) the Board to obtain
the names of male citizens between the ages of 21
63
and 65. In other areas of the State a person over 65 is
not required to serve on a jury (§ 21, Title 30), but is not
mandatorily excluded. By virtue of Section 200 of Title
62, the Jury Board has “performed the duties required
of it by law when they shall have prepared a jury roll
. . . in compliance with the law consisting of the names
of qualified jurors in number equal to at least 6 per cent
of the population of the county in accordance with the
last Federal census. . . .” When the roll is made up and
the box is filled, the box is then delivered into the cus
tody of the presiding judge of the Circuit Court. Under
the general provisions of the law, the box is kept in the
office of the Probate Judge and the president of the Jury
Commission keeps one of the keys to the same (§20, Ti
tle 30). In Jefferson County, the jury box is refilled ev
ery two years, and the obtaining of information and the
selection of jurors for the rolls is a continuous process,
with a continuous purging of the same. More than 20
categories of individuals are exempt from jury duty,
based upon the nature of the employment of the indi
viduals involved ( §3 , Title 30). The qualifications of
jurors are prescribed by Section 21 of Title 30.
By virtue of Section 201 of Title 62, the Jury Board
is charged with requiring the Clerk of the Board “to scan
the registration lists, the lists returned to the Tax As
sessor, any city directory, telephone directory, and any
and every other source of information from which he
may obtain information, and to visit every precinct at
least once a year. . . . ” The Clerk stated that he did
not regularly use the registration list, since a person
could be a qualified juror without being a qualified
voter, and could be a qualified voter and not a quali
fied juror; that the registration list contained many in
dividuals over 65 years of age and individuals incapaci
tated for jury service. The voting list indicates those
64
who are colored, but do not give addresses, but only
the precinct and the address of the box where the party
is to vote.
The 1960 Census reveals that there are 120,205 white
males over 21 years of age and 51,961 non white males
residing in Jefferson County; that between the ages of
21 and 65 there are 106,409 white males and 44,864 non
white males. Roughly, the percentage is 71 white and 29
nonwhite. The jury rolls consist of 8,892 names in the
Bessemer Cut-Off, 43,837 names in the Birmingham di
vision.
The Supreme Court, in Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
403-4 (1945), has stated that “fairness in selection has
never been held to require proportional representation of
races upon a jury.” In that case it was further stated that
“the mere fact of inequality in the number (of a racial
group) selected does not in itself show discrimination. A
purpose to discriminate must be present which may be
proven by systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of
the proscribed race or by unequal application of the
law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimina
tion.”
The law does not require that racial groups be recog
nized in the composition of juries; however, their con
tinual exclusion or mere symbolic representation will
constitute discrimination.
In Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (286-287), the Court
stated:
“Jurymen should be selected as individuals, on the
basis of individual qualifications, and not as mem
bers of a race.
“We have recently written why proportional repre
sentation of races on a jury is not a constitutional
65
requisite.1 Suceintly stated, our reason was that the
Constitution requires only a fair jury selected with
out regard to race. Obviously the number of races
and nationalities appearing in the ancestry of our cit
izens would make it impossible to meet a require
ment of proportional representation. Similarly, since
there can be no exclusion of Negroes as a race and
no discrimination because of color,2 proportional
limitation is not permissible. That conclusion is com
pelled by the United States Code. Title 18, §243,3
based on §4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. While the
language of the section directs attention to the right
to serve as a juror, its command has long been recog
nized also to assure rights to an accused. Prohibiting
racial disqualification of Negroes for jury service,
this congressional enactment under the Fourteenth
Amendment, § 5,4 has been consistently sustained
and its violation held to deny a proper trial to a Negro
accused.5 Proportional racial limitation is therefore
forbidden. An accused is entitled to have charges
against him considered by a jury in the selection of
which there has been neither inclusion nor ex
clusion because of race.”
1 A kin s v. Texas, S upra (325 U.S. 398).
2 Neal v. Delaware, 103, U.S. 370; A kin s v. Texas, supra, 404.
3 “No citizen possessing all o ther qualifications w hich are or may
be prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or
p e tit ju ro r in any court of the United States, or of any S tate on ac
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and whoever,
being an officer or o ther person charged w ith any duty in the selec
tion or sum m oning of jurors, excludes or fails to summ on any citizen
fo r such cause, shall be fined not m ore than $5,000.”
4 “Section 5. The Congress shall have pow er to enforce, by ap
propria te legislation, the provisions of this article.”
5 See Neal v . Delaware, supra, 385, 386; Hill v. Texas, supra, 404
(316 U.S. 400); Fay v. N ew Y o rk supra, 284 (332 U.S. 261).
66
As observed, the Jury Board does not have posses
sion of the jury box. The possession of the box is with
the presiding judge of the Cut-Off and the presiding
judge of the Birmingham division, and as further noted,
the evidence reveals that the Cut-Off jury rolls are made
up in the same manner as the rolls in Birmingham. Of
ficers are presumed to act in good faith in discharging
their duties. Bad faith is not to be imputed. Clarence
C. Walker Civic League et al v. Board of Public In
struction, 5 Cir., 154 F. 2d 726.
From the evidence in this case, no reasonably exact
comparison can be made between the white and Negro
citizens as to the percentage of each race which is eligi
ble for jury service which might tend to indicate dis
crimination against eligible Negroes.
On the evidence and in the light of the authorities
referred to, the Court is of the opinion, acting in pur
suance of a sound discretion, that this is not a case for
the granting of a temporary injunction.
It is, therefore, ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DE
CREED by the Court, without prejudice to any final de
cree to be entered herein, that the petition for tempo
rary injunction be and the same is hereby denied, and
that the motion to dismiss be and the same is hereby
continued pending a further hearing of this action on
the merits.
Done and Ordered, this the 6 day of June, 1962.
H. H. GROOMS
DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER ON PRE-TRIAL HEARING
(Number and Title Omitted) (Filed July 20,1964)
This cause coming on to be heard on a regular pre-
67
trial hearing, and all parties being present in person
or by counsel, the following action was thereupon
taken:
1. The following pleadings and amendments were al
lowed: Complaint and answer to be filed.
2. It was agreed by all of the parties that the follow
ing are all of the issues in controversy in this
cause:
This is an action by the plaintiffs and those simi
larly situated charging discrimination in the filling of
the jury box and in the making up of the jury roll in
Jefferson County, Alabama, both in Birmingham and in
the Bessemer Cut-Off, all as more fully appears in the
complaint filed herein.
The defendants’ answer will be a general denial ex
cept as otherwise admitted pursuant to Rule 8(b).
The testimony which was taken on the hearing for
a temporary injunction will be used in lieu of the retak
ing of evidence contained in said transcript, and the
Court will hear only additional testimony not covered
by the transcript.
It is therefore ORDERED by the Court that all of
the above-named allowances and agreements be and the
same are hereby binding upon all parties in the above-
styled cause, unless this order be hereafter modified by
order of the Court.
Done this 20th day of July 1964.
H. H. GROOMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
68
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(Number and Title Omitted) (Filed December 2,1964)
On November 2, 1964, the above styled action came
on for final hearing. It was stipulated that the evidence
taken on the hearing for a temporary injunction be con
sidered by the Court on this final hearing without any
retaking of the same. Additional evidence was heard.
The Court finds from the evidence:
(1) That five persons are engaged in making surveys
of white communities and two in Negro communities in
Jefferson County. The Clerk of the Jury Commission
and his assistant make the surveys in the Negro com
munities.
(2) That there are in the Bessemer Cut-Off, about
which the chief complaint is here made, 29,900 males
over twenty-one and under sixty-five years of age and
that of this number 18,313, or approximately 62 per
cent, are white and 11,587, or approximately 38 per cent,
are non-white. The breakdown between Negroes and oth
er non-whites is not disclosed by the evidence.
(3) The percentage of non-whites eligible in relation
to the whites eligible under Title 30, Section 21, of the
Alabama Code is not disclosed, nor is the percentage of
the non-whites claiming exemptions under Title 30, Sec
tion 3, in relation to whites claiming exemptions shown.
The number of non-whites actually “served” with sum
monses for jury duty in relation to whites “served” is
likewise not shown by the evidence.
(4) Negroes appear regularly for jury service and
the number is never less than four. There were five on
the venire during the week of this hearing, and there
69
have been occasions when there were eight or nine on
the venire, which averages about forty-eight men.
(5) Negroes seldom sit on the trial of cases or serve
on grand juries in the Bessemer Cut-Off.
(6) In the organization of the jury week-by-week
Negro jurors are assigned to jury 4.
Once the jury box has been filled possession is sur
rendered to the presiding judge of the court. These de
fendants have nothing whatever to do with the sum
moning of jurors for duty, drawing their names from
the box, excusing them from service after they have
been summoned, assigning them to numbered juries, or
selecting those who shall serve on the grand jury or
on the trial juries. The number of peremptory challenges
in both civil and criminal cases is fixed by statute. The
exercise of such peremptory challenges rests exclusively
with the parties.
Any disparity between Negro and white jurors re
sulting from the summoning, drawing, excusing, assign
ing or selecting of jurors cannot be attributed to these
defendants.
The court does not find evidence even in the pres
ence of some disparity in numbers of those actually serv
ing which is sufficient to establish discrimination
against eligible Negroes in the formulation of the jury
roll and in the filling of the jury box.
It hardly need be said that the Court cannot grant
relief against parties not before it or grant relief in areas
over which these defendants have no jurisdiction or
right to intervene, and their actions should not be con
trolled by injunction when the right to redress appears
to lie elsewhere.
70
For its further Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law the Court here adopts the opinion filed in this
cause on June 7, 1962, and the findings of fact and con
clusions of law stated therein.
Judgment will be entered in accordance with the
foregoing.
Done and Ordered, this the 2nd day of December,
1964.
H. H. Grooms
United States District Judge
71
APPENDIX B
STATUTES RELATING TO THE OPERATION
OF THE JURY SYSTEM IN
JEFFERSON COUNTY, ALABAMA
From Title 30, Code of Alabama 1940 (Recomp. 1958)
§20. Jury roll and cards. — The jury commission
shall meet in the court house at the county seat of the
several counties annually, between the first day of Au
gust and the twentieth day of December, and shall
make in a well bound book a roll containing the name
of every male citizen living in the county who possessed
the qualifications herein prescribed and who is not ex
empted by law from serving on juries. The roll shall
be arranged alphabetically and by precincts in their nu
merical order and the jury commission shall cause to
be written on the roll opposite every name placed there
on the occupation, residence and place of business of
every person selected, and if the residence has a street
number it must be given. Upon the completion of the
roll the jury commission shall cause to be prepared plain
white cards all of the same size and texture and shall
have written or printed on the cards the name, occupa
tion, place of residence and place of business of the per
son whose name has been placed on the jury roll; writ
ing or printing but one person’s name, occupation, place
of residence and of business on each card. These cards
shall be placed in a substantial metal box provided with
a lock and two keys, which box shall be kept in a safe
or vault in the office of the probate judge, and if
there be none in that office, the jury commission shall
deposit it in any safe or vault in the court house to be
designated on the minutes of the commission; and one
of said keys thereof shall be kept by the president of
72
the jury commission. The other of said keys shall be
kept by a judge of a court of record having juries, other
than the probate or circuit court, and in counties having
no such court then by the judge of the circuit court,
for the sole use of the judges of the courts of said county
needing jurors. The jury roll shall be kept securely
and for the use of the jury commission exclusively. It
shall not be inspected by anyone except the members of
the commission or by the clerk of the commission upon
the authority of the commission, unless under an order
of the judge of the circuit court or other court of rec
ord having jurisdiction. (1939, p. 86; 1945, p. 496, appvd.
July 7,1945.)
§21. Qualifications of persons on jury roll. — The
jury commission shall place on the jury roll and in the
jury box the names of all male citizens of the county
who are generally reputed to be honest and intelligent
men and are esteemed in the community for their in
tegrity, good character and sound judgment; but no per
son must be selected who is under twenty-one or who
is an habitual drunkard, or who, being afflicted with a
permanent disease or physical weakness is unfit to dis
charge the duties of a juror; or cannot read English or
who has ever been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude. If a person cannot read English and
has all the other qualifications prescribed herein and is
a freeholder or householder his name may be placed on
the jury roll and in the jury box. No person over the
age of sixty-five years shall be required to serve on a
jury or to remain on the panel of jurors unless he is
willing to do so. (1939, p. 86; 1943, p. 309, appvd. July
1,1943.)
§24. Duty of commission to fill jury roll; procedure;
etc. — The jury commission is charged with the duty
73
of seeing that the name of every person possessing the
qualifications prescribed in this chapter to serve as a
juror and not exempted by law from jury duty, is placed
on the jury roll and in the jury box. The jury commis
sion must not allow initials only to be used for a juror’s
name but one full Christian name or given name shall
in every case be used and in case there are two or
more persons of the same or similar name, the name by
which he is commonly distinguished from the other per
sons of the same or similar name shall also be entered
as well as his true name. The jury commission shall re
quire the clerk of the commission to scan the registra
tion lists, the lists returned to the tax assessor, any city
directories, telephone directories and any and every oth
er source of information from which he may obtain in
formation, and to visit every precinct at least once a
year to enable the jury commission to properly perform
the duties required of it by this chapter. In counties
having a population of more than one hundred and
eighteen thousand and less than three hundred thou
sand, according to the last or any subsequent federal
census, the clerk of the jury commission shall be al
lowed an amount not to exceed fifty dollars per calen
dar year to defray his expenses in the visiting of these
precincts, said sum or so much thereof as is necessary to
be paid out of the respective county treasury upon the
order of the president of the jury commission. (1939,
p. 86.)
§25. Separate rolls for courts in territorial subdi
visions. — Whenever a court requiring grand and petit
juries, or petit juries, is established for and held in a
territorial subdivision of the county, the jury commis
sion shall make and keep a separate roll and make a
separate box for that court and territorial subdivision,
on which roll and in which box only the names of jurors
74
residing in that territory shall be placed, which box
shall be kept by the clerk of said court and the key
thereof by the judge of said court, and all jurors for
that court shall be drawn by the judge of said court
as provided in this chapter from the separate jury box
provided under this section, and shall be summoned as
provided by law summoning jurors otherwise drawn. The
names of jurors whose names are required to be placed
on the roll and in the box in this section provided for,
shall not be placed on any other roll nor in any other
box nor shall any such person be authorized or required
to serve as a juror in any court outside of said terri
torial subdivision. If there is more than one court re
quiring grand and petit juries, or petit juries estab
lished for and held in such territorial subdivision of the
county, all of such courts shall procure their juries from
the box in this section provided for, and this section is
intended to apply to any division of a court that is held
in such territorial subdivision, including the probate
court. It is not the object or effect of this section to re
peal or affect any local law. (1939, p. 86.)
§30. (8616) (7248) Drawing grand and petit juries
from jurybox. — At any session of a court requiring
jurors for the next session, the judge, or where there
are more than one, then any one of the judges of the
court shall draw from the jury box in open court the
names of not less than fifty persons to supply the grand
jury for such session and petit juries for the first week
of such session of the court, or if a grand jury is not
needed for the session at least thirty persons, and as
many more persons as may be needed for jury service
in courts having more than one division for the first
week, and after each name is drawn it shall not be re
turned to the jury box, and there shall be no selection
of names, and must seal up the names thus drawn, and
75
retain possession thereof, without disclosing who are
drawn until twenty days before the first day of the
session of the court for which the jurors are to serve,
when he shall forward these names by mail, or express,
or hand the same to the clerk of the court who shall
thereupon open the package, make a list of the names
drawn, showing the day on which the jurors shall ap
pear and in what court they shall serve, and entering
opposite every name the occupation of the person, his
place of business, and of residence, and issue a venire
containing said names and information to the sheriff
who shall forthwith summon the persons named thereon
to appear and serve as jurors. (1909, p. 305.)
§33. (8619) Method of summoning jurors; returns
— The sheriff shall execute every order to summon
jurors, except as otherwise provided herein, by giv
ing personal notice to every such person, or by leav
ing a written notice at the place of his residence with
some member of his family, or some person residing in
the same house, at least two days before the day ap
pointed for the service of the juror in court, which order
must be returned to the clerk of the court when it is
sued with the proper return thereon showing the man
ner of service, by the sheriff, on or before the day
appointed for the appearance of the juror. (1909, p.
305.)
§34. (5060) (7468) (5101) (3924) (4121) (3565)
(25) Packing jury — Any sheriff or other officer having a
discretion in summoning jurors, who summons any per
son with intent to produce a result favorable to any
party having a cause in the court in which such person
is summoned, must, on conviction, be imprisoned in
the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than
five years.
76
§35. (5061) (7469) (5102) (3925) (4123) (3570)
(29) Connivance of sheriff.—Any sheriff who connives at
the commission of the offense prohibited by the preced
ing section, by any constable, bailiff, or deputy sheriff,
must, on conviction, be imprisoned in the penitentiary
for not less than two nor more than five years.
§36. (8620) Sheriff failing to summon guilty of con
tempt. — If the sheriff or any deputy shall negligently
fail to summon any person to serve as a juror whom he
is commanded to summon, he shall be held and deemed
guilty of a contempt of court, and shall be fined not
more than one hundred dollars in every case where the
person is not so served, and he may also be imprisoned
in the county jail for not more than five days. (1909,
p. 305.)
§37. (8621) Failure to summon; mistake of name not
ground for quashing. — The return of any such person
as “not found” shall be prima facie evidence of negli
gence on the part of the sheriff, or deputy making the
return and he shall be punished by the court unless the
court is reasonably satisfied from evidence pro
duced that he was not negligent. If the sheriff fails to
summon any jurors drawn, or any person summoned
fails or refuses to attend the trial, or there is any mis
take in the name of any person drawn, or summoned,
none or all of these grounds shall be sufficient to quash
the venire, or continue the cause. (1909, p. 305.)
§38. (8622) Hearing of excuses; empaneling and or
ganizing grand and petit juries. — The court shall re
quire all persons named in the venire to be called, and
shall then hear all excuses and claims of exemptions and
qualifications, and after passing upon all of the excuses
or claims, shall cause the names of all the jurors in at
tendance upon the court on that day, and who have
77
not been excused by the court, to be written on separate
slips of paper, or cards and placed in a hat or box, and
thereupon the judge of the court must, in open court,
draw from the hat or box, at sessions requiring grand
juries, the names of eighteen jurors who shall be em
paneled and sworn as the grand jury for the sessions
of the court, provided that only one grand jury is au
thorized by law for that session; but if more than one
grand jury is authorized by law for such session, then
said jurors, so empaneled, shall be the first grand
jury for said session, and any subsequent grand
jury, or grand juries for such session as is now or may
hereafter be authorized by law must be drawn, sum
moned, sworn and empaneled, as provided in this chap
ter during the said session, and the venire for same may
contain such number of names as the judge may deem
necessary. The judge must then proceed to draw from
the hat or box, the names of twelve jurors who shall
be empaneled and sworn as petit jury no. 1, and in like
manner the judge must draw and empanel and swear
petit jury no. 2, and when necessary, as many more jurors
as the judge or judges of the court may deem proper, all
of whom shall serve as petit jurors for that week, un
less discharged sooner by the court, and may be re
quired to serve till any case on trial is determined. If
petit juries are needed for any week or weeks of the
sessions, after the first week, the judge or any two
judges of said court, if there is more than one judge,
shall, in like manner at such times as to him or them
may seem best, draw from the jury box such number of
names, not less than thirty, for each of such subsequent
weeks, as will in the discretion of such judge or judges, be
sufficient for the week for which same are drawn. (1919,
p. 1039.)
§74. (8689) (7307) (5046) Defaulting juror punished
78
for contempt; proceedings. — If any person summoned
as a grand or petit juror shall fail to obey such sum
mons without good excuse, to be determined by the
court, he shall be deemed guilty of a contempt of court;
and if no sufficient excuse be rendered for him at the
time of his default, a rule shall issue to him to show
cause why he shall not be adjudged guilty of such con
tempt and punished accordingly; and if he shall fail at
the next session after the service of such notice to ren
der such excuse, he shall be fined by the court not more
than one hundred dollars, and may be imprisoned in the
county jail for not more than ten days. In courts hold
ing sessions longer than thirty days the rule shall be
made returnable twenty days after it issues, and the
person in default shall have ten days after service in
which to appear and render his excuse.
§48. (4889) Unlawfully placing in or withdrawing
names from jury box; penalty. — Any person who shall
unlawfully place in or withdraw from the jury box, any
name or names of persons, or destroy, conceal or re
move such jury box, or place on or erase from the jury
roll, the name of any person, or destroy, mutilate, con
ceal or remove such jury roll, shall be guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction, shall be sentenced to the peniten
tiary, or to hard labor for the county for not less than
six months, nor more than two years, to be fixed by the
court. (1909, p. 305.)
§49. (5070) (7478) (5098) (3921) Willful neglect of
duty by jury commissioner or officer. — Any jury com
missioner or other officer who willfully or negligently
fails to discharge any duty required of him by law in
the drawing or selecting of a juror or jury, or who
draws or selects a juror or jury in any manner or order
other than that prescribed by law, must, on conviction,
79
be fined not less than fifty nor more than one thousand
dollars.
§50. (5071) (7479) (5099) (3922) Corruptly influ
encing jury commissioner or officer.—Any person who at
tempts, otherwise than by bribery, to influence any jury
commissioner, or any other officer charged with the
execution of any duty concerning the selecting, draw
ing, summoning, impaneling, or organizing of jurors
or juries, must, on conviction, be fined not more than
one thousand dollars, and may also be imprisoned in
the county jail or sentenced to hard labor for the county
for not more than twelve months.
§51. (5072) (7480) (5100) (3923) (4766) (4093)
(543) Drawing jury unfairly; penalty.—Any person who
does an act calculated to affect the fair drawing of a jury,
and with intent to affect the same, must, on conviction,
be fined not less than two hundred, nor more than one
thousand dollars, and may also be imprisoned in the
county jail for not more than six months; and if such
person is a judge of probate, sheriff, or clerk of the cir
cuit court, or jury commissioner, or a member of a
board of revenue, or a county commissioner, his office is
thereby vacated, and must be filled as in other cases of
vacancy, on such conviction being certified to the ap
pointing power by the presiding judge or the clerk of
the court in which it is had.
§72. (8665) Grand juries; how and when empaneled.
— There shall be empaneled in every county having
less than fifty thousand population, not less than two
grand juries in every year, and when they have complet
ed their labors, in its discretion the court may permit
them to take a recess subject to the call of the judge of
80
the circuit court, or chief justice of the supreme court,
and may be reassembled at any place where the cir
cuit court of the county is to be held. In all counties hav
ing over fifty thousand population, there shall be em
paneled not less than four grand juries in every year.
(1915, p. 809.)
From Title 62, Code of Alabama 1940 (recomp. 1958)
§199. Duty to procure all names. — The jury board
shall obtain as nearly as practicable the name of every
male citizen over the age of twenty-one and under the
age of sixty-five years together with their occupation
and place of residence and place of business. (1931,
p. 455.)
§200. Where board meets; make roll, etc. — The
jury board shall meet in the court house of the county
and make in a well bound book a roll, carrying so far
as is practicable, the name of every male citizen living
in the county who possesses the qualifications herein pre
scribed and who is not exempted by law from serving
on juries. The roll shall be arranged alphabetically and
by precincts in their numerical order and the jury
roll, to take the testimony of witnesses, to require the
production of any books, papers, or documents and gen
erally to do and perform whatever acts necessary to es
tablish to their satisfaction that the said jury roll con
forms to all legal requirements. The jury board shall
have performed the duties required of it by law when
they shall have prepared a jury roll otherwise in com
pliance with law consisting of the names of qualified
jurors in number equal to at least six per cent of the
population of the county in accordance with the last fed
eral census. (1931, p. 455.)
§201. Who on jury roll; etc. — The jury board is
81
charged with the duty of seeing that the name of ev
ery person possessing the qualifications prescribed here
in to serve as a juror and not exempted by law from
jury duty, is placed on the jury roll and in the jury
box and they may summon and cause to attend before
them any person within the county and examine him on
oath touching such name, residence, occupation and
qualifications of any person residing in the county. The
jury board must not allow initials only to be used for the
juror’s name, but one full Christian name or given
name shall in every case be used and in case there are
two or more persons of the same or similar name, the
name by which he is commonly distinguished from the
other person of the same or similar name shall also be
entered as well as his true name. The jury board shall
require the clerk of the board to scan the registration
list, the lists returned to the tax assessor, any city direc
tory, telephone directory and any and every other source
of information from which he may obtain information,
and to visit every precinct at least once a year to en
able the jury board to properly perform the duties re
quired of it by law. (1931, p. 455.)
§202. When refill box. — Whenever it shall appear
to the judge of the circuit court or court of like jurisdic
tion that the jury box is so nearly exhausted as to re
quire refilling, he shall notify the jury board and the
said board shall thereupon proceed to refill the box as
herein provided. (1931, p. 455.)
§228. Excuses of jurors. — Any person summoned
for jury duty who is excused from serving as a juror
during the period of time for which he has been sum
moned to serve, may in the discretion of the judge ex
cusing him and by his written order, be required to
serve during some subsequent specified week of court.
82
If at the time of the organization of juries, it appears
that a greater number of persons are available for jury-
duty than the needs of the court require, the court may
by lot excuse such number of jurors as are not needed,
and may, in its discretion and by written order require
such excused persons to serve during some specified sub
sequent week of court. No juror who is excused pur
suant to the provisions of this section shall be entitled
to his mileage fee, and per diem fee for the day on
which he originally appears and is excused; and for his
services during the subsequent week in which he is re
quired to serve he shall receive the same fees as if he
had originally been summoned to serve during that
week. The card bearing the name of an excused juror
who has been required to serve during such subsequent
week shall not be returned to the jury box, but shall
be placed by the clerk with the cards bearing the names
of persons drawn and summoned for such subsequent
week, and thereafter dealt with the same as though
such excused juror had been originally summoned for
such subsequent week, except that no additional sum
mons need be issued to such excused juror. (1936, Ex.
Sess., p. 6.)
83
APPENDIX C
The Liuzzo Case
Chance for a Conviction in Civil Rights Slaying Is Slim
5/4/65
By N e i l A. M a x w e l l
HAYNEVILLE, Ala. — The facts in the case seem
simple. The aging Ford pulled alongside Mrs. Viola
Liuzzo’s white 1963 Oldsmobile as it sped along a dark,
lonely section of U.S. 80 and a barrage of bullets cut
her dead. A witness in her car will testify to that.
The next morning the FBI arrested four Ku Klux
Klansmen and President Johnson went on TV to name
them and denounce the acts of which they were accused.
He didn’t say they were guilty, but most listeners got
the idea.
Since then, three of the accused have been twice in
dicted — first by a Federal grand jury for depriving
Mrs. Liuzzo of her civil rights, then here at the seat of
Lowndes County on charges of murder. The fourth man
named by President Johnson was not charged, for it de
veloped that he was an FBI informer, eye-witness to the
crime.
Civil rights leaders say the evidence against the three
defendants must have been strong, because the grand
jury that indicted them for murder was all-white and
civil rights crimes are looked on with a great deal of
tolerance in these parts.
Yesterday, in the musty, high-ceilinged courtroom
of the spacious white courthouse here, the first of the
three defendants went on trial. What are the chances
that he or the two others implicated in the murder will
84
be convicted? Using the history of civil rights slayings
as a guide, they are slim indeed. Moreover, there are in
the Liuzzo case added pitfalls that convince many civil
rights experts it is highly unlikely any of the accused
will spend much time behind bars.
The President’s Statement
First, consider the elements peculiar to the Liuzzo
case.
Of most striking significance is the President’s bla
tant statement on television; it is expected to provide
the defense with excellent fodder for contending the
Klansmen can’t get an impartial trial in Lowndes Coun
ty — or anywhere else, for that matter.
“There are going to be four defendants,” declares a
Birmingham attorney who is following the cases, “the
three Klansmen and President Johnson.” If a guilty ver
dict should be returned, he explains, the defense can
claim in appeal that the matter was pre-judged by the
President. “If these cases go to the Supreme Court, part
of the ruling will have to be on what the President did.”
Just as damaging, observers insist, is the presence of
the FBI informer in the car when the killing occurred.
In many crimes, in many places, such a circumstance
might clinch a guilty verdict — but not in a civil rights
slaying in the Deep South in 1965. The fact that the in
former was there, one attorney speculates, opens the
door for the defense to paint in jurors’ minds a picture
of entrapment of the three Klansmen, with Mrs. Liuzzo
being offered as a sacrifice to make a case.
Even if that isn’t done, the lawyer continues, “the
testimony of anyone connected with the Federal Gov
ernment hasn’t been worth a hoot in the South in the
85
past. After the defense shows this witness to be a stool
pigeon as well, I don’t imagine his testimony will car
ry much weight in Lowndes County.” There is also the
possibility that the three defendants will claim that the
informer, who wasn’t charged with the crime, was the
one who actually did it, the lawyer adds.
Composition of Jury
Also working against conviction is the fact that the
jurors, as selected yesterday, all are white and presuma
bly strong segregationists, as are nearly all of the 2,000
whites who live along with the 12,000 Negroes in
Lowndes County. There was nothing legally that says
the jury had to be all white, but a Negro has never
served on a jury hearing a civil rights slaying case.
Alabama law calls for a jury roster to list the names
of “all male citizens of the county who are generally re
puted to be honest and intelligent men and are esteemed
in the community.” In the box containing 100 names
from which a jury was chosen for the first trial, there
was the name of one Negro, but he was excused at his
own request on grounds of health.
The attitude toward the crime of many white citizens
of Hayneville also argues against a conviction. The
merit of their reasoning aside, many residents here
abouts are convinced that MrSLiuzzo, an “outside agi
tator,” got what she deserved.
Whatever weight the various factors in the Liuzzo
case may bring to bear, the outcome of other civil rights
slayings suggests it would be difficult indeed for the
state to get a conviction on a lesser charge, let alone
on a murder charge.
Since the civil rights movement began its present
86
phase in 1960 with lunch-counter sit-ins, 24 persons have
been slain for reasons directly related to integration ac
tivities, according to records at the Southern Regional
Council, an Atlanta-based human rights organization. Up
to the death of Mrs. Liuzzo, here is how these cases had
been resolved:
No arrests ............................................................. 12
Arrests but no t r i a l ............................................. 6
Acquittal .......................................................... . . 1
Hung j u r y ............................................................ 1
Guilty of m u rd e r ................................................. 0
Guilty of manslaughter ..................................... 3
The closest to a murder conviction that any of these
slayings produced was the case of Byron de la Beck
with, a Mississippian who was charged with the death
of Medgar Evers, an official of the NAACP. Beckwith
had two trials, both of which ended in hung juries.
In the three cases that results in a finding of guilt,
one involved the death of a white man in which three
Negroes were sent to prison; a second involved the death
of a Negro in which two white youths were found guilty
but not sent to prison; in the third, a white man re
ceived a sentence of 10 years.
A brief review of the 24 slayings follows:
1965, THREE DEATHS
MRS. VIOLA LIUZZO — The Detroit woman went
to Selma to help in the march on Montgomery. She was
killed the day the march ended as she drove through
Lowndes County on her way to Montgomery to pick up
a second load of marchers and ferry them back to Selma.
THE REV. JAMES REEB — The Boston minister
was beaten on a Selma street and died two days later.
87
Four Selma whites were arrested and three have been
indicted on murder charges. They will come up for
trial sometime later this year.
JIMMIE LEE JACKSON — A Negro youth, he was
killed in a voter demonstration at Marion, Ala. Officials
said later that a state trooper did it. No arrest was made.
1964, SEVEN DEATHS
JAMES E. CHANEY, ANDREW GOODMAN, MI
CHAEL H. SCHWERNER — The three civil rights
workers were slain shortly after being released from
jail in Philadelphia, Miss. Later 18 whites, including the
sheriff and his chief deputy, were arrested on Federal
civil rights charges which later were thrown out. No
prosecution.
LEMUEL PENN — The Washington, D. C., edu
cator was gunned down as he drove home from a tour
of Army reserve duty at Fort Benning, Ga. Four Ku
Klux Klansmen were arrested, three indicted for mur
der, and two tried. Despite a confession by one which
implicated the others, they were acquitted.
HUBERT ORMSBY — A Mississippi Negro youth,
he was found floating in the Big Black River, clad in a
CORE T-shirt. The verdict was accidental drowning.
LOUIS ALLEN — A Mississippi youth who report
edly witnessed an earlier slaying of a Negro active in
civil rights work was slain himself. No arrest was made.
MRS. JOHNNIE MAE CHAPPELL — A Jackson
ville, Fla., Negro woman, she was shot by a white youth
from a car cruising a Negro neighborhood after demon
strations there. The white youth was convicted of man
slaughter and sentenced to 10 years.
88
1963, TEN DEATHS
ADDIE MAE COLLINS, CYNTHIA WESLEY,
CAROL ROBERTSON, DENIS McNAIR — The four
Negro girls were at Sunday School in Birmingham
when killed by an exploding bomb. No arrests.
JOHNNY ROBINSON — The Negro was killed in
rioting that followed the church bombing. No arrests
were made.
VIRGIL WARE — He was killed the same day by a
pistol-toting white lad riding with a buddy on a motor-
scooter. One of the white boys was convicted of man
slaughter, and the other pleaded guilty. After a stern
lecture, the judge sentenced them to seven months in
the county jail, but then probated the sentence and
set them free.
JOHN L. COLEY — A Birmingham Negro, he was
shot dead in rioting that followed another bombing of a
home two weeks earlier than the one at the church. No
arrests were made.
WILLIAM MOORE — A Baltimore mailman making
a lone protest march across Alabama, he was killed by
a bullet from a passing car. A white man was arrested,
but not indicted.
MEDGAR W. EVERS — Mississippi field secretary
for the NAACP, he was slain by an ambush sniper out
side his home in Jackson. Byron de la Beckwith had two
trials each ending in a hung jury.
FRED W. LINK — A Lexington, N. C., white man,
he was killed during a racial riot. Three Negroes were
tried and convicted of manslaughter. Two were sen
tenced to six months, the third to four to seven years.
89
1962, TWO DEATHS
PAUL GUIHARD, RAY GUNTER — Both white,
they were on the campus of the University of Missis
sippi at Oxford during rioting over the admission of
James Meredith. A rooftop sniper killed Mr. Guihard, a
reporter from France, and Mr. Gunter, a local TV repair
man. No arrests were made.
1961, ONE DEATH
HERBERT LEE — A Negro active in civil rights ac
tivities, he was shot by a white state legislator. The
death was ruled justifiable.
1960, ONE DEATH
MRS. MATTIE GREEN — The Ringgold, Ga., Ne
gro woman was killed when a bomb blasted her home.
No arrests were made.
It’s always possible, of course, that one or more of
the three defendants being separately tried in the Liuzzo
case could be convicted. But, as the history of civil rights
slayings in the South suggests, it must be considered un
likely.